DPI415: COMPARATIVE POLITICS IN GLOBALDPI415: COMPARATIVE POLITICS IN GLOBAL

PERSPECTIVE

Class 3: Comparative methods: Contrasts between case‐studies v. large N. approaches.

STRUCTURE

1. Recap on previous class discussion:  Comparing the causes for the lack of democratization in the Middle 

East. Shopping list of propositions: Methods and approaches for each? Methods and approaches for each?

2. Pros and cons about alternative comparative politics research designs King Keohane and Verba – Logic of scientific research design King, Keohane, and Verba Logic of scientific research design Brady and Collier, Mahoney, Munck and Snyder

3. Applied illustration: testing consociational theory Area studies/regional studies/ case studies. Illustration: contrasting / g / g

pathways in Benin v. Togo Pros and Cons? Large‐N quantitative econometric models: Illustration: 

democratization patterns worldwidedemocratization patterns worldwide Pros and Cons?

1. RECAPDemocratization in the Middle East

1. RECAP: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES

3. Many units of analysisHigh

Level of

f f labstraction 2.A few units of analysis

1.Single unit casesLow

Scope

ow

One Many

RECAP: DISCUSSION EXERCISE

You are asked to act as an independent consultant pto explain the failure of electoral democracy to develop in the Middle East.

Your client could be:  An international organization eg the UNDP, the World Bank, A government department eg the UK Foreign Office, US State dept. The non‐profit NGO eg the Soros foundation or Amnesty International The private sector seeking a risk assessment for investment eg Mobil oil

What alternative factors would you consider to be important whenanalyzing this issue and why?

Brainstorm and write down a list of factors, ranked from most to leastimportant, working in pairs for 10 minutes. We will then compare

l ti th l d id h ld l thexplanations across the class and consider how we would analyze theissue.

What method and approach would you use to analyze the evidence?

Note: The historical index of democracy is the combined Freedom House civil liberties and political rights score, 1972‐2007, standardized to 100‐pts

RECAP: THE CAUSES FOR THE LACK OF

DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST.Type Rival propositions Research methods, comparative 

framework, case selectionCultural Cultural traditions

Colonial legacies

Role of religion and religiosity 

Weak civil society

Economic Impact of oil resources, ‘resource curse’ thesis, state‐capture and rent‐seeking

Sociological Impact of socio‐economic inequality, lack of a middle class, role of education, and gender inequality 

Institutional Role of state‐structures, traditional monarchies, constitutional arrangements

IR Regional hegemonic powers/ internationalIR Regional hegemonic powers/ international pressures.

Role of international conflict

2. COMPARATIVE RESEARCH DESIGNS

Debate about the pros and cons of alternative strategies

2. DEBATE

Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba. Designing Social Inquiry 1994 (Princeton)

Logic of inference is same for qualitative and quantitative approaches, but styles of analysis are different Qualitative research uses thick description of a small number of 

cases, particular events, decision, institutions, location, regime, nation.

Quantitative research uses numerical measurement abstracting Quantitative research uses numerical measurement, abstracting from particular to testable generalizations, systematic patterns, emphasizes replicability and regularities in classes/categories

Yet both use same logic– designed to make descriptive or g g pexplanatory inferences about unobserved phenomenon on the basis of empirical information about the world.

Ideally research topics should be (i) important in the real world and also (ii) make a contribution to scientific explanationalso (ii) make a contribution to scientific explanation

POTENTIAL PROBLEMS OF CASE‐STUDY APPROACHES

King, Keohane and Verba (1994)g, ( )

Selection and omitted variable bias

Selecting on the dependent variable E.g. Lijphart Patterns of Democracy 30 ‘long‐standing 

democracies’

E.g. Skocpol social revolution in France, Russia and Chinag p ,

Too few cases reduces scientific testing  Lack of capacity to make scientific inferences and estimate 

error

CRITIQUE OF KING, KEOHANE AND VERBA

Henry Brady and David Collier Rethinking Social Inquiry y y g q y2004 (Rowman and Littlefield)

Quantitative approaches, through maximizing diverse cases,  loses contextual knowledge, 

relies upon statistical techniques unsuited to much data in p qpolitical science, and 

underestimates statistical uncertainty and error.

Value of within case causal chains process tracing and Value of within case causal chains, process tracing, and path‐dependent relationships Fruitful for generating theories, hypotheses, and concepts

Distinct approach not reduced to statistical methods

3. ILLUSTRATING THE APPROACHES

Explaining the puzzle of democratization through case studies and large‐N analysis

CONSOCIATIONAL THEORY

Figure 5.1: The core sequential steps in consociational theoryg q p y

Proportional electoral systems

Plural

societies contain distinct ethnic

communities

with low thresholds

Strengthens democratic

consolidation and reduced ethnic conflict Positive action

mechanisms for

Facilitates the

election of representatives and parties drawn from

minority iti

Community leaders have incentives to cooperate within legislatures and

coalition governments, building trust at elite

levelcommunities mechanisms for minorities: boundary

delimination, communal rolls,

and reserved seats

communities

level

Generates support for

democracy among community members

Arend Lijphart 1999. Patterns of Democracy. Yale University Press

PAIRED CASES STUDIES

Figure 1.1: West Africa by type of regime, Freedom House, 2004

MAURITANIA

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BURKINA FASO

CHAD

GAMBIA

MALI NIGER

SENEGAL

BamakoBamakoBamakoBamakoBamakoBamakoBamakoBamakoBamakoNiameyNiameyNiameyNiameyNiameyNiameyNiameyNiameyNiamey

NouakchottNouakchottNouakchottNouakchottNouakchottNouakchottNouakchottNouakchottNouakchott

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BENIN

BURKINA FASO

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

GHANA

GUINEA

GUINEA BISSAU

IVORY COAST

LIBERIA

NIGERIASIERRA LEONE TOGO

BamakoBamakoBamako

LagosLagosLagosLagosLagosLagosLagosLagosLagos

N'djamenaN'djamenaN'djamenaN'djamenaN'djamenaN'djamenaN'djamenaN'djamenaN'djamena

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CONGO

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

SAO TOME & PRINCIPE

AbidjanAbidjanAbidjanAbidjanAbidjanAbidjanAbidjanAbidjanAbidjan AccraAccraAccraAccraAccraAccraAccraAccraAccra

BanguiBanguiBanguiBanguiBanguiBanguiBanguiBanguiBanguiMalaboMalaboMalaboMalaboMalaboMalaboMalaboMalaboMalabo YaoundeYaoundeYaoundeYaoundeYaoundeYaoundeYaoundeYaoundeYaounde

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GABON

ZAIREBrazzavilleBrazzavilleBrazzavilleBrazzavilleBrazzavilleBrazzavilleBrazzavilleBrazzavilleBrazzaville

KKey

Free

Partly free

Not free

Source: Calculated from Freedom Around the World. www.freedomhouse.org

PAIRED CASES: BENIN AND TOGO7.0

South Africa

Cape Verde

6.0

5.02005

>> H

igh

Benin

S h ll

Senegal

Sao Tome & Principe

Niger

MauritiusMali

Madagascar

Lesotho

K

GhanaBotswana

4.0

eral D

emoc

racy 2

Zambia

Uganda

Tanzania

Sierra Leone

Seychelles

Nigeria

Mozambique

MalawiLiberia

Kenya

GambiaDjibouti

Congo, Republic ofComoros

Central African Republic

Burundi Burkina Faso

3.0

2.0Low

<< Li

be

TogoChad

Zimbabwe

Swaziland

Somalia

Rwanda

Mauritania

Guinea

Gabon

E t i l G i

j

Cote D'Ivoire

Congo, Democratic Republic of

Angola

7.006.005.004.003.002.001.000.00

Low <<Liberal Democracy 1970s >> High

1.0

Zimbabwe

Sudan

Equatorial Guinea

Figure 1.2: Liberal democracy in Sub‐Saharan Africa, 1970s and 2005

Note: The figures are the mean score of each country on the 7‐point Liberal Democracy scale by Freedom House.Source: Calculated from Freedom Around the World. www.freedomhouse.org

WHY THE CONTRASTS BETWEEN BENIN AND TOGO?

Individual leaders? Economic development? Natural resources?Eth i di i i ? Ethnic divisions?

Radical movements? International pressures? International pressures? Regional diffusion?

Table 1.1: Key indicators in Benin and Togo

Social and economic indicators

Area 116, 622 Sq km 56, 785 sq. km

Pop., 2003 7.9m 5.8m

GDP, 2002 $7.7bn $1.4bn

Benin Togo

GDP per capita (PPP US$), 2003 $1,115 $1,696

Life expectancy at birth, 2003 54 years 54 years

Human Development Index, 2003 0.431 0.512

Adult literacy (% of pop. 15+), 2001 33.6% 53.0%

E h i f i li i 2002 (Al i ) 787 709Ethnic fractionalization, 2002 (Alesina) .787 .709

Political indicators

Year of independence 1960 (from

France)

1960 (from

France)

Liberal Democracy Freedom House Index, 1973 7 PR/5 CL 7 PR/6 CL

7-point scale (where 1=high,7=low) (Not free) (Not free)

Liberal Democracy Freedom House Index, 2005 2 PR/ 2CL 6 PR/ 5 CL

Freedom House classification Free Not free

Control of Corruption (Kaufmann) Rank (0-100) 2004 46 15

Government effectiveness (Kaufmann) Rank (0-100)

2004

39 7

Political stability (Kaufmann) Rank (0-100) 2004 35 33

Rule of Law (Kaufmann) Rank (0-100) 2004 41 16

Voice and accountability (Kaufmann) Rank (0-100) 55 13

2004

Regulatory quality (Kaufmann) Rank (0-100) 2004 31 21

Note: See the appendix for details of these indices and sources of data.

PAIRED CASES BENIN V. TOGO

Benin adopted power‐sharing arrangements in early p p g g y1990s Check and balances

P t ti f h i ht Protection of human rights

PR elections to national parliament

Multiparty politics

Independent judiciary established

Local and municipal government

Independent media Independent media

Togo  Repressive one party regime and limitary backed dictatorship

No progress in human rights

LARGE N ANALYSIS

DATA

Classify institutions Electoral systems: PR, Combined/mixed, majoritarian Federalism v. unitary states   Type of executive (pres v. parl) Types of media systems

M d F i di t Measure democracy: Four indicators Freedom House: Liberal democracy Polity IV: Constitutional democracy Cheibub: Contested democracy Vanhanen: Participatory democracy Vanhanen: Participatory democracy

Test cross‐national time‐series evidence in 191 nations 1972‐2004 Paired historical case‐studies illustrate underlying process e.g.

Togo v. Benin Singapore v. South Korea – economic development India v Bangladesh – decentralization and local governance Ukraine v. Uzbekistan – role of the media UK v. New Zealand – electoral reform

CONTROLS FOR CS‐TS MODELS?

Log per capita GDP Colonial heritage (British) Region (Middle East)R i l diff i Regional diffusion

Ethnic fractionalization Population size Population size Area size

Figure 5.3: Levels of democracy by type of electoral system, 2000

65 67

7771

78

70

80

90

h

58

49

65

57

4250

60

70

ocra

cy >

> Hi

gh

35

25

32

20

30

40

Low

<<

Dem

o

0

10

FH Polity Vanhanen Cheibuby

Majoritarian Combined PR

Note: The standardized 100-point scales of democracy are described in Table 3.1. The four scales measure Liberal Democracy (Freedom House 2000), Constitutional Democracy (Polity IV 2000), y ( ) y ( y )Participatory Democracy (Vanhanen 2000), and Contested Democracy (Cheibub and Gandhi 2000). When tested by ANOVA, the difference between mean scores are significant (at the p=.001 level).Contemporary electoral systems are classified in 191 nations worldwide based on Appendix A inAndrew Reynolds, Ben Reilly and Andrew Ellis. 2005. Electoral System Design: The New InternationalIDEA Handbook. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. The type of electoral system was classified into three categories: Majoritarian/plurality (Single member plurality, 2nd Ballot, Block Vote, Alternative Vote, and Single Non-Transferable Vote), Proportional Representation (Party List and STV) and Combined (using more than one type of ballot insimultaneous elections for the same body).

Table 5 2: Electoral systems and democracy all societies worldwide

Liberal democracy Constitutional democracy Freedom House Polity IV

b (pcse) p b (pcse) p

Table 5.2: Electoral systems and democracy, all societies worldwide

b (pcse) p b (pcse) pINSTITUTIONAL RULES Majoritarian -2.33 (.454) *** -7.64 (.949) *** Proportional representation .904 (.619) N/s 3.85 (.561) *** Positive action strategies 4 13 ( 466) *** 11 41 ( 777) ***Positive action strategies 4.13 (.466) 11.41 (.777) CONTROLS Log GDP/Capita 13.90 (.832) *** 11.91 (1.01) *** Ex-British colony 12.35 (.962) *** 12.36 (1.36) *** Middle East -10.99 (1.16) *** -16.79 (1.40) *** Regional diffusion .632 (.036) *** .883 (.049) ***Ethnic fractionalization -8.45 (.878) *** -1.98 (1.56) N/s Population size .001 (.001) N/s .000 (.001) *** Area size .001 (.001) *** .001 (.001) *** Constant -21.96 -38.45 N. observations 4768 394668 39 6N. of countries 174 145 Adjusted R2 .487 .533 Note: Entries for Liberal Democracy, Constitutional Democracy and Participatory Democracy 100-point scales are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients (with their panel corrected standarderrors) and the significance (p) of the coefficients for the pooled time-series cross-national analysis b i d i S ’ d Th i f C d D l i i iobtained using Stata’s xtpcse command. The entries for Contested Democracy are logistic regression.

For the measures of democracy, see Chapter 2. For the classification of the type of electoral system,see Figure 5.1. The default (comparison) is mixed electoral systems. For details of all the variables,see Technical Appendix A. Significant at * the 0.10 level, ** the 0.05 level, and *** the 0.01 level.

Table 5 3: Electoral systems and democracy plural societies only Liberal democracy Constitutional democracy Freedom House Polity IV

b (pcse) p b (pcse) p INSTITUTIONAL RULES

Table 5.3: Electoral systems and democracy, plural societies only

INSTITUTIONAL RULES Majoritarian -4.27 (.625) *** -3.30 (1.16) *** Proportional representation 4.81 (.966) *** 10.68 (.915) *** Positive action strategies 424 ( 676) N/s 13 96 (1 52) ***Positive action strategies .424 (.676) N/s 13.96 (1.52) CONTROLS Log GDP/Capita 10.21 (.519) *** 7.26 (1.21) *** Ex-British colony 8.35 (.744) *** 8.20 (1.10) *** Middle East 8 39 ( 974) *** 20 72 (3 13) ***Middle East -8.39 (.974) *** -20.72 (3.13) ***Regional diffusion .739 (.027) *** 1.04 (.055) *** Ethnic fractionalization 14.97 (3.18) *** 26.51 (4.27) *** Population size -.001 (.000) *** -.001 (.001) *** Area size .001 (.001) *** .001 (.001) *** C t t 30 9 54 9Constant -30.9 -54.9N. observations 2116 1851 N. of countries 76 66 Adjusted R2 .545 .477 Note: Entries for Liberal Democracy, Constitutional Democracy and Participatory Democracy 100-

point scales are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients (with their panel corrected standardpoint scales are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients (with their panel corrected standarderrors) and the significance (p) of the coefficients for the pooled time-series cross-national analysis obtained using Stata’s xtpcse command. The entries for Contested Democracy are logistic regression.For the measures of democracy, see Chapter 2. For the classification of the type of electoral system,see Figure 5.1. The default (comparison) is mixed electoral systems. For details of all the variables,see Technical Appendix A. Significant at * the 0.10 level, ** the 0.05 level, and *** the 0.01 level.

CONCLUSIONS1. Institutional choices matter1. Institutional choices matter

Power‐sharing is associated with consolidation of democracy Robust for different types of institutions Robust for different measures of democracy Cases illustrate historical processes underlying relationship

2. Yet power‐sharing regimes relatively uncommon3. How can these arrangements be promoted more widely?g p y

Policy implications for constitutional choices and reforms. Afghan electoral reform, Sudan constitutional settlement, Nepalese 

constitution, Sri Lanka peace talks, Iraq and federalism,… Next research agenda: what causes countries to choose power‐sharing Next research agenda: what causes countries to choose power‐sharing 

agreements? The politics of institutional change 

PROS AND CONS OF EACH APPROACH?

NEXT CLASS

Nation‐states  

Newton and Van Deth Ch 1

Caramani Ch 4Caramani Ch 4