Dont Know Much About Qualia Or Do We? Justin C. Fisher
University of Arizona Dept of Philosophy March 10, 2004 Slide 2
Overview Introduction Anti-Physicalist Arguments A Parody: The
Confoundment of Man (The End) Objections and Replies Slide 3 a
priori vs a posteriori knowledge Water is the predominant local
stuff that rains from sky, flows in rivers, etc If the local stuff
that actually does all those things is H 2 O, then water is H 2 O.
Ah yes H 2 O is the local stuff that actually does all those
things. Slide 4 Various Formulations of Physicalism There is
nothing more to the world than the sorts of things and properties
that physicists study. Insofar as contingent arrangements of
objects and properties serve to make our claims true, these
arrangements are of physical objects and properties. (All
information is physical information.) (The physical truths a priori
entail all the truths.) (A minimal physical duplicate of our world
would be a complete duplicate) Slide 5 What are Qualia? Qualia are
supposed to be the properties that constitute the phenomenal
character or the what its like of conscious experience. We are
supposed to have direct knowledge of our (current) qualia. Louis
Armstrong: When you got to ask what it is, youll never get to know.
Slide 6 The Explanatory Gap (Joe Levine) No amount of physical
findings could explain the things we know about qualia. (For we
should know a priori how any plausible explanations might go, and
we have no such knowledge) ?? Slide 7 The Knowledge Argument Mary
spends her entire life in a black and white room, and there learns
all the physical info relevant to color vision. When she finally
sees color, she gains new info. So not all info is physical info.
Frank Jackson Slide 8 Rene Descartes Conceivability Arguments (1) I
can conceive of my mind existing without any body, so my mind must
be distinct from my body. Slide 9 Zombies & Spectral Inverts
Its conceivable that physically indistinguishable beings might have
different qualia so qualia must be non-physical. == Dave Chalmers
Slide 10 Common Structure P1. We have qualia. P2. We will forever
lack a priori knowledge of the relations between qualia and
ordinary physical properties. P3. Such a priori ignorance about a
property we have would pose problems for physicalism. Physicalism
cant hope to explain qualia. Physical knowledge wont yield qualia
knowledge. Zombies must be conceivable, hence possible. C. Qualia
are distinct from physical properties. Slide 11 My Strategy I will
describe a case mirroring the case of qualia, but in which it is
stipulated that the properties in question are physical ones. I
will then show that the anti-physicalist style of argument runs
into problems in this case. Delving into why these arguments would
fail in my imagined case will at least help us to understand how
these arguments are supposed to work in the case of qualia, and
perhaps it will also reveal that they fail in that case as well.
Slide 12 The Confoundment of Man ILL ENDOW THAT MORTAL FOOL WITH AN
EXTRA WAY OF KNOWING THE CURRENT STATE OF HIS VISUAL CORTEX. THAT
WILL SURELY CONFOUND HIM! Slide 13 I now know, beyond a doubt, that
I have certain properties. Ill call them schmalia I know some
things about how different schmalia are related to one another But
I know absolutely nothing about how my schmalia might be related to
the properties that I know about in more ordinary ways. Slide 14
What are these Schmalia? Are my schmalia familiar properties like
mass, or wealth, or being third in line at the marketplace? Or are
they new and mysterious properties, of a kind never before
encountered? I must seek the advice of wise men Slide 15 Joseph
Schlevine Given your ignorance of how your schmalia might possibly
be related to other things, no amount of physical information can
gain any explanatory foothold with respect to your schmalia. Even
if you found perfect correlates of schmalia you still wouldnt be
able to explain why schmalia are correlated with those properties
rather than other ones. Slide 16 Frank Schmackson Imagine that
prior to your gift from the gods, you had learned all the physical
info. Youre sure that all this physical knowledge wouldnt have
enabled you to infer the things that you now know about schmalia.
So your schmalia must be non-physical. Slide 17 David Schalmers
Given your ignorance about the relations between schmalia and other
properties, you can coherently conceive of schombies and schmalia
inverts. So schmalia must not be physical properties. Slide 18 The
Upshot The gods endowed the man with special knowledge of certain
physical properties schmalia. Close analogs of the three popular
anti-physicalist arguments would lead the man to conclude that his
schmalia are not, in fact, physical properties. Since that style of
argument would lead the man from true premises to a false
conclusion, there must be something wrong with that style of
argument. Slide 19 Possible Responses (1)To deny that the described
case is possible. (2)To point out some important disanalogy between
schmalia and qualia. The natural counter would then be to try to
remedy the disanalogy. Ultimately, both responses amount to the
same thing: denying that the schmalia case can be fixed up in such
a way that it is both (1) possible and (2) strongly analogous to
the case of qualia. Slide 20 #1. Deny that the man could have this
sort of direct knowledge of physical properties. But most
anti-physicalists say that we can have such direct knowledge, at
least of qualia. What principled reason do we have for thinking
that one couldnt have such direct knowledge of physical properties?
Slide 21 #2. Demand a story of the mechanism by which the man knows
schmalia, while being quite ignorant of their nature. Several
physicalists have offered potential stories (e.g., Loar, Millikan,
Papineau). (Anti-physicalists have no better story of the mechanism
by which we know qualia.) Slide 22 #3. Insist that direct knowledge
of physical properties would reveal them as such. But this is hard
to motivate It also gives the anti-physicalist a suspiciously easy
argument: If my qualia were physical properties Id know it. I dont
know any such thing. Hence, my qualia arent physical properties.
Slide 23 #4. Deny that the man can positively conceive of schmalia
in the way that would be needed to entail possibility. No one has a
clear account of positive conceivability! Its not clear that we can
positively conceive of qualia. Supposing we can positively conceive
of qualia in the relevant sense, its not clear what principled
reason we could have for saying that the man couldnt possibly
positively conceive of schmalia in the relevant sense. Slide 24 #5.
Deny that the man could be truly a priori ignorant of the relations
between schmalia and ordinary physical properties? (1) What else
might the man know a priori ? That schmalia play a causal role in
generating his confident beliefs and reports about schmalia? That,
if the most parsimonious theory of everything identifies schmalia
with certain physical properties, then (probably) schmalia are
identical with those physical properties? That schmalia are
properties that are related to his beliefs about schmalia in
accordance with some good naturalized theory of representation?
Slide 25 #5. Deny that the man could be truly a priori ignorant of
the relations between schmalia and ordinary physical properties?
(2) Extra a priori knowledge might help block the anti-physicalist
arguments in either case. Its more plausible that we do have such a
priori knowledge in the single case of qualia, than that one would
have to have such knowledge in any possible case of knowing
schmalia. Hence, this response invites more problems than it solves
for the anti-physicalist. Slide 26 #6. What about Chalmers
2D-argument? 1.Zombies are conceivable. 2.So, there is an
epistemically possible way that the world might turn out actually
to be, such that there are zombies in it. 3.For each epistemic
possibility, there is a corresponding genuine metaphysical
possibility. 4.Whenever a Qualia-claim is conceived as being true
of an epistemic possibility, the corresponding Qualia-claim would
be true of the corresponding genuine metaphysical possibility.
5.So, zombies are metaphysically possible. 6.So, physicalism is
false. Slide 27 (4Q) Whenever a Qualia-claim is conceived as being
true of an epistemic possibility, the corresponding Qualia-claim
would be true of the corresponding genuine metaphysical
possibility. This substantive premise is not entailed by (and may
not even be compatible with) the claim that we are quite a priori
ignorant about our qualia. Hence, one might hold that such a
premise holds in the case of qualia, but not schmalia; thereby
yielding a disanalogy between the two cases. But what exactly does
this premise mean? Slide 28 Conceivably, (4W) Whenever a
Water-claim is conceived as being true of an epistemic possibility,
the corresponding Water- claim would be true of the corresponding
genuine metaphysical possibility. The water-version of premise 4
can be shown to be false Actually, H2OH2OXYZ Possibly, XYZ H2OH2O
H2OH2O Slide 29 (4H). Whenever a Healer-claim is conceived as being
true of an epistemic possibility, the corresponding Healer-claim
would be true of the corresponding genuine metaphysical
possibility. The healer-version of premise 4 is plausibly true
Actually, Possibly, Conceivably, Slide 30 Two Models Water: for a
possible substance to be water it must be the same substance as
whatever local substance actually plays the watery role. We can
conceive that water might be some other substance, but this isnt
genuinely possible. Healer: for a possible being to be a healer, it
need only play an appropriate role; and it doesnt matter at all
what our local healers turn out to be like. Whenever we
(positively) conceive of an alien healer, there is a corresponding
genuinely possible healer. Slide 31 Which model best fits qualia?
Unlike water, we (seemingly) cant say very much a priori about the
qualia-y role that local qualia must play. At best, we can say,
whatever Q 23 is, its that property, the one Im having now. (Is
this enough?) Unlike healer, there seems to be no hope of giving a
general a priori specification of the role that any possible
property would need to play in order to count as an instance of a
given quale. At best we can say that a given quale must play the
role of feeling as it does. (But why think a given metaphysical
possibility genuinely would feel the way the corresponding
epistemic possibility is conceived as feeling?) Slide 32 (4Q)
Whenever a Qualia-claim is conceived as being true of an epistemic
possibility, the corresponding Qualia-claim would be true of the
corresponding genuine metaphysical possibility. The (Type B)
physicalist holds Actually, Conceivably, Possibly, Slide 33 (4Q)
Whenever a Qualia-claim is conceived as being true of an epistemic
possibility, the corresponding Qualia-claim would be true of the
corresponding genuine metaphysical possibility. The (Type B)
physicalist holds that a)As a matter of empirical fact, the
property I know as quale Q 23 actually is some physical property,
say P 45. b)But still it is conceivable that my quale Q 23 might
turn out to be ectoplasmic property E 67, and hence that I may have
a zombie twin who lacks Q 23. c)Corresponding to this epistemic
possibility, there is a metaphysically possible world, with a
smattering of E 67. d)But, this metaphysically possible world is
not a world in which quale Q 23 (i.e., physical property P 45 ) is
E 67. e)So premise 4 is false. Slide 34 Upshot Regarding
2D-Argument Chalmers 2D-argument requires premise 4. It may be hard
to make a plausible version of premise 4 in the case of schmalia;
hence, the 2D-argument may evade my parody. But still, premise 4 is
not obviously true, and the physicalist might plausibly deny it.
Hence, even if the 2D-argument may evade my parody, it does so by
taking on a premise that is more difficult to sustain than any in
the arguments I parodied. Slide 35 The End
