Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)

U.S. Government Nuclear Forensics

Operations

September 16, 2014

Jeffrey MorrisonProgram ManagerNational Technical Nuclear Forensics Center

The Challenge: Nuclear Terrorism is a Persistent Threat

A nuclear attack would change our way of life.

Terrorists have called for a nuclear attack on the US.

The availability of nuclear and radiological material continues to increase as nations develop the capability to produce nuclear power.

Nuclear terrorism remains an enduring risk because of its potential consequences.

“I continue to believe that nuclear terrorism remains one of the greatest threats to global security. That’s why working to prevent nuclear terrorism is going to remain one of my top national security priorities as long as I have the privilege of being President of the United States.” President Obama (NDU, 3 Dec 2012)

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IAEA Illicit Trafficking Data

Source: IAEA Incident &Trafficking Database 3

DHS’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office

DNDO was established in DHS as an interagency office in 2005 (NSPD 43/HSPD 14) and authorized by the 2006 SAFE Port Act.

– “To improve the Nation’s capability to detect and report unauthorized attempts to import, possess, store, develop, or transport nuclear or radiological material for use against the Nation, and to further enhance this capability over time.”

DNDO’s National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center was established in 2006 (NSPD 17/HSPD 4) and authorized by the 2010 Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Act (P.L. 111-140).

– “To ensure an enduring national technical nuclear forensics capability to strengthen the collective response of the United States to nuclear terrorism or other nuclear attacks.”

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Nuclear Forensics: from Deterrence to Attribution

Nuclear Defense Spectrum

All-sourceinfo fused}Technical

NuclearForensics

IntelligenceCommunity

LawEnforcement

Materials Device Debris

Trace origin of materials to help identify and close smuggling networks.

Inform national response decisions.

Disrupt follow-on event.

Support prosecution.

Enhance deterrence.

Deter-Dissuade Detect Interdict Render

Safe Post-Det Cons. Mgmt.

Secure AttributionRecovery

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U.S. Policy

“Renewing the U.S. commitment to hold fully accountable any state, terrorist group, or other non-state actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use WMD, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts.”

Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010

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Interagency Mission

DoD FBI DOE

DOS DHS ODNI

POST-DETLEAD AGENCY INVESTIGATION

PRE- TO POST- DET

INTERNATIONAL PRE-DET MATERIALS

INTELLIGENCE

ANLINL

LANLLLNL

NBLNIST

ORNLPNNL

Y-12DoD Labs

SRNLSNL

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DNDO’s Primary Interlocking Nuclear Forensics Missions

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USG Integration and Readiness

Joint planning– National Strategic Plan, Implementation Plan, Annual Review to Congress

– Executive Council, Steering Committee, Working Groups

– Nuclear Forensics Requirements Center

Joint exercising– “Snowmaggedon” in New York

– “Prominent Hunt” in Indiana

– International (“Iron Koala” & “Galaxy Serpent”)

– Attribution TTX

Joint assessments– National Academy of Sciences: “Nuclear Forensics: A Capability at Risk”

– OSTP “Nuclear Defense R&D Roadmap”

– Pipeline and Workforce studies

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DNDO’s NTNFC leads the integration of the USG interagency through joint

planning, exercising and assessments.

Signature Discovery

Improving Analysis Methods

Certified Reference Materials and Performance Testing

Pattern Recognition and Other Evaluation Tools

Technology Advancement for Materials

Other

K-25

Y-12

Trinity, Hiroshima, & Nagasaki

Major shift from weapons production to LEU production

Calutron Enrichment

HEU Production

0 2 4 6 8

1940s

0 2 4 6 8

1950s

0 2 4 6 8

1960s

0 2 4 6 8

1970s

0 2 4 6 8

1980s

0 2 4 6 8

1990s

0 2 4 6 8

2000s

0

Weapons component production, HEU recycle

1st H-bomb (Eniwetok)

New HEU purification system

LEU Production

Portsmouth

Paducah

Gas

eous

Diff

usio

n P

lant

s

LEU Production

LEU Production

HEU Production VHEU Production (Naval Reactors)

Reprocessed LEU recycle from Hanford blanket material

Period of rapidly increasing capabilities in uranium processing & fabrication

Production Capabilities Restoration Project

Production suspension & process revisions

Zr to Er

New rolling mills & heavy presses Begin work on

new processing facilities

End of all US HEU & Pu Production

Material Production Timelines

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Academic Pathway to a Nuclear Forensics Career

N a t i o n a l L a b M e n t o r i n g

UndergraduateScholarships, Summer

School

GraduateFellowships, Internships

Junior Faculty AwardsPost-doctoralFellowships

University Education Awards

Multi-Year R&D Funding

Relies on Multi-Disciplinary Expertise:

• Radiochemists• Geochemists• Analytical Chemists• Nuclear Engineers• Reactor Engineers• Process Engineers• Physicists• Nuclear Physicists• Statisticians• Metallurgists

National Nuclear Forensics Expertise Development Program

DNDO leading effort to restore the expertise pipeline – back from the brink

Provided support to over 300 students and faculty and 23 universities since 2008, in close partnership with 11 national labs

19 new PhD nuclear forensic scientists in the workforce; on track to meet near-term milestone of 35 new PhDs by 2018

Program now viewed as model – Nuclear Security Summit 2014; future IAEA collaboration

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Nuclear Forensics International Cooperation

Forum Members Focus Key Products

54 Heads-of-State (Invited)

Effective momentum to existing NF efforts

Nuclear Security Summit Work Plan, Communique

85 Partner Nations (Volunteer)

Policy: NF capabilities awareness, best practices, TTXs

NF Fundamentals Document, Iron Koala, NF Information Sharing

162 Member StatesNF guidance and training for member states

Nuclear Security Series Documents, IAEA NF Training

International scientists and law enforcement

(volunteer)

Technical forum and information exchange, analytical exercises

Comparative Lab Analysis Exercises; National NF Libraries TOR

Strengthening international collaboration is essential: Develops nuclear forensics core capabilities, shares best practices and lessons learned, and builds NF community

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Quality Assurance

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“You have to be right – and you have to be able to prove that you’re right”

Michael ChertoffFormer Secretary of Homeland SecurityNTNFC Program Review – 29 July 2013

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QA Systems in Nuclear Forensics Measurements must be scientifically and legally defensible

– ‘Daubert’ Standard Empirical testing: whether the theory or technique is falsifiable, refutable, and/or testable.

Whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication.

The known or potential error rate.

The existence and maintenance of standards and controls concerning its operation.

The degree to which the theory and technique is generally accepted by a relevant scientific community.

QA systems are used to provide a high level of confidence and reliability in nuclear forensics measurements

– ISO 17025 Accreditation

– Annual Proficiency Testing

– Annual Audits

– Certified Reference Materials

– Methodology Benchmarking Studies

– Exercises

BIPM

National Metrology Institutes:(NIST, IRMM, LNHB, NRC, NPL, PTB, etc.)

Reference Laboratory:

DOE/NBL

Measurement Laboratories: National Labs (INL, LLNL, LANL, PNL, SRNL, ORNL, etc.)

Other Nat’l/Int’l Measurement Laboratories: (AWE, IAEA, CEA,

ITU etc.)

Nuclear ForensicsMQO/QC

RequirementsFBI, NMIP, DOE/NNSA,

DoD, DHS

SRMs/CRMsIsotopics/Assay

CCQM/CCRI (Core Competencies)InterLab Comparisons

InterLaboratory ComparisonsLANL Pu ExchangeAWE U Exchange

IRMM NUSIMEP/REIMEP

CRMsMeas Eval Prog(Mass, Isotopics)

Nuclear ForensicsCertified Reference MaterialTraceability ChainANSI N42.23

Measurement Traceability & Evaluations(IRMM NUSIMEP/REIMEP Mass)

CRM Measurements

Bq, g

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Methodology Benchmarking Studies– Methodology Benchmarking Studies Designed to Establish:

– Data on the accuracy and precision of analytical methods used by different laboratories, including variation within and between laboratories.

– The most appropriate analytical methods for determining required TNF conclusions.

– A set of modern baselines and expectations for nuclear measurement performance.

– A compendium of “best practices” and “best standard operating procedures” for TNF.

– Strengths and weaknesses in measurement capability.

– Data for method validation and laboratory quality assurance.

– Uranium Methodology Benchmarking Completed in FY11

– Plutonium Methodology Benchmarking Completed in FY12

– Trace Actinides in Uranium Benchmarking Completed in FY14

– Trace Actinides in Plutonium Benchmarking Underway

Key Points Nuclear forensics supports (does not equal) attribution

Technical conclusions may be crucial to USG’s case

May help to deter the facilitators (not the terrorists themselves)

NTNF is a tightly coordinated multi-agency, cross-disciplinary mission

The expertise pipeline is rebounding – promising career path

QA is critical to ensuring defensible results

– “You have to be right – and you have to be able to prove that you’re right”

Expectation management is crucial: “Substantial capabilities exist today, but much work remains to be done in order for capabilities to match expectations.”

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