DoJ Inspector General Report: Review of FBI Interactions with CAIR, September 13, 2013

7/29/2019 DoJ Inspector General Report: Review of FBI Interactions with CAIR, September 13, 2013

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U.S. Department ofJusticeOffice of the Inspector GeneralEvaluation and Inspections Division

Review of FBI Interactions with the Council on American-

Islamic Relations September 2013

1-2012-007RREDACTED - FOR PUBLIC RELEASE


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(U) TABLE OF CONTENTS (U)

(U) BACKGROUND (U) ............................................................. .. ... .... I (U) Introduction (U) .... ......................................... ........... .................. I (U) Purpose, Scope, and Methodology of the OIG Review (U) ............ 2 (U) Background (U) ..... ......... ....................................... .................... 2

(U) The FBI's 2008 for CAIR (U) ............... ........... 4 (U) Post-2008 Media Guidance from the FBI Office of PublicAffairs Regarding Muslim Outreach (U) 9(S IINO FORN) 20 11 EC "Reiterating" the(S I INOFORN) .... .... .... .. ........................ .. .. . .... .. ........ .................. .11

(U) RESULTS OF THE REVIEW (U) ................ ....... ...... ... .................. I3 (U) Incident I: Chicago Field Office: American Islamic College Speaking Engagement (July 2010) (U) ................................................................................ 13

(U) Synopsis (U) .............................................. ...... ...................... 13 (U) Facts Leading Up to the Event (U) ......................... .. .............. . 13 (U) OIG Analysis (U) ...... ....... .. ............ ... .......... ...... ......... .......... ... 15

(U) Incident 2: New Haven Field Office: CAIR Trainers at a Diversity Training Workshop (October 20 10) (U) ........ .... ............ ... ............. ......... ........................ . 15 (U) Synopsis (U) ...... .... ... .................................. ...................... ..... 15 (U) Facts Leading Up to the Event (U) ........... ...... ........ .... ............. 15 (U) OIG Analysis (U) ... .. ....... ................... .. ..... ...... ...... .................. 19

(U) Incident 3: Chicago Field Office: DHS Quarterly Chicago Roundtable (December 20 I 0) (U) ................................................ .. ...... ..... ..... ....21

(U) Synopsis (U) .. .. .................... ......... .................. .... .......... .. .......2 1 (U) Facts Leading Up to the Event (U) .......................................... 22 (U) OIG Analysis (U) ......... ....... ................. ......... ..... ............ .... .....22

(U) Incident 4: Philadelphia Field Office: CAIR Attendance at Philadelphia CREST Training (December 20 I0) (U) ... ...... ... ............... ............... ............... .. ... ..... ..23

(U) Synopsis (U) .. ........ ....... ...... .... ..... ... ........ ....... .. ...... .... .... .. ......23 (U) Facts Leading Up to the Event (U) ...... ............... ... ...... ....... ..... 23 (U) OIG Analysis (U) ........... .. ....... .... .... .. . .... . ................ .... ... .. ........25

u.s. Department of JusticeOffice of the Inspector GeneralEvaluation and Inspections Division


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(U) Incident 5: Philadelphia Field Office:Pennsylvania Human Relations Task Force Meetings(August2011-June 2012) (U) ............................... ..... .... ... .......... ..26 (U) Synopsis (U) ........ ... .. ... .... ........................ ..... ................ .. ....... 26 (U) Facts Leading Up to the Event (U) ......... .. ...............................27 (U) OIG Analysis (U) ...... .... ... ........................ ..... .. ......... ..... .. .. ......27

(U) CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS (U) .................... .... ...29 (U) APPENDIX I: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 'S RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT (U) ... ... .. ............. ..... ................... ...32 (U) APPENDIX II : ACRONYMS (U) ................. ................................... 33 (U) APPENDIX III: CLASSIFIED SOURCE DOCUMENTS (U) ............34

U.S. Department of JusticeOffice of the Inspector GeneralEvaluation and Inspections Division


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(U) BACKGROUND (U)

(U) Introduction (U)(U) Since the summer of 2008, the Federal Bureau of Investigation(FBI) has had in place policy for its field offices that was intended tosignificantly restrict non-investigative interactions with the Council onAmerican-Islamic Relations (CAIR) , CAiR is a non-profit group whosewebsite states that it is operating in America "to enhance understandingof Islam, encourage dialogue, protect civil liberties, empower AmericanMuslims, and build coalitions that promote justice and mutualunderstanding,"' (U)(S I I NOFORN) The FBI originally established this policy in response to acriminal investigation and prosecution by the Department of Justice inwhich CAIR and other organizations were named as unindicted co-conspirators in a terrorism fmancing case. As a result of theinvestigation and that it needed aunified and coordinated sharply circumscribing FBInon-investigative CAIR, in part, to "ensure thatthe FBI is not supporting individuals who support extremist or terroristideologies." Yet, our review identified issues with the way theFBI implemented the We found that, in three of fivespecific ' resulted in a failure to coordinate asrequired by the and a number of u b s ~ s withCAIR that we inconsistent with the _(S I INOFORN)(U) 'From 2009 through 2011, the FBI's Office of Public Affairs alsosent out several guidance memoranda on the topic of Muslim outreachand the FBI's relationship with CAIR. These guidance memorandaindicated that the FBI had determined that CAIR was not an appropriatepartner for formal liaison activities. The guidance memoranda wereissued to FBI field office media coordinators and included backgroundinformation and suggested responses for anticipated questions from themedia regarding the FBI's relationship with CAiR. (U)

IU) 1 See www.CAIR.com.Accordingtoitswebsite.CAIR was established in 1994and has a national headquarters in Washington, D.C., and 28 chapter offices. These 28cbapter offices fall within the operational area of responsibility of 27 FBI field offices. (U)
http://www.cair.com.accordingtoitswebsite.cair/http://www.cair.com.accordingtoitswebsite.cair/


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(UI Purpose, Scope, and Methodology of the 010 Review (UI(U) After receiving a congressional request to review the FBI's non-investigative interactions with CAIR, the Office of the Inspector General(OIG) initiated this review in March 2012 to examine the clarity of theFBI's policy and guidance regarding interactions with CAIR and the FBIfield offices' compliance with the policy and guidance. Our reviewfocused on five specific interactions between the FBI and CAIR that welearned took place from 2010 through 2012 at three FBI field offices:New Haven, Connecticut; Chicago, Illinois; and Philadelphia,Pennsylvania. (U)(S / / NOFORN) We interviewed 15 FBI officials in the Washington, D.C.,New Haven, and Chicago Field Offices as well as FBI H ~~ o r m e r and current officials of the FBI's __ and Office of Public Affairs (OPA). 2 For our review of theincidents arising out of the Philadelphia Field Office, we requested awritten explanation as . . e-mails between thefield office, OPA, and as to the otherincident. For our review overall, we examined over 5,000 pages ofclassified and unclassified e-mails, policies, testimony, and otherdocuments. (S / /NOFORN)(U) Background (0)( S ~ 0 8 , _ developed and implemented what it termeda _ on CAIR that was designed to significantly alter howFBI field offices interacted with CAIR ~ t a t i v e s in connection withcommunity outreach activities .3 The _ addressed only non-investigative community outreach interactions and was not intended toaffect field offices' interactions with CAIR representatives with regard tocivil rights complaints or criminal investigations. (S / /NOFORN)

(UI ' S ee Appendix III. (UI


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_ In July 2008, before _ disseminated tbeOPA, which is the FBI Headquarters' unit responsible for commllnityoutreach activities, sent out "preliminary guidance for engagingorganizations such as [CAIRj and other organizations ."s Specifically withregard to CAlR, this July 2008 OPA EC "recommended and encouraged'in general terms tbat field offices implement guidelines tbat includedrefraining from participating in any CAIR -sponsored events, avoidingbeing photographed with leaders of CAIR, and not engaging witb CAIR inevents such as fundraisers . (S ((NOFORN)

In August 2008, _ began sending a series of ECs toover the next 4 months, would convey the FBI'sregarding CAIR. The ECs outlined permissible and

impennissible community outreach activities the FBI could or could notconduct witb CAIR. The ECs also stated tbat it was mandatory for fieldoffices to coordinate with.. regarding all of their interactions withCAIR representatives. (S ( ( NOFORN)(S((NOFORN) The FBI developed the in part, in lightof evidence presented in 2007 at tbe trial of the Holy Land Foundationfor Relief and Development (HLF) in United States v. Holy LandFoundation et al. (Cr. No. 3:04-240-P, N.D. Tx .), linking two knownnational CAIR leaders to Hamas, a specially designated terroristorganization . CAIR was named an unindicted .case because of its . with HLF .

(S (( NOFORN)

(U) 4 The FBI uses a standard memorandum format to communicate directives tothe field that are uploaded into the FBI 's Automated Case System . These memorandaare referred to as Electronic Communications or ECs, (U)(U) 5 OPA supports FBI operations, provides direct service to the pu blie andenhances and maintains public trust by sharing information about the FBIresponsibilities , operations, accomplishments, policies and values. OPA achieves itsmission through management of the FBI's Media Relations and Community OutreachPrograms. (U)


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ll!!!:.!QME (U)

offices on interactions with CAIR and mandatory

(S / /NOFORN) The key elements of the articulated inthe latter half of 2008 are discussed below, followed by a brief discussionof a 2011 EC that "reiterated" the _ and required that _approve any deviations from it. (S / /NOFORN)

~ O R N ) In August 2008, _ announced the FBI's __ regarding interactions with CAIR in the first of a series of ECs toal l 56 FBI field offices and to OPA. During the next 4 months, _ sentthree additional ECs about the _ and _ sent two other ECs onparticular aspects of implementing the _ (S / / NOFORN)(S/ /NOFORN) _ issued the first of the ECs on August IS, 2008 . Thesynopsis of the EC indicated that it "[pJrovide[dJ guidance to all field

(U) 6 In April 2009 , the FBI Office of Congressional Affairs WTote in response toquestions from members of Congress that "until we can resolve whether there continuesto be a relationship between CAIR or its executives with HAMAS, the FBI does not viewCAIR as an appropriate liaison partner."


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~ ~ ~ w i t h ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

The EC included two paragraphs summarizing thethen stated that the Special Agent in Charge (SAC)Di,:ector of CAIR had met on October 22, 2008, and

The EC recognized that the _ was "a significant

It stated that the field officesshould not invite CAIR to participate in FBI-sponsored events. The ECalso stated that if field offices were approached by CAIR to participate inany of the specifically listed activities, the field offices should explain thatCAlR's status required further evaluation at the national level and referlocal chapters to the CAIR national headquarters for that purpose. TheEC acknowledged that there were "many close relationships betweenvarious FBI field divisions and local CAIR chapters" and that not all localchapters were affiliated with terror:ist organizations. But the ECconcluded that "in order to stop CAIR senior leadership from exploitingany contact with the FBI . it is critical to control and limit any contact"with CAIR and "it is also critical for the relevant field divisions to contact_ . . . with any approach by CAIR." It further indicated that field

(S IINOFORN j Not quite 2 months later, on October 7,2008, _ sentan EC to all field offices that focused on annual banquets local CAIRchapters typically held in the fall. _ requested that field officesreceiving invitations to the banquets decline in writing, using the specificlanguage the _ provided in the EC. (SI INOFORNj(SIINOFORNj About 2;(, weeks later, on October 24,2008, _ sentanother EC to the field, this one focusing on what human resourcespecialists and community outreach specialists were to say to CAlRleaders during encounters at recruiting or outreach activities. Accordingto the EC, on October 2!, 2008, _ l e a r n e d that FB! human resourcerecruiters had come into contact with CAIR at

discussed the FBI's "parameters for any future interaction ." Three ofthese parameters applied to FBI human resource and communityoutreach specialists:


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1) CAIR will no longer be invited to participate in any FBlsponsoredevents and the FBI will no longer participate in any CAIRsponsoredevents .

2) CAiR is not excluded. from open forums that are not organizedjsponsored by the FBI.3) This position does not affect civil rights complaints. CAIR leaders, itsmembers or any other individual can contact any FBI field office andfile or discuss any civil rights matter at any time . These issues willbe addressed by the civil rights divisions in the appropriate fieldoffices. (SI I NOFORN)

(S/ /NOFORN) A week later, on October 3 1,2008, _ sent an EC to thefield offices and to OPA to "reiterate" the guidance in the prior three ECson interacting with CAlR, including "mandatory coordination" with ~for "all interactions with CAIR representatives." The EC began byreferencing the ECs and then provided four points of con tactin _ and who could address any questions field officeshad about the set forth in the ECs. The EC went on to state that. can have a negative impact .and that "interaction with thesp"cifically with the FBI needs to be

reiterated of activitiesWIl len the field division should refrain as stated in the August 15,

2008, EC if approached by CAlR and the requirement of coordinationwith _ regarding contacts with CAlR. (S / /NOFORN)(S/ /NOFORN) Not quite 2 weeks later, on November 12, 2008, _ sentan EC to 3 56 field offices and to OPA announcing a mandatory3-hour coordination meeting at FBI Headquarters onNovember 25.7 The EC referenced the prior communications, which had"clearly directed all field offices to deny CAIR, via it's [sic) local leadershipas well as it's [sic) national leadership, access to the FBI with respect tothe FBI field office and the FBI national community outreach initiatives."According to the EC , the coordination meeting was scheduled becausethe field offices were facing "unique challenges involving their establishedand in some cases, long-term relationships with local CAIR chapters."The EC stated that the senior manager for each field office or a high-leveldesignee must attend the meeting, either in person at the FBI's(SjjNOFORN) 7 The 31 field offices that initially received the EC were those that hadlocal CAIR chapters in their areas. However, in an additional EC dated November 20,_ stated that "all ADIes and SACs" were required to participate in the November 25meeting. (SI INOFORN)


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and stated that the meeting was being held tothe _ (SIINOFORN)

l a r l g t l " , ! ~ e in the sent

(SI F O R N ) At the November 2S meeting, the Assistant Director (AD)for _ told the to comply with theguidelines of the for CAIR. According to oneparticipant, the AD stressed that CAlR was a field office's primary pointof contact with the Muslim community, the field office must establish analternative point of contact for any future commilllity outreach activities.(SIINOFORN)

to the field offices regarding the activities they should refrain from, suchas attending CAIR-sponsored events and allowing CAIR to conductcultural sensitivity training, to participate in the FBI Citizen's Academy,or attend events. The slides further described the

(SIINOFORN) On December 4,2008, the _ followed up on themeeting with an EC to the 31 field offices with local C A I ~their districts and to OPA. The EC outlined seven steps _offered as guidance to "assist each field office in making officialnotification [of the FBI's policy] to the CAlR chapter" in the field office'sarea. The steps included scheduling a meeting with CAlR at the FBI fieldoffice (rather than in CAIR facilities) to discuss the policy, emphasizingthat the policy was FBI Headquarters driven, describing in a limited waythat CAIR's status as an unindicted co-conspirator required the FBI to"cease contact with CAIR as an organization," and encouraging the localCAIR chapter to contact CAIR national leadership to resolve the issueswith the FBI in Washington . The EC then provided two points of contact


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The the AD for _comply with the guidelines of the

within 45 days by notifying their local CAIR chaptersthat they

. 9 . ! : ! ~ ! 2 ! : ~ about

natiolnal policy and reporting back tohad done so. Field offices without local CAIR contacts were required toconfirm that notification was not necessary. (SIINOFORN)(S I INOFORN) When we asked the former AD for _ who was theDeputy Assistant Director (DAD) for _ at the t i m ~ u e dmultiple ECs over a 4-month period regarding the _ hesaid that some of the field offices were reluctant to go along with the_ initially For example, on October 27, 2008, the Los AngelesSAC sent an e-mail to his staff stating that the field office's "position isthat we will decide how our relationship is operated and maintained withCAIR barring some additional instruction from FBI Headquarters." TheSAC further stated: "Please instruct your folks at this time that they arenot to abide by the [October 24, 2008, EC from _ , but that theirdirection in regards to CAIR will from the LA Field Office fronto m c e We learned from otherSACs also were reluctant to follow the The former ADalso said that field office managers was b ~ nby _ rather than _ and "they did not like to _ Thefonner AD stated that the ECs were meant to demonstrate that it was a

rather than an issue that affected only a _(SIINOFORN)

(SIINOFORN) According to the former AD, the ECs contained "kid glove"language to make it more palatable to the field offices, who did not wantto be controlled by a perceived _ policy and were interested inprotecting their own community outreach activities with the Muslimcommunity. which they also regarded as good sources of information. Hesaid that the language in the ECs was kept fairly general because noguidance could be comprehensive enough to cover every situation thefield offices might encounter. For that reason, the 2008 ECs providedthe field offices with points of contact in _ and _ so that fieldpersonnel could obtain guidance regarding how to handle specificoutreach activities that might involve CAiR. (SIINOFORN)

(S IINOFORN) 8 He served as Assistant Director of the FBI'sfrom January to December 2010. (SIINOFORN)


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(U) Post-2008 Media Guidance from the FBI Office of Public AffairsRegarding Muslim Outreach (U)(U) According to FBI documents, in March 2009, legal counsel forCAIR wrote to the Attorney General seeking information regarding theFBI's suspension of fannal relations with CAlR. Additionally. a coalitionof Muslim American groups issued a public statement claiming that theFBI's treatment of CAIR, among other issues, disrupted attempts to growtrust between the FBI and the Muslim community. On April 28 , 2009,OPA's National Press Office issued the ftrst of ftve FBI-wide "PublicAffairs Guidance" documents disseminated to the field offices throughtheir media coordinators to provide guidance on handling media andother inquiries on the topic of Muslim outreach. (U)(U) In the background section of the guidance, OPA noted that whileboth FBI Headquarters and the fteld offices continued to have regulardiscussions with members of groups representing the Muslim Americanand Arab American communities, "the FBI has had to adjust theparameters of its relationship with CAIR." The guidance, which wasissued to FBI field office media coordinators, contained suggestedresponses to anticipated questions from the media regarding the FBI'srelationship with CAIR. The guidance also included summaries in thefonn of various questions and answers regarding the FBI's interactionswith and outreach efforts to the Muslim community. (U)(U) On July 10, 2009, OPA issued additional FBI-wide public affairsguidance on the topic of "Muslim Outreach/FBI-CAIR Relationship."Similar to the April 2009 guidance, the document contained a series of15 questions and answers with talking points related to handlinginquiries regarding matters such as the USA PATRIOT Act, FBI authorityto enter mosques, outreach efforts to Muslim community leaders, andthe basis for the FBI's suspension of "all formal contacts'" with CAIRfollowing the Holy Land case. The guidance specifically stated that, untilthe FBI could determine whether there continued to be a connectionbetween CAIR or its executives and Hamas, "the FBI does not view CAIRas an appropriate liaison partner'" for non-investigative activities. (U)(U) On January 22, 2010, OPA issued "updated guidance" on handlinginquiries on the topic of Muslim outreach. In that document, field officeswere provided a "Press Response'" that included the following language:

Our outreach efforts range from formal national-level relationships withestablished groups, to local multi-cultural advisory boards, CitizenAcademies and youth activities. Most important are the individualrelationships established by personnel in the field with leaders in theirlocal communities. (U)


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(U) The January 2010 guidance provided another series of talkingpoints that included matters related to CAIR. The guidance repeatedthat the FBI did not consider CAIR "an appropriate partner for formalliaison activities' at that time. (U)(U) On March 29, 2010, OPA again updated its guidance regardinghandling inquiries related to Muslim outreach. The talking pointsreiterated that while the FBI did not consider CAIR to be an appropriatepartner for formal liaison activities, U[als a practical matter,representatives of CAIR and the FBI have attended the same events incertain places at certain times ." (U)(U) Finally, on March II , 2011, OPA issued additional guidance onhandling inquiries related to Muslim outreach, largely reiterating thetalking points regarding CAIR in the guidance it had issued a year earlierto the effect that CAIR was not an appropriate partner for formalactivities, but that as a practical matter, CAIR representatives and FBIofficials did attend events at the same time. (V)(SIINOFORN) The OPA guidance provided points of contact at OPA forquestions regarding inquiries related to Muslim outreach andinteractions with CAIR. They did not refer to the.. ECs or explicitlystate that field offices were to coordinate with ~ t h regard to non-investigative contact with CAIR. (SIINOFORN)(SIINOFORN) To determine why OPA, rather than _ was providinganswers to questions about interactions with CAIR, we asked the formerAD for _ who stated that he did not view the FBI's _ solely asan issue for _ According to the former AD, some of the field officessaw the policy as an obstacle to the overall implementation of theiroutreach strategy for the Muslim community. He stated that many of thefield offices' questions related to community outreach and were thusappropriate for OPA to answer. He added that he believed there issometimes shopping for answers , so if". . ... didn't give you theanswer you wanted ... pick up the phone and call a different authorityat headquarters . . . that is not uncommon in the FB!." (SIINOFORN)(SIINOFORN) He also said that _ was unable to provide strongoversight of OPAis advice to the field offices because of _

o v e r w h e l ~ day-to-day workload. He acknowledged that, while hethought _ embraced, in t h e ~ a t least, the strategy that wastrying to deploy ... _ being _ as busy as it is , I think washampered by the fact that they weren't able to provide the strongprogram management and guidance and central control that they shouldhave." (SIINOFORN)


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(SIINOFORN) OPA told us that they believe they consulted with _ infonnulating the additional guidance, though they could not locate anye-malls or other documentation reflecting this. (SIINOFORN)(SIINOFORN) The fonner Unit Chief for O P ~ l a t i o n sUnit during the 2008 implementation of the _ who

r e m a i ~ o s i t i o n until June 20 II, told us he did not consultwith _ when a field office called OPA seeking advice regardinginteractions with CAIR. He said there was no reason for him to consultoutside OPA about how to answer a question from the field because hewas "intimately knowledgeable" about the policy, having been involved inthe discussions regarding the impact of the policy on OPA's CommunityRelations Program. (SIINOFORN)(SIINOFORN) ""-!C!....f


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with OPA was appropriate because of the intersecting communityrelations issues involved with such interactions. The EC concluded byreiterating that "any deviation from this p o l i ~ s t be coordinated with,and authorized by, the Assistant Director" of _ (S/ /NOFORN)(U) When we interviewed the individual who has served as OPA's CAIRpoint of contact since July 2012, he told us that he believes he would bethe field offices' first point of contact for community outreach questionsregarding CAIR because most of the engagement with the Muslimcommunity takes place through the outreach program that OPA overseesat FBI Headquarters . He said he could not specifically recall receivingany requests for guidance on CAIR interactions since the June 2011 ECwas issued. (U)@L1!:!0FORN) When we interviewed the individual who has served as_ CAIR point of contact since March 2012, she said she did notknow who the OPA point of contact was regarding field office interactionswith CAIR. She told us about a field office request for guidance that hadbeen referred to her by _ that she did not discuss with OPA. In fact,she said that she has not discussed CAIR interactions in the field officeswith anyone from OPA since she has been in her current position.(S/ /NOFORN)(S/ /NOFORN) We found that in three of the five specific incidentsdiscussed below. there was a failure to comply with the requirement thatnon-investigative interactions with CAIR be coordinated with_pursuant to the 2008 _ ECs. Additionally, while we did not analyzespecific incidents where coordination was an issue since the June 2011reissuance of the our interviews with personnel fromOPA and _ indicate that they did not contemplate coordinatingbetween each other with regard to any inquiries from the field as statedin the synopsis in the June 2011 EC. (S/ /NOFORN)


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(U) RESULTS OF THE REVIEW (U)

(SIINOFORN) The OIG reviewed five interactions between the FBI andCAIR that took place field offices between 2010 and2012 to assess the FBI's and its implementation andthe field offices' compliance The facts leading up toeach event and our analysis of them are described below. (SIINOFORN)(U)lncident 1: Chicago Field Office: American Islamic College Speaking Engagement (July 2010) (U)(U) Synopsis (U)(U) On July 27, 2010, the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the FBI'sChicago Field Office was the featured speaker at an event at theAmerican Islamic College in Chicago at which he was introduced byCAIR's Chicago Civil Rights Director. (U)(U) Facts Leading Up to the Event (U)(U) In May 2010, the Chicago SAC's secretary received a telephone callfrom a professor at the American Islamic College in Chicago asking if theSAC was willing to speak at an evening lecture series sponsored by thecollege. The SAC, through his secretary, accepted the speakingengagement invitation for July 27, 2010, and decided on a 30-minutepresentation titled, "The FBI in a Changing World." (U)(U - LES) From May to June 2010, the American Islamic Collegeprofessor and the SAC's secretary exchanged e-mails that discussedlogistics of the event. These exchanges included: an abstract of theSAC's speech, his biography and picture, software for the presentation,and the format of the presentation. The professor also wrote to the SAC'ssecretary the speaker.The SAC said on the AmericanIslamic College and the individual who sent the invitation. However, wefound no e-mail exchange showing that the FBI sought informationabout who the moderator would be, and the SAC's secretary did notrecall seeking this information. (U - LES)(U) On the day of the event, a Chicago Field Office CommunityOutreach Specialist received an e-mail at 12:32 p .m., from a CAIRlistserv , with the subject, "[Name deleted) to Moderate FBI Lecture atAlC - Tonight ," that contained the flyer listing the CAIR Chicago Civil


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Rights Director as the moderator for the lecture. The CommunityOutreach Specialist told the OIG that she had received the e-mail fromCAIR, but that she did not forward the e-mail to the SAC or discuss itwith him. When we asked if she had any discussions with the SACabout the event, she told us that the SAC was at "too high a level" andthat she assumed the Media Coordinator/Public Affairs Agent wouldhave been on the e-mail and would have been the appropriate person tospeak to him. (V)(V) In his interview with the OIG, the SAC said that on the evening ofJuly 27,2010, as he parked his car and began walking to the event, hereceived a telephone call from the Chicago Field Office's MerliaCoordinator/Public Affairs agent, who the SAC indicated was aware ofthe policy and wanted to alert him that the CAIR Civil Rights Directorwould be introducing him at the speaking engagement. The SAC saidthat it would have been embarrassing to back out and that, had heknown earlier that day, he might have canceled or requested thatsomeone else serve as the moderator. The SAC also told us he and theCAIR Civil Rights Director knew each other and he was pleased shewould be making the introduction. He denied any advance knowledgethat someone from CAIR would be introducing him at the event andadded that it was not a CAIR-sponsored event. (V)(V) According to the SAC, there were approximately a dozen people atthe event, and the CAIR Civil Rights Director introduced him in acomplimentary way. Shortly after the event, CAIR-Chicago posted adescription of the event on its website with a photograph of the SACtalking to the class:

On Tuesday, July 27th, CAIR-Chicago's Civil Rights Director (namedeleted] moderated an event featuring a speech by (the] Special Agent inCharge of the FBI's Chicago Field Office, at the American Islamic College.The speech and subsequent discussion focused on the FBI's historicaland current role in the United States and how the bureau works with theMuslim community. During her introduction, [name deleted[ discussedhow the FBI interacts with the Muslim community . ... The Questionand Answer period following [the SAC's] speech wa s lively . . . ."9 (U)

(V) In his interview with the OIG, the SAC denied the characterizationon CAIR's website that the CAIR Civil Rights Director "moderated" theevent. He told us that she only introduced biro and made a fewstatements, and he noted that he had "no control over what CAIR postson its website." (V)

9 http://cairchicago.org accessed October 11, 2012.
http:///reader/full/http://cairchicago.orghttp:///reader/full/http://cairchicago.orghttp:///reader/full/http://cairchicago.orghttp:///reader/full/http://cairchicago.org


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(V) OIG Analysis (V)~ O F O R N ) In this incident, there was no attempt to coordinate with_ However, we recognize that the SAC was notified of CAlR'sinvolvement in the program at the last minute and had to make ajudgment call. While we do not question the decision that was reachedunder these unique circumstances, had the SAC learned sooner theidentity of the person who would introduce him, we believe thatcoordination with should have occurred. 10 The end result of thisincident - CAIR posting on its website of a photograph showing the SACspeaking at the event and a description of CAIR's Civil Rights Directormoderating ~ the sort of exploitation of contact with theFBI that the _ was intended to avoid. (SIINOFORN)(U) Incident 2: New Haven Field Office: CAlR Trainers at a Diversity Training Workshop (October 2010) (U) (V) Synopsis (V) (V) On October 29 , 2010, the FBI New Haven Field Office co coordinated a diversity training workshop with the Muslim Coalition of Connecticut (MCC) titled "Bridging the Gap between Law Enforcement and the Muslim Community/' for federal, state, and loca11aw enforcement officers, including approximately 12 FBI employees.Il The training was held at a non-FBI training facility. Two of the six trainers at the event were local CAIR chapter leaders. (V) (V) Facts Leading Vp to the Event (V) (V) On February 6,2010, a Liaison Agent in the FBI's New Haven Field Office met with the Connecticut Muslim Leadership Council. 12 The (SIINOFORN) 10 In reaching this conclusion, we note that this same SAC told us withregard to Incident 3 below that he believed that the various ECs from FBI Headquartersregarding interactions with CAIR were merely "guidance- and not required policy. Whilethe tenn "guidance" wa s used in the ECs, we do not believe that it should have beenviewed as . particularly in light of th e SAC's ownattendance at meeting in November 2008 on the subject. TheSAC for the Chicago Field Office cited in this event retired from the FBI in September2012. ISI I NOFORN)(U) 11 According to th e group 's website, the stated mission of the Muslim Coalitionof Connecticut is to bring together Muslims in the state and to provide anunderstanding of Islam and Muslims through education and outreach. (U)(U) 1:2 According to th e Liaison Agent, his primary role was to build bridges with theMuslim community and build a professional, healthy , overt relationship with Muslim(Cent'd.)
http:///reader/full/employees.Ilhttp:///reader/full/employees.Il


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Leadership Council asked the agent if the FBI would be receptive toMuslim cultural training from speakers affiliated with the MCC. OnFebruary 22,2010 , the Liaison Agent met with members of the MCC todiscuss Muslim cultural diversity training for the FBI New Haven FieldOffice agents and staff. The training session was tentatively planned forMay 2010 . (U)(SIINOFORN) In April 2010, the Liaison Agent spoke again with MCCmembers and discussed the proposed training date, potential topics, andspeakers. During this period. he learned that two of the six proposedspeakers were the CAIR Connecticut chapter President and a CAIRConnecticut board member. The Liaison Agent said he informed theMCC liaison that the CAIR speakers could not i p a t e in the trainingbecause of the policy set forth in the ECs from _ (SIINOFORN)(U) Shortly afterward, the Liaison Agent met with members of theMuslim Leadership Council in Connecticut. Members of the Councilexpressed concern about the FBI's position and noted that CAIR's boardmembers were also leaders in the Muslim community and to precludethem from the training would not only insult them but would put theMCC in an awkward position. In an e-mail to the SAC dated May 7,2010, the Liaison Agent said he told the Muslim Leadership Council thathe had asked FBI Headquarters to clarify its directive not to have "formalrelations with CAIR," and Headquarters' instruction was not to allowCAIR personnel on FBI property, or to participate as a member of theFBI's Multi-Cultural council, or to allow CAIR representatives to beinstructors at the proposed training. (V)(SIINOFORN) On M ~ e Liaison Agent sent an e-mail to FBIHeadquarters' OPA, _ In the e-mail, the Liaison Agentasked for their help to address three CAIR-related issues, including theMCC's continuing request that CAIR be a part of the proposed trainingcourse. The OPA Unit Chief responded to the e-mail by calling theLiaison Agent the same day. In an e-mail that afternoon to the SAC ofthe New Haven Field Office, the Assistant Special Agent in Charge(ASAC), and his immediate supervisor, the Liaison Agent summarized hisconversation with the OPA Unit Chief, stating:

A CAIR member-at-large , basedon the current reading of the directive, aleader of CAlR should clearly FBI -space . . . and a Board ofDirector of CAIR member in our space would likely be at the discretion ofth e SAC. (SIINOFORN)

leaders in the community. He said he conducted training for Muslim communitygroups. (U)


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(U) When we asked the OPA Unit Chief about his direction to NewHaven, he told us that while he could not recall this specificconversation, "My guidance is the same guidance I've given . . , as longas it's not sponsored by this particular organization [CAIR], you're fine.As long as you're not inviting them into our house, you're fine . We don'tattend their events , they don't attend ours.n (U)(S II NOFORN) In a follow-up e-mail on May 26,2010, the Liaison Agentinformed h i s ~ t h a t h e had spoken again with OPA and withagents from _ While the e-mail references a discussionregarding another of the three issues identified in his May 14 e-mail.itisnot clear Liaison Agent's May 26 e-mail whether he also spokewith the agents about the training program. We spoke withone of the agents identified in the e-mail, who indicated that hespecifically recalled speaking with the Liaison Agent New Havenabout the planned training in this instance, and the . hetold the Liaison Agent that the training was against the_.3hen we asked the _ agent i f he was aware that the OPAUnit Chief had told the Liaison ~ t that training by CAIR waspermissible if it was offsite, the _ agent responded: "What doeslocation have anything to do with what it says in the policy?" The_agent did not recall a conversation with the Liaison Agent about offsitetraining. The _ agent added that, as a general matter, OPA wasalways trying to find some way to get around the policy, which he saidOPA did not like from the beginning . The _ agent told us that he didnot recall speaking with the Liaison Agent. The L i a i s o ~ n t told usthat he did not recall whether he had spoken with the _ agent or the_ agent about the program. (SI I NOFORN)(U) In an e-mail dated June 10,2010, the Liaison Agent informed theSAC that the Muslim Leadership Council still wanted to conduct thetraining for the FBI. The Liaison Agent wrote that he supported the CAIRboard member serving as a trainer, stating, "I personally believe that[name deleted] is honorable and will not use any of his time in our officeto promote a CAIR agenda." In the e-mail to the SAC, the Liaison Agentreiterated OPA's view that the SAC had discretion to decide whether aCAIR board member could participate in an event in FBI space. TheLiaison Agent also notified the SAC that he was prepared to manage thetraining and take responsibility for its success or failure . (U)

(SI/NOFORN) 13 The agent indicated that, as a general matter, he did not recallspeaking with agents from the field who supported the policy, but he did recall speakingwith agents who were not happy about it. (S IINOFORNI


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(U) According to the SAC, the New Haven Field Office had recentlyreceived training on "Islamaphobia," so she suggested in late June orearly July 2010, that the audience be expanded to include other federal ,state, and loca11aw enforcement officers and that the event be moved toan offsite location . She also told the OIG that she did not view thetraining as an FBI-sponsored event and that, had it been one, the fieldoffice's executive management would have been in attendance andprovided remarks. (U)(U) In an e -mail dated July 15 , 2010, to his supervisor a nd others inthe New Haven Field Office , the Liaison Agent stated:

I'm putting together a training seminar for federal. state, and local LEOs[law enforcement officers) that will take place in September or Octoberand will focus on the Islamic faith. I expect to coordinate with the POSTAcademy to co-host this seminar at their Meriden facility . . . . Whatwould help me most at this point is a list of questions / topics yo u wouldlike addressed . .. , I intend to design it as a . . . course with focusedtopics of concern to LEOs .... I will be sharing your comments withother seminar organizers and speakers to design a tailored agenda to suitour needs . . . . (U)

(V) Between July and September 2010, the Liaison Agent consultedwith the MCC several times to discuss an d develop the training topicsand syllabus, an d solicited input for topics from the New Haven FieldOffice. On September 8, 2 010, the Liaison Agent sent an e-mail to theSAC, ASAC, and several others in the New Haven Field Office informingthem that the training event would be held on October 29, 2010 . Thee-mail included the seminar title, tentative topics and schedules, and thenames of the six speakers, including the title of the CAIR ExecutiveDirector.14 The Liaison Agent sent several more e-mails to hissupervisors in September and October describing the training event andlisting two of the speakers as CAIR officials. (U)(U) In e-mails to the Liaison Agent, some staff in the New Haven FieldOffice expressed concern about having two CAlR officials providingtraining._ For example , when the Liaison Agent's supervisor asked if theSAC was "OK with that?" The Liaison Agent responded, "Yes, it is offsite,non-FBI space and anyone can join in." He noted that the SAC hadasked him to "promote the seminar as an all LEO event . . . ." (U)(U) In an e-mail dated September 30, 2010, the Chief Division Counsel(CDC) noted that two of the speakers had ties to CAIR, including its(U) l4 The title of the second CAIR leader was not included on the September 8e-mail, though it was included on subsequent e-mails and on the training flyer. (U)
http:///reader/full/Director.14http:///reader/full/Director.14http:///reader/full/Director.14http:///reader/full/Director.14


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Executive Director, and that the FBI Headquarters guidance was that itdid not consider CAJR an appropriate partner for formal liaison activitiesand events . The CDC asked the Liaison Agent for confirmation that theFBI was neither sponsoring the event nor partnering with CAIR for theevent . To address these concerns, the Liaison Agent moved the listing ofthe two MCC organizers of the event to the top of the trainingannouncement flyer to more prominently display them . He sent the CDCan e-mail asking if the changes to the flyer were acceptable, and the CDCresponded affirmatively. (V)(V) In addition, in an e-mail dated Oc tober 6,2010, the ASAC revisedthe Liaison Agent's introductory paragraph that accompanied thetraining flyer to remove any reference to the New Haven Field Office'sinvolvement in organizing and developing the event. (U)(V) On October 29,2010, the training was held at the POST Academyin Meriden, Connecticut. The title of the training was "Bridging the Gapbetween Law Enforcement and the Connecticut Muslim Community,"and the training included topics such as Islarnaphohia; Scriptural Issuesand Hadith Authenticity; Misconceptions and Stereotypes; and theExperience and Struggles of African American Muslims. At theconclusion of the training, the New Haven Training Officer sent an e-mailto the FBI Director's Office and OPA notif'ying them of New Haven 'sattendance at the training seminar "hosted by the FBI and MuslimCoalition of Connecticut" and "facilitated" by the Liaison Agent . (V)(V) On November 1, 2010, the Liaison Agent memorialized the trainingin an in-house memorandum approved by his supervisor. The LiaisonAgent detailed his efforts in coordinating the training, writing that he"developed, organized, and attended the seminar." He wrote that heworked with the MCC and developed a syllabus that included sixspeakers, five selected by the MCC , including the Executive Director ofCAlR's Connecticut chapter, and one instructor he selected . The LiaisonAgent wrote, "Approximately 47 LEOs and LEO agency employeesattended the seminar, including 12 from the FBI . . . ." (V)(U) OIG Analysis (U)(SI N O F O ~ While in this instance the New Haven Field Officecontacted _ among t h e ~ a r d i n g the training, we found they didnot abide by the opinion of _ and, instead, followed the advicereceived from OPA. The guidance from OPA resulted in an FBIinteraction with CAIR that we found to be inconsistent with the __ set forth in the 2008 ECs . (SIINOFORN)


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(SIINOFORN) The impetus for the training in this particular instancecame from the MCC, which approached the FBI in February 2010 to askwhether it would be receptive to Muslim cultural training. When theLiaison Agent learned in March 2010 that the MCC proposed twospeakers afftliated with CAiR the MCC contact inApril 2010, consistent with the that CAiR speakerscould not participate in t h ~ Liaison Agent sent an e-mailon May 14, 2010, to OPA, _ to request guidance on thetraining issue as well as two other CAIR-related issues . The " agenttold us that he specifically advised the Liaison Agent that the trainingwould be violative of the FBI's policy on interactions with CAIR.However, the Liaison Agent said he received guidance from OPA statingin substance that CAiR could participate in the training if it was held offsite. The Liaison Agent summarized the OPA Unit Chiefs view in ane-mail to his supervisors that a CAIR leader could provide the training,but not in FBI space, and a CAiR board member could be present in FBIspace at the discretion of the SAC. We found no support for this view.(SIINOFORN)(SIINOFORN) The SAC suggested that the training be expanded toinclude participation by other federal, state, and local law enforcementofficers and moved to a non-FBI facility. However, we do not believe thatOPA's advice that this would be with the plainlanguage or clear intent of the FBI 's which was toprohibit CAIR from participating in such cultural sensitivity training withthe FBI. The topics covered by the training were intended to sensitizelaw enforcement to Muslim culture. a type of cultural sensitivity trainingwithin the n o n ~ e a c h activities from which CAIR wasbarred by the _ CAIR was selected as one of therepresentatives of the Muslim community to provide training at thisevent. The CAIR speakers were identified on the training flyer as theExecutive Director and Board Member of the Council on AmericanIslamic Relations, Connecticut Chapter, confirming that theirparticipation was in an official, not individual, capacity. (SIINOFORN)(SIINOFORN) According to the FBI Liaison Agent's written description ofhis role in several e-mails and memoranda, he participated actively inorganizing the training seminar by developing the training topics andsyllabus, selecting one of the six speakers, locating the training venue,identifying and inviting the law enforcement agencies, and creating andcausing the dissemination of the training flyers. The New Haven trainingofficer stated in a contemporaneous EC that the FBI had "hosted" theevent with the MCC and that it was "facilitated" by the Liaison Agent.Under these circumstances, we found that the concerns about noninvestigative interactions with CAIR underlying the


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at the time

did not

were directly implicated by the public interaction with CAIR in thistraining event. (S/ /NOFORN)(S / /NOFORN) OPA's Public Affairs Guidance on Muslim Outreach,including contact with CAIR, was the most recent FBI Headquarters voice

was planned in 20 10, a 1 m o ~ e a r s after thewas implemented through the _ ECs in 2008. ThePu:bliic Affairs Guidance listed OPA personnel as points of contactsfor any questions from the field offices. The Liaison Agent and,

ultimately, the New Haven Field Office followed the guidance receivedfrom . guidancefrom and forensure that the field office restricted The OIGbelieves that, in this instance, the muddled lines of authority allowed theshared desire of OPA and the field office to foster interactions with the

to effectively undermine the intent of the 2008to sever such non-investigative community relations(S / /NOFORN)

{UI Incident 3: Chicago Field Office:DRS Quarterly Chicago Roundtable{December 20101 {UI(U) Synopsis (U)(U) During our review of FBI Chicago Field Office documents inconnection with Incident 1 discussed above, we learned that theDepartment of Homeland Security (DHS) Office for Civil Rights and CivilLiberties sponsored a Quarterly Community Engagement ChicagoRoundtable (Roundtable) that many Chicago area government andcommunity organizations attended. According to FBI and DHSdocuments, the purpose of the Roundtable was to bring togetherAmerican-Arab Muslim, South Asian, Middle Eastern, and Sikhcommunity leaders with government representatives to discuss issuesrelated to homeland security, civil rights, and other areas as well as rolesand responsibilities of law enforcement, immigration, and othergovernment officials. The Chicago Field Office SAC informed us that heoccasionally hosted this Roundtable at the Chicago Field Office building.On December 2, 2010, the FBI Chicago Field Office hosted the DHSQuarterly Roundtable in FBI space at it s field office building, and theChicago chapter Civil Rights Director of CAIR was listed among the DHSinvited guests. However, an FBI Chicago Community Outreach Specialisttold us that the CAIR official, although invited, did not attend theRoundtable . (U)


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(V) Facts Leading Vp to the Event (U)(V) We asked the SAC if CAIR was pennitted in FBI office space whenhe hosted the Roundtable. He stated that i f DHS considered CAIRofficials to be part of the community and invited them to the Roundtable,the FBI would not deny them entry at the door. The SAC also stated thatif CAIR officials came to the Chicago Field Office, he was not required toreport it to FBI Headquarters, just as he was not required to report ameeting with CAIR on a civil rights matter. IS He stated such notificationwould be impractical given the realities the Field Office encountered. Hesaid that he viewed the various ECs fromFBI Headquarters regardinginteractions with CAIR as "guidance" and not policy. and that hetherefore was not required to contact or coordinate with Headquarters.(V)(V) OIG Analysis (V)(S I I NOFORN) As with Incident 1 discussed above, there was no effortmade by the C h i c ~ i e l d Office to comply with the coordinationrequirement with _ regarding a proposed interaction with CAIR. Hadthe CAIR official attended the Roundtable event hosted at the FBIChicago Field Office, . would have been inconsistentwith the intent of the to prohibit CAIR officials fromhaving access to the FBI and its field offices that they could tout inpublic. (SIINOFORN)(S IINOFORN) In his interview, the SAC likened this Roundtable meetingto a town hall event. The October 24,2010, EC from _ states, 'CAIRis not excluded from open forums that are not organized/sponsored bythe FBI." However, the DHS Roundtable was open to invited guests, asdistinct from an open town hall forum open to the public. Also, becausethe event was co-hosted by and held at the FBI's Chicago Field Office, itreasonably gave the appearance that it was co-; sponsored by the FBI.The Chicago SAC did not consult or coordinate this meeting with _ orreceive authorization f rom " to allow a CAIR official to attend ameeting at the FBI's Chicago Field Office. The SAC told us he would nothave consulted with FBI Headquarters regarding this event under anycircumstances because he viewed the policy as "guidance" and did notbelieve that it required such consultation . As stated with regard toIncident 1 above. while the term "guidance" was used in the EC I we donot believe that the EC could have been viewed as anything other than(U) 15 The field office did send an EC reporting the roundtable event to theDirector's Office at FBI headquarters after the event occurred, but it did not mentionthat a CAIR representative had been invited to attend. (U)


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~ c u l a r l y in light of the SAC's attendance at __ meeting in November 2008 on this same subject.While the CAIR representative ultimately did not attend the Roundtable,the failure to follow the ECs in this instance could have led to anbelieve would have been inconsistent with the

(S / / NOFORN)(U) Incident 4: Philadelphia Field Office: CAIR Attendance at Philadelphia CREST Training (December 2010) (U) (U) Synopsis (U)(U) On December 11,2010, the FBI Philadelphia Field Office held aCommunity Relations Executive Seminar Training (CREST), asubprogram of the FBI Citizen's Academy, at a Philadelphia area Islamiccenter. The FBI allowed a PhiIadelphia-CAIR official to attend thistraining event as an invited guest. (U)(U) Facts Leading Up to the Event (U)(U) In 2006 the FBI Headquarters ' OPA created CREST as asubprogram within its Citizen's Academy Program to increase thenumber of citizens exposed to the day-ta-day operations of specific partsof the FBI. According to FBI documents and its website, CREST is ashorter, more focused version of the Citizen's Academy, conducted inpartnership with a community group at an offsite location, and sessionsare customized to meet the needs of each community group host.CREST classes are taught by FBI leaders, senior FBI Special Agents,Squad Supervisors, or subject matter experts. According to aPhiladelphia Field Office e-mail describing the program, the FBI does notconduct background checks or otherwise vet the individuals participatingin the CREST program. (U)(U) On October 12, 2010, the Philadelphia Field Office Public Affairsand Media Relations Coordinator (hereafter referred to as PhiladelphiaPublic Affairs Coordinator) sent an e-mail to the AD of OPA stating,"Philadelphia will be conducting a CREST with eight to twelve leadersfrom the Muslim community in our territory. Is there a problem if one ofthe attendees is from CAIR?" (U)(U) Later in the day, the Philadelphia Public Affairs Coordinator alsosent an e-mail to a Philadelphia Supervisory Special Agent and copiedOPA officials about the upcoming CREST program. The e-mail statedthat a proposed participant was the Secretary of the Board of Directors ofthe Pennsylvania chapter of CAIR. The Philadelphia Public Affairs


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Coordinator asked the Supervisory Special Agent to conduct backgroundresearch on the CAIR Board Secretary "to see if there is , in fact, somereason or justification for our prohibiting Mr. [name deleted1 fromparticipating in the upcoming CREST program." The Philadelphia PublicAffairs Coordinator's e-mail reminded all of the e-mail recipients that"several years ago, the FBI suspended our formal relationship with, andceased official contacts with CAIR." The e-mail also stated, II'At this timethe FBI does not consider CAIR an appropriate partner for formal liaisonactivities and events." (U)(U) In the e-mail, the Public Affairs Coordinator also summarized adiscussion he had that morning with the AD and a Unit Chief of OPA. Asa result of that discussion, he said in the e-mail, "we are leaningtowards" allowing the CAIR official's participation in the CREST, "absentany compelling reasons not to." In the e-mail, the Philadelphia PublicAffairs Coordinator outlined the argument in favor of allowing the CAIRofficial's participation in the CREST. He stated that at the time Muslimgroups around the country were claiming they were being unfairlytargeted by the FBI. He wrote that if the field office was going to excludethe CAIR official from the CREST, he wanted to ensure there was"sufficient justification" for doing so, rather than "simply because of hisrole in CAIR." He also mentioned that CAIR was not participating as asponsor or organizer of the event. He noted that the CAIR official wouldbe allowed to attend CREST "because of his role in the Muslimcommunity and not because of his volunteer role on the CAIR Board ofDirectors." The Public Affairs Coordinator's e-mail concluded that theCAIR official's "participation in the CREST would not, on its face, violatethe Bureau policy with respect to the termination of our relationship withCAIR." (U)(U) On October 18 , 2010 , the Philadelphia Public Affairs Coordinatorreceived an e-mail from an OPA Supervisory Special Agent stating that hehad discussed the matter with the AD for OPA and the incoming SACbeing assigned to the Philadelphia Field Office. According to the OPASupervisory Special Agent, they had agreed that the CAIR official "canattend the CREST as he will be one of a number of communityrepresentatives present; and a significant focus of the CREST will be CivilRights." The CAIR official attended the CREST, which took place asscheduled in Philadelphia on December 11, 2010. (U)(U) On December 15 , 2010, CAIR Philadelphia posted an article on itswebsite titled, "CAIR-PA Participates in FBI Community RelationsTraining Program." The article described the purpose and contents of thetraining and stated that CAIR-Pennsylvania staff and board membersattended along with other Muslim leaders . CAIR provided a link to theCREST training program on the FBI's website, FBl.gov. (U)


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December 17, 2010,The e-nlail cOlItaim:d

That same day, the

an anSupervisory Special AgentrelEtted to CAIR officials.

of the recent Philadelphia CREST event.Supervisory Special e e-mail to OPA asking, this inconformity with the _ The Assistant Director for OPAresponded that it did "conform," adding that "the event wasn't an FBItralning program." (SIINOFORN)(V) OIG Analysis (V)(SIINOFORN) This incident again exemplifies a failure to coordinatewith ~ with regard to a planned non-investigative interaction withCAIR as required by the 2008 _ ECs. The OIG believes thatpermitting a CAIR Board . CRESTprogram is inconsistent with theTwo of the four sp,:cific i [ t t e I ' a c l t i ~ ~

(S I I NOFORN)(V) While CREST is not the Citizen's Academy, the FBI's own websiteindicates that CREST was created by the FBI as a subprogram of theCitizen's Academy. The FBI serves in partnership with communitygroups to provide this program and the classes are taught by FBIleaders, supervisors, and senior Special Agents. The OPA's ReferenceGuide describes CREST as a "shorter, more focused version of theCitizen's Academy," Graduates of the training have the opportunity tojoin the Citizen's Academy.!6 (V)(S I I NOFORN) I t appears that OPA provided guidance that effectivelyreversed the presumption against CAIR participation in non-investigatoryFBI activities in this instance. OPA indicated that it wanted to ensure(S /I NOFORN 16 The e-mails that we reviewed reflect that the Philadelphia Field Officeunderstood that the participation of a CAIR representative was controversial in thisdescribing the event, the FBI did not ordinarily vet or

on CREST participants, unlike the participants in theHowever, in this case, the Philadelphia Field Officeof the CAIR participant to see if there was any reasonYet whether o r ~ C A I R representativeis irrelevant to the____ to deny theorganization access to the FBI in such non-investigative community ou treach activities.

(S II NOFORN)


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that there was sufficient justification for excluding the CAIR participantapart from his role in CAlR. Again, it is not surprising that OPA, whichhas overall responsibility for such outreach programs, or the field offices,which carry them Qut, have preferred a different approach than

ECs arising out of a specificNevertheless, we believe that the

was called for under theprc,.tlmption . ECs' plainly against CAIR participation insuch non-investigative outreach programs absent coordination with. .and a d e t e r m i n ~ by FBI Headquarters personnelinvolved in the _ (S IINOFORN)(SIINOFORN) In the e-mail summarizing the discussion with OPA, thefield office represented that th e CAIR official would be attending theCREST because of his role as a Muslim community leader rather thanbecause of his role-on th e CAIR board of directors. Yet, the initialrequest for advice asked i f there was "a problem i f one of the attendees isfrom CAIR," not a more general religious community representative and,in any event, the ultimate result was that a CAIR Board Memberparticipated in the program b l i c 1 y cited by CAIR on it swebsite, which is what the _ was trying to avoid.(SIINOFORN)(SIINOFORN) The field office also defended this individual'sparticipation by noting that a significant focus of the event was going tobe civil rights, and this was one of th e factors ultimately cited by OPA inapproving the CAIR representative's involvement. In its response to thedraft of this report, the FBI emphasized that the CREST event wasintended to discuss civil rights through a grant that was funded topromote racial healing programs. However, to read the e x c ~ r

~ c i v i l rights complaints or matters contained in the __ that broadly would eviscerate the policy, and the OIG isunaware of any investigatory content in the CREST program that wouldhave exempted it from the n on non-investigatoryoutreach contained in the _ (SIINOFORN)(V) Incident 5: Philadelphia Field Office:Pennsylvania Human Relations Task Force Meetings(August 2011 - June 2012) (V)(U) Synopsis (U)(U) Between August 2011 and June 2012, three Special Agents fromth e FBI Philadelphia Field Office attended five meetings of thePennsylvania Human Relations Interagency Task Force on CommunityActivities and Relations in Harrisburg (hereafter referred to as the


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Pennsylvania Human Relations task force. CAIR personnel also attendedthese meetings.l7 (U)(U) Facts Leading Up to the Event (U)

(U) An Acting Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the PhiladelphiaField Office informed the OIG that its personnel have attended thePennsylvania Human Relations task force meetings in Harrisburg on amonthly basis for the last 7 years for liaison purposes related to its civilrights program. The Ac ting Assistant Special Agent in Charge stated thatattending these meetings is important given the FBI's role andresponsibility as the only federal criminal investigation and lawenforcement agency with jurisdiction in this area. He stated that thePhiladelphia Field Office does not organize or plan the task force meetings,nor does it control who the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commissioninvites to its meetings. Numerous other state and private organizationsattend as do other law enforcement agencies. along with representatives ofthe Department of Justice Civil Rights Division and the Anti-DefamationLeague. He also stated that FBI policy does not preclude FBI attendanceat third party meetings that are also attended by representatives of CAIR.(U)(U) OIG Analysis (U)(SIINOFORN) We found that FBI attendance at the Pennsylvania HumanRelations task force meetings, which were sponsored by the PennsylvaniaCommission, were not inconsistent with the FBI's

on CAIR. The June 2011 _ policy in effect at the timeof these meetings in 2011 and 2012 did not prohibit "FBI attendance atpublic events at which CAIR officials are or may be present if CAIR is not a .sponsor of the event.' (SIINOFORN)(SIINOFORN) Since the Pennsylvania Human Relations task force and itsmeetings were sponsored by a state government agency, and not by theFBI or CAIR, the meetings were not held in FBI office space, the FBI didnot have a role in organizing the program, and the event was not otherwise

(U) 17 The Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission enforces the state's anti-discrimination laws. The taskforce is made up of the Pennsylvania Human RelationsCommission, the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office, the Pennsylvania State Police,working in conjunction with other state and federal agencies, community organizations.advocacy groups, local government and law enforcement agencies. The primaryfunction of the group is to quickly and appropriately address civil tensions whenconflicts occur, and to promote positive community relations among various groups inorder to prevent tension, http://WW\11.phrc.state.pa.us/portal/server .pt/community/bias hate crimes/19235 accessedB/13/2013. (U)
http:///reader/full/meetings.l7http://ww/11.phrc.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/communityhttp://ww/11.phrc.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/communityhttp://ww/11.phrc.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/communityhttp:///reader/full/meetings.l7http://ww/11.phrc.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community


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structured in a way that would give the public appearance of a liaisonr e l a t i o ~ between CAIR and the FBI, we found that the risks identifiedin the _ ECs were not present in this instance. (S / /NOFORN)


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(U) CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS (U)

(SIINOFORN) In 2008, the FBI developed a intendedoffices' n o n - i n v e S t i g a t i v v , e ~ ~ ; ~ : ; ; ; ~ CAIR. The

was based on concerns the

five incidents wereviewed, we concluded that the CAIR was not followed,resulting in interactions with CAIR that were inconsistent with the policy.(SIINOFORN)(SIINOFORN) The policy broadly prohibited non-investigativecommunity outreach interactions with CArR. such as attending CA IR - sponsored events and allowing CArR to attend FBI-sponsored events, while permitting interactions regarding civil r i g h ~ criminal investigations. The ECs containing the _ acknowledged that the _ represented a significant deviation from FBI policy and that it aIIected..l2!!,gstanding relationships in theof these factors, _ issued several iterations of the

during the last half of 2008, laying out the reasons fornew instructions for coordination with" regarding

contact with CAIR, and points of contact for any questions .(SIINOFORN)~ O R N ) Yet, despite (1) recognizing the importance of the __ by issuing these memoranda, (2) being aware of the apparentreluctance of some field offices to follow the new policy, and (3) holding amandatory meeting with field office leadership from around the countryto address that reluctance and ensure national compliance , l I I I ~ d i d

~ ~ c t j v e oversight to ensure compliance with t h e _AD at the time of the incidents described in this reportes"enltiaJly a c l r n ( ) w l e d l ~ e d this, telling us that _ was unable to providestrong oversight concerning the advice provided to the field officesbecause of an overwhelming day-to-day workload. The failure by _ tofollow through to ensure the requisite coordination with ~ left theimplementation of the policy uncertain, resulting in contacts that wereviewed with CAIR that we found to be inconsistent with the __ (SIINOFORN)


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(SIINOFORN) The coordination with _ for non-investigative CAIRinteractions that the 2008 ECs required did not always occur, eventhough there is no question that the agents at _ would have had astrong interest in participating in such discussions. In practice, wefound that the field offices at times contacted OPA rather than the __ points of contact and OPA did notconsistently coordinate with when that happened. In fact,the Unit Chief at OPA told us such coordination with _was unnecessary because of "intimate knowledge" of the FBI's policy.(SIINOFORN)(SIINOFORN) The implementation problems were exacerbated by theguidance OPA issued in 2009 and 2010 regarding handling mediainquiries relating to interactions with CAIR. While the five Public AffairsGuidance memoranda OPA issued on Muslim Outreach and CAIRinteractions during this period were not necessarily inconsistent with theECs, they listed OPA personnel as points of contact for field officequestions on such community outreach matters. We believe that this ledto confusion r e g a r ~ t h o r i t y and, coupled with the lack ofconsultation with _ ultimately resulted in FBI interactionswith CAJR based on consultations with OPA that we believe wereinconsistent with the goal of the FBI's (SIINOFORN)(SIINOFORN) Our review of the incidents described above shows thatbecause of its general role in community outreach matters and itsissuance of the more recent media guidance discussing FBI -CAIRinteractions, it was OPA that was sought ~ e d guidance tothe field offices, without consultation with _ As a result,contacts with CAIR were approved we believe likely would not havebeen approved at the time by We contactswere inconsistent with the tenns set forthand was supposed to enforce. It appears that the common mission ofOPA and the field divisions to foster interactions with the Muslimcommunity ran cases, effectively undenninedthe intent of the FBI's to sever such non-investigativecommunity relations activities with CAIR. (SIINOFORN)(SIINOFORN) We acknowledge that no policy can account for everypossible circumstance and that some of the language employed in thevarious communications from FBI Headquarters may have left someroom for interpretation. However, we believe that the lack of effectiveoversight of the _ implementation, followed by _ ceding ofthe field to OPA, led to the inconsistent adherence with poliey evidencedby several of the incidents we examined. (SIINOFORN)


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(SIINOFORN) The F B ~ o l i c y was introduced 5 yearsago. Even though the _ was reiterated in 2011 withmore ' for approval directly from _ for anydeviations, did not demonstrate the commitment toensure the effective implementation. We are concerned that,due to frequent personnel rotations, retirements, and promotions, it ispossible that FBI staff may not be familiar with the background, history,or objectives of the policy, or may continue to labor undermisapprehensions regarding its import or application. In addition, theFBI needs to ensure that all appropriate personnel at Headquarters,particularly OPA and and in the field offices are fully briefed on the

with one another. The FBI's re-promulgationof the in June 2011, reflects its belief that specific require that non-investigative interactions with CAIR be restricted on an ongoing basis . As a result, the FBI needs to ensurethat all relevant personnel are fully informed as to the objectives andrequirements of its current CAIR policy and to ensure its effectiveimplementation. (SIINOFORN)(U) OIG recommends that the FBI: (U)1. (U) Ensure effective implementation of FBI policy relating tointeractions with CAIR, including the coordination mandated by thepolicy and the enforcement and oversight of compliance with thepolicy. (U)2. (SIINOFORN) Provide comprehensive education on the objectives

and requirements of the current CAIR toHeadquarters and field office personnel who are likely to be involvedwith the application of the policy. (SIINOFORN)


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(UI APPENDIX I: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT (UI

u.s. 0.1"1"'-" ofJUCIccfalm! BllfMu o(JlMISlipdOll

Wuhilll\Oll, D. C. 20535-0001Seplembcr 17; 20 I:J

The HoncnbIc Michael B. Horowitz_0,"""Ot!Jee or tbe lnIpcccor Oeoenl'U. S. DepIrtmcat of Justice

~ O l'eanIylvcdl AVCDUC, N.W.Washlqton. DC 20530Dar Mr. Horowitz:

The FcdCJ1lJ Bureau oflrlvestipliOtl (FBI) apprccil1es the oppommity to review andrespond to )'OUromcc', report entitlcd, Rmrw o/FBllnt,rocdOftS wltlt 1M COllnQl onA.fMrlca"./sitlll1/c RllotloM (CAIR).

We toDCut with your acknowledgement that "110 policy can aecount tor every possiblecircumstance and that lOme orthe lanJua&e e m p J ~ iD the various t


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(U) APPENDIX II: ACRONYMS (U)

AD Assistant DirectorADIC Assistant Director in ChargeASAC Assistant Special Agent in ChargeCAIR Council on American-Islamic RelationsCDC Chief Division CounselCREST Community Relations Executive Seminar Training(S / / NOFOR:N) /NOFORN)DHS Department of Homeland SecurityEC Electronic CommunicationFBI Federal Bureau of InvestigationHLF Holy Land Foundation for Relief and DevelopmentLEO Law Enforcement OrganizationMCC Muslim Coalition of ConnecticutOIG Office of the Inspector GeneralOPA Office of Public AffairsSAC Special Agent in Charge(S / I NOFOJ;tNI (S//NOFORN)


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(U) APPENDIX III: CLASSIFIED SOURCE DOCUMENTS (U)

FBI Electronic Communi cations (EC)


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. O FORN ) Date; 12 / 04 / 2008

0,"'0 , 12 .

Interviews

Date: 8 / 30 / 12 Title: Interview # 1

Documents

DoJ Inspector General Report: Review of FBI Interactions with CAIR, September 13, 2013