DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2370.2012.00348.x Kurt Lewin’s Field ...s+field+theory... · Kurt Lewin’s Field Theory:A Review and Re-evaluation Bernard Burnes and Bill Cooke1 Manchester

Kurt Lewin’s Field Theory: A Reviewand Re-evaluation

Bernard Burnes and Bill Cooke1

Manchester Business School, University of Manchester, Manchester M15 6PB, UK, and 1Lancaster UniversityManagement School, Lancaster University, Lancaster LA1 4YX, UK

Corresponding author email: [email protected]

Field theory was central to Kurt Lewin’s work yet, after his death, interest in it declinedsignificantly until the 1990s when a variant, force field analysis, became widely used.This paper examines the origins, purpose and continuing relevance of field theory. Itespecially looks at the influences of gestalt psychology, topology and Ernst Cassirer’sphilosophy of science on its development. It argues that Lewin’s attempt to replaceconventional topology with his own Lewinian mathematics-based topology in pursuit ofscientific rigour resulted in the undermining of its relevance. The paper also comparesforce field analysis with Lewin’s original conception of field theory and shows that ithas significant weaknesses in terms of rigour. It concludes that a return to Lewin’soriginal conception of field theory, based on gestalt psychology and conventional topol-ogy, can provide academics and practitioners with a valuable and much-neededapproach to managing change.

Introduction

Kurt Lewin (1890–1947) was one of the leading psy-chologists of his generation (Marrow 1969; Tolman1948). His work provided the foundations of Organ-ization Development (OD) and is still consideredby many as central to it (Boje et al. 2011; Burnes2004a, 2007; Burnes and Cooke 2012; Cooke 2007;Cummings and Worley 2005; French and Bell 1990;Kleiner 1996; Wheeler 2008). As Edgar Scheincommented:

There is little question that the intellectual fatherof contemporary theories of applied behaviouralscience, action research and planned change is KurtLewin. His seminal work on leadership style and theexperiments on planned change which took place in

World War II in an effort to change consumerbehaviour launched a whole generation of researchin group dynamics and the implementation ofchange programs. (Schein 1988, p. 239)

In his lifetime, Lewin was best known for thedevelopment of field theory (or topological psychol-ogy as he also called it), which provided the theoreti-cal underpinning of all his applied work (Cartwright1952b). A notable example in the managementcontext was his ground-breaking study of leadershipstyles, which demonstrated the efficacy of demo-cratic over laissez-faire and autocratic leadershipstyles (Lewin 1939b; Lewin et al. 1939; Lippitt1939). For Danziger (2000, p. 349), the significanceof this piece is not just what it says about leadership,for which it is best known, but because it is a ‘para-digmatic’ Lewinian exemplar of field theory.

Lewin developed field theory over a 25-yearperiod starting in the 1920s (Cartwright 1952a;Marrow 1969). Drawing on field theory in physics,he argued that ‘the order of coexisting facts in apsychological or social situation can be viewed as

The authors would like to thank Allan Macpherson, Associ-ate Editor IJMR, and the three reviewers of this paper fortheir help, advice and support. They would also like to thankProfessor Ladd Wheeler for his helpful comments on anearlier draft of this paper.

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International Journal of Management Reviews, Vol. 15, 408–425 (2013)DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2370.2012.00348.x

© 2012 The AuthorsInternational Journal of Management Reviews © 2012 British Academy of Management and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA02148, USA

[a life] space’ (Lewin and Lorsch 1939, p. 401).Lewin’s field theory states that it is possible to under-stand, predict and provide the basis for changing thebehaviour of individuals and groups by constructinga ‘life space’1 comprising the psychological forcesinfluencing their behaviour at a given point in time(Back 1992; Diamond 1992). Lewin originally devel-oped field theory in order to understand individualbehaviour, but later he used it mainly as a method foranalysing and changing group behaviour (Burnes2007).

Field theory played a central part in all Lewin’swork by allowing him and his associates to under-stand the forces that sustained undesired behaviours,and to identify those forces that would need to beeither strengthened or weakened in order to bringabout desired behaviours (M. Lewin 1998). It wasone of the four elements that make up Lewin’splanned approach to change, the others being groupdynamics, action research and the three-step modelof change (Burnes 2004a). The role of field theoryand group dynamics was to understand how particu-lar social groupings were formed, motivated andmaintained. The role of action research and the three-step model of change was to change the behaviour ofthese social groups. Though there is a tendency totreat these as separate aspects of Lewin’s work,Allport (1948, p. ix) states: ‘All of his concepts,whatever root-metaphor they employ, comprise asingle well-integrated system.’

However, the foundation on which planned changewas built was field theory. Without this, it is notpossible to understand the forces that maintaincurrent behaviour and identify those that would haveto be modified in order to bring about change. Unfor-tunately, while group dynamics, action research andthe three-step model of change have garnered muchsupport since Lewin’s death in 1947, ‘the generalunderstanding of field theory by social scientists hasgrown increasingly vague’ (Gold 1992, p. 67; seealso Danziger 1992, 2000; Deutsch 1968). Indeed, bythe 1980s, leading books on OD and social psy-chology hardly mentioned field theory per se (e.g.Cummings and Huse 1989; French and Bell 1984;Lindzey and Aronson 1985). In the 1990s, there wasa renewed interest in field theory (Back 1992; Gold

1992; Hendry 1996; Schein 1996), but, as will beshown, what generally emerged was a watered-downversion of Lewin’s original concept.

In reviewing and re-evaluating field theory, weargue that the main reason for the decline of fieldtheory was Lewin’s pursuit of mathematical rigourover practical relevance. As Gulati (2007, p. 775)notes: ‘A long-standing debate among managementscholars concerns the rigor, or methodologicalsoundness, of our research versus its relevance tomanagers.’

It is a debate that continues to preoccupy manage-ment scholars (see Bartunek 2007; Hodgkinson andRousseau 2009; Polzer et al. 2009). Schultz (2010)neatly sums up the debate, arguing that achievingrigour and relevance is a difficult balancing act – toofar down the rigour route; and research can lose itsrelevance – usability – for practitioners; too far downthe relevance route, and practice ceases to be basedon methodological soundness.

Lewin was popularly iconized in Marrow’s (1969)biography of him: The Practical Theorist. The book’stitle comes from Lewin’s famous aphorism ‘thatthere is nothing so practical as a good theory’ (Lewin1943–44, p. 169). Lewin’s yardstick for rigour wasthat his approach to change should be based on asound theoretical–methodological foundation. Hisyardstick for relevance was that his approach tochange should enable individuals and groups tounderstand and restructure their perceptions of theworld around them (Burnes 2007; Lewin 1942).Therefore, it may seem strange that he is accused ofmisjudging the rigour–relevance balance. However,as this paper will show, in his development of fieldtheory, even the ‘practical theorist’ could take a steptoo far and end up sacrificing relevance in his searchfor rigour.

This paper examines the origins and purpose offield theory, particularly its foundation in gestalt psy-chology and topology, and its connection to Lewin’sphilosophy of science. Then it explores the reasonsfor its decline after Lewin’s death and argues that thiswas primarily brought about by Lewin’s pursuit ofinappropriate mathematical rigour. It goes on toexamine the resurgence of interest in field theory inthe 1990s and, in particular, the variant known asforce field analysis. It also examines the relevanceof field theory to current, social-constructionist-influenced OD practices, such as dialogic OD andappreciative inquiry (AI), and argues that they arecompatible with and would benefit from field theory.The paper concludes that a return to Lewin’s original

1Lewin and his associates referred to the ‘life space’ by anumber of terms, especially psychological environment, per-ceptual environment, psychological field, social field andforce field. However, they most commonly referred to a ‘lifespace’, and this is the term used in this paper.

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© 2012 The AuthorsInternational Journal of Management Reviews © 2012 British Academy of Management and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

conception of field theory, based on gestalt psychol-ogy and conventional topology, can restore therigour–relevance balance in Lewin’s work andprovide academics and practitioners with a valuableand much-needed approach to managing change.

The paper begins by describing gestalt psychology.

The influence of gestalt psychology

Lewin’s field theory argues that behaviour is derivedfrom the totality of coexisting and interdependentforces that impinge on a person or group and makeup the life space in which the behaviour takes place(Lewin 1942). In developing field theory, Lewin wasgreatly influenced by gestalt psychology, whichemerged in Germany in the early part of the 20thcentury (Köhler 1967). For psychologists, a gestalt isa perceptual pattern or configuration that is the con-struct of the individual mind. It is a coherent wholethat has specific properties that can neither bederived from the individual elements nor be consid-ered merely as the sum of them (Kadar and Shaw2000). As French and Bell (1990, p. 140) observed,‘gestalt therapy is based on the belief that personsfunction as whole, total organisms’.

Gestalt psychology strongly challenged the thendominant structuralist and behaviourist theories ofpsychology, which maintained that human beings aresimply the sum of their parts, and that the individualparts can be identified and the causes of behaviourrelated to individual external stimuli (Deutsch 1968;Lewin 1939b; Martin 2003). Indeed, the prevailingview among psychologists at that time was that sub-jective experience, like perception, played no part inbehaviour and was an ‘improper subject for scientificinquiry’ (Rock and Palmer 1990, p. 61). The notionwas that discrete stimuli bring about discreteresponses that are not affected by the individual’sperception of these. Behaviourists and structuralistsclaimed that only discrete events that can beobserved mattered, and that these ‘observables’ couldbe counted and analysed and mathematical relation-ships between them determined (Rummel 1975).

Gestalt psychologists take a very different view.First, they maintain that the individual as a wholeperson is different from the sum of their parts, andthat the individual parts are interdependent and inter-act in a dynamic fashion. Therefore, looking at indi-vidual elements separately from each other andseparate from the person’s perceptual or psychologi-cal environment produces a misleading view of the

causes of human behaviour and how it can bechanged. Second, they argue that individuals’ behav-iour is the product of their current environment andhow individuals perceive the environment (Köhler1967; Martin 2003). From the gestalt perspective,behaviour is not just a product of external stimuli;rather, it arises from how the individual perceivesthese stimuli. That is to say, how a person behaves isnot just dependent on the forces that impinge onthem, but also on their subjective perception of theseforces. Consequently, two people may see or experi-ence a phenomenon, but perceive it in very differentways (Rock and Palmer 1990; Rummel 1975). Forgestalt psychologists, behavioural change is a learn-ing process, which involves gaining or changing per-ceptions, insights, outlooks, expectations or thoughtpatterns (French and Bell 1990). In explaining anindividual’s behaviour, gestaltists take into accountnot only a person’s actions and the responses theseelicit, but also the interpretation the individual placeson these. Consequently, in organizational terms,gestalt psychologists seek to help individuals andgroups to change their perception of themselves andthe situation in question, which, in turn, they believewill lead to changes in behaviour (Smith et al. 1982).

Lewin became interested in gestalt psychologywhen, on being demobilized from the German armyafter World War I, he went to work at the Psycho-logical Institute in the University of Berlin. It wasthere he met and worked with two of the founders ofgestalt psychology, Max Wertheimer and WolfgangKöhler (Köhler 1967; Marrow 1969). It was theholistic nature of gestaltism that attracted Lewin. Hemaintained that piecemeal analysis of individualstimuli and actions could not give a true or accuratepicture of the reasons why a person behaved as theydid. Instead, he felt that gestalt psychology, byseeking to understand the totality of a person’s situ-ation, seemed much nearer to the way in which anindividual actually experienced life. Like Lewin,Köhler and Wertheimer moved to the USA to escapethe rise of Nazism, but Lewin’s work began todiverge from theirs. Köhler and Wertheimer contin-ued to pursue their laboratory-based experiments.Lewin, in contrast, had become more preoccupiedwith real-world issues and the need to understandand change human behaviour (Arnheim 1986; Bargal1998; Köhler 1967; Marrow 1969). This put Lewin atodds with Köhler, who found Lewin’s later work too‘heretical’ for his taste (Marrow 1969, p. 159). Nev-ertheless, Lewin made a valuable contribution to theearly development of gestalt psychology and, as the

410 B. Burnes and B. Cooke


following section shows, it clearly underpins theprinciples on which his field theory was built (Lewin1939b).

Lewin’s philosophy of science

As the above shows, field theory in psychology ismost closely associated with gestalt psychology(Deutsch 1968). This can clearly be seen by examin-ing the six fundamental characteristics that underpinLewin’s (1942, pp. 60–64) field theory, as follows:

1. Constructive method: For Lewin, the meaningof any concept is derived from its relationshipto other concepts. This allows the relationshipbetween a theory or system and the elements thatmake it up to be clearly seen. This stands in con-trast to what Lewin saw as the shortcomings of theclassificatory approach to theory-building, whichderives an ‘ideal’ class of object by abstractionfrom ‘particular’objects, but which does not allowthe particular to be derived from the ideal (Deutsch1968). Applying the constructive method to thecreation of a life space enabled Lewin to establishthe relationship between the life space and theelements that compromise it, such as psychologi-cal position and psychological force.

2. Dynamic approach: In psychology, people andgroups are seen as behavioural systems that tendto maintain a dynamic equilibrium (Deutsch1968). Lewin (1947b) shared this view, seeingequilibrium in social life as a dynamic processwhere change occurs, but a recognizable form ismaintained. Lewin referred to this as a ‘quasi-stationary equilibrium’ (Lewin 1947a). For Lewin(1943c), a change from one ‘quasi-stationaryequilibrium’ to another is brought about by achange in the psychological forces in a life space.For example, new or unfulfilled needs disrupt theequilibrium and it can only be restored when theneeds are met (Wheeler 2008). Therefore, by ana-lysing the forces in a life space, it is possible tounderstand, predict and, by altering these forces,change behaviour.

3. Psychological approach: Though Lewin oftenborrows terms from the physical sciences, heargued that ‘psychological phenomena must beexplained in psychological terms’ (Deutsch 1968,p. 415). He also argued that the elements of anindividual or group’s life space must be based ontheir perception of their reality at the time rather

than seeking to construct it from the ‘objective’viewpoint of an observer.

4. Analysis beginning with the situation as a whole:For Lewin, all ‘psychological events (thinking,acting, dreaming, hoping, etc.) are conceived to bea function of the life space’(Deutsch 1968, p. 417).Therefore, rather than attempting to understand asituation by focusing on one or two elements inisolation, one needs to consider the situation as awhole. It then becomes possible to judge theimportance, or not, of individual elements and theinterdependence of the elements in the life space.

5. Behaviour as a function of the field [life space] atthe time it occurs: Unlike many psychologists ofhis day, Lewin’s gestaltian perspective led him tofocus on the psychological forces that impinge onthe behaviour of an individual in the ‘here andnow’ (Deutsch 1968, p. 418). For Lewin (1936),behaviour is not caused by something in the past(or the future), but is grounded in the totality ofthe present situation.

6. Mathematical representations of the psychologi-cal situation: To be seen as a rigorous, scientificdiscipline, Lewin maintained that psychology hadto represent behaviour in mathematical terms(Deutsch 1968). For him, mathematics was notonly ‘logically strict’, but it was also in line withthe constructive method (Lewin 1942, p. 64).

Looking at the first five principles, it can be seenthat these are strongly influenced by gestalt psychol-ogy. The stress on constructing and understandingthe situation as a whole, the need to understand thedynamic equilibrium of the life space, and seeingcurrent behaviour as product of the here and now, areall based on gestalt psychology. However, the sixthprinciple, mathematical representation, does not flowfrom Lewin’s gestaltian roots; rather, it comes fromhis philosophy of science.

Like other gestaltians, Lewin was attracted by theparallels being drawn between the psychologicalconcept of perceptual fields and the work that physi-cists were doing on field theory (Köhler 1967).However, in the pursuit of scientific rigour, he soughtto take this parallel further than other gestaltists byattempting to base his field theory on the sameprocess of ‘mathematization’ as the physical sciences(Lewin 1949, p. 33). In this, he was strongly influ-enced by the work of the philosopher Ernst Cassirer,who tried to establish physics as the ‘paradigmscience’ (Danziger 2000, p. 341). In particular,Lewin (1949, p. 35) saw Cassirer’s development of a



‘mathematical constructive procedure’ as a way ofdetermining the relationship between general psy-chological laws and individual behaviour, which hesaw as central to applying the constructive method topsychology.

Based on the application of Cassirer’s approach,Lewin believed his development of field theory wouldbring about a scientific revolution in how psycholo-gists perceive the world, similar to the Galilean revo-lution in astronomy (Danziger 1992; Lewin 1942). Inorder to do this, Lewin maintained that psychologymust begin to use constructs such as force, locomo-tion, mass and energy, as used by physicists, as a wayof identifying and representing the forces that bringabout individual behaviour and that these conceptshad to be measured mathematically (Lewin 1944,1949; Lippitt 1939; Marrow 1969).

Lewin was convinced by Cassirer’s argument thatphysics through its mathematical rigour was the‘paradigm science’. Therefore, for Lewin, physicswas the benchmark against which all other scienceswere to be measured. Consequently, the ‘mathemati-zation’ of gestaltian field theory would raise it to thesame level of respectability as field theory in physics.Unfortunately, as will be shown later, Lewin’spursuit of scientific rigour and respectability, throughthe application of a mathematical dimension to hisfield theory, led him to lose sight of relevance.

Defining field theory

The rationale for field theory is Lewin’s belief that allbehaviour arises from the psychological forces in aperson’s life space and that behavioural change arisesfrom changes to these forces (Cartwright 1952b).Therefore, in order to understand, predict and begin tochange a person’s behaviour, it is necessary to takeinto account everything about the person and his/herperceptual or psychological environment in order toconstruct the person’s life space (Lewin 1943a). Thelife space includes only those aspects of the envir-onment that are perceived at some level, either con-sciously or unconsciously, by the individual (M.Lewin 1998). Wheeler (2008, p. 1640) observed that:‘[the] Life space is the total psychological envir-onment that the person experiences subjectively,although not necessarily consciously’.

Rummel takes a similar view of field theory:

First, it is an emphasis on a person’s subjectiveperspective. Second, it incorporates the whole that

is subjectively relevant to a person and to organizebehavior, goals, needs, desires, intentions, tensions,forces, and cognitive processes into one system.Third, the elements composing this whole areinterdependent and stand in dynamic mutual rela-tionship. Fourth, the key to the dynamic nature ofthis subjective whole is the idea of tension (energy)systems created by needs and discharged byachieving associated goals. Fifth, the dynamic psy-chological construct is that of inner-personalforces, which result from the intensity of personalneeds and the valence of associated goals. Sixth,blocked goals can lead to increase in tension and avariety of behavioral and psychological conse-quences. And finally, inner-personal conflict is theresult of opposing psychological forces. (Rummel1975, pp. 43–44)

Therefore, for Lewin (1947b), the field in which aperson’s behaviour takes place is an intricate set ofsymbolic interactions and forces that, depending ontheir valence (strength), can either reinforce orchange their behaviour.

Lewin expressed his theory in the formula:

B f p e= ( , )

That is to say, behaviour B is a function of the inter-action between the person p (or group) and theirenvironment e. (p,e) is also how Lewin defined theindividual or group’s life space (Marrow 1969). Herecognized that individuals and groups do not inhabitjust one life space, but have separate life spaces forwork, home and other activities. He maintained that,if one could identify, plot and establish the potencyof the forces in a person’s life space, it would bepossible not only to understand why individuals,groups and even entire organizations act as they do,but also what forces would need to be diminished orstrengthened in order to bring about behaviouralchange.

Lewin saw field theory as a way of combiningscientific rigour and practical relevance by offering arigorous, theory-based method for analysing behav-iour, and a practical approach to changing behaviourby allowing individuals to understand their actionsbetter. Lewin saw behaviour as the product of theenvironment and the way in which individuals inter-pret external stimuli. Field theory allows an indi-vidual or group to map out, and thus learn tounderstand, the totality and complexity of the lifespace in which their behaviour takes place, andappreciate how the forces that comprise their lifespace can be changed or reinterpreted in order to



modify their own behaviour. Consequently, forLewin, change was a learning process; he believedthat successful behavioural change could only beachieved if individuals and groups could be helped tounderstand and reflect on the forces that impinge ontheir lives (Lewin 1942).

Given what was involved in this learning process,Lewin saw behavioural change as being a slowendeavour. However, he did recognize that, undercertain circumstances, such as a personal, organiza-tional or societal crisis, the various forces in the lifespace can shift quickly and radically. In such cases,established routines and behaviours break down, andthe status quo is no longer viable. New patterns ofactivity can rapidly emerge, and a new behaviouralequilibrium or ‘quasi-stationary equilibrium’ isformed (Lewin 1947a).

Figure 1 shows a simplified example of a Lewin-ian life space. Each of the segments within the lifespace represents a different psychological force.Lewin argued that it is not sufficient to identify oneor two of the forces that impinge on the individualor group, but that all the forces, and how they relateto and interact with each other, have to be taken intoaccount (Cartwright 1952a; Lewin 1939a, 1944).Therefore, the life space presents a holistic view ofthe individual and their situation. As all parts of thelife space are interdependent, changes to one part ofthe field are likely to lead to changes in the wholefield. This is not just because of the interdependentnature of the psychological forces, but also becausethe life space as a whole is different from the sum ofthe individual forces that impinge on a person. AsLewin (1939a, p. 8) put it: any dynamical whole hasproperties of its own. The whole might be symmet-ric in spite of its parts being asymmetric, a wholemight be unstable in spite of its parts being stable inthemselves.’

The individual forces in the field are themselvessubject to change and, as they are constantly interact-ing with each other, they create a field that is in acontinuous state of dynamic equilibrium (Deutsch1968). As Lewin (1947a, p. 199) put it: ‘Change andconstancy are relative concepts; [individual and]group life is never without change, merely differencesin the amount and type of change exist.’ This is whyLewin used the term ‘quasi-stationary equilibrium’ toindicate that, while there might be a consistent rhythmand pattern to the behaviour and processes of anindividual or group, these tended to fluctuate con-stantly owing to changes in the forces or circum-stances that impinge on the individual or group.

Mapping the field: the challengeof rigour

Having established the importance of the life spaceto an individual’s and group’s behaviour, Lewin wasleft with the puzzle of how to map the life space. Oneof the criticisms gestaltians faced was that, in con-trast to behaviourists and structuralists, their workwas too qualitative. Inspired by Cassirer’s phil-osophy of science, and field theory in physics, Lewin(1940a) believed his psychological field must bebased on mathematical concepts and laws. In order toachieve this, he was drawn towards topology:

The youngest discipline of geometry called ‘topol-ogy’ is an excellent tool with which to determine thepattern of the life-space of an individual, and todetermine within this life-space the relative posi-tions which the different regions of activity orpersons, or groups of persons bear to each other.(Lewin 1939a, p. 8)

Topology is a major area of mathematics developedby physicists and mathematicians and is concernedwith mapping out the geometrical properties andspatial relations of objects such as circles andspheres. Topologists are concerned with the way inwhich the constituent parts of a space or field areinterrelated or arranged and how they change whenthe forces around them are increased or decreased(Mendelson 1990).

Figure 2 shows a simple example of how Lewinused topology to map out an individual’s life space.Within the field of forces that make up the individual’slife space, P is the individual, O represents theircurrent situation or behaviour, and G is the goal thatthey wish to achieve or the change that they wish to

Figure 1. A Lewinian life space



make. The dotted line represents the shortest pathbetween where they are in their life space and wherethey want to be. The sectors immediately above,below and behind O represent the forces for change,and those between O and G represent the forcesresisting change. The other forces in the field will alsoexert an influence on the change the person wishes tomake and will also be affected by the change.

Topology provided Lewin (1929, p. 125) with avaluable method of creating a visual representationof the forces that impinge on an individual or groupand the interconnections between these, allowing theindividual to be represented

1. as a total person with a certain structure2. as a relative unity within a psychological envir-

onment of particular topology and particular fieldforces.

This is why Lewin also referred to field theory astopological psychology. However, as Wheeler (2008,p. 1640) observed, Lewin later invented ‘hodology’(from the Greek word ‘hodos’ meaning path) to over-come what he saw as the shortcomings of topology.For Lewin, the main shortcomings were that topologyprovided only a static picture of behaviour, and it didnot allow for the measurement of forces. Lewinbelieved that ‘the concrete person in the concretesituation can be represented mathematically’ (Halland Lindzey 1978, p. 386). Though familiar with theformal mathematical systems of his day, he rejectedthese as unsuitable to his needs and so developed hisown – hodology (Kadar and Shaw 2000). As Lewincommented:

The topological space is too ‘general’ for repre-senting those dynamical psychological problemswhich include the concept of direction, distance, orforce. They can be treated with a somewhat more

specific geometry, which I have called ‘hodologicalspace’. This space permits us to speak in a math-ematically precise manner of equality and differ-ences of direction, and of changes in distance,without pre-supposing the ‘measuring’ of angles,directions, and distances, which is usually not pos-sible in a sociopsychological field. Lewin (1939b,pp. 890–891)

Hodology allowed Lewin to ‘plot possible paths fromone region to another in a topological diagram’ andto develop important theoretical constructs such as‘region, locomotion, barrier, valence, goal, force,field of force, and gradient of force field’ (Wheeler2008, p. 1640). Lewin’s new hodological geometrynot only allowed him to use mathematics to representthe forces in a group’s life space, but also to measurethem and their effect on each other. This meant thathe could understand the forces that brought about agroup’s current behaviour and also establish whichforces would need to be increased or decreased andby how much, to change that to a more desiredbehaviour (Lewin 1938, 1939a,b).

Therefore, Lewin’s field theory relied on topologyto create a static picture of a group’s current behav-iour and the mathematics of hodology to turn thisinto a dynamic model that could be used to changebehaviour. He was inconsistent in his use of termi-nology, and tended more often than not to use theterm ‘topology’ when also discussing hodology, asdid his followers (Cartwright 1952a; Marrow 1969).To try to avoid confusion, we use the term ‘topology’when referring to conventional topology and theterm ‘Lewinian topology’ when referring to themathematical-hodological variant. Though he sawLewinian topology as a major step forward for fieldtheory, as the following section shows, the result ofLewin’s foray into mathematics was to underminerather than support field theory.

Lewinian topology: the Achilles’ heelof field theory

After his death in 1947, Lewin’s work on groupdynamics, action research and his three-step modelof change was taken up by other scholars and becamethe basis of OD (Burnes and Cooke 2012). However,his work on field theory went into decline (Back1992; Deutsch 1968; Gold 1992; Wheeler 2008).This seems somewhat paradoxical, given that Lewinsaw field theory as central to all his work and as thefirst stage or foundation of his Planned approach to

Figure 2. Life space with person and goal



change (Burnes 2004a; M. Lewin 1998). For Lewin,the purpose of field theory was twofold. First, theconstruction of individual and group force fieldsallowed him to understand the forces that broughtabout certain behaviours. Second, it opened up thepossibility that, by changing some of these forces,individual and group behaviour could be changed.However, in order to do this, he believed it was nec-essary to measure the strength of the psychologicalforces within a field and to be able to calculate theeffect that changing the strength of one or moreforces would have on the rest of the field (Kadar andShaw 2000).

As his daughter explained, being able to establishthe strengths of the forces that bring about or restrainmovement, i.e. behavioural change, was central to hisconcept of field theory:

The most important dynamic concept in Lewiniantheory was that of driving and restraining forces,which are the result of positive and negativevalences [strength] of goals. With respect to anygiven goal, these forces have direction, distance,strength and point of application: the person. Theperson’s reaction to these forces is physical or psy-chological movement towards or away from avalenced region – an effect that Lewin called loco-motion. (M. Lewin 1998, p. 106)

As already observed, Lewin’s problem with topologywas that it is useful for constructing static models,but he did not consider it suitable for constructingdynamic models. This is why he developed Lewiniantopology, based on his own mathematical formulaeborrowed from physics. This can be seen in manyof Lewin’s articles and books (see for example thecollection of his papers on Field Theory in SocialScience edited by Cartwright (1952a)). Unfortu-nately, wherever Lewin replaces the elegance of hisgestalt-based field theory and his topological lifespaces with his own tortuous mathematical notation,his arguments become hard to follow. Indeed, someof Lewin’s closest supporters appeared unconvincedby his application of Lewinian topology to fieldtheory (Marrow 1969). This was particularly the casewith Dorwin Cartwright and Leon Festinger, whotried to convince Lewin to replace his own math-ematical system with more conventional statisticalmethods (Cartwright and Festinger 1943; Festinger1949). Even his patron and biographer, AlfredMarrow (1969, p. 116), was moved to comment thatLewin’s writings on topology were ‘difficult reading’and that ‘few psychologists were willing to devote

the time to the careful study of his complex system ofconcepts’. However, as Back (1992) notes, Lewinrejected any suggestion for modifying his approach,and so Lewinian topology and field theory remainedinextricably linked.

Thus, Lewin’s commitment to topology becamethe Achilles’ heel of field theory. This is a point madeforcibly by Rummel (1975, pp. 40–41) who praisedfield theory, but maintained that: ‘Lewin strode agigantic misstep in formalizing his system in uglytopological pseudopods [hodological spaces]. Heplaced the theoretical emphasis on his topology – andnot his conceptions, and his tool was inadequate to itstask.’

The irony of this is that, in terms of rigour, Lewinbelieved that psychological theories must be basedon mathematics if psychology was to be recognized atrue science. Yet it was his pursuit of mathematics –and therefore of the apparent rigour so afforded –which jeopardized his theory (Lewin and Lorsch1939). Even before his death, when he was in aposition to mount a defence, Lewin’s topologicalapproach was subject to severe criticism. Garrett(1939, p. 517) commented that: ‘Lewin contends thatit [Lewinian topology] provides the basis for a trulyscientific psychology. But many feel that it is merelya novel but cumbersome way of picturing simplepsychological situations.’

London (1944, p. 289) went further, arguing thatnot only was it ‘impossible’ to use [Lewinian] topol-ogy as a method of mapping out the life space ofhuman beings, but ‘that in any case, Lewin’s topol-ogy is not the topology of mathematics’. In effect,London is saying Lewinian topology cannot be usedin the way that Lewin sought to use it.

If the rejection of Lewinian topology by mathema-ticians raised serious questions concerning its rigour,the difficulty even his colleagues had in understand-ing and applying it raised similarly serious questionsconcerning its relevance. The tragedy is that, whereLewin and his colleagues used field theory withoutdrawing on Lewinian topology, the results weregroundbreaking: see, for example, the autocracy–democracy studies with Lippitt and White (Lippitt1939) and the Harwood studies with Bavelas andFrench (Burnes 2007).

As Deutsch (1968) and Martin (2003) bothobserved, the mathematical dimension of Lewin’sfield theory was not well developed; in essence, itwas a work in progress, which even he, with hispragmatic and ‘make do’ approach to methodology,did not always use. Unfortunately, Lewin’s early



death ended any progress that might have been made.Afterwards, few had the knowledge or motivation todefend or use Lewinian topology, and its rejectionled inexorably to the decline in interest in field theoryas a means of bringing about organizational change.Consequently, despite its undoubted value as avehicle for understanding and changing individualand group behaviour, by the 1980s, it was largelyignored or misunderstood in the organizational arena(Danziger 1992, 2000; Gold 1992). Ironically, thiswas not the case in other areas of psychology.Lewin’s field theory, without the hodological math-ematics, influenced the work of a number of promi-nent psychologists, such as the neo-behaviorism ofClark L Hull, the ecological psychology of JamesGibson (Kadar and Shaw 2000) and the child psy-chology of Jack Block (Block et al. 1981).

The re-emergence of field theory

In the 1990s, the apparent terminal decline of fieldtheory was halted. This was partly because 1990marked the 100th anniversary of Lewin’s birth,which gave rise to renewed interest in his work,including field theory. For example, the Journal ofSocial Issues published a special issue in 1992 enti-tled: ‘The Heritage of Kurt Lewin: Theory, Researchand Practice’. This contained three articles devotedto the importance of field theory (Back 1992;Diamond 1992; Gold 1992). These sought to set therecord straight as far as field theory was concernedand brought it to the attention of a generation ofscholars and practitioners for whom it was a new, oronly vaguely remembered, concept.

Another important reason for the renewed inter-est in field theory was work which was beginning toappear on the causes of resistance to change(Schein 1996). This showed that resistance wasassociated with deep-seated defensive routineswithin individuals and groups, and especially high-lighted the role played by perception (see Argyris1990, 1997; Hirschhorn 1988). This renewed inter-est in field theory was promoted by long-standingsupporters of Lewin such as Schein, whose ownresearch, like Lewin’s, had shown that resistance tochange was not something that could be trivializedor ignored:

The key, of course, was to see that human change,whether at the individual or group level, was a pro-found psychological dynamic process that involved

painful unlearning [and that] the stability of humanbehavior was based on ‘quasi-stationary equilibria’supported by a large force field of driving andrestraining forces. (Schein 1996, p. 28)

Therefore, Lewin’s work on field theory once againbegan to attract the attention of scholars and practi-tioners of behavioural and organizational change(Back 1992). Elsass and Veiga (1994) used fieldtheory as a way of examining and explaining accul-turation in organizations. Similarly, in a major reviewof resistance to change, Dent and Goldberg (1999)drew attention to the importance of Lewin’s work ingeneral and his field theory in particular in under-standing and managing resistance to change. Lidenand Antonakis (2009) also maintain that Lewin’sfield theory has been influential in developing con-tingency approaches to leadership through its stressof the importance of context. Indeed, even criticsof Lewin’s work have drawn on field theory todevelop their own models of change (Hendry 1996).There are also groups who continue to study topo-logical psychology, and even those who see it as thebasis of cognitive psychology (Smith 1994). In addi-tion, parallels have been drawn between Lewin’swork on field theory and the work of complexitytheorists, especially in terms of self-organizingsystems (Kippenberger 1998; Smith and Gemmill1991). For example, it has been argued that the for-mulation and behaviour of complex systems asdescribed by Chaos and Catastrophe theorists bearstriking similarities to Lewin’s conceptualization offield theory (Burnes 2004b).

The variant of field theory that is now in generaluse – usually referred to as force field analysis – hasbeen applied to a wide range of organizational issues,including leadership (Schwering 2003), gender (Lanand Lee 1997), TQM (Thakkar et al. 2006), profes-sional boundaries in medicine (Kathan-Selck andvan Offenbeek 2011) and IT implementation (Bozan2003). However, force field analysis is not only freeof any form of Lewinian topology, but is also free ofmuch of the underlying theoretical support providedby Lewin. As Cronshaw and McCulloch (2008, p. 90)state, those who promoted force field analysis have‘fundamentally misunderstood Lewin’s work’. If onelooks at books or websites that advocate force fieldanalysis (see for example Cummings and Worley2005; Hannagan 2007; Huczynski and Buchanan2009; Senior 2002; or Google ‘force field analysis’),one will be presented with something very similar toFigure 3.



This figure is taken from the UK National HealthService’s (NHS) Institute for Innovation andImprovement. Therefore, one might assume that anychange tools it was advocating would be well sup-ported by an understanding of the underlying princi-ples or theory. However, though the Institute’swebsite states that ‘Force Field Analysis is a manage-ment technique for diagnosing situations, developedby Kurt Lewin, a pioneer in the field of social sci-ences’, and provides a reference to a collection ofLewin’s papers which is out of print, there is nomention of field theory or its precepts (NHS Institutefor Innovation and Improvement 2008). Force fieldanalysis is put forward as a relatively straightforwardtechnique for identifying forces for change andforces against. Even more puzzling is the fact that itappears to be seen as an approach to change in itselfwithout any mention of the other elements ofLewin’s planned change. In fairness to the NHS, thisis not unusual: most of those who advocate thisvariant of field theory also ignore the bulk of Lewin’swork. This is perhaps why Boje and Rosile (2010)claim that force field analysis trivializes Lewin’sfield theory.

Certainly, the shortcomings and lack of rigour inthis watered-down version of field theory can be seenif one compares Figure 3 with Lewin’s representa-tion of a life space as depicted in Figure 2. The com-parison shows that Figure 3 is only focusing on a fewelements directly behind or in front of points O andG. Other elements within the life space, includingimportant relationships and the overall context, are

either ignored or not recognized. Schein (1996, p.28) observed: ‘For change to occur, this force fieldhad to be altered under complex psychological con-ditions because, as was often noted, just adding adriving force toward change often produced animmediate counterforce to maintain the equilibrium.’

At best, just focusing on a few obvious driving andrestraining forces, and ignoring the ‘complex psy-chological conditions’ that make up the entire lifespace, will only provide a very partial understandingof the situation, if not a misleading one. The conse-quences, or unintended consequences, of change ini-tiatives based on such poor foundations are unlikelyto be what the change initiators expected. As Merton(1936) argued, unintended consequences arise froman ignorance of the factors that are likely to influencethe outcome of an action and of any consequencesother than those expected. Force field analysis bereftof Lewin’s field theory is likely to lead to such igno-rance. In effect, ignoring the complexity of humanbehaviour by reducing it to a simple stimuli-responseformula renders unintended consequences inevitable.This may help to explain why it is estimated thatsome 60–80% of change initiatives fail (Burnes2009).

It could of course be argued that what proponentsof force field analysis are doing is taking Lewin’smathematically over-complex field theory andmaking it readily and quickly applicable to organiza-tional life, i.e. they are trying to re-establish its rel-evance. However, there are three problems with thisargument. First, most users do not appear to know

Figure 3. NHS force field analysis (NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement 2008)



that it is a simplified version of Lewin’s theory and,consequently, are not in a position to judge the valueor utility of the ‘simplification’ (see ODI 2009).Second, as argued above, while Lewinian topologymay be suspect, his gestalt-based field theory and hisuse of conventional topology to generate life spacediagrams are in themselves quite robust and usable(Burnes 2007; Lippitt 1939; Marrow 1969). Lastly,as our understanding of organizations has developed,the trend has been to move from seeing them fromthe mechanical–behaviourist perspective of Scien-tific Management to understanding them as complexand difficult-to-change social systems (Burnes2009). Unfortunately, force field analysis seems towant to buck this trend. It appears to have replacedthe complex–social perspective of Lewin’s fieldtheory with a simplistic, mechanical–behaviouristapproach.

The key issue is whether or not it is possible toapply Lewin’s field theory without Lewinian topol-ogy. To answer this question, one has to examine hismajor work on the topic: Principles of TopologicalPsychology (Lewin 1936). This is the nearest Lewingets to producing a field theory handbook. As withmost of Lewin’s work on the application of fieldtheory, it is not an easy read. However, it does have anumber of benefits that recommend it to anyoneinterested in understanding and using field theory.First, in the main it is bereft of the mathematicalformulae that pepper Lewin’s later work on the topic.In this book he uses conventional topology to con-struct life spaces rather than Lewinian topology.Second, it takes the reader through a step-by-stepprocess of understanding the principles and some ofthe practicalities of constructing and using lifespaces. Its major drawback is that it does not providethe reader with real-life examples of the use of fieldtheory, though, as the title suggests, this was not thepurpose of the book. However, in Lewin’s later work,he does show how he applied field theory to realsituations: see especially the examples given in thethree collections of his papers: Field Theory in SocialScience (Cartwright 1952a); Resolving Social Con-flict (G W Lewin 1948); and The Complete SocialScientist: A Kurt Lewin Reader (Gold 1999).

A small number of researchers have shown howLewin’s original conception of field theory, i.e.without the mathematics, can be successfully appliedto change initiatives. For example, Brager and Hol-loway (1993) applied field theory to change at a largehealth facility for elderly people. The study showsthe many elements that go to form a life space and

the complexity involved in data collection and ana-lysis. It also shows that data collection must continuethroughout the change process and that its assess-ment is not a linear process, but an iterative onewhereby, through discussion of their own behaviour,the participants gain insights into and understandingof their situation.

A second example is a study by DePanfilis (1996),which applies field theory to the implementation ofchild mistreatment risk-assessment systems. As withthe Brager and Holland study, this one demonstratesthe complexity of constructing a life space. However,though DePanfilis also discards Lewin’s mathemat-ics, she does attempt to give some weighting to theforces within the life space by labelling their impor-tance as high, low or uncertain. In addition, whatboth studies show is that constructing and interpret-ing a life space is a slow and participatory processthat needs to be facilitated by an experienced changeagent. The power of Lewin’s work, as these twostudies show, and as Schein (1996) maintains, liesnot in mathematical formalization, but in its abilityto construct life space models that identify importantpsychological forces and how they interact with eachother. The main data on which Lewin constructed lifespaces was the participants’ ‘verbal reports’, percep-tions, of their own situation (Deutsch 1968, p. 416).

Though this renewed interest in applying fieldtheory is interesting in and of itself, it takes on agreater sense of importance if two other factors aretaken into account. The first is a growing recognitionof the relevance of the breadth of Lewin’s work tocontemporary organization concerns, especiallychange, ethics and values (Boje et al. 2011; Burnes2004a; Burnes and By 2012; Coghlan and Jacobs2005; Elrod and Tippett 2002; Hendry 1996). Theargument is that Lewin’s work, including fieldtheory, is not just of historical interest, but has con-tinuing relevance for academics, practitioners andchange participants.

The second and related factor is that newer formsof OD, such as dialogic OD and AI, which are basedon a social constructionist perspective, have alsobeen linked to Lewin’s work (Burnes 2004a; Oswick2009; Van Nistelrooij and Sminia 2010). As a majorreview of OD by Burnes and Cooke (2012) argues,though Lewin is often painted as a modernist with aunitary view of reality, the gestalt psychology thatunderpins field theory maintains that individuals andgroups perceive and experience the world from theirown perspectives, i.e. they have their own view ofreality. This is interesting if one considers the criti-



cisms of Lewin from the social constructionist per-spective. For example, Tsoukas and Chia (2002) arecritical of what they see as Lewin’s static, stagemodel of change. However, if one compares Lewin’sgestaltian approach to organizational life with theirs,which stresses the role of flux, perception and sense-making, there are some intriguing parallels. A similarobservation can be made of Hatch’s (1997) criti-cisms and her own view of organizational life. There-fore, what field theory offers, counter to many ofLewin’s critics, is a method for identifying indi-vidual and group realities and creating a new organ-izational reality.

This can be seen in Boje and Rosile’s (2010)application of field theory to storytelling, which isitself a social constructionist approach to organiza-tional change (Boje et al. 2011). They use a classicLewin (1940b) example of marriage to show howmultiple realities can give rise to conflict in relation-ships and how this can be resolved by creating asingle reality (see Figures 4–6). Figure 4 shows thehusband’s life space (reality) at T1. He intends tomove closer to his wife’s position and expects her toreciprocate. However, Figure 5 shows that his wife’sappreciation of the situation at T1 is very different,she expects her husband to move away from her and,in response, intends to do the same. Figure 6 shows a

new joint reality at T2 that incorporates what actuallyhappened. Boje and Rosile (2010) argue that onlywith this joint understanding of their reality (lifespace) does it become possible for the couple makesuccessful changes to their relationship.

If one looks at AI, for example, it is possible tosee how this non-mathematical version of fieldtheory could be applied to this newer variant of OD.Appreciative inquiry is a form of action research thatincorporates dialogic OD and social constructionisttheory and comprises a four-stage approach tochange: Discovery, Dream, Design and Deliver/Destiny (Bushe 2001, 2011). As such, it has strongsimilarities to three of the four elements of Lewin’splanned change, i.e. group dynamics, action researchand the three-step model of change. Its underlyingsocial constructionist philosophy is also consistentwith Lewin’s gestalt psychology. However, AI doesnot include field theory. Yet, if one considers thatAI begins by attempting to reveal and understandthe multiple views of reality in a group or organiza-tion, and then moves on to attempt to construct anew, joint reality, this seems like a situation made forfield theory. Applying field theory to AI would havethe triple advantage of providing AI with a robustand theoretically sound approach to identifying andunifying multiple realities, facilitating the wide-spread participation that is crucial to AI (Bushe2011), and reuniting all four elements of plannedchange.

It could be argued that it would be too time-consuming and involve too many people for Lewin’sfield theory approach to change to be made to work,but that could be said of a number of organizationaltechniques. For example, large-group/whole-systemOD interventions, such as Weisbord’s (1987) conceptof ‘getting the whole system in the room’, attempt toinvolve the whole organization. Similarly, the ringisystem of decision-making, which is extensively and

Figure 4. Husband T1

Figure 5. Wife T1

Figure 6. Husband and wife T2



successfully used in Japan, seeks organization-wideinvolvement (Tennant and Roberts 2001).

To sum up, therefore, in examining field theory,we appear to be presented with three variants: first,Lewinian topology that sacrifices relevance in thepursuit of rigour; secondly, force field analysis thatsacrifices rigour in the pursuit of relevance; andlastly, Lewin’s original field theory based on gestaltpsychology and conventional topology, whichappears to possess both rigour and relevance, anddoes seem to be consistent with and useful for newerforms of OD.

Conclusion

One has to sit up and take notice when someone ofthe standing of Edgar Schein states:

Kurt Lewin was a scientist and researcher par excel-lence, yet Lewin probably contributed more to thepractice of management and to the field of organ-izational consulting than anyone in history. On thescientific front, Lewin was a genius in creating truesocial experiments that demonstrated unequivocallythe impact of leadership style and social climate onthe productivity and emotional life of the group.(Schein 1997, p. 7)

There is little doubt that Kurt Lewin was one ofthe outstanding social scientists of his day and thathis achievements were numerous (Marrow 1969).Though his work encountered fierce criticism in the1980s and 1990s (see Hatch 1997; Kanter et al.1992; Pettigrew 1985), the 1990s and especially thelast decade have seen strong support for the continu-ing relevance of his work. Hendry (1996) and Elrodand Tippett (2002) provided robust evidence for theefficacy of Lewin’ three-step model of change. Simi-larly, his work on action research and group dynam-ics has received considerable praise (Cassell andJohnson 2006; Coghlan and Jacobs 2005; Dickensand Watkins 1999). In addition, a recent review of 60years of the change literature also found significantsupport for the participative and ethical dimension ofLewin’s approach to change (Oreg et al. 2011).

Therefore, even now, more than 60 years afterhis death, his work is highly influential and centralto OD, change management, and consultancy theoryand practice (Burnes 2004a, 2007; Marion 2002).However, as this paper has shown, field theory, whichLewin considered to be the foundation on which allhis work was based (M. Lewin 1998), has not received

the same level of attention and support as otherelements of his work. Lewin’s basic argument wasthat, if one does not understand the current situation,the forces that are maintaining the current quasi-stationary equilibrium, one cannot even begin to bringabout change. Beyond that, field theory allows indi-viduals and groups to explore, understand and learnabout themselves and how they perceive the world andhow those around them perceive it.

For Lewin, this learning was only the start of thechange process; it enabled the unfreezing of behav-iour and the creation of a willingness to change.However, in order to bring about change, one has toestablish which forces to modify in the life space,and to judge what effect this would have. Toachieve this, it is necessary to understand groupdynamics, the second element in Lewin’s plannedapproach to change. In its turn, this relies on astructured, participative and iterative process foridentifying and analysing the change options andthen implementing the chosen ones. For Lewin, thisprocess was action research, the third element inplanned change. This, though, only achieves the‘moving’ of behaviour; it does not necessarilysustain – refreeze – the behaviour.

This is the importance of the fourth element ofplanned change, the three-step model, because itfocuses not just on motivating and bringing aboutchange, but also on sustaining it. As Lewin (1947a,p. 228) noted, change is ‘frequently short lived; aftera “shot in the arm,” group life soon returns to theprevious level’. This is where field theory once againplays its role. The process of participative learning,which is fundamental to field theory, allows individu-als and groups both to map out their current lifespace (their reality) and construct a new, moredesired life space (reality). However, this can only bedone if there is widespread participation, understand-ing and learning. This is why changes that areimposed or that only have superficial participationtend to bring only limited benefits – those who haveto make the changes have only limited understandingof, and commitment to, what is being changed andwhy (Burnes 2009; Oreg et al. 2011).

Lewin’s field theory was a significant break withthe contemporary view of human behaviour. Itoffered a holistic view of human behaviour thatfocused on the entirety of a person or group’sperceptual or psychological environment (Lewin1943a,b). How is it, then, that in the organizationalsphere, field theory almost disappeared from viewafter his death, and that even when it made a reap-



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pearance in the 1990s, it was mainly in a watered-down version? The answer lies in Lewin’s belief thatrigour required ‘mathematization’ (Lewin 1949, p.33). As discussed earlier, Lewin (1942) based hisfield theory on six fundamental principles. Five ofthese were derived from or were consistent withgestalt psychology. However, the sixth principle,‘mathematical representation of the psychologicalsituation’, was inspired by Cassirer’s philosophy ofscience. Mathematization was Lewin’s (1949)attempt to raise psychology to the level of the ‘para-digm science’, i.e. physics. In so doing, Lewin wentbeyond conventional topology to create his ownLewinian topology, replete with his own mathemati-cal formulae. Unfortunately, it was a topology math-ematicians rejected and most organizationalpsychologists did not or could not relate to. Conse-quently, after Lewin’s death, it went into decline.

Rummel (1975, p. 41) refers to Lewin’s adoptionof a mathematical approach to field theory as a‘gigantic misstep’. Certainly, in terms of misunder-standing the nature of rigour, it was. It was also a‘misstep’ in terms of relevance – usability – becauseit undermined two of the guiding principles of hiswork: namely, that change is a participative processand a learning process (Burnes 2004a). In his desirefor rigour, by couching his theory in complex math-ematics, Lewin made it very difficult for those whoshould have been involved in the change processeither to participate in it or learn from it. In effect,Lewin fell foul of his own guiding principle – ‘thatthere is nothing so practical as a good theory’ –because Lewinian topology was not practical, i.e. itlacked relevance, and so could not be a good theory,i.e. it lacked rigour.

However, if we remove the hodological maths, i.e.the ‘not good theory’, and concentrate on the under-lying gestalt theory and use of conventional topologyto construct life spaces of the type shown in Figure 2,we would argue that great possibilities for participa-tion and learning open up. That is to say, rather thanbreaching Lewin’s guiding principle, this re-formedfield theory restores it by aligning rigour and rel-evance. Just as Lewin demonstrated in the 1930s and1940s by working with skilled facilitators, changeparticipants can identify behavioural driving andrestraining forces (Cartwright 1952a). They canbegin to identify the secondary forces that lie aroundthese and start to understand their perceptual envir-onment. They can create a life space that is theirs andthat they understand and can learn from. They cangain insights into their behaviour – what they do and

why they do it – and learn about how to change it. Infact, they return to the essential nature of Lewin’sforce field theory and capture its real purpose, whichis not to quantify forces and relationships, but toproduce understanding about what people do andwhy they do it. In essence, it allows individuals andgroups to explore existing organizational realities,assess their appropriateness and create new organiza-tional realities. In this way, key questions can beaddressed and answered about why so many changeinitiatives fail, why resistance to change arises andwhat the real barriers to behavioural change are(Burnes 2009; Dent and Goldberg 1999; Schein1996, 1997). In particular, it provides a means ofaligning OD with complexity and social construc-tionist perspectives on change.

There is one final and important point that arisesfrom this examination of field theory and relates toits relevance to modern organizations. There is littledoubt that organizations are facing more change thanever before. There is also little doubt that, in themain, their ability to manage change successfullyappears to be inadequate to the task (Beer and Nohria2000; Burnes 2009; Rogers et al. 2006; Senturiaet al. 2008). However, field theory with the math-ematical quantification removed, but retaining itsgestalt basis and conventional topology, provides arobust and holistic approach to understanding andchanging behaviour. By allying this to the other threeelements of Lewin’s Planned approach – groupdynamics, action research and the three-step modelof change – one is presented with a powerfulapproach to bringing about change (Burnes 2004a;Cooke 2006). Crucially, in an era where the untram-melled pursuit of personal gain has led to businessfailures and economic collapse, it is an ethicalapproach to change that addresses individual andorganizational values (Burnes and By 2012; Burnesand Cooke 2012; Stiglitz 2010).

A substantial body of evidence has emerged in thelast decade to show that OD is going through a ren-aissance in its traditional heartlands and a substantialexpansion globally and that Lewin’s work lies at thecentre of this renaissance (Burnes and Cooke 2012;Mozenter 2002; Ramos and Rees 2008; Wirtenberget al. 2007). However, there is also evidence that thenewer, large-scale OD approaches to change havebeen less successful than anticipated and that a keyreason for this is the failure to achieve widespreadparticipation, or to use Weisbord’s (1987) phrase,they have not been successful at ‘getting the wholesystem in the room’. As we pointed out earlier, these



newer approaches, such as AI, do seem to incorpo-rate key elements of Lewin’s planned change, but notfield theory. Schein and others have argued that manyaspects of Lewin’s work have become fundamentalto understanding how organizations and the peoplewho populate them behave (Argyris 1997; Bargalet al. 1992; Greiner and Cummings 2004; Hendry1996; Schein 1996). The time now seems right torestore field theory to that list.

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DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2370.2012.00348.x Kurt Lewin’s Field ...s+field+theory... · Kurt Lewin’s Field Theory:A Review and Re-evaluation Bernard Burnes and Bill Cooke1 Manchester