Does Skeptical Theism Lead to Moral Skepticism?

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXXII, No. 2, March 2006

Does Skeptical Theism Lead to Moral Skepticism?

JEFF JORDAN

University of Delaware

The evidential argument from evil seeks to show that suffering is strong evidence against theism. The core idea of the evidential argument is that we know of innocent beings suffering for no apparent good reason. Perhaps the most common criticism of the evidential argument comes from the camp of skeptical theism, whose lot includes Wil- liam Alston, Alvin Plantinga, and Stephen Wykstra. According to skeptical theism the limits of human knowledge concerning the realm of goods, evils, and the connections between values, undermines the judgment that what appears as pointless evil really is pointless. For all we know the suffering of an innocent being, though appearing pointless, in fact leads to a greater good. In this paper I argue that no one who accepts the doctrines of skeptical theism has a principled way of avoiding moral skepticism.

The evidential argument from evil seeks to show that evil is strong evidence against theism. While the evidential argument comes in various versions, perhaps its most prominent version is an argument that seeks to show that the apparent pointlessness of much of the pain and suffering found in the world makes it likely that God does not exist:

1. there probably exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. And,

2. an omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.

Therefore,

3. it is probable that no omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being exists. (Rowe 1979, 335-41)

DOES SKEPTICAL THEISM LEAD TO MORAL SKEPTICISM? 403

Although there are several versions of the evidential argument, let’s dub (1)- (3) the evidential argument. The evidential argument is an argument for atheism, where atheism is the proposition that God does not exist. By God I mean that individual, if any, who is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect. A theist is anyone who believes that God exists. Evil is any case of undeserved pain or suffering by one or more beings. Some evil is caused by the free choices of moral agents; some is not. The former kind of evil is usually designated moral evil; and the latter, natural evil . In the philosophical literature on the problem of evil, evil is not typically used in the sense of immoral action, or wickedness, or wrongdoing on the part of moral agents, but as undeserved pain and suffering.

The core idea of the evidential argument is that we know of innocent beings suffering for no apparent good reason. Consider, for example, Rowe’s fawn, trapped in a forest fire, and horribly burned, lingering in anguish for days until dying. No known good is such that we know that it would justify God in permitting the pain and suffering of the fawn.’ This knowledge (or more precisely, lack of knowledge) seems to support (1). Expressing the core idea a bit more precisely:

P. No good we know of is known to justify an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being in permitting the suffering of Rowe’s fawn.

so:

Q. there probably is no good at all that justifies an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being in permitting the suffering of Rowe’s fawn.2

The inference of (Q) from (P) is the primary support upon which (1) rests. If (P) adequately supports (Q), then the evidential argument is a formidable obstacle to theistic belief since both theists and atheists typically hold that no possible world contains both God and pointless evil.

Is the inference of (Q) from (P) acceptable? An impressive array of philosophical critics has contended that it is not. Perhaps the most common criticism comes from the camp of skeptical t h e i ~ m . ~ According to skeptical theism not only is the inference of (Q) from (P) invalid, evil is not even evi-

l I will use the phrase “known good” to mean “known instance of good“ rather than “known type of good” throughout this paper (similarly, with any use of “known evil”). See Rowe 1991. Among the roster of skeptical theists one will find M.B. Ahem 1971, William Alston 1991 & 1996, Alvin Plantinga 1988, and Stephen Wykstra 1990 & 1996. Although William James was no (classical) theist, his “vivisection case” in “Is Life Worth Living?” provides a fine illustration of the skeptical theistic claim. See James 1897: 58.

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dence contra theism. As Stephen Wykstra puts it, “the suffering in the world is not, as Rowe thinks, strong evidence against theism, and in fact isn’t even weak evidence against it” (Wykstra 1990, 139): Because of our cognitive limitations, we’re in no position to judge that cases of suffering are not what we would expect in a God created universe if we were to lack these limitations. The criticism of the inference of (Q) from (P) is that we are not justified in taking the goods we’re aware of as representative of all possible goods. It may be that no good we’re aware of would justify God in permitting the suffering of Rowe’s fawn. But it does not follow, the skeptical theists asserts, that probably no good would do so. Since our grasp of goods may be biased or limited in scope, we have no good reason to think that our failure to detect a justifying good is a reliable indicator that there isn’t one.

The skeptical component of skeptical theism is intended by its proponents to be limited in scope. The skeptical theist, for example, is not thereby a fideist. External world skepticism, induction skepticism, other-minds skepticism, theological skepticism, moral skepticism, or any other kind of inap- propriate skepticism is not supposed to follow from skeptical theism. In what follows, however, I argue that the skeptical theist is in the precarious position of attempting to hold the hungry wolf of skepticism by its ears. Moral skepticism flows from skeptical theism. No one who accepts the doctrines of skeptical theism has a principled way of avoiding moral skepticism. To see this, let’s begin with a characterization of skeptical theism.

Skeptical Theism’ Skeptical theism may enjoy a venerable lineage, tracing back to the biblical book of Job, where God dismisses Job’s complaints about unjustified suffering as so much ignorance:

Who is this that darkens counsel by words without knowledge? ... Where were you when 1 laid the foundations of the earth? Tell me if you have understanding.

Following Michael Bergman’s helpful characterization of skeptical theism, I’ll understand skeptical theism as theism, conjoined with any of (S1)- ( S 3 ) :

S1: we have no good reason to think that the goods we’re aware of are representative of the possible goods there are?

Wykstra retracts this claim (calling it “impetuous”) in Wykstra 1996: 148. What I’m calling “skeptical theism” is called “defensive skepticism” by Richard Gale. See his 1996. Possible goods are goods that could obtain, whether in fact they ever do.


52: we have no good reason to think that the relations between goods and evils we’re aware of are representative of the possible relations between goods and evils there are.

S3: we have no good reason to think that the evils we’re aware of are representative of the possible evils there are. (Bergmann 2001,279)

Any theist who accepts (Sl), or (S2), or (S3) is thereby a skeptical theist. None of (Sl)-(S3) asserts that there are possible goods or relations or evils beyond our ken. Propositions (S 1)-(S3) are staunchly agnostic in their refusal to take a stand. They each assert that we have no good reason for thinking that are or are not possible goods, or relations, or evils beyond our ken. For all we justifiably believe there are, and, for that matter, for all we justifiably believe there are not.

Perhaps the goods we’re aware of are in fact representative of the possible goods. Even if that were the case, we’re in no position to appreciate that fact according to skeptical theism because of our cognitive shortcomings. Since we know that we’re fallible and probably ignorant of data that may be rele- van tda ta about the range of value, data about modal possibilities and neces- sities, data about the interconnections between states of affairs-it is no sur- prise, the skeptical theist suggests, that we cannot affirm premise (1) of the evidential argument. And if we cannot affirm (l), the evidential argument collapses as so much unsupported deadwood.

Proposition (S 1) is the claim usually proffered by skeptical theists. Because of the limited human cognitive condition, we are in no position to infer from our failure to detect a good great enough to justify God permitting a particular horrendous evil that there is no such good if (Sl) is correct. Since we do not know that our grasp of possible goods is exhaustive of all possible goods, or even representative of all possible goods, we cannot infer from the absence of a known justifying good to there being none. William Alston seeks to motivate (Sl) with his claim that:

Given what we know of our limitations-the variety of questions we don’t know how to answer, the possibilities we can’t exclude of realms of being to which we have no access, our ignorance even of many of the details of human history, and so on-how can we suppose that we are in a position to estimate the extent to which the possibilities we can envisage for divine reasons for permitting evils even come close to exhausting the possibilities open to an omniscient being? It is surely the better part of wisdom to acknowledge that we are groping in the dark in assessing the extent to which we can survey the whole field. (Alston 1996, 318)

Friends of (Sl) claim that the limitations we surmise about our cognitive powers render inferences about the full range of values just so much leaping out into the epistemic darkness. Indeed, it’s not just that we’re not justified in thinking our grasp of possible goods is representative, skeptical theists often argue that we’re justified in thinking that our grasp of possible goods is not

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representative. We’ve good reason to think our grasp of possible goods is unrepresentative.’

Proposition (S2) presumably rests on the idea that if one has no justified beliefs about the relata involved in a particular kind of relation, one probably cannot justifiably believe that a particular relation is the relation involved. If one knows little about water and nothing about HzO, one will not know that the liquidity of the former supervenes upon the chemical properties of the latter. In like manner, the skeptical theist suggests, because of our ignorance, we may be oblivious of certain deep connections between goods and evils, such that the suffering of Rowe’s fawn is in fact connected to a justifying greater good, even though it seems manifestly pointless.

Proposition (S3) is a counterpart claim to (S 1). Just as we’re in no position to think that we’re aware of all possible goods or even that the goods we’re aware of are representative of all possible goods, the same holds true for evils. Why think that the evils we’re aware are representative of all evils? The same considerations that count against our justifiably believing that we have an adequate grasp of goods count against our justifiably believing that we have an adequate grasp of evils. Proposition (S3) is an important complement to (Sl) and (S2) because of the standard analysis of pointless evil. An evil is pointless just in case it’s not necessary. An evil is necessary just in case God must permit it in order to either bring about a greater good, or to prevent an equally bad or worse evil from occurring. Notice that (Sl) fits with the first disjunct, while (S3) fits with the second.

According to the evidential argument there are cases of horrendous evil that appear not to be instrumental goods. They seem, in other words, cases that God need not permit in bringing about a greater good. A common way of understanding instrumental status is adding the value of the consequences of a state of affairs with the value of the state of affairs itself. So, a state of affairs is instrumentally good just in case the intrinsic value of it (whether good or bad), combined with the intrinsic value of its consequences (whether good OJ

bad), is good overall. According to the skeptical theist, it may be that cases of horrendous evil are instrumental goods. God must permit them to bring about a greater good. Let’s call a state of affair that’s intrinsically bad and that’s not instrumentally good, bad all things considered (or bad ATC). Likewise we’ll say that a state of affairs that’s intrinsically good and that’s not instrumentally bad is good all things considered (or good ATC). It is the contention of the skeptical theist that we’re never in position to call any state of affairs bad ATC, since, for all we justifiably believe, (Sl)-(S3) are true. If

It may be that even if the skeptical theist is correct about (SI), that’s irrelevant to the validity of the evidential argument. It’s possible both that our knowledge of possible goods is unrepresentative, while our knowledge of actual goods is representative. And the evidential argument may require only the latter. I owe this point to a discussion with Joel Pust


we’re never in position to judge a state of affairs bad ATC premise (1) is undercut. Since what seems pointless may not in fact be pointless, no one is justified in taking particular instances of suffering as pointless evil. To say that we’re never in position to call any state of affairs bad ATC entails, first, that we have no justified belief concerning the probabilities between actions or events, and their possible long-term consequences; and, second, that we have no justified belief concerning the value of an action’s or event’s total consequences. If we had justified beliefs about the relevant probabilities, and about the values of the relevant outcomes, one could have a justified belief about the moral status of a state of affairs.

In what follows I argue that any one who accepts (S l), is thereby committed to ( S 2 ) , and has no principled way of avoiding (53). But any one who accepts (Sl) , (S2), and (S3) cannot avoid what I’ll call moral myopia. And moral skepticism follows from a general moral myopia. I’ll understand moral myopia as the condition in which one is not justified in judging a particular state of affairs as bad ATC, or, as good ATC. While every one is at times morally myopic, skeptical theism leads to chronic moral myopia. The skeptical theist undercuts her ability to rely upon the (epistemic) appearances of what’s good or bad. And this undercutting results in moral skepticism. In particular, my argument is that skeptical theism leads to moral skepticism about consequentialism, and a severe truncation of deontological morality.* The argument can proceed either of two ways. The first way contends that a loss of justified beliefs about the long-term consequences of actions follows from the affirmation of (Sl)-(S3), and this loss adversely impacts moral reasoning. The second way contends that the skeptical theistic affirmation of (Sl)-(S3) drives a wedge between the appearances of good and evil, and what it’s reasonable to believe about good and evil. Developed either way the argument is sufficient to show that moral skepticism follows from skeptical theism.

As with skepticism generally, there are a variety of moral skepticisms. The kind of moral skepticism that flows from skeptical theism is skepticism about moral justification:

no one is ever justified in believing a moral proposition.

This kind of moral skepticism holds that we lack good reason to believe moral propositions, perhaps because adequate evidence is always beyond our grasp. Skepticism about moral justification entails skepticism about moral knowledge as long as knowledge entails justified belief.

* Divine command moralities elude my argument, while Natural Law moralities are truncated by my argument (in a sense to be explained later).

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Connecting the Dots

The proposition I argue for is that any one committed to (Sl) , is thereby committed to (S2), and has no principled way of avoiding ( S 3 ) . But one who accepts (Sl), (S2), and (S3) can never take states of affairs that seem obviously bad ATC as in fact bad ATC, and cannot take states of affairs that seem obviously good ATC as in fact good ATC. This inability is an instance of chronic moral myopia, and from it moral skepticism flows. The following five points generate support for the claim that skeptical theism results in moral skepticism. The first point is that (Sl) entails ( S 2 ) .

Does (Sl) entail (S2)? According to (Sl) there may be goods beyond our ken. Could there be a possible world in which (Sl) is true and humans exist, and in which (S2) is false? It does not seem so. Suppose there is a good G beyond our ken connected to observable evil E. Notice that there’ll be some relation R between G and E that is also beyond our ken: we couldn’t know about E and R but fail to know about G. Our put another away, if we have no justified beliefs about G, we cannot know that R is a relation between G and E. For every alleged good beyond our ken connected to an evil, there will thereby be at least one relation also beyond our ken. (Sl) entails (S2) since our beliefs about the relations between goods and evils cannot be representative or exhaustive if our grasp of goods is neither. That is, given what we know and do not know, we cannot see that there is a relation between the observable evil and some unknown good.

One might object that (Sl) does not entail (S2) by arguing that:

4. G and E are unknown to US.^

5 . R specifies a relation between G and E. But (6) is consistent with (4) and (5):

6. R also specifies a relation between G and E and both G‘ and E are known to us.

And if (6) were true, wouldn’t we know about R? So R could be a relation holding between things beyond our ken and holding between things within our ken. Isn’t this possible? If so, then there’s no entailment from (Sl) to (S2).

The problem with this objection is that if we knew (or justifiably believed) nothing of G and E, then we could not know (or justifiably believe) that R holds between them. Further, if we could not know (or justifiably believe) that R holds between G and E, how could we know (or justifiably believe) that our knowledge about R is representative? The relevant sense of representative here is what’s generally true relative to a specified population.

I owe this objection to Michael Almeida.


So, a sample of a population is representative just in case it captures relevant features in the correct proportions. In the example at hand, even though R is in fact representative of the limited domain of G and G’, we could know this only if we knew the relevant domain was limited to G and G’. So, even if (4)-(6) were all true, we could not know that R is representative because we know nothing about G. More generally: we could know that our knowledge about possible relations between goods and evils was representative only if our knowledge about possible goods was known to be representative.”

The second point involves this question: could we justifiably believe that our knowledge about possible evils was representative if we did not have this justified belief about possible goods or possible relations? It’s hard to see how. One way of justifiably believing that our grasp of possible evils was representative would require, in part, having justified beliefs about the relations found between various kinds of evils and various kinds of goods. But if we justifiably believe neither that our grasp of possible relations between goods and evils is representative, nor that our grasp about possible goods is not biased, this way is foreclosed. Additionally, if for any evil selected, it may be, for all we justifiably believe, both intrinsically bad and instrumentally good (and, of course, for all we justifiably believe, it may not be), and this despite the appearances, it’s again hard to see how we could justifiably believe that our knowledge of possible evils is representative since appearances are lost as a guide.

The third point is this: if we’re in no position to justifiably believe that there are states of affairs that are bad ATC, then we’re in no position to justifiably believe that there are states of affairs that are good ATC. If, for all we justifiably believe, every horrendous evil is instrumentally good, then, for all we justifiably believe, every state of affairs that seems obviously good may be instrumentally bad. The very reasons that induce our inability to recognize states of affairs that are bad ATC would induce a similar inability for good ATC.

Fourth point: if one cannot justifiably believe that a state of affairs is bad ATC, or good ATC, then one cannot make moral judgments involving that state of affairs. This is easiest seen within a direct consequentialist frame- work. An action is immoral according to direct consequentialism just in case its performance renders the world worse-off than other action one could have done. But if for any evii one picks, it may be, for all one justifiably believes, instrumentally good, then one cannot justifiably believe that performing that action would make the world worse-off. Likewise, if one is obligated to do that action which renders the world better-off than would doing any other action; and yet, for any action one picks, one cannot justifiably believe that

lo Even if (S1) does not entail (S2), only a slight revision of the argument would be necessary: any one who accepts (S1) has no principled way of avoiding (S2) and (S3).

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the performance of that action is good ATC, because, for all one justifiably believes, that action may be instrumentally bad, then one cannot justifiably believe that doing that action would make the world better-off. If one cannot justifiably believe of any state of affairs that it is bad ATC, or good ATC, then one cannot make substantial moral judgments within a direct consequentialist context.

Much the same holds for other kinds of consequentialism. For simplic- ity’s sake let’s consider only moral wrongness. According to indirect consequentialism one is wrong to do a certain sort of action just in case the consequences of everyone’s doing that sort of action would render the world worse off. Rule consequentialism holds that an action is wrong just in case it does not conform to a set of rules general acceptance of which would maximize utility. But if one has no justified beliefs about long-term consequences, one will have no justified beliefs about the consequences of everyone doing some- thing, or the consequences of a general acceptance of a set of rules, and one will thereby lack the resources required by both indirect consequentialism, and rule consequentialism with which to either judge the moral status of an action, or to adopt a rule.

Consider Kantian morality. If it’s true that never being in position to call any state of affairs bad ATC entails that no one has a justified belief concem- ing the probabilities between actions or events, and their possible long-term consequences, then Kant’s universalizability test for moral status would be ineffectual. One can effectively employ the Kantian test only if one knows enough about long-term consequences of actions to determine what would result from everyone acting on a particular maxim. Bruce Aune makes this point well, using m to represent a maxim, and G(m) to represent universaliz- ing or generalizing a maxim:

Though Kant says that the generalization of “necessarily contradicts itself,” he should not be interpreted as holding that is logically inconsistent or self-contradictory. When he asks, “How would things stand if my maxim became a universal law [of nature]?” he makes it clear that he is considering what might be called the “natural consequences” of his maxim’s being a law of nature, and these consequences are to be determined in large part by our knowledge of natural things, including morally imperfect human beings. Thus, it is only by reference to what we know about human behavior that we are entitled to conclude that, if everyone began to act on the maxim a, utterances of ’‘I promise ...” would come to be regarded as empty shams. (Aune 1979,54)

Skeptical theism, however, disavows our having the knowledge necessary to employ the universalizability test.

Deontological theories generally would suffer a severe truncation when conjoined with skeptical theism. For one thing, writers in the deontological tradition typically hold that persons have an imperfect duty of beneficence, since “. . .there are beings in the world whose condition we can make better in

DOES SKEPTICAL THEISM LEAD TO MORAL SKEPTICISM? 41 1

respect of virtue, or of intelligence, or of pleasure” (Ross 1930, 21).” But if for any action one picks, one cannot justifiably believe that the performance of that action is good ATC, because, for all one justifiably believes, that action may be instrumentally bad, then one cannot justifiably believe that doing that action would render another better-off. While one could know that one has a duty to benefit another, one would never be in a position to justifiably believe that performing or refraining from this or that action, satisfies that duty. Additionally, the supererogatory would be lost to the deontologist, since one could never have a justified belief whether one’s action would result in a state of affairs good ATC. Indeed, imperfect duties generally become otiose when conjoined with skeptical theism since one would never be in a position to justifiably believe that doing a particular sort of action here and now instead of a later action would satisfy one’s duty.’* The loss of justified belief about long-term consequences, that is, even for most non-consequentialist theories of morality, is a severe problem since one could not settle whether performing a certain action was better than performing some other action.”

Fifth point: the inability to judge states of affairs as good ATC, or as bad ATC which results from accepting (Sl)-(S3) holds for any and every state of affairs, no matter how obvious its moral status may seem. The scope of the conjunction of (Sl)-(S3) ranges over all states of affairs. If, for all one justifiably believes, the apparently neutral state of affairs of wearing a cap could be instrumentally bad, then it’s clear that the moral myopia induced is perva- sive and complete.

These five points provide good reason to hold that moral skepticism flows from theistic skepticism. If we’re rendered epistemically impotent from m- ognizing states of affairs that are bad ATC, and states of affairs that are g o d ATC, because, for all we justifiably believe they may be instrumental goods, or instrumental evils, then we are lost in a flood of skeptical doubt undercutting moral justification. Given (Sl)-(S3), no one is justified in making moral judgments. l 4

I ’

l2

l 3

Kant also holds that “to be beneficent where one can is a duty.” See Kant 1981: 21. 1 owe this point to Alexander Pruss. It may be useful to note that virtue ethics when conjoined with skeptical theism will also be truncated by the lack of justified beliefs about long-term consequences, without which it’s hard to see how we’d distinguish traits conducive to human flourishing from those that are not. Almeida and Oppy (2003) argues that skeptical theism attempts to undercut the “noseeum” inferences (roughly, inferences that move from the absence of a known X to there being no X at all) found in evidential arguments from evil fail because “noseeum” inferences are found also in normal moral reasoning, and these inferences stand or fall together. By undercutting “noseeums” in evidential arguments, “noseeum” inferences in normal moral reasoning are likewise undercut. The problem with this argument is their assumption that “noseeum” inferences stand or fall together. There’s good reason to doubt that the kind of “noseeum” inference found in evidential arguments is the same as

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So far the argument has been that any theist who accepts (Sl) is on a slippery slope toward accepting (S2) and ( S 3 ) and, finally, a slide into moral skepticism. Importantly, the same is true with any theist who accepts (S2), or ( S 3 ) . Any one accepting (S2) has no principled way of avoiding either ( S 3 ) or (Sl). By denying that one’s knowledge of the relations between goods and evils is ever representative, one is precluded from knowing whether one’s knowledge of good, and one’s knowledge of evils are representative. Also, any theist accepting (S3) has no way of avoiding (52) and (Sl). This is obvious once one realizes that (S3) entails (S2) . And with (S2) and ( S 3 ) in hand, there’s no principled way of avoiding (Sl). Taking the path of skeptical theism by accepting any of (Sl)-(S3) lands one in the quagmire of moral skepticism.

Three Objections

One might attack the fourth point by arguing that even if we cannot judge whether an evil is bad ATC, moral skepticism need not follow. For instance, G.E. Moore championed the view that “. . .whether an action is right or wrong always depends upon its total consequences.. .” (Moore 1912, 106). He also argued that lacking sufficient knowledge about causal connections and the consequences of actions, “we never have any reason to suppose that an action is our duty: we can never be sure that any action will produce the greatest value possible” (Moore 1903, 149; see also 24-7). So, according to Moore, moral myopia is a chronic and universal condition of humankind, and yet Moore was no moral ~keptic.’~ J.M. Keynes objected to Moore’s Principia argument, and suggested a way of determining our duties even if we cannot determine the probable effects of actions beyond the near future:

If good is additive, if we have reason to think that of two actions one produces more g o d than the other in the near future, and if we have no means of discriminating between their results in the distant future, then by what seems a legitimate application of the Principle of Indifference we may suppose that there is a probability in favour of the former action. Mr. Moore’s argument must be derived from the empirical or frequency theory of probability, according to which we must know for certain what will happen generally (whatever that may mean) before we can assert a probability. (Keynes 1921, 309-10)

Perhaps we might understand Keynes as distinguishing between what is objectively right (the action with the best outcome), and what is subjectively right (the action it is reasonable to believe will have the best outcome), with

that found in normal moral reasoning. Moreover, it is not even clear that moral reasoning involves “noseeum” inferences. It may be true that consequentialist reasoning does, but it is doubtful that Kantian moral reasoning does. Moore held that a useful task of Ethics is determining “which among alternatives likely to occur will produce the greatest total value. For, although this alternative cannot be proved to be the best possible, yet it may be better than any course of action which we should otherwise adopt.” Moore 1903: 150.

l5


the latter available to us, even if the former is not.I6 So, while it’s true that accepting (Sl)-(S3) precludes one from justification about what’s objectively right, one can still justifiably believe that an action is subjectively right, and in doing so avoid moral skepticism.

But notice that the distinction between what’s objectively right, and what’s subjectively right is not available to the skeptical theist, since skeptical theism forfeits not only the means of adjudicating between actions in the distant future, but also the means of adjudicating between actions in the near future. According to skeptical theism we have no good reason to think that the goods, evils, and connections between goods and evils, with which we’re acquainted are representative of the possible goods, possible evils, and possible connections there are. So, for all we justifiably believe, the evils with which we’re acquainted could be connected with very great goods, such that they are in fact good ATC. If the way things appear to us (their apparent moral status) is not a reliable guide to the way things really are (their objective moral status), then, by affirming (Sl)-(S3), the skeptical theist has lost the appearances. Just as external world skeptics contend that we’re not justified in accepting the reliability of how things seem, the skeptical theist contends that, for all we justifiably believe, the way things morally seem may be systematically misleading. The skeptical theist is entrenched in the position that, for all one justifiably believes, what seems horrendously evil is not really bad ATC. Because the appearances are lost to the skeptical theist there is no action that it’s reasonable to believe will have the best outcome, even in the near future. The appearances are lost since, if they were probative, the skeptical theistic assault against the evidential argument would lose whatever force it has, as the proponent of the evidential argument could avail herself of theresources of the appearances as a way of arguing that it is reasonable to judge a horrendous evil as p0int1ess.l~

A second objection is built upon the notion of a basic evil from Thomis- tic natural law.’’ A basic evil, or what is sometimes called “evil per se,” is an action that it is always wrong for an agent intentionally to do, no matter what instrumental benefits may follow from it. Suppose that lying were a basic evil. One could know that lying is a basic evil without knowing whether it is evil ATC, since whether lying is instrumentally good or not is irrelevant to the question of whether it is a basic evil, and wrong for one to do. Hence, morality can be retained even if no one has justified beliefs about evils ATC.

l 6 The distinction between objective and subjective right is not found in Moore. See Shaw

11 may be relevant to mention that my argument has proceeded as if (Sl)-(S3) applied to events only. But notice that (Sl)-(S3), as they stand, could apply to dispositions, habits, and propositional states generally. I owe this objection to Alexander Pruss.

1995 1 14-22.

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While skeptical theism conjoined with a Natural Law morality does not lead to moral skepticism, it does lead to a truncation of morality. With Natu- ral Law moralities an important component is a toleration principle permitting one to tolerate preventable evils as long as the consequences of doing so are great enough. For instance, if one sees a jealous man murdering Osama bin Laden because he erroneously thinks that Osama slept with his wife, one has no duty to stop the murder, even though murder is a basic evil.’’ Notice however that our alleged inability to distinguish evils ATC would be relevant here. Toleration principles would be lost to Natural Law moralities if skeptical theism were true. In addition, Natural Law moralities often ernpioy the doctrine of double effect, holding that one can perform an action with foresee- able effects, some good, some evil, as long as:

7. the act is good in itself or is morally neutral,

8. only the good effect is intended,

9. the evil effect is not a means to the good,

10. the good effect is proportionate with the evil.

Again our aileged inability to distinguish evils ATC would be relevant here, since justified beliefs about (9) and (10) would be foreclosed. The doctrine of double effect would be rendered useless. So, while skeptical theism conjoined with a Natural Law morality does not lead to moral skepticism, it does lead to a truncation of morality.

A third objection contends that while we’re in no position to judge that horrendous evils are bad ATC from God’s perspective, it does not follow that we’re in no position to judge a horrendous evil a bad ATC from our perspective. And it is this last point that’s necessary for the foregoing argument, since moral skepticism follows from theistic skepticism only if we’re in no position to judge a horrendous evil as bad ATC from our perspective.

This objection fails since it clearly follows from accepting (Sl)-(S3) that we’re in no position to judge a horrendous evil as bad ATC from our perspective. It is our ignorance and our fallibility, our perspective that is, that alleg- edly preclude us from forming justified beliefs about evils being pointless. If we cannot justifiably believe an evil pointless because, for all we justifiably believe, it may be instrumentally good, then we cannot believe an evil to be bad ATC, since, for all we justifiably believe, it may be instrumentally good.

I owe this example to Alexander Pruss. 19

DOES SKEPTICAL THEISM LEAD TO MORAL SKEPTICISM? 41 5

In Conclusion Although championed by an impressive roster of supporters skeptical theism comes at a brutal cost. It may well be, for all that’s been said here, that skeptical theism provides good reason to reject the evidential argument from evil. But that rejection comes at the expense of commonsense morality. By reject- ing the evidential argument via skepticism the skeptical theist likewise rejects our belief that we are often justified in our moral beliefs. This rejection may be exorbitant even for the theist.”

1 thank Michael Almeida, Alexander Pruss, and Joel Pust for their helpful comments. An ancestor of this paper was read at the 2004 Meeting of the Society for Philosophy of Religion in Mobile, Alabama, with Scot Davidson as the commentator.

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416 JEFF JORDAN

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Does Skeptical Theism Lead to Moral Skepticism?