Does Heavy Brigade Need Recon and Security Element

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DOES THE FORCE XXI HEAVY BRIGADE NEED AN ORGANICRECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY ELEMENT?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. ArmyCommand and General Staff College in particular

fulfillment of the requirements for thedegree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

WILLIAM J. MCKEAN, MAJ, USAB.S., Presbyterian College, Clinton, South Carolina, 1983

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas1995

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited


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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE I Form ApprovedOM6 No. 0704-018812 June 1995 I Master's The

a. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Does the Force M I Heavy Brigade Need anOrqanic Reconnaissance and Security Element6. AUTHOR(S)Major William J. McKean, U.S. Army

I . PERFORMING ORGAN IZATION NAM E(S) A ND ADDRESS(ES)

U.S. Army Command and General Staff CollegeATTN: ATZL-SWD-GDFort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900

3. SPONSOR ING/MONITOR ING AGENCY NA ME(S) A N 0 ADDRESS(ES)

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

is, 2 Auq 94 - 2 Jun 955. FUNDING NUMBERS

8. PERFORMING ORGA NIZATIONREPORT NUMBER

10. SPONSORING/MONlTORlNGAGENCY REPORT NUMBER

l2a. DISTRlBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODEApproved for public release, distributionis unlimited.

I3. ABSTRACT (Maxrmum 200wordsJThis study investigates the need for an organic reconnaissance and security element(RSE) in the heavy brigades of Force MI. The study shows the reasons futurebrigades need RSEs. The following areas were used to compare brigades with organicRSEs to brigades without organic RSEs: control of battlespace, battle command,information, protect the force, and tempo. Information from doctrine, studies,white papers, Master of Military Art and Science theses and School of AdvancedMilitary Studies monograms, and briefings were used to make this comparison.Although there are no current brigades with RSEs to compare with the currentbrigades without RSEs, there is a large amount of evidence that documents theabilities and problems of current brigades without RSEs. Simulation-based testshave directly compared brigades with organic RSEs. Simulation-based tests havedirectly compared bridges with organic RSEs to brigades without organic RSEs. Allevidence clearly shows that future brigades of Force XXI will need organic RSEs.

O SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF PAGESOrganic Reconnaissance and Security Element (RSE) 9416. PRICE CODE

II . SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 20. LIM ITA TIO N OF A8ST RAC lOF REPORT OF THIS PAGE OF ABSTRACTUnclassified I Unclassified I Unclassified I Unlimited

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCETHESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: MAJ William J. McKeanThesis Title: Does the Force XXI Heavy Brigade Need an OrganicReconnaissance and Security Element?

Approved by:

, Thesis Committee ChairmanLTC Paul R. Plemmons, M.S.

, MemberMAJ Robert D. Kunkel. M.A.

onsuMember, CCOL Kenneth R. Garren, Ph.D.

llt :ing Faculty

Accepted this 2d day of June 1995 by:

, Director, Graduate DegreePrograms Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the studentauthor and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S.,ArmyCommand and General Staff College or any other governmental agency.(References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)


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ABSTRACT

DOES THE FORCE XXI HEAVY BRIGADE NEED AN ORGANIC RECONNAISSANCEAND SECURITY ELEMENT?, by MAJ. William J. McKean USA, 94 pages.

This study investigates the need for an organic reconnaissance andsecurity element (RSE) in the heavy brigades of Force XXI. The studyshows the reasons future brigades need RSEs. The following areas wereused to compare brigades with organic RSEs to brigades without organicRSEs: control of battlespace, battle cormand, information, protect theforce, and tempo. Information from doctrine, studies, white papers,Masters of Military Arts and Science theses and School of AdvancedMilitary Studies monograms, and briefings was used to make thiscomparison. Although there are no current brigades with RSEs to comparewith the current brigades without RSEs, there is a large amount ofevidence that documents the abilities and problems of current brigadeswithout RSEs. Simulation-based tests have directly compared brigadeswith organic RSEs to brigades without organic RSEs. All evidence clearlyshows that future brigades of Force XXI will need organic RSEs.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank several individuals for their support inthe completion of this study. Due to their persistence, patience, andencouragement I was able to accomplish this task.

The good Lord, for he has made all things possible.My family, who provided the moral support, inspiration, love,

and made enormous sacrifices to see this paper to completion. Thank youLisa, Elizabeth, Clint, Pierce, and Lynne!

Colonel Kenneth R. Garren, who patiently worked tirelessly tomake my paper correct in every way possible. His encouragement,expertise, and professionalism contributed greatly to my efforts.

Lieutenant Colonel Paul R. Plemmons, who provided leadership,professional challenges, and encouragement that tremendously helped tosee this study to completion. His persistence and hard work helped methrough this difficult task.

Last but not least, Major Robert D. Kunkel, who has been amentor and a hero to me for my twelve years of service and who holds theimportant position in this cavalryman's professional life as my firsttroop commander. His dedication to me and my efforts greatlycontributed to the completion of this paper. His constant effort toassist in every way with his tactical, doctrinal, and professional

expertise immeasurably improved this study and me.


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPROVAL PAGE .............................................ABSTRACT .................................................ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CHAPTER

1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE ............................3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY............. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4. ANALYSIS...................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5. CONCLUSION.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

BIBLIOGRAPHY............. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Ec22.eii

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CHAPTER 1INTRODUCTION

You can never do too much reconnaissance.'General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It

PurwoseThis paper defines the requirement for an organic reconnaissance

and security element (RSE) in the future Force XXI brigade. It showshow an organic RSE can increase the effectiveness of the brigade. Thebrigade gains increased effectiveness from an organic RSE at the brigadelevel. This increased capability comes from the organic RSE giving thebrigade greater capability to accomplish critical reconnaissance andsecurity (screen) missions. The accomplishment of these reconnaissanceand security missions does many things for the brigade. It can make thebrigade more capable of operating independently, fighting as part of adivision and reducing risk. It also makes the brigade more capable byexpanding the brigade's battlespace, improving battle command,increasing the brigade's ability to get information, protecting theforce, and increasing the tempo. Based on the new threat and expandedmissions, this increased ability is even more important. Withinformation age technology, an organic RSE would "increase the volume,accuracy, and speed of battlefield information available to commandersu2of a Force XXI brigade. By increasing the maximum capabilities of the


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brigade to find and engage the enemy, an organic RSE could increase thebrigade's battle space. An organic RSE can increase a Force XXIbrigade's lethality. The RSE does this by providing the brigadecommander with real-time information on the enemy. With this increasein information on the enemy, the brigade can synchronize all the systemsavailable (direct fires, indirect fires, CAS (close air support), andArmy aviation). The brigade can also better use those systems where andwhen they can best destroy the enemy. An organic RSE can increase aForce XXI brigade's survivability by increasing the brigade's ability toprotect the force. RSEs can increase the brigade's capability to gainearly warning of any enemy action against the brigade. With this earlywarning, the brigade can take action to avoid the enemy's efforts.Brigades could also take actions against the enemy to preempt hisactions. The organic RSE could increase the brigade's ability tooperate at a greater tempo. The RSE can do this by giving the brigade aseparate unit to handoff enemy units and go to its next objective. Thiswould keep the brigade from dealing with each mission sequentially.Instead, the brigade could begin influencing follow-on battles andcompleting the current fight. With the increased early warning, thebrigade will increase the momentum of its operations and suffer fewercasualties. The Force XXI brigade can better dominate an expandedbattlespace with this increased lethality, survivability, and tempoprovided by an organic RSE.

BackaroundThis problem, of no organic reconnaissance and security

element, arose when the Army-of-Excellence reductions in 1984 deleted


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the brigade scout platoon to generate more positions for MilitaryPolice. Studies and investigations reveal that without an organic RSE,maneuver brigades were less effective. Unfortunately for the Army'sheavy brigades, there has been no change in the doctrinal or tacticalrequirements for reconnaissance and security tasks. Brigades havebecome less effective because of the requirement to conductreconnaissance/security tasks without the assets to do these tasks.This drop in effectiveness is critical now because the Army's heavybrigades must accomplish additional missions with fewer resources andmore new threats. The Mobile Strike Force used in the latestexperiments at Fort Leavenworth is experimenting with a brigade RSE.

Brigade commanders fight combined arms battles and engagementsemploying all tactical means available. They integrate and coordinatedifferent types of maneuver battalions, field artillery, aviation,engineer, ADA (air defense artillery), tactical air support, andsometimes naval fire support. All this is done to accomplish thebrigade mission.' Brigade commanders get battalions to the right placesat the right times and in the right combinations to defeat the enemydecisively '

Currently the brigade is the only tactical unit in the Armywithout an organic RSE. Force XXI brigades need an organic RSE "to findthe enemy, develop the situation, and to provide the commander with thereaction time and security."'

Although not doctrine, TRADOC PAM 525-5 describes how the Armyplans to fight in the future. Maneuver forces must expand theirbattlespace to achieve three distinct advantages over the enemy: first


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by a variety of reconnaissance means, identify, disrupt, or destroyenemy forces before they can effectively engage friendly forces; second,protect the force by finding the enemy, finding out his capabilities,and conducting effective security operations; and third, attack theenemy in depth and simultaneously. To accomplish these new tasks, thefuture FORCE XXI Brigades need an organic cavalry organization.

Statement of the ProblemA review of the literature about brigade reconnaissance and

security elements shows a need for further study of these inadequaciesand how the Army can resolve them. The present brigades need an organicRSE; and, even more important, future Force XXI heavy brigades will havean even greater need for an organic RSE.

This paper explored two areas to answer the thesis question,"Does the Force XXI Heavy Brigade Need an Organic Reconnaissance andSecurity Element?'

First, why do most of the studies show that the current heavybrigade needs an organic RSE? This paper analyzed the reasons to seewhich apply to future brigades in future situations.

Second, based on future threats. doctrine, and currentexperimentation/studies on future operations and units, does the ForceXXI heavy brigade need an organic RSE?

Assum~tionsThis study made three assumptions. First, current budget and

personnel reductions will continue to negatively affect the forcestructure of the Army. Second, integration of new weapons and equipment


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systems into the U.S. Army will continue. Third, the new threat willrequire future ForceXXI brigades to accomplish more reconnaissance andsecurity tasks. The solutions to the problems presented in this paperwill not follow the zero growth constraints enforced by TRADOC. Thepaper will also attempt to solve the brigade's reconnaissance andsecurity problems now and in the future. Recommendations presented willalso conform to doctrinal standards.

LimitationsThis research project has the limitation of force structure and

an inability to find out the effect on the future force of budget andzero growth constraints.

Delimitations

This paper will not try to decide whatfuture technology cando. The recommendations will aim at solving the problems in brigadescaused by an absence of an organic RSE. The paper will also recommendhow the RSE can be an integral part of the Army's new ForceXXIbrigades. This project will limit the research and study to the GulfWar and results at the NTC (National Training Center). This paper willstudy and recommended elements for brigade RSEs from the ones currentlyrecommended by different agencies in theArmy.

$ianificance

Previous studies recommended organic RSEs at the brigade levelbased on past threats and technologies. These studies andinvestigations did not incorporate a consideration of new threats andnew technologies currently in or being considered for use in


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reconnaissance and security elements. This paper will study and analyzethe requirement for an organic RSE based on today's updated threats andtechnologies. The new threat promises to create a greater need toremove unknown factors. The Army must restudy the question of the needfor an organic RSE in the brigade because of the recent changes in thethreat and new technologies. The Army's new Force XXI must include thenewest and most relevant answers or solutions to this need. In studyingthis problem, the Army must consider new doctrine describing how it willfight in the future. New results from studies and experiments conductedby the battle labs must also be considered in studying this problem.The new battlefield is more demanding on the commander. His requirementto see the battlefield is greater than ever before. New doctrine iscalling for commanders to better protect their forces with newtechnologies against these new threats. An organic RSE would allow thebrigade commander to expose the RSE while employing all the assetsavailable. The ability to see the battlefield allows the commander to

effectively employ the brigade. With the brigade's modernized systemsand increased lethality, the brigade commander must have an organic RSE.A commander can only maximize the effects if he can clearly see thebattlefield. During the Army's reorganization to reduce its size andbetter its ability to meet the new threat, reconnaissance and securityelements may represent an economic way to exploit a brigade's firepowercapabilities.

DefinitionsDefinitions are according to Field Manual 71-100, Division

Qwerations, dated June 1990; Field Manual 71-3, Armored and Infantry


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Briaade, dated 1988; Field Manual 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized InfantrvBattalion Task Force, dated 1988; TRADOC PAM 525-5, FORCE XXIQPERATIONS, dated August 1994; and Student Text-Mobile Strike Force-94PW. Qwerational Concewts for the Mobile Strike Force, dated 1994.

Battle Command is the art of decision making, leading, andmotivating soldiers and their organizations into action to accomplishmissions. It includes visualizing current state and future states, thenformulating concepts of operations to get from one to another at leastcost. It also includes assigning missions, prioritizing and allocatingresources, selecting the critical time and place to act, and knowing howand when to make adjustments during the fight.=

Battleswace components of this space are determined by themaximum capabilities of friendly and enemy forces to find and dominateeach other by fires and maneuver and in the electromagnetic

Broadcast Intelliaence is the capability to rapidly provideaccurate/real-time intelligence (all levels) to the lowest possibletactical level, precluding the layered procedural intelligence flow ofin rmation.'

Devth ~ m u l t a n e o u sttack are the simultaneous applicationof combat power against an enemy throughout the depth and breadth of thebattlefield; objective goes beyond defeating the enemy; objective is toaccelerate enemy defeat '

Information Aaa is the future period when social, cultural, andeconomic patterns will reflect the decentralized, nonhierarchical flowof inforrnati~n.'~


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Inf io a are continuous combined-arms operationsthat enable, enhance, and protect the commander's decision cycle andexecution while influencing that of an opponent's; operations areaccomplished through effective intelligence, command and control, andcommand and control warfare operations, supported by all availablefriendly information systems; the Army conducts battle commandinformation operations across the full range of military operations.''

laence is the product resulting from the collection,evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all availableinformation concerning an enemy force, foreign nations, or areas ofoperations that are immediately or potentially significant to militaryplanning and operations.

Securitv Owerations, FM 71-100, describes operations thatprovide information about the enemy and provide reaction time, maneuverspace, and protection to the division.'' Security operations alsorequire aggressive reconnaissance to reduce terrain and enemy unknowns,gaining and maintaining contact with the enemy to ensure continuousinformation, and providing early and accurate reporting of informationto the protected force. Security operations may orient in any directionfrom a stationary or moving force characterizes security operations."

Dbservation Standoff is the ability to observe the enemywithout being observed by the enemy. A technological advantage usuallygains observation standoff. This standoff allows friendly forces tobring fires on the enemy while protecting the force by not allowing theenemy to observe and bring fires on the friendly forces.


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Endnotes'patton George S., Jr. liar As I Knew It Cambridge, MA: The

Riverside Press, 1947.2U. S. Army, TRADOC Pam 525-5, FORCE X I PERATIONS (Ft. Monroe,

VA: Department of the Army, Headquarters, United States, Army Trainingand Doctrine Command, 1 ~ugust 994), 1-5'u. S. Army, Field Manual 100-5. Doerations (Washington, DC:Department of the Army, 1993), 2-214 .Fleld Manual 100-5, 2-21'~ield Manual 100-5, 2-23%. S. Army, D O C am 525-5. FORCE XXI OPERATIONS U. S. ArmyTraining and Doctrine Command, Ft. Monroe, VA, Department of the Army, 1

~ugust 994, Glossary-17 DOC Pam 525-5. FORCE XXI OP- Glossary-18 C Pam 525-5. FORCE XXI OPERATIONS Glossary-19 C Pam 525-5. FORCE XXI OPERATIONS Glossary-2l " ~ R A ~ ~ ~am 525 5. FORCE X I PERATIONS Glossary-411 DOC Pam 525-5. FORCE XXI OPERATIONS Glossary-412u. S. Army, Field Manual 71-100, Division Ooeration~(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1990). 1-18.


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CHAPTER 2REVIEW OF LITERATURE

WroductionThis chapter provides a review of the literature which affects

the need for an organic reconnaissance and security element (RSE) in theForce XXI heavy brigade. The review groups information from each ofthese sources as it pertains to the following category: Will thebrigade fight independently? Will brigades fight as part of a division?What is risk to brigades without RSEs? Does an organic RSE improve abrigade's: control of battlespace, battle command, information, threat,protect the force, and tempo?

This chapter consists of a review and analysis from thefollowing sources: (1) doctrinal manuals, (2) government studies, ( 3 )whitepapers, Masters of Military Arts and Sciences theses and School ofAdvanced Military Studies monograms, (4)Combat Training Center/Gulf WarExperiences, and (5) briefings. The period of the literature discussedin this chapter is 1983 to the present.

Kill brisades fisht indewendentlv in the future?Doctrine

FM 100-5, Army Operations contains much support for the need ofan organic RSE in the brigade. It describes brigade operations in thesame way it describes divisions and corps operations.


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Division and brigade commanders fight combined arms battles andengagements employing every tactical means available. Theyintegrate and coordinate different kinds of maneuver battalions,field artillery, aviation, engineer, ADA, tactical air support,and, sometimes, naval fire support to accomplish brigade anddivision missions. . . . Corps, division, and brigade commandersget battalions to the right places at the right times and in theright combinations to defeat the enemy decisive1y.l

FM 71-100, pivision Owerationq, like FM 100-5 states thatbrigades can operate independently/semiindependently. "It [Brigade] canbe employed in independent or semiindependent operations when properlyorganized for combat."'

FM 71-3. Briaade Owerations, contradicts FM 100-5 and FM 71-100. It does this when it says, "Brigades do not act independently butas part of a division or corps that conducts combat operations to attainoperational goals."' The date of this manual is 1988. This was a timewhen the threat and the US force were far different from how they existtoday. Due to recent changes, it is reasonable to assume that FM 71-3no longer reflects the current potential of brigades fightingindependently. Newer manuals mention the possibilities of brigadesfighting independently.

FM 71-100 discusses the importance of reconnaissance in itsrelation to the IPB (intelligence preparation of the battlefield)process. It also shows the brigade's dependence on the division forthis reconnaissance and intelligence. Reconnaissance operations provideinformation on the terrain and enemy to the division commander, maneuver

brigades, and staff. Reconnaissance verifies or refutes analyzedinformation in the IPB pr~ducts.~


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StudiesThe Reconnaissance and Security Study is especially informative

because it is recent (1993), and contains a simulated battle of a futureconflict. On this future battlefield, units with today and tomorrow'sorganizations and equipment fought an updated threat. The studycompared brigades with organic RSEs to brigades without organic RSEs.The study determined "the brigade may require R&S [reconnaissance andsecurity1 elements if it is to be a full-blown maneuver force." Thestudy also identified "The addition of a brigade RSE showed value inthat it helped the brigade commander maintain control over the momentumof the battle, leading to timely success with fewer cas~alties."~ hisinformation comes from the only head-to-head comparison found. Theresults show the increased capability an organic RSE can add to abrigade operating as part of a division. A brigade fightingindependently will required this increased capability even more.

The Army of Excellence (AOE), Volume 111, removed thereconnaissance and security element from the brigade. The maneuverbattalions and the division's cavalry squadron were to accomplish thereconnaissance missi~ns.~ he crucial issue here is the force reductionwithout a reduction or loss in the need for this element was the reasonfor the loss of this platoon. The organic brigade RSE was taken fromthe force structure, but none of the missions went away.

Combat Training Centers and Gulf War ExperiencesThe Deputy Commanding General for Combat Developments states,

"Clearly, there is still a need for a security element. The idea should


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articulate a force projection Army flavor with brigades deployed asindependent elements when the Divisional Cavalry is not available."'This supports the need for an organic brigade RSE. It also supports twopossibilities which may make the requirement for an organic RSE evengreater in the future. These possibilities are: the brigade may deployindependently when divisional cavalry is not available, or the divisioncavalry may not be available when the brigade is operating as part ofthe division.

Under Army operations, the focus on nonlinear operationsemphasizes the need for an organic brigade RSE. Army operations willrequire brigades to frequently operate independently of their divisions.The brigade RSE will increase the brigade's ability to conductindependent operations.

Effective reconnaissance is essential for survival on thebattlefield. All army echelons, from theater to company, have specificreconnaissance and security requirements. To meet these requirements,

all army echelons from corps to battalion have organic reconnaissanceunits except the divisional brigade. Initially, the Army viewed thebrigade merely as a field headquarters designed to provide command andcontrol to a variable number of maneuver battalions. The Army did notallocate the brigade headquarters any organic combat forces of its own.However. FM 71-123, Tactics and Techniuues for Combined Arms Forces:&n&xBrisade. Battalion Task Force. and Comwanv Team, and FM 71-3describe brigade level reconnaissance and security missions.

Combat experience gained from Operation Desert Storm andoperational tests prove the need for brigades to be able to provide for


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their own reconnaissance and security. To meet this need, the brigadecomnander must have an organic unit that can conduct reconnaissance andprovide security.

BriefingsThe briefing on Brigade Reconnaissance and Security Element

identified brigade needs differ from divisional needs. The brigadecommander cannot expect the divisional cavalry to meet brigade needs.Brigade commanders cannot expect any cavalry between brigade and enemy.Battalion scouts are not flexible or robust enough to do the job for thebrigade.

Biaade fiuhts as wart of a division?Doctrine

FM 71-3 states, "Brigades do not act independently but as partof a division or corps that conducts combat operations to attainoperational g~als."~ithout a doubt, this was and still is thepreferred method of fighting a brigade. It is more possible the Armymay employ brigades independently now than ever before. The Army mayalso employ brigades as part of a division. Although this doctrinestates brigades do not fight independently, future situations may forcebrigades to fight independently. Because of this possibility, the Armymust organize the Force XXI brigade to be capable of fightingindependently.

Combat Training Centers and Gulf War ExperiencesFrom the National Training Center experience it has been

observed that Division/Corps intelligence support is fifteen to thirty


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kilometers forward of the Forward Line of Troops (FLOT). This does notgain the brigade the required information on the enemy five to fifteenkilomet,ers forward of the FLOT as required for a brigade deliberateattack (DATK) lo

In a report from the NTC, Lieutenant Colonel John D.Rosenberger, Senior Brigade Trainer, states that the requirement for anorganic RSE at the brigade level is essential. He states that thebrigade commander needs an RSE because the brigade has a doctrinal andtactical requirement to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance, but noorganic capability to satisfy his requirements. Lieutenant ColonelRosenberger also points out that divisions have limited assets tosatisfy the brigade commander's requirements within his battlespace.

After action review (AAR) comments from 1st Brigade, 1stCavalry Division, 19 March 1990 state that there is a clear anddemonstrated requirement for the brigade to have an organic light scoutcapability. The AAR also states that the brigade can task subordinateunits for reconnaissance assets, but this detracts from the task forcecollection plans. The brigade information requirements are normallymuch deeper on the battlefield where stealth is essential to missionsuccess. A major concern of the brigade remains thecounterreconnaissance battle." All these requirements come frombrigades which fought as part of a division.

DoctrineA doctrinal review of FM 71-123 and FM 71-3 describes brigade

reconnaissance and security tasks. FM 71-3 requires establishment of a


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security force for offensive operations. These tasks are additional tobattalion and division reconnaissance and security tasks. Currentdoctrine recognizes brigades must currently employ subordinate units inbrigade reconnaissance and security roles. When brigades either do ordo not accomplish at a cost to other forces, these doctrinal andtactical tasks increases the risk to the brigade and subordinate units.

DoctrineFM 100-5 describes the need of future leaders to see/know the

elements within their battlespace and how acquisition is part ofexpanding battlespace. An organic RSE can conduct reconnaissance andsecurity to provide information for acquisition.

Within a given battle space, commanders must understand the effectsof geography and terrain, appropriately apply use of organiccapabilities, and integrate joint and combined assets that can bebrought to bear against the enemy. . . . Battle space is thephysical volume that expands or contracts in relation to theability to acquire and engage the enemy.12

A brigade with the addition of an organic RSE can accomplish this.

StudiesIn the Reco~aiSSance nd Security Study, the brigades with

organic RSEs increased the battle space of the brigades. Depending onmission, enemy, terrain, and troops available time (METT-T) andcommunications ranges, the brigade RSE in the offense could operate upto twenty five kilometers forward of the battalions in the brigade."


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Combat Training Centers and Gulf War ExperiencesThe brigade commander requires a security force that can

operate well forward, to the flanks, or rear of, the main body.Security missions may include screen, rear area security, or both.Inherent to all security operations is the mission of counterreconnaissance. This security force is essential if the brigade is tomaintain the freedom to act without enemy observation or interference.14

BriefingsThe briefing "Reconnaissance and Security," under MAPEX

INSIGHTS states battalion scouts cannot get out far enough to satisfybrigade timelines.

Battle CommandStudies

Brigades in The Reconnaissance and Security Study determinedthey could accomplish the brigade mission without a brigade RSE, butwith slower tempo and increased casualties. The Brigade with an organicRSE gained benefits gained from the addition of an organic RSE. Anaddition of a brigade RSE showed value in that it helped the brigadecommander maintain control over the momentum of the battle.15

An RSE allowed the brigade commander to concentrate on brigadeconcerns without degrading the battalion's scouting capability. The RSEalso provided a needed key element between the division cavalry.squadron and the fighting battalions. Conduct of passage of lines isone example where they would be a major asset.16


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Combat Training Centers and Gulf War ExperiencesThe CALL Newsletter, No. 92-X, May 92, Reconnaissance,

OPERATION DESERT STORM EPILOGUE identifies the requirement for anorganic scout capability at the brigade level. Brigade commanders whoorganized reconnaissance elements enhanced their ability to see andcontrol the battle.'? This enhanced ability to see and control thebattle is an improvement in the brigade's battle command.

In Lieutenant Colonel Rosenberger's report he states that thebrigade commanders have the requirement to protect the force, provideearly warning, and emplace/guide long range killing systems to setconditions for controlling the battlefield. The brigade must ensure theemplacement of early warning assets with minimum risk to U.S. soldiers.Force protection is a prerequisite for offensive and defensive successfor the brigade. Force protection is a function of effectivereconnaissance and surveillance operations.''

Effective employment of the brigade RSE will allow the division

commander the freedom to concentrate his cavalry in the critical areasof the division. This keeps the division commander from attempting tocover the entire division front with this limited asset.

An organic RSE can improve battle command by helping brigadecommand and control. Helping brigade command and control includes allefforts directed toward strengthening the brigade commander's ability toinfluence, direct, and shape the battle. Command and controlenhancement may include, but is not limited to, helping brigademovement, maintaining or reestablishing contact with friendly units, andsupporting the execution of multiple, simultaneous, brigade missions.


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BriefingsThe briefing "Brigade Reconnaissance and security Element" by

the U.S. Army Armor Center and School on 15 January 1992 states that theRSE provides the brigade commander with an organic reconnaissance andsecurity capability which meets the reconnaissance and securityreguirements. Doctrinal publications, Operation Desert Stormexperience, and operational tests provide these reconnaissance andsecurity requirements.

Brigade RSEs enhance a brigade commander's ability to exploitcommand and control, intelligence, and maneuver in both the offense anddefense. In the offense the RSE can provide reconnaissance and flanksecurity. Reconnaissance identifies trafficable routes and terrain forthe brigade. Flank security provides advance warning and counter-reconnaissance. In the defense the RSE can provide reconnaissance,screen, counterreconnaissance, and retrograde.

The briefing "Reconnaissance and Security", RADOC AnalysisCommand--Operations Analysis Center, Fort Leavenworth, 21 January 1993states that there are times when the brigade commander needs somecapability to develop and synchronize the battle. The briefing alsobrings out that without the division cavalry, the brigade commander doesnot have the organic assets to fill the human intelligence gap.''

LnformationDoctrine

FM 100-5 describes how information gathered from reconnaissanceand security operations enables a commander to see the battlefield.Seeing the battlefield allows a commander to assess the situation and


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direct the military action required to achieve victory. "Ultimately,they [leaders at all levelsl, must assimilate thousands of bits ofinformation to visualize the battlefield, assess the situation, anddirect the military action required to achieve victory."20

FM 100-15 states because of future threats, our leaders need to"Promote bold, innovative risk-taking and the immediate exploitation ofopportunities within the context of the commander's intent."21 A leaderneeds information gained through good reconnaissance and securityoperations to see and find opportunity he can immediately exploit.

FM 71-3 highlights the absence of an RSE of enemy information,During the operation, the brigade 52 provides the commandercontinuous updates of enemy activities and anticipated enemycourses of action. His sources include reports from MI assets,eavesdropping of battalion operations and intelligence nets,analysis of reported sightings, and situational templates of theenemy. 2

There is no organic RSE to give the brigade commander and S-2 adirect and responsive source of information on the enemy.

FM 71-3 describes a critical reconnaissance mission, but thebrigade has no organic asset to accomplish it. "The brigade conductsaggressive reconnaissance to identify enemy locations, obstacles, andareas of possible NBC contamination and prepares to overcome obstaclesand rapidly pass through defiles."23 An organic RSE could improve abrigade's ability to accomplish these tasks

StudiesDivision 86 Analytical Methodology states,

Technology has helped the commander a great deal in this task[seeing the battlefield] with radar, aerial reconnaissance andspace assets. However, the brigade commander has no asset that isorganic that can help him "see" on the battlefield the place he


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really needs to 'see'. In order for the Division Commander to"see" the battlefield, his brigade commanders must be able to seethe battlefield and anticipate what tactics and forces he needs toemploy. 4

This shows that the ability of brigades to see the battlefield affectsthe ability of divisions to see the battlefield.

This study highlights the problem at brigade level and theproblem caused to other units because of the reconnaissance and securitygap at brigade level.

The Cavalry/Reconnaissance Net Assessment--Master Planaddresses the need for an RSE. It states that the need for morereconnaissance is the inability of long-range sensors to see throughreduced visibility conditions. Also, battle tempo requires commandersto have prompt and accurate information to exploit high technologysystems. The study also identifies what an RSE could do for thebrigade. The brigade scouts would unburden the already over-taskedbattalion scout platoon and provide significant command and controlassistance to the brigade commander. The depth and width of the brigadesector and the time needed to react to enemy formations demand that thebrigade commander have an organization able to provide him timelyinformation in his area of concern.25

General Officer Executive Committee (GOEC) 1988 statesobservations from the CTCs and comments by field commanders throughoutthe Army indicate an inability of battalions and brigades to routinely

conduct adequate reconnaissance of the battlefield, provide adequateforce security, and defeat enemy reconnaissance forces. Battalion andbrigade maneuver forces are not winning the reconnaissance/securitybattle "


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The Reconnaissance and Security Study states,The analysis showed that, even with various divisional cavalrydesigns, there were situations where the brigade R&S[reconnaissance and security1 requirements were not met. This wasparticularly evident when the scenario involved the forcemaneuvering and other HUMINT assets were unavailable. Transitionsfrom reconnaissance to combat situations put division R&S assets atrisk. These shortfalls are areas where an RSE could be aneffective resource for the brigade ~ommander.~'

The Reconnaissance and Security Computer-Assisted Map Exercise(CAMEX) described many specific benefits the organic RSEs gave thebrigades. The Blue (U.S. Amy) commander viewed the greatestversatility of the R&S element was in the near (close) fight. Knowingthe disposition of major enemy formations, the brigade commander feltthere was sufficient time to posture the main body forces to meetpotential threats. The R&S element's primary function was to find thesmall, isolated threats, deal with them within capability, or quicklybypass, passing the destruction to the main body. Major intelligencesystems and UAVs would have difficulty identifying and locating thesehigh-resolution threat^.^'

White Papers/MMAS and SAMS MonographsThe SAMS monograph "Ground Reconnaissance in the Heavy Corps:

Do Tactical Assets Match Mission Requirements?" states,The most glaring deficiency for the ground reconnaissancecapability within the corps is the lack of any organic groundreconnaissance organization at the brigade level. Such anorganization is required both by the missions a brigade receives,and the size of a sector or zone in which a brigade may operate.This supports the idea that a brigade commander needs verificationof information provided by division, detailed information forplanning, and near real-time information on enemy movements. Italso highlights the importance of the brigade RSE in terms ofimportance within the corps ground reconnaissance ~apability.'~


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This analysis deals with the layering effect. The layeringeffect is the need for reconnaissance at all levels from Corps toBattalion. An information gap forms without reconnaissance at everylevel, as with current brigades, which adversely affects the unitmissing the reconnaissance element and the total reconnaissance system.This gap at brigade level also reduces the brigades' ability to operateindependently.

Combat Training Centers and Gulf War ExperiencesAAR Comments, 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, 19 March 1990

states that the brigade can task subordinate units for reconnaissanceassets, but this detracts from the task force collection plans. Thebrigade information requirements are normally much deeper on thebattlefield where stealth is essential to mission success.30

The CALL Newsletter, No. 92-X, May 1992, Reconnaissance,OPERATION DESERT STORM Epilogue, states that brigade commanders, whoorganized reconnaissance elements, enhanced their ability to see andcontrol the battle. 1

In a memorandum, Requirement for a Heavy Brigade ReconnaissanceCompany, Lieutenant Colonel John D. Rosenberger, Senior Brigade Trainer,Operations Group, NTC, makes many salient points in support of anorganic RSE for the brigade. First. he believes the Army needs areconnaissance company working for the brigade commander. Second, he

recommends the NTC support the heavy brigade reconnaissance companyinitiative. Third, he says that the heavy brigade reconnaissancecompany could fix the current inability of the brigade commander "to seeand acquire" the enemy five-to-fifteen kilometers forward of the FLOT.


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The reconnaissance company overcomes this "show stopper" at the tacticallevel of war. The reconnaissance company allows the brigade commanderto create the conditions for success throughout the width and depth ofthe battlefield. Division/Corps operational intelligence supportfifteen to thirty kilometers forward of the FLOT does not gain therequired information on the enemy five to fifteen kilometers forward ofthe FLOT as required for a brigade deliberate attack (DATK)."

Prerequisites for offensive and defensive success are reactiontime and maneuver space. The import point is, all (offensive/defensiveprerequisites for success) depend on effective reconnaissance andsurveillance operations.

In the "Operations Concept For Brigade Reconnaissance andSecurity" the brigade has reconnaissance and security requirements thatdiffer from division and battalion requirements. Divisional cavalry isresponsive to the needs of the division commander, which often differfrom the needs of the brigade commander. The brigade commander may findthe divisional cavalry assigned to flank security missions or operatingin front of another brigade. Without a brigade RSE, the brigadecommander cannot expect that there will be any reconnaissance andsecurity forces between the brigade and the enemy other than his ownbattalion scouts. Brigades without RSEs may often operate without therequired information to successfully conduct their mission.

Brigade RSEs will enhance the brigade commander's ability toexploit the battlefield operating system of intelligence. Inintelligence, the brigade RSE will represent an intelligence collectionasset directly responsive to the brigade commander. The RSE will


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provide detailed intelligence about terrain and enemy activitythroughout the brigade sector. Brigade RSEs will be valuable working inareas outside the battalion areas of operation. The reconnaissance doneby the brigade RSE will enable the brigade commander to see thebattlefield. This will allow the brigade to exploit the opportunitiesoffered by terrain and enemy dispositions.

BriefingsThe briefing "Brigade Reconnaissance and Security Element"

states that brigade RSEs enhance a brigade commander's ability toexploit intelligence in the offense and defense. In the offense the RSEprovides intelligence from reconnaissance and flank security.Reconnaissance identifies trafficable routes and terrain for thebrigade. Flank security provides intelligence from advance warning andcounter-recon. In the defense the RSE provides intelligence fromreconnaissance, screen, counter-recon.

The briefing "Force Design Update Winter 1 9 9 2 , " ForceDevelopment Department, Combined Arms Center-Combat Development, FortLeavenworth reveals that in the decreased force density places a premiumon reconnaissance and security forces. Commanders at every echelon havethe requirement to secure their force and have the need to see thebattlefield. Brigade commanders cannot delegate responsibility tosecure their force.

The briefing "Reconnaissance and Security Review," Backgroundand environment, 16 June 1 9 9 2 states that observations from OperationDESERT STORM show that many brigade commanders want an organicreconnaissance element. It also points out that several brigades


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rotating through the CTCs organize ad hoc reconnaissance elements atbrigade level. Further, during the 1991 and 1992 FDU (Force DesignUpdate) process, the addition of a brigade reconnaissance/securityelement to heavy brigades was presented. The reasons for this were theintelligence system does not develop the situation and the uncertain andchanging environment.

Further, the IPB on the future battlefield is more vague andless precise. Sensors can supplement but cannot replace goodreconnaissance. 3

The briefing "Reconnaissance and Security," TRADOC AnalysisCommand--Operations Analysis Center, Fort Leavenworth, 21 January 1993states that there are times when the brigade commander needs thecapability to develop and synchronize the battle. The study also bringsout that without the division cavalry, the brigade commander does nothave the organic assets to fill the human intelligence (HUMINT) gap.34The MAPEX INSIGHTS sight the brigades need for human reconnaissancecapability 35

The briefing mReconnaissance and Security," TRADOC AnalysisCommand, provides some important information. In the NEA (North EastAsia/Korea) scenario insights, it was found JSTARS effectiveness waslimited because the threat was stationary. Signal intelligence (SIGINT)was limited because the threat was not transmitting. All this madeHUMINT resources critical."

MAPEX INSIGHTS also said battalion scouts cannot get out farenough to satisfy brigade timelines.


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The briefing states. the brigade intelligence needs differ fromdivisional needs.

The briefing "Reconnaissance and Security Review," U.S. ArmyCombined Arms Center, 30 ~pril 992 provides a brief history of thebrigade RSE problem. The history starts with the fact that Division 86brigade HHC (headquarters and headquarters company) design contained asix cavalry fighting vehicle (CFV) scout platoon. Then, duringtransition to AOE (1984) the Army eliminated the brigade scout platoon.Subsequent studies reasserted the need for brigade scouts. Finally, theRecon/counterrecon/surveillance assessment recognized the brigade neededto see deeper. The common thread is, the brigade commander needs thecapability to "see over the next hill."

ThreatCombat Training Centers and Gulf War Experiences

In the report Operational Concept for Brigade Reconnaissanceand Security Operations, Major General Thomas C. Foley, Commandant, U.S.Army Armor School, presents strong arguments for the requirement of anRSE at brigade level. A brigade requires an organic RSE for manyreasons. The reasons are future threat, the brigade commander's needs,and requirements of Army Operations.

Under threat, the report provides key issues. Thedisintegration of the Soviet Bloc has been associated with decreasingstability in the global community. Many areas subject to increasedturmoil and instability may be of vital interest to the United States.Some nations and alliances in these areas possess regional militarycapabilities equivalent or nearly equivalent to member states of the


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former Warsaw Pact. These capabilities include modern main battle tanksand aircraft. large standing armies, and advanced command, control, andcomunications technology. These forces must be considered capable ofaggressive, robust reconnaissance down to the regiment or brigade leveland the ability to defend in depth.

BriefingsThe briefing "Force Design Update Winter 1992" maintains the

Army designed its force for a battlefield significantly different fromthe battlefield of today. In the past, units relied on secure flanksand adjacent units. Now units cannot rely on secure flanks. A unit'sability to template the future battlefield will be less precise in thefuture '7

The briefing "Reconnaissance and Security Review," Backgroundand environment, 16 June 92, states that brigades need an organic RSEbecause of an uncertain and changing environment.

It also states that the Army designed its force for abattlefield significantly different from the battlefield of today. Thenorm in past was you could count on secure flanks and adjacent unitswhile the norm now is you cannot count on secure flanks.

Also, the IPB on the future battlefield is more vague and lessprecise. Sensors can supplement but cannot replace good reconnaissance.Also, intelligence systems do not develop the situation. Lastly, again

decreased force density places a premium on reconnaissance and securityforces

Lastly, the new battlefield has more unknowns (noncontiguousforces, greater dimension^).'^


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The threats presented to brigades recently in the Gulf War andthe CTCs were considered so great they warranted the formation of ad hocRSEs. Results from operational tests on future simulated battlefieldsbased on the most updated threat warrant the need for brigade RSEs.

Protect the ForceDoctrine

FM 100-5 defines force protection as: "It is better to see,target, and hit the enemy at a distance from which he cannot hitback."'0 An organic RSE could assist the brigade in accomplishing thismission.

FM 100-15 states, "The violence and speed of the attackfrequently offer the best security by keeping the enemy so heavilyinvolved that he has neither the time nor the means to endanger thesuccess of the attack."" Although true, a unit can conduct operationswith violence and speed [tempol only if it is executing good andcontinues reconnaissance and security operations. The description,"Security operations provide information about the enemy and providereaction time, maneuver space, and protection to the division,"42 ointsout these benefits.

FM 71-3 makes a doctrinal admission of the seriousness of theproblem of not having an organic RSE when it states; "It [the brigade]could provide its own security force, although this is not desirable."')

Studies"General Officer Executive Committee (GOEC) 1988" states,

"Observations at the CTCs and comments by field commanders throughout


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the Army indicate an inability of our battalions and brigades toroutinely provide adequate force security. Our battalion and brigademaneuver forces are not winning security battle."44

The "Reconnaissance and Security Computer-Assisted Map Exercise(CAMEX)" states, "With early warning capability of the brigade reducedand the momentum of the brigade slowed, the brigade suffered increasedlosses. The timing of mission completion was not a factor for thisscenario, but the slowing of the brigade's momentum has implications forthe force where timeliness is imp~rtant."~~

Combat Training Centers and Gulf War ExperiencesIn the "Operational Concept for the Brigade Reconnaissance and

Security Operations" effective reconnaissance is essential for survivalon the battlefield. All army echelons, from theater to company, havespecific reconnaissance and security requirements.

Briefings"Force Design Update Winter 1992," Force Development

Department, Combined Arms Center-Combat Development, Fort Leavenworth,reveals that in the decreased force density places a premium securityforces. Commanders at every echelon have the requirement to securetheir force. Brigade commanders cannot delegate responsibility tosecure their force.

.Te.mx?Doctrine

Tempo, its importance, and how to achieve it are described inFM 100-5. "The tempo of operations today has accelerated to the point


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that all commanders must learn to dominate their battle space. . . .Tempo is the rate of speed of military action and controlling oralternating that rate is essential for maintaining the initiati~e."~~

FM 71-3 describes increasing the tempo and taking advantage ofall opportunities must be done to avoid slow, inconclusive attacks withheavy losses. This compliments FM 100-5 which says the Army must becapable of achieving decisive victory and describes decisive victory asthe ability to deploy rapidly, to fight, to sustain themselves, and towin quickly with minimum casual tie^.^' To have increased tempo and totake advantage of all opportunities requires information gained throughgood reconnaissance and security. "Applying pressure day and night candeny a weakened enemy relief from battle, recoup of losses, or theopportunity to gain the initiative. Failure to take advantage of allopportunities may result in slow, inconclusive attacks and heavylosses. ' 8

FM 71-3 states, "During close, deep, and rear operations, thebrigade S2 and supporting intelligence assets aggressively acquirecurrent intelligence to provide the commander with early, accurateintelligence assessments that expedites decision cycles."49 Thisacquisition of current intelligence could be much improved with anorganic brigade RSE.

"Commanders seek a tempo that maintains relentless pressure onthe enemy to prevent him from recovering from the shock and effects ofthe attack. A quick tempo demands an ability to make tactical decisionsquickly, to execute operations that deny the enemy a pause, and toexploit opportunities according to the commander's intent."50 To


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increase tempo by quickly making decisions and exploiting opportunities,a brigade must continuously execute good reconnaissance and securityoperations:

StudiesThe "Cavalry/~econnaissance et Assessment--Master Plan"

addresses the need for an USE: "Why more reconnaissance needed battletempo requires that commanders have prompt and accurate information toexploit high technology systems. The time needed to react to enemyformations demand that the brigade commander have an organization ableto provide him timely information in his area of concern."51

The Reconnaissance and Security Study states that brigades didnot need an organic RSE. The brigade (without an RSE) performed itsmission, but at a slower tempo than the brigade RSE. Without a separateunit that could fix, hand-off, and go to the next objective, the brigadehad to deal with each mission sequentially and could not effectivelybegin to influence follow-on battles until the current fight wascompleted. 2

Combat Training Centers and Gulf War ExperiencesCounterreconnaissance is a critical task of all security

operations. The counterreconnaissance focus of the Brigade RSE will beto strip away enemy ground reconnaissance. This will allow the brigadecommander to operate inside the decision cycle of an enemy who is thenoperating blindly.


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BriefingsThe briefing "Brigade Reconnaissance and Security Element,"

describes the RSE as an asset that can increase the brigade's tempo.The RSE can do this in the offense by accomplishing reconnaissancemissions. These reconnaissance missions can identify trafficable routesand terrain for the brigade. This information about terrain as well asinformation on the enemy allows the brigade to increase its tempo. TheRSE can also accomplish security missions that can increase thebrigade's tempo. These security missions provide information thatallows a brigade to increase its tempo.


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Endnotes1U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5, Qwerations (Washington, DC:Department of the Army, 1993). 2-21'u.s. Army, Field Manual 71-100, Division Owerations(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1990), 2-1.3U.S. Army, Field Manual 71-3, Armored and Mechanized InfantryBriaade (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1988),1-1.4U.S. Army, Field Manual 71-100, Division Owerations(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1990). 1-18.'u. S. Army Combined Arms Center, "Reconnaissance and SecurityStudy," Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army TRADOC Analysis Center,se~tember 993, 1-4.6- Final Rewort Vol 111. The Heaw Division Ft.Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combined Arms Combat Development Activity,2-5.'MEMO, Dewutv Commanding General for Combat Developments,Headquarcers combined Arms ~onuf&d and Fc. Leavenworth, ~'nsas to ForceDevelopment Direccorate. Fc. Leavenworch, KS.9 ~ . ~ .rmy, Field Manual 71-3, Armored and Mechanized InfantryBriaade (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1988).1-1.10MEMO for Commander, Operations Group, "Requirement for a HeavyBrigade Reconnaissance Companyv, LTC John Rosenberger, Senior BrigadeTrainer, Operations Group, Ft. Irwin, CA, 26 Oct 1993.I11ivi ion, 19 Mar 1990.12U.S. Army. Field Manual 100-5, Qwerations (Washington, DC:Department of the Army, 19931, 6-12.13u. . Army Combined Arms Center, "Reconnaissance and SecurityComputer-Assisted Map Exercise ( CAMEX ) , " U.S. Army TRADOC AnalysisCenter, Sep 1993, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 7-4.14Major General Thomas C. Foley, "Operational Concept ForBrigade Reconnaissance and Security Operations," Ft. Knox, KY:Department of the Army. Headquarters, U.S. Army Armor School. 7 Feb1992.lS"~econnaissancend Security Study, 1-15

16"~econnaissancerid Security Study," 1-1417U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned, Reconnaissance. No.92-X May 1992."lieutenant Colonel John D. Rosenberger, "BrigadeReconnaissance Organization," Brigade Training Team, National TrainingCenter, Ft. Irwin CA, 17 Nov 93.


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%.s. Army TRADOC Analysis Command, "Reconnaissance andSecurity," U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command--Operations Center,Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 21 Jan 93.20~ield anual 100-5, 2-1421U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-15, Corws Overations (Washington,D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1989). 4-1.22 .Fleld Manual 71-3, 3-423~ield anual 71-3, -2024U.S. Army, Division 86 Analvtical Methodolocry U.S. ArmyTRADOC, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, Mar 9, 1981.2 5 ~ .. Army Armor School, "Cavalry/Reconnaissance et Assessment

- Master Plansm irectorate of Combat Developments, 31 Aug 1988, 1-4, 2 -17.26U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, "Reconnaissance, Surveillance,and Counter-reconnaissance Assessment," Briefing for General OfficerExecutive Committee, CAC, 30 Sep 1988, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 5.2 7 ~ . Armv Combined Arms Center. "Reconnaissance and SecuritvStudy, U.S. ~rmy-TRADOC nalysis ~entei, ep 1993, Ft Leavenworth, KS,1-15.2 8 ~ .. Army Combined Arms Center, "Reconnaissance and SecurityComputer-Assisted Map Exercise (CAMEX),' U.S. Army TRADOC AnalysisCenter, Sep 1993, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 7-4.29~ajor ames E. Wolf, Ground Reconnaissance in the Heavv Corws:D p t c h ission Reauirements? School of AdvancedMilitarv Studies. U.S. Armv Command and General Staff College, Ft.~eavenworth, S, 30 Nov 88; 3.3 0 ~ ~ ~omments, 1st Briaade. 1st Cavalrv Division, 19 Mar 1990.31U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned, NEWSLETTER;RECONNAISSANCE. No. 92-Y, U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, Ft.Leavenworth, KS, May 1992, 19.3 Z ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ U Mor Comnder, Operations Group, "Requirement for aHeavy Brigade Reco~aiSSance ompany," Lieutenant Colonel John D.Rosenberger, Senior Brigade Trainer, Operations Group, ~ t .rwin, CA, 26Oct 1993.3 3 ~ .. Army Combined Arms Center, "Reconnaissance and SecurityReview," Headquarters U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Ft. Leavenworth,KS, 30 April 92.3 4 ~ . ~ .rmy TRADOC Analysis Command, "Reconnaissance andSecurity," U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Operations Center,Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 21 Jan 93.3 5 ~ .. Army TRADOC Analysis Command, "Reconnaissance andSecurity," U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Operations Center,Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 21 Jan 93.


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3 6 ~ . ~ .rmy TRADOC Analysis Command, "Reconnaissance andSecuritv." U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Analysis Command,

"u.s. Army Combined Arms Center. "Force Design Update Winter1992," Director, Force Design Directorate, Combined Arms Center - CombatDevelopment, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 3 Feb 93."u. S. Army Combined Arms Center, "Reconnaissance and SecurityReview," Headquarters U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Ft. Leavenworth,KS, 30 April 92.3 9 ~ . ~ .rmy TRADOC Analysis Command, "Reconnaissance andSecurity," U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Analysis Command.Ft. Leavenworth, KS.40U.S. Army. Field Manual 100-5, Oweratione (Washington, DC:Department of the Army, 1993). 6-13.41U.~. rmy, Field Manual 71-100, Division Owerati-(Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1990), 4-942 .Field Manual 71-100, 1-18.43U.S. Army, Field Manual 71-3, Armored and Mechanized InfantrvBrisade (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1988).4-2.44~.S. rmy Combined Arms Center, "Reconnaissance, Surveillance,and Counter-reconnaissance Assessment," Briefing for General OfficerExecutive Committee, CAC, 30 Sep 1988, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 5.4 5 ~ . ~ .rmy Combined Arms Center, "Reconnaissance and SecurityComputer-Assisted Map Exercise (CAMEX),* U.S. Army TRADOC AnalysisCenter, Sep 1993, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 7-5.46U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5, Ooeratiogg, (Washington,DC:

Department of the Anny, 1993). 7-2.47U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5, Owerations (Washington, DC:Department of the Army, 1993). 1-5.4 8 ~ . ~ .rmy, Field Manual 71-3, ABriaade (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1988),3-3.49Field Manual 71-3, 4-11"u.s. Army, Field Manual 100-5, Qwerations (Washington, DC:Department of the Army, 1993), 7-3.51U.S. Army Armor School, "Cavalry/Reconnaissance et Assessment- Master Plan," Directorate of Combat Developments, Ft. Knox, KY, 31 Aug1988, 1-4, 2-17.52U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, "Reconnaissance and SecurityComputer-Assisted Map Exercise (CAMEX)," U.S. Army TRADOC AnalysisCenter, Sep 1993, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 7-5.


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CHAPTER 3RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

IntroductiQBThree major parts make up this chapter. The first part

explains the methodology used to conduct the research. The second partexplains the purpose and construction of the matrix used to structurethe research and organize the data. The third part explains thestrengths and weaknesses of this research methodology.

Exwlanation of MethodolowThis section describes the research procedures used to conduct

this study. It attempts to determine if there is a need for an organicreconnaissance and security element (RSE) at the brigade level. Todetermine if brigades need an organic RSE, the paper makes a comparisonbetween brigades with and without an RSE. The matrix groups theresearch from five sources into nine categories. The paper analyzed theinformation from each source to determine if it did or did not supportthe catagory. Each category represented an area that if improved by anRSE would improve the brigade.

The first part of the matrix displays the sources from left toright across the top of the matrix. The sources for the research aredoctrine. studies, CTC/Gulf War experiences, and briefings. Thesesources were selected to get the broadest and most unbiased informationavailable. The information was a sampling from each source, but theinformation gathered was in no way all the information available.


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The second part of the matrix displays the catagories used toanalyze the data from the different sources. It runs from top to bottomalong the left side of the matrix. These categories are as follows:brigades as independent fighting forces; brigades as part of a division;risk; control of battlespace; battle command; information; threat;protect the force; and tempo. The paper uses these categories toanalyze the data from all the different sources. Present and possiblefuture doctrine provided these categories. They are areas that the Armyhas decided are very important. A brigade must do well in all thesedifferent areas to be successful on the future battlefield.

The results of the analysis are the third part of the matrix.

Here the data is analyzed by source per category and either "supportsthe need for a brigade RSE" or "does not support the need for a brigadeRSE

Once all the data is organized and placed on the matrix, anoverall analysis can be accomplished. First, an analysis by sourceacross each catagory showing what sources have information about thedifferent catagories. It also shows which of these different sourcessupports the requirement for an organic RSE. It also shows which sourcesdo not supprt the requirement for an organic RSE in each catagory.Second. an analysis per category across each source shows which sourcessupport each catagory and which do not support each catagory. Third,after making the first two analysis, the matrix allows a total analysisto decide if the research does or does not support the need for abrigade RSE.

Strenaths and WeaknessesThe weakness in this research methodology is the fact that the

active Army currently has no brigades with organic RSEs to compare


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against brigades without organic RSEs. Therefore a comparison cannot bemade.

There are several strengths of the methodology. One strengthis the broad range of sources used in collecting data. A secondstrength is the broad range of categories used in the analysis. Theseare strengths because they are drawn from current doctrine and futuredoctrine-guiding sources (TRADOC PAM 525-5) describing how the Army willfight in the future.


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TABLE 1METHODOLOGY MATRIX

Bde Part ofDivision IBde FightsIndepedently

I I I I IRiskControl ofBattlespace

Doctrine

Battle CommandInformation

I Threat

Studies

Protect theForceTempo

WhitePapers/MMASstheses, S A WMonographsCTC/Gulf WarExperience Briefings


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CHAPTER 4ANALYSIS

Will briaades fiaht inde~endentv in the future?To find the answer to this question the paper reviewed

doctrine, studies, CTC/Gulf War experience, and briefings.

DoctrineDoctrinally, there is support for brigades fighting

independently and support for brigades not fighting independently.There is much support in recent doctrine saying brigades in the

future may fight independently. FM 100-5 (1993) and FM 71-100 (1990)both state that brigades may fight independently.

Older doctrine, such as FM 71-3 (1988), says, "Brigades do notact independently but as part of a division or corps."'

In summary, the most recent doctrine more accurately reflectsfuture threats and possible reactions to those threats. The Army basesdoctrine on many important facts which could cause brigades to fightindependently in the future. It accounts for downsized forces,deployability limitations, and current reaction plans based on brigadepackages. All these facts and new doctrine clearly lead to theconclusion, there is some possibility future brigades may fightindependently.


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StudiesStudies provide supporting evidence for brigades to fight

independently and brigades not to fight independently."The Reconnaissance and Security Study and the Reconnaissance,"

(1993) and "Security computer-Assisted Map Exercise (CAMAX)," (1993)suggests brigades may fight independently in the future.

Three studies "~iviSi0n 6 Analytical Methodology,' (1981),"Army Of Excellence (AOE), VOL 111," and "Reconnaissance and SecurityStudy," (1993)) suggest brigades will not fight independently.

In past and current studies, the Army tested brigades as partof their division. The conclusion that brigades will always fight aspart of their divisions is possible. The fact that brigades fight aspart of divisions during most tests and operations does not rule out thepossibility brigades may fight independently. Some studies suggestbrigades might fight independently. The evidence shows brigades willoperate both independently and as part of a division in the future.

CTC/Gulf War ExperienceCTC/GULF War Experience show support for brigades fighting

independently.A memorandum from the Deputy Commanding General for Combat

Development and the "Operational Concept for Brigade Reconnaissance andSecurity Operations," both describe brigades deploying and fightingindependently.


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BriefingsBriefings also show support for brigades fighting

independently. Three briefings "Brigade Reconnaissance and SecurityElement," "Force Design Update Winter" (19921, and "Reconnaissance andSecurity" have supporting evidence that brigades may fight independentlyin the future.

ConclusionNo one can predict with certainty whether brigades fighting in

the future will fight independent of their division. As with allmilitary decisions, the Army must make a decision to prepare units forthe worst possibility. A review of doctrine, studies, CTC/Gulf Warexperience, and briefings reveals substantial evidence for thepossibility Force XXI future brigades may fight independent of theirdivisions.

Whether future brigades may fight independently is veryimportant when deciding the brigade's need for an organic RSE. Whenbrigades lost their scout platoons (RSE) to AOE, Army of Excellence,cuts, the brigades' maneuver battalions and the divisional cavalrysquadron accomplished the reconnaissance missi~ns.~ brigade fightingas part of a division made possible the idea of battalion scouts anddivision cavalry accomplishing the brigade's reconnaissance missions.If a brigade fights independently of its division, the brigade will onlyhave the maneuver battalions to accomplish the brigade's reconnaissancemissions. The problem for an independent operating brigade is dependingon its maneuver battalions to accomplish its reconnaissance missions. A


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brigade depending on its maneuver battalion's scouts is unacceptable forthree reasons. First, past studies show these battalions have

already overburdened battalion scout platoons. . . . Observationsat the CTCs and comments by field commanders throughout the Armyindicate an inability of our battalions and brigades to routinelyconduct adequate reconnaissance of the battlefield, provideadequate force security and defeat enemy reconnaissance forces.Our battalion and brigade maneuver forces are not winning thereconnaissance/security battle.'

Since these battalion scout platoons cannot accomplish thereconnaissance tasks for their battalion, they will be unable toaccomplish the brigade's reconnaissance tasks. Gulf War experiences inafter action reviews (AARs) state, "the brigade can task subordinateunits for reconnaissance assets, but this detracts from the task force[battalion] collection plans."4

So using battalion scouts for brigade reconnaissance tasks notonly means the battalion scouts cannot accomplish the tasks, their usewill adversely affect the battalions. Second, the possibility thedivisional cavalry will be unavailable leaves the independently fightingbrigade in trouble. The independently fighting brigade will have nodivisional cavalry or maneuver battalion to accomplish the brigades'reconnaissance missions. With no divisional cavalry available and thebattalions' scout platoons unable to do the reconnaissance missions,leaves the no reconnaissance and security element between the brigadeand the enemy. Because there are no reconnaissance and securityelements between the brigade and the enemy, the future brigade requiresan organic RSE. The future Force XXI brigades require an RSE toaccomplish reconnaissance missions.


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Will future brigades fight independently? Earlier doctrinalmanuals (FM 71-3, 1988) state, "brigades do not act independently but aspart of a division or corps."5 However, more recent doctrinal manualsraise the possibility that brigades may fight independently. FM 100-5(1993) suggests that "Divisions and brigades will fight combined armsbattles and engagements employing every tactical means available." FM100-5 also states "Corps, division, and brigade commanders getbattalions to the right places at the right times and in the rightcombinations to defeat the enemy de~isively."~ his descriptionsuggests that brigades may independently like a corps and division.Brigades in the future may have to conduct independent operations. FM71-100 (1990) states, "It [brigade] can be employed in independent orsemiindependent operations when properly organized for combat."' TRADOCPam 525-5, states, "Strategic lift limitations, other servicecapabilities, time limitations, and other factors may compel the Army touse only those forces absolutely necessary."' These limitations andothers now unforeseen may cause the Army in the future to employbrigades independently. TRAWC PAM 525-5 also states, "The future Armywill be smaller, yet have new, expanded, and diverse missions in anunpredictable, rapidly changing world environment. These factorsmandate change to the way we organize."' Again, the Army may employbrigades independently in the future to deal with new and differentthreats than those of the past. There are many other reasons the Armymay employ brigades independently in the future. First, there aresimply fewer brigades to fight with, and fewer brigades could cause thedivisions to have to spread them out beyond mutual support, making them


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independent. Secondly, the Army bases the "Ready Brigade" reactionforce system on the fact that only one brigade, initially, will be ableto rapidly deploy into an area. The Army also bases the brigade afloaton getting a brigade on the ground quickly to fight independently, atleast initially. All these factors and limitations lead to thepossibility that the Army may employ future brigades independently.

Briaade fiahts as wart of a division?As stated above, it is possible brigades may fight

independently or fight as part of a division. The next question is, Ifa brigade fights as part of a division, does it still require an organicRSE? The paper reviewed doctrine, studies, CTC/Gulf War experience, andbriefings to find the answer to this question.

DoctrineDoctrinally, there is support both for brigades in a division

needing an RSE and support for brigades in a division not needing anRSE.

FM 100-5, FM 71-3, and FM 71-123 support the need for anorganic RSE in divisional brigades.

FM 71-100 does not support the need for an organic RSE in thedivisional brigade.

Of the doctrinal evidence, three of the four manuals reviewedsupport the need for an organic RSE in the divisional brigade. Brigadesfighting as part of a division require an organic RSE because thebattalion scouts are unable to accomplish the brigade's reconnaissancetasks. Brigades in a division cannot depend on the divisional cavalry


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to accomplish the brigade's reconnaissance and security tasks. Thedivisional cavalry is a critical division asset that will focuses on thereconnaissance and security tasks of the division. These divisionreconnaissance and security tasks are different from the brigade's.

StudiesStudies describe support for brigades in a division needing an

organic RSE and support for brigades in a division not needing anorganic RSE.

The following studies contain support for an organic RSE forbrigades in a division: "The Division 86 Analytical Methodology,""~ivision estructuring Concept Report," "Division Restructuring Study,""Division 86 Study," "The Cavalry/Reconnaissance Net Assessment--MasterPlan," "The Branch Operational Concept," "Reconnaissance and SecurityStudy," and "Reconnaissance and Security Computer-Assisted MapExercise (CAMEX)

The following studies do not support an organic RSE forbrigades in a division: "The Army OF Excellence(A0E). VOL 111,""Reconnaissance and Security Study Reconnaissance," and "SecurityComputer-Assisted Map Exercise (CAMEX)."

Whitepapers, MMAS Theses and SAMS MonographsWhite papers/MMAS and SAMS Monographs support the need for an

organic RSE for brigades in a division.The following White papers/MMAS and SAMS Monographs support an

organic RSE in the divisional brigade: "The Branch Operational Conceptfor the Total Armor Force as Part of The AirLand Operations Combined


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Arms Team in Twenty-first Century Battle" and "Ground Reconnaissance inthe Heavy Corps: Do Tactical Assets Match Mission Requirements?"

CTC/Gulf War ExperienceCTC/Gulf War Experience showed the need for an organic RSE for

brigades.M s . CALL, and Comnder's comments, and NTC Experience

displayed a need for an organic RSE for brigades in a division. Thefollowing AARs displayed a need for an organic RSE: "PreliminaryLessons Learned During OPERATION DESERT STORM," 1st Armored Division;"AAR Comments," 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division. The following CALLinformation displayed a need for an organic RSE: CALL Newsletter,

ssance, CALL ComDendium 1988, Commander's Comments. AARs thatdisplayed a need for an organic RSE are: I11 Corps Commander, "VIICorps Desert Storm 100 hour War Brief," Deputy Commanding General forCombat Developments; "Operational Concept for Brigade Reconnaissance andSecurity Operations;" and "Summer '93 Force Design Update (FDU) " SomeNTC experience which displayed a need for an organic RSE: Memorandum,"Requirement for a Heavy Brigade Reconnaissance Company" and "BrigadeReconnaissance Organization."

The following connnander's comments do not support the need foran organic RSE for divisional brigades: General Maddox, Summer '93,CINCUSAREUR Comments on "Force Design Update," (FDU) Winter 1992,

"Summer '93 Force Design Update (FDU)."


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BriefingsBriefings show support for divisional brigades needing an

organic RSE and support for divisional brigades not needing an organicRSE

The following briefings support the need for an organic RSE indivisional brigades: "The Brigade Reconnaissance and Security Element,""Force Design Update Winter," 1992, "Reconnaissance and SecurityReview," Background and Environment, 'Brigade Reconnaissance andSecurity Element (RSE)," "Reconnaissance and Security," "Reconnaissanceand Security Force Review Phase I,' "Reconnaissance and Security,"TRADOC Analysis Command, "Reconnaissance and Security Review," U.S. ArmyCombined Arms Center, vBattalion/Brigade Scout Platoon."

A briefing which did not support the need for an organic RSE indivisional brigades is "Reconnaissance and Security," TRADOC AnalysisCommand, and "Reconnaissance and Security Review," U.S. Army CombinedArms Center.

Most of the briefings support the need for an organic RSE indivisional brigades.

ConclusionThe weight of the evidence supports the requirement for an

organic RSE in divisional brigades.Doctrine requires an organic RSE in divisional brigades. Two

doctrinal reviews show the requirement for an organic RSE in divisionalbrigades. The two reviews are the "Reconnaissance and Security ForceReview," Combined Arms Center and the "Reconnaissance and Security ForceReview Phase I," "Brigade Reconnaissance and Security Element (RSE),"


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U.S. Army Armor Center. Combined Arms Command's (CAC) doctrinal reviewstates that brigades have reconnaissance (zone, area, routereconnaissance) and security (screen) responsibilities. It then pointsout brigades have no doctrinal reconnaissance and security capabilitiesto conduct reconnaissance (zone, area, route reconnaissance) andsecurity (screen). The CAC review also states. under EMERGING DOCTRINALFINDINGS, which both NTC and Desert Storm surfaced the issue of abrigade RSE. In many cases during Desert Storm, brigades were the basicmaneuver element and brigade commanders felt blind without organicreconnaissance assets.'' FM 71-3 requires establishment of a securityforce for offensive operations." Establishment of a security force isdifficult for a brigade without an organic reconnaissance and securityunit. To establish this security force requires the brigade to tasksubordinate units. This tasking of subordinate units takes combat poweraway from the main body and has these units attempting to do securitymissions as the security force. Taking units from the main body andhaving these units do security missions they are not trained andequipped for is a lot to ask of a unit not trained, equipped, ororganized to do security missions. Current Army doctrine (FM71-3 andFM71-123) specifies brigade reconnaissance and security tasks. Thesetasks are additional to battalion and division reconnaissance andsecurity tasks. The current doctrine recognizes that brigades mustpresently employ subordinate units in brigade reconnaissance andsecurity roles.

The studies containing support for divisional brigades notneeding an organic RSE state that the maneuver battalions and divisional


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cavalry will accomplish the brigades' reconnaissance missions.Overburdened battalion scouts are unable to accomplish reconnaissancetasks for battalions. Therefore battalion scouts cannot accomplishreconnaissance for the brigade. The division cavalry is a criticaldivision asset that accomplishes the division's reconnaissance tasks.Gulf War experiences in AARs tell that 'the brigade can task subordinateunits for reconnaissance assets, but this detracts from the task force[battalion] collection plans."12 The inability of battalion scouts andthe absence of the divisional cavalry squadron leaves the independentlyfighting brigade with no unit to accomplish the brigade's reconnaissancemissions. With no unit to accomplish the brigade's reconnaissancemissions, the future independently employed brigade's need for anorganic RSE to accomplish the brigade's reconnaissance missionsincreases. The Reco~aissance nd Security Study revealed that "Thebrigade may require RSE elements if it is a full-blown maneuver force."The fact that full-blown maneuver brigades may require an RSE isimportant because many brigades in divisions fight as full-blownmaneuver forces--the Gulf War being one example. This study alsostated, "The addition of a brigade RSE showed value in that it helpedthe brigade commander maintain control over the momentum of the battle,leading to timely success with fewer casualties."" A brigade fightingas part of a division gained the benefits of an organic RSE. The"Reco~aisSance nd Security Computer-Assisted Map Exercise(CAMEX)"states that "It [RSE] allowed him [brigade commander] to concentrate onbrigade concerns without degrading the battalion's scouting capability.The RSE also provided a key element between the divisional cavalry


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squadron and the fighting battalions. The R&S element's primaryfunction was to find the small, isolated threats, deal with them withincapability, or quickly bypass, passing the destruction to the main body.Major intelligence systems and UAVs would have difficulty identifyingand locating these high-resolution threats."" These studies, one fromthe past and two from simulated future battles weight the evidence infavor of the requirement for an organic RSE in divisional brigades. Thenumber of studies on this subject is great and most of these studiessupport the need for an organic RSE for divisional brigades. Fewstudies contain support for divisional brigades not needing an organicRSE.

The White papers, MMAS Theses and SAMS Monographs reviewed,support the need for an organic RSE in divisional brigades.

The CTC/Gulf War experience reviewed showed support for anorganic RSE in divisional brigades. Most of the evidence supports theneed for an organic RSE. Evidence against the n

Documents

Does Heavy Brigade Need Recon and Security Element