DOCUMENT RELEASE AND CHANGE FORM...RPP-6637 01A HAZARD EVALUATION FOR AX -IX, ITS1, 241-SX-401, 241-SX-402, 241 -C-801, 241-A-431 RPP-6669 01 HAZARD EVALUATION FOR TRANSITION OF TANK

1 SPF-001 (Rev.D1)

DOCUMENT RELEASE AND CHANGE FORMPrepared For the U.S. Department of Energy, Assistant Secretary for Environmental ManagementBy Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC., PO Box 850, Richland, WA 99352Contractor For U.S. Department of Energy, Office of River Protection, under Contract DE-AC27-08RV14800

TRADEMARK DISCLAIMER: Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States government or any agency thereof or its contractors or subcontractors. Printed in the United States of America.

Release Stamp

1. Doc No: RPP-15188 Rev. 12H

2. Title:HAZARD EVALUATION DATABASE REPORT

3. Project Number: ☒ N/A 4. Design Verification Required:

☐ Yes ☒ No5. USQ Number: ☒ N/A

N/A-6

6. PrHA Number Rev. ☒ N/A

Clearance Review Restriction Type:public

7. Approvals

Title Name Signature DateClearance Review Raymer, Julia R Raymer, Julia R 10/08/2018Design Authority Goetz, Tom Goetz, Tom 09/25/2018Checker Smith, Ryan D Smith, Ryan D 09/25/2018Document Control Approval Scales, Anthony Scales, Anthony 10/08/2018Originator Omberg Carro, Susan K Omberg Carro, Susan K 09/25/2018Responsible Engineering Manager Goetz, Tom Goetz, Tom 09/26/2018USQ Evaluator Smith, Ryan D Smith, Ryan D 09/25/2018

8. Description of Change and Justification

Incorporates the Safety Basis Amendment approved by ORP in letter 18-NSD-0022 for Tank Farms Automation and page changes from negative USQD TF-18-1508-D R0.

9. TBDs or Holds ☒ N/A

10. Related Structures, Systems, and Components

a. Related Building/Facilities ☒ N/A b. Related Systems ☒ N/A c. Related Equipment ID Nos. (EIN) ☒ N/A

11. Impacted Documents – Engineering ☒ N/A

Document Number Rev. Title

12. Impacted Documents (Outside SPF):

N/A

13. Related Documents ☐ N/A

Document Number Rev. TitleHNF-1727 00 HAZARD EVALUATION OF THE 242-A PACKAGE BOILER SYSTEM IMPACT ON TANK FARMSHNF-3737 01A TANK 241-SY-101 SAFETY BASIS FOR REMEDIATION ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS BEFORE CLOSURE

OF THE UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION ON WASTE SURFACE CHANGEHNF-4215 00 HAZARD EVALUATION FOR 244-CR VAULTHNF-4240 01 ORGANIC SOLVENT TOPICAL REPORTHNF-4508 00 HAZARD EVALUATION FOR 242-T EVAPORATOR FACILITYHNF-5334 00 HAZARD EVALUATION FOR WASTE TRANSFER SYSTEM PIPING FLAMMABLE GAS HAZARDSHNF-SD-WM-FHA-020 09 TANK FARMS FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSISHNF-SD-WM-HIE-012 00 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION FOR DEPLOYING THE CONE PENETROMETER IN THE TANK

FARM FOR VADOSE ZONE CHARACTERIZATIONRPP-10006 15 Methodology and Calculations for the Assignment of Waste Groups for the Large Underground Waste Storage

Tanks at the Hanford SiteRPP-10007 03 FLAMMABLE GAS RELEASE CALCULATIONAL METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS FOR CATCH TANKS AND

DOUBLE-CONTAINED RECEIVER TANKS AT THE HANFORD SITERPP-10773 00 COMPRESSED GAS ACCIDENT PARAMETRIC CONSEQUENCE ANALYSISRPP-11736 01 ASSESSMENT OF AIRCRAFT CRASH FREQUENCY FOR THE HANFORD SITE 200 AREA TANK FARMSRPP-12395 00 OFFSITE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS FOR THE BOUNDING TANK FAILURE DUE TO

EXCESSIVE LOADS ACCIDENTRPP-12444 03 TECHNICAL BASIS FOR THE TANK FAILURE DUE TO EXCESSIVE LOADS REPRESENTIVE ACCIDENTRPP-12646 07 MIXING OF INCOMPATIBLE MATERIALS IN WASTE TANKS TECHNICAL BASIS DOCUMENTRPP-12683 02 OFFSITE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS FOR THE BOUNDING AIRCRAFT CRASH ACCIDENTRPP-12710 01 FLAMMABLE GAS DIFFUSION FROM WASTE TRANSFER ASSOCIATED STRUCTURESRPP-13033 07J TANK FARM DOCUMENTED SAFETY ANALYSISRPP-13175 06 Techanical Basis Document for the Aboveground Tank Failure Representative Accident and Associated

Represented Hazardous ConditionsRPP-13261 02 ANALYSIS OF VEHICLE FUEL RELEASE RESULTING IN WASTE TANK FIRERPP-13329 04 TANK FARM FACILITY HAZARD CATEGORIZATIONRPP-13354 04 TECHNICAL BASIS FOR THE RELEASE FROM CONTAMINATED FACILITY REPRESENTATIVE ACCIDENT

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Document Number Rev. TitleRPP-13384 02 ORGANIC SOLVENT TECHNICAL BASIS DOCUMENTRPP-13438 02 TECHNICAL BASIS FOR THE TANK BUMP ACCIDENT AND ASSOCIATED REPRESENTATIVE HAZARDOUS

CONDITIONSRPP-13470 03 Offsite Radiological Consequence Analysis for the Bounding Flammable Gas AccidentRPP-13482 08 ATMOSPHERIC DISPERSION COEFFICIENTS AND RADIOLOGICAL/TOXICOLOGICAL EXPOSURE

METHODOLOGY FOR USE IN TANK FARMSRPP-13503 01 ACCUMULATION OF FLAMMABLE GAS IN SEALED WASTE TRANSFER ASSOCIATED STRUCTURESRPP-13510 11 Flammable Gas Technical Basis DocumentRPP-13604 03 TECHNICAL BASIS DOCUMENT FOR THE UNPLANNED EXCAVATION/DRILLING OF 200 AREA SOILSRPP-13750 41 Waste Transfer Leaks Technical Basis DocumentRPP-13978 02 TECHNICAL BASIS FOR TRANSPORTATION-RELATED WASTE SAMPLE HANDLING ACCIDENTSRPP-14618 04 TECHNICAL BASIS FOR THE ABOVEGROUND STRUCTURE FAILURE ACCIDENTRPP-15123 02 SYSTEM DESIGN DESCRIPTION FOR AP TANK FARM ANNULUS VENTILATION SYSTEMRPP-17190 06B SAFETY EVALUATION OF THE WASTE RETRIEVAL SYSTEM VACUUM SYSTEM FOR 241-C TANK FARMS

200-SERIES TANKSRPP-17965 05 SAFETY EVALUATION OF THE SINGLE-SHELL TANKS MODIFIED SLUICING WASTE RETRIEVAL SYSTEMRPP-19097 00 EVALUATION OF INSULATING CONCRETE IN HANFORD DOUBLE-SHELL TANKSRPP-20459 00A SAFETY EVALUATION FOR LEAK DETECTION AND MONITORINGRPP-23584 00 SAFETY EVALUATION OF WASTE GEL IN THE TANK FARMSRPP-24398 00 PACKAGE-SPECIFIC SAFETY DOCUMENT ONSITE TRANSFER CASKRPP-30040 00 SAFETY EVALUATION FOR THE OFF-RISER SAMPLING SYSTEMRPP-33763 00 SAFETY EVALUATION FOR THE 241-T TANK FARM INTERIM SURFACE BARRIERRPP-35850 00 SAFETY EVALUATION OF TANK FARMS CONDENSATES AND CONDENSATE SYSTEMSRPP-36253 00 EVALUATION OF POSTULATED PRESSURIZING AND CHANNELING WASTE LEAK ACCIDENT SCENARIOSRPP-37922 04 TECHNICAL BASIS DOCUMENT FOR USE OF COMPRESSED AIR TO AIR BLOW POTENTIALLY

CONTAMINATED WASTE TRANSFER LINESRPP-46868 00 TECHNICAL BASIS FOR TEMPERATURE CONTROL TO PREVENT TANK BUMPS IN 241-AN-106RPP-51600 00 EVALUATION OF CATCH TANK 241-UX-302A LIQUID AND SOLIDS COMPOSITIONSRPP-5926 20 Steady-State Flammable Gas Release Rate Calculation and Lower Flammability Level Evaluation for Hanford Tank

WasteRPP-6355 00 HAZARD EVALUATION FOR SALT WELL PUMPING HOSE-IN-HOSE ABOVEGROUND TRANSFERRPP-6485 00 TECHNICAL INFORMATION TO SUPPORT DST EMERGENCY ANNULUS PUMPINGRPP-6599 00 HAZARD EVALUATION FOR 242-S EVAPORATOR HOT SIDERPP-6637 01A HAZARD EVALUATION FOR AX-IX, ITS1, 241-SX-401, 241-SX-402, 241-C-801, 241-A-431RPP-6669 01 HAZARD EVALUATION FOR TRANSITION OF TANK 241-SY-101 FROM RESTRICTED USE TO USEFUL

SERVICE AS A NORMAL DSTRPP-7204 00 HAZARD EVALUATION FOR THE PROPANE HEATED FLUSH WATER SYSTEM LOCATED ADJACENT TO

242-S EVAPORATORRPP-7475 08 CRITICALITY SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT FOR HANFORD TANK FARMS FACILITIESRPP-7552 00 ROTARY MODE CORE SAMPLING CONTROL DECISION RECORDRPP-7771 00A FLAMMABLE GAS SAFETY ISSUE RESOLUTIONRPP-7878 00 HAZARD EVALUATION OF CAUSTIC ADDITION TO DOUBLE-SHELL TANK 241-AN-102 AND GENERAL

CAUSTIC ADDITION HAZARDS COMMON TO ALL DOUBLE-SHELL TANKSRPP-7991 00 SAFETY EVALUATION FOR REMOTE PIT REFURBISHMENT USING THE PIT VIPERRPP-8050 17 Lower Flammability Limit Calculations for Catch Tanks, DST Annuli, Waste Transfer-Associated Structures, and

Double-Contained Receiver Tanks in Tank Farms at the Hanford SiteRPP-8153 00 244-AR VAULT REMEDIATION HAZARD EVALUATION AND CONTROL DECISION RECORDRPP-8520 00 CAUSTIC ADDITION BY PRESSURIZED TRUCK - HAZARD EVALUATION REPORTRPP-8563 00 SAFETY EVALUATION FOR COMPRESSED GAS HAZARDS IN THE TANK FARMSRPP-9576 00 SAFETY EVALUATION FOR PUSH MODE CORE SAMPLINGRPP-9689 04A OFFSITE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCE CALCULATION FOR THE BOUNDING MIXING OF INCOMPATIBLE

MATERIALS ACCIDENTRPP-CALC-47670 00 SINGLE SHELL LEAK DETECTION PIT FLAMMABLE GAS EVALUATION FOR 101-AX AND 103-AXRPP-CALC-48383 03 TECHNICAL BASIS DOCUMENT FOR VENTILATION SYSTEM FILTRATION FAILURES LEADING TO AN

UNFILTERED RELEASE FOR SST OPERATIONSRPP-CALC-55156 02 Technical Basis Document for Ventilation System Filtration Failures Leading to an Unfiltered Release for DST

OperationsRPP-RPT-26718 00A DOME LOAD COLLAPSE ASSESSMENT FOR HANFORD DOUBLE- AND SINGLE-SHELL TANKSRPP-RPT-26836 01 Gas Retention and Release from Hanford Sludge WasteRPP-RPT-31126 00 241-AX-1X LIQUID LEVEL ASSESSMENT REPORTRPP-RPT-32085 00 241-BY-ITS1 LIQUID LEVEL ASSESSMENT REPORTRPP-RPT-35913 01 PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR PRIMARY VENTILATION SYSTEM UPGRADES IN THE 241-AN AND 241-

AW TANK FARMSRPP-RPT-35922 00A 241-C-109 WASTE RETRIEVAL SYSTEM PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSISRPP-RPT-35926 02 241-S HIHTL REMOVAL PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSISRPP-RPT-35927 00 241-C-104 WASTE RETRIEVAL SYSTEM PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSISRPP-RPT-36033 00 PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS PERFOMED FOR TANK 241-AP-101 TO TANK 241-AW-102 WASTE

TRANSFERRPP-RPT-38246 00B 241-C110 WASTE RETRIEVAL SYSTEM PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS

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Document Number Rev. TitleRPP-RPT-39551 01 241-C-04B HEEL PIT WASTE TRANSFER PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSISRPP-RPT-40641 00 241-UX-302A WASTE TRANSFER PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSISRPP-RPT-45438 00 241-C-111 WASTE RETRIEVAL SYSTEM PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSISRPP-RPT-45608 00 PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS PERFORMED FOR THE PNEUMATIC TESTING OF ENCASEMENT LINESRPP-RPT-46804 00 PROJECT W-566 WASTE FEED DELIVERY - TRANSFER LINE UPGRADES 241-SY TRANSFER LINE

REPLACEMENT PROCESS HAZARDS ANALYSIS REPORTRPP-RPT-47364 00 PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR THE C-107 DOME EXCAVATION, RISER REMOVAL, AND LARGE RISER

INSTALLATIONRPP-RPT-47789 00 PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS PERFORMED FOR THE TANK 241-C-104 ARTICULATING MAST SYSTEMRPP-RPT-49923 00 241-C-108 HARD HEEL RETRIEVAL PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSISRPP-RPT-49941 00 241-C-112 Waste Retrieval System Process Hazard AnalysisRPP-RPT-52456 00 241-C-109 HARD HEEL RETRIEVAL PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSISRPP-RPT-52511 01 PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR THE C-105 DOME EXCAVATION, RISER REMOVAL, AND LARGE RISER

INSTALLATIONRPP-RPT-52589 00 241-C-104 HARD HEEL RETRIEVAL PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSISRPP-RPT-54069 00 241-C-101 Waste Retrieval System Process Hazard AnalysisRPP-RPT-54703 00 RETRACTABLE CORROSION MONITORING PROBE (RCMP) PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSISRPP-RPT-55554 00 241-C-110 Hard Heel Retrieval Process Hazard AnalysisRPP-RPT-55555 00 241-C-112 Hard Heel Retrieval Process Hazard AnalysisRPP-RPT-55703 00 Process Hazard Analysis for the AZ-301 Tanker Option Project (T1P90)RPP-RPT-56309 00 Process Hazard Analysis for the Cone Penetrometer Waste Measurement DeviceRPP-RPT-56372 00 Process Hazard Analysis for Robotic Crawler Inspection of 241-AY-102 Leak Detection Pit PipingRPP-RPT-58250 00 Beyond Design Basis Event Evaluation to Support Implementation of Operating Experience Report 2013-01RPP-RPT-58272 01 241-AY-102 Tank Recovery Project Process Hazards Analysis ReportRPP-RPT-58373 00 241-AN-106 Slurry Distributor Flush and Grout Activity Process Hazards Analysis ReportRPP-RPT-58405 00 241-C-111 Hard Heel Retrieval Process Hazard AnalysisRPP-RPT-58647 00 Analysis of Forensic Data from 241-AW, 241-AP, and 241-AY Farm Waste Transfer Line EncasementsRPP-RPT-59926 00 AP-02A Mixer Pump Transport Process Hazards AnalysisRPP-RPT-60039 00 In-Pit Heater Process Hazards Analysis ReportTE-07-009 03 Technical Evaluation for the C-109 and AN-106 Transfer PumpsTE-07-027 00 Technical Evaluation of Waste Leak Paths and Waste Leaks Due To Waste Channeling for Transfer Related

Activities Associated with Tanks 241-AP-101, 241-AP-105 and 241 AW 102

14. Distribution

Name OrganizationBaxter, Diana NUCLEAR SAFETYGoetz, Tom NUCLEAR SAFETYOmberg Carro, Susan K NUCLEAR SAFETYSmith, Ryan D NUCLEAR SAFETY

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RPP-15188Revision 12-H

Tank Farms Hazard Evaluation Database Report

Prepared by

R. D. SmithWashington River Protection Solutions, LLC

Date PublishedOctober 2018

Prepared for the U.S. Department of EnergyOffice of River Protection

Contract No. DE-AC27-08RV14800

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Approved for Public Release;

Further Dissemination Unlimited

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HAZARD EVALUATION DATABASE REPORT

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CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1

2.0 PURPOSE ............................................................................................................................1

3.0 DATA MANAGEMENT.....................................................................................................1

4.0 HAZARD EVALUATION DATABASE DESCRIPTION .................................................2

5.0 DATABASE CHANGES CONTROLLED BY THIS DOCUMENT...............................18

6.0 REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................18

APPENDICES

A HAZARD EVALUATION DATABASE NO CONTROL FIELDS .............................. A-i

B HAZARD EVALUATION DATABASE WITH CONTROL FIELDS .......................... B-i

LIST OF TABLES

Table 4-1. Hazard Evaluation Database Fields. (2 sheets) .......................................................... 3

Table 4-2. Representative Hazard Analysis. (11 sheets) ............................................................. 5

Table 4-3. Frequency Levels. ..................................................................................................... 16

Table 4-4. Environmental Consequence Categories. .................................................................. 17

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LIST OF TERMS

DSA documented safety analysis ECN engineering change notice TOC Tank Operations Contractor USQ unreviewed safety question

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

This document identifies, describes, defines, and documents the contents and structure of the tank farms hazard evaluation database. This database was developed in conjunction with the hazard analysis activities to record hazard evaluation results performed for the documented safety analysis (DSA) in accordance with DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses. The database is part of the approved safety basis for the Hanford Site tank farms.

2.0 PURPOSE

The hazard evaluation database incorporates the final results of the hazard evaluation process for the tank farm safety basis. The database documents the safety basis portion of the hazard evaluation and accident analysis results in a series of records that detail the spectrum of hazardous conditions and controls required by DOE-STD-3009-94. The database explicitly defines the hazard topography of the DSA. The database is used primarily to support the development and maintenance of the DSA, safety analysis activities, and the unreviewed safety question (USQ) process.

3.0 DATA MANAGEMENT

The hazard evaluation database described in this report is maintained and managed by the Tank Operations Contractor (TOC). The TOC has ownership and responsibility for configuration management of the hazard evaluation database. Configuration management is currently maintained through the document control system through the use of engineering change notices (ECN). The Nuclear Safety manager is required to approve all changes to the hazard evaluation database.

The ECN process includes internal reviews and peer reviews of the reported data. Analysts working with the database are required to verify internal consistency within the hazard evaluation database when changes are made. The database is updated when existing data or analyses are revised or new data or analyses are developed to support the safety basis. The electronic word processing files are maintained under configuration management by Nuclear Safety personnel.

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4.0 HAZARD EVALUATION DATABASE DESCRIPTION

The hazard evaluation database is maintained in a series of Microsoft Word electronic files. The most current revision of RPP-15188 is considered to be the official version of the hazard evaluation database.

The hazard evaluation database consists of data arranged in the fields defined in Table 4-1. Additional tables (4-2 through 4-4) are referenced by entries in Table 4-1. These tables are used during the hazard evaluations to assign parameters that are maintained in the database. The tables are included to clarify the types of information contained in the safety basis portions of the database. These tables are not part of the database.

Appendices A and B are the safety basis-controlled portion of the database. Appendix A presents the hazard evaluation data primarily associated with the no control fields of the hazard evaluation database. Appendix B presents the hazard evaluation data primarily associated with the control fields of the hazard evaluation database.

The data in the database was divided in this manner to facilitate ease of hardcopy presentation.

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Table 4-1. Hazard Evaluation Database Fields. (2 sheets) Database field

name Description

ID This field consists of a unique alpha/numeric identification code for each hazardous condition identified during the hazard evaluation activities.

Candidate Accident

This field lists the accident grouping to which the hazardous condition has been assigned, and the DSA section which describes the accident. Candidate accidents are a preliminary set of accidents that formed the basis for the DSA accident evaluations.

Material at Risk A description of the type and quantity of material that may be affected by the occurrence of a hazardous condition. Also referred to as MAR.

Hazardous Condition

A structured description of the uncontrolled release of hazardous or radioactive material associated with the unique ID code and a listing of activities or facilities to which the hazardous condition applies.

Cause A description of the factors that could cause the hazardous condition. Consequence A description of the consequence of an uncontrolled release related to a specific hazardous

condition. NC Freq The frequency of occurrence of a specified hazardous condition, assuming no controls is in

place. Entries in this field are “A”, “U”, “EU”, or “BEU” (i.e., anticipated, unlikely, extremely unlikely, or beyond extremely unlikely). These entries are defined in Table 4-3.

NC Offsite Rad Offsite radiation exposure consequence, assuming no controls are in place. Two sub-columns are included within this field: >25 rem, and >5 rem. Entries in these fields are either “Y” (for Yes), or “N” (for No).

NC Offsite Tox >PAC 2

Offsite toxicological exposure consequence, assuming no controls are in place. Entries in this field are either “Y” (for Yes), or “N” (for No).

NC Onsite Rad >100 rem

Onsite radiation exposure consequence, assuming no controls are in place. Entries in this field are either “Y” (for Yes), or “N” (for No).

NC Onsite Tox >PAC 3

Onsite toxicological exposure consequence, assuming no controls are in place. Entries in this field are either “Y” (for Yes), or “N” (for No).

NC Sig FW Cons

The consequence to a facility worker, assuming no controls are in place. Entries in this field are “Y” or “N” (Yes or No). To be marked “Y”, the consequence must be significant, applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47.

Basis for NC Consequence

This field provides a discussion of the basis for no controls consequence assignment for the offsite individual, onsite worker, and facility worker.

Basis for NC Frequency

This field provides a discussion of the basis for no controls frequency assignment.

NC Env Category

The resultant effect to the environment of a release associated with a specific hazardous condition, assuming no controls are present. Entries are “E0”, “E1”, “E2”, or “E3”. These entries correspond to the categories defined in Table 4-4.

Preventive SSC/SAC

A list of SSCs or SACs and their safety designation that prevent an accident.

Mitigative SSC/SAC

A list of SSCs or SACs and their safety designation that mitigate an accident.

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Table 4-1. Hazard Evaluation Database Fields. (2 sheets) Database field

name Description

Important Contributor to Defense-in-Depth (SSC or Key Element of AC)

A list of important contributors to defense-in-depth (either SSCs or key elements of an AC) and their safety designation.

Defense-in-Depth Features (Non-safety SSC, non-TSR, or SMP)

A list of defense-in-depth features (which are not credited in the safety analysis and are not designated safety-significant SSCs or TSRs).

Environmental Controls

A description of how the controls address environmental risk (for those hazardous conditions listed as either E2 or E3).

Change Memo A record of changes made to the approved DSA portions of the hazard evaluation database, including reference to authorizing documents.

Notes: TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Process Hazard Analysis, as amended, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC,

Richland, Washington. Cons = consequence. DSA = documented safety analysis. ENV = environmental. Freq = frequency. FW = The involved facility worker located at the facility. ID = identification code. MAR = material at risk. MIT SSC = mitigative structures, systems, and components. MIT SAC = mitigative specific administrative control. NC = no controls. Offsite = The maximum offsite individual at the Hanford Site boundary. Onsite = The onsite receptor (uninvolved with the activity occurring) at 100 m from the source of the

MAR. OSHA = Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Prev SSC = preventive structures, systems, and components. Prev SAC = preventive specific administrative control. Rad = radiological. SSC = structures, systems, and components. Tox = toxicological. TSR = technical safety requirements. WC = with controls.

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Table 4-2. Representative Hazard Analysis. (11 sheets) Facility/topic Technique Characteristics and source document(s)

Facility interfaces - Impacts on tank farm facilities of active physical interfaces

222-S Laboratory HAZOP Source: WHC-SD-WM-TI-759, Appendix A.1 242-A Evaporator HAZOP Source: WHC-SD-WM-TI-759, Appendix A.2 242-S Evaporator HAZOP Source: WHC-SD-WM-TI-759, Appendix A.3 242-T Evaporator2 HAZOP Source: WHC-SD-WM-TI-759, Appendix A.4 B Plant2 HAZOP Source: WHC-SD-WM-TI-759, Appendix A.5 PFP2 HAZOP Source: WHC-SD-WM-TI-759, Appendix A.6 PUREX2 HAZOP Source: WHC-SD-WM-TI-759, Appendix A.7 T Plant2 HAZOP Source: WHC-SD-WM-TI-759, Appendix A.8 U Plant HAZOP Source: WHC-SD-WM-TI-759, Appendix A.9 204-AR Waste Unloading Facility HAZOP Lab waste, transfer of waste by vehicle

Source: WHC-SD-WM-TI-759, Appendix A.10

244-AR Vault HAZOP Storage for liquid waste Source: WHC-SD-WM-TI-759, Appendix A.11

241-SX-401 Condenser Shielding Building

HAZOP Impacts of inactive facilities Source: RPP-6637

241-SX-402 Condenser Shielding Building


241-AX-IX Ion Exchanger HAZOP Impacts of inactive facilities Source: RPP-6637

In-Tank Solidification System (ITS-1)


241-C-801 Cesium Loadout Facility HAZOP Impacts of inactive facilities Source: RPP-6637

241-A-431 Ventilation Building HAZOP Impacts of inactive facilities Source: RPP-6637

Overground transfers HAZOP SST waste transfer overground Source: WHC-SD-WM-TI-759, Appendix A.12

SST 241-C-106 (in pre-sluicing condition, results still apply to other tanks)

HAZOP SST, high-heat, active ventilation Source: WHC-SD-WM-TI-759, Appendix A.13

DST 241-AN-107 HAZOP DST, caustic addition Source: WHC-SD-WM-TI-759, Appendix A.14

DST 241-AW-102 HAZOP DST, evaporator interface, active ventilation Source: WHC-SD-WM-TI-759, Appendix A.15

SST 241-S-102 HAZOP SST, flammable gas, organics, passive ventilation Source: WHC-SD-WM-TI-759, Appendix A.16

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SST 241-SX-114 HAZOP SST, dry crust, high-heat, active ventilation Source: WHC-SD-WM-TI-759, Appendix A.17

Cross-site transfer (DST 241-SY-102) (selected portions of Project W-058)

DST, waste transfer by pipeline, replacement cross-site transfer system

HAZOP Source: WHC-SD-WM-TI-759, Appendix A.18 HAZOP Source: WHC-SD-WM-TI-759, Appendix A.18 PHA Source: WHC-SD-W058-PHA-001, and Addendum 2 Tank 241-AZ-101 mixer pump test HAZOP Mixer pump operation

Source: WHC-SD-WM-TI-759, and Addendum 4 209-E Storage Area (covers the 616 Facility which has replaced the 209-E Storage Area)

PHA Storage for RCRA and low-level waste Source: WHC-SD-WM-TI-759, Appendix B.1

Propane Tank Adjacent to 242-S Evaporator

PHA Large propane tank explosions Source: RPP-7204

244-AR Vault PHA Storage for liquid waste Source: WHC-SD-WM-TI-759, Appendix B.3

244-CR-Vault HAZOP Storage and transfer of liquid waste Source: HNF-4215

Clean-out boxes PHA Interface with waste transfer system Source: WHC-SD-WM-TI-759, Appendix B.5

Cribs, ditches, and ponds PHA Disposal of liquid waste Source: WHC-SD-WM-TI-759, Appendix B.6

Inactive miscellaneous underground storage tank (plus other inactive facilities)

PHA Various types and forms of radioactive and hazardous material Source: WHC-SD-WM-TI-759, Appendix B.7

Siphoning PHA Various types and forms of radioactive and hazardous material Source: WHC-SD-WM-TI-759, Appendix B.8

Tank operations (DST 241-AZ-102) PHA DST, aging waste Source: WHC-SD-WM-TI-759, Appendix B.9

Tank operations (SST 241-BX-109) PHA SST, passive ventilation Source: WHC-SD-WM-TI-759, Appendix B.10

Tank operations (DST 241-SY-101) PHA DST, flammable gas, active ventilation, mixer pump Source: WHC-SD-WM-TI-759, Appendix B.11

Vertical storage units PHA Storage for solid low-level waste Source: WHC-SD-WM-TI-759, Appendix B.12

Cone Penetrometer PHA Exploration of vadose zone Source: HNF-SD-WM-HIE-012

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Tank Farm 241-AZ ventilation upgrade PHA Active ventilation operation and design Source: WHC-SD-WM-TI-759, Addendum 3

242-A Package Boiler PHA Tank farm impacts from adjacent system Source: HNF-1727

Waste transfer systems/flammable gas hazards

PHA Flammable gas hazards in waste transfer piping (primary piping and piping encasements) and waste transfer-associated structures Source: HNF-5334

DST 241-SY-101 PHA Post-remediation of crust growth and buoyant displacement gas release events Source: RPP-6669

Common cause failure What-if Events with potential impact on multiple tank farm facilities Source: WHC-SD-WM-TI-759, Appendix C.1

External events What-if Events with potential impact on multiple tank farm facilities Source: WHC-SD-WM-TI-759, Appendix C.2

Natural events What-if Events with potential impact on multiple tank farm facilities Source: WHC-SD-WM-TI-759, Appendix C.3

Waste transfers What-if Events that have been developed based on information gathered or discovered in the course of analysis upgrades and updates Source: See the hazard evaluation database.

Hose-in-hose transfers PHA Analysis of saltwell pumping transfers using hose-in-hose transfer lines Source: RPP-6355

Sodium Nitrite Additions HAZOP Sodium nitrite handling involving pressurized tank truck transfers Source: See the hazard evaluation database

Caustic addition to waste tanks using air pressurized truck

HAZOP Sodium hydroxide handling involving pressurized tank truck transfers Source: RPP-8520

Push Mode Core Sampling HAZOP Tank sampling using sample trucks in push mode Source: RPP-9576

Rotary Mode Core Sampling HAZOP Tank sampling using sample trucks in rotary mode Source: RPP-7552

Off-Riser Sampling System What-if Tank sampling using an off-riser sampling system Source: RPP-30040

“Pit Viper” remote robotic arm operations for pit refurbishing (compressed gas hazards only)

HAZOP Impacts of remote robotic arm operations in pits where compressed air is present Source: RPP-7991

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Tank Farm compressed gas hazards PHA Hazards associated with the presence of compressed gases in the tank farms Source: RPP-8563

RCSTS compressed gas hazards What-If Hazards associated with the presence of a pressurized inert atmosphere in the encasement of the RCSTS Source: See the hazard evaluation database

Waste transfer from 241-SY-101 to 241-SY-102 using hose-in-hose transfer system

HAZOP Transfer of waste through hose-in-hose transfer system to cross-site transfer system Source: USQ TF-00-0713 and HNF-3737, Rev. 1

242-S Evaporator Building HAZOP Impacts of inactive facilities Source: RPP-6599

242-T Evaporator Building HAZOP Impacts of inactive facilities Source: HNF-4508

Caustic addition to 241-AN-102

HAZOP Sodium hydroxide additions to tanks Source: RPP-7878

244-AR Vault remediation HAZOP Remediation of 244-AR Vault tanks Source: RPP-8153

Preparation for transport of waste and waste contaminated material

PHA Various types and forms of radioactive and hazardous material developed during the course of DSA analysis upgrades Source: See the hazard evaluation database

Multiple What-if Events that have been developed based on information gathered or discovered in the course of DSA analysis upgrades Source: See the hazard evaluation database

Vacuum retrieval of SST waste HAZOP Events associated with the use of a vacuum system to retrieve waste from SSTs Source: RPP-17190

Modified sluicing of SST waste HAZOP Events associated with the use of a modified sluicing system to retrieve waste from SSTs Source: RPP-17965

Tank Farm fuel handling What-if Events associated with the fuel handling Source: Response to DOE SER 02-TED-026

Waste gel What-if Impacts of waste gel formation in the tank farms Source: RPP-23584

High resolution resistivity and electrical resistivity tomography leak detection monitoring

What-if Events associated with the use of electrical resistance based leak detection and monitoring methods Source: RPP-20459

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Tank farm condensate and condensate systems

HAZOP Hazards associated with condensate generated within tank farm systems (e.g., DST primary tank ventilation systems, SST portable exhausters, SST breather filter assemblies, inactive ventilation systems, instrument lines) Source: RPP-35850

241-C-109 modified sluicing including the mobile retrieval tool

HAZOP Hazards associated with 241-C-109 modified sluicing including the mobile retrieval tool Source: RPP-RPT-35922

DST to DST waste transfer HAZOP Hazards associated with a representative DST to DST waste transfer based on waste recirculation and transfer from DST 241-AP-101 to DST 241-AW-102 Source: RPP-RPT-36033

Disconnection and removal of HIHTL HAZOP Disconnection and removal of HIHTL. Includes hazards associated with compressed air blowout of HIHTL primary and connected waste transfer system primary piping and “walking” the HIHTL with a crane Source: RPP-RPT-35926

241-T Tank Farm interim surface barrier What-if Hazards associated with installation and use of an interim surface barrier in the 241-T Tank Farm Source: RPP-33763

Primary ventilation systems in the 241-AN and 241-AW that were installed by Project W-314

HAZOP Hazards associated with the primary ventilation systems installed in the 241-AN and 241-AW Tank Farms by the W-314 project Source: RPP-RPT-35913

SST modified sluicing retrieval using hydraulically powered vertical turbine pump

HAZOP Hazards associated with SST modified sluicing retrieval using hydraulically powered vertical turbine pump Source: RPP-RPT-38246, RPP-RPT-35927

241-C-04B heel pit waste transfer HAZOP Hazards associated with liquid removal from the 241-C-04B heel pit in support of equipment removal and retrieval equipment installation Source: RPP-RPT-39551

241-C-111 modified sluicing retrieval including operation of waste transfer pump AN01A-WT-P-023

HAZOP Hazards associated with SST modified sluicing retrieval and DST waste transfers using hydraulically powered vertical turbine pumps Source: RPP-RPT-45438

241-C-104 What-if Hazards associated with the use of the 241-C-104 Articulating Mast System to move an obstruction at the bottom of the tank Source: RPP-RPT-47789

Pneumatic testing of encasement lines What if Hazards associated with pneumatic testing of waste transfer primary piping system encasements Source: RPP-RPT-45608

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241-AY-102 Leak Detection Pit Drain Piping Robotic Inspection

What if Hazards associated with the use of a remotely operated robotic crawler, covering installation, operation, and removal. Source: RPP-RPT-56372

241-SY waste transfer line replacement HAZOP Hazards associated with the replacement (removal and installation) of eight waste transfer lines in the 241-SY Tank Farm. Includes hazards associated with water lancing/flushing of waste transfer line SN-278. Source: RPP-RPT-46804

Cone Penetrometer Waste Measurement Device

HAZOP Hazards associated with installation, operation, and removal of the cone penetrometer waste measurement device in DSTs 241-AN-101 and 241-AN-106. Source: RPP-RPT-56309

AZ-301 Tanker Option Project (T1P90) HAZOP Hazards associated with the new transfer route (hose-in-hose connection/system) from the AZ-301 condensate tank to a staged tanker truck, which will periodically transport condensate to the Effluent Treatment Facility (ETF). Source: RPP-RPT-55703

241-AN-Slurry Distributor What if Slurry Distributor Flush and Grout Activity. Source: RPP-RPT-58373

241-C-101 Waste Retrieval System Process Hazard Analysis

“Delta” HAZOP

Hazards associated with 241-C-101 retrieval, including the extended reach sluicer system. Source: RPP-RPT-54069

241-C-102 Waste Retrieval System Process Hazard Analysis

“Delta” HAZOP


241-C-104 hard heel retrieval “Delta” HAZOP

Hazards associated with 241-C-104 hard heel retrieval, including caustic addition and cleaning. Source: RPP-RPT-52589

241-C-105 riser removal and installation “Delta” What if

Hazards associated with the 241-C-105 dome excavation, riser removal, and large riser installation. Source: RPP-RPT-52511

241-C-107 riser removal and installation What if Hazards associated with the 241-C-107 dome excavation, riser removal, and large riser installation. Source: RPP-RPT-47364





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Hazards associated with 241-C-110 hard heel retrieval, including caustic addition and cleaning, Foldtrack Retrieval System, and POR357 direct-contact water heating skid. Source: RPP-RPT-55554

241-C-111 Hard Heel Retrieval “Delta” HAZOP

Hazards associated with 241-C-111 hard heel retrieval. Source: RPP-RPT-58405

241-C-112 Waste Retrieval System “Delta” HAZOP


241-C-112 Hard Heel Retrieval “Delta” HAZOP

Hazards associated with 241-C-112 hard heel retrieval. Source: RPP-RPT-55555

241-UX-302A Liquid Removal “Delta” HAZOP

Hazards associated with pumping liquid from 241-UX-302A into Polar tanker and emptying into DST AP-106. Source: RPP-RPT-40641 and RPP-RPT-52171

Retractable Corrosion Monitoring Probe What if Hazards associated with installing and operating the Retractable Corrosion Monitoring Probe in 241-AW-105. Source: RPP-RPT-54703

Process Hazards Analysis for Criticality Safety Evaluation Report Upgrade

What If/ Checklist

Hazards Associated with fissile material operations at all of the tank farms facilities (222-S, 242-A, and the Tanks and associated facilities) to support update of the CSER. Source: RPP-RPT-58063

241-AP Ventilation Tank Primary System Upgrades

“Delta” HAZOP

Hazards associated with the redesigned primary ventilation system (based on W-314 exhausters) to be installed in the 241-AP Tank Farms by the TIP83 Project. Source: RPP-RPT-58674

241-AY-102 Tank Recovery Project Process Hazards Analysis Report

“Delta” HAZOP

Hazards associated with the AY Recovery Project unique design aspects including sluicing in Tank AY-102. Source: RPP-RPT-58272

241-AW-106 Plugged Transfer Pump Clearing Process Hazard Analysis

What If/ Checklist

Hazards associated with activities needed to ensure that there are no drainable liquids in the 241-AW-06A transfer pump when it is removed from 241-AW-106. Source: RPP-RPT-58712

AP-02A Mixer Pump Transport Process Hazards Analysis

“Delta” HAZOP

Hazards associated with transport of the contaminated AP-02A Mixer Pump from within the AP Tank Farm to a nearby radioactive material area outside the AP Tank Farm fence. Source: RPP-RPT-59926

In-Pit Heater Process Hazards Analysis Report

“Delta” HAZOP

Hazards associated with the operation of the 2500 watt resistive element forced air in-pit heaters. Source: RPP-RPT-60039

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241-C-105 Waste Retrieval System “Delta” HAZOP

Hazards associated with 241-C-105 sluicing retrieval system. Source: RPP-RPT-60225

241-SX Tank Farm Interim Surface Barrier Project

“Delta” HAZOP

Hazards associated with installation and use of interim surface barriers (i.e., north barrier, south barrier, and expansion barrier) in the 241-SX Tank Farm. Source: RPP-RPT-60765

241-TY Tank Farm Interim Surface Barrier

What If/ Checklist

Hazards associated with installation and use of interim surface barrier in the 241-TY Tank Farm. Source: RPP-RPT-44892

Notes:

1 The 242-T Evaporator, B Plant, PFP, PUREX, and T Plant are no longer connected to the tank farms and, therefore, no longer pose any interfacing facility hazards. DOE SER 02-TED-026, 2003, Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for Approval of Justification for Continued

Operation (JCO) for Storage, Transport, and Transfer of Liquid Fuel and Conduct of Refueling Operations, and Storage, Transport, and Use of Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG) within the Tank Farms, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of River Protection, Richland, Washington.

HNF-1727, 1997, Hazard Evaluation of the 242-A Package Boiler System Impact on Tank Farms, Rev. 0, Duke Engineering & Services Hanford, Inc., Richland, Washington.

HNF-3737, 2000, Tank 241-SY-101 Safety Basis for Remediation Activities and Operations Before Closure of the Unreviewed Safety Question on Waste Surface Change, Rev. 1A, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

HNF-4215, 1999, Hazard Evaluation for 244-CR Vault, Rev. 0, Fluor Daniel Hanford, Inc., Richland, Washington.

HNF-4508, 1999, Hazard Evaluation for 242-T Evaporator Facility, Rev. 0, Lockheed Martin Hanford Corporation, Richland, Washington.

HNF-5334, 1999, Hazard Evaluation for Waste Transfer System Piping Flammable Gas Hazards, Rev. 0, Fluor Daniel Northwest, Inc., Richland, Washington.

HNF-SD-WM-HIE-012, 1997, Hazard Identification and Evaluation for Deploying the Cone Penetrometer in the Tank Farm for Vadose Zone Characterization, Rev. 0, Duke Engineering & Services Hanford, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-6355, 2000, Hazard Evaluation for Salt Well Pumping Hose-In-Hose Aboveground Transfer, Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-6599, 2000, Hazard Evaluation for 241-S Evaporator “Hot Side,” Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-6637, 2002, Hazard Evaluation for AX-IX, ITS1, 241-SX-401, 241-SX-402, 241-C-801, 241-A-431, Rev. 1A, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-6669, 2000, Hazard Evaluation for Transition of Tank 241-SY-101 from Restricted Use to Useful Service as a Normal DST, Rev. 1, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-7204, 2000, Hazard Evaluation for the Propane Heated Flush Water System Located Adjacent to 242-S Evaporator, Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-7552, 2001, Rotary Mode Core Sampling Control Decision Record, Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-7878, 2001, Hazard Evaluation of Caustic Addition to Double-Shell Tank 241-AN-102 and General Caustic Addition Hazards Common to all Double-Shell Tanks, Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-7991, 2001, Safety Evaluation for Remote Pit Refurbishment Using the Pit Viper, Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

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Table 4-2. Representative Hazard Analysis. (11 sheets) Notes (continued):

RPP-8153, 2002, 244-AR Vault Remediation Hazard Evaluation and Control Decision Record, Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-8520, 2002, Caustic Addition by Pressurized Truck – Hazard Evaluation Report, Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-8563, 2002, Safety Evaluation for Compressed Gas Hazards in the Tank Farms, Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-9576, 2002, Safety Evaluation for Push Mode Core Sampling, Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-17190, 2007, Safety Evaluation of the Waste Retrieval System Vacuum System for 241-C Tank Farm 200-Series Tanks, Rev. 6-B, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-17965, 2006, Safety Evaluation of the Single-Shell Tanks Modified Sluicing Waste Retrieval System, Rev. 5, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-20459, 2004, Safety Evaluation for Leak Detection and Monitoring, Rev. 0A, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-23584, 2004, Safety Evaluation of Waste Gel in the Tank Farms, Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-30040, 2006, Safety Evaluation for the Off-Riser Sampling System, Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-33763, 2007, Safety Evaluation for the 241-T Tank Farm Interim Surface Barrier, Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-35850, 2008, Safety Evaluation of Tank Farm Condensates and Condensate Systems, Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-51600, 2009, Evaluation of Catch Tank 241-UX-302A Liquid and Solids Compositions, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-35913, 2008, Process Hazard Analysis for Primary Ventilation System Upgrades in the 241-AN and 241-AW Tank Farms, Rev. 1, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-35922, 2008, 241-C-109 Waste Retrieval Process Hazard Analysis, Rev. 0A, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-35926, 2008, 241-S HIHTL Removal Process Hazard Analysis, Rev. 2, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-35927, 2008, 241-C-104 Waste Retrieval System Process Hazard Analysis, Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-36033, 2007, Process Hazard Analysis Performed for Tank 241-AP-101 to Tank 241-AW-102 Waste Transfer, Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-38246, 2009, 241-C-110 Waste Retrieval System Process Hazard Analysis, Rev. 0-B, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-39551, 2009, 241-C-04B Heel Pit Waste Transfer Process Hazard Analysis, Rev. 1, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-40641, 2009, 241-UX-302A Waste Transfer Process Hazard Analysis, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-44892, 2010, Process Hazard Analysis for TY Tank Farm Interim Surface Barrier, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-45438, 2010, 241-C-111 Waste Retrieval System Process Hazard Analysis, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-45608, 2010, Process Hazard Analysis Performed for the Pneumatic Testing of Encasement Lines, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-46804, 2010, Project W-566 Waste Feed Delivery - Transfer Line Upgrades 241-SY Transfer Line Replacement Process Hazards Analysis Report, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-47364, 2010, Process Hazard Analysis for the C-107 Dome Excavation, Riser Removal, and Large Riser Installation, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

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RPP-RPT-47789, 2010, Process Hazard Analysis Performed for the Tank 241-C-104 Articulating Mast System, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-49923, 2011, 241-C-108 Hard Heel Retrieval Process Hazard Analysis, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.


RPP-RPT-52171, 2012, 241-UX-302A Waste Transfer Into Waste Drums Process Hazards Analysis, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.


RPP-RPT-52511, 2013, Process Hazard Analysis for the C-105 Dome Excavation, Riser Removal, and Large Riser Installation, Rev. 1, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.




RPP-RPT-54703, 2013, Retractable Corrosion Monitoring Probe (RCMP) Process Hazard Analysis, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.



RPP-RPT-55703, 2013, Process Hazard Analysis for the AZ-301 Tanker Option Project (T1P90), Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-56309, 2013, Process Hazard Analysis for the Cone Penetrometer Waste Measurement Device, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-56372, 2013, Process Hazard Analysis for Robotic Crawler Inspection of 241-AY-102 Leak Detection Pit Piping, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-58063, 2015, Process Hazards Analysis for Criticality Safety Evaluation Report Upgrade, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-58272, 2015, 241-AY-102 Tank Recovery Project Hazards Analysis, Rev. 1, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-58373, 2014, 241-AN-106 Slurry Distributor Flush and Grout Activity Project Hazards Analysis Report, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.


RPP-RPT-58647, 2015, 241-AP Ventilation Tank Primary System Upgrade Project Process Hazards Analysis, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-58712, 2017, 241-AW-106 Plugged Transfer Pump Clearing Process Hazard Analysis, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-59926, 2017, AP-02A Mixer Pump Transport Process Hazards Analysis, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-60039, 2017, In-Pit Heater Process Hazards Analysis Report, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-60225, 2017, 241-C-105 ERSS Retrieval Process Hazard Analysis (PrHA) Report, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-60765, 2018, Process Hazard Analysis for 241-SX Tank Farm Interim Surface Barrier Project, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

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WHC-SD-W058-PHA-001, 1995, Hazards and Operability for the Replacement Cross-Site Transfer System, Rev. 0A, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, Washington.

WHC-SD-WM-TI-759, 1996, Hazard Evaluations for the Tank Waste Remediation System Final Safety Analysis Report, Rev. 0, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, Washington.

COB = clean-out box. DSA = documented safety analysis. DST = double-shell tank. HAZOP = Hazard and Operability Study. HIHTL = hose-in-hose transfer line.

OGT = overground transfer. PFP = Plutonium Finishing Plant.

PHA = preliminary hazard analysis. PUREX = Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (Facility). RCSTS = Replacement Cross-Site Transfer System RCRA = Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976. SST = single-shell tank. USQ = unreviewed safety question.

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Table 4-3. Frequency Levels. Category Definition

A (>10-2 to ≤10-1/yr)

“Anticipated events”: Frequency greater than once in 100 operating years

U (>10-4 to ≤10-2/yr)

“Unlikely”: Frequency between once in 100 years and once in 10,000 operating years

EU (>10-6 to ≤10-4/yr)

“Extremely unlikely”: Frequency between once in 10,000 years and once in 1 million operating years

BEU (<10-6/yr)

“Beyond extremely unlikely”: Frequency of less than once in 1 million operating years

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Table 4-4. Environmental Consequence Categories. Category Definition

E3 Offsite discharge or discharge to groundwater

E2 Significant discharge onsite

E1 Localized discharge

E0 No significant environmental consequence

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5.0 DATABASE CHANGES CONTROLLED BY THIS DOCUMENT

The database is part of the safety basis and is kept current with the safety basis, including approved amendments. Configuration management is accomplished according to the TOC document control process. Changes are authorized through the ECN system. The Nuclear Safety manager approves all changes to RPP-15188. The changes are peer reviewed for compliance with the content requirements of Section 4.0.

6.0 REFERENCES

DOE-STD-3009-94, 2006, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses, Change Notice No. 3, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.

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APPENDIX A

HAZARD EVALUATION DATABASE NO CONTROL FIELDS

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LIST OF TABLES

Table A 01. Flammable Gas Accidents ............................................................................. A 01-1

Table A 02. Nuclear Criticality Accidents ............................................................... A 02-1

Table A 03. Waste Transfer Leak Accidents ..................................................................... A 03-1

Table A 04. Release from Contaminated Facility .............................................................. A 04-1

Table A 05. Air Blow Accidents ........................................................................................ A 05-1

Table A 06. External Events .............................................................................................. A 06-1

Table A 07. Tank Failures Due to Excessive Loads .......................................................... A 07-1

Table A 08. Mixing of Incompatible Materials Accidents ................................................ A 08-1

Table A 09. Unplanned Excavations & Drilling Accidents ............................................... A 09-1

Table A 10. Tank Bump Accidents .................................................................................... A 10-1

Table A 11. Aboveground Structure Failures .................................................................... A 11-1

Table A 12. Transportation Related Waste Handling Accidents ....................................... A 12-1

Table A 13. Filtration Failures Leading to Unfiltered Releases ........................................ A 13-1

Table A 14. Organic Solvent Fires..................................................................................... A 14-1

Table A 15. Aboveground Tank Failures ........................................................................... A 15-1

Table A 16. Radiation Exposures ...................................................................................... A 16-1

Table A 17. Occupational Exposures ................................................................................. A 17-1

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LIST OF TERMS

ACGIH American Council of Government Industrial Hygienists ALARA As Low as Reasonable Achievable ALC Air Lift Circulator ARF airborne release fraction BBI best-basis inventory BEU Beyond Extremely Unlikely CAM continuous air monitor CFM Cubic Feet per Minute CFR Code of Federal Regulations CONS Consequence dP differential pressure DCRT double-contained receiver tank DDT deflagration-to-detonation transition DOE U.S. Department of Energy DOT Department of Transportation DSA documented safety analysis DST double-shell tank DUSST Decontamination Unit & Safety Shower Trailer ENRAF Enraf-Nonius Series 854 (gauge) Env Environmental division EPA Environmental Protection Agency EPDM ethylene-propylene-diene monomer ERSS extended reach sluicer system ERT electrical resistivity tomography EU Extremely Unlikely Freq frequency FVT Filtered Vacuum Truck FW facility worker GRE gas release event HEME High-efficiency mist eliminator HEPA high-efficiency particulate air (filter) HIHTL hose-in-hose transfer line HRR high resolution resistivity IMUST inactive miscellaneous underground storage tank ITS-1 In-Tank Solidification System LCO Limiting Condition for Operation LDM leak detection and monitoring LDP leak detection pit LFL lower flammability limit LPG liquefied petroleum gas MAR material at risk MIM Mix of Incompatible Material NC No Controls NDA Nondestructive Assay

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NDE Nondestructive Testing Equipment NESL Non Entry Systems, Ltd. NOC notice of construction NPH normal paraffin hydrocarbon OCC occupational ORP Office of River Protection OSF Organic Solvent Fires OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration OTC onsite transfer cask PAC Protective Action Criteria PAO polyaphaolefin PEL Permissible Exposure Limits pH power of hydrogen (negative logarithm of hydrogen-ion

concentration) PNNL Pacific Northwest National Laboratory PSSD package specific safety document Pu Plutonium PUREX Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (Plant) RAD Radiological rem radiation equivalent man RCSTS replacement cross-site transfer system RF respirable fraction RPP River Protection Project SCAPA (DOE) Subcommittee on Consequence Assessment and Protective

Action SHMS standard hydrogen monitoring system Sig Significant SMP safety management program SSC structures, systems, and components SST single-shell tank SWIM stop work, warn others, isolate the area, and minimize exposure TBP Tri-Butyl Phosphate TEEL Temporary Emergency Exposure Limit TFDEL Tank Failure Due to Excessive Loads TNT trinitrotoluene TOC Tank Operations Contractor TOX Toxicological TVL Threshold Limit Values ULD unit-liter dose UPED Unplanned Excavation and Drilling UPR unplanned release UR unfiltered releases USOF unit sum of fraction VFD variable frequency drive WA DOH NOC Washington State Department of Health Notice of Construction WRPS Washington River Protection Solutions LLC

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REFERENCES

10 CFR 835, “Occupational Radiation Protection,” Code of Federal Regulations, as amended.

29 CFR 1910.119, “Occupational Safety and Health Standards,” Code of Federal Regulations, as amended.

40 CFR 68, Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions, “Code of Federal Regulations, as amended.

08-TED-009, 2008, Contract No. DE-AC27-99RL14047 – Approval of Safety Basis (SB) Amendment – 044 To Allow Operation of the W-314 Exhausters in the 241-AN Tank Farm, S. J. Olinger, ORP, to J.C. Fulton, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

COA-AMTF-08-01-REV-0, This is a condition of approval (COA) from DOE letter 08-TED-009, “Contract No. DE-AC27-99RL14047 – Approval of Safety Basis (SB) Amendment – 044 To Allow Operation of the W-314 Exhausters in the 241-AN Tank Farm”, S. J. Olinger, ORP, to J.C. Fulton, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., dated April 10, 2008.

DOE-HDBK-3010-94, 2000, Airborne Release Fractions/Rates and Respirable Fractions of Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities, Change Notice No. 1, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.

DOE-STD-3014-96, 1996, Accident Analysis for Aircraft Crash into Hazardous Facilities, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.

HNF-4240, 2001, Organic Solvent Topical Report, Rev. 1, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

HNF-SD-WM-FHA-020, Tank Farm Fire Hazards Analysis, as amended, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

OE-09-004, 2009, Operability Evaluation for Ventilation System Freezing, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

PNNL-11668, 1997, Seismic Event-Induced Waste Response and Gas Mobilization Predictions for Typical Hanford Waste Tank Configurations, Rev. 0, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, Washington.

PNNL-13933, 2002, Review of the Technical Basis of the Hydrogen Control Limit for Operations in Hanford Tank Farms, Rev. 1, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, Washington.

RPP-5926, Steady-State Flammable Gas Release Rate Calculation and Lower Flammability Level Evaluation for Hanford Tank Waste, as amended, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

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RPP-6213, 2005, Hanford Waste Tank Bump Accident and Consequence Analysis, Rev. 4, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-6485, 2000, Technical Information to Support DST Emergency Annulus Pumping, Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-6599, 2000, Hazard Evaluation for 242-S Evaporator “Hot Side,” Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-7475, Criticality Safety Evaluation of Hanford Tank Farms Facility, as amended, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-7771, 2001, Flammable Gas Safety Issue Resolution, Rev. 0A, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland Washington.

RPP-8050, Lower Flammability Limit Calculations for Catch Tanks, IMUSTs, DST Annuli, Pit Structures and Double-Contained Receiver Tanks in Tank Farms at the Hanford Site, as amended, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-9689, Offsite Radiological Consequence Calculation for the Bounding Mixing of Incompatible Materials Accident, as amended, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-10006, Methodology and Calculations for the Assignment of Waste Groups for the Large Underground Waste Storage Tanks at the Hanford Site, as amended, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-10007, Flammable Gas Release Calculational Methodology and Results for Active Catch Tanks and DCRTs at the Hanford Site, as amended, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-10773, Compressed Gas Accident Parametric Consequence Analysis, as amended, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-11736, Assessment of Aircraft Crash Frequency for the 200 Area Tank Farms, as amended, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-12395, Offsite Radiological Consequence Analysis for the Bounding Tank Failure Due to Excessive Loads Accident, as amended, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-12444, Technical Basis for the Tank Failure Due to Excessive Loads Representative Accident and Associated Represented Hazardous Conditions, as amended, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-12646, Mixing of Incompatible Materials in Waste Tanks Technical Basis Document, as amended, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

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RPP-12683, Offsite Radiological Consequence Analysis for the Bounding Aircraft Crash Accident, as amended, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-12710, 2003, Flammable Gas Diffusion From Waste Transfer Associated Structures, Rev. 1, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland Washington.

RPP-13175, Technical Basis Document for the Aboveground Tank Failure Representative Accident and Associated Represented Hazardous Conditions, as amended, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-13261, Analysis of Vehicle Fuel Release Resulting in Waste Tank Fire, as amended, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-13329, Tank Farm Facility Hazard Categorization, as amended, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-13354, Technical Basis for the Release From Contaminated Facility Representative Accident and Associated Represented Hazardous Conditions, as amended, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-13384, Organic Solvent Technical Basis Document, as amended, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-13438, Technical Basis Document for Tank Bump Representative Accident and Associated Hazardous Conditions, as amended, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-13470, Offsite Radiological Consequences for the Bounding Flammable Gas Accident, as amended, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-13482, 2015, Atmospheric Dispersion Coefficients and Radiological and Toxicological Exposure Methodology for Use in Tank Farms, Rev. 8, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-13503, 2003, Accumulation of Flammable Gas in Sealed Waste Transfer Associated Structures, Rev. 1, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-13510, Flammable Gas Technical Basis Document, as amended, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-13604, Technical Basis Document for the Unplanned Excavation/Drilling of 200 Area Soils, as amended, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-13750, Waste Transfer Leaks Technical Basis Document, as amended, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

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RPP-13978, Technical Basis For the Transportation-Related Handling Representative Accidents and Associated Hazardous Conditions, as amended, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-14618, Technical Basis for Aboveground Structure Failure Accident and Associated Represented Hazardous Conditions, as amended, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-15123, System Design Description for AP Tank Farms Annulus Ventilation System (DSA-BASED), as amended, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-19097, Evaluation of Insulating Concrete in Hanford Double-Shell Tanks, as amended, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-20459, Safety Evaluation for Leak Detection and Monitoring, as amended, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-24398, Package-Specific Safety Document Onsite Transfer Cask, as amended, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-35850, Safety Evaluation of Tank Farms Condensates and Condensate Systems, as amended, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-36253, 2008, Evaluation of Postulated Pressurizing and Channeling Waste Leak Accident Scenarios, Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-37922, Technical Basis Document for Use of Compressed Air to Air Blow Potentially Contaminated Waste Transfer Lines, as amended, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-46868, 2011, Technical Basis for Temperature Control to Prevent Tank Bumps in 241-AN-106, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-CALC-47670, 2010, Single Shell Leak Detection Pit Flammable Gas Evaluation for 101-AX and 103-AX, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-CALC-48383, Technical Basis Document for Ventilation System Filtration Failures Leading to an Unfiltered Release for SST Operations, as amended, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-CALC-55156, Technical Basis Document for Ventilation System Filtration Failures Leading to an Unfiltered Release for DST Operations, as amended, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-26718, Dome Load Collapse Assessment for Hanford Double- and Single-Shell Tanks, as amended, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

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RPP-RPT-26836, 2014, Gas Retention and Release from Hanford Sludge Waste, Rev. 1, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-31126, 2006, 241-AX-IX Liquid Level Assessment Report, Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-32085, 2006, 241-BY-ITS1 Liquid Level Assessment Report, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-58250, 2015, Beyond Design Basis Event Evaluation to Support Implementation of Operating Experience Report, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

TE-07-009, Technical Evaluation for the C-109 and AN-106 Transfer Pumps, as amended, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

TE-07-027, Technical Evaluation of Waste Leak Paths and Waste Leaks Due to Waste Channeling for Transfer Related Activities Associated with Tanks 241-AP-101, 241-AP-105 and 241-AW-102, as amended, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

TF-08-1619-D, Unreviewed Safety Question Evaluation - RPP-15188, Hazard Evaluation Database Report, Revision 8-M, Changes Associated with Waste Channeling, Jet Momentum, and Air Lift (Occurrence Report EM-RP--CHG-TANKFARM-2007-0011), as amended, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Process Hazard Analysis, as amended, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

WAC 246-247, Washington Administrative Code, Chapter 246-247, “Radiation Protection – Air Emissions.”

WHC-SD-SQA-CSA-30004, 1996, Criticality Safety Review for Inactive Miscellaneous Underground Storage Tanks, Rev. 0, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, Washington.

WHC-SD-WM-CN-062, 2002, HEPA Filter Failure by Fire or Heater Overtemperature and Subsequent Unfiltered Release, Rev. 2B, Fluor Federal Services, Richland, Washington.

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RPP-15188 REV 12 Appendix A. Hazard Evaluation Database No Controls Fields.

ID Candidate Accident Material at Risk Hazardous Condition Cause Consequence NC

Freq

NC Offsite Rad NC Offsite

Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW

Cons Basis for NC Consequence Basis for NC

Frequency NC Env

Category ≥25 rem ≥5 rem

A 01-1

FG-DST-01 Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

DST waste Release of DST waste due to a DST headspace deflagration (steady-state flammable gas deflagration)

Insufficient ventilation causes flammable gases generated by the waste in the DST to accumulate in the tank headspace to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed Note: Insufficient ventilation can result from various causes. For example, all causes of DST primary ventilation system failure (e.g., human error, equipment failure) Note: There are various potential ignition sources. For example, installed equipment (normal and/or off-normal operation), tank intrusive activities (e.g., push mode core sampling), external events (e.g., vehicle fire, range fire), natural events (e.g., lightning, seismic)

Release of DST waste; potential physical injury or damage from deflagration

U N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on calculations presented in RPP-13470. The offsite toxicological consequence is qualitatively determined based on scoping calculations documented in RPP-13510. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13510. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition is a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, a DST or SST flammable gas deflagration or detonation could cause grievous injury or death to a facility worker due to overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles). The potential toxicological exposure could also exceed the PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F assuming a release of 1 to 5 L of waste (RPP-13510), a dilution volume of 1,000 m3, 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). Using the same assumptions, the potential radiation dose would not exceed the 100 rem threshold for a significant worker hazard. The conclusions on toxicological exposure and radiation dose consider sensitivity to the assumptions. There is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The frequency of a headspace deflagration in a DST due to the steady-state accumulation of flammable gases is qualitatively determined to be “unlikely” considering: (1) the ventilation ratio to maximum concentration < LFL are < 2 ft3/min (worst case), others are < 1 ft3/min (RPP-5926), (2) studies of passive ventilation rates that indicate ventilation rates are significantly greater than barometric breathing rates (RPP-RPT-58250), and (3) flammable gas monitoring data during extended ventilation outages (including the three highest flammable gas-generating tanks) that showed passive ventilation maintained concentration < 25% LFL (RPP-RPT-58250) that corroborates that concentrations are unlikely to exceed the LFL under passive ventilation conditions.

E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 01-2

FG-DST-02a Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

DST waste Release of DST waste due to a DST headspace deflagration (spontaneous GRE flammable gas deflagration)

Spontaneous GRE (i.e., due to a buoyant displacement [BD] GRE) causes a flammable gas concentration in the DST headspace above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed Applies to: Saltcake waste tanks


BEU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on calculations presented in RPP-13470. The offsite toxicological consequence is qualitatively determined based on scoping calculations documented in RPP-13510. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13510. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The facility worker consequences are bounded by FG-DST-01.

The frequency of a headspace deflagration in a saltcake waste tank due to a spontaneous BDGRE is qualitatively determined to be “beyond extremely unlikely” considering: (1) flammable gas monitoring data that demonstrates spontaneous GREs in the five DSTs designated Waste Group A have not resulted in flammable gas concentrations that exceed the LFL), (2) waste additions to these Waste Group A DSTs, which may result in spontaneous GREs larger than those historically observed, are prohibited without prior ORP approval, (3) only small water additions to these Waste Group A DSTs shown not to cause a GRE that exceeds 100% of the LFL are authorized, (4) chemical additions are not authorized, and (5) creating additional Waste Group A tanks is prohibited without prior ORP approval. See RPP-13510.

E2

FG-DST-02b Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

DST waste Release of DST waste due to a DST headspace deflagration (spontaneous GRE flammable gas deflagration)

Spontaneous GRE (i.e., due to a deep sludge [DS] GRE or BDGRE) causes a flammable gas concentration in the DST headspace above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed. Applies to: Sludge tanks (e.g., DST 241-AN-101 and DST 241-AN-106)



The frequency of a headspace deflagration in a sludge waste tank due to a spontaneous DSGRE or BDGRE is qualitatively determined to be “beyond extremely unlikely” based on the evaluation described in RPP-RPT-26836.

E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 01-3


DST waste Release of DST waste due to a DST headspace deflagration (operation induced GRE flammable gas deflagration)

Operation induced GRE causes a flammable gas concentration in the DST headspace above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed Note: Authorized operations that could cause an induced GRE hazard in DSTs are described in DSA Section 3.3.2.4.1 and include waste transfers that uncover solids in a Waste Group B DST and water additions, chemical additions, and waste transfers into a Waste Group B DST.


A N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on calculations presented in RPP-13470. The offsite toxicological consequence is qualitatively determined based on scoping calculations documented in RPP-13510. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13510. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition is a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, a DST or SST flammable gas deflagration or detonation could cause grievous injury or death to a facility worker due to overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles). The potential toxicological exposure could also exceed the PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F assuming a release of 1 to 5 L of waste (RPP-13510), a dilution volume of 1,000 m3, 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). Using the same assumptions, the potential radiation dose would not exceed the 100 rem threshold for a significant worker hazard. The conclusions on toxicological exposure and radiation dose consider sensitivity to the assumptions. There is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The frequency of a headspace deflagration in a DST due to an operation induced GRE is qualitatively determined to be “anticipated” because (1) many DSTs contain sufficient retained flammable gas to achieve 100% of the LFL if all the retained gas is released into the tank headspace, and (2) planned operations are capable of releasing a significant fraction of the retained gas in a DST.

E2


DST waste Release of DST waste due to a DST headspace deflagration (seismic induced GRE flammable gas deflagration)

Seismic induced GRE causes a flammable gas concentration in the DST headspace above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed



The frequency of a headspace deflagration in a DST due to a seismic induced GRE is qualitatively determined to be “unlikely” based on the frequency of a seismic event significant enough to release sufficient retained gas to cause the flammable gas concentration in the DST headspace to exceed the LFL.

E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 01-4


DST waste Release of DST waste due to a DST headspace detonation

Steady-state generation and accumulation, a spontaneous GRE, and/or an operation or seismic induced GRE causes a flammable gas concentration in the DST headspace above the concentration required for a detonation or a DDT (deflagration-to-detonation transition); an ignition source is assumed

Release of DST waste; potential physical injury or damage from detonation

BEU N Y N N Y Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on calculations presented in RPP-13470. The offsite toxicological consequence is qualitatively determined based on scoping calculations documented in RPP-13510. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13510. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition is a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, a DST or SST flammable gas deflagration or detonation could cause grievous injury or death to a facility worker due to overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles). The potential toxicological exposure could also exceed the PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F assuming a release of 5 L of waste (RPP-13510), a dilution volume of 1,000 m3, 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). Using the same assumptions, the potential radiation dose would not exceed the 100 rem threshold for a significant worker hazard. The conclusions on toxicological exposure and radiation dose consider sensitivity to the assumptions. There is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The frequency of a headspace detonation in a DST is qualitatively determined to be “beyond extremely unlikely” considering: (1) the likelihood of reaching detonable limits prior to the occurrence of a deflagration, (2) the strong ignition source requirement for the direct initiation of a detonation, (3) the special geometry conditions required for a DDT, and (4) an insufficient volume of retained flammable gas in the DST solids to achieve detonable concentrations. See RPP-13510.

E2


DST waste Release of DST waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in a DST annulus

DST primary tank leak into the annulus; flammable gases generated by the waste accumulate in the DST annulus to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed


U N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on calculations presented in RPP-13470. The offsite toxicological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation that the consequence is reasonably bounded/represented by the consequence of a flammable gas deflagration in the DST headspace (see RPP-13510). (Note: A flammable gas deflagration in a DST annulus is postulated to cause failure and release of waste from the primary tank.) Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are based on a qualitative evaluation that the consequences are reasonably bounded/represented by the consequences of a flammable gas deflagration in the DST headspace (see RPP-13510). (Note: A flammable gas deflagration in a DST annulus is postulated to cause failure and release of waste from the primary tank.) Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition is a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, a DST or SST flammable gas deflagration or detonation could cause grievous injury or death to a facility worker due to overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles). The potential toxicological exposure could also exceed the PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F assuming a release of 1 to 5 L of waste (RPP-13510), a dilution volume of 1,000 m3, 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). Using the same assumptions, the potential radiation dose would not exceed the 100 rem threshold for a significant worker hazard. The conclusions on toxicological exposure and radiation dose consider sensitivity to the assumptions. There is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The frequency of a deflagration in a DST annulus is qualitatively determined to be “unlikely” based on the likelihood of an undetected DST primary tank leak into an annulus of sufficient volume and composition to reach the LFL. See RPP-13510.

E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 01-5


DST waste and waste in the waste transfer

Release of waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in a DST annulus

Waste transfer misroute to a DST annulus; flammable gases generated by the waste accumulate in the DST annulus to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed

Release of waste; potential physical injury or damage from deflagration

U N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on calculations presented in RPP-13470. The offsite toxicological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation that the consequence is reasonably bounded/represented by the consequence of a flammable gas deflagration in the DST headspace (see RPP-13510). (Note: A flammable gas deflagration in a DST annulus is postulated to cause failure and release of waste from the primary tank.) Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are based on a qualitative evaluation that the consequences are reasonably bounded/represented by the consequences of a flammable gas deflagration in the DST headspace (see RPP-13510). (Note: A flammable gas deflagration in a DST annulus is postulated to cause failure and release of waste from the primary tank.) Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition is a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, a DST or SST flammable gas deflagration or detonation could cause grievous injury or death to a facility worker due to overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles). The potential toxicological exposure could also exceed the PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F assuming a release of 1 to 5 L of waste (RPP-13510), a dilution volume of 1,000 m3, 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). Using the same assumptions, the potential radiation dose would not exceed the 100 rem threshold for a significant worker hazard. The conclusions on toxicological exposure and radiation dose consider sensitivity to the assumptions. There is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The frequency of a deflagration in a DST annulus is qualitatively determined to be “unlikely” based on the likelihood of an undetected misroute into a DST annulus of sufficient volume and composition to reach the LFL. See RPP-13510.

E2


DST waste Release of waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in a DST annulus

The maximum waste level in DST 241-AY-101, 241-AY-102, 241-AZ-101, or 241-AZ-102 is exceeded, waste overflows into a side fill line, the side fill leaks into the annulus, and flammable gases generated by the waste accumulate in the DST annulus to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed


EU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on calculations presented in RPP-13470. The offsite toxicological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation that the consequence is reasonably bounded/represented by the consequence of a flammable gas deflagration in the DST headspace (see RPP-13510). (Note: A flammable gas deflagration in a DST annulus is postulated to cause failure and release of waste from the primary tank.) Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are based on a qualitative evaluation that the consequences are reasonably bounded/represented by the consequences of a flammable gas deflagration in the DST headspace (see RPP-13510). (Note: A flammable gas deflagration in a DST annulus is postulated to cause failure and release of waste from the primary tank.) Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition is a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, a DST or SST flammable gas deflagration or detonation could cause grievous injury or death to a facility worker due to overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles). The potential toxicological exposure could also exceed the PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F assuming a release of 1 to 5 L of waste (RPP-13510), a dilution volume of 1,000 m3, 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). Using the same assumptions, the potential radiation dose would not exceed the 100 rem threshold for a significant worker hazard. The conclusions on toxicological exposure and radiation dose consider sensitivity to the assumptions. There is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The frequency of a deflagration in a DST annulus is qualitatively determined to be “extremely unlikely” based on multiple barrier failures required that include exceeding the OSD-T-151-0007 DST 241-AY and 241-AZ tank farm primary tank waste liquid level maximum operating limit and loss of confinement integrity of the side fill lines that pass through the annulus.

E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 01-6

FG-SST-01 Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

SST waste Release of SST waste due to a SST headspace deflagration (steady-state flammable gas deflagration)

Insufficient ventilation causes flammable gases generated by the waste in the SST to accumulate in the tank headspace to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed Note: Insufficient ventilation can result from various causes. For example, plugged HEPA breather filter, closed HEPA breather filter isolation valve, portable exhauster system failures Note: There are various potential ignition sources. For example, installed equipment (normal and/or off-normal operation), tank intrusive activities (e.g., push mode core sampling), external events (e.g., vehicle fire, range fire), natural events (e.g., lightning, seismic)

Release of SST waste; potential physical injury or damage from deflagration


The frequency of a headspace deflagration in an SST due to a steady state accumulation of flammable gas is qualitatively determined to be “unlikely” considering: (1) conservative calculations in RPP-5926 that conclude that only two SSTs can reach the LFL under barometric breathing conditions, (2) studies of passive ventilation rates (RPP-RPT-58250) that indicate ventilation rates are significantly greater than barometric breathing rates and thus concentration would be well below the LFL in all SSTs, (3) decades of flammable gas monitoring data corroborate these studies, (4) attempts to limit vapor emission by closing breather filters resulted in vapor emissions from other tank openings (closing the breather filter does not seal the tank), and (5) the flammable gas generation rates are decreasing with time as radionuclides decay.

E2


SST waste Release of SST waste due to a SST headspace deflagration (spontaneous GRE flammable gas deflagration)

Spontaneous GRE causes a flammable gas concentration in the SST headspace above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed


BEU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on calculations presented in RPP-13470. The offsite toxicological consequence is qualitatively determined based on scoping calculations documented in RPP-13510. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13510. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The facility worker consequences are bounded by FG-SST-01.

The frequency of a headspace deflagration in an SST due to a spontaneous GRE is qualitatively determined to be “beyond extremely unlikely” based the tank waste characteristics and volumes. Although spontaneous GREs in SSTs have occurred, they are uniformly small and slow, and the resultant flammable gas concentrations have been well below 25% of the LFL. See RPP-7771.

E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 01-7


SST waste Release of SST waste due to a SST headspace deflagration (operation induced GRE flammable gas deflagration)

Operation induced GRE causes a flammable gas concentration in the SST headspace above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed Note: There are no operations authorized in SSTs that could result in an induced GRE flammable gas hazard (i.e., where operations induced GREs could achieve 100% of the LFLs)


-- N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on calculations presented in RPP-13470. The offsite toxicological consequence is qualitatively determined based on scoping calculations documented in RPP-13510. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13510. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: Because there are no authorized operations that could release sufficient retained flammable gases to achieve 100% of the LFL in the SST headspace, there are no significant facility worker consequences.

No frequency is assigned because there are no authorized operations that could release sufficient retained flammable gases to achieve 100% of the LFL in the SST headspace.

E2


SST waste Release of SST waste due to a SST headspace deflagration (seismic induced GRE flammable gas deflagration)

Seismic induced GRE causes a flammable gas concentration in the SST headspace above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed


BEU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on calculations presented in RPP-13470. The offsite toxicological consequence is qualitatively determined based on scoping calculations documented in RPP-13510. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13510. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The facility worker consequences are bounded by FG-SST-01.

The frequency of a headspace deflagration in an SST due to a seismic induced GRE is “beyond extremely unlikely” because the estimated retained flammable gas in SSTs from RPP-10006 times an estimated 10% release caused by a design basis earthquake (PNNL-11668) is insufficient to reach a flammable gas concentration in the SST headspace above the LFL.

E2


SST waste Release of SST waste due to a SST headspace deflagration in multiple SSTs

Flammable gas deflagration in one SST propagates into another SST via cascade line (steady-state gas generation hazard)


EU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on calculations presented in RPP-13470. The offsite toxicological consequence is qualitatively determined based on scoping calculations documented in RPP-13510. (Note: Flammable gas deflagrations in multiple SSTs are qualitatively determined not to increase the consequence levels. See RPP-13510.) Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on an evaluation documented in RPP-13510. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition is a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, a DST or SST flammable gas deflagration or detonation could cause grievous injury or death to a facility worker due to overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles). The potential toxicological exposure could also exceed the PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F assuming a release of 1 to 5 L of waste (RPP-13510), a dilution volume of 1,000 m3, 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). Using the same assumptions, the potential radiation dose would not exceed the 100 rem threshold for a significant worker hazard. The conclusions on toxicological exposure and radiation dose consider sensitivity to the assumptions. There is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The frequency of this accident scenario is determined to be “extremely unlikely” considering: (1) the “unlikely” frequency for a deflagration in a single SST (i.e., “unlikely” that the flammable gas concentration is at the LFL), and (2) both tanks must reach the LFL at approximately the same time (otherwise a deflagration in one tank could occur prior to the second tank reaching the LFL). See RPP-13510.

E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 01-8


SST waste Release of SST waste due to a SST headspace detonation

Steady-state flammable gas generation and accumulation, a spontaneous GRE, and/or an operation or seismic induced GRE causes a flammable gas concentration in the SST headspace above the concentration required for a detonation or a DDT (deflagration-to-detonation transition); an ignition source is assumed

Release of SST waste; potential physical injury or damage from detonation

BEU N Y N N Y Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on calculations presented in RPP-13470. The offsite toxicological consequence is qualitatively determined based on the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13510. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13510. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition is a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, a DST or SST flammable gas deflagration or detonation could cause grievous injury or death to a facility worker due to overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles). The potential toxicological exposure could also exceed the PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F assuming a release of 5 L of waste (RPP-13510), a dilution volume of 1,000 m3, 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). Using the same assumptions, the potential radiation dose would not exceed the 100 rem threshold for a significant worker hazard. The conclusions on toxicological exposure and radiation dose consider sensitivity to the assumptions. There is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The frequency of a detonation in an SST is qualitatively determined to be to be “beyond extremely unlikely.” In making this determination, consideration was given to: (1) the likelihood of reaching detonable limits and having an ignition source prior to the occurrence of a deflagration, (2) the strong ignition source requirement for the direct initiation of a detonation, (3) the special geometry conditions required for a DDT, and (4) an insufficient volume of retained flammable gas in the SST solids to achieve detonable concentrations. See RPP-13510.

E2

FG-LDM-01 Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

SST waste Release of SST waste due to a SST headspace deflagration

Increased flammable gas generated by a high resolution resistivity (HRR) or electrical resistivity tomography (ERT) leak detection and monitoring (LDM) off-normal condition results in a flammable gas concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed



“Unlikely” is the same frequency as FG-SST-01 (steady-steady flammable gas deflagration) because for LDM to significantly increase flammable gas generation and accumulation in an SST requires: (1) an equipment and/or software failure(s) that causes the LDM electrical transmitter to connect to the thermocouple riser, (2) indefinite use of the failed LDM, which is easily identified, and (3) a theoretical maximum flammable gas generation rate from electrolysis of water or corrosion (cathodic protection phenomena). See RPP-20459.

E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 01-9

FG-HF-01 Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

DST or SST waste Release of waste due to a DST or SST headspace deflagration

Hydraulic fluid leak into an DST or SST creates flammable vapor (fluid volatility or fine spray); an ignition source is assumed


BEU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on calculations presented in RPP-13470. The offsite toxicological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation that the consequence of a hydraulic fluid deflagration is reasonably bounded/represented by the consequence of a flammable gas deflagration in a DST or SST headspace. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are based on a qualitative evaluation that the consequences of a hydraulic fluid deflagration are reasonably bounded/represented by the consequences of a flammable gas deflagration in a DST or SST headspace. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The facility worker consequences are bounded by FG-DST-01 or FG-SST-01.

The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is based on the following three factors: (1) there has to be a leak in the hydraulic system that produces an atomized spray – an event judged to be “unlikely” in HNF-SD-WM-FHA-020, (2) to support the deflagration scenario this atomized spray would have to fill the entire tank headspace, and (3) an ignition source would have to be present and HNF-SD-WM-FHA-020 indicates that while the listed minimum ignition energy for hydrogen is 0.02 mJ, the minimum ignition energy for atomized hydraulic fluid is expected to be several of orders of magnitude greater (i.e., lightning, vehicle fuel fire). That is, the coincidence of lightning or a vehicle fuel fire with an atomized hydraulic fluid spray leak filling the DST or SST headspace is “beyond extremely unlikely.”

E2

FG-DCRT-01 Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

Residual waste in DCRT

Release of residual waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in a DCRT (244-BX, 244-S, 244-TX) (steady-state flammable gas deflagration)

Insufficient ventilation causes flammable gases generated by the residual waste in the DCRT to accumulate in the tank headspace to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed Note: Insufficient ventilation can result from various causes. For example, loss of weight factor dip tube flow, plugged HEPA breather filter, closed HEPA breather filter isolation valve.

Release of residual DCRT waste; potential physical injury or damage from deflagration

U N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are conservatively assumed to be the same as the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The “Yes” for significant facility worker hazard is based on the conservative assumption that the effects of the flammable gas deflagration on the facility worker are similar to those from a SST headspace flammable gas deflagration (see FG-SST-01).

The “unlikely” frequency is qualitatively determined based on the flammability evaluations of DCRTs in RPP-8050, operating experience, and flammable gas monitoring data (i.e., measured DCRT headspace flammable gas concentrations are well below 25% of the LFL).

E2



Release of residual waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in a DCRT (244-BX, 244-S, 244-TX) (spontaneous GRE flammable gas deflagration)

Spontaneous GRE causes a flammable gas concentration in the DCRT headspace above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed


BEU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are conservatively assumed to be the same as the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The facility worker consequences are bounded by FG-DCRT-01.

The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is qualitatively determined considering the conservatively estimated volume of retained flammable gases in the DCRT settled solids and the spontaneous GRE release fraction required to reach the LFL in the tank headspace. See RPP-10007.

E2

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RPP-15188 REV 12-B Appendix A. Hazard Evaluation Database No Controls Fields.


Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 01-10



Release of residual waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in a DCRT (244-BX, 244-S, 244-TX) (operation induced GRE flammable gas deflagration)

Operation induced GRE causes a flammable gas concentration in the DCRT headspace above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed Note: There are no authorized operations (i.e., waste transfers out of the DCRT) that could release sufficient retained flammable gases to achieve 100% of the LFL in the tank headspace.


-- N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are conservatively assumed to be the same as the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The facility worker consequences are bounded by FG-SST-01.

No frequency is assigned because there are no authorized operations that could release sufficient retained flammable gases to achieve 100% of the LFL in the DCRT headspace.

E2



Release of residual waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in a DCRT (244-BX, 244-S, 244-TX) (seismic induced GRE flammable gas deflagration)

Seismic induced GRE causes a flammable gas concentration in the DCRT headspace above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed


BEU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are conservatively assumed to be the same as the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The facility worker consequences are bounded by FG-SST-01.

The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is qualitatively determined considering the conservatively estimated volume of retained flammable gases in the DCRT settled solids and the seismic induced GRE release fraction required to reach the LFL in the tank headspace. See RPP-10007.

E2

FG-CT-01 Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

Residual waste in a catch tank

Release of residual waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in a catch tank (241-S-304, 241-TX-302C, 241-U-301B,* 241-UX-302A, 241-A-350, 241-AZ-151, 241-ER-311, 244-A, 241-EW-151, 204-AR-TK-1, 241-A-302A, 241-A-417, 241-AX-152, 241-AZ-154) *241-U-301B = 241-U-301

Insufficient ventilation causes flammable gases generated by the residual waste in the catch tank to accumulate in the tank headspace to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed Note: Insufficient ventilation can result from various causes. For example, loss of weight factor dip tube flow, plugged HEPA breather filter, closed HEPA breather filter isolation valve.

Release of residual catch tank waste; potential physical injury or damage from deflagration


The “unlikely” frequency is qualitatively determined based on the flammability evaluations of catch tanks in RPP-8050, operating experience, flammable gas monitoring data (i.e., measured catch tank headspace flammable gas concentrations are well below 25% of the LFL, and/or the known presence of a passive ventilation path).

E2

FG-CT-01-POLAR1 Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

Less than 1,000 gallons of 241-UX-302A waste in Polar Tanker

Release of residual waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in Polar Tanker during filling with 241-UX-302A waste

Insufficient ventilation causes flammable gases generated by the 241-UX-302A waste in the Polar Tanker to accumulate in the tank headspace to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed

Release of 241-UX-302A waste; potential physical injury to facility worker or equipment damage from deflagration

BEU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are conservatively assumed to be the same as the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The “Yes” for significant facility worker hazard is based on the conservative assumption that the effects of the flammable gas deflagration on the facility worker are similar to those from a SST headspace flammable gas deflagration (see FG-SST-01).

The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is qualitatively determined based on the percent fill of tanker by 241-UX-302A waste (less than 1,000 gal in a 5,000 gal tank) being insufficient to cause the headspace to reach LFL under barometric breathing conditions. The Polar Tanker is required to be vented to allow waste to be transferred into the tanker.

E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 01-11


Less than 1,000 gallons of 241-UX-302A waste in Polar Tanker

Release of residual waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in Polar Tanker when the tanker is being emptied into 241-SY-102

Insufficient ventilation causes flammable gas generated by the 241-UX-302A waste in the Polar Tanker to accumulate in the tank headspace to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed

Release of 241-UX-302A waste; potential physical injury to facility worker or equipment damage from deflagration


The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is qualitatively determined based on the percent fill of the tanker by 241-UX-302A waste (less than 1,000 gal in a 5,000 gal tank) being insufficient to cause the headspace to reach LFL under barometric breathing conditions. The tanker is vented upon arrival. Note: Emptying the tanker requires the vent to be closed when the headspace is pressurized by compressed air. However, only a very short time is required to empty the tank and addition of compressed air during that process ensures that concentration of flammable gas will not increase.

E2



Release of residual waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in a catch tank (241-S-304, 241-TX-302C, 241-U-301B,* 241-UX-302A, 241-A-350, 241-AZ-151, 241-ER-311, 244-A, 241-EW-151, 204-AR-TK-1, 241-A-302A, 241-A-417, 241-AX-152, 241-AZ-154) *241-U-301B = 241-U-301

Spontaneous GRE causes a flammable gas concentration in the catch tank headspace above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed


A N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are conservatively assumed to be the same as the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The facility worker consequences are bounded by FG-CT-01.

The highest frequency is conservatively assumed to be “anticipated” based on the lack of data and analysis of the steady-state flammable gas hazard in these tanks. (Note: The flammable gas release from the GRE will add to the pre-existing flammable gas concentration in the tank headspace from steady-state flammable gas release, which could be near the LFL.) (Note: The hazard may be BEU for some catch tanks. See RPP-10007.

E2



Release of residual waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in catch tank (241-S-304, 241-TX-302C, 241-U-301B,* 241-UX-302A, 241-A-350, 241-AZ-151, 241-ER-311, 244-A, 241-EW-151, 204-AR-TK-1, 241-A-302A, 241-A-417, 241-AX-152, 241-AZ-154) *241-U-301B = 241-U-301

Operation induced GRE causes a flammable gas concentration in the catch tank headspace above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed Note: There are no authorized operations that could release sufficient retained flammable gases to achieve 100% of the LFL in the tank headspace.


-- N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are conservatively assumed to be the same as the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The facility worker consequences are bounded by FG-CT-01.

No frequency is assigned because there are no authorized operations that could release sufficient retained flammable gases to achieve 100% of the LFL in the active catch tank headspace.

E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 01-12



Release of residual waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in a catch tank (241-S-304, 241-TX-302C, 241-U-301B,* 241-UX-302A, 241-A-350, 241-AZ-151, 241-ER-311, 244--A, 241-EW-151, 204-AR-TK-1, 241-A-302A, 241-A-417, 241-AX-152, 241-AZ-154) *241-U-301B = 241-U-301

Seismic induced GRE causes a flammable gas concentration in the catch tank headspace above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed


BEU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are conservatively assumed to be the same as the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The facility worker consequences are bounded by FG-CT-01.

The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is qualitatively determined based on the probability of two random independent events (i.e., flammable gas concentration above the LFL, and its ignition caused by a seismic event; and the presence of a facility worker). See RPP-10007.

E2

FG-ITM-01A Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

Residual waste in tank Release of residual waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in an IMUST

Insufficient ventilation causes flammable gases generated by the waste in the tank to accumulate in the tank headspace to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed Note: Insufficient ventilation can result from various causes. For example, no vent path provided (i.e., tank is sealed), plugged HEPA breather filter, closed HEPA breather filter isolation valve

Release of residual waste in tank; potential physical injury or damage from deflagration

A N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are conservatively assumed to be the same as the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The “Yes” for significant facility worker hazard is based on the conservative assumption that the effects of the flammable gas deflagration on the facility worker are similar to those from a SST headspace flammable gas deflagration (see FG-SST-01).

The highest frequency is conservatively assumed to be “anticipated” based on the lack of data and analysis of the steady-state flammable gas hazard in these tanks. Most of the IMUSTs have been interim stabilized, meaning that pumpable liquids have been removed and the tanks isolated. In many cases, it is not practical to verify the existence of a flow path for barometric breathing (i.e., it is conceivable that isolation activities have created a zero airflow condition for some IMUSTs). In addition, because some of the tanks are constructed of steel, diffusion will be relatively ineffective in reducing the hydrogen concentration in the tanks. Under these conditions, it is assumed that the IMUSTs could eventually reach the LFL.

E2

FG-ITM-01B Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

Residual waste in tank Release of residual waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in 244-CR Vault tank (244-CR-TK-001, -002, -003, -011)

Insufficient ventilation causes flammable gases generated by the waste in the tank to accumulate in the tank headspace to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed Note: Insufficient ventilation can result from various causes. For example, passive vent path plugged, plugged HEPA breather filter, closed HEPA breather filter isolation valve



The “unlikely” frequency is qualitatively determined based on flammable gas monitoring data and/or the known presence of a passive ventilation path.

E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 01-13

FG-ITM-01C Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

Residual waste in tank Release of residual waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in a 244-AR Vault tank (i.e., 244-AR-TK-001, -002, -003, and -004)

Insufficient ventilation causes flammable gases generated by the waste in the tank to accumulate in the tank headspace to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed Note: Insufficient ventilation can result from various causes. For example, plugged HEPA breather filter, closed HEPA breather filter isolation valve


BEU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are conservatively assumed to be the same as the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The facility worker consequences are bounded by FG-SST-01.

The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is qualitatively determined considering: (1) liquids in 244-AR Vault tanks has been removed and only small quantities of pumpable liquids remain in each tank and (2) the tanks are open to the vaults thereby ensuring passive ventilation and diffusion.

E2

FG-ITM-02 Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

Residual waste in tank Release of residual waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in an IMUST, or 244-CR Vault tank (244-CR-TK-001, -002, -003, -011)

Spontaneous GRE causes a flammable gas concentration in the tank headspace above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed



The highest frequency is conservatively assumed to be “anticipated” based on the lack of data and analysis of the steady-state flammable gas hazard in these tanks. (Note: The flammable gas release from the GRE will add to the pre-existing flammable gas concentration in the tank headspace from steady-state flammable gas release which could be near the LFL.)

E2



Operation induced GRE causes a flammable gas concentration in the tank headspace above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed Note: There are no authorized operations that could release sufficient retained flammable gases to achieve 100% of the LFL in the tank headspace.


-- N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are conservatively assumed to be the same as the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-1). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The facility worker consequences are bounded by FG-ITM-02.

No frequency is assigned because there are no authorized operations that could release sufficient retained flammable gases to achieve 100% of the LFL in the active catch tank headspace.

E2



Seismic induced GRE causes a flammable gas concentration in the tank headspace above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed


BEU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are conservatively assumed to be the same as the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The facility worker consequences are bounded by FG-ITM-02.

The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is qualitatively determined based on the probability of two random, independent events (i.e., flammable gas concentration above the LFL and its ignition caused by a seismic event; and the presence of a facility worker)

E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 01-14

FG-242T-01 Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

Residual waste/ contamination in evaporator vessel 242-T-101 and associated piping

Release of residual waste/contamination due to a flammable gas deflagration in evaporator vessel 242-T-101

Steady-state flammable gas generation and accumulation in evaporator vessel 242-T-101 to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed

Release of residual waste/ contamination; potential physical injury or damage from deflagration

A N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological consequence is determined to be less than 100 rem, based on the facility being classified as Hazard Category 3, as documented in RPP-13329. The onsite worker toxicological consequence is conservatively assumed to be the same as the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The “Yes” for significant facility worker hazard is based on the conservative assumption that the effects of the flammable gas deflagration on the facility worker are similar to those from a SST headspace flammable gas deflagration (see FG-SST-01).

The frequency of “anticipated” is conservatively assumed based on lack of 242-T Evaporator knowledge regarding the quantity of residual waste/contamination present, air infiltration/ flammable gas escape rates, and internal ignition sources.

E2


Residual waste/ contamination in feed tank 242-T-102 and associated piping

Release of residual waste/contamination due to a flammable gas deflagration in feed tank 242-T-102

Steady-state flammable gas generation and accumulation in feed tank 242-T-102 to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed


A N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological consequence is determined to be less than 100 rem, based on the facility being classified as Hazard Category 3 as documented in RPP-13329. The onsite worker toxicological consequence is conservatively assumed to be the same as the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The “Yes” for significant facility worker hazard is based on the conservative assumption that the effects of the flammable gas deflagration on the facility worker are similar to those from a SST headspace flammable gas deflagration (see FG-SST-01).

The frequency of “anticipated” is conservatively assumed based on lack of 242-T Evaporator knowledge regarding the quantity of residual waste/ contamination present, air infiltration/ flammable gas escape rates, and internal ignition sources.

E2


Residual waste/ contamination in pre-heater tanks 242-T-103 and 242-T-104 and associated piping

Release of residual waste/contamination due to a flammable gas deflagration in pre-heater tank 242-T-103 or 242-T-104

Steady-state flammable gas generation and accumulation in pre-heater tank 242-T-103 or 242-T-104 to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed




E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 01-15


Residual waste/ contamination in cyclone separator 242-T-105 and associated piping

Release of residual waste/contamination due to a flammable gas deflagration in cyclone separator 242-T-105

Steady-state flammable gas generation and accumulation in cyclone separator 242-T-105 to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed




E2


Residual waste/ contamination in packed scrubber 242-T-106 or condenser 242-T-107 and associated piping

Release of residual waste/contamination due to a flammable gas deflagration in packed scrubber 242-T-106 or condenser 242-T-107

Steady-state flammable gas generation and accumulation in packed scrubber 242-T-106 or condenser 242-T-107 to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed


A N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological consequence is determined to be less than 100 rem, based on the facility being classified as Hazard Category 3 as documented in RPP-13329. The onsite worker toxicological consequence is qualitatively estimated as less than PAC-3 because the only potential material-at-risk is condensate (i.e., lower source term than the tank waste assumed for the representative accident [see FG-SST-01]). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The “Yes” for significant facility worker hazard is based on the conservative assumption that the effects of the flammable gas deflagration on the facility worker are similar to those from a SST headspace flammable gas deflagration (see FG-SST-01).


E1


Residual waste/ contamination in condenser catch tanks 242-T-108 and 242-T-109 and associated piping

Release of residual waste/contamination due to a flammable gas deflagration in condenser catch tank 242-T-108 or 242-T-109

Steady-state flammable gas generation and accumulation in condenser catch tank 242-T-108 or 242-T-109 to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed


U N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological consequence is determined to be less than 100 rem, based on the facility being classified as Hazard Category 3 as documented in RPP-13329. The onsite worker toxicological consequence is qualitatively estimated as less than PAC-3 because the only potential material-at-risk is condensate (i.e., lower source term than the tank waste assumed for the representative accident [see FG-SST-01]). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The “Yes” for significant facility worker hazard is based on the conservative assumption that the effects of the flammable gas deflagration on the facility worker are similar to those from a SST headspace flammable gas deflagration (see FG-SST-01).

The “unlikely” frequency is qualitatively estimated based on the limited flammable gas generation from condensate that may be present in the tanks and because the tanks are open to the catch tank room (i.e., passively ventilated).

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 01-16


Residual waste/ contamination in cyclone catch tank 242-T-110 and associated piping

Release of residual waste/contamination due to a flammable gas deflagration in cyclone catch tank 242-T-110

Steady-state flammable gas generation and accumulation in cyclone catch tank 242-T-105 to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed




E2


Residual waste/ contamination in the 242-T Evaporator building feed tank room

Release of residual waste/contamination due to a flammable gas deflagration in the feed tank room of the 242-T Evaporator building

Steady-state flammable gas generation and accumulation in the feed tank room of the 242-T Evaporator building to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed


BEU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological consequence is determined to be less than 100 rem, based on the facility being classified as Hazard Category 3 as documented in RPP-13329. The onsite worker toxicological consequence is conservatively assumed to be the same as the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The “Yes” for significant facility worker hazard is based on the conservative assumption that the effects of the flammable gas deflagration on the facility worker are similar to those from a SST headspace flammable gas deflagration (see FG-SST-01).

The estimated quantities of residual waste/ contamination present do not generate sufficient flammable gas to reach the LFL in the feed tank room.

E2


Residual waste/ contamination in the 242-T Evaporator building evaporator room

Release of residual waste/contamination due to a flammable gas deflagration in the evaporator room of the 242-T Evaporator building

Steady-state flammable gas generation and accumulation in the evaporator room of the 242-T Evaporator building to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed


BEU N N N N Y Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological consequence is determined to be less than 100 rem, based on the facility being classified as Hazard Category 3 as documented in RPP-13329. The onsite worker toxicological consequence is conservatively assumed to be the same as the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The “Yes” for significant facility worker hazard is based on the conservative assumption that the effects of the flammable gas deflagration on the facility worker are similar to those from a SST headspace flammable gas deflagration (see FG-SST-01).

The estimated quantities of residual waste/ contamination present do not generate sufficient flammable gas to reach the LFL in the evaporator room.

E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 01-17


Residual waste/ contamination in the 242-T Evaporator building catch tank room

Release of residual waste/contamination due to a flammable gas deflagration in the catch tank room of the 242-T Evaporator building

Steady-state flammable gas generation and accumulation in the catch tank room of the 242-T Evaporator building to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed


BEU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological consequence is determined to be less than 100 rem, based on the facility being classified as Hazard Category 3 as documented in RPP-13329. The onsite worker toxicological consequence is conservatively assumed to be the same as the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The “Yes” for significant facility worker hazard is based on the conservative assumption that the effects of the flammable gas deflagration on the facility worker are similar to those from a SST headspace flammable gas deflagration (see FG-SST-01).

The estimated quantities of residual waste/ contamination present do not generate sufficient flammable gas to reach the LFL in the catch tank room.

E2

FG-242S-HOTSIDE-01 Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

Residual waste/ contamination in the 242-S Evaporator (Hot Side)

Release of residual waste/contamination due to a flammable gas deflagration in the 242-S Evaporator (Hot Side)

Steady-state flammable gas generation and accumulation in 242-S Evaporator (Hot Side) equipment (e.g., evaporator vessel, recirculation pump line, primary condenser, condenser catch tank) to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed (e.g., intrusive activities)


U N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively estimated as less than 100 rem and PAC-3, respectively, because the evaporator was flushed and the radioactive liquids removed following the last operation of the 242-S Evaporator (i.e., lower source term than the tank waste assumed for the representative accident [see FG-SST-01]). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The “Yes” for significant facility worker hazard is based on the conservative assumption that the effects of the flammable gas deflagration on the facility worker (i.e., overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure [missiles]) are similar to those from a SST headspace flammable gas deflagration (see FG-SST-01).

The highest qualitative estimate of frequency from RPP-6599.

E1

FG-A431-01 Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

Residual contamination on the 241-A-431 ventilation building de-entrainer

Release of residual contamination due to a flammable gas deflagration within the 241-A-431 ventilation building de-entrainer

Potential flammable gas migration from A farm or generation and accumulation within the 241-A-431 ventilation building de-entrainer to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed (e.g., sampling activities, lightning)

Release of residual contamination; potential physical injury or damage from deflagration

BEU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological consequence is determined to be less than 100 rem, based on the facility being classified as Hazard Category 3 as documented in RPP-13329. The onsite worker toxicological consequence is qualitatively estimated as less than PAC-3 because the only material that passed through the 241-A-431 ventilation building de-entrainer was tank off-gas (i.e., lower source term than the tank waste assumed for the representative accident [see FG-SST-01]), and there is limited material-at-risk in the de-entrainer based on radiation levels that are essentially background. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The “Yes” for significant facility worker hazard is based on the conservative assumption that the effects of the flammable gas deflagration on the facility worker are similar to those from a SST headspace flammable gas deflagration (see FG-SST-01).

The de-entrainer does not contain a significant quantity of waste and, therefore, there is relatively little flammable gas generation. In addition, the de-entrainer is open to the atmosphere. Note: The 241-A-431 ventilation building is isolated from the 241-A Tank Farm.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 01-18

FG-ITS1-01 Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

Residual contamination in ITS-1 piping or equipment

Release of residual contamination due to a flammable gas deflagration in ITS-1 equipment

Flammable gas generation and accumulation within ITS-1 piping or equipment to a concentration above the LFL; ignition source assumed


EU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological consequence is determined to be less than 100 rem, based on the facility being classified as Hazard Category 3 as documented in RPP-13329. The onsite worker toxicological consequence is conservatively assumed to be the same as the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The “Yes” for significant facility worker hazard is based on the conservative assumption that the effects of the flammable gas deflagration on the facility worker are similar to those from a SST headspace flammable gas deflagration (see FG-SST-01).

The “extremely unlikely” frequency is qualitatively based on the following: (1) Flammable gas generation is limited because only hot air (vapor) from 241-BY-102 was processed by ITS-1; (2) The de-entrainer, condenser, demister, cyclone separator, HEPA filters, and exhauster were designed to drain (i.e., would not retain liquid) and are passively ventilated; (3) From a liquid level assessment (RPP-RPT-32085), no free liquid was observed or measured in the feed tank or ion exchange column; (4) The results of flammable gas samples taken during the liquid level assessment were 10% of the LFL for the ion exchanger (Direct Reading Instrument Survey #06-03406) and 0% of the LFL for the feed tank (Direct Reading Instrument Survey #06-03360); (5) The design of the solution hold-up tank precludes hydrogen buildup and flammable gas samples taken during the liquid level assessment were 0% of the LFL (Direct Reading Instrument Survey #06-03413); and (6) A drain line may connect ITS-1 to 241-BY-102, but 241-BY-102 does not pose a significant flammable hazard (i.e., the steady-state time to LFL assuming no ventilation is >1826 days [RPP-5926] and there is insufficient retained flammable gas in the settle solids to achieve 100% of the LFL if all the retained gas is released into the tank headspace [RPP-10006]).

E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 01-19

FG-AXIX-01 Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

Contamination contained on the 241-AX-IX ion exchanger resin

Release of contaminated resin due to a flammable gas deflagration in the 241-AX-IX ion exchanger

Flammable gas generation and accumulation within the 241-AX-IX ion exchanger to a concentration above the LFL; ignition source assumed (e.g., intrusive activities)

Release of contaminated resin; potential physical injury or damage from deflagration

BEU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological consequence is based on the facility being classified as Hazard Category 3 as documented in RPP-13329. The onsite worker toxicological consequence is qualitatively estimated to be below PAC-3 based on: (1) the 241-AX-IX ion exchanger processed only condensate from aging waste tank vapor (i.e., lower source term than the tank waste assumed for the representative accident [see FG-SST-01]); (2) radiation readings that are essentially background indicate limited processed material in the ion exchanger; and (3) no free liquid was observed or measured in a liquid level assessment of the ion exchanger (RPP-RPT-31126). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The “Yes” for significant facility worker hazard is based on the conservative assumption that the effects of the flammable gas deflagration on the facility worker are similar to those from a SST headspace flammable gas deflagration (see FG-SST-01).

The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is qualitatively estimated based on the following. Flammable gas generation is limited considering: (1) the 241-AX-IX ion exchanger processed only condensate from aging waste tank vapor; (2) radiation readings that are essentially background indicate limited processed material in the ion exchanger; and (3) no free liquid was observed or measured in a liquid level assessment of the ion exchanger (RPP-RPT-31126). Also, the results of flammable gas samples taken during the liquid level assessment of the ion exchanger were 0% of the LFL (Direct Reading Instrument Survey #06-02154). In addition, there are no identified ignition sources (i.e., no electrical power to the 241-AX-IX ion exchanger).

E1

FG-C801-01 Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

Contamination in piping and residual material in the 241-C-801 building

Release of contamination and residual material due to a flammable gas deflagration in 241-C-801 facility piping

Flammable gas intrusion from C-103 results in energetic release into building atmosphere (building structure not assumed to be damaged by deflagration); ignition source assumed (e.g., intrusive activities)

Release of contamination and residual material; potential physical injury or damage from deflagration

BEU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively estimated to be below 100 rem and PAC-3, respectively, because even if the waste transfer lines were not flushed (the normal practice), the quantity of waste is limited and located in 1 to 2 in. diameter lines embedded in the concrete walls and floors of the building. The only other MAR is limited to contamination from spills and/or leaks. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The “Yes” for significant facility worker hazard is based on the conservative assumption that the effects of the flammable gas deflagration on the facility worker are similar to those from a SST headspace flammable gas deflagration (see FG-SST-01).

The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is qualitatively estimated because 241-C-103 has been retrieved and is, therefore, not a significant flammable hazard (i.e., the steady-state time to LFL assuming no ventilation is >1826 days [RPP-5926] and there is insufficient retained flammable gas in the settle solids to achieve 100% of the LFL if all the retained gas is released into the tank headspace [RPP-10006]).

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 01-20


Contamination in piping and residual material in the 241-C-801 building


Internal flammable gas generation in piping results in energetic release into building atmosphere (building structure not assumed to be damaged by deflagration); ignition source assumed (e.g., intrusive activities)

Release of contamination and residual material; potential physical injury or damage from deflagration

U N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively estimated to be below 100 rem and PAC-3, respectively, because even if the waste transfer lines were not flushed (the normal practice), the quantity of waste is limited and located in 1 to 2 in. diameter lines embedded in the concrete walls and floors of the building. The only other MAR is limited to contamination from spills and/or leaks. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition is a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, a flammable gas deflagration or detonation could cause grievous injury or death to a facility worker due to overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles). The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure would not exceed the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard, respectively, based on the limited MAR. There is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “unlikely” frequency is qualitatively assigned based on the estimated frequency for a deflagration in a waste transfer line in RPP-13510.

E1


Contamination in 241-C-801 piping (assuming there is some contamination in the raw water spray system)


Flammable gas collection in 241-C-801 raw water spray system in valve pit; ignition source assumed (e.g. intrusive activities)

Release of contamination; potential physical injury or damage from deflagration

U N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively estimated to be below 100 rem and PAC-3, respectively, because even if the waste transfer lines were not flushed (the normal practice), the quantity of waste is limited and located in 1 to 2 in. diameter lines embedded in the concrete walls and floors of the building. The only other MAR is limited to contamination from spills and/or leaks. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition is a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, a flammable gas deflagration or detonation could cause grievous injury or death to a facility worker due to overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles). The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure would not exceed the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard, respectively, based on the limited MAR. There is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “unlikely” frequency is qualitatively assigned based on the estimated frequency for a deflagration in a waste transfer line in RPP-13510.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 01-21

FG-SX401-01 Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

Residual contamination in 241-SX-401 piping, condenser, or condensate tanks

Release of contamination due to a flammable gas deflagration in 241-SX-401 piping, condenser, or condensate tanks

Flammable gases generated by the residual contamination in 241-SX-401 piping, condenser, or condensate tanks (e.g., radiolysis, corrosion) accumulate to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed (e.g., cutting into condenser or condensate tanks to perform sampling causes sparks)


U N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively estimated to be below 100 rem and PAC-3, respectively, because the 241-SX-401 Condenser Shielding Building only processed vapor from the 241-SX Tank Farm tanks, it is unlikely that there remains any condensate in the condensate return head tank or condensate seal tank after more than 30 years, and there is no high radiation area in 241-SX-401. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition is a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, a flammable gas deflagration or detonation could cause grievous injury or death to a facility worker due to overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles). The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure would not exceed the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard, respectively, based on the MAR (condensate). There is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “unlikely” frequency is qualitatively estimated based on the limited flammable gas generation because only vapor from the headspace of 241-SX Tank Farm tanks was cooled by the 241-SX-401 and -402 condenser shielding building systems and there are no high radiation areas indicating limited quantities of retained condensate and residuals.

E1


Residual contamination in 241-SX-402 piping, condenser, or condensate tanks


Flammable gases generated by the residual contamination in 241-SX-402 piping, condenser, or condensate tanks (e.g., radiolysis, corrosion) accumulate to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed (e.g., cutting into condenser or condensate tanks to perform sampling causes sparks)


U N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively estimated to be below 100 rem and PAC-3, respectively, because there is no record that the 241-SX-402 Condenser Shielding Building was ever used to condense vapor from the 241-SX Tank Farm tanks, and the radiation levels in the facility are at background levels. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition is a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, a flammable gas deflagration or detonation could cause grievous injury or death to a facility worker due to overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles). The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure would not exceed the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard, respectively, based on the MAR (condensate). There is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “unlikely” frequency is qualitatively estimated based on the limited flammable gas generation because only vapor from the headspace of 241-SX Tank Farm tanks was cooled by the 241-SX-401 and -402 condenser shielding building systems and there are no high radiation areas indicating limited quantities of retained condensate and residuals.

E1

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RPP-15188 REV 12-H Appendix A. Hazard Evaluation Database No Controls Fields.


Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 01-22

FG-GT-01 Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

Tank waste Release of tank waste due to flammable gas deflagration in gas-trapping systems or equipment Note: Gas-trapping systems and equipment are systems or equipment that may contain flammable gases generated by tank wastes, including flammable gases generated by corrosion in a tank waste environment, and that have a configuration that can trap flammable gases and accumulate a flammable gas concentration > 25% LFL. Examples of gas-trapping systems or equipment include core sample drill pipes, weight factor dip tubes, and waste transfer pump columns including connected systems or equipment (e.g., jumpers, transfer lines) up to a gas-trapping boundary. Equipment that is sealed in a manner that prevents the intrusion of tank waste and the migration of flammable gas, or equipment that is vented in a manner that prevents accumulation of flammable gas, is not considered gas-trapping equipment.

Flammable gases are generated and/or accumulate within gas-trapping systems or equipment; ignition source assumed Note: Flammable gases can be from steady-state generation or from an induced GRE if gas-trapping equipment (e.g., waste sampling equipment) encounters a pocket of flammable gases.

Release of tank waste; potential physical injury or damage from deflagration

A N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined to be below 100 rem and PAC-3, respectively, based on the limited MAR in the gas-trapping systems or equipment. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition is a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, with some exceptions (see below). Applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, a flammable gas deflagration or detonation could cause grievous injury or death to a facility worker due to overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles). The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure would not exceed the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard, respectively, based on the limited MAR. There is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

“Anticipated” is the highest frequency for postulated flammable gas deflagrations inside gas-trapping systems or equipment based on operating experience. See RPP-13510.

E1

FG-WIE-02 This hazardous condition has been deleted.

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

FG-XFR-01 This hazardous condition has been deleted.

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

FG-XFR-02 Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

Transferred waste Release of waste due to flammable gas deflagration in buried/bermed primary waste transfer piping

Active transfer with accumulation of flammable gas generated by waste in the primary piping to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed (i.e., excavation, cone penetrometer, and drilling)

If the primary piping is penetrated by the ignition source, release of waste; potential physical injury or damage from deflagration

BEU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are determined to be below 100 rem and PAC-3, respectively, based on the limited MAR and/or limited energy source. (Note: A release is not unexpected unless the primary piping is penetrated by the ignition source.) See RPP-13510. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The “No” for significant facility worker hazard results because there is no facility worker present in the immediate vicinity of the flammable gas deflagration or detonation and the consequences are limited by the available MAR and/or flammable gas volume (i.e., energy).

The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is qualitatively determined based on the absence of space for flammable gases to accumulate in the primary piping during a waste transfer.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 01-23


-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --


-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --


Transferred waste Release of waste due to flammable gas deflagration in the primary hose of HIHTL

Active transfer with accumulation of flammable gases generated by the waste in the primary HIHTL to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed (i.e., tribocharging, lightning, vehicle impact, seismic, and high wind)

If the primary hose is penetrated by the ignition source, release of waste; potential physical injury or damage from deflagration

BEU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are determined to be below 100 rem and PAC-3, respectively, based on the limited MAR and/or limited energy source. (Note: A release is not unexpected unless the primary hose is penetrated by the ignition source.) See RPP-13510. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The facility worker consequences are bounded by FG-XFR-04.

The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is qualitatively determined based on the absence of space for flammable gases to accumulate in the primary hose during a waste transfer

E1


-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --


Transferred waste Release of waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in active or inactive waste transfer piping or HIHTL systems (primary or encasement)

Accumulation of flammable gas generated by the residual waste in active or inactive waste transfer piping or HIHTL systems to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed


A N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are determined to be below 100 rem and PAC-3, respectively, based on the limited MAR and/or limited energy source. See RPP-13510. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition is a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, a flammable gas deflagration or detonation could cause grievous injury or death to a facility worker due to overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles). The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure would not exceed the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard, respectively, based on the limited MAR. There is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “anticipated” frequency is based on operating experience.

E1


Transferred waste for the 222-S Laboratory

Release of waste due to flammable gas deflagration in the waste transfer lines from the 222-S Laboratory (i.e., SNL-5350 and SNL-5351)

Failure to flush line after transfer with accumulation of flammable gas generated by residual waste in the primary piping to a concentration above the LFL or leak in primary piping with accumulation of flammable gas generated by the waste in the piping encasement to a concentration above the LFL; ignition source is (i.e., excavation, cone penetrometer, drilling, leak detector, sump pump)

If the waste transfer line is penetrated by the ignition source, release of waste; potential physical injury or damage from deflagration

BEU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are determined to be below 100 rem and PAC-3, respectively, based on the limited MAR and/or limited energy source. (Note: A release is not unexpected unless the waste transfer line is penetrated by the ignition source.) Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The “Yes” for significant facility worker hazard is based on the conservative assumption that the effects of the flammable gas deflagration on the facility worker are similar to those from a SST headspace flammable gas deflagration (see FG-SST-01).

The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is qualitatively determined based on the dilute waste transferred from the 222-S Laboratory and the absence of corrosion because the waste transfer lines (primary and encasement) are constructed of a fiberglass filled composite material.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 01-24

FG-6241-01 Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

Waste in waste transfer Release of waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in the 6241-A Diversion Box

Waste transfer leak into the 6241-A Diversion Box; flammable gas generated by the waste accumulates in the structure to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed



The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is based on the 6241-A Diversion Box volume (22,321 ft3) and passive ventilation. The postulated accident scenario requires a waste transfer leak of >100,000 gal (> 60% fill fraction based on RPP-8050), but that does not fill the structure. It is not credible that such a large leak would go undetected based on the 36-in. DST waste level (material balance) discrepancy, leak detection required by environmental permits, and radiation surveys. (Note: With the structure filled 60% full of waste, it would take 4 years to reach the LFL. Diffusion through the concrete walls would further increase the time to LFL.)

E2


Waste in waste transfer Release of waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in the 6241-V Vent Station

Waste transfer leak into the 6241-V Vent Station; flammable gas generated by the waste accumulates in the structure to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed



The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is based on the 6241-V Vent Station volume and passive ventilation. The postulated accident scenario requires a waste transfer leak of >30,000 gal (> 60% fill fraction based on RPP-8050), but that does not fill the structure. It is not credible that such a large leak would go undetected based on the 11-in. DST waste level (material balance) discrepancy, leak detection required by environmental permits, and radiation surveys. (Note: With the structure filled 60% full of waste, it would take 4 years to reach the LFL. Diffusion through the concrete walls would further increase the time to LFL.)

E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 01-25

FG-VACRET-01 Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

Residual waste in the vacuum retrieval system slurry tank

Release of residual waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in the slurry tank

Insufficient ventilation causes flammable gases generated by the residual waste in the slurry tank to accumulate in the tank headspace to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed Note: An induced or spontaneous GRE hazard may also exist.

Release of residual waste; potential physical injury or damage from deflagration


The “anticipated” frequency is conservatively assumed based on the lack of data and analysis on the contents or configuration of the vacuum retrieval system.

E2


Residual waste in the vacuum retrieval system water separator

Release of residual waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in the water separator

Insufficient ventilation causes flammable gases generated by the residual waste in the water separator to accumulate in the tank headspace to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed Note: An induced or spontaneous GRE hazard may also exist.

Release of residual waste; potential physical injury or damage from deflagration


The “anticipated” frequency is conservatively assumed based on the lack of data and analysis on the contents or configuration of the vacuum retrieval system.

E2

FG-FF-01 Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

Tank waste Release of tank waste due to a fire or flammable gas deflagration in the tank headspace Note: Tanks include DSTs, DST annuli, DST leak detection pits, SSTs, 241-AX leak detection pits, DCRTs, active and inactive catch tanks, IMUSTs, 244-CR Vault tanks, 244-AR Vault tanks

Internal vehicle accident causes fuel tank failure and fuel leak into a tank and subsequent fire or deflagration of fuel vapors; an ignition source is assumed Note: Internal vehicles are those directly involved in tank farm operations/construction Note: Fuel can be gasoline or LPG. Diesel fuel vapors are not expected to reach the LFL and diesel fuel fires in a tank are considered organic solvent fires (see DSA Section 3.3.2.3.1).


U N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on calculations presented in RPP-13470. The offsite toxicological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation that the consequence of a gasoline or LPG fire or deflagration is reasonably bounded/represented by the consequence of a flammable gas deflagration in a DST or SST headspace (see RPP-13510). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are based on a qualitative evaluation that the consequences of a gasoline or LPG fire or deflagration are reasonably bounded/represented by the consequences of a flammable gas deflagration in a DST or SST headspace (see RPP-13510). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The “No” for significant facility worker hazard is because this hazardous condition is a common industrial hazard that is regulated by DOE-prescribed occupational safety and health standards (i.e., fire protection requirement). That is, the primary facility worker consequence is from overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles) and is independent of where the gasoline or LPG flammable gas deflagration occurs.

The “unlikely” frequency is based on analyses in RPP-13261 in which the event frequency considers: (1) a vehicle striking a structure such that the fuel tank is ruptured, (2) the fuel leaking into a tank, (3) the fuel-air concentration reaching the LFL, and (4) the presence of an ignition source. See RPP-13510.

E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 01-26



External vehicle accident causes fuel tank failure and fuel leak into a tank and subsequent fire or deflagration of fuel vapors; an ignition source is assumed Note: External vehicles are vehicles on roads outside of tank farm facilities, including refueling tankers. Note: Fuel can be gasoline or LPG. Diesel fuel vapors are not expected to reach the LFL and diesel fuel fires in a tank are considered organic solvent fires (see DSA Section 3.3.2.3.1).


EU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on calculations presented in RPP-13470. The offsite toxicological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation that the consequence of a gasoline or LPG fire or deflagration is reasonably bounded/represented by the consequence of a flammable gas deflagration in a DST or SST headspace (see RPP-13510). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are based on a qualitative evaluation that the consequences of a gasoline or LPG fuel fire or deflagration are reasonably bounded/represented by the consequences of a flammable gas deflagration in a DST or SST headspace (see RPP-13510). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The “No” for significant facility worker hazard is because this hazardous condition is a common industrial hazard that is regulated by DOE-prescribed occupational safety and health standards (i.e., fire protection requirement). That is, the primary facility worker consequence is from overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles) and is independent of where the gasoline or LPG flammable gas deflagration occurs.

The “extremely unlikely” frequency considers the postulated accident scenario that requires: (1) a “run-away” external vehicle, (2) the vehicle striking a tank farm structure such that the fuel tank is ruptured and the fuel leaking into a tank, (3) the fuel-air concentration reaching the LFL, and (4) the presence of an ignition source.

E2


Tank waste Release of tank waste due to a fire or flammable gas deflagration in the tank headspace Note: Tanks include DSTs, DST annuli, DST leak detection pit, SSTs, DCRTs, active and inactive catch tanks, IMUSTs, 244-CR Vault tanks, 244-AR Vault tanks

Fueling accident causes fuel leak into a tank and subsequent fire or deflagration of fuel vapors; an ignition source is assumed Note: Fuel can be gasoline or LPG. (Diesel fuel vapors are not expected to reach the LFL and diesel fuel fires in a tank are considered organic solvent fires [see DSA Section 3.3.2.3.1].) Fueling may involve hoses from a tanker located outside the tank farm or portable fuel containers.


U N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on calculations presented in RPP-13470. The offsite toxicological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation that the consequence of a gasoline or LPG fuel fire or deflagration is reasonably bounded/represented by the consequence of a flammable gas deflagration in a DST or SST headspace (see RPP-13510). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are based on a qualitative evaluation that the consequences of a gasoline or LPG fuel fire or deflagration are reasonably bounded/represented by the consequences of a flammable gas deflagration in a DST or SST headspace (see RPP-13510). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The “No” for significant facility worker hazard is because this hazardous condition is a common industrial hazard that is regulated by DOE-prescribed occupational safety and health standards (i.e., fire protection requirement). That is, the primary facility worker consequence is from overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles) and is independent of where the gasoline or LPG flammable gas deflagration occurs.

“Unlikely” is the highest frequency of postulated fueling accidents that could cause a tank fire or deflagration considering that the location and size of the fuel spill must result in sufficient fuel leaking into the tank to cause the fire or deflagration.

E2



Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) leaks from a container located near a tank and, being heavier than air, flows into the tank; an ignition source is assumed


U N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on calculations presented in RPP-13470. The offsite toxicological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation that the consequence of an LPG fire or deflagration is reasonably bounded/represented by the consequence of a flammable gas deflagration in a DST or SST headspace (see RPP-13510). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are based on a qualitative evaluation that the consequences of an LPG fire or deflagration are reasonably bounded/represented by the consequences of a flammable gas deflagration in a DST or SST headspace (see RPP-13510). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The “No” for significant facility worker hazard is because this hazardous condition is a common industrial hazard that is regulated by DOE-prescribed occupational safety and health standards (i.e., fire protection requirement). That is, the primary facility worker consequence is from overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles) and is independent of where the LPG flammable gas deflagration occurs.

The “unlikely” frequency is qualitatively established based on industry experience. LPG cylinders have leaked and fires/deflagrations have occurred. However, LPG is used in a very large number of applications every year and the frequency on a per use basis is not “anticipated.”

E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 01-27


DST 241-AW tank waste

Release of DST 241-AW waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in the tank headspace

All causes of 242-A Evaporator package boiler diesel fuel storage tank failure (e.g., vehicle impact) causing a spill large enough to enter the 241-AW Tank Farm and subsequent deflagration of fuel vapors; an ignition source is assumed Note: Diesel fuel fires in a tank are considered organic solvent fires (see DSA Section 3.3.2.3.1).

Release of DST 241-AW tank waste; potential physical injury or damage from deflagration

BEU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on calculations presented in RPP-13470. The offsite toxicological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation that the consequence is reasonably bounded/represented by the consequence of a flammable gas deflagration in a DST headspace (see RPP-13510). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological consequence and The onsite worker toxicological consequence are based on a qualitative evaluation that the consequences are reasonably bounded/represented by the consequences of a flammable gas deflagration in a DST headspace (see RPP-13510). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The “No” for significant facility worker hazard is because this hazardous condition is a common industrial hazard that is regulated by DOE-prescribed occupational safety and health standards (i.e., fire protection requirement). That is, the primary facility worker consequence is from overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles) and is independent of where the diesel fuel vapor deflagration occurs.

The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency considers the postulated accident scenario that requires: (1) failure of 242-A Evaporator package boiler diesel fuel storage tank(s) and the spill of sufficient fuel to enter the 241-AW Tank Farm, (2) the diesel fuel leaking into a tank, (3) the diesel fuel-air concentration reaching the LFL, and (4) the presence of an ignition source.

E2

FG-AZ301-01 Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

702-AZ ventilation system condensate, chemicals, and contaminants in tank AZ301-COND-TK-001

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials due to a flammable gas deflagration in the condensate receiving tank AZ301-COND-TK-001 headspace

Insufficient ventilation causes flammable gases generated by the condensate in AZ301-COND-TK-001 to accumulate in the tank headspace to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials; potential physical injury or damage from deflagration

EU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accidents (i.e., a deflagration in a DST, see FG-DST-01, or SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively assigned based on the limited volume of flammable gas, the smaller MAR relative to the representative accidents, and the lower radiological and toxicological source terms for the condensate including corrosion inhibiting chemicals, caustic flush solutions, and contaminants, versus tank waste assumed for the representative accidents (i.e., a deflagration in a DST, see FG-DST-01, or SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition is not a significant facility worker hazard because it is a common industrial hazard addressed by the industrial hygiene safety management program.

Tank AZ301-COND-TK-001 is constructed of stainless steel and is passively ventilated. The material that can enter the tank is condensate from the 241-AZ-702 ventilation system, corrosion inhibiting chemicals, ventilation system flush (caustic) solutions, and contaminants that are typically dilute. Based on these two factors (i.e., stainless steel containing a solution that is essentially mildly contaminated water), limited flammable gas generation is expected.

E1


702-AZ ventilation system condensate, chemicals, and contaminants in the tanker truck connected to the AZ-301 condensate system

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials due to a flammable gas deflagration in the condensate receiving tanker truck headspace

Insufficient ventilation causes flammable gases generated by the condensate in the tanker truck to accumulate in the tanker truck headspace to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed


EU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accidents (i.e., a deflagration in a DST, see FG-DST-01, or SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively assigned based on the limited volume of flammable gas, the smaller MAR relative to the representative accidents, and the lower radiological and toxicological source terms for the condensate including corrosion inhibiting chemicals, caustic flush solutions, and contaminants, versus tank waste assumed for the representative accidents (i.e., a deflagration in a DST, see FG-DST-01, or SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition is not a significant facility worker hazard because it is a common industrial hazard addressed by the industrial hygiene safety management program.

The tanker truck is constructed of stainless steel and is passively ventilated. The material that can enter the tanker truck is condensate from the 241-AZ-702 ventilation system, corrosion inhibiting chemicals, ventilation system flush (caustic) solutions, and contaminants that are typically dilute. Based on these two factors (i.e., stainless steel containing a solution that is essentially mildly contaminated water), limited flammable gas generation is expected.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 01-28

FG-COND-01 Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

Ventilation system condensate, chemicals, and contaminants

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials due to a flammable gas deflagration in a condensate seal pot or collection tank headspace

Insufficient ventilation causes flammable gases generated by the condensate in the condensate seal pot or collection tank to accumulate in the headspace to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed


U N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accidents (i.e., a deflagration in a DST, see FG-DST-01, or SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively assigned based on the limited volume of flammable gas, the smaller MAR relative to the representative accidents, and the lower radiological and toxicological source terms for the condensate including corrosion inhibiting chemicals, caustic flush solutions, and contaminants, versus tank waste assumed for the representative accidents (i.e., a deflagration in a DST, see FG-DST-01, or SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition is not a significant facility worker hazard because it is a common industrial hazard addressed by the industrial hygiene safety management program.

Condensate seal pots and collection tanks are vented. Condensate is judged to be more dilute than high gas generation rate tank wastes, and thus have lower gas generation rates. Fill fractions needed to achieve LFL conditions in vented carbon steel tanks (assuming high flammable gas generation rate tank wastes) are approximately 0.80 - 0.90 or more (see RPP-8050 analysis for active catch tanks or DCRTs as examples of conservative cases) which are above the normal seal pot and collection tank fill fractions. If the vent plugs (e.g., drain line plugs), the time to LFL conditions is many weeks to months, allowing considerable time to restore venting (e.g., clear drain plug).

E1



Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials due to a flammable gas deflagration in ventilation system ducting, demister, or SST breather filter assembly

Insufficient ventilation causes flammable gases generated by the contaminated condensate in the ventilation system to accumulate to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed


BEU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accidents (i.e., a deflagration in a DST, see FG-DST-01, or SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively assigned based on the limited volume of flammable gas, the smaller MAR relative to the representative accidents, and the lower radiological and toxicological source terms for the condensate, including corrosion inhibiting chemicals, caustic flush solutions, and contaminants, versus tank waste assumed for the representative accidents (i.e., a deflagration in a DST, see FG-DST-01, or SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The “Yes” for significant facility worker hazard is based on the conservative assumption that the effects of the flammable gas deflagration on the facility worker are similar to those from a SST headspace flammable gas deflagration (see FG-SST-01).

The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is based on the low flammable gas generation rates and the design of the ventilation systems (e.g., vented, fill fractions are below that required to achieve 100% of the LFL).

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 01-29



Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials due to a flammable gas deflagration in an instrumentation line and/or cabinet

Insufficient ventilation causes flammable gases generated by the contaminated condensate in the instrument line or cabinet to accumulate to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed


BEU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accidents (i.e., a deflagration in a DST, see FG-DST-01, or SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively assigned based on the limited volume of flammable gas, the smaller MAR relative to the representative accidents, and the lower radiological and toxicological source terms for the condensate, including corrosion inhibiting chemicals, caustic flush solutions, and contaminants, versus tank waste assumed for the representative accidents (i.e., a deflagration in a DST, see FG-DST-01, or SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The “Yes” for significant facility worker hazard is based on the conservative assumption that the effects of the flammable gas deflagration on the facility worker are similar to those from a SST headspace flammable gas deflagration (see FG-SST-01).

The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is based on the low flammable gas generation rates and the design of the instrumentation systems (e.g., vented, fill fractions are below that required to achieve 100% of the LFL).

E1

FG-MISC-01 Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

Tank waste in flex receiver bag

Release of tank waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in a flex receiver bag

Flammable gases from the tank propagate into a flex receiver bag; an ignition source is assumed (e.g., spark from herculite or equipment)


EU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined to be determined to be below 100 rem and PAC-3, respectively, based on the limited MAR in the flex receiver bag. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined to be determined to be below 100 rem and PAC-3, respectively, based on the limited MAR in the flex receiver bag. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition is a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, a flammable gas deflagration or detonation could cause grievous injury or death to a facility worker due to overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles). The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure would not exceed the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard, respectively, based on the limited MAR. There is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The frequency of a deflagration in a flexible receiver bag is qualitatively determined to be “extremely unlikely” based on: (1) the probability of flexible receiver operations when the tank steady-state flammable gas concentration exceeds the LFL or when a spontaneous or induced GRE occurs, and (2) the presence of an ignition source such that the deflagration occurs in the flexible receiver bag but not the tank headspace.

E1


Tank waste Release of tank waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in the tank headspace Note: Tanks include DSTs, DST annuli, DST leak detection pits, SSTs, 241-AX leak detection pits, DCRTs, active and inactive catch tanks, IMUSTs, 244-CR Vault tanks, 244-AR Vault tanks

Reactive material in tank causes chemical reaction with waste generating flammable gases that accumulate to a concentration above the LFL in the tank headspace; an ignition is assumed


BEU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on calculations presented in RPP-13470. The offsite toxicological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation that the consequence is reasonably bounded/represented by the consequence of a flammable gas deflagration in a DST or SST headspace (see RPP-13510). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are based on a qualitative evaluation that the consequences are reasonably bounded/represented by the consequences of a flammable gas deflagration in a DST or SST headspace (see RPP-13510). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The “Yes” for significant facility worker hazard is based on the conservative assumption that the effects of the flammable gas deflagration on the facility worker are similar to those from a SST headspace flammable gas deflagration (see FG-SST-01).

The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is based on the fact that there are no reactive chemicals or materials other than the occasional use of aluminum tools, pump electric motors lighting systems. Amount of reactive material required to generate sufficient gas is sufficiently large to qualitatively assign a “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency.

E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 01-30


Tank waste Release of tank waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in the tank headspace Note: Tanks include DSTs, DST annuli, DST leak detection pits, SSTs, 241-AX leak detection pits, DCRTs, active and inactive catch tanks, IMUSTs, 244-CR Vault tanks, 244-AR Vault tanks

Vendor supplies flammable gas for purge gas supply (e.g., camera); an ignition is assumed


EU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on calculations presented in RPP-13470 for DSTs and SSTs, which bound the other tanks. The offsite toxicological consequence is qualitatively determined based on scoping calculations documented in RPP-13510 for DSTs and SSTs, which bound the other tanks. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13510 for DSTs and SSTs, which bound the other tanks. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The “No” for significant facility worker hazard is because this hazardous condition is a common industrial hazard that is regulated by DOE-prescribed occupational safety and health standards (i.e., industrial safety requirements). That is, the primary facility worker consequence is from overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles) and is independent of where a flammable gas deflagration due to using the wrong bottled gas occurs.

The frequency of “extremely unlikely” is qualitatively determined based on multiple barrier failures required that include: (1) government regulation of the distribution of industrial gases, (2) Compressed Gas Associated requires each type industrial gas have a unique mating connection, and (3) industry does not provide adapters to connect different types of gases.

E2


Tank waste Release of tank waste due to the deflagration of a pocket of flammable gases in the waste Note: Tanks include DSTs, DST annuli, DST leak detection pits, SSTs, 241-AX leak detection pits, DCRTs, active and inactive catch tanks, IMUSTs, 244-CR Vault tanks, 244-AR Vault tanks

Waste intrusive activity (e.g., push mode core sampling) ignites a flammable gas pocket in the waste


EU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite consequences of a deflagration in a pocket of flammable gases would be bounded by a sub-surface deflagration (see FG-MISC-05). The consequences would be less than 5 rem and PAC-2, as there would be no structural damage to the tank and the quantity of waste disturbed would be small. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The consequences would be bounded by a sub-surface deflagration (see FG-MISC-05). The onsite consequences of a deflagration in a pocket of flammable gases would be less than 100 rem and PAC-3, as there would be no structural damage to the tank and the quantity of waste disturbed would be small. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The “No” for significant facility worker hazard is based on the limited energy from a deflagration of a pocket of gas and that the deflagration occurs under the waste surface within a tank.

The propagation of a subsurface deflagration beyond 1 m in Hanford waste (i.e., a pocket of flammable gases) is “beyond extremely unlikely.” The frequency was qualitatively increased to “extremely unlikely” based on the assumption that sampling activities provide a potential ignition source for a pocket of flammable gases. See RPP-13510.

E1


Tank waste Release of tank waste due to a subsurface flammable gas deflagration Note: Tanks include DSTs, DST annuli, DST leak detection pits, SSTs, 241-AX leak detection pits, DCRTs, active and inactive catch tanks, IMUSTs, 244-CR Vault tanks, 244-AR Vault tanks

Waste intrusive activity (e.g., push mode core sampling) causes a propagating subsurface flammable gas deflagration


EU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite consequences of a sub-surface deflagration would be less than 5 rem and PAC-2, as there would be no structural damage to the tank and the quantity of waste disturbed would be small. See RPP-13510. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite consequences of a sub-surface deflagration would be less than 100 rem and PAC-3, as there would be no structural damage to the tank and the quantity of waste disturbed would be small. See RPP-13510. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The “No” for significant facility worker hazard is based on the limited energy from a deflagration of a pocket of gas and that the deflagration occurs under the waste surface within a tank.

The propagation of a subsurface deflagration beyond 1 m in Hanford waste (i.e., a pocket of flammable gases) is “beyond extremely unlikely.” The frequency was qualitatively increased to “extremely unlikely” based on the assumption that sampling activities provide a potential ignition source for a pocket of flammable gases. See RPP-13510.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 01-31


Residual contamination in ALC compressed air supply lines

Release of residual contamination due to a flammable gas deflagration in an ALC compressed air supply line

Flammable gases generated by the residual contamination in ALC compressed air supply line accumulate to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed (e.g., back hoe disturbs line and creates spark)


BEU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are determined to be below 100 rem and PAC-3, respectively, based on the limited MAR. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The “Yes” for significant facility worker hazard is based on the conservative assumption that the effects of the flammable gas deflagration on the facility worker are similar to those from a SST headspace flammable gas deflagration (see FG-SST-01).

The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is based on insufficient flammable gas generation by the residual contamination to reach the LFL and lack of ignition sources.

E1


Tank waste Release of tank waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in a riser Note: Tanks include DSTs, DST annuli, DST leak detection pits, SSTs, 241-AX leak detection pits, DCRTs, active and inactive catch tanks, IMUSTs, 244-CR Vault tanks, 244-AR Vault tanks

Activity causes ignition of flammable gases in a tank riser


EU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined to be less than 5 rem and PAC-2, respectively, based on the limited MAR in the riser and no expected damage to the tank. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined to be less than 100 rem and PAC-3, respectively, based on the limited MAR in the riser and no expected damage to the tank. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition is a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, a flammable gas deflagration or detonation could cause grievous injury or death to a facility worker due to SSC failure or overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles). The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure would not exceed the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard, respectively, based on the limited MAR. There is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

A flammable gas deflagration in a riser only (versus in the tank headspace) requires a GRE. The frequency is qualitatively determined to be “extremely unlikely” based on the probability of: (1) riser activity when a spontaneous or induced GRE occurs, (2) the GRE is large enough to cause a flammable gas concentration above the LFL in the riser, and (3) the presence of an ignition source.

E1


Residual contamination in equipment stored for re-use

Release of residual contamination due to a flammable gas deflagration in equipment stored for re-use

Flammable gases generated by the residual contamination in equipment stored for re-use accumulate to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed


BEU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The consequences are bounded by the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST, see FG-SST-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are determined to be below 100 rem and PAC-3, respectively, based on the limited MAR. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The “Yes” for significant facility worker hazard is based on the conservative assumption that the effects of the flammable gas deflagration on the facility worker are similar to those from a SST headspace flammable gas deflagration (see FG-SST-01).

The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is based on insufficient flammable gas generation by the residual contamination to reach the LFL and lack of ignition sources.

E1

FG-FZ-01 Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

DST waste Release of DST waste due to a DST headspace deflagration (steady-state flammable gas deflagration)

Loss of ventilation due to freezing conditions causes flammable gases generated by the waste in the DST to accumulate in the tank headspace to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed Note: Steady-state flammable gas hazard controls in DSTs are dependent on an open ventilation path that may be temporarily blocked as a result of freezing conditions



The frequency of “beyond extremely unlikely” is based on a historical review of continuous days at or below freezing versus the time for flammable gases to accumulate to a concentration above the LFL in DSTs (see OE-09-004).

E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 01-32


Waste in SST, DCRT, or active catch tank

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials due to SST, DCRT, or active catch tank headspace deflagration (steady-state flammable gas deflagration

Loss of ventilation due to freezing conditions causes flammable gases generated by the waste in the SST, DCRT, or active catch tank headspace to accumulate in the tank headspace to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed Note: Steady-state flammable gas hazard controls in SSTs 241-B-203 and 241-B-204; DCRTs; and active catch tanks are dependent on an open ventilation path that may be temporarily blocked as a result of freezing conditions


BEU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on calculations presented in RPP-13470. The offsite toxicological consequence is qualitatively determined based on scoping calculations for SSTs documented in RPP-13510. The offsite toxicological consequence for DCRTs and active catch tanks is conservatively assumed to be the same as the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on scoping calculations for SSTs documented in RPP-13510. The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences for DCRTs and active catch tanks are conservatively assumed to be the same as the representative accident (i.e., a deflagration in an SST). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The facility worker consequences are bounded by FG-SST-01.

The frequency of “beyond extremely unlikely” is based on a historical review of continuous days at or below freezing versus the time for flammable gases to accumulate to a concentration above the LFL in SSTs, DCRTs, and active catch tanks (see OE-09-004).

E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 02-1

NuCr-01 N/A Waste contents of Tank Farm facilities.

Nuclear criticality event in the Tank Farm facilities

Criticality is not credible for activities in the Tank Farms (see RPP-7475 for evaluated activities).

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Because criticality is not credible for activities in the Tank Farms, there are no consequences. RPP-7475 demonstrates that criticality is not credible for activities in the Tank Farms.

N/A

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RPP-15188 REV 12-D Appendix A. Hazard Evaluation Database No Controls Fields.


Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-1

WTL-A-01 Waste Transfer Leak (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.3 and 3.4.2.2)

Liquid radioactive waste being transferred Applies to: Transfers using a high head waste transfer pump

Fine spray leak from primary piping in a structure into the waste transfer-associated structure. Applies to: Physically connected primary piping, physically connected waste transfer-associated structures

All causes (e.g., excessive live and dead loads, vehicle traffic, vehicle collisions, dropped loads, blast effects from propane/LPG or other combustible tank explosions, flammable gas deflagrations/detonations within the piping, freezing, failures due to fires, fatigue, corrosion, erosion, gasket or valve stem packing failure, jumper leaks, jumper misalignment, high waste pressure, water hammer, high waste temperature radiation/chemical attack of non-metallic flexible jumpers, seismic events, non-metallic flexible hose failure due to high tensile forces during ERSS operation)

Release of radioactive and other hazardous material to the atmosphere (airborne fine spray aerosol release)

U N N N Y Y N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2. Note that the consequences for a leak from a failure in the EPDM portion of a non-metallic flexible hose are less (bounded by WTL-A-02) as the EPDM hose cannot maintain the fine crack geometry required for a fine spray leak release. The EPDM hose leak location would expand (fish mouth) rather than form the narrow crack required for a fine spray leak that could exceed onsite guidelines. Note that fine spray leaks are also not postulated for waste leaks from waste transfer valve stems because of the long, tortuous leak path. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of the fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 1000 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

An “unlikely” frequency is assigned to the fine spray leak scenario as this scenario requires a fine crack that has an optimal width for producing the maximum amount of fine spray aerosol and most cracks are expected to have a width such that they would not be optimal producers of fine aerosol spray. Note that the frequency for a specific cause may be lower.

E2



Waste leak from failed primary piping in a structure into a waste transfer-associated structure or waste leak in failed encased primary piping that drains from the encasement to a structure or leak in HIHTL primary hose to a waste transfer-associated structure due to drainage from HIHTL encasement to the structure (non-fine spray leaks, e.g., large break). Applies to: Physically connected primary piping, physically connected HIHTLs, physically connected waste transfer-associated structures including structures connected by structure drains

All causes (e.g., excessive live and dead loads, vehicle traffic, vehicle collisions, dropped loads, blast effects from propane/LPG or other combustible tank explosions, flammable gas deflagrations/detonations within the piping, freezing, failures due to fires, fatigue, corrosion, erosion, gasket or valve stem packing failure, jumper leaks, jumper misalignment, high waste pressure, water hammer, high waste temperature radiation/chemical attack of non-metallic flexible jumpers, seismic events, non-metallic flexible hose failure due to high tensile forces during ERSS operation)

Release of liquid radioactive waste to atmosphere (splash and splatter and wind entrainment) or soil surface (waste pool)

A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 as the applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of the non-fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 100 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release and any jet or stream is not into a normally occupied area, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

An “anticipated” frequency is assigned based on a qualitative assessment that damage to primary piping due to a variety of causes could be expected to occur if no controls were in place. Note that the frequency due to a specific cause may be lower.

E2

WTL-A-03 This hazardous condition has been deleted.

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-2


Liquid radioactive waste being transferred Applies to: Transfers using a low head waste transfer pump including: • Low head SST

retrieval pumps and DST transfer pumps

• Sump pumps used to pump waste from waste transfer-associated structures

• Pumps used to pump waste from DST annuli

• 242-A Evaporator steam jet pump (J-B-1)

Waste leak from failed primary piping in a structure into a waste transfer-associated structure or waste leak in failed encased primary piping that drains from the encasement to a structure or leak in a HIHTL primary hose to a waste transfer-associated structure due to drainage from HIHTL encasement to the structure. Applies to: Physically connected primary piping, physically connected HIHTLs, physically connected waste transfer-associated structures including structures connected by structure drains

All causes (e.g., excessive live and dead loads, vehicle traffic, vehicle collisions, dropped loads, blast effects from propane/LPG or other combustible tank explosions, flammable gas deflagrations/detonations within the piping, freezing, failures due to fires, fatigue, corrosion, erosion, gasket or valve stem packing failure, jumper leaks, jumper misalignment, high waste pressure, water hammer, high waste temperature radiation/chemical attack of non-metallic flexible jumpers, seismic events)

Release of liquid radioactive waste to atmosphere (spray, splash and splatter and wind entrainment) or soil surface (waste pool)

A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 that bound these conditions. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750 that apply to low head pumps and gravity head situations (i.e., those with maximum head - flow conditions that are bounded by the “de minimus” head/flow curve (Figure 6). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of a non-fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 100 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release and any spray, jet, or stream is not into a normally occupied area. The remaining criteria are not applicable.


E2


Waste from the 242-A Evaporator Applies to: Waste in the vessel, waste in the sump, contaminated water in the sump

Waste leak from primary piping into AW02D pit during 242-A Evaporator vessel dump Applies to: AW02D pit, vessel dump through DR-335, sump overflow through DR-334, sump gravity transfers through DR-334 Applies to: Physically connected primary piping, physically connected waste transfer-associated structures

All causes Release of liquid radioactive waste to atmosphere (spray, splash and splatter and wind entrainment) or soil surface (waste pool)

EU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A4. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A4 Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of a non-fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 100 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release and any spray, jet, or stream is not into a normally occupied area. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

Because evaporator dumps and sump steam jet transfers are uncommon events, and since no removable jumpers are involved in creating the 10-in. transfer path, this accident has been assigned a frequency of “extremely unlikely.”

E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-3


Liquid radioactive waste being transferred Applies to: Waste gravity head situations including: • 242-A Evaporator

gravity transfers through supernatant or slurry transfer lines,

• gravity head in waste transfer lines due to line hold up (structure covers on)

Waste leak from failed primary piping in a structure into a waste transfer-associated structure or waste leak in failed encased primary piping that drains from the encasement to a structure or leak in a HIHTL primary hose to a waste transfer-associated structure due to drainage from HIHTL encasement to the structure. Applies to: Physically connected primary piping, physically connected HIHTLs, physically connected waste transfer-associated structures including structures connected by structure drains.



A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 that bound these conditions. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750 that apply to low head pumps and gravity head situations (i.e., those with maximum head - flow conditions that are bounded by the “de minimus” head/flow curve (Figure 6). Head/flow conditions for 242-A Evaporator gravity transfers are based in calculations in RPP-13750, Attachment A5. Head/flow conditions for transfer line holdup is based on calculations in RPP-13750, Attachment A6. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of a non-fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 100 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release and any spray, jet, or stream is not into a normally occupied area. The remaining criteria are not applicable.


E2


Waste transferred from the 222-S Laboratory using pump WT-P-1

Waste leak from failed primary piping into siphon standpipe station. Applies to: SNL-5350 and SNL 5351

All causes (e.g., excessive live and dead loads, vehicle traffic, dropped loads, flammable gas deflagrations/detonations within the piping, freezing, failures due to fires, fatigue, erosion, high waste pressure, water hammer, high waste temperature radiation/chemical attack, seismic events)




E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-4


Waste transferred from the 222-S Laboratory

Waste leak from failed sump pump system while pumping waste from the siphon standpipe station using a sump pump. Applies to: SNL-5350 and SNL 5351

All causes (e.g., excessive live and dead loads, dropped loads, flammable gas deflagrations/detonations within the piping, freezing, failures due to fires, fatigue, erosion, high waste pressure, water hammer, high waste temperature radiation/chemical attack, seismic events)




E1


Liquid radioactive waste being transferred by a sump pump in a waste transfer associated structure Applied to: • Sump pumps in SST

retrieval system aboveground manifold boxes

• Sump pumps in SST retrieval system waste transfer-associated structures that transfer waste directly back to the underlying tank

• Sump pumps in the RCSTS Diversion Box 6241-A and Vent Station 6241-V

Waste leak into the waste transfer-associated structure from failed primary piping between the sump pump discharge and the first isolation valves towards the waste transfer primary piping

All causes (e.g., excessive live and dead loads, vehicle traffic, vehicle collisions, dropped loads, blast effects from propane/LPG or other combustible tank explosions, flammable gas deflagrations/detonations within the piping, freezing, failures due to fires, fatigue, corrosion, erosion, gasket failure, pump seal leaks, jumper leaks, jumper misalignment, high waste pressure, water hammer, high waste temperature radiation/chemical attack of non-metallic flexible jumpers, seismic events)




E0

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-5


Liquid radioactive waste being transferred by DST waste transfer pumps. Applies to: • Transfers using a high

head waste transfer pump

• Transfer using a low head waste transfer pump

Waste leak from RCSTS Diversion Box 6241-A or Vent Station 6241-V sump pump system or primary piping vent (downstream of the second isolation valve off of the RCSTS supernatant transfer line) Applies to: RCSTS Diversion Box 6241-A and Vent Station 6241-V sump pump systems and Vent Station 6241-V primary piping vent

Failed or mispositioned isolation valves


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 that bound these conditions. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750 that apply to low head pumps and gravity head situations (i.e., those with maximum head - flow conditions that are bounded by the “de minimus” head/flow curve (Figure 6). The sump pump system and primary piping vent are open to the sump and thus leak pressure is limited to below the de minimus head/flow curve. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of a non-fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 100 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release and any spray, jet, or stream is not into a normally occupied area. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “anticipated” frequency is based on a qualitative assessment that the failure or mispositioning of an isolation due to a variety of causes would be expected to occur if no controls were in place.

E0

WTL-A-11a Waste Transfer Leak (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.3 and 3.4.2.2)

Liquid radioactive waste being transferred Applies to: Transfer using a high head or low head waste transfer pump

Waste leak from failed shaft seal into the pit


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 that bound these conditions. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on the consequence being bounded by WTL-A-02 and WTL-A-04. Note that fine spray leaks are not postulated for waste leaks from waste transfer pump seals because of the long, tortuous leak path. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of a non-fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 100 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release and any spray, jet, or stream is not into a normally occupied area. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

An “anticipated” frequency is assigned based on operating experience; a shaft seal leak into a pit has occurred during tank farm operations. Note that the frequency for a certain pump or due to a specific cause may be lower.

E1

WTL-A-11b This hazardous condition has been deleted.

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-6



Fine spray leak from primary piping in a structure into the waste transfer-associated structure during a waste transfer pump rotation check or pump bump. Applies to: Physically connected primary piping, physically connected waste transfer-associated structures

All causes (e.g., excessive live and dead loads, vehicle traffic, vehicle collisions, dropped loads, blast effects from propane/LPG or other combustible tank explosions, flammable gas deflagrations/detonations within the piping, freezing, failures due to fires, fatigue, corrosion, erosion, gasket failure, jumper leaks, jumper misalignment, high waste pressure, water hammer, high waste temperature radiation/chemical attack of non-metallic flexible jumpers, seismic events)


EU N N N Y Y N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on the consequence being bounded by WTL-A-01. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on the consequence being bounded by WTL-A-01. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The facility worker consequences are based on the consequences being bounded by WTL-A-01.

An “extremely unlikely” frequency is assigned to this fine spray leak scenario, one frequency level less than a fine spray leak during a waste transfer (see WTL-A-01) as this scenario requires the fine spray leak to occur during the relatively infrequent and short duration rotation checks and pump bumps. Note that the frequency for a specific cause may be lower.

E2



Waste leak from failed primary piping in a structure into a waste transfer-associated structure or waste leak in failed encased primary piping that drains from the encasement to a structure or leak in HIHTL primary hose to a waste transfer-associated structure due to drainage from HIHTL encasement to the structure (non-fine spray leaks, e.g., large break) during a waste transfer pump rotation check or pump bump. Applies to: Physically connected primary piping, physically connected HIHTLs, physically connected waste transfer-associated structures including structures connected by structure drains


Release of liquid radioactive waste to atmosphere (splash and splatter and wind entrainment) or soil surface (waste pool)

U N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on the consequence being bounded by WTL-A-02. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on the consequence being bounded by WTL-A-02. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The facility worker consequences are based on the consequences being bounded by WTL-A-02.

An “ unlikely” frequency is assigned to this leak scenario, one frequency level less than a leak during a waste transfer (see WTL-A-02) as this scenario requires the leak to occur during the relatively infrequent and short duration rotation checks and pump bumps. Note that the frequency for a specific cause may be lower.

E2


Liquid radioactive waste being transferred Applies to: Transfers using a low head waste transfer pumps including: • Low head transfer

pumps • Sump pumps used to

pump waste from waste transfer-associated structures

• Pumps used to pump waste from DST annuli

Waste leak from failed primary piping in a structure into a waste transfer-associated structure or waste leak in failed encased primary piping that drains from the encasement to a structure or leak in a HIHTL primary hose to a waste transfer-associated structure due to drainage from HIHTL encasement to the structure during a waste transfer pump rotation check or pump bump. Applies to: Physically connected primary piping, physically connected HIHTLs, physically connected waste transfer-associated structures including structures connected by structure drains



U N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on the consequence being bounded by WTL-A-04. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on the consequence being bounded by WTL-A-04. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The facility worker consequences are based on the consequences being bounded by WTL-A-04.

An “ unlikely” frequency is assigned to this leak scenario, one frequency level less than a leak during a waste transfer (see WTL-A-04) as this scenario requires the leak to occur during the relatively infrequent and short duration rotation checks and pump bumps. Note that the frequency for a specific cause may be lower.

E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-7


Liquid radioactive waste being transferred Applies to: Transfer using a high head or low head waste transfer pump

Waste leak from failed shaft seal into the pit during a waste transfer pump rotation check or pump bump.


U N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 that bound these conditions. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on the consequence being bounded by WTL-A-02 and WTL-A-04. Note that fine spray leaks are not postulated for waste leaks from waste transfer pump seals because of the long, torturous leak path. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of a non-fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 100 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release and any spray, jet, or stream is not into a normally occupied area. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

An “unlikely” frequency is assigned, one frequency level less than a leak during a waste transfer (see WTL-A-11a) as this scenario requires the leak to occur during the relatively infrequent and short duration rotation checks and pump bumps. Based on operating experience; a shaft seal leak into a pit has occurred during tank farm operations. Note that the frequency due to a specific cause may be lower.

E1


-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --


Liquid radioactive waste being transferred Applies to: Waste holdup in a transfer line

Waste leak while removing/repositioning a waste transfer primary piping jumper due to gravity head from waste holdup

All causes (e.g., waste hold up due to plugged line, closed valve, low spot in transfer route)


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 that bound these conditions. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750 that apply to low head pumps and gravity head situations (i.e., those with maximum head - flow conditions that are bounded by the “de minimus” head/flow curve (Figure 6). Head/flow conditions for transfer line holdup is based on calculations in RPP-13750, Attachment 6. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of a non-fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 100 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release and any chemical burn hazards due to spray, jet, or stream into a normally occupied area is considered to be an occupational hazard. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

An “anticipated” frequency is assigned based on a qualitative assessment that a leak due to line holdup while removing or repositioning a jumper could be expected to occur if no controls were in place. Note that the frequency due to a specific cause may be lower.

E1

WTL-A-18A This hazardous condition has been deleted.

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

WTL-A-18B This hazardous condition has been deleted.

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-8


Waste isolated in a waste transfer system (jumper, piping) within a waste transfer-associated structure (e.g., pit, valve box)

Pressurized waste leak from the transfer system into a waste transfer-associated structure due to thermal expansion of trapped waste.

Isolation of a waste filled section of the transfer system (between closed isolation valves) is heated (e.g., by the ambient environment, heat trace, pit heater) and causes high pressure. A leak then occurs due to all causes (e.g., due to overpressure).

Release of liquid radioactive waste to atmosphere (fine spray, non-fine spray, splash and splatter, and wind entrainment), soil surface (waste pool)

BEU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 that are judged to bound the consequences for a release due to thermal expansion of trapped fluids. The total release quantity due to thermal expansion, by comparison, is very small (only that required to depressurize the system). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A7 that indicates that trapped volumes in the jumper or piping in a waste transfer-associated structure would need to be > 30 gal (much larger than current transfer system jumpers or piping in waste transfer-associated structures) to exceed onsite guidelines. The potential waste release due to thermal expansion in buried transfer lines is judged to be below onsite guidelines due to limited potential temperature increases (limited heat sources, the ground is a large heat sink). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The facility worker consequences are based on the consequences being bounded by WTL-A-01.

The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is based on virtually any air space between closed isolation valves is sufficient to account for thermal expansion of the fluid (i.e., prevent failure of the waste transfer system).

E1


Contaminated Liquid from catch tank 241-UX-302A

Either a pressurized fine spray leak or a low pressure large break leak occurs in some portion of the retrieval path during pumping of the catch tank.

Any cause of either a pressurized fine spray leak or a low pressure large break leak during pumping of the catch tank.

Release of material being pumped from catch tank 241-UX-302A to the environment.

A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A10. The maximum pressure (441 psig) and the maximum flow rate (9.25 gpm) for the AGI retrieval pump fall below the de minimus curve for the specific waste material in 241-UX-302A. Therefore, a leak of this waste material cannot exceed onsite or offsite guidelines. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A10. The maximum pressure (441 psig) and the maximum flow rate (9.25 gpm) for the AGI retrieval pump fall below the de minimus curve for the specific waste material in 241-UX-302A. Therefore, a leak of this waste material cannot exceed onsite or offsite guidelines. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of the fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 1000 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and the benign radiological and toxicological properties of the 241-UX-302A waste material. There is no significant potential for chemical burns because the pH of the 241-UX-302A waste material has been measured as approximately 8. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

The frequency of a leak occurring in a retrieval system is anticipated because leaks in retrieval systems have occurred before at Tank Farms.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-9

WTL-B-01 Waste Transfer Leak (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.3 and 3.4.2.2)

Liquid radioactive waste being transferred Applies to: • Transfers using a high


• Transfers using a low head waste transfer pumps including: - Low head DST

transfer pumps - Sump pumps used

to pump waste from waste transfer associated structures

- Pumps used to pump waste from DST annuli

- 242-A Evaporator steam jet pump (J-B-1)

• Waste transfer pump rotation checks or pump bumps

Waste leak in buried/bermed transfer line into the soil or leak into an in-ground waste transfer associated structure that then leaks from the bottom of the structure to the soil (e.g., through cracks in the structure or leaking drain line). Applies to: Physically connected waste transfer pipelines

All causes of failure of buried/bermed piping (e.g., excessive live and dead loads, vehicle traffic, dropped loads, flammable gas deflagrations/detonations within the piping, freezing, fatigue, corrosion, erosion, high waste pressure, water hammer, high waste temperature, seismic events). All cause for leaks into an in-ground structure (e.g., waste leak from failed primary piping in a structure into a waste transfer-associated structure or waste leak in encased primary piping that drains from the encasement to a structure or leak in HIHTL primary hose to a waste transfer-associated structure due to drainage from HIHTL encasement to the structure)

Release of radioactive and other hazardous material to the soil (waste pool with wind entrainment and gamma-ray shine)

A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 (see the large break case that bounds these conditions). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of a waste pool is very limited (only due to wind entrainment from the waste pool) and there is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release or waste pool. The remaining criteria are not applicable.


E2



Waste leak in buried/bermed transfer line into the soil or leak into an in-ground waste transfer associated structure that then leaks from the bottom of the structure to the soil (e.g., through cracks in the structure or leaking drain line) during 242-A Evaporator vessel dump Applies to: Vessel dump through DR-335, sump overflow through DR-334, sump gravity transfers through DR-334

All causes (e.g., excessive live and dead loads, vehicle traffic, dropped loads, flammable gas deflagrations/detonations within the piping, freezing, fatigue, corrosion, erosion, high waste pressure, water hammer, high waste temperature, seismic events)


EU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A4. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A4 Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of a waste pool is very limited (only due to wind entrainment from the waste pool) and there is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release or waste pool. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

Because evaporator dumps and sump steam jet transfers are uncommon events, the drain line does not have jumpers, and the drain lines are relatively short runs compared to the tank farm transfer system in general, this accident has been assigned a frequency of “extremely unlikely.” Note that the frequency due to a specific cause may be lower.

E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-10



gravity transfers through supernatant or slurry transfer lines,

• gravity head in waste transfer lines due to line hold up

Waste leak in buried/bermed transfer line into the soil or leak into an in-ground waste transfer associated structure that then leaks from the bottom of the structure to the soil (e.g., through cracks in the structure or leaking drain line). Applies to: Physically connected waste transfer pipelines



A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 that bound these conditions. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750 that apply to low head pumps and gravity head situations (i.e., those with maximum head - flow conditions that are bounded by the “de minimus” head/flow curve (Figure 6). Head/flow conditions for 242-A Evaporator gravity transfers are based in calculations in RPP-13750, Attachment A5. Head/flow conditions for transfer line holdup are based on calculations in RPP-13750, Attachment A6. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of a waste pool is very limited (only due to wind entrainment from the waste pool) and there is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release or waste pool. The remaining criteria are not applicable.


E2


Waste transferred from the 222-S Laboratory using pump WT-P-1

Waste leak from failed primary piping into soil or leak into an in-ground waste transfer associated structure that then leaks from the bottom of the structure to the soil (e.g., through cracks in the structure or leaking drain line). Applies to: SNL-5350 and SNL-5351



A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 that bound these conditions. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750 that apply to low head pumps and gravity head situations (i.e., those with maximum head - flow conditions that are bounded by the “de minimus” head/flow curve (Figure 6). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of a waste pool is very limited (only due to wind entrainment from the waste pool) and there is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release or waste pool. The remaining criteria are not applicable.


E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-11



Waste leak from transfer line encasement to soil while pumping waste from the siphon standpipe station using a sump pump. Applies to: SNL-5350 and SNL-5351





E1


Liquid radioactive waste being transferred by a sump pump in a waste transfer associated structure Applied to: • Sump pumps in SST

retrieval system aboveground manifold boxes

• Sump pumps in the RCSTS Diversion Box 6241-A and Vent Station 6241-V

Waste leak in buried/bermed transfer line to the soil or leak into an in-ground waste transfer associated structure that then leaks from the bottom of the structure to the soil (e.g., through cracks in the structure or leaking drain line). Applies to: Physically connected waste transfer pipelines





E1


Liquid radioactive waste Waste leak from underground tank, annulus, vault, or sump to soil column Applies to: DST, DST annulus, SST, DCRT, catch tank, IMUST, 244-AR-TK-001, 002, 003, 004, 244-TK-CR-001, 002, 003, 011, 255-CR Vault cell (sumps), 242-S pump room sump, 242-T sump

All causes Release of liquid radioactive waste to soil (no surface waste pool)

A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and offsite toxicological consequences are based on no waste aerosol release as no surface pool is formed. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are based on no waste aerosol release as no surface pool is formed and gamma-ray shine is limited by the shielding provided by the soil overburden. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. No waste aerosol release as no surface pool is formed and gamma-ray shine is limited by the shielding provided by the soil overburden. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

An “anticipated” frequency is assigned based on operating experience where leaks from waste storage tanks to the ground have occurred.

E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-12


Liquid radioactive waste being transferred mixed with any waste initially in the receipt tank Applies to: All waste transfers

Waste leak to the soil surface due to overfilling and overflowing the receipt tank.

All causes (e.g., failure to stop the transfer, misroute into the wrong tank, siphoning)


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 and Attachment 4 that bound these conditions. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750 that demonstrate that waste leak rates at zero head must exceed 1100 gal/min to exceed guidelines (see RPP-13750, Figure 6) which bounds all transfer pumps and gravity transfer condition with the exception of 242-A Evaporator vessel dumps. Pools formed during a 242-A Evaporator dump are bounded by the calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A4. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of a waste pool is very limited (only due to wind entrainment from the waste pool) and there is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release or waste pool. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

An “anticipated” frequency is assigned based on a qualitative assessment that overfilling/overflowing a tank due to a variety of causes could be expected to occur if no controls were in place. Note that the frequency due to a specific cause may be lower.

E2


Liquid radioactive waste mixed with water

Waste leak to the soil surface due to water/fluid intrusion that overfills and overflows the tank, cell, or vault

Water system failures or human errors during flushing operations, and other causes. Applies to: raw water, service water, fire water, water from 242-A Evaporator facility, rainwater, snowmelt, 702-AZ ventilation system recirculation cooling system leak


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 and Attachment A4 that bound these conditions. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750 that demonstrate that waste leak rates at zero head must exceed 1100 gal/min to exceed guidelines (see RPP-13750, Figure 6) which is judged to be greater than leaks rates due to overfilling by water intrusions/additions. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of a waste pool is very limited (only due to wind entrainment from the waste pool) and there is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release or waste pool. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

An “anticipated” frequency is assigned based on a qualitative assessment that overfilling/overflowing a tank due to a variety of causes could be expected to occur if no controls were in place. Note that the frequency due to a specific cause may be lower.

E2


Liquid radioactive waste being transferred Applies to: All waste transfers

Waste leak in buried/bermed transfer line into the soil that remains subsurface

All causes that are not readily detected (e.g., corrosion, material flaw, freezing, flammable gas deflagration in the line)

Subsurface contamination of soil results in direct radiation exposure

EU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and offsite toxicological consequences are based on no waste aerosol release as no surface pool is formed. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are based on no waste aerosol release as no surface pool is formed and gamma-ray shine is limited by the shielding provided by the soil overburden. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The only significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 that is applicable to the potential hazardous condition is exposure to direct radiation from the subsurface pool. Because there would be no observable indications of a waste leak, gamma-ray shine could potentially result in a significant facility worker hazard (i.e., direct radiation exposure ≥ 100 rem).

The “extremely unlikely” frequency is assigned due to multiple passive barrier failures required that include the waste transfer primary piping and the waste transfer encasement piping.

E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-13

WTL-C-01 Waste Transfer Leak (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.3 and 3.4.2.2)


Fine spray leak to the atmosphere from unburied or exposed waste transfer primary piping or encasement test riser

All causes (e.g., excessive live and dead loads, vehicle traffic, vehicle collisions, dropped loads, excavation events, blast effects from propane/LPG or other combustible tank explosions, over pressure due to failure in compressed air system used to blowout HIHTL and connected piping, flammable gas deflagrations/detonations within the piping, freezing, high environmental temperatures, failures due to fires, fatigue, corrosion, erosion, high waste pressure, water hammer, high waste temperature, seismic events)


U N N N Y Y N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of the fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 1000 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release. The remaining criteria are not applicable.


E2



Waste leak from unburied or exposed waste transfer primary piping or encasement test riser (non-fine spray, e.g., large break)


Release of liquid radioactive waste to atmosphere (spray, splash and splatter, and wind entrainment), soil surface (waste pool), or spray, jet, stream into a worker occupied area

A N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition meets the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of a non-fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 100 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release, however, the spray, jet, or stream could be into a normally occupied area and result in a severe chemical burn if a worker is wetted by the waste. The remaining criteria are not applicable.


E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-14


Liquid radioactive waste being transferred Applies to: Transfers using a low head waste transfer pump including: • Low head DST

transfer pumps: • Pumps used to pump

waste from DST annuli


• 242-A Evaporator steam jet pump (J-B-1)

Waste leak from unburied or exposed waste transfer primary piping or encasement test riser



A N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 that bound these conditions. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750 that apply to low head pumps and gravity head situations (i.e., those with maximum head - flow conditions that are bounded by the “de minimus” head/flow curve (Figure 6). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition meets the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of a non-fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 100 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release, however, the spray, jet, or stream could be into a normally occupied area and result in a severe chemical burn if a worker is wetted by the waste. The remaining criteria are not applicable.


E2



Waste leak from unburied or exposed primary piping (DR-335 or DR-334) during 242-A Evaporator vessel dump through DR-335, sump overflow through DR-334, or sump gravity transfers through DR-334





E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-15



gravity transfers through supernatant or slurry transfer lines

• gravity head in waste transfer lines due to line hold up

Waste leak from unburied or exposed waste transfer primary piping or encasement test riser



A N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 that bound these conditions. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750 that apply to low head pumps and gravity head situations (i.e., those with maximum head - flow conditions that are bounded by the “de minimus” head/flow curve (Figure 6). Head/flow conditions for 242-A Evaporator gravity transfers are based in calculations in RPP-13750, Attachment A5. Head/flow conditions for transfer line holdup is based on calculations in RPP-13750, Attachment A6. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition meets the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of a non-fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 100 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release, however, the spray, jet, or stream could be into a normally occupied area and result in a severe chemical burn if a worker is wetted by the waste. The remaining criteria are not applicable.


E2

WTL-C-06a Waste Transfer Leak (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.3 and 3.4.2.2)

Waste transferred from the 222-S Laboratory using pump WT-P-1 or

Waste leak from unburied or exposed waste transfer primary piping or encasement test riser during a transfer from 222-S laboratory Applies to: SNL-5350 and SNL-5351





E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-16

WTL-C-06b Waste Transfer Leak (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.3 and 3.4.2.2)


Waste leak from unburied or exposed waste transfer piping encasement during pumping of waste from a siphon standpipe station using a sump pump. Note that the sump pumps transfer through the pipe encasements. Applies to: SNL-5350 and SNL-5351

All causes (e.g., excessive live and dead loads, vehicle traffic, vehicle collisions, dropped loads, excavation events, blast effects from propane/LPG or other combustible tank explosions, over pressure due to failure in compressed air system used to blowout HIHTL and connected piping, flammable gas deflagrations/detonations within the piping, freezing, high environmental temperatures, failures due to fires, fatigue, corrosion, erosion, gasket or valve stem packing failure, jumper leaks, jumper misalignment, high waste pressure, water hammer, high waste temperature, seismic events)


U N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 that bound these conditions. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750 that apply to low head pumps and gravity head situations (i.e., those with maximum head - flow conditions that are bounded by the “de minimus” head/flow curve (Figure 6). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition meets the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of a non-fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 100 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release, however, the spray, jet, or stream could be into a normally occupied area and result in a severe chemical burn if a worker is wetted by the waste. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

An “unlikely” frequency is assigned based on a qualitative assessment that this operation would only occur if the waste transfer primary piping were to leak first combined with the frequency of a leak in the encasement during this short duration operation. Note that the frequency due to a specific cause may be lower.

E2



Fine spray leak to the atmosphere from overground transfer hose connector or connection. (Note that the EPDM hose cannot maintain the fine crack geometry required for a fine spray leak release. The EPDM hose leak location would expand [fish mouth] rather than form the narrow crack required for a fine spray leak and thus is addressed by WTL-C-08)

All causes (e.g., excessive live and dead loads, vehicle traffic, vehicle collisions, dropped loads, blast effects from propane/LPG or other combustible tank explosions, over pressure due to failure in compressed air system used to blowout HIHTL and connected piping, flammable gas deflagrations/detonations within the piping, freezing, high environmental temperatures, failures due to fires, fatigue, corrosion, erosion, gasket failure, high waste pressure, water hammer, high waste temperature, seismic events)


U N N N Y Y N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of the fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 1000 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release. The remaining criteria are not applicable.


E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-17



Waste leak from overground transfer hose, connector, or connection (non-fine spray, e.g., large break)




An “anticipated” frequency is assigned based on a qualitative assessment that damage to the overground hose due to a variety of causes could be expected to occur if no controls were in place. Note that the frequency due to a specific cause may be lower.

E2

WTL-C-08-UX-302A Waste Transfer Leak (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.3 and 3.4.2.2)

Contaminated Liquid from the 241-UX-302A Catch Tank

Waste leak from overground transfer hose, connector, or connection (non-fine spray, e.g., large break) Pressure provided by compressed air or water flushing)

All causes e.g., • excessive live and dead

loads • excessive loads due to

thermal expansion • vehicle traffic • vehicle collisions • dropped loads • Pressure provided by

compressed air or water flushing

• flammable gas deflagrations/detonations within the piping

• freezing • high environmental

temperatures • failures due to fires • fatigue • corrosion • erosion • gasket or packing failure • high waste pressure • water hammer • high waste temperature • seismic events


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A12. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A12. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release, spray, jet, or stream into a normally occupied area. The remaining criteria are not applicable.


E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-18


Liquid radioactive waste being transferred

Waste leak from overground transfer hose, connector, or connection Applies to: • Transfers using low head

waste transfer pumps including:

• Low head SST retrieval pumps and low head DST transfer pumps






E2


Liquid radioactive waste being transferred from a catch tank Applies to: Transfers using a low head waste transfer pump including: • 241-UX-302A Catch

Tank transfer pump

Waste leak from overground transfer hose, connector, or connection (pressure at maximum pump is rated for ‒ leaks occur during tanker loading)



thermal expansion • vehicle traffic • vehicle collisions • dropped loads • blast effects from

propane/LPG or other combustible tank explosions

• over pressure due to failure in compressed air system used to blowout HIHTL and connected piping

• flammable gas deflagrations/detonations within the piping


temperatures • failures due to fires • fatigue • corrosion • erosion • gasket or packing failure • high waste pressure • water hammer • high waste temperature • seismic events




E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-19

WTL-C-09-POLAR Waste Transfer Leak (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.3 and 3.4.2.2)

Liquid radioactive waste contained in Polar Tanker transferred from 241-UX-302A

Waste leak from Polar Tanker, tanker connector, or hose connection (leaks occur during tanker unloading using compressed air pressure or during flushing with water)



thermal expansion • vehicle collisions • dropped loads • blast effects from

propane/LPG or other combustible tank explosions

• over pressure • flammable gas

deflagrations/detonations within the piping


temperatures • failures due to fires • fatigue • corrosion • erosion • gasket or packing failure • high waste pressure • high waste temperature • seismic events



An “anticipated” frequency is assigned based on a qualitative assessment that damage to the Polar Tanker due to a variety of causes could be expected to occur if no controls were in place. Note that the frequency due to a specific cause may be lower.

E2


Liquid radioactive waste being transferred (waste hold up)

Waste leak from overground transfer hose, connector, or connection due to gravity head in waste transfer lines due to line hold up



A N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 that bound these conditions. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750 that apply to low head pumps and gravity head situations (i.e., those with maximum head - flow conditions that are bounded by the “de minimus” head/flow curve (Figure 6). Head/flow conditions for transfer line holdup is based on calculations in RPP-13750, Attachment A6. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition meets the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of a non-fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 100 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release, however, the spray, jet, or stream could be into a normally occupied area and result in a severe chemical burn if a worker is wetted by the waste. The remaining criteria are not applicable.


E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-20


Liquid radioactive waste Waste leak from unburied or exposed waste transfer primary piping or encasement test riser or overground transfer hose during a waste transfer pump rotation check or pump bump. Applies to: • Transfers using a high head

waste transfer pump • Low head transfer pumps: • Low head SST retrieval

pumps and low head DST transfer pumps



Release of liquid radioactive waste to atmosphere (fine spray, non-fine spray, splash and splatter, and wind entrainment), soil surface (waste pool), or spray, jet, stream into a worker occupied area

U N N N Y Y Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2. The onsite radiological consequence for a fine spray leak exceeds 100 rem and the onsite toxicological consequence exceeds PAC-3. The onsite radiological consequence for a non-fine spray leak is less than 100 rem and the toxicological consequence is below PAC-3. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition meets the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of a non-fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 1000 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release, however, the spray, jet, or stream could be into a normally occupied area and result in a severe chemical burn if a worker is wetted by the waste. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

An “unlikely” frequency is assigned, one frequency level less than a leak during a waste transfer (as this scenario requires the leak to occur during the relatively infrequent and short duration rotation checks and pump bumps. Note that the frequency of a fine spray leak is “extremely unlikely” because this scenario requires a fine crack that has an optimal width for producing the maximum amount of fine spray aerosol and most cracks are expected to have a width such that they would not be optimal producers of fine aerosol spray. Note that the frequency for a specific cause may be lower.

E2


Contaminated rain water from U Plant stack

Waste leak from unburied or exposed piping

All causes (e.g., excavation event)


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 that bound these conditions. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750 that apply to low head pumps and gravity head situations (i.e., those with maximum head - flow conditions that are bounded by the “de minimus” head/flow curve (Figure 6). Head/flow conditions for U-Plant stack intrusion water are bounded by those for transfer line holdup (100 ft of head and 490 gal/min (see RPP-13750, Attachment A6). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of a non-fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 100 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the contaminated intrusion water as the dilute waste (contaminated intrusion water) is judged to have a pH < 12.5. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

An “anticipated” frequency is assigned based on a qualitative assessment that damage to piping due to a variety of causes could be expected to occur if no controls were in place. Note that the frequency due to a specific cause may be lower.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-21


Liquid radioactive waste being transferred or used for retrieval operations (sluicing)

Leak of waste from in-tank equipment that extends from the tank headspace out of the tank due to jet momentum - liquid jet through tank headspace Applies to: In-tank equipment that extends from the tank headspace out of the tank that provides a potential pathway for waste flow due to jet momentum during waste transfers or retrieval operations (see Engineering Technical Evaluations for specific equipment and operations evaluated)

Waste jet in the tank headspace (e.g., DST or SST retrieval sluicer, waste transfer through a DST slurry distributor) strikes a piece of in-tank equipment that acts as a pipe or conduit out of the tank (e.g., thermocouple tree, liquid observation well, transfer pump column) that has a small opening/creates a small opening (e.g., erodes through corroded material). The jet kinetic-energy head is converted into static pressure due to conservation of momentum. The opening is not significantly larger than the jet diameter and the in-tank equipment has few if any other openings in it. The static pressure created forces waste up the equipment and it leaks to the soil surface, into the atmosphere, or into a waste transfer-associated structure.


EU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750 that apply to situations with maximum head - flow conditions that are bounded by the “de minimus” head/flow curve (Figure 6). Head/flow conditions for jet momentum conditions are judged to be bounded by the de minimus head/flow curve. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of a non-fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 100 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release. The frequency of a chemical burn from a waste spray, jet, or stream is “beyond extremely unlikely” based on the “extremely unlikely” frequency of the leak combined with the conditional probability that a worker would be present in a target location at the exact time that the leak occurred and could not take self-protective actions. Because it is “beyond extremely unlikely” (i.e., not credible) that chemical burn would occur, there are no significant facility worker consequences from a chemical burn. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “extremely unlikely” frequency is based on the accident requiring the following specific conditions. (1) The waste jet must be pointed at the hole in the in-tank equipment continually for a significant time period to fill the equipment and force waste out of the tank. (2) The hole must be about the same size of the jet or smaller. (3) There can be few if any other holes in the equipment. (See RPP-36253)

E1


Residual waste contamination within in-tank equipment

Leak of contaminated water from in-tank equipment that extends from the tank headspace out of the tank due to jet momentum - water jet through tank headspace Applies to: In-tank equipment that extends from the tank headspace out of the tank that provides a potential pathway for contaminated water flow due to jet momentum during water jet operations (DST or SST retrieval water jets, decon spray wands, decon spray rings, flushing of slurry distributors (see Engineering Technical Evaluations for specific equipment and operations evaluated)

Water jet in the tank headspace (e.g., DST or SST retrieval water jets, flush water from a DST slurry distributor) strikes a piece of in-tank equipment that acts as a pipe or conduit out of the tank (e.g., thermocouple tree, liquid observation well, transfer pump column) that has a small opening/creates a small opening (e.g., erodes through corroded material). The jet kinetic-energy head is converted into static pressure due to conservation of momentum. The opening is not significantly larger than the jet diameter and the in-tank equipment has few if any other openings in it. The static pressure created forces waste up the equipment and it leaks to the soil surface, into the atmosphere, or into a waste transfer-associated structure.

Release of liquid radioactive contaminated water to atmosphere (spray, splash and splatter, and wind entrainment), soil surface (waste pool), or spray, jet, stream into a worker occupied area

EU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on being bounded by WTL-C-18a because the contaminated water is more dilute than waste. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on being bounded by WTL-C-18a because the contaminated water is more dilute than waste. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of a non-fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 100 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative contaminated water (i.e., ULD of 1,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+06). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the contaminated water, which is judged to have a pH < 12.5. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “extremely unlikely” frequency is based on the accident requiring the following specific conditions. (1) The water jet must be pointed at the hole in the in-tank equipment continually for a significant time period to fill the equipment and force contaminated water out of the tank. (2) The hole must be about the same size of the jet or smaller. (3) There can be few if any other holes in the equipment. (See RPP-36253)

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-22


Tank waste Applies to: DSTs, SSTs

Leak of waste due to jet momentum - liquid jet through supernatant or low strength solids Applies to: In-tank equipment that extends from below the waste surface out of the tank that provides a potential pathway for waste flow due to jet momentum during waste transfers or retrieval operations (see Engineering Technical Evaluations for specific equipment and operations evaluated)

A liquid jet within the waste (supernatant or low strength solids) strikes a piece of in-tank equipment that acts as a pipe or conduit out of the tank (e.g., thermocouple tree, liquid observation well, transfer pump column) that has a small opening/creates a small opening (e.g., erodes through corroded material). The opening is not significantly larger than the jet diameter and has few, if any, other openings in it. The jet kinetic-energy head is converted into static pressure due to conservation of momentum. The static pressure created forces waste up the equipment and it leaks to the soil surface, into the atmosphere, or into a waste transfer-associated structure.


BEU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 that bound these conditions. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750 that apply to situations with maximum head - flow conditions that are bounded by the “de minimus” head/flow curve (Figure 6). Head/flow conditions for jet momentum conditions are judged to be bounded by the de minimus head/flow curve. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The facility worker consequences are based on the consequences being bounded by WTL-C-02.

The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is based on rapid dissipation of jet energy in supernatant and insufficient waste strength to support a column of waste that could exit the top of a tank (see RPP-36253).

E1


Tank waste Applies to: DSTs, SSTs, DCRTs, catch tanks, IMUSTs

Leak of waste due to channeling within high strength waste ‒ pressurized liquids or gases

A source of pressure (e.g., waste transfer discharge, flush water, air lift circulator compressed air) channels through a low strength solids layer that is covered by a hard rigid waste layer or channels within a hard waste layer. The source of pressure (pressurized liquid, pressurized gas) is sealed within the waste solids layer, a leak path (e.g., waste transfer pump, water lance) is also sealed within the waste solids layer, and the hard waste has sufficient strength to support a pressure great enough to raise the waste out of the tank and leak to the soil surface, into the atmosphere, or into a waste transfer-associated structure. (See Engineering Technical Evaluations for specific equipment and operations evaluated).


BEU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 that bound these conditions. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750 that apply to situations with maximum head - flow conditions that are bounded by the “de minimus” head/flow curve (Figure 6). Head/flow conditions for jet momentum conditions are judged to be bounded by the de minimus head/flow curve. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The facility worker consequences are based on the consequences being bounded by WTL-C-02.

The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is based on accident requiring the simultaneous presence of exceptionally high waste shear-strength, and a continuous pressure tight seal between a source of pressurized waste and equipment that provides a conduit out of the tank. (See RPP-36253 and various Technical Evaluations)

E1


Tank waste Applies to: DSTs, DCRTs, catch tanks

Waste leak due to air lift Applies to: Dip-tube air, air lift circulators

Compressed air (e.g., dip-tube air, air lift circulators [ALC]) flows from a source (dip-tube air, ALC) up another pipe (e.g., dip-tube, ALC air line) and lifts waste out of the tank and leaks to the soil surface, into the atmosphere, or into a waste transfer-associated structure. (See Engineering Technical Evaluations for specific equipment and operations evaluated).

Release of liquid radioactive waste to atmosphere (wind entrainment), soil surface (waste pool)

BEU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 that bound these conditions. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750 that apply to situations with maximum head - flow conditions that are bounded by the “de minimus” head/flow curve (Figure 6). Head/flow conditions for airlift are limited to very low head as the air lifts the waste onto the ground but does not pressurize the waste and thus conditions are judged to be bounded by the de minimus head/flow curve. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The facility worker consequences are based on the consequences being bounded by WTL-C-02.

The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is based on the evaluation of postulated leak scenarios in various Technical Evaluations as described in TF-08-1619-D

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-23


Contaminated hydraulic fluid Applies to: • Hydraulic power

systems for in-tank equipment including: - Sluicers - Pumps - Masts/arms

• Evacuation of hydraulic fluid from pumps using compressed gases

Leak of contaminated hydraulic fluid

Trace amounts of contamination enter the hydraulic fluid through seals or fittings with subsequent hydraulic fluid release from a failed hydraulic line or fitting.

Release of contaminated hydraulic fluid to atmosphere

A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 that are judged to bound the consequences for a release of contaminated hydraulic fluid. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on the qualitative evaluation that the contamination levels (ULD, USOF, 137Cs and 90Sr concentrations) in the hydraulic fluid are much lower than tank waste and consequence would not exceed onsite evaluation guidelines. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on qualitative evaluation that the contamination levels (ULD, USOF, 137Cs and 90Sr concentrations) in the hydraulic fluid are much lower than tank waste and consequence would not exceed these facility worker thresholds. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

An “anticipated” frequency is assigned based on a qualitative assessment that contamination of hydraulic fluid is expected.

E1


Liquid waste being transferred

Waste leak from waste transfer pump power cable due to leakage through submersible pump shaft seals into the electrical motor (without shorting out the motor) with subsequent leakage through electrical connections and power cabling outside of waste transfer-associated structure (pump pit). Applies to: SST and DST submersible electric pumps (e.g., Gorman-Rupp design)

Failure of shaft seal due to all causes.

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials to atmosphere or environment

EU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 that bound these conditions. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750 that apply to situations with maximum head - flow conditions that are bounded by the “de minimus” head/flow curve (Figure 6). Head/flow conditions for leakage through submersible pump electrical cables are well below the de minimus curve based on TE-07-009. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on qualitative evaluation that the pressure and flow rate of any leakage does not result in significant aerosol formation or a spray/jet/stream leak into a worker occupied area (i.e., is < 0.1 gal/min)(See TE-07-009).

The “extremely unlikely” frequency is based on multiple failures required for the leak to occur to the environment including failed pump shaft seals, filling oft motor cavity without shorting out the motor, failure of electrical connections at the motor housing.

E1


Liquid waste being transferred

Leak through instrument’s waste transfer primary confinement boundary through instrument housing and then through instrument cable outside of waste transfer-associated structure (pump pit, manifold box) (See Engineering Technical Evaluations for specific equipment and operations evaluated).

Failure of instrument’s primary pressure boundary due to all causes

Release of liquid radioactive waste to atmosphere (wind entrainment), soil surface (waste pool), or direct radiation exposure

A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 that bound these conditions. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750 that apply to situations with maximum head - flow conditions that are bounded by the “de minimus” head/flow curve (Figure 6). Head/flow conditions for leakage through submersible pump electrical cables are well below the de minimus curve based on TE-07-027. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on qualitative evaluation that the pressure and flow rate of any leakage does not result in significant aerosol formation or a spray/jet/stream leak into a worker occupied area (i.e., is < 0.1 gal/min)(See TE-07-027).

The “anticipated” frequency is based on experience with primary confinement boundaries in tank farms and is conservatively applied for leaks through instrument and power cables.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-24


Waste isolated in transfer route that includes overground transfer hose.

Pressurized waste leak from an overground transfer hose due to thermal expansion of trapped waste.

Isolation of a waste filled section of the transfer system (between closed isolation valves) is heated by the ambient environment or heat trace and causes high pressure. A leak then occurs due to all causes (e.g., due to overpressure).

Release of liquid radioactive waste to atmosphere (fine spray, non-fine spray, splash and splatter, and wind entrainment), soil surface (waste pool)

BEU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 that are judged to bound the consequences for a release due to thermal expansion of trapped fluids. The total release quantity due to thermal expansion, by comparison, is very small (only that required to depressurize the system). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A7 that conclude that trapped volumes in the transfer route that includes an overground hose would need to be > 8,000 gal (much larger than current retrieval systems) to exceed onsite guidelines. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The facility worker consequences are based on the consequences being bounded by WTL-C-02.

The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is based on virtually any air space between closed isolation valves is sufficient to account for thermal expansion of the fluid (i.e., prevent failure of the waste transfer system).

E1



Leak of waste due to direct jetting out of the tank Applies to: DST or SST retrieval sluicer, waste transfer through a DST slurry distributor

A free jet (DST or SST retrieval sluicer, waste transfer through a DST slurry distributor) is aimed at an open riser and the waste jet exits the tank.

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials to the soil surface (pool); atmosphere (splash and splatter); or spray, jet, stream into a worker occupied area

BEU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 that bound these conditions. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750 that apply to situations with maximum head - flow conditions that are bounded by the “de minimus” head/flow curve (Figure 6). Direct jetting is essentially a zero head condition thus conditions are judged to be bounded by the de minimus head/flow curve. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The facility worker consequences are based on the consequences being bounded by WTL-C-02.

The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is based on the evaluation of postulated leak scenarios. DST or SST retrieval sluicers and DST slurry distributors cannot aim above horizontal.

E1



Leak of waste due to direct jetting out of the tank Applies to: • DST or SST retrieval

using the Extended Reach Sluicer System

A free jet (Extended Reach Sluicer System) is inadvertently aimed towards the tank dome and risers, and the waste jet exits the tank through an open riser or through a breather filter (leaks through the HEPA filter media).

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials to the soil surface (pool); atmosphere (splash and splatter); or spray, jet, stream into a worker occupied area

A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 that bound these conditions. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750 that apply to situations with maximum head - flow conditions that are bounded by the “de minimus” head/flow curve (Figure 6). Direct jetting is essentially a zero head condition thus conditions are judged to be bounded by the de minimus head/flow curve. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of a non-fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 100 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release, and, the spray, jet, or stream would not be into a normally occupied area as tank risers are not open during retrieval activities and leaks through the breather or HEPA filter media would not be a spray, jet, or stream leak. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “anticipated” frequency is assigned based on a qualitative assessment that inadvertent aiming of a waste jet towards the tank dome/riser could be expected to occur if no controls were in place. Note that the frequency of waste exiting the tank would be lower as direct paths to the atmosphere (risers) are closed or covered during retrieval activities except the riser with the breather filter.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-25


Ventilation system condensate, glycol, chemicals, and contaminants Applies to: Ventilation system condensate or glycol, chemicals, and contaminants, adding corrosion inhibiting chemicals to the AZ301-COND-TK-001 condensate tank, flushing the 702-AZ ventilation system and condensate systems with caustic solutions

Leak of process condensate or contaminated glycol from ventilation system Apples to: DST primary tank ventilation systems, DST annulus ventilation systems, portable ventilation system skids, breather filter systems, SST inactive ventilation systems, DST ventilation system condensate or glycol systems

Ducting failure, drain line failure, seal pot failure, glycol tank overflow, etc. due to all causes such as corrosion, gasket failure, in-pipe flammable gas deflagration, seismic events, tornado/high winds, externally generated missiles caused by compressed gas system failure, component fatigue, internally generated missiles caused by fan blade failure, external overburden, external dropped equipment, excavation operations, ground creep movement, vehicle collisions, freezing and thawing of ventilation system components, overheating or freezing of glycol due to all causes, including failed thermocouple or wrong set-point for glycol heater.


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 that bound these conditions. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750 that apply to situations with maximum head - flow conditions that are bounded by the “de minimus” head/flow curve (Figure 6). Condensate gravity transfer and condensate pumped transfers are bounded by the de minimus head/flow curve. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of a non-fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 100 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the condensates which are judged to have a pH < 12.5. Hazards due to chemicals added to the condensate or condensate systems (e.g., chemicals added to the AZ301-COND-TK-001 condensate tank for corrosion control, chemicals used to flush condensate systems) are occupational hazards addressed by the safety and health safety management programs. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “anticipated” frequency is a bounding frequency for leak accidents. It is based on operating experience in general waste transfer systems and is conservatively applied to leaks in condensate systems.

E1


Gray water from decontamination units and safety showers Applies to: Decontamination Unit and Safety Shower Trailer (DUSST)

Leak of gray water while pumping from the Water Buffalo to a DST Applies to: Transfers to DST 241-AY-101 and to DST 241-SY-102

Failure of hose (all causes) above grade


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 that bound these conditions. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750 that apply to situations with maximum head - flow conditions that are bounded by the “de minimus” head/flow curve (Figure 6). Pumping of gray water is judged to be bounded by the de minimus head/flow curve. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of a non-fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 100 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the gray water which is judged to have a pH < 12.5. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “anticipated” frequency is based on operational experience. Small leaks from various causes are expected.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-26


Intrusion water in DST leak detection pit (LDP) Applies to: Intrusion water in leak detection pits

Leak of intrusion water while pumping from the LDP Applies to: Intra-farm transfer from a Leak Detection Pit/Radiation Detection Drywell to a DST, above ground with a hose, using small pumps according to the LDP pumping protocol in OSD-T-151-00007

Failure of hose (all causes) above grade


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 that bound these conditions. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750 that apply to situations with maximum head - flow conditions that are bounded by the “de minimus” head/flow curve (Figure 6). Pumping of intrusion water from leak detection pits is judged to be bounded by the de minimus head/flow curve. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of a non-fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 100 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the intrusion water which is judged to have a pH < 12.5. The remaining criteria are not applicable.


E1


Liquid radioactive waste being transferred from DST leak detection pits

Waste leak from overground transfer hose, connector, or connection during inadvertent pumping of waste from DST leak detection pits Applies to: Transfers from DST leak detection pits

All causes (e.g., excessive live and dead loads, vehicle traffic, vehicle collisions, dropped loads, blast effects from propane/LPG or other combustible tank explosions, over pressure due to failure in compressed air system used to blowout HIHTL and connected piping, flammable gas deflagrations/detonations within the piping, freezing, high environmental temperatures, failures due to fires, fatigue, corrosion, erosion, gasket failure, high waste pressure, water hammer, high waste temperature, seismic events


A N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 that bound these conditions. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 that bound these conditions. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition meets the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of a non-fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 100 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release, however, the spray, jet, or stream could be into a normally occupied area and result in a severe chemical burn if a worker is wetted by the waste. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

An "anticipated" frequency is assigned based on a qualitative assessment that damage to the overground hose due to a variety of causes could be expected to occur if no controls were in place. Note that the frequency due to a specific cause may be lower.

E2

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RPP-15188 REV 12-F Appendix A. Hazard Evaluation Database No Controls Fields.


Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-27


242-A Evaporator process condensate and flush solutions

Leak of 242-A Evaporator process condensate and flush solutions during transfer to Tank Farms Apples to: Gravity transfers, transfer using P-B-2 and transfers using J-B-1

Leak due to all causes Release of liquid to atmosphere (spray, splash and splatter, and wind entrainment), soil surface (waste pool), or spray, jet, stream into a worker occupied area

A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 that bound these conditions. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on a qualitative evaluation that the radiological and toxicological source terms (ULD and USOFs) for these dilute fluids are at least an order of magnitude less than the bounding valued used in the analysis in RPP-13750, Attachment A2, such that consequences are less than 100 rem and PAC-3. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of the fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 1000 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and very conservative source terms for dilute fluids (i.e., ULD of 10,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+07). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release. There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the condensates which are judged to have a pH < 12.5. Hazards from chemicals added to the flush solutions are occupational hazards. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “anticipated” frequency is based on operational experience. Leaks from various causes are expected.

E1


Flush water and residual waste in transfer line

Leak of flush water and residual waste from transfer line or HIHTL to soil surface or atmosphere during flushing operations Also includes potential waste releases during plugged transfer pump pressure clearing, flushing, and punching/draining activities.

All causes Release of liquid to atmosphere (spray, splash and splatter, and wind entrainment), soil surface (waste pool), or spray, jet, stream into a worker occupied area

A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 that bound these conditions. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750 and the qualitative determination for a postulated fine spray leak that the material at risk is contaminated flush water (i.e., the residual waste is diluted by the flush water) and that the volume of any residual waste slug is insufficient to cause a 15-minute time weighted average concentration exceeding PAC-3. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of the fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 1,000 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release. There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the contaminated flush water, which is judged to have a pH < 12.5, and there is no significant potential for chemical burns from a jet or stream of waste (i.e., waste slug with pH ≥ 12.5) because the release is not into a normally occupied area or the probability of a misroute and release of waste and a worker present and the worker cannot take self-protection action is “beyond extremely unlikely” (i.e., multiple, independent, random events). Hazards from chemicals added to the flush solutions are occupational hazards. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “anticipated” frequency is based on operational experience that leaks from various causes are expected. Note that the frequency due to a specific cause may be lower.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-28


Lance/flush water and residual waste in transfer line

Leak of lance/flush water and residual waste from transfer line SN-278 to soil surface or atmosphere during water lancing or flushing operations Applies to: Water lancing/ flushing in SN-278, which is an existing waste transfer line (extending from the SY-01A pump pit to the SY-B valve pit) that is being removed and replaced. Jumpers have been removed and line has been drained. Potholing surveys show some portions of the line have radiation readings on the order of 400 mrem which past experience with similar lines in SY Farm indicates are produced by residual solids that were not mobilized during flushes. To reduce exposure to workers who will be in close proximity to piping during cutting/removal, a high pressure/low flow water lance will be used to break up solids and the line will then be flushed.


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 that bound these conditions. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750 and the qualitative determination for a postulated fine spray leak that the material at risk is contaminated flush water (i.e., the residual waste is diluted by the lance/flush water). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of the fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 1,000 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and conservative tank waste for the SN-278 configuration (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release. There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the contaminated lance/flush water, which is judged to have a pH < 12.5. In addition, workers are located outside the SY-01A pump pit and SY-B valve pit. Workers are also aware of hazards and are expected to take self-protective actions. The remaining criteria are not applicable.


E1


Flush water, supernatant, residual waste, or grout contained inside in the slurry distributor

Leak (spray or pool) into a pit or atmosphere

Applies to: Flushing or grouting of a slurry distributor

Flushing then grouting of the slurry distributor results in overpressurization

Release of liquid to pit (spray, pool) exposing workers to radioactive materials contamination or direct ionizing radiation) or hazardous and corrosive chemicals contained in waste.

A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 that bound these conditions.

Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750 and the qualitative determination for a postulated fine spray leak that the material at risk is contaminated flush water (i.e., the residual waste is diluted by the flush water).

Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of the fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 1,000 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the contaminated slurry distributor flush water mixed with supernatant, or from grout, which are judged to have a pH < 12.5. In addition, workers are located outside the pit. Workers are also aware of hazards and are expected to take self-protective actions. The remaining criteria are not applicable.


EI

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-29


Leak test water and residual waste in transfer line

Leak of test water and residual waste from transfer line or HIHTL to soil surface or atmosphere during leak testing of waste transfer primary piping system/HIHTL connections


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 that bound these conditions. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750 and the qualitative determination for a postulated fine spray leak that the material at risk is contaminated test water (i.e., the residual waste is diluted by the water used for leak testing) and that the volume of any residual waste slug is insufficient to cause a 15-minute time weighted average concentration exceeding PAC-3. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of the fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 1,000 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release. There is no significant potential for chemical burns from a jet or stream of waste because any worker present is looking for leaks and would take self-protection action. The remaining criteria are not applicable.


E1

WTL-D-01 Waste Transfer Leak (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.3 and 3.4.2.2)


Fine spray leak in unintended transfer line, interfacing water line, or inactive facility.

Misroute into unintended transfer line, interfacing water system, or inactive facility through failed or mispositioned isolation valve. Fine spray leak in unintended line due to various causes (e.g., misaligned jumper, severely corroded pipe) Applies to: Waste transfer isolation valves, waste transfer primary piping, interfacing water system piping, primary piping in in-active facilities


EU N N N Y Y N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of the fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 1000 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

An “extremely unlikely” frequency is assigned to the fine spray leak scenario as this scenario requires a misroute in addition to a fine crack that has an optimal width for producing the maximum amount of fine spray aerosol and most cracks are expected to have a width such that they would not be optimal producers of fine aerosol spray.

E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-30



Waste leak in unintended transfer line, interfacing water line, or inactive facility (non-fine spray, e.g., large break)

Misroute into unintended transfer line, interfacing water system, or inactive facility through failed or mispositioned isolation valve. Leak in unintended line due to various causes (e.g., misaligned or dis-connected jumper, severely corroded pipe) Applies to: Waste transfer isolation valves, waste transfer primary piping, interfacing water system piping, primary piping in in-active facilities




E2


Liquid radioactive waste being transferred Applies to: Transfers using a low head waste transfer pump including: • Low head DST

transfer pumps: • Pumps used to pump

waste from DST annuli


Waste leak in unintended transfer line, interfacing water line, or inactive facility




The “anticipated” frequency is based on a qualitative assessment that the failure or mispositioning of an isolation due to a variety of causes would be expected to occur if no controls were in place

E2

WTL-D-03-UX-302A Waste Transfer Leak (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.3 and 3.4.2.2)

Liquid radioactive waste being transferred from 241-UX-302A Catch Tank Applies to: Transfers using a low head waste transfer pump including: • 241-UX-302A Catch

Tank transfer pump

241-UX-302A waste leak into water truck or onto the ground

Misroute into flush water truck or onto the ground through failed or mispositioned isolation valve. Applies to: 241-UX-302A waste transfer system


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A12 that bound these conditions. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A12. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release, spray, jet, or stream into a normally occupied area. The remaining criteria are not applicable.


E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-31


Liquid radioactive waste being transferred Applies to: 242-A Evaporator gravity transfers through supernatant or slurry transfer lines,

Waste leak in unintended transfer line, interfacing water line, or inactive facility



A N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 that bound these conditions. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750 that apply to low head pumps and gravity head situations (i.e., those with maximum head - flow conditions that are bounded by the “de minimus” head/flow curve (Figure 6). Head/flow conditions for 242-A Evaporator gravity transfers are based in calculations in RPP-13750, Attachment A5. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition meets the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of a non-fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 100 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release, however, the spray, jet, or stream could be into a normally occupied area and result in a severe chemical burn if a worker is wetted by the waste. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “anticipated” frequency is based on a qualitative assessment that the failure or mispositioning of an isolation due to a variety of causes would be expected to occur if no controls were in place

E2

WTL-D-05a This hazardous condition has been deleted.

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

WTL-D-05b This hazardous condition has been deleted.

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

WTL-D-06 This hazardous condition has been deleted.

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

RPP-15188 Rev.12H 10/8/2018 - 2:27 PM 99 of 250



Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-32



Waste leak (fine spray) in unintended transfer line, interfacing water system, or inactive facility

Misroute into unintended transfer line through cross-connected flexible jumper (discharge end of jumper connected to the wrong nozzle). Leak in unintended transfer line due to various causes (e.g., disconnected or misaligned jumper, severely corroded pipe) Applies to: Flexible jumpers

Release of liquid radioactive waste to atmosphere (airborne fine spray aerosol release)

U N N N Y Y Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition meets the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of a non-fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 1000 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release, however, the spray, jet, or stream could be into a normally occupied area and result in a severe chemical burn if a worker is wetted by the waste. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

An “unlikely” frequency is assigned based on a qualitative assessment that the accident requires both a misroute due to a cross-connected jumper, which is judged to be “unlikely” and a leak in the unintended piping. However, a leak in an in active facility or unintended transfer route might be expected due to aging of piping in the facility or open nozzle in un-intended piping. Note that an “extremely unlikely” frequency could be assigned to the fine spray leak scenario as this scenario requires a fine crack that has an optimal width for producing the maximum amount of fine spray aerosol and most cracks are expected to have a width such that they would not be optimal producers of fine aerosol spray.

E2


Liquid radioactive waste being transferred Applies to: • Transfer using high

head waste transfer pumps

• Transfers using a low head waste transfer pump including: - Low head DST


to pump waste from waste transfer-associated structures


Waste leak (non-fine spray) in unintended transfer line, interfacing water system, or inactive facility



U N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition meets the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of a non-fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 100 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release, however, the spray, jet, or stream could be into a normally occupied area and result in a severe chemical burn if a worker is wetted by the waste. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

An “unlikely” frequency is assigned based on a qualitative assessment that the accident requires both a misroute due to a cross-connected jumper, which is judged to be “unlikely” and a leak in the unintended piping. However, a leak in an in active facility or unintended transfer route might be expected due to aging of piping in the facility or open nozzle in un-intended piping.

E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-33


Liquid radioactive waste being transferred Applies to: 242-A Evaporator gravity transfers through supernatant or slurry transfer lines

Waste leak in unintended transfer line, interfacing water system, or inactive facility


Release of liquid radioactive waste to atmosphere (spray, splash and splatter and wind entrainment), soil surface (waste pool), or spray, jet, stream into a worker occupied area

U N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment 2 that bound these conditions. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750 that apply to low head pumps and gravity head situations (i.e., those with maximum head - flow conditions that are bounded by the “de minimus” head/flow curve (Figure 6). Head/flow conditions for 242-A Evaporator gravity transfers are based in calculations in RPP-13750, Attachment A5. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition meets the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of a non-fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 100 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release, however, the spray, jet, or stream could be into a normally occupied area and result in a severe chemical burn if a worker is wetted by the waste. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

An “unlikely” frequency is assigned based on a qualitative assessment that the accident requires both a misroute due to a cross-connected jumper, which is judged to be “unlikely” and a leak in the unintended piping. However, a leak in an in active facility or unintended transfer route might be expected due to aging of piping in the facility or open nozzle in un-intended piping.

E2


Liquid radioactive waste being transferred as well as waste in receipt tank (DST, SST, DCRT, catch tank) waste. Applies to: Transfers using a waste transfer pump, gravity transfers from the 242-A Evaporator

Waste leak into unintended tank and tank/vault overflows. Applies to: DSTs, DST annuli, SSTs, DCRTs, catch tanks

Misroute into unintended tank through failed or mispositioned isolation valve or through cross-connected flexible jumper (discharge end of jumper connected to the wrong nozzle). Applies to: Waste transfer isolation valves, Flexible jumpers

Release of liquid radioactive waste to soil (surface waste pool)

A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 (see large break case which bounds the conditions for a surface pool only) Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 as the applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. There is very limited aerosol (only that due to wind entrainment) and the potential direct radiation dose is limited because the worker would readily recognize the large waste pool and evacuate the area. Waste pools have been determined to no present a chemical burn hazard based on the judgment that walking in a waste pool would not wet a significant portion of the body as substantial footwear is required in the Tank Farms. The remaining criteria are not applicable

The “anticipated” frequency is based on a qualitative assessment that the failure or mispositioning of an isolation due to a variety of causes would be expected to occur if no controls were in place. Note that the frequency due to a cross-connected jumper could be assigned a frequency of “unlikely.”

E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-34


Liquid radioactive waste Applies to: Waste transfer pumps (high head and low head)

Waste leak due to inadvertent pump start when transfer system in not configured as intended

All causes (e.g., human error) Release of liquid radioactive waste to atmosphere (fine spray, splash and splatter, and wind entrainment), soil surface (waste pool), or spray, jet, stream into a worker occupied area

A N N N Y Y Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2 Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition meets the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of a non-fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 1000 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,00 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release, however, the spray, jet, or stream could be into a normally occupied area and result in a severe chemical burn if a worker is wetted by the waste. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

An “anticipated” frequency is assigned for human error based on judgment. Note that an “unlikely” frequency could be assigned to the fine spray leak scenario as this scenario requires a fine crack that has an optimal width for producing the maximum amount of fine spray aerosol and most cracks are expected to have a width such that they would not be optimal producers of fine aerosol spray.

E2


-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --


-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --


Liquid radioactive waste being transferred

Applies to: • Transfers using a high


• Low head transfer pumps: - Low head DST


to pump waste from waste transfer-associated structures


Waste leak in unintended transfer line, interfacing water line, or inactive facility during a waste transfer pump rotation check or pump bump.

Misroute into unintended transfer line, interfacing water system, or inactive facility through failed or mispositioned isolation valve or through cross-connected flexible jumper (discharge end of jumper connected to the wrong nozzle).

Release of liquid radioactive waste to atmosphere (fine spray, non-fine spray, splash and splatter and wind entrainment), soil surface (waste pool), or spray, jet, stream into a worker occupied area

U N N N Y Y Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2. The onsite radiological consequence for a fine spray leak exceeds 100 rem and the onsite toxicological consequence exceeds PAC-3. The onsite radiological consequence for a non-fine spray leak is less than 100 rem and the toxicological consequence is below PAC-3. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition meets the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of a non-fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 1000 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release, however, the spray, jet, or stream could be into a normally occupied area and result in a severe chemical burn if a worker is wetted by the waste. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

An “unlikely” frequency is assigned, one frequency level less than a misroute during a waste transfer (as this scenario requires the leak to occur during the relatively infrequent and short duration rotation checks and pump bumps. Note that the frequency of a fine spray leak is “extremely unlikely” because this scenario requires a fine crack that has an optimal width for producing the maximum amount of fine spray aerosol and most cracks are expected to have a width such that they would not be optimal producers of fine aerosol spray. Note that the frequency for a specific cause may be lower.

E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-35


Dissolved hard heel radioactive waste mixed with caustic solution being sampled in SST. Applies to: Waste sampling using sluicers and sample sleeve in SST

Some of the dissolved waste/caustic solution being sampled is diverted up the sampling sleeve by the water pressure from the sluicer and splashes onto a worker. Applies to: Sampling activity in SST

Waste/caustic stream from sluicer is inadvertently aimed such that material being sampled is able to splash up the length of the sampling sleeve and out the top. This requires that the sample bottle not be in the sampling sleeve, to create an open pathway to the top.

Dissolved waste/ caustic solution splashing from the top of the sample sleeve and onto a facility worker.

EU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are bounded by analysis presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2, which indicates that a large pipe break leak will not exceed guidelines. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are bounded by analysis presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A2, which indicates that a large pipe break leak will not exceed guidelines. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of the fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 1000 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). There is no a significant potential for chemical burns from the waste release because a release due to splashing of waste up the 26 ft long, 3-inch diameter sampling tube is expected to be very small. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

An “extremely unlikely” frequency is assigned because a substantial quantity of waste/caustic solution would have to splash up the sampling sleeve (approximately 26 ft of 3-in diameter pipe [H-14-109328]) and onto a facility worker located in the immediate vicinity. It is not clear that this is physically possible. Also, this would have to happen when the sample bottle is not in the sampling sleeve, which it would be much of the time when the sluicer is aimed at the sampling port.

E1

WTL-E-01a Waste Transfer Leak (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.3 and 3.4.2.2)

Liquid radioactive waste being transferred Applies to: • Transfers using waste

transfer pumps • Waste transfer pump

rotation checks or pump bumps

Waste aerosol release from active ventilation system. Aerosol generated by in-tank spray leak. Filtration degraded (without controls) Applies to: DSTs, actively ventilated SSTs (SST retrievals)

Spray leaks from all causes (e.g., leaking connectors, piping flaws, corrosion, open service connections, failed component, mis-assembly)

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials to the atmosphere

EU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on being bounded by WTL-C-01. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A3, that conclude that consequences are below guidelines unless the transfer pump is operating well above the design pressure of the piping systems and the exhaust stack is failed (see WTL-E-01b). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol produced by a fine spray leak directly to the atmosphere is not a significant facility worker hazard (see WTL-C-01) which bounds this hazardous condition. There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “extremely unlikely” frequency is based on a qualitative assessment of the likelihood of a fine crack developing in a pump discharge line that extends above the waste level within the headspace of the tank. Since this accident scenario can only occur in a very limited length of pipe, the frequency has been reduced one level, to “extremely unlikely,” compared to the corresponding fine spray into the air representative accident (WTL-C-01).

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-36

WTL-E-01b Waste Transfer Leak (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.3 and 3.4.2.2)

Liquid radioactive waste being transferred Applies to: • Transfers using waste

transfer pumps • Waste transfer pump


Waste aerosol release from active ventilation system. Aerosol generated by in-tank spray leak. Filtration degraded (without controls) Applies to: DSTs, actively ventilated SSTs (SST retrievals)



BEU N N N N Y N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on being bounded by WTL-C-01. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A3, that conclude that to exceed guidelines the waste transfer pump must be operating well above the design pressure (control system and pressure relief device failures that allow operation above the pressure rating for the transfer lines) and the exhauster stack must be failed such that the release is at or near ground level. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol produced by a fine spray leak directly to the atmosphere is not a significant facility worker hazard (see WTL-C-01) which bounds this hazardous condition. There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is based on an “extremely unlikely” frequency for the fine spray leak inside a tank headspace (see WTL-E-01a) combined with the conditional probability that the pressure is above the design pressure of the piping (control system and pressure relief device failures) and the exhauster stack has failed such that the release is at or near ground level.

E2

WTL-E-02 Waste Transfer Leak (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.3 and 3.4.2.2)

Liquid radioactive waste that had leaked into a DST annulus and is subsequently being transferred Applies to: • DST annulus

transfers • DST annulus waste

transfer pump rotation checks or pump bumps

Waste aerosol release from DST annulus ventilation system. Aerosol generated by spray leak in the DST annulus. Filtration degraded (without controls) Applies to: DST annuli



EU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A3. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A3. (Note that maximum pump pressure for an annulus pump is much less than the pressure assumed in Attachment A3 [RPP-6485, Technical Information to Support DST Emergency Annulus Pumping, Appendix B].) Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol produced by a fine spray leak directly to the atmosphere is not a significant facility worker hazard (see WTL-C-01) which bounds this hazardous condition. There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “extremely unlikely” frequency is based on a qualitative assessment of the likelihood of a fine crack developing in a pump discharge line that extends above the waste level within the headspace of the tank. Since this accident scenario can only occur in a very limited length of pipe, the frequency has been reduced one level, to “extremely unlikely,” compared to the corresponding fine spray into the air representative accident (WTL-C-01).

E1


DST waste Waste aerosol release from DST annulus ventilation system. Aerosol generated by splash and splatter from waste leaking from the DST primary tank to the DST annulus. Filtration degraded (without controls) Applies to: DST annuli

Leak in DST primary tank due to all causes (e.g., corrosion, impact by in-tank equipment, thermal shock/stress, seismic event).


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A3. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on being bounded by WTL-E-02. The aerosol generation rate for a splash and splatter event is less than for a pressurized fine spray leak event. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The facility worker consequences are based on the consequences being bounded by WTL-E-02.

The “anticipated” frequency is based on the judgment that a leak in a DST primary liner could be expected if there were no controls and is considered to be conservative.

E1

WTL-E-03b This hazardous condition has been deleted.

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 03-37

WTL-E-03c This hazardous condition has been deleted.

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --


Liquid radioactive waste being transferred Applies to: • Transfers using a

waste transfer pump • Waste transfer pump


Waste aerosol release from DST annulus ventilation system. Aerosol generated by splash and splatter from a misrouted waste transfer into a DST annulus. Filtration degraded (without controls) Applies to: DST annuli

Human error – mispositioned jumper.


U N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-13750, Attachment A3. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on being bounded by WTL-E-02. The aerosol generation rate for a splash and splatter event is less than for a pressurized fine spray leak event. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The facility worker consequences are based on the consequences being bounded by WTL-E-02.

The “unlikely” frequency is based on a specific mistransfer that requires a transfer through the central pump pit of a DST and a piping configuration error within the pit such that the transfer is routed to the annulus pump-out pit.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 04-1

RCF-FG-01 Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Section 3.3.2.4.1)

Residual waste/contamination in the waste transfer-associated structure

Release of residual waste/contamination due to a flammable gas deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure

Flammable gases at a concentration above the LFL enter a waste transfer-associated structure from a connected tank headspace; an ignition source is assumed. Note: Connected tanks include DSTs, SSTs, DCRTs, catch tanks, IMUSTs, 244-CR Vault tanks, 244-AR Vault tanks. Note: The connection between the tank headspace and a waste transfer-associated structure can be a riser, drain line, waste transfer line, etc. The flammable gas hazard can also propagate from the “connected” waste transfer-associated structure to another structure. Note: Flammable gases in the connected tank headspace can be from steady-state generation, an induced GRE, and/or a spontaneous GRE.

Release of residual waste/contamination, potential physical injury or damage from deflagration

A N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation of the calculations documented in RPP-13470 and the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354 (i.e., “flammable gas accident” releases and consequences bound “release from contaminated facility” releases and consequences). The offsite toxicological consequence is qualitatively based on the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition is a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, a flammable gas deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure could cause grievous injury or death to a facility worker due to overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles). Based on the limited MAR and facility worker self-protective actions (SWIM), the potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are not expected to exceed the 100 rem or PAC-3 thresholds, respectively. There is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

“Anticipated” is the highest frequency of the causes of flammable gas at a concentration above the LFL in the connected tank [e.g., induced flammable gas GRE hazard in a connected DST (see RPP-13510)]. Note: Flammable gases in a connected tank will not preferentially migrate or accumulate in a connected waste transfer-associated structure.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 04-2

RCF-FG-02a Release from Contaminated Facility (DSA Section 3.3.2.4.4)

Residual waste/contamination in the waste transfer-associated structure and/or waste from the waste transfer leak

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials due to a flammable gas deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure

Waste transfer leak into a waste transfer-associated structure; flammable gases generated by the waste accumulate in the structure to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed. Note: The flammable gas hazard may also propagate to another structure.

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials, potential physical injury or damage from deflagration

U N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation of the calculations documented in RPP-13470 and the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354 (i.e., “flammable gas accident” releases and consequences bound “release from contaminated facility” releases and consequences). The offsite toxicological consequence is qualitatively based on the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition is a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, a flammable gas deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure could cause grievous injury or death to a facility worker due to overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles). Based on the limited MAR and facility worker self-protective actions (SWIM), the potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are not expected to exceed the 100 rem or PAC-3 thresholds, respectively. There is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “unlikely” frequency is based on the postulated accident scenario that requires the leak to fill the waste transfer-associated structure above a minimum level (fill volume > 10% for worst case waste, but more typically > 70-80%, see RPP-8050), but not completely full, and ventilation and hydrogen diffusion must be significantly restricted (e.g., the structure must be steel lined, painted, or coated with a nonporous membrane, to restrict diffusion through the structure walls; passive ventilation and diffusion through the structure covers must be restricted by sealing cracks and gaps in cover blocks and valve handle access ports). Operating experience with DSTs and SSTs, that operate at a high waste fill fraction have restricted diffusion (DSTs are steel lined, most SSTs have coatings on the concrete domes), equilibrate at FG concentration <25% LFL under passive ventilation supports the conclusion that concentrations > LFL in waste transfer-associated structures are “unlikely.”

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 04-3

RCF-FG-02b Release from Contaminated Facility (DSA Section 3.3.2.4.4)



Waste transfer leak into a waste transfer-associated structure due to a waste transfer pump seal leak; flammable gases generated by the waste accumulate in the structure to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed. Note: The flammable gas hazard may also propagate to another structure.


U N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation of the calculations documented in RPP-13470 and the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354 (i.e., “flammable gas accident” releases and consequences bound “release from contaminated facility” releases and consequences). The offsite toxicological consequence is qualitatively based on the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition is a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, a flammable gas deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure could cause grievous injury or death to a facility worker due to overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles). Based on the limited MAR and facility worker self-protective actions (SWIM), the potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are not expected to exceed the 100 rem or PAC-3 thresholds, respectively. There is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “unlikely” frequency is based on the postulated accident scenario that requires the leak to fill the waste transfer-associated structure above a minimum level (fill volume > 10% for worst case waste, but more typically > 70-80%, see RPP-8050), but not completely full, and ventilation and hydrogen diffusion must be significantly restricted (e.g., the structure must be steel lined, painted, or coated with a nonporous membrane, to restrict diffusion through the structure walls; passive ventilation and diffusion through the structure covers must be restricted by sealing cracks and gaps in cover blocks and valve handle access ports). Operating experience with DSTs and SSTs, that operate at a high waste fill fraction have restricted diffusion (DSTs are steel lined, most SSTs have coatings on the concrete domes), equilibrate at FG concentration <25% LFL under passive ventilation supports the conclusion that concentrations > LFL in waste transfer-associated structures are “unlikely.”

E1

RCF-FG-03 Release from Contaminated Facility (DSA Section 3.3.2.4.4)



Waste transfer leak into an encasement; flammable gases generated by the waste accumulate in the encasement and connected waste transfer-associated structure to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed.


EU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation of the calculations documented in RPP-13470 and the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354 (i.e., “flammable gas accident” releases and consequences bound “release from contaminated facility” releases and consequences). The offsite toxicological consequence is qualitatively based on the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition is a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, a flammable gas deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure could cause grievous injury or death to a facility worker due to overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles). Based on the limited MAR and facility worker self-protective actions (SWIM), the potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are not expected to exceed the 100 rem or PAC-3 thresholds, respectively. There is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “extremely unlikely” frequency is based on the postulated accident scenario that requires an undetected waste transfer leak into an encasement and fill the encasement above a minimum level (fill volume > 10% for worst case waste, but more typically > 70-80%, see RPP-8050), but not completely full, and the encasement drain valve must be closed. In addition there are few possible ignition sources in the encasement.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 04-4


Residual waste/contamination in waste transfer-associated structure

Release of contaminated intrusion water due to a flammable gas deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure

Intrusion of water (e.g., rain, snow melt) into waste transfer-associated structure; flammable gases generated by contaminated intrusion water accumulate in the structure to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed.

Release of contaminated intrusion water, potential physical injury or damage from deflagration

BEU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation of the calculations documented in RPP-13470 and the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354 (i.e., “flammable gas accident” releases and consequences bound “release from contaminated facility” releases and consequences). The offsite toxicological consequence is qualitatively based on the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354. (Note: The MAR is intrusion water mixed with the residual contamination in a waste transfer-associated structure.) Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition is a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, a flammable gas deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure could cause grievous injury or death to a facility worker due to overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles). Based on the limited and dilute MAR and facility worker self-protective actions (SWIM), the potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are not expected to exceed the 100 rem or PAC-3 thresholds, respectively. There is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is based on the very low flammable gas generation rate for residual waste contamination diluted by intrusion water. It is not plausible that intrusion water could fill the pit to a “magic” point where passive ventilation and/or diffusion is insufficient to maintain the flammable gases generated from the pit contamination < 100% of the LFL.

E1



Release of residual waste/contamination due to flammable gas deflagration in the waste transfer-associated structure

Hydraulic fluid leak into structure creates flammable vapor (fine spray); an ignition source is assumed.


BEU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation of the calculations documented in RPP-13470 and the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354 (i.e., “flammable gas accident” releases and consequences bound “release from contaminated facility” releases and consequences). The offsite toxicological consequence is qualitatively based on the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354 (i.e., the consequences of a deflagration from flammable gases generated by waste are similar to a deflagration from flammable gases generated by hydraulic fluid). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354 (i.e., the consequences of a deflagration from flammable gases generated by waste are similar to a deflagration from flammable gases generated by hydraulic fluid). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition is a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, a hydraulic mist deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure could cause grievous injury or death to a facility worker due to overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles). Based on the limited MAR and facility worker self-protective actions (SWIM), the potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are not expected to exceed the 100 rem or PAC-3 thresholds, respectively. There is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is based on the following three factors: (1) there has to be a leak in the hydraulic system that produces an atomized spray – an event judged to be “unlikely” in HNF-SD-WM-FHA-020, (2) to support the deflagration scenario this atomized spray would have to fill the entire structure, and (3) an ignition source would have to be present and HNF-SD-WM-FHA-020 indicates that while the listed minimum ignition energy for hydrogen is 0.02 mJ, the minimum ignition energy for atomized hydraulic fluid is expected to be several of orders of magnitude greater (i.e., lightning, vehicle fuel fire). That is, the coincidence of lightning or a vehicle fuel fire with an atomized hydraulic fluid spray leak filling the structure is “beyond extremely unlikely.”

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 04-5




Flammable gases generated in equipment submerged in tank waste and open in a waste transfer-associated structure (e.g., a riser, transfer line) accumulate in a waste transfer-associated structure to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed.


BEU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation of the calculations documented in RPP-13470 and the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354 (i.e., “flammable gas accident” releases and consequences bound “release from contaminated facility” releases and consequences). The offsite toxicological consequence is qualitatively based on the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition is a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, a flammable gas deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure could cause grievous injury or death to a facility worker due to overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles). Based on the limited MAR and facility worker self-protective actions (SWIM), the potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are not expected to exceed the 100 rem or PAC-3 thresholds, respectively. There is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is based on the engineering judgment that flammable gases generated in equipment submerged in tank waste are insufficient to accumulate in a waste transfer-associated structure to a concentration above the LFL considering barometric/passive ventilation and diffusion.

E1




Flammable gases generated by residual waste/contamination in a waste transfer-associated structure accumulate in the structure to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed. Note: This hazardous condition encompasses polyurethane foam-covered waste transfer-associated structures and metal waste transfer-associated structures.



The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is based on RPP-12710 and RPP-13503. These references show: (1) diffusion from interim isolated concrete waste transfer-associated structures prevents the accumulation of significant concentrations of flammable gas from residual waste/ contamination in the structure and (2) for the interim isolated structures lined with steel, the estimated time to the LFL exceeds the design life (~20 years) of the material used for interim isolation. See also RPP-13354.

E1




Leak and ignition of gasoline or LPG that is stored or transported in or near a waste transfer-associated structure.


U N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation of the calculations documented in RPP-13470 and the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354 (i.e., “flammable gas accident” releases and consequences bound “release from contaminated facility” releases and consequences). The offsite toxicological consequence is qualitatively based on the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The “No” for significant facility worker hazard is because this hazardous condition is a common industrial hazard that is regulated by DOE-prescribed occupational safety and health standards (i.e., fire protection requirements). That is, the primary facility worker consequence is from overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure [missiles] and is independent of where the gasoline or LPG flammable gas deflagration occurs.

The “unlikely” frequency is qualitatively established based on industry and tank farm experience.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 04-6


Waste or residual contamination in the tank vault; ventilation system filters and residual contamination

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials due to a flammable gas deflagration in a tank vault Note: Tank vaults (i.e., vaults that provide secondary confinement for tanks) including DCRT vaults, 244-CR Vault cells, 244-AR Vault cells, and catch tank vaults Note: No significant release of waste in the tank is postulated

Flammable gases generated by the waste and residual contamination accumulates in the tank vault to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed Note: Waste in the tank vault could include waste leaked from the tank


BEU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively based on the engineering judgment that the consequences of a tank vault deflagration are reasonably bounded/represented by a deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure (see RPP-13354). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological consequence and the onsite worker toxicological consequence are qualitatively based on the engineering judgment that the consequences of a tank vault deflagration are reasonably bounded/represented by a deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure (see RPP-13354). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition is a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, a flammable gas deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure could cause grievous injury or death to a facility worker due to overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles). Based on the limited MAR and facility worker self-protective actions (SWIM), the potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are not expected to exceed the 100 rem or PAC-3 thresholds, respectively. There is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency considers the estimated quantity and characteristics of the waste present in a tank vault, the volume of the tank vault, and barometric/passive ventilation and diffusion with respect to flammable gas generation and accumulation in the tank vault to a concentration above the LFL. See RPP-13510.

E1


Waste or residual contamination in an IMUST vault; ventilation system filters and residual contamination

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials due to a flammable gas deflagration in an IMUST vault Note: No significant release of waste in the tank is postulated

Flammable gases generated by the waste and residual contamination accumulates in the IMUST vault to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed Note: Waste in the tank vault could include waste leaked from the tank


EU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively based on the engineering judgment that the consequences of a tank vault deflagration are reasonably bounded/represented by a deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure (see RPP-13354). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological consequence and the onsite worker toxicological consequence are qualitatively based on the engineering judgment that the consequences of a tank vault deflagration are reasonably bounded/represented by a deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure (see RPP-13354). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition is a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, a flammable gas deflagration in an IMUST vault could cause grievous injury or death to a facility worker due to overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles). Based on the limited MAR and facility worker self-protective actions (SWIM), the potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are not expected to exceed the 100 rem or PAC-3 thresholds, respectively. There is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “extremely unlikely” frequency is qualitatively determined because although the quantity of the waste in an IMUST vault required to create a flammable gas hazard considering the vault volume and passive ventilation and/or diffusion is not expected, the vault conditions for the IMUSTs are not known.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 04-7


Waste or residual contamination in the tank vault; ventilation system filters and residual contamination

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials due to a flammable gas deflagration in a tank vault Note: Tank vaults (i.e., vaults that provide secondary confinement for tanks) include DCRT vaults, 244-CR Vault cells, 244-AR Vault cells, and catch tank and IMUST vaults Note: No significant release of waste in the tank is postulated

Leak and ignition of gasoline or LPG that is stored or transported in or near a tank vault


U N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively based on the engineering judgment that the consequences of a tank vault deflagration are reasonably bounded/represented by a deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure (see RPP-13354). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological consequence and the onsite worker toxicological consequence are qualitatively based on the engineering judgment that the consequences of a tank vault deflagration are reasonably bounded/represented by a deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure (see RPP-13354). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The “No” for significant facility worker hazard is because this hazardous condition is a common industrial hazard that is regulated by DOE-prescribed occupational safety and health standards (i.e., fire protection requirements). That is, the primary facility worker consequence is from overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure [missiles] and is independent of where the gasoline or LPG flammable gas deflagration occurs.

The “unlikely” frequency is based on the postulated accident scenario that requires: (1) a vehicle accident with fuel tank rupture or a refueling accident and spill at a specific location and (2) a subsequent flammable gas deflagration. This frequency is consistent with the results of RPP-13261.

E1


DST waste in leak detection pit

Release of DST waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in a leak detection pit

Waste leak into DST leak detection pit; flammable gases generated by the waste accumulate in the leak detection pit to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed

Release of DST waste, potential physical injury or damage from deflagration

U N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively based on the engineering judgment that the consequences of a deflagration in a DST leak detection pit are reasonably bounded/represented by a deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure (see RPP-13354). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological consequence and the onsite worker toxicological consequence are qualitatively based on the engineering judgment that the consequences of a deflagration in a DST leak detection pit are reasonably bounded/represented by a deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure (see RPP-13354). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition is a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, a flammable gas deflagration in a DST leak detection pit could cause grievous injury or death to a facility worker due to overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles). Based on the limited MAR and facility worker self-protective actions (SWIM), the potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are not expected to exceed the 100 rem or PAC-3 thresholds, respectively. There is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “unlikely” frequency is based on the postulated accident scenario that requires the failure of one required passive barrier, i.e., failure of the DST secondary (annulus) steel tank. (Note that failure of the 241-AY-102 primary tank and waste leak into the annulus has occurred leaving the annulus as the only remaining passive barrier.)

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 04-8


SST 241-AX waste in leak detection pit

Release of SST 241-AX waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in a leak detection pit

Waste leak into a SST 241-AX Tank Farm tank leak detection pit; flammable gases generated by the waste accumulate in the leak detection pit to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed

Release of SST 241-AX waste, potential physical injury or damage from deflagration

BEU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively based on the engineering judgment that the consequences of a deflagration in a SST 241-AX leak detection pit are reasonably bounded/represented by a deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure (see RPP-13354). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological consequence and the onsite worker toxicological consequence are qualitatively based on the engineering judgment that the consequences of a deflagration in a SST 241-AX leak detection pit are reasonably bounded/represented by a deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure (see RPP-13354). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition is a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, a flammable gas deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure could cause grievous injury or death to a facility worker due to overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles). Based on the limited MAR and facility worker self-protective actions (SWIM), the potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are not expected to exceed the 100 rem or PAC-3 thresholds, respectively. There is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is based on the maximum fill fraction of waste possible in a SST 241-AX tank leak detection pit (< 5%) (RPP-CALC-47670). With this maximum fill fraction and barometric breathing and/or diffusion, it is not possible for flammable gas to accumulate to the LFL based on the analyses in RPP-8050 and RPP-12710/RPP-13503.

E1

RCF-FG-12c Release from Contaminated Facility (DSA Section 3.3.2.4.4)

Waste in a SST leak detection drywell

Release of waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in a SST leak detection drywell

SST waste leak that migrates to and then leaks into a SST leak detection drywell; flammable gases generated by the waste accumulate in the leak detection drywell to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed


BEU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively based on the engineering judgment that the consequences of a deflagration in a SST leak detection drywell are reasonably bounded/represented by a deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure (see RPP-13354). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological consequence and the onsite worker toxicological consequence are qualitatively based on the engineering judgment that the consequences of a deflagration in a SST leak detection drywell are reasonably bounded/represented by a deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure (see RPP-13354). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition is a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, a flammable gas deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure could cause grievous injury or death to a facility worker due to overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles). Based on the limited MAR and facility worker self-protective actions (SWIM), the potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are not expected to exceed the 100 rem or PAC-3 thresholds, respectively. There is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is qualitatively assigned based on the following. Significant intrusion of waste into a SST leak detection drywell is not expected based on the various designs of the leak detection drywells and based on operating experience. In the unexpected event that waste accumulates in a SST leak detection drywell, the estimated time to reach the LFL is beyond the design life of the drywell based on the calculations in RPP-13503 (i.e., the fill fraction is limited and the hydrogen generation rate of SST waste that migrates to the drywell would be significantly less than that assumed in the RPP-13503 analysis).

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 04-9


Residual contamination in AZ-301 structure; ventilation system condensate (including chemicals and contaminants)

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials due to a flammable gas deflagration in the AZ-301 structure

Flammable gases generated by 702-AZ ventilation system condensate accumulate in the AZ-301 structure to a concentration above the LFL (i.e., AZ-301 tank leak into the AZ-301 structure); an ignition source is assumed

Release of residual contamination and ventilation system condensate (including chemicals and contaminants), potential physical injury or damage from deflagration

BEU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation considering the limited MAR and the calculations documented in RPP-13470. The offsite toxicological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation considering the limited MAR and the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are based on a qualitative evaluation considering the limited MAR and the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition is a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, a flammable gas deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure could cause grievous injury or death to a facility worker due to overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles). Based on the limited MAR and facility worker self-protective actions (SWIM), the potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are not expected to exceed the 100 rem or PAC-3 thresholds, respectively. There is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is based on the judgment that the flammable gas generation rate for 702-AZ ventilation system condensate is too low to allow accumulation above the LFL in the AZ-301 structure considering the dilute nature of the condensate and the limited potential fill fraction in the AZ-301 structure.

E1


Residual contamination in ventilation system seal pot pit or condensate pump enclosure (e.g., 241-AP Tank Farm); ventilation system condensate (including chemicals and contaminants)

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials due to a flammable gas deflagration in a ventilation system seal pot pit or condensate pump enclosure

Flammable gases generated by residual contamination accumulate in a ventilation system seal pot pit or condensate pump enclosure to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed

Release of residual contamination and ventilation system condensate (including chemicals and contaminants), potential physical injury or damage from deflagration

BEU N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation considering the limited MAR and the calculations documented in RPP-13470. The offsite toxicological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation considering the limited MAR and the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are based on a qualitative evaluation considering the limited MAR and the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition is a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, a flammable gas deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure could cause grievous injury or death to a facility worker due to overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles). Based on the limited MAR and facility worker self-protective actions (SWIM), the potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are not expected to exceed the 100 rem or PAC-3 thresholds, respectively. There is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is based on the judgment that the flammable gas generation rate for ventilation system condensate is too low to allow accumulation above the LFL in seal pot pits or condensate pump enclosures, considering the dilute nature of the condensate and the limited potential fill fraction in such structures.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 04-10


Residual waste/contamination in the waste transfer-associated structure and/or waste from the waste leak


Waste transfer leak into a waste transfer-associated structure due to a failed waste transfer pump mechanical shaft seal from all causes (e.g., overpressure); flammable gases generated by the waste accumulate in the structure to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed


U N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation of the calculations documented in RPP-13470 and the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354 (i.e., “flammable gas accident” releases and consequences bound “release from contaminated facility” releases and consequences). The offsite toxicological consequence is qualitatively based on the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively based on the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition is a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, a flammable gas deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure could cause grievous injury or death to a facility worker due to overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles). Based on the limited MAR and facility worker self-protective actions (SWIM), the potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are not expected to exceed the 100 rem or PAC-3 thresholds, respectively. There is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “unlikely” frequency is based on the postulated accident scenario that requires an undetected waste transfer pump mechanical shaft seal failure and that flammable gases generated from the waste leak accumulate to a concentration above the LFL and are ignited.

E1


Residual waste/contamination in the waste transfer-associated structure and/or waste from the waste leak.

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials due to a flammable gas deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure due to a leak of waste into the structure due to jet momentum. Applies to: In-tank equipment that extends from the tank headspace into a waste transfer-associated structure during waste transfers or retrieval operations (see Engineering Technical Evaluations for specific equipment and operations evaluated)

Waste jet in the tank headspace (e.g., DST or SST retrieval sluicer, waste transfer through a DST slurry distributor) strikes a piece of in-tank equipment that acts as a pipe or conduit out of the tank (e.g., thermocouple tree, liquid observation well, transfer pump column) that has a small opening/creates a small opening (e.g., erodes through corroded material). The jet kinetic-energy head is converted into static pressure due to conservation of momentum. The opening is not significantly larger than the jet diameter and the in-tank equipment has few if any other openings in it. The static pressure created forces waste up the equipment and it leaks into the waste transfer-associated structure. Flammable gases generated by the waste accumulate in the structure to a concentration above the LFL; an ignition source is assumed

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials, potential physical injury or damage from deflagration.


The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is based on the leak due to jet momentum being “extremely unlikely” (see WTL-C-13a) and the conditional probability that flammable gases generated from the waste leak accumulate to a concentration above the LFL and are ignited. For the flammable gas to accumulate to a concentration above the LFL, the leak must be undetected and fill the structure above a minimum level (fill volume > 10% for worst case waste, but more typically > 70-80%, see RPP-8050, but not completely full, and ventilation and hydrogen diffusion must be significantly restricted (e.g., the structure must be steel lined, painted, or coated with a non-porous membrane, to restrict diffusion through the structure walls; passive ventilation and diffusion through the structure); covers must be restricted (e.g., by sealing cracks and gaps in cover blocks and valve handle access ports or foamed over).

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 04-11

RCF-LH-01 Release from Contaminated Facility (DSA Section 3.3.2.4.4)


Release of residual waste/contamination due to a load handling accident (e.g., load drop) in a waste transfer-associated structure

All causes of load-handling accidents. For example, load drop during crane work, cover block lifting bails fail during lift, degraded cover block breaks during lift

Release of residual waste/contamination

U N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation of the calculations documented in RPP-13470 and the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354 (i.e., “flammable gas accident” releases and consequences bound “release from contaminated facility” releases and consequences). The offsite toxicological consequence is qualitatively based on the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on scoping calculations in RPP-13354. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria provided in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Facility workers will take self-protective actions (SWIM) and the radiation dose/exposure to toxic chemicals is not expected to cause death or require ongoing large-scale medical intervention.

The “unlikely” frequency is based on application of hoisting and rigging program requirements.

E1


Residual waste/contamination in contaminated facility

Release of residual waste/contamination due to a load handling accident (e.g., load drop) in a contaminated facility Note: Contaminated facilities include risers

All causes of load-handling accidents. For example, load drop during crane work


U N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively based on the engineering judgment that the consequences of load handling accidents in contaminated facilities are reasonably bounded/represented by a load handling accident in a waste transfer-associated structure (see RPP-13354). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are based on a qualitative evaluation considering the limited MAR and the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria provided in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Facility workers will take self-protective actions (SWIM) and the radiation dose/exposure to toxic chemicals is not expected to cause death or require ongoing large-scale medical intervention.

The “unlikely” frequency is based on application of hoisting and rigging program requirements.

E1

RCF-F-01 Release from Contaminated Facility (DSA Section 3.3.2.4.4)


Release of residual waste/contamination due to fire in a waste transfer-associated structure

All types and causes of fires. For example, electrical fires; fires due to maintenance activities (e.g., cutting, grinding, welding) and transient combustibles; vehicle fuel fires, including fires resulting from fuel leaks/spills during refueling activities; portable propane, diesel, or oil fuel fired heater fires, including fires resulting from fuel leaks/spills during refueling activities; fuel leaks/spills during refueling activities; hydraulic fluid fires; external events (e.g., range fires), natural events (e.g., lightning)


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation of the calculations documented in RPP-13470 and the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354 (i.e., “flammable gas accident” releases and consequences bound “release from contaminated facility” releases and consequences). The offsite toxicological consequence is qualitatively determined based on the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria provided in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Facility workers will take self-protective actions (SWIM) and the radiation dose/exposure to toxic chemicals is not expected to cause death or require ongoing large-scale medical intervention.

“Anticipated” is the highest frequency of the various causes of a fire.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 04-12



Release of residual waste/contamination in a contaminated facility due to fire Note: Contaminated facilities include risers, contaminated equipment, 242-S Evaporator (Hot Side), 242-T Evaporator, contaminated vehicles (e.g., cranes, core sampling trucks, support vehicles), miscellaneous inactive processing facilities, isolated and abandoned equipment, 204-AR Waste Unloading Facility, ventilation condensate systems (e.g., seal pot pit, condensate pump enclosure)

All types and causes of fires. For example, electrical fires; fires due to maintenance activities (e.g., cutting, grinding, welding) and transient combustibles; vehicle fuel fires; fuel spills during refueling activities; hydraulic fluid fires; external events (e.g., range fires), natural events (e.g., lightning)


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on the engineering judgment that the consequences of fires in contaminated facilities are reasonably bounded/represented by a fire in a waste transfer-associated structure (see RPP-13354). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on the engineering judgment that the consequences of fires in contaminated facilities are reasonably bounded/represented by a fire in a waste transfer-associated structure (see RPP-13354). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria provided in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Facility workers will take self-protective actions (SWIM) and the radiation dose/exposure to toxic chemicals is not expected to cause death or require ongoing large-scale medical intervention.

“Anticipated” is the highest frequency of the various causes of a fire.

E1


Tank waste; waste or residual contamination in the tank vault; ventilation system filters and residual contamination

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials due to a fire in a tank vault Note: Tank vaults (i.e., vaults that provide secondary confinement for tanks) includes DST annuli, DCRT vaults, 244-CR Vault cells, 244-AR Vault cells, and catch tank and IMUST vaults Note: The release includes releases from the tank due to heating of the tank waste and releases of waste or residual contamination in the cell and connected ventilation system

Fuel leak or spill into a tank vault from a vehicle or refueling accident; an ignition source is present

Release of radioactive and other hazardous material

U N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on the engineering judgment that the consequences of fires in tank vaults are reasonably bounded/represented by a fire in a waste transfer-associated structure (see RPP-13354). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on the engineering judgment that the consequences of fires in tank vaults are reasonably bounded/represented by a fire in a waste transfer-associated structure (see RPP-13354). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria provided in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Facility workers will take self-protective actions (SWIM) and the radiation dose/exposure to toxic chemicals is not expected to cause death or require ongoing large-scale medical intervention.

The “unlikely” frequency is based on the postulated accident scenario that requires: (1) a vehicle accident with fuel tank rupture or a refueling accident and spill at a specific location and (2) a fire. This frequency is consistent with the results of RPP-13261.

E1


Radioactive and other hazardous material in the vacuum retrieval vessel/pump enclosure

Release of radioactive and other hazardous material due to a fire in or involving the vessel/pump enclosure (NESL enclosure for retrieval of 241-C 200-series tanks)

All types and causes of fires. For example, vehicle fuel fire; hydraulic fluid fire

Release of radioactive and other hazardous material

U N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation of the calculations documented in RPP-13470 and the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354 (i.e., “flammable gas accident” releases and consequences bound “release from contaminated facility” releases and consequences). The offsite toxicological consequence is qualitatively determined based on the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354. Basis for NC Onsite consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria provided in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Facility workers will take self-protective actions (SWIM) and the radiation dose/exposure to toxic chemicals is not expected to cause death or require ongoing large-scale medical intervention.

“Unlikely” is the highest frequency for postulated fires. That is, a vehicle fuel fire accident scenario is “unlikely” because it requires a vehicle fuel tank rupture and fire at a specific location and the fuel entering the above grade enclosure. (Note: The “unlikely” frequency is consistent with the results of RPP-13261.) A hydraulic fluid fire is “extremely unlikely” because of the high flash point and low vapor pressure of the hydraulic fluid and the unlikely probability that a leak will go undetected in the enclosure due to design.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 04-13

RCF-CG-01 Release from Contaminated Facility (DSA Section 3.3.2.4.4)


Release of residual waste/contamination due to a compressed gas system failure (leak) in a waste transfer-associated structure Note: Compressed gas systems in waste transfer-associated structures include airlift circulator lines, weight factor dip tubes, instrument air (e.g., valves), nitrogen purge to cameras; standard gas bottles (e.g., breathing air, nitrogen, argon, calibration gases, welding gases)

All causes of compressed gas system failures (leaks). For example, human error (e.g., improper assembly); load handling accidents (e.g., load drop); pipe, jumper, or hose failure (e.g., corrosion, material defect, degradation, vibration, wear), construction or maintenance activities (e.g., pinching, mechanical impact), overpressure (e.g., failed or misadjusted pressure regulator); fire; external events (e.g., missiles); natural events (e.g., seismic) Note: Causes include liquid nitrogen leak in or flow into waste transfer-associated structure from tanker or Dewar (i.e., boiling cryogenic liquid)


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation of the calculations documented in RPP-13470 and the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354 (i.e., “flammable gas accident” releases and consequences bound “release from contaminated facility” releases and consequences). The offsite toxicological consequence is qualitatively determined based on the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria provided in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Facility workers will take self-protective actions (SWIM) and the radiation dose/exposure to toxic chemicals is not expected to cause death or require ongoing large-scale medical intervention.

“Anticipated” is the highest frequency of the causes of compressed gas system failures (leaks) in waste transfer-associated structures.

E1


Residual contamination in the contaminated facility

Release of residual contamination due to a compressed gas system failure (leak) in a contaminated facility Note: Contaminated facilities include buildings housing compressed air systems, DST leak detection pit, pipe chases, core sample trucks, 244-AR Vault Note: Compressed gas systems include compressed air systems, nitrogen systems

All causes of compressed gas system failures (leaks). For example, human error (e.g., improper assembly); load handling accidents (e.g., load drop); pipe, jumper, or hose failure (e.g., corrosion, material defect, degradation, vibration, wear), construction or maintenance activities (e.g., pinching, mechanical impact), overpressure (e.g., failed or misadjusted pressure regulator); fire; external events (e.g., missiles); natural events (e.g., seismic)

Release of residual contamination

A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on the engineering judgment that the consequences of compressed gas system failures (leaks) in contaminated facilities are reasonably bounded/represented by a compressed gas system failure (leak) in a waste transfer-associated structure (see RPP-13354). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on the engineering judgment that the consequences of compressed gas system failures (leaks) in contaminated facilities are reasonably bounded/represented by a compressed gas system failure (leak) in a waste transfer-associated structure (see RPP-13354). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria provided in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Facility workers will take self-protective actions (SWIM) and the radiation dose/exposure to toxic chemicals is not expected to cause death or require ongoing large-scale medical intervention.

“Anticipated” is the highest frequency of the causes of compressed air system failure.

E1


Residual contamination in compressed air line

Release of residual contamination due to disconnecting a compressed air system or a compressed air system failure

Disconnection of compressed air line; all causes of compressed air system failure (e.g., compressed air line/hose failure, external events)

Release of residual contamination

A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation considering the limited MAR, the calculations documented in RPP-13470, and the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354. The offsite toxicological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation considering the limited MAR and the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are based on a qualitative evaluation considering the limited MAR and the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria provided in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Facility workers will take self-protective actions (SWIM) and the radiation dose/exposure to toxic chemicals is not expected to cause death or require ongoing large-scale medical intervention.

“Anticipated” is the highest frequency of the causes of compressed air system failure.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 04-14



Release of residual waste/contamination due to a compressed air leak in a waste transfer-associated structure during compressed air blowout of a HIHTL

All causes of HIHTL primary hose failure (e.g., mechanical impact, material degradation, unidentified flaw, installation error, fabrication error), or misroute of the compressed air flow. Note: This hazardous condition does not include MAR in the HIHTL primary hose and, therefore, it applies even if a HIHTL primary hose has been flushed.


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on scoping calculations documented in RPP-37922, Appendix F. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on scoping calculations documented in RPP-37922, Appendix F. Basis for Facility Worker Consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria provided in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Facility workers will take self-protective actions (SWIM) and the radiation dose/exposure to toxic chemicals is not expected to cause death or require ongoing large-scale medical intervention.

Operational experience indicates that leaks from pressurized systems have occurred in tank farms and are “anticipated.”

E1



Release of residual waste/contamination resulting from compressed air flow into waste transfer-associated structure due to open or failed encasement drain valve during pneumatic testing of a waste transfer primary piping system encasement.

Failure to close encasement drain valve prior to pneumatic test, or all causes of encasement drain valve failure during pneumatic test.


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on scoping calculations documented in RPP-37922, Appendix F. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on scoping calculations documented in RPP-37922, Appendix F. Basis for Facility Worker Consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria provided in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Facility workers will take self-protective actions (SWIM) and the radiation dose/exposure to toxic chemicals is not expected to cause death or require ongoing large-scale medical intervention.

“Anticipated” is the highest frequency of the causes of an open encasement drain valve (due to human error) or valve failure.

E1



Release of residual waste/contamination resulting from compressed air flow into waste transfer-associated structure due to failure of waste transfer primary piping system in the structure during pneumatic testing of HIHTL and/or waste transfer primary piping system connections in tank farms (i.e., HIHTL primary hose assembly connections, HIHTL encasement hose assembly connections, or waste transfer primary piping system connections). (Note: Pneumatic testing is only allowed if the HIHTL and waste transfer primary piping systems have never been used and are not connected to HIHTL or waste transfer primary piping systems that have been used.)

All causes of waste transfer-primary piping system failure in the waste transfer-associated structure (e.g., mechanical impact, material degradation, unidentified flaw, installation error, fabrication error). Note: There is no MAR in the new, uncontaminated waste transfer systems.


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on scoping calculations documented in RPP-37922, Appendix F. (Note: The residual contamination in the waste transfer-associated structure is limited because the structure has to be decontaminated to allow workers to install the waste transfer primary piping systems whose connections are to be pneumatically tested.) Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on scoping calculations documented in RPP-37922, Appendix F. (Note: The residual contamination in the waste transfer-associated structure is limited because the structure has to be decontaminated to allow workers to install the waste transfer primary piping systems whose connections are to be pneumatically tested.) Basis for Facility Worker Consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria provided in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Facility workers will take self-protective actions (SWIM) and the radiation dose/exposure to toxic chemicals is not expected to cause death or require ongoing large-scale medical intervention.


E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 04-15

RCF-O-01 Release from Contaminated Facility (DSA Section 3.3.2.4.4)


Release of residual waste/contamination due to flooding of a contaminated facility Note: Contaminated facilities include waste transfer-associated structures, tank vaults (i.e., vaults that provide secondary confinement for tanks), 242-S Evaporator (Hot Side), 242-T Evaporator, miscellaneous inactive process facilities, 204-AR Waste Unloading Facility

All causes of flooding (e.g., fire protection system failure, water line break, rain and snow melt)


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on a qualitative evaluation considering the limited MAR and dilution from the water causing the flooding. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are based on a qualitative evaluation considering the limited MAR and dilution from the water causing the flooding. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria provided in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Facility workers will take self-protective actions (SWIM) and the radiation dose/exposure to toxic chemicals is not expected to cause death or require ongoing large-scale medical intervention.

“Anticipated” is the highest frequency of the various causes of flooding

E1

LLHM-01 Low-Level Radioactive, Hazardous, and Mixed Waste Accidents (DSA Section 3.3.2.3.1)

Low-level radioactive, hazardous, and mixed waste stored at the 616 Facility

Release of low-level radioactive, hazardous, or mixed waste due to a fire at the 616 Facility

All “operational” causes of fires. For example, spontaneous combustion, incompatible wastes, heat from the sun, waste handling or other human activities

Release of low-level radioactive, hazardous, and mixed waste

A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on the categorization of the 616 Facility as Hazard Category 3. The offsite toxicological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation considering the MAR that could be stored at the 616 Facility and involved/released in a fire. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological consequence is based on the categorization of the 616 Facility as Hazard Category 3. The onsite worker toxicological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation considering the MAR that could be stored at the 616 Facility and involved/released in a fire. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria provided in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Facility workers will take self-protective actions (SWIM) and the radiation dose/exposure to toxic chemicals is not expected to cause death or require ongoing large-scale medical intervention.

“Anticipated” is the highest frequency for fires and explosions caused by “operational” accidents

E1


Low-level radioactive, hazardous, and mixed waste stored at the 616 Facility

Release of low-level radioactive, hazardous, or mixed waste due to a fire at the 616 Facility

Fires caused by external events (e.g., range fire, aircraft crash) and natural events (e.g., lightning, seismic event) involves a significant number of waste storage containers


EU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on the categorization of the 616 Facility as Hazard Category 3. The offsite toxicological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation considering the MAR that could be stored at the 616 Facility and involved/released in a fire. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological consequence is based on the categorization of the 616 Facility as Hazard Category 3. The onsite worker toxicological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation considering the MAR that could be stored at the 616 Facility and involved/released in a fire. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria provided in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Facility workers will take self-protective actions (SWIM) and the radiation dose/exposure to toxic chemicals is not expected to cause death or require ongoing large-scale medical intervention.

Range fires initiated by external and natural events on the Hanford Site are an “anticipated” frequency event. However, the likelihood that a range fire could engulf the 616 Facility or that a fire initiated in the facility by lightning or a seismic event could result in release of low-level radioactive, hazardous, and mixed waste from a significant number of the storage containers at the 616 Facility is qualitatively determined to be “extremely unlikely,” based on the noncombustible building construction, limited combustibles within the facility, and the dispersed storage arrangement. The frequency of an aircraft crash at the 616 Facility is “beyond extremely unlikely” (see RPP-11736).

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 04-16


Low-level radioactive, hazardous, and mixed waste stored at a temporary storage location

Release of low-level radioactive, hazardous, or mixed waste due to a fire at a temporary storage location

All causes of fires. For example, spontaneous combustion, incompatible wastes, heat from the sun, waste handling or other human activities, external events (e.g., range fire, aircraft crash), natural events (e.g., lightning, seismic)


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on the categorization of the 616 Facility as Hazard Category 3. The offsite toxicological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation considering the MAR that could be stored at a temporary storage location and involved/released in a fire. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological consequence is based on the categorization of the 616 Facility as Hazard Category 3. The onsite worker toxicological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation considering the MAR that could be stored at a temporary storage location and involved/released in a fire. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria provided in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Facility workers will take self-protective actions (SWIM) and the radiation dose/exposure to toxic chemicals is not expected to cause death or require ongoing large-scale medical intervention.

“Anticipated” is the highest frequency of the various causes of a fire or explosion.

E1


Radioactive and other hazardous solid material (hazardous waste could be liquid) - Type A quantities (drums) and/or 450 kg of hazardous material (drums only)

Release of radioactive and other hazardous material from drum due to pressurized drum failure at time that pallet is moved from pad to staging area (1 drum involved of 4 on pallet)

Sealed drum and hot day or internal chemical, thermal, or radiolysis reactions (radioactive material containing drums have Nucfil vents)


U N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on a qualitative evaluation considering the limited MAR and the energy source. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are based on a qualitative evaluation considering the limited MAR and the energy source. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria provided in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Facility workers will take self-protective actions (SWIM) and the radiation dose/exposure to toxic chemicals is not expected to cause death or require ongoing large-scale medical intervention.

The “unlikely” frequency is based on operational experience.

E1


Radioactive and other hazardous solid material (hazardous waste could be liquid) - Type A quantities (boxes) and/or 2,300 kg of hazardous material (box only)

Release of radioactive and other hazardous material from box due to pressurized box failure at time that box is moved from pad to staging area (1 box involved)

Hot day or internal chemical, thermal, or radiolysis reactions


EU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on a qualitative evaluation considering the limited MAR and the energy source. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are based on a qualitative evaluation considering the limited MAR and the energy source. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria provided in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Facility workers will take self-protective actions (SWIM) and the radiation dose/exposure to toxic chemicals is not expected to cause death or require ongoing large-scale medical intervention.

The “extremely unlikely” frequency is based on operational experience.

E1



Release of radioactive and other hazardous material from drum due to drum failure resulting from vehicle fire (4 drums involved)

Equipment failure (fuel line failure, electrical shorts, etc.) resulting in fire involving radioactive/hazardous waste-containing drums




E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 04-17



Release of radioactive and other hazardous material from box due to box failure resulting from vehicle fire (2 boxes involved)

Equipment failure (fuel line failure, electrical shorts, etc.) resulting in fire involving radioactive/hazardous waste-containing boxes




E1



Release of radioactive and other hazardous material from drum due to drop of drums while moving to staging area or loading on truck (4 drums involved)

Equipment failure or operator error


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on a qualitative evaluation considering the limited MAR and the energy source. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are based on a qualitative evaluation considering the limited MAR and the energy source. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria provided in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Facility workers will take self-protective actions (SWIM) and the radiation dose/exposure to toxic chemicals is not expected to cause death or require ongoing large-scale medical intervention.

The “anticipated” frequency is based on operational experience.

E1



Release of radioactive and other hazardous material from box due to drop of box while loading on truck (1 box involved)





E1



Release of radioactive and other hazardous material from box due to drop of box while moving to staging area (2 stacked boxes involved)





E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 04-18



Release of radioactive and other hazardous material from drum due to fork lift tine puncture (2 drums involved)





E1



Release of radioactive and other hazardous material from box due to fork lift tine puncture (1 box involved)





E1



Release of radioactive and other hazardous material from drum due to random drum failure (1 drum involved)

Structural failure (random event related to age of drum or preexisting structural degradation/damage, corrosion, rust, water damage, freeze-thaw cycles, internal chemical or thermal reactions, etc.)



The “unlikely” frequency is based on tank farm operational experience (i.e., temporary storage).

E1



Release of radioactive and other hazardous material from box due to random box failure (1 box involved)

Structural failure (random event related to age of box or preexisting structural degradation/damage, corrosion, rust, water damage, freeze-thaw cycles, internal chemical or thermal reactions, etc.)




E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 04-19


Radioactive and other hazardous solid material (hazardous waste could be liquid) - Type A quantities (boxes and flexible wrap)

Release of radioactive and other hazardous material from package due to load drop from crane (involves dropped package and packages already on truck)




The “unlikely” frequency is based on tank farm operational experience

E1


Radioactive and other hazardous solid material (hazardous waste could be liquid) - Type A quantities (in drums, boxes, flex wrapped objects)

Release of radioactive and other hazardous material from package due to impact by non-involved vehicle operating in area

Equipment failure or vehicle operator error




E1


Radioactive and other hazardous solid material - Type A quantities (flex wrapped objects)

Release of radioactive and other hazardous material from package due to vehicle fire resulting from impact by non-involved vehicle operating in area

Equipment failure or vehicle operator error




E1

LLHM-18 Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Section 3.3.2.4.1)

Radioactive and other hazardous solid material (hazardous waste could be liquid) - Type A quantities (in drums or boxes)

Release of radioactive and other hazardous material from drum or box due to flammable gas deflagration

Flammable gas buildup due to venting failure with spark generated during process of moving drum or box


U N N N N N Y Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on a qualitative evaluation considering the limited MAR and the energy source. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are based on a qualitative evaluation considering the limited MAR and the energy source. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition is a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, a flammable gas deflagration in a waste drum or box could cause grievous injury or death to a facility worker due to overpressure or physical impact from SSC failure (missiles). Based on the limited MAR and facility worker self-protective actions (SWIM), the potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are not expected to exceed the 100 rem or PAC-3 thresholds, respectively. There is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.


E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 04-20


Radioactive and other hazardous solid material (hazardous waste could be liquid) - Type A quantities (in drums)

Release of radioactive and other hazardous material from drum due to drum breach when high wind causes drum to fall off truck before being secured

High wind topples drum from truck (drum not yet secured)




E1


Radioactive and other hazardous solid material (hazardous waste could be liquid) - Type A quantities (in drums and boxes)

Release of radioactive and other hazardous material due to breach resulting from wind driven missile

Wind driven missile impacts staged drum/box causing breach


EU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on a qualitative evaluation considering the limited MAR and the energy source. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are based on a qualitative evaluation considering the limited MAR and the energy source. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria provided in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Facility workers will take self-protective actions (SWIM) and the radiation dose/exposure to toxic chemicals is not expected to cause death or require ongoing large-scale medical intervention.

The “extremely unlikely” frequency is based on engineering and operational experience.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 05-1

ABD-01 Air Blow Accidents (DSA Section 3.3.2.4.5)

Residual waste in unflushed 2-inch diameter HIHTL primary hose assembly and connected waste transfer primary piping system, and residual contamination in connected waste transfer-associated structure (e.g., pit).

Release of radioactive and other hazardous material aerosols from a HIHTL primary hose assembly and connected waste transfer primary piping system, and/or a waste transfer-associated structure due to leak during compressed air blowout. Applies to: 2-in diameter HIHTL primary hose assembly and connected waste transfer primary piping system, waste transfer-associated structures (e.g., pits)

Failure of the primary hose due to all causes (e.g., mechanical impact, material degradation, unidentified flaw, installation error, fabrication error [failure not detected during waste transfers or occurs after use of HIHTL for waste transfers], or overpressure of the primary hose resulting from human error [such as obtaining the wrong compressor]).


A N N N N Y N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Offsite radiological consequence is based on qualitative analysis contained in RPP-37922, Section 1.2.3, which indicates that the representative air blow accident is bounded by the waste transfer leak accident analyzed in RPP-13750. Offsite toxicological consequence is based on scoping calculations documented in RPP-37922. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: Onsite worker radiological consequence is based on scoping calculations documented in RPP-37922. The analysis assumed a maximum volume of 122 gal of worst case tank waste in the HIHTL to be air blown (based on 1,500 ft of 2 in. diameter primary hose half full of waste); a maximum pressure of 500 lb/in2 gauge that the compressed air source can produce; and a maximum of 25 vol% of insoluble solids in the leaking waste. The toxicological consequence is based on the results of a sensitivity analysis documented in RPP-37922, Table 3-2, which showed that the onsite toxicological consequence reaches PAC-3 at higher pressures (> 500 lb/in2 gauge). Basis for Facility Worker Consequence: The impact to the facility worker resulting from the release from a failure of the primary HIHTL during compressed air blowout does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. This determination is based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of the aerosol release is limited to less than approximately 1000 mg/m3, less than 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 2.0 E+05 Sv/L; USOF of 5.0 E+08). Chemical burns caused by skin contact with caustic waste during a planned work activity (HIHTL airblow) are an occupational hazard addressed by safety management programs.

The “anticipated” frequency is based on operational experience, which indicates that leaks from pressurized systems have occurred in tank farms.

Note that a frequency of “unlikely” could be assigned for small leaks, which are assumed to have an optimal fine crack size for producing waste aerosol spray.

E1


Residual waste in unflushed 2-inch diameter HIHTL primary hose assembly and connected waste transfer primary piping system, and residual contamination in connected waste transfer-associated structure (e.g., pit).

Release of radioactive and other hazardous material aerosols from a HIHTL primary hose assembly and connected waste transfer primary piping system and/or waste transfer-associated structure due to misroute during compressed air blowout. Applies to: 2-inch diameter HIHTL primary hose assembly and connected waste transfer primary piping system, waste transfer-associated structures (e.g., pits)

Human error or failure of waste transfer system isolation valves causes a misroute of the compressed air to an unintended location.


A N N N N Y N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Offsite radiological consequence is based on qualitative analysis contained in RPP-37922, Section 1.2.3, which indicates that the representative air blow accident is bounded by the waste transfer leak accident analyzed in RPP-13750. Offsite toxicological consequence is based on scoping calculations documented in RPP-37922. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: Onsite worker radiological consequence is based on scoping calculations documented in RPP-37922. The analysis assumed a maximum volume of 122 gal of worst case tank waste in the HIHTL to be air blown (based on 1,500 ft of 2 in. diameter primary hose half full of waste); a maximum pressure of 500 lb/in2 gauge that the compressed air source can produce; and a maximum of 25 vol% of insoluble solids in the leaking waste. The toxicological consequence is based on the results of a sensitivity analysis documented in RPP-37922, Table 3-2, which showed that the onsite toxicological consequence reaches PAC-3 at higher pressures (> 500 lb/in2 gauge). Basis for Facility Worker Consequence: The impact to the facility worker resulting from the release from a misroute during compressed air blowout of a HIHTL does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. This determination is based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of the aerosol release is limited to less than approximately 1000 mg/m3, less than 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 2.0 E+05 Sv/L; USOF of 5.0 E+08). Chemical burns caused by skin contact with caustic waste during a planned work activity (HIHTL airblow) are an occupational hazard addressed by safety management programs.

The “anticipated” frequency is based on operational experience indicating that misroutes have occurred in tank farms.

Note that a frequency of “unlikely” could be assigned for small leaks, which are assumed to have an optimal fine crack size for producing waste aerosol spray.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 05-2


DST waste supernatant Release of radioactive and other hazardous material aerosols from a DST headspace due to compressed air blowout through HIHTL flow path that terminates below the waste level in the receiving tank. As the compressed air bubbles up through the supernatant, it entrains supernatant. Some of this supernatant aerosol is then swept out of the DST headspace by the DST ventilation system (no filtration assumed). Applies to: HIHTL, DSTs

As part of an air blowout operation, compressed air may be directed into a DST and released below the supernatant waste surface – planned operation.


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Offsite radiological consequence is based on qualitative analysis contained in RPP-37922, Section 1.2.3, which indicates that the representative air blow accident is bounded by the waste transfer leak accident analyzed in RPP-13750. Offsite toxicological consequence is qualitatively assigned based on scoping calculations documented in RPP-37922. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: Onsite worker radiological consequence is qualitatively assigned based on scoping calculations documented in RPP-37922. Onsite worker toxicological consequence is qualitatively assigned based on scoping calculations contained in RPP-37922. The analysis is not sensitive to air compressor performance (pressure or flow rate) because all calculated consequence values are more than three orders of magnitude below guidelines. Basis for Facility Worker Consequence: The impact to the facility worker resulting from the release from a DST headspace during compressed air blowout of a HIHTL does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria provided in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. This determination is based on the aerosol release rate for compressed air bubbling below the liquid level as calculated in RPP-37922 Appendix G (4.055E-11 m3/sec), a release time of 15 min, a dilution volume of 1000 m3, reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 2.0 E+05 Sv/L; USOF of 5.0 E+08), and since the aerosol concentration is so low, the facility worker is assumed to be exposed for 8 hr. There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “anticipated” frequency is based on air blowing into the DST below the waste surface being a planned activity.

E1

ABD-03-UX-302A Air Blow Accidents (DSA Section 3.3.2.4.5)

241-UX-302A waste Release of radioactive and other hazardous material aerosols from Polar Tanker headspace due to compressed air blowout through overground hose flow path that terminates below the waste level in the tanker. As the compressed air bubbles up through the waste, it entrains radioactive and other hazardous materials. Some of this waste aerosol is then swept out of the Polar Tanker headspace by pressure of the compressed air (no filtration assumed). Applies to: 241-UX-302A waste transfer.

Failed HEPA filter on Polar Tanker allows unfiltered release of compressed air blowdown. As part of an air blowout operation, compressed air will be directed into the polar tanker which has a configuration that releases the air below the waste surface ‒ planned operation.


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Offsite radiological consequence is based on qualitative analysis contained in RPP-37922, Section 1.2.3, which indicates that the representative air blow accident is bounded by the waste transfer leak accident analyzed in RPP-13750. Offsite toxicological consequence is qualitatively assigned based on scoping calculations documented in RPP-37922, Appendix G. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: Onsite worker radiological consequence was qualitatively assigned based on scoping calculations documented in RPP-37922, Appendix G. Onsite worker toxicological consequence is qualitatively assigned based on scoping calculations contained in RPP-37922, Appendix G. The analysis is not sensitive to air compressor performance (pressure or flow rate) because all calculated consequence values are more than three orders of magnitude below guidelines. Basis for Facility Worker Consequence: The impact to the facility worker resulting from release of radioactive and other hazardous material aerosols from the Polar Tanker headspace does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria provided in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. This determination is based on the aerosol release rate for compressed air bubbling below the liquid level as calculated in RPP-37922, Appendix G (4.055E-11 m3/sec), a release time of 15 min, a dilution volume of 1000 m3, reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 2.0 E+05 Sv/L; USOF of 5.0 E+08), and since the aerosol concentration is so low, the facility worker is assumed to be exposed for 8 hr. There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “anticipated” frequency is based on air blowing into the Polar Tanker below the waste surface being a planned activity.

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 05-3


Radioactive or hazardous material in RCSTS encasement line (approximately 8 miles of pressurized piping which is considered to contain some residual leakage from the primary pipeline)

Release of radioactive and other hazardous material due to RCSTS encasement breach and inert nitrogen blowdown (de-pressurization) Applies to: RCSTS encasement in line WT-SNL-3150 Note: Only the supernate line (WT-SNL-3150) is currently authorized for use.

Leakage of low pressure inert nitrogen atmosphere maintained on encasement to the atmosphere (all causes)

Spread of residual waste or contamination present and/or worker exposure

A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Offsite radiological consequence is based on qualitative analysis contained in RPP-37922, Section 1.2.3, which indicates that the representative air blow accident is bounded by the waste transfer leak accident analyzed in RPP-13750. Offsite toxicological consequence is qualitatively assigned based on scoping calculations contained in RPP-37922, Appendix H. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: Onsite worker radiological consequence is qualitatively assigned based on scoping calculations contained in RPP-37922, Appendix H. Onsite worker toxicological consequence is qualitatively assigned based on scoping calculations contained in RPP-37922, Appendix H. Based on the analyses presented in RPP-37922, Appendix H, the consequences of a 1 gal leak of waste (the base case assumes worst case tank farm liquid waste and worst case West Area tank farm solid waste) from an RCSTS encasement pressurized with up to 10 lb/in2 of nitrogen pressure will be below onsite radiological and toxicological guidelines. Release of over 2750 gal of waste from an RCSTS encasement would be required to exceed onsite toxicological guidelines. Basis for Facility Worker Consequence: The impact to the facility worker resulting from the release from a RCSTS encasement breach and inert nitrogen de-pressurization does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria provided in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Based on the analysis in RPP-37922, Appendix H, any significant amounts of waste that might accumulate in the encasement segments would drain to and collect at the low points in the RCSTS. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. This determination is based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of the aerosol release is limited to less than approximately 1000 mg/m3, less than 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 2.0 E+05 Sv/L; USOF of 5.0 E+08). The frequency of an encasement cover gas leak that includes residual liquid waste when a worker is present is “beyond extremely unlikely.” The remaining criteria are not applicable.


E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 05-4


Residual waste in waste transfer primary piping system

Release of radioactive and other hazardous material aerosol from waste transfer primary piping system during pneumatic testing of a waste transfer primary piping system encasement due to the pressure in the encasement increasing to a point where the primary pipe is breached, leading to pressurization of the primary piping system. Residual waste is then expelled from the primary through a separate leak location. (High pressure spray leak) Applies to: Waste transfer primary piping system encasements being pneumatically tested

Either human error or equipment failure causes pressure in encasement to rise high enough to damage primary line

Pressurized leak of residual waste from the primary line

EU N N N N Y N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Consequences are qualitatively judged to be bounded by ABD-01. In particular, ABD-01 assumes there is 122 gal of residual waste remaining in the line. This assumption is made for ABD-01 because HIHTLs follow the contour of the ground, and therefore may not be self-draining following a waste transfer. Hazardous condition ABD-05 is concerned with waste transfer primary piping systems, which are sloped for drainage. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: Consequences are qualitatively judged to be bounded by ABD-01. In particular, ABD-01 assumes there is 122 gal of residual waste remaining in the line. This assumption is made for ABD-01 because HIHTLs follow the contour of the ground, and therefore may not be self-draining following a waste transfer. Hazardous condition ABD-05 is concerned with waste transfer primary piping systems, which are sloped for drainage. Basis for Facility Worker Consequence: Consequences are qualitatively judged to be bounded by ABD-01. In particular, ABD-01 assumes there is 122 gal of residual waste remaining in the line. This assumption is made for ABD-01 because HIHTLs follow the contour of the ground, and therefore may not be self-draining following a waste transfer. Hazardous condition ABD-05 is concerned with waste transfer primary piping systems, which are sloped for drainage.

The “extremely unlikely” frequency is based on all of the following conditions occurring during the pneumatic testing: (1) the encasement test pressure exceeds the pressure required to fail the primary piping (see the Note below); (2) there is significant MAR in the primary piping because the primary piping was not drained or flushed; and (3) the waste release is an “unlikely” fine spray leak (i.e., an optimal size crack is assumed) because this is the only waste release that can result in onsite worker consequences exceeding the PAC-3 evaluation guideline. Note: The encasement test pressure (i.e., the encasement design pressure plus 10%) is significantly below the design pressure of the waste transfer primary piping system design pressure. For waste transfer primary piping systems with encasements that require pneumatic testing, except for the two fiberglass-filled composite waste transfer lines from the 222-S Laboratory (SNL-5350 and SNL-5351), the encasement test pressure is 60 lb/in2 gauge plus 10% versus a primary piping design pressure of 275 lb/in2 gauge or 400 lb/in2 gauge. For waste transfer lines SNL-5350 and SNL-5351 from the 222-S Laboratory, the encasement test pressure is 10 lb/in2 gauge plus 10% versus a primary piping design pressure of 125 lb/in2 gauge.

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 05-5



Release of radioactive and other hazardous material aerosol from waste transfer primary piping system during pneumatic testing of a waste transfer primary piping system encasement with a pre-existing breech between the primary pipe and the encasement that allows pressurization of the primary during encasement testing. Residual waste is then expelled from the primary through a separate leak location. (High pressure spray leak) Applies to: Waste transfer primary piping system encasements being pneumatically tested

Pre-existing breech between primary line and encasement together with a leak path for pressurized waste from primary line to the environment.

Pressurized leak of residual waste from the primary line

EU N N N N Y N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Consequences are qualitatively judged to be bounded by ABD-01. In particular, ABD-01 assumes there is 122 gal of residual waste remaining in the line. This assumption is made for ABD-01 because HIHTLs follow the contour of the ground, and therefore may not be self-draining following a waste transfer. Hazardous condition ABD-06 is concerned with waste transfer primary piping systems, which are sloped for drainage. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: Consequences are qualitatively judged to be bounded by ABD-01. In particular, ABD-01 assumes there is 122 gal of residual waste remaining in the line. This assumption is made for ABD-01 because HIHTLs follow the contour of the ground, and therefore may not be self-draining following a waste transfer. Hazardous condition ABD-06 is concerned with waste transfer primary piping systems, which are sloped for drainage. Basis for Facility Worker Consequence: Consequences are qualitatively judged to be bounded by ABD-01. In particular, ABD-01 assumes there is 122 gal of residual waste remaining in the line. This assumption is made for ABD-01 because HIHTLs follow the contour of the ground, and therefore may not be self-draining following a waste transfer. Hazardous condition ABD-06 is concerned with waste transfer primary piping systems, which are sloped for drainage.

The “extremely unlikely” frequency is based on all of the following conditions occurring during the pneumatic testing: (1) the primary piping is failed; (2) there is significant MAR in the primary piping because the primary piping was not drained or flushed; and (3) for the onsite worker consequences to exceed the PAC-3 evaluation guideline, the waste release is an “unlikely” fine spray leak (i.e., an optimal size crack is assumed) and the encasement test pressure exceeds the minimum pressure required for a fine spray leak (i.e., approximately 420 ft of head or approximately 240 lb/in2 gauge assuming a specific gravity of 1.3 – see RPP-13750 Figure 6) Note: The encasement test pressure is the encasement design pressure plus 10%. For all waste transfer primary piping systems with encasements that require pneumatic testing, except for the two fiberglass-filled composite waste transfer lines from the 222-S Laboratory (SNL-5350 and SNL-5351), the encasement test pressure is 60 lb/in2 gauge plus 10%. For waste transfer lines SNL-5350 and SNL-5351 from the 222-S Laboratory, the encasement test pressure is 10 lb/in2 gauge plus 10%.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 05-6



Release of radioactive and other hazardous material aerosol from waste transfer primary piping system during pneumatic testing of a waste transfer primary piping system encasement due to the pressure in the encasement increasing to a point where the primary pipe is breeched. Air flows into the primary pipe but the primary pipe has an open flow path and therefore does not become pressurized internally. Residual waste is expelled from the primary through a separate leak location to the environment. (Low pressure leak) Applies to: Waste transfer primary piping system encasements being pneumatically tested

Either human error or equipment failure causes pressure in the encasement to rise high enough to damage the primary line.

Low pressure leak of residual waste from the primary line

U N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Based on the bounding waste transfer leak accident analysis in RPP-13750, offsite evaluation guidelines are not exceeded. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: Based on the bounding waste transfer leak accident analyses in RPP-13750, onsite worker evaluation guidelines can only potentially be exceeded by a fine spray leak. Basis for Facility Worker Consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of the non-fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 100 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). Chemical burns caused by skin contact with caustic waste during a planned work activity (pneumatic testing of a waste transfer primary piping system encasement) are an occupational hazard addressed by safety management programs. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “unlikely” frequency is based on the following conditions occurring during the pneumatic testing: (1) the encasement test pressure exceeds the pressure required to fail the primary piping system (see the Note below); and (2) the primary piping has an open path to the environment. Note: The encasement test pressure (i.e., the encasement design pressure plus 10%) is significantly below the design pressure of the waste transfer primary piping system design pressure. For waste transfer primary piping systems with encasements that require pneumatic testing, except for the two fiberglass-filled composite waste transfer lines from the 222-S Laboratory (SNL-5350 and SNL-5351), the encasement test pressure is 60 lb/in2 gauge plus 10% versus a primary piping system design pressure of 275 lb/in2 gauge or 400 lb/in2 gauge. For waste transfer lines SNL-5350 and SNL-5351 from the 222-S Laboratory, the encasement test pressure is 10 lb/in2 gauge plus 10% versus a primary piping system design pressure of 125 lb/in2 gauge.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 05-7



Release of radioactive and other hazardous material aerosol from waste transfer primary piping system during pneumatic testing of a waste transfer primary piping system encasement with a pre-existing breech between the primary pipe and the encasement. Air flows into the primary pipe but the primary pipe has an open flow path and therefore does not become pressurized internally. Residual waste is expelled from the primary through a separate leak location to the environment. (Low pressure leak) Applies to: Waste transfer primary piping system encasements being pneumatically tested

Pre-existing breech between primary line and encasement together with a leak path for waste from primary line to the environment.

Low pressure leak of residual waste from the primary line

EU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Based on the bounding waste transfer leak accident analysis in RPP-13750, offsite evaluation guidelines are not exceeded. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: Based on the bounding waste transfer leak accident analyses in RPP-13750, onsite worker evaluation guidelines can only potentially be exceeded by a fine spray leak. Basis for Facility Worker Consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of the non-fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 100 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 100,000 Sv/L; USOF of 1 E+08). Chemical burns caused by skin contact with caustic waste during a planned work activity (pneumatic testing of a waste transfer primary piping system encasement) are an occupational hazard addressed by safety management programs. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “extremely unlikely” frequency is based on the following conditions occurring during the pneumatic testing: (1) the primary piping is failed; and (2) the primary piping has another open path to the environment.

E1


Residual waste remaining in waste transfer primary piping system encasement

Release of radioactive and other hazardous material aerosol from waste transfer primary piping system encasement during pneumatic testing of the encasement due to a pressurized air leak. The leak releases air and residual waste to the environment. Applies to: Waste transfer primary piping system encasements being pneumatically tested

Either human error or equipment failure creates a leak in the encasement to the environment during the time the encasement is pressurized.

Pressurized leak of residual waste from the encasement

A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively assigned based on the limited material at risk in the encasement. The material at risk is limited based on WAC 173-303-640 requirements that waste that leaks into the encasement be detected and cleaned up. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: Onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively assigned based on the limited material at risk in the encasement. The material at risk is limited based on WAC 173-303-640 requirements that waste that leaks into the encasement be detected and cleaned up. Basis for Facility Worker Consequence: The impact to the facility worker resulting from a release from a pressurized encasement during pneumatic testing does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. This determination is based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of the aerosol release is limited to less than approximately 1000 mg/m3, less than 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 2.0 E+05 Sv/L; USOF of 5.0 E+08). Chemical burns caused by skin contact with caustic waste during a planned work activity (pneumatic testing of a waste transfer primary piping system encasement) are an occupational hazard addressed by safety management programs. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

Creation of a pressurized air leak by equipment failure or human error is judged to be “anticipated.”

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 05-8


Residual waste in jumper that connects pump AN02A-WT-P-004 to the slurry distributor

Release of radioactive and other hazardous material aerosol from jumper that connects pump AN02A-WT-P-004 to the slurry distributor during air blowout. The leak releases air and residual waste to the environment. Applies to: Jumper that connects pump AN02A-WT-P-004 to the slurry distributor during air blowout that occurs as part of DST 241-AN-102 caustic addition governed by procedure TO-020-936

Failure of the jumper due to all causes (e.g., material degradation, unidentified flaw, [failure not detected during flush that precedes the air blowout], or overpressure of jumper from human error [such as obtaining the wrong compressor]).

Pressurized leak of residual waste from jumper

U N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively assigned based on the limited material at risk in the jumper. The material at risk is limited based on the fact that the jumper is self-draining and of limited length. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: Onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively assigned based on the limited material at risk in the jumper. The material at risk is limited based on the fact that the jumper is self-draining and of limited length. Basis for Facility Worker Consequence: The impact to the facility worker resulting from a release from the jumper during air blowout does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. This determination is based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of the aerosol release is limited to less than approximately 1000 mg/m3, less than 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 2.0 E+05 Sv/L; USOF of 5.0 E+08). Chemical burns caused by skin contact with caustic waste during a planned work activity (air blowout of the jumper that connects pump AN02A-WT-P-004 to the slurry distributor) are an occupational hazard addressed by safety management programs. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

Because the jumper will be flushed prior to initiating any air blowouts, which will demonstrate that there is an open flow path, creation of a pressurized air leak by equipment failure or human error is judged to be “unlikely.”

Also note that leak detection in the pit is required so any gross failures of the jumper during the flush (resulting in leakage) should be detected prior to commencing the air blowout.

E1


Flush water and residual contamination remaining in waste transfer primary piping system encasements for lines SL-167 and SL-168.

Release of flush water and residual contamination from a primary piping system encasement during compressed air blowout performed to evaporate the residual flush water from the encasements. Applies to: Primary piping encasements for lines SL-167 and SL-168 where flush water was inadvertently introduced during COB removal. (This is expected to be a one-time activity for each encasement.)

Above grade leak (all causes) from the encasement during blowout.

Release of flush water and residual contamination to the atmosphere

A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively assigned based on the limited material at risk in the encasement. The material at risk is limited based on WAC 173-303-640 requirements that waste that leaks into the encasement be detected and cleaned up. Also, swabs taken of the encasements did not show any contamination above background. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: Onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively assigned based on the limited material at risk in the encasement. The material at risk is limited based on WAC 173-303-640 requirements that waste that leaks into the encasement be detected and cleaned up. Also, swabs taken of the encasements did not show any contamination above background. Basis for Facility Worker Consequence: The impact to the facility worker resulting from a release from the SL-167 or SL-168 encasement during compressed air blowout does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. This determination is based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of the aerosol release is limited to less than approximately 1000 mg/m3, less than 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 2.0 E+05 Sv/L; USOF of 5.0 E+08). Chemical burns caused by skin contact with caustic waste during a planned work activity (air blowout of Sl-167 or SL-168 encasement) are an occupational hazard addressed by safety management programs. The remaining criteria are not applicable.


E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 05-9


Waste from catch tank 241-UX-302A

A leak in the waste transfer route during flushing and blowdown of the 241-UX-302A pump discharge assembly including filter housing.

Any cause of a leak in the waste transfer route during flushing and blowdown of the 241-UX-302A pump discharge assembly including filter housing.

Release of material being pumped from catch tank 241-UX-302A to the environment.

A N N N N N N Basis for NC consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on calculations presented in RPP-52288. Basis for NC On site Worker consequence: The onsite radiological consequence is based on calculations presented in RPP-52288. This document assumed 60 gal. of waste is available to leak, and that the waste is 241-UX-302A waste containing 10 vol% solids. Flushing of the 241-UX-302A pump discharge assembly is limited to 60 to 100 gal. of raw water at 75 to 90 psig. Compressor output is limited to 35 to 45 psig (maximum 150 psig). The event analyzed in RPP-52288 bounds the flushing and blowdown of the 241-UX-302A pump discharge assembly to the Polar Tanker. The conclusion is that a compressed air pressure of more than 1300 psig would be required to exceed onsite radiological or toxicological guidelines. While the precise maximum pressure that a portable compressor can produce is not known, it is judged that the maximum pressure is well below 1300 psig. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F and based on the judgment that the aerosol that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of the fine spray leak is limited to less than approximately 1000 mg/m3, < 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and the benign radiological and toxicological properties of the 241-UX-302A waste material. There is no significant potential for chemical burns because the pH of the 241-UX-302A waste material has been measured as approximately 8. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “anticipated” frequency is based on operational experience, which indicates that leaks from pressurized systems have occurred at tank farms.

El


Residual 241-UX-302A waste material in hose and tank headspace aerosols.

Leak in transfer line within the 241-UX-302 headspace during blow down of transfer line.

Any cause of a leak in the waste retrieval hose during compressed air blowing of the retrieval line.

Potential pressurization of the 241-UX-302A catch tank resulting in: Unfiltered release of tank headspace atmosphere. Damage to catch tank.

A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on being bounded by hazardous condition WTL-E-0la. This hazardous condition assumes that a high pressure waste transfer pump is pumping worst case tank waste through the headspace of a ventilated DST, when a leak occurs and a large amount of waste aerosol is released into the headspace and blown out by the ventilation system. The accident is assumed to continue for 2 hrs. Offsite radiological and toxicological consequences for the WTL-E-0la accident are below guidelines. It is unlikely that the 241-UX-302A catch tank can retain any significant pressure, but if it can, it might be possible to pressurize the tank and damage it so as to produce a leak of 241-UX-302A material to the surrounding soil (it is a direct-buried tank). The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences for this accident scenario are bounded by hazardous condition WTL-B-07, which includes an underground leak from a catch tank. Offsite radiological and toxicological consequences for WTL-B-07 are below guidelines. Basis for NC On site Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on being bounded by hazardous condition WTL-E-0la. This hazardous condition assumes that a high pressure waste transfer pump is pumping worst case tank waste through the headspace of a ventilated DST, when a leak occurs and a large amount of waste aerosol is released into the headspace and blown out by the ventilation system. The accident is assumed to continue for 2 hrs. Onsite radiological and toxicological consequences for the WTL-E-01a accident are below guidelines. It is unlikely that the 241-UX-302A catch tank can retain any significant pressure, but if it can, it might be possible to pressurize the tank and damage it so as to produce a leak of 241-UX-302A material to the surrounding soil (it is a direct-buried tank). The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences for this accident scenario are bounded by hazardous condition WTL-B-07, which includes an underground leak from a catch tank. Onsite radiological and toxicological radiological consequences for WTL-B-07 are below guidelines. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The facility worker consequences for this hazardous condition are bounded by those for WTL-E- 0la and WTL-B-07, both of which state that the potential hazardous condition is not a significant facility worker hazard.

The “anticipated” frequency is based on operational experience, which indicates that leaks from pressurized systems have occurred at tank farms.

El

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 06-1

Aircraft-1 External Events ‒ Aircraft Crash (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.6 and 3.4.2.3)

Radioactive waste in underground storage tanks Applies to: Stored waste

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from an underground storage tank when struck by aircraft. Applies to: DSTs, SSTs, DCRTs, catch tanks, and IMUSTs.

General aviation aircraft strikes an underground tank. Applies to: Not caused by any activity under the control of the TOC.

Release of radioactive and/or hazardous material to atmosphere Primary consequence to workers results from airplane impact and subsequent hazards (e.g., fire/explosion, flying debris) directly associated with and immediately following the crash

EU N N N/A N/A N/A N/A Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is calculated in RPP-12683, Offsite Radiological Consequence Analysis for the Bounding Aircraft Crash Accident. The bounding scenario assumes a general aviation aircraft crashes directly into one tank. Mechanical impact causes dome collapse and aircraft fuel spreads across waste surface and burns. A Raytheon Aircraft 2001 King Air B200, formerly the Beechcraft B200, was selected as the bounding general aviation aircraft and is assumed to have a fully loaded weight of 12,500 lb (the upper weight limit for general aviation aircraft) and a maximum fuel load of 544 gal (1,654 kg). Consequences are dominated by the release caused by the burning fuel (all of which is assumed to burn) which is assumed to aerosolize the worst-case (i.e., highest ULD) sludge. For the dome collapse consequences, RPP-12683 uses the bound source term volume calculated in RPP-12444, Technical Basis for the Tank Failure Due to Excessive Loads Representative Accident. The consequence calculations are for a DST, which bounds the consequences for a SST, and are qualitatively judged to bound those for the DCRTs, catch tanks, and IMUSTs which have been removed from service (i.e., no further waste additions are allowed) and thus have limited inventory, and radiological source terms that are less than the worst-case sludge evaluated for the DST. Offsite toxicological consequences are not calculated. Per DOE-STD-3014-96, Accident Analysis for Aircraft Crash into Hazardous Facilities, Section 1.3, the standard is only applicable for chemicals when the facility contains hazardous chemicals in quantities that make it subject to the requirements of 29 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 1910.119 or the facility contains hazardous chemicals that make it subject to the requirements of the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Risk Management Program (40 CFR 68). Tank Farms is not subject to either 29 CFR 1910.119 or 40 CFR 68 so there is no requirement to calculate offsite toxicological consequences. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: Per the guidance in DOE-STD-3014-96, Appendix A, Section A.1.2, the onsite consequences of an aircraft accident are only evaluated in unique cases. The rationale provided in DOE-STD-3014-96 is that the level of damage at the facility itself would, with high probability, result in death or serious injury to occupants of the facility or neighboring areas directly affected by the crash and associated debris. In light of these high probability (and severe) consequences, exposure to hazardous material release is unlikely to add significantly to the workers’ overall risk from the accident. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: Rationale for not requiring evaluation of facility worker consequences is provided above.

Event frequency was developed following the methodology established in DOE-STD-3014-96 and is documented in RPP-11736, Assessment of Aircraft Crash Frequency for the Hanford Site 200 Area Tank Farms. Because the SSTs and DSTs are considered cumulatively (i.e., the effective area of all 177 tanks was considered), the frequency of an aircraft crash impacting either a DST or an SST was determined to be “extremely unlikely.” This frequency is dominated by general aviation aircraft (6.55E-06/yr out of the total frequency of 6.86E-06/yr which included commercial and military aircraft and helicopters) and therefore the consequence analysis assumed the crash involved a general aviation aircraft. Because of the limited size of a general aviation aircraft (representative wingspan is 50 ft per Table B-16 in DOE-STD-3014-96 and the total weight is 12,500 lb), the separation among individual DSTs/SSTs, and the structural robustness of the DSTs/SSTs a general aviation crash into two or more tanks that produced significant consequences (i.e., dome collapse of two or more DSTs/SSTs and waste aerosolization from burning fuel) is qualitatively judged to be “beyond extremely unlikely.”

E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 06-2

Aircraft-1 (cont)

External Events ‒ Aircraft Crash (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.6 and 3.4.2.3)

Although only DSTs and SSTs are specifically evaluated in RPP-11736 the frequency results can be extended to include the other underground tanks. Rationale is that inclusion of other tanks (< 177 tanks each of which has a diameter < 75 ft used to represent DSTs/SSTs) would not affect the EU frequency (6.86E-6/yr based on 177 DSTs/SSTs).


Radioactive waste in aboveground tank farm facilities Applies to: Stored and/or residual waste

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from an aboveground tank farms facility. Applies to: 204-AR Waste Unloading Facility, 242-S Evaporator [Hot Side], 244-AR Vault, and the 244-CR Vault. DOE-STD-3014-96 is applicable to Hazard Category 1 and 2 facilities and facilities that contain hazardous chemicals in quantities that make it subject to the requirements of 29 CFR 1910.119 or 40 CFR 68. The 242-T Evaporator, and the 616 Facility are Hazard Category 3 facilities and are not subject to either 29 CFR 1910.119 or 40 CFR 68.

General aviation aircraft strikes an aboveground tank farm facility. Applies to: Not caused by any activity under the control of the TOC.

Not evaluated because of low frequency

BEU N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Per DOE-STD-3014-96 aircraft crashes with a frequency < 10-6/yr require no further analysis. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: Per DOE-STD-3014-96 aircraft crashes with a frequency < 10-6/yr require no further analysis. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: Per DOE-STD-3014-96 aircraft crashes with a frequency < 10-6/yr require no further analysis.

RPP-11736 evaluated a representative aboveground facility (204-AR Waste Unloading Facility) and concluded that the frequency of the aircraft crash was 1.56E-7/yr. It is qualitatively judged that, based on this frequency being representative of the other three aboveground facilities that were not specifically analyzed in RPP-11736, the cumulative frequency is “BEU.”

N/A

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 06-3


Liquid radioactive waste being transferred Applies to: Waste being transferred (i.e., pumped or gravity transfer)

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from a waste transfer. Applies to: All active waste transfer systems including those connected to the 242-A Evaporator and the 222-S Laboratory

General aviation aircraft strikes a part of a waste transfer system while a transfer is ongoing. Applies to: Not caused by any activity under the control of the TOC.

Not evaluated because of low frequency

BEU N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Per DOE-STD-3014-96 aircraft crashes with a frequency < 10-6/yr require no further analysis. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: Per DOE-STD-3014-96 aircraft crashes with a frequency < 10-6/yr require no further analysis. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: Per DOE-STD-3014-96 aircraft crashes with a frequency < 10-6/yr require no further analysis.

RPP-11736 determined that the frequency of an airplane crash into a DST/SST is “extremely unlikely.” This frequency is based on the effective area of all 177 tanks and the reality that the material-at-risk is always present. Intermittent activities such as waste transfers, where significant material-at-risk is not always present in the potentially impacted system, were not specifically evaluated in RPP-11736. However, it is qualitatively judged that the frequency of an aircraft crashing into some portion of a transfer route when waste is being transferred is “beyond extremely unlikely.” This judgment is based on the duration and geographic footprint of waste transfers, where longer duration transfers (i.e., SST retrievals) involve an SST and nearby DST and thus have a small geographic footprint, while the waste transfer system with the largest geographic footprint, the replacement cross-site transfer system, is not frequently used (i.e., 0 - 2 times per year with transfer durations typically ranging from a week to 10 days). In addition, there are rarely more than two concurrent waste transfers occurring at any given time.

N/A

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 07-1

TFDEL-01 Tank Failure Due to Excessive Loads (DSA Section 3.3.2.3.1)

Waste contents of the DST or SST

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials to the atmosphere through a failed tank dome Applies to: DST, 100-Series SST, 200-Series SST

Excessive concentrated load applied to tank dome (e.g., vehicles, temporary or permanent concentrated loads).

Release of tank waste aerosols to atmosphere.

U N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The radiological consequence of DST/SST dome failure due to excessive concentrated loads was estimated in calculations presented in RPP-12444, Appendix A. The toxicological consequence is also estimated in RPP-12444, Appendix A. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The consequence of excessive concentrated loads was estimated in scoping calculations presented in RPP-12444, Appendix A. The analysis assumes: • A DST filled to 460 inches (a range of waste levels from 25 in. to 460 in. were analyzed

with the worst onsite radiological consequences occurring at 25 in. while the worst onsite toxicological consequences occur at 460 in.)

• the largest credible concentrated load placed directly on top of the waste tank (150-Ton Linkbelt Crawler – total weight with load rounded to 300 tons),

Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F assuming a release amount of 1.0 E-02 L in the first 60 seconds of the event (derived from RPP-12444); a dilution volume of 1000 m3; 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area; and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 2.0 E+05 Sv/L and USOF of 6.0 E+07 [both values from RPP-12444]). This conclusion is not sensitive to these assumptions. Even though the DSTs and SSTs contain high pH, caustic solutions, there is no significant potential for chemical burns to the facility worker from the failure of the tank domes unless the worker is within the vehicle causing the dome failure (in which case, he would be killed from the fall into the tank). The remaining criteria of Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F are not applicable.

The frequency of the dome failure due to excessive concentrated load is estimated to be “unlikely,” based the evidence of a robust design for the waste tanks.

E3

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 07-2



Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials to the atmosphere through a failed tank dome, or dome perforation. Applies to: DSTs, 100 series SSTs, or 200 series SSTs. Also applies to: Vehicles driving off of ramps into pits.

Load dropped onto tank dome or vehicles driving off of ramps into pits.

Releases of tank waste aerosols to atmosphere.

U N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The radiological consequence of DST/SST dome failure due to excessive concentrated loads was estimated in calculations presented in RPP-12444, Appendix A. Section 4.2 of RPP-12444 states that this consequence bounds that of dome failure from load drop events. Offsite radiological consequences for perforation events are analyzed in RPP-12444, Appendix B but are bounded by those produced by dome failures from excessive concentrated loads. The toxicological consequence is estimated in scoping calculations presented in RPP-12444, Appendix A. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The consequence of load drop events causing tank dome failure is discussed in RPP-12444, Section 4.2. This section states that the consequence of a tank dome failure due to a load drop is bounded by the consequence of a tank dome failure due to excessive concentrated load. Onsite radiological and toxicological consequences for perforation events are analyzed in RPP-12444, Appendix B but are bounded by those produced by dome failures from excessive concentrated loads. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The facility worker consequences for this event are bounded by those of TFDEL-01. Therefore, there are no significant facility worker hazards associated with this hazardous condition.

COA-AMTF-08-01-Rev-0 of 08-TED-009 gives ORP concurrence with the consideration of load drops to be “unlikely,” based on the evidence of robust implementation and inherent nature of the Hoisting & Rigging Safety Management Program. This, combined with the robust nature of a structurally sound tank, and the fact that the drop would have to occur within a “vulnerable” area (i.e., without the high degree of earth over-fill such as a pit), gives an overall frequency of a dropped load perforating or failing a tank dome of “extremely unlikely.” Dome failure/perforation caused by vehicle drops into pits are considered to be “unlikely” based the evidence of a robust design for the waste tanks. The “unlikely” frequency is also based on the frequency of the evaluation basis seismic event (“unlikely”) as an initiator of a load drop.

E3

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 07-3



Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials to the atmosphere through a failed tank dome. Applies to: DST, 100-Series SST, or 200-series SST

Excessive uniform load applied to tank dome through either excess soil or other external loading (snow, water ponding, or ash fall), or excessive vacuum in the tank for any reason (e.g., incorrect ventilation system valving, incorrect portable ventilation system, quenching of hot tank contents through addition of cold waste or flush water).


BEU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The radiological consequence of DST/SST dome failure due to excessive concentrated loads was estimated in scoping calculations presented in RPP-12444, Appendix A. Section 4.3 of RPP-12444 states that this consequence bounds that of excessive uniform loads because the uniform load (i.e., the ~27 ft of soil estimated to cause a dome collapse) would suppress potential releases. The toxicological consequence was estimated in RPP-12444, Section 4.3 which states that the consequence of a dome failure due to excessive concentrated load would bound that of the failure due to excessive uniform load. Consequences for the dome failure from excessive vacuum would also be bounded by the consequence due to excessive concentrated load because this consequence includes the impact energy of the 300 ton load falling into the tank while the excessive vacuum scenario does not. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The consequence of tank dome failure due to excessive uniform load is discussed in RPP-12444, Section 4.3. This section states that the consequence would be bounded by that for tank dome collapse due to excessive concentrated load. The large soil cover would suppress waste aerosol releases. Consequences for the dome failure from excessive vacuum would also be bounded by the consequence due to excessive concentrated load because this consequence includes the impact energy of the 300 ton load falling into the tank while the excessive vacuum scenario does not. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The facility worker consequences for this event are bounded by those of TFDEL-01. Therefore, there are no significant facility worker hazards associated with this hazardous condition.

The frequency of the dome failure due to excessive uniform load was estimated as “Beyond Extremely Unlikely” due to the robust nature of the waste tanks and the low amount of loading on the domes relative to that required to exceed the structural capacity of the waste tanks. Similarly, the frequency of tank dome failure due to excessive vacuum was estimated as “Beyond Extremely Unlikely” because of the robust nature of the waste tanks and the ability of the DST secondary tank and SST to withstand the projected vacuums. (Note: common mode failure hazardous conditions were evaluated for failures of multiple tanks due to excess vacuum conditions for cascaded SSTs – the frequency of these events were considered to be bounded by the frequency given here for the single tank event (i.e., BEU) due to the fact that it’s less likely for the event to affect two tanks than for one.)

E3



Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials to the atmosphere through a cracked tank dome. Applies to: DST, 100-Series SST, or 200-series SST

Seismic event Releases of tank waste aerosols to atmosphere.

U N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The radiological consequence of DST/SST dome failure due to excessive concentrated loads was estimated in calculations presented in RPP-12444, Appendix A. Section 4.4 of RPP-12444 states that the tank failure due to seismic event is bounded by the failure due to excessive concentrated loads. However, the engineering judgment is made in RPP-12444, Section 4.4 that there is insufficient energy in the design basis earthquake event to cause a dome collapse (See RPP-RPT-26718 for details) and that there would be insignificant radiological or toxicological releases through a cracked tank dome. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The engineering judgment is made in RPP-12444, Section 4.4 that there is insufficient energy in the design basis earthquake event to cause a dome collapse (See RPP-RPT-26718 for details) and that there would be insignificant radiological or toxicological releases through a cracked tank dome. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The facility worker consequences for this event are bounded by those of TFDEL-01. Therefore, there are no significant facility worker hazards associated with this hazardous condition.

The “unlikely” frequency is based on the frequency of the evaluation basis seismic event (“unlikely”).

E3

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 07-4


Waste contents of the DST

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials to the atmosphere through a failed DST dome.

Primary tank leak or waste misroute into DST annulus results in primary tank dropping from loss of integrity of insulating concrete

Releases of tank waste aerosols to atmosphere

BEU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The radiological consequence of DST/SST dome failure due to excessive concentrated loads was estimated in calculations presented in RPP-12444, Appendix A. RPP-12444, Section 4.5, states that the offsite radiological and toxicological consequence of the release due to excessive concentrated loads bounds that of the DST dome failure due to failure of the insulating concrete. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The consequence of DST dome failure due to failure of the insulating concrete was discussed in RPP-12444, Section 4.5. In this section, it is stated that the consequence of tank dome failure due to excessive concentrated load bounds that of this event. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The facility worker consequences for this event are bounded by those of TFDEL-01. Therefore, there are no significant facility worker hazards associated with this hazardous condition.

Qualitative judgment in RPP-19097 is that the overall deformation in the steel primary tank would be sufficient to compensate for the displacement-limited, slowly-occurring, 1-in. settlement of the insulating concrete. Therefore, the frequency is qualitatively estimated to be “beyond extremely unlikely.”

E2


Waste contents of the DST


Primary tank leak or waste misroute into DST annulus results in primary tank floating due to excess waste in annulus

Releases of tank waste aerosols to atmosphere

BEU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The radiological consequence of DST/SST dome failure due to excessive concentrated loads was estimated in calculations presented in RPP-12444, Appendix A. The toxicological consequence was also estimated in RPP-12444, Appendix A. RPP-12444, Section 4.5, states that the consequence of the release due to excessive concentrated loads bounds that of the DST dome failure due to failure of the insulating concrete. This consequence is qualitatively judged to also apply to the failure of the DST due to floating of the inner tank. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The consequence of DST dome failure due to failure of the insulating concrete was discussed in RPP-12444, Section 4.5. In this section, it is stated that the consequence of tank dome failure due to excessive concentrated load bounds that of the DST dome failure due to failure of the insulating concrete. This consequence is qualitatively judged to also apply to the failure of the DST due to floating of the inner tank. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The facility worker consequences for this event are bounded by those of TFDEL-01. Therefore, there are no significant facility worker hazards associated with this hazardous condition.

A frequency of “beyond extremely unlikely” was assigned, since DSTs were analyzed for effects of additional water or waste into the annulus. Uplift occurring from addition of water to a DST annulus will not result in dome failure even if the annulus is full of liquid.

E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 07-5


Waste contents of the DCRT, catch tank, or IMUST

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials to the atmosphere through failed tank/vault. Applies to: • DCRTs • catch tanks • IMUSTs • 244-AR vault • 244-CR vault Based on physical similarities between the analysis performed for DCRTs and other inactive facilities (i.e., 244-AR Vault, 244-CR vault), these facilities are added to the listing of applicable facilities (below-grade tanks in reinforced concrete vaults with thick concrete slabs between the vaults and an above-grade concrete structure).

Excessive load (concentrated or uniform), applied to tank, cover block, or cover plate or load drop for any reason.


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The radiological consequence of DST/SST dome failure due to excessive concentrated loads was estimated in calculations presented in RPP-12444, Appendix A. Offsite radiological consequences for DCRT failure due to excessive concentrated loads are analyzed in RPP-12444, Appendix C and are bounded by those produced by DST/SST dome failures from excessive concentrated loads. Qualitative judgments on consequences for failures of DCRTs from other causes (and for catch tanks, IMUSTs and other inactive tanks due to excessive concentrated loads as well as other causes) are documented in RPP-12444, Sections 4.8 through 4.11. The offsite toxicological consequence is based on scoping calculations documented in RPP-12444, Appendix C and the qualitative judgments documented in Sections 4.8 through 4.11. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The consequence of failures of DCRTs was estimated in scoping calculations presented in RPP-12444, Appendix C. This analysis assumed: • the weight of the debris (concentrated load and debris) is 20 tons (40,000 lb). • the DCRT tank failure is modeled as debris free-falling 20 ft Qualitative judgments on onsite radiological and toxicological consequences for failures of DCRTs from other causes (and for catch tanks, IMUSTs and other inactive tanks due to excessive concentrated loads as well as other causes) are documented in RPP-12444, Sections 4.8 through 4.11. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The facility worker consequences for this event are bounded by those of TFDEL-01. Therefore, there are no significant facility worker hazards associated with this hazardous condition

The frequency of failure due to excessive concentrated or uniform loads on catch tanks was estimated to be “anticipated,” due to the uncertainties related to their current conditions. This frequency bounds the failure of other equipment.

E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 08-1

MIM-01 Mixing of Incompatible Materials (DSA Section 3.3.2.3.1)

Waste in DSTs or 100-Series SSTs

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from DST or 100-Series SST to the atmosphere due to gas generation and tank pressurization from reaction of acid with tank waste. Applies to: Bulk chemical additions to DSTs or 100-Series SSTs

Inadvertent bulk addition (tanker truck load) of acid to a DST or 100-Series SST when intending to add bulk chemical for corrosion control (sodium hydroxide or sodium nitrite) or to support retrieval (sodium hydroxide) due to vendor or paperwork error.

Releases of waste aerosols and acid vapors to the atmosphere

U N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on calculations presented in RPP-9689. The offsite toxicological consequence is based on calculations presented in RPP-12646. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations documented in RPP-12646. The calculations are based on a maximum bulk addition of 5000 gal at a rate of 175 gal/min. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant facility worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, assuming a release rate of 1.16 E-03 L/s from RPP-12646, a dilution volume of 1,000 m3, 10 seconds for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 1.0 E+05 Sv/L; USOF of 1.0 E+08). This conclusion is not sensitive to these assumptions. There is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, there is no asphyxiation hazard, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

“Unlikely” because the scenario requires that the chemical vendor also produce bulk quantities of sulfuric acid, mistakenly fills the delivery truck with the wrong chemical, places incorrect placarding on the vehicle, and includes incorrect delivery paperwork. The highly corrosive substance would have to be shipped to the receiving facility without being noticed by delivery personnel or shipping and receiving personnel. The vehicle would have to be connected and the corrosive material delivered without notice by participating personnel and the receiving tank would have to contain high concentrations of carbonate.

E2


Waste in DSTs or SSTs Release of liquids, solids, and/or vapors from DST or SST due to chemical reaction of incompatible wastes Applies to: DST transfer to another DST, DST transfer to a SST (for recycle sluicing retrieval operations), DST or SST sluicing retrieval transfer (SST to DST or DST to DST), transfer waste from DST annulus to a DST, waste transfer out of a waste transfer-associated structure using a sump pump

Mixing of waste from one tank with waste in another tank (due to normal transfer, drainage of waste transfer leakage, mis-routing to destination other than intended) creates chemical incompatibility (reaction from waste added to waste) results in exothermic reaction or gas generation with waste or gas release.

Release of waste aerosols or toxic gas to atmosphere

A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on being bounded by MIM-01. The offsite toxicological consequence is based on qualitative judgments described in RPP-12646, Section 2.2, where process history and experience have shown that tank waste is not incompatible with tank waste in other tanks. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are based on qualitative judgments described in RPP-12646, Section 2.2, where process history and experience have shown that tank waste is not incompatible with tank waste in other tanks. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria, since the consequence is bounded by that of MIM-01.

The “anticipated” frequency is based on waste additions to other waste is a common operation.

E1


Waste in DSTs Release of liquids, solids, and/or vapors from DST due to chemical reaction of incompatible wastes Applies to: Transfers from the 222-S Laboratory

Mixing of waste creates chemical incompatibility (reaction from waste added to waste) results in exothermic reaction or gas generation with waste or gas release.


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on being bounded by MIM-01. The offsite toxicological consequence is based on qualitative judgments described in RPP-12646, Section 2.2, where process history and experience have shown that tank waste is not incompatible with tank waste in other tanks. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are based on qualitative judgments described in RPP-12646, Section 1.2.1, where it is stated that the 222-S Laboratory typically transfers very dilute waste to tank farms. In addition, the capacity of the sending tank (TK-WT-102 in the 219-S Facility) is only 4,000 gal. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria, since the consequence is bounded by that of MIM-01.


E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 08-2


Waste in DSTs Release of liquids, solids, and/or vapors from DST due to chemical reaction of incompatible wastes Applies to: Transfers from the 242-A Evaporator

Mixing of waste creates chemical incompatibility (reaction from waste added to waste) results in exothermic reaction or gas generation with waste or gas release.


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on being bounded by MIM-01. The offsite toxicological consequence is based on qualitative judgments described in RPP-12646, Section 2.2, where process history and experience have shown that tank waste is not incompatible with tank waste in other tanks. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are based on qualitative judgments described in RPP-12646, Section 2.2, where process history and experience have shown that tank waste is not incompatible with tank waste in other tanks. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria, since the consequence is bounded by that of MIM-01.


E1


Waste in DST or SST Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from DST or SST to the atmosphere due to gas generation and tank pressurization from reaction of acid with tank waste. Applies to: Adding caustic solution (NaOH in water) or sodium nitrite solution (NaNO2 in water) to DST or SST, adding corrosion inhibiting chemicals to the AZ301-COND-TK-001 condensate tank, flushing the 702-AZ ventilation system (including using caustic solutions), pumping condensate from AZ301-COND-TK-001 to DST

Inadvertent small addition (55 gal drum) of acid when intending to add other chemical.

Releases of waste aerosols and acid vapors to the atmosphere

U N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on being bounded by MIM-01. The offsite toxicological consequence is based on qualitative judgments described in RPP-12646, Section 2.2, considering that the total volume of potentially reactive acid is small and the credible rate of addition is much lower (approximately 10 gal/min) than the bounding case (see MIM-01). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are based on qualitative judgment documented in RPP-12646, Section 2.2, considering that the total volume of potentially reactive acid is small and the credible rate of addition is much lower (approximately 10 gal/min) than the bounding case (see MIM-01). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria, since the consequence is bounded by that of MIM-01.

The “unlikely” frequency is based on similar reasons to that for bulk additions (see MIM-01).

E1


Waste in DCRT or catch tank

Release of radioactive and other hazardous aerosols from DCRT or catch tank to the atmosphere due to chemical reaction

Waste leak causes draining of incompatible waste to DCRT or catch tank (reaction from waste added to waste)


U N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on being bounded by MIM-02. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are based on being bounded by MIM-02. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria, since the consequence is bounded by that of MIM-01.

The “unlikely” frequency is based on the DCRTs and catch tanks being removed from service and, therefore, even in the event of a waste leak, it is judged to be unlikely that the leakage will drain to a DCRT or catch tank.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 08-3


Tank waste and headspace aerosols and vapors

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from tank headspace to the atmosphere due to tank waste reaction with incompatible material (e.g., aluminum, rubber, plastic) inserted into or dropped into tank waste. Applies to: DSTs, SSTs, DCRTs, catch tanks, IMUSTs, 244-AR Vault, 244-CR Vault, 241-AX Leak Detection Pits Examples of in-tank equipment or items that may be dropped are: • ENRAFs (primary tank

level) • push-mode core sampling

tools, mirrors, gauge plugs • thermocouples used to

monitor the waste • periscopes • still and television cameras • pit shielding plug • small submersible pumps • waste transfer pumps • waste mixer pumps • zip cords • spark resistant tools • sampler bit • liquid observation wells • sludge weight clamps and

thimbles • cone penetrometer

Reaction of incompatible materials causes generation of toxic gases with potential for pressurization of tank headspace

Release of waste aerosols or toxic gases

A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on being bounded by MIM-01. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on the judgment that there is an insufficient quantity of incompatible material to result in significant toxic gas generation or tank pressurization. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria, since the consequence is bounded by that of MIM-01.

The “anticipated” frequency is based on non-steel equipment already inserted in waste and dropping non-steel equipment into the waste is expected within the life of the facility.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 08-4


Toxic gases in tank waste (liquid or solid phase of waste)

Release of radioactive and other hazardous aerosols from tank vapor space to the atmosphere due to release of toxic vapors from waste Applies to: DSTs, SSTs, DCRTs, catch tanks, IMUSTs, 244-AR Vault, 244-CR Vault, 242-T Evaporator

Agitation from all mechanical, chemical, or physical means causing ammonia release or induced GRE; spontaneous GRE; or alkalinity (pH) adjustment, resulting in release of toxic vapors already present in the waste Activities which could release toxic gases from waste include: • Intrusive activity such as

push mode core sampling; • Waste transfers (releases

due to waste distributors); • DST or SST sluicing

retrievals; • Sampling; • Water lancing; • Installation/removal of

equipment; • Chemical adjustment of

waste (pH change due to caustic addition) due to ammonia solubility changes vs. pH

Aerosol release of radioactive and other hazardous materials to the atmosphere

A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on being bounded by MIM-01. The offsite toxicological consequence is based on the calculation below, which postulates an ammonia release from an actively ventilated DST or SST. PNNL-13933 discusses, in Section 2.1, that hydrogen, nitrogen, nitrous oxide, ammonia, methane, and other organic compounds are found in the headspaces of waste tanks and in the liquid and solid wastes. Of the toxic gases contained in the waste, ammonia constitutes the primary concern. Using the analysis methodology of RPP-13482, with the following inputs: • According to PNNL-13933, the maximum historical values of ammonia release from SY-

101 seen at Hanford in August 1993, set a reasonable upper bound for rapid releases of gas of 3,000 ppm (2,090 mg/m3); and the maximum seen from the waste transfers from SY-101 to SY-102 in March 2000, was approximately 7,400 ppm (5,160 mg/m3)

• Atmospheric dispersion coefficient of 2.22 E-05 s/m3 • Ventilation flowrate upper bound of 3,500 ft3/min (1.65 m3/s ) for DST exhausters (see

RPP-13750, Attachment A3) • PAC-2 value of 111 mg/m3 (SCAPA PAC Database, Rev. 26) Tox offsite = (1.65 m3/s)(5,160 mg/m3)(2.22 E-05 s/m3)/ 111 mg/m3 = 1.7 E-03 (PAC-2) Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological consequence is based on being bounded by MIM-01. The onsite worker toxicological consequence is based on the calculation below. Using the analysis methodology of RPP-13482, with the following inputs: • A bounding ammonia concentration in the tank headspace of 7,400 ppm (5,160 mg/m3)

(see above) • Atmospheric dispersion coefficient of 3.28 E-02 s/m3 • Ventilation flowrate upper bound of 3,500 cfm (see above) • PAC-3 value of 766 mg/m3 (SCAPA PAC Database, Rev. 26) Tox onsite = (1.65 m3/s)(5,160 mg/m3)(3.28 E-02 s/m3)/ 766 mg/m3 = 0.36 (PAC-3) Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. The potential radiation dose is well below the 100 rem threshold, based on being bounded by the consequence of MIM-01. The toxicological exposure is well below the PAC-3 threshold for a significant worker hazard based on an estimation of the physiological consequences of the potential exposure to potential ammonia releases from current best basis inventory of Hanford tank waste. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “anticipated” frequency is based on planned operations that will release toxic vapors from the waste.

E1


Toxic gas generated in SST waste

Release of toxic gases from SST to the atmosphere due to high resolution resistivity (HRR) or electrical resistivity tomography (ERT) leak detection and monitoring (LDM) off-normal condition

Toxic gases generated in waste by LDM due to human error or software/equipment failure(s) (i.e., LDM electric current passing through waste produces toxic gases)

Release of toxic gases A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is based on the accident analysis of the bounding radiological case (RPP-9689) described for MIM-01. The offsite toxicological consequence is based on the accident analysis presented in RPP-20459. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are based on the accident analysis presented in RPP-20459. The analysis assumed the LDM transmitter was limited to 120 volts and 1.5 amps = 9.4 E+18 electrons/sec Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria, since the consequence is bounded by that of MIM-01.

“Anticipated” because the initiating event may be human error.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 08-5


Tank waste and headspace aerosols and vapors

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from tank headspace to the atmosphere due to tank waste reaction with minor additions of incompatible material (e.g., liquids or solids) that inadvertently drain into the waste tank or are intentionally added to the waste. Applies to: DSTs, SSTs, DCRTs, catch tanks, IMUSTs, 244-AR Vault, 244-CR Vault Examples of materials that may be added or drain into the waste are: • Hydraulic fluid • Intrusion water from leak

detection pits • Spray fixative used for

contamination control • “Gray” water from

decontamination units and safety showers

• Conditioned water used to wash down pits

Reaction of incompatible materials causes generation of toxic gases with potential for pressurization of tank headspace


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on being bounded by MIM-01. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on judgment due to insufficient quantity of incompatible material to result in significant generation of toxic gases or tank pressurization. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria, since the consequence is bounded by that of MIM-01.

The “anticipated” frequency is based on the understanding that work in pits causing material to drain into the waste tanks, as well the addition of small amounts of material occurring as part of activities such as pumping of leak detection pits and gray water, are expected within the life of the facility.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 09-1

UPED-01 Unplanned Excavation/ Drilling (DSA Section 3.3.2.3.1)

Radioactive and other hazardous material (i.e., contaminated soil) present in excavation site; crib, ditch, pond, or unplanned release site (UPR).

Release of contaminated soil to the atmosphere during excavation using the Guzzler®1 filtered vacuum truck (FVT).

Multiple, concurrent failures of separation/filtration equipment in the Guzzler® FVT. Guzzler® Filtration Design: 1. Debris tank with radial

diversion separator. 2. Cyclone separators (2). 3. Filter bag house(s) (2); each

containing 34 bag and filter cages 60 inches long 99.95% efficient to 1 micron. 450 psi Mullen Burst. Back pulsed during operation.

4. Micro strainer to protect vacuum blower.

5. Vacuum blower; 5500 CFM with up to 28 in Hg vacuum.

6. HEPA filter unit; 2’-0”x2’-0”x10” Flanders > 99/95% with challenge aerosol PAO-4. Yearly change out. Nondestructive assay (NDA) of used HEPA filters.

7. Baffled sound attenuation (muffler) and stack.

Release of contaminated soil to the atmosphere via the Guzzler® exhaust stack.

EU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences from excavation activities using the Guzzler® FVT are based on calculations presented in RPP-13604. The analysis assumes (1) contaminated soil is excavated at a maximum rate of 1 yd3 in 15 min and 7 yd3 in 2 hours; (2) that 1% of the excavated soil is released from the Guzzler FVT exhaust stack (i.e., no credit for the Guzzler bag house or HEPA filter); and (3) ULDs and USOFs calculated for the bounding (worst case) TOC waste site. Basis for NC Onsite consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on scoping calculations presented in RPP-13604. The analysis assumes (1) contaminated soil is excavated at a maximum rate of 1 yd3 in 15 min and 7 yd3 in 2 hours; (2) that 1% of the excavated soil is released from the Guzzler FVT exhaust stack (i.e., no credit for the Guzzler bag house or HEPA filter); and (3) ULDs and USOFs calculated for the bounding (worst case) TOC waste site. Basis for FW Consequences: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, assuming a release of 7.6 L in 15 min of contaminated soil (RPP13604), a dilution volume of 1,000 m3, 10 s for a facility worker to evacuated the area, and a bounding ULD (3.1E+01 Sv/L) and USOF (1.1E+06 [PAC-3]) for TOC waste sites (RPP-13604). The remaining criteria of Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, are not applicable.

The “extremely unlikely” frequency is based on multiple physical barriers to uncontrolled release installed on the Guzzler® FVT, as well as the administrative requirements (e.g., radiological surveys approximately every 1 ft3) that control Guzzler® FVT excavation operations. Excavation in tank farms is governed by WA DOH NOC requirements and constraints.

E1


Radioactive and other hazardous material present in excavation site; crib, ditch, pond, or unplanned release site (UPR).

Excavation by backhoe into a 200 Area crib, ditch, pond, or UPR site. Applies to: Excavation by hand (shovel) and power tool. Any excavation in soils using backhoe. Bounds drilling using auger drill string, push mode, but does not apply to air rotary drilling which is outside of WRPS (TOC) scope.

Dispersal of excavated material from use of backhoe in the various cribs, ditches, and ponds, or UPR site.

Release of radioactive or hazardous materials from the excavation site to the atmosphere due to excavation by backhoe in an unplanned/inadvertent excavation.

U N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences from excavation activities using a backhoe are based on calculations presented in RPP-13604. The analysis assumes a 0.5 yd3 bucket, dumping at a rate of one every 2 minutes over an 8 hour period, with 50% available for re-suspension. Basis for NC Onsite consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences were estimated in scoping calculations presented in RPP-13604. The analysis assumes a 0.5 yd3 bucket, dumping at a rate of one every 2 minutes over an 8 hour period, with 50% available for re-suspension. Basis for FW Consequences: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, assuming a release amount, a release rate and re-suspension rate values from RPP-13604. The remaining criteria of Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, are not applicable.

The “unlikely event” frequency is based on multiple administrative barriers required by the actual excavation process and safety management programs are required to be violated to create this scenario. Excavation in tank farms is governed by WA DOH NOC requirements and constraints. Outside of tank farms or in a non-contaminated area excavation is governed by Hanford Site Excavation Permit preparation and approval as part of the work planning process.

E1

1 Guzzler is a registered trademark of Guzzler Manufacturing, Inc., Streator, Illinois.

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 09-2


Radioactive and other hazardous material from general contaminated soil surface or near-surface release points.

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from below surface release points to the atmosphere due to a failure of a pressurized line from excavation activities. Applies to: A buried pressurized compressed air, instrument or water line.

Underground pressurized line failure due to excavation activities. Applies to: Inadvertent excavation (backhoe) or drilling (closed-end probe, sonic, cable tool, auger, cone penetrometer, and rotary hydraulic hammer direct push), as initiators to failure of pressurized lines.

Release of radioactive and hazardous material particulates in the soil to the atmosphere.

A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are bounded by UPED-02 based on much less material at risk available for dispersion (i.e., water or air line is exposed when broken during the excavation, and so little additional contaminated soil is lofted. Also, it can reasonably be assumed that the excavation will cease upon the breaking of the line, so the duration of the event will be less than the 8 hour timeframe of UPED-02). Basis for NC Onsite consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are bounded by UPED-02 based on much less material at risk available for dispersion (i.e., water or air line is exposed when broken during the excavation, and so little additional contaminated soil is lofted. Also, it can reasonably be assumed that the excavation will cease upon the breaking of the line, so the duration of the event will be less than the 8 hour timeframe of UPED-02). Basis for FW Consequences: Qualitative determination based on backhoe excavation FW Consequences as being bounded by UPED-02.

A range of frequencies can be assigned to this event due to the nature of the initiating event; from operator error to non-mechanistic failures. A frequency of “anticipated” is conservatively assigned to the event.

E1


General contaminated below surface soils

Release of contaminated soil to the atmosphere due to a failure of a buried pressurized line or primary piping system encasement during pneumatic testing. Applies to: A buried pressurized compressed air, instrument or water line, and pneumatic testing of lines or waste transfer primary piping system encasements during pneumatic testing.

Buried pressurized line failure due to corrosion or improper assembly. All causes of an underground compressed air leak from waste transfer primary piping system encasement during pneumatic testing.

Release of radioactive and other hazardous material particulates in the soil to the atmosphere.

A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite radiological consequence: The offsite radiological consequences from failure of underground pressurized lines or waste transfer primary piping system encasements during pneumatic testing are estimated to be bounded by the consequence of excavation activities using a backhoe (UPED-02) based on engineering judgment of the onsite consequences provided for the event in RPP-10773. Basis for NC Onsite radiological consequence: The onsite radiological consequences from failure of underground pressurized lines are based on calculations presented in RPP-10773. These consequences are qualitatively judged to also represent those for a compressed air leak from a primary piping system encasement during pneumatic testing, because the assumed compressed air pressures and volumetric flow rates are comparable to those assumed in RPP-10773. Basis for NC Offsite and Onsite toxicological consequences: The offsite and onsite toxicological consequences are bounded by UPED-02 based on much less material at risk available for dispersion (i.e., the quantity of contaminated soil lofted by the ruptured water or air line, or by the primary piping encasement compressed air leak during pneumatic testing). The lofting of contaminated soil will not continue for an extended period of time once the line breaks or the encasement leaks, so the duration of the event will be much less than the 8 hour timeframe of UPED-02. Basis for FW Consequences: Qualitative determination based on backhoe excavation FW Consequences as being bounded by UPED-02

A range of frequencies can be assigned to this event due to the nature of the initiating event; from operator error to non-mechanistic failures. A frequency of “anticipated” is conservatively assigned to the event.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 10-1

BMP-01 Tank Bump (DSA Section 3.3.2.3.1)

DST or SST aerosols Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from a DST or SST to the atmosphere due to tank bump Applies to: DSTs and SSTs

Tank bump caused by heating sludge above saturation temperature and heating supernatant liquid to near saturation temperature from all causes (e.g., loss of ventilation, loss of power, pump recirculation of waste, or caustic addition) Applies to: DST or SST ventilation systems, transfer and recirc pumps, and caustic additions

Release of radioactive and often hazardous materials to air

BEU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Offsite radiological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation of the calculations documented in RPP-13470 (i.e., “flammable gas accident” releases and consequences bound “tank bump” releases and consequences). The offsite toxicological consequences are qualitatively assigned in Section 2.1.3.1 of RPP-13438. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological consequences are qualitatively assigned in Section 2.1.3.1 of RPP-13438. The onsite toxicological consequences are qualitatively assigned in Section 2.1.3.1 of RPP-13438. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F assuming a release amount of 0.3 L of waste per bump from RPP-6213, a dilution volume of 1,000 m3, 60 seconds for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 1.0 E+03 Sv/L, USOF of 1.0 E+07 that bounds 241-AZ-101and 241-AZ-102). There is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, there is no asphyxiation hazard, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The BEU frequency is presented in RPP-13438. The basis for BEU is the initial condition that all DST and SSTs currently meet at least one of the following criteria. Any one of these criteria will keep a tank from bumping: 1) Tank heat load

< 17 kW (< 58000 Btu/hr)

2) Non-convective layer is < 0.3 m (< 12 in) thick

3) Convective supernatant layer is < 1 m (< 39 in) thick

4) The material properties and gas generation rates of the sludge must be such that net retention of noncondensable gases occurs and can eventually lead to neutral buoyancy. If the noncondensable gas generation rate in the nonconvective layer is sufficiently low, such that the ratio of vertical void fraction profile to the neutral buoyant void fraction is less than unity (1.0), tank bumps cannot occur.

A fifth criterion is applicable to DST 241-AN-106 only. The technical basis for this criterion is established in RPP-46868. This criterion is supernatant temperature in 241-AN-106 is ≤ 194ºF.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 10-2


DST aerosols Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from DST to the atmosphere due to boiling waste Applies to: DSTs

Boiling waste due to long term loss of ventilation in tank and/or operations that can heat waste.

Release of radioactive and often hazardous materials to air

U N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Offsite radiological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation of the calculations documented in RPP-13470 (i.e., “flammable gas accident” releases and consequences bound “tank bump” releases and consequences). The offsite toxicological consequences are calculated in Appendix B of RPP-13438. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological consequences are calculated in Appendix B of RPP-13438. The onsite toxicological consequences are calculated in Appendix B of RPP-13438. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. The basis for “No” consequence to the facility worker is based on the response time to a boiling waste event. Tank waste heat-up to the boiling point is a slow event. Monitoring of tank waste temperature is ongoing at tank farms, and a boiling event is not going to take facility workers by surprise. Although high volumes of waste may be released over a long period of time, concentrations from this type of release will not build up to threshold limits.

The “unlikely” frequency is based on the expected frequency of a long-term loss of adequate ventilation air flow. The only event that was deemed capable of taking out the aging waste ventilation system for a sustained period was an earthquake, which has a “U” frequency (RPP-13438)

E1

BMP-03a Tank Bump (DSA Section 3.3.2.3.1)

SST aerosols, SST dry surface waste

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from a SST to the atmosphere due to sudden flashing of water added to tank Applies to: SSTs

Boiling waste or sudden flashing due to high heat in SST waste

Release of radioactive and often hazardous materials or dried waste to air

BEU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Offsite radiological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation of the calculations documented in RPP-13470 (i.e., “flammable gas accident” releases and consequences bound “tank bump” releases and consequences). The offsite toxicological consequences are calculated in Appendix B of RPP-13438. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological consequences are calculated in Appendix B of RPP-13438. The onsite toxicological consequences are calculated in Appendix B of RPP-13438. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The facility worker consequence is bounded by BMP-01.

The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is presented in RPP-13438, which states that no SSTs were found to be susceptible to boiling or flashing, because of insufficient heat load.

E1

BMP-03b Tank Bump (DSA Section 3.3.2.3.1)

DST sludge aerosols, dry sludge surface particulates

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from a DST to the atmosphere due to sudden flashing of water sprayed on hot sludge after the supernate has been removed Applies to: DSTs

Boiling waste or sudden flashing due to high heat in uncovered (i.e., no supernate) DST sludge

Release of radioactive and hazardous materials or dried waste to air

A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Offsite radiological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation of the calculations documented in RPP-13470 (i.e., “flammable gas accident” releases and consequences bound “tank bump” releases and consequences). The offsite toxicological consequences are calculated in Appendix B of RPP-13438. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological consequences are calculated in Appendix B of RPP-13438. The onsite toxicological consequences are calculated in Appendix B of RPP-13438. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. The “No” consequence to the facility worker is based on the fact that although large volumes of waste might be released if water were continuously sprayed onto hot waste over a long time period, the rate of sludge mobilization is small given the small water addition rate (gallons per minute, not hundreds of gallons per minute). Thus, consequences are not expected to approach threshold limits.

The “anticipated” frequency is based on the conservative assumption that sufficient heat generation is present in the sludge to heat it above 212 °F if all supernate was removed. Note that tank waste has undergone significant decay since RPP-13438 was released, which reduces the decay heat generation rate.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 10-3


SST waste Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from SST to the soil and aerosol release to the atmosphere due to steam bump in liner gap Applies to: SSTs

Any activity that causes water to breach the tank liner resulting in water leakage into liner gap, steam formation and bump breaching tank bottom (e.g., sluicer breaches liner or waste overfills the liner) Applies to: SST liner. Activities that overfill SST.

Below grade radioactive liquid and hazardous liquid release; large steam bump aerosol release to atmosphere

BEU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Offsite radiological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation of the calculations documented in RPP-13470 (i.e., “flammable gas accident” releases and consequences bound “tank bump” releases and consequences). The offsite toxicological consequences are qualitatively assigned in Section 2.1.3.1 of RPP-13438. The consequences of a steam bump in the liner gap are bounded by a tank bump. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological consequences are qualitatively assigned in Section 2.1.3.1 of RPP-13438. The onsite toxicological consequences are qualitatively assigned in Section 2.1.3.1 of RPP-13438. The consequences of a steam bump in the liner gap are bounded by a tank bump. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The facility worker consequence is bounded by BMP-01.

Current waste temperature data shows that these tanks are well below the saturation temperature of water. The highest temperature found in SSTs is 76C (168.8F) (241-A-104). The SSTs have been under passive cooling conditions for many years and show no trend of increasing temperature. Since the temperature is substantially below the saturation of water there is no possibility of steam bubble formation behind the tank liner no matter what quantity of water is involved.

E2

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 11-1

AGSF-01 Above Ground Structure Failure (DSA Section 3.3.2.3.1)

Waste contained on or in equipment

Release of radioactive and/or hazardous material from load drop of waste containing equipment, load drop onto waste contaminated equipment, or spill from surface and/or cavities of elevated equipment to the atmosphere Applies to: • pumps • reel tapes • ENRAFs (primary tank

level) • thermocouple trees • multiple instrument trees • weight factor

instrumentation • zip cords • sluicers • salt well screens • slurry distributors • air lances • air lift circulators • liquid observation wells • manual tapes • specific gravity probes • HIHTLs • jumpers • cone penetrometer

All causes of crane failures (e.g., mechanical, rigging, vehicle, natural phenomenon, human error) and waste containment failures (e.g., containment bag breach, HIHTL plug becomes detached, ambient conditions, wind, mechanical, pressurization) while equipment is elevated above the ground

Release of radioactive and/or other hazardous materials

A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Offsite radiological consequence is bounded by waste transfer leak accident, RPP-13750. Offsite toxicological consequence documented in RPP-14618, Section 4.1. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: Onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are estimated in scoping calculations presented in RPP-14618, Section 4.1. Assumptions for the consequences include: • Up to 50 gals of worst case waste and up to a 70 ft drop/spill height. Note: Sensitivity calculations show up to 100 gals of worst case waste and up to 100 ft drop/spill height are still below guidelines. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. This determination if based on the judgment that the waste release that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of the drop is limited to less than approximately 1000 m3; 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area; and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 6.7E+04 Sv/L and USOF of 3.3 E+07 [both values from RPP-14618]). This conclusion is not sensitive to these assumptions. Even though the waste could potentially contain high pH, caustic solutions, chemical burns caused by skin contact with caustic waste during a planned work activity (contaminated equipment removal or handling) are an occupational hazard addressed by safety management programs. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

Lifting of loads and removing equipment from tanks in tank farms are activities that have occurred and will occur in the future in order to carry out the mission. There have been several occurrences during equipment removal activities involving waste leakage from equipment. Note that “anticipated” is the bounding frequency among the initiators; some initiators may have a lower frequency.

E1


Waste contained on or in equipment

Release of radioactive and/or hazardous material from waste containing equipment to the atmosphere Applies to: Any contaminated aboveground structure (e.g., equipment removed from a tank, SHMS cabinets, CAMs cabinets)

All causes (e.g., fires, mechanical impacts, natural phenomenon)


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Offsite radiological consequence is bounded by waste transfer leak accident, RPP-13750. Offsite toxicological consequence bounded by those documented in RPP-14618, Section 4.1. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: Onsite radiological and toxicological consequences bounded by those documented in RPP-14618 based on the limited amount of residual waste contained on the equipment being impacted. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria, since the radiological and toxicological consequences are bounded by that of AGSF-01. There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the aerosol release. The remaining criteria of Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 are not applicable.

Fires and mechanical impacts are “anticipated” events in the tank farms. Note that “anticipated” is the bounding frequency among the initiators; some initiators may have a lower frequency.

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 11-2


Residual materials in the HEPA filters and ventilation ductwork

Release of radioactive and/or hazardous material to the atmosphere from ventilation system HEPA filters and ductwork due to load drop on HEPA filter housing (i.e., crushing) Applies to: • DST primary tank

ventilation systems • breather filter systems • portable ventilation system

skids (POR03, POR04, POR05, POR06, POR-008)

• SST inactive ventilation systems (e.g., SX-Farm)

• DST annulus ventilation systems

• DCRT breather filter assemblies

• 242-T ventilation system • 242-S ventilation system Note: Hazardous conditions associated with partial release of HEPA filter inventory where the ventilation system is operating are addressed in the unfiltered release accident.

All causes (e.g., human error, mechanical, natural phenomenon) of crushing

Release of radioactive and/or other hazardous materials to the atmosphere

A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Offsite radiological consequence bounded by waste transfer leak accident, RPP-13750. Offsite toxicological consequence documented in RPP-14618, Section 4.2. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: Onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are estimated in scoping calculations presented in RPP-14618, Section 4.2. Assumptions for the consequences are based on the W-314 ventilation system because the W-314 system has the most HEPA filters of all DST primary ventilation systems and SST portable exhausters deployed in the tank farms. Assumptions include: • Total HEPA filter loading of 5.2 L of dried waste. This is based on a 2 by 1 array of dual-

stage HEPA filters on each of two trains, each filter with 1 L of material loading, with an additional 1 L of material assumed in the ducting and 0.1 L of material on each of two prefilters.

Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. This determination is based on the judgment that the waste release that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of a load drop onto a HEPA filter is limited to less than approximately 1000 m3; 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area; and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 1.0E+04 Sv/L and USOF of 2.2 E+07 [both values from RPP-14618]). This conclusion is not sensitive to these assumptions. Even though the waste could potentially contain high pH, caustic solutions, there is no significant potential for chemical burns to the facility worker from the hazardous condition because workers are not expected to be standing near the crane lift when equipment is elevated. They are expected to take self-protective actions (e.g., evacuate area). Although they may be exposed to some portion of the initial release plume, the resultant exposure to radiological or toxic materials is not expected to be of sufficient magnitude to cause death or require ongoing large-scale medical intervention. The remaining criteria of Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 Attachment F, are not applicable.

Lifting of loads in tank farms is an activity that has occurred and will occur in the future in order to carry out the mission. Note that “anticipated” is the bounding frequency among the initiators; some initiators may have a lower frequency.

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Total amount of radioactive and/or other hazardous material contained in facility and tanks

Release of radioactive and/or other hazardous material from facility to the atmosphere due to structure failure Applies to: • 244-AR Vault • 244-CR Vault • 204-AR Waste Unloading

Facility

All causes (e.g., Mechanical impact, degradation, natural phenomenon, ambient conditions)


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Offsite radiological consequences bounded by dome collapse, RPP-12395. Offsite toxicological consequences bounded by the representative accident scenario for a load drop in a DCRT documented in RPP-12444, Section 4.1. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: Onsite radiological and toxicological consequences bounded by the representative accident scenario for a load drop in a DCRT documented in RPP-12444, Section 4.1. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria, since the consequence is bounded by that of TFDEL-07.

The frequency of each initiator may vary, however the most likely frequency has been evaluated as “anticipated” based on history that structures fail. Note that “anticipated” is the bounding frequency among the initiators; some initiators may have a lower frequency.

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 11-3


Total amount of radioactive and/or other hazardous material contained in facility

Release of radioactive and/or other hazardous material from facility to the atmosphere due to structure failure Applies to: Miscellaneous Inactive Processing Facilities (241-AX-IX Ion Exchanger, 241-SX-401 and 241-SX-402 Condenser Shielding Buildings, 241-A-431 Ventilation Building, 241-C-801 Cesium Loadout Facility, 241-BY-ITS-1 In-Tank Solidification System)

All causes (e.g., Mechanical impact, degradation, natural phenomenon, ambient conditions)


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are bounded by AGSF-04 based on facility classification and limited MAR. (Rationale provided in note below) Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: Onsite radiological and toxicological consequences bounded by AGSF-04. (Rationale provided in note below) Note: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively estimated because the 241-SX-401 Condenser Shielding Building only processed vapor from the 241-SX Tank Farm tanks. It is unlikely that there remains any condensate in the condensate return head tank or condensate seal tank after more than 30 years, and there is no high radiation area in 241-SX-401. The 241-SX-402 Condenser Shielding Building was never used to condense vapor from the 241-SX Tank Farm tanks, and the radiation levels in the facility are at background levels. The only material that passed through the 241-A-431 ventilation building de-entrainer was tank off-gas and there is limited material-at-risk in the de-entrainer based on radiation levels that are essentially background. Even if the waste transfer lines in the 241-C-801 Loadout Facility were not flushed (the normal practice), the quantity of waste is limited and located in 1 to 2 in. diameter lines embedded in the concrete walls and floors of the building. The only other MAR is limited to contamination from spills and/or leaks. The 241-BY-ITS-1 In-Tank Solidification System is classified as Hazard Category 3 as documented in RPP-13329. The 241-AX-IX ion exchanger is classified as Hazard Category 3 as documented in RPP-13329 and the 241-AX-IX ion exchanger processed only condensate from aging waste tank vapor, radiation readings that are essentially background indicate limited processed material in the ion exchanger; and no free liquid was observed or measured in a liquid level assessment of the ion exchanger (RPP-RPT-31126). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria, since the consequence is bounded by that of TFDEL-07.

The frequency of each initiator may vary, however the most likely frequency has been evaluated as “anticipated” based on history that structures fail. Note that “anticipated” is the bounding frequency among the initiators; some initiators may have a lower frequency.

E1


Surface contamination (i.e., waste) on the waste transfer pump Note: The MAR does not include waste that could be trapped inside the waste transfer pump

Release of surface contamination (i.e., waste) on a waste transfer pump removed from a tank during its decontamination with a water spray ring located outside of the tank (i.e., in a waste transfer-associated structure) due to confinement barrier failure Note: Releases of waste that could be trapped inside a waste transfer pump are addressed in hazardous condition AGSF-01

All causes of confinement barrier failure (e.g., human error, operational events, external events, natural events)


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Offsite radiological consequence is bounded by waste transfer leak accident, RPP-13750. Offsite toxicological consequence documented in RPP-14618, Section 4.3. (Rationale provided in note below) Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: Onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are estimated in scoping calculations presented in RPP-14618, Section 4.3. (Rationale provided in note below) Note: Radiological and toxicological consequences are qualitatively determined based on the scoping calculations and engineering judgments documented in RPP-14618, Section 4.3. The engineering judgments consider the potential MAR on the surface of a waste transfer pump removed from a tank, the conservative ARF/RF, and the mitigating effect of the water used for decontamination. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria, since the consequence is bounded by that of AGSF-01.

The “anticipated” frequency is based on the many different confinement barrier failure modes, including human error

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RPP-15188 REV 12-A Appendix A. Hazard Evaluation Database No Controls Fields.


Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 12-1

TRN-01 Transportation Related Waste Handling Accidents (DSA Section 3.3.2.3.1)

Waste in approved inter- or intra-facility waste sample shipping containers (analysis assumes no credit for containers)

Release of radioactive and/or hazardous materials from fire involving waste sample containers Applies to: Waste samples packaged in approved inter- or intra-facility transport containers

All types and causes of fires (e.g., range fire, vehicle fuel fire)


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Offsite radiological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation of the calculations documented in RPP-13470 and the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13978 (i.e., “flammable gas accident” releases and consequences bound “transportation related waste sample handling accidents” releases and consequences). Offsite toxicological consequence is based on scoping calculations documented in RPP-13978, Section 4.1. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: Onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are based on scoping calculations documented in RPP-13978, Section 4.1. The analysis assumes the maximum volume of waste involved in the representative fire accident is 6.0 L contained in 10 onsite transfer cask (OTC) waste sample carriers staged in two cask stands. Each OTC cask stand holds five OTCs. The maximum volume per OTC is 0.6 L, which is the bounding source term for the container as documented in RPP-24398, Package Specific Safety Document Onsite Transfer Cask, Rev. 0. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The impact to the facility worker resulting from the fire does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria provided in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Facility workers are not expected to be standing near the staged containers when the impact occurs, but would be close enough to observe the release. They are expected to take self-protective actions (e.g., evacuate area). Although they may be exposed to some portion of the initial release plume, the resultant exposure to radioactive or toxic materials is not expected to be of sufficient magnitude to cause death or require ongoing large-scale medical intervention.

The “anticipated” frequency is based on operational experience, which indicates that fire events have occurred in the tank farms. Note that a frequency of “unlikely” could be assigned to the vehicle fuel fire event.

E1




All causes of load drop/impact events (e.g., vehicle impact, human error, mechanical failure, seismic)


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Offsite radiological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation of the calculations documented in RPP-13470 and the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13978 (i.e., “flammable gas accident” releases and consequences bound “transportation related waste sample handling accidents” releases and consequences). Offsite toxicological consequence is based on scoping calculations documented in RPP-13978, Section 4.2. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: Onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are based on scoping calculations documented in RPP-13978, Section 4.2. The analysis assumes the maximum volume of waste involved in the representative drop accident is 3.0 L contained in 5 OTC waste sample carriers staged in one cask stand. Each OTC cask stand holds five OTCs. The maximum volume per OTC is 0.6 L, which is the bounding source term for the container as documented in RPP-24398, Rev. 0. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The impact to the facility worker resulting from the load drop/impact does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria provided in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Facility workers are not expected to be standing near the crane lift when the load is lifted, but would be close enough to observe the release. They are expected to take self-protective actions (e.g., evacuate area). Although they may be exposed to some portion of the initial release plume, the resultant exposure to radioactive or toxic materials is not expected to be of sufficient magnitude to cause death or require ongoing large-scale medical intervention

The “anticipated” frequency is based on operational history, which has shown that load drop/impact events initiated by human error or equipment malfunction have occurred. Note that a frequency of “unlikely” could be assigned to the seismically initiated load drop based on the frequency of the evaluation basis seismic event.

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 12-2



Release of radioactive and/or hazardous materials from fire involving waste sample containers • Applies to: Waste samples packaged in approved inter- or intra-facility transport containers

Work delay causes a buildup of pressure inside an unvented waste container due to thermal expansion (e.g., hot day) or gas generation (e.g., radiolysis, chemical reactions) or work delay causes flammable gases generated inside an unvented waste container to accumulate to a concentration above the LFL. Pressurized release or flammable gas deflagration occurs when temporary lid is removed from waste container.

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials to the atmosphere; physical injury or damage from deflagration

A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Offsite radiological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation of the calculations documented in RPP-13470 and the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13978 (i.e., “flammable gas accident” releases and consequences bound “transportation related waste sample handling accidents” releases and consequences). Offsite toxicological consequence is based on a conservative estimate of the potential waste release from a deflagration in an unvented OTC, which is the bounding PSSD-compliant shipping container (for tank waste samples) with respect to payload / material-at-risk. The waste release from a deflagration is conservatively estimated using the DOE-HDBK-3010-94 TNT equivalent correlation. The explosive energy potential occurs when a 5% mixture of hydrogen and air exists within the OTC (i.e., 5% hydrogen by volume). The 5% hydrogen assumption is consistent with hydrogen deflagration calculations performed in RPP-24398, Package-Specific Safety Document Onsite Transfer Cask. The volume of void space within the OTC for each payload configuration is identified in RPP-24398. The configuration with the largest void space volume is the 10-inch auger sampler, which has a package void space volume of 616.7 cm3 (0.617 L) (Ref. page 7-17 of RPP-24398). Assuming 5 vol% hydrogen (RPP-24398, page 7-24), there would be approximately 30.8 cm3 (0.0308 L) of hydrogen, or approximately 0.00138 moles of hydrogen (0.0308 L / 22.4 L/mole) at standard conditions and pressures (32 °F and 1 atm). Correction for actual temperature is neglected as it would only reduce the moles of hydrogen present. The available energy is approximately 94 cal (0.00138 moles of hydrogen x 68,317 cal/mole of hydrogen). This energy corresponds to 0.085 g of TNT (94 cal / 1,100 cal/g). Because the waste release is small [0.085 g or approximately 0.07 mL (0.085 g / 1.30 g/ml)], consequences were qualitatively judged to be below guidelines for all receptors. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: Onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are based on a conservative estimate of the potential waste release from a deflagration in a waste container as described above (see Basis for NC Offsite consequence). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: A PSSD or DOT-compliant shipping container flammable gas deflagration does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria provided in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. As shown above (see Basis for NC Offsite consequence section), the available energy in 616.7 cm3 of flammable gas is 94 cal or approximately 394 joules (94 cal x 4.186 joules/cal). Although a facility worker could be present in the immediate vicinity of the waste container when the event occurs, the conservatively estimated energetic release is small. With respect to the potential for physical injury (i.e., grievous injury or death resulting from pressurized release or flammable gas deflagration when the temporary lid is removed from the waste container), none is expected because of the limited energy of the deflagration. (Note: For perspective, the energy released from modern legal firecrackers falls between 30 and 250 joules. An M-80, which is a large firecracker designed for military use as a gunfire simulator, releases about 50,000 joules.)

The “anticipated” frequency is based on operational history, which has shown that over pressure and flammable gas deflagration events have occurred in the past.

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 12-3


Waste in approved inter- or intra-facility shipping containers (analysis assumes no credit for containers)

Release of radioactive and/or hazardous materials from fire involving waste containers Applies to: Waste packaged in approved inter- or intra-facility transport containers

All types and causes of fires (e.g., range fire, vehicle fuel fire)


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Offsite radiological consequence is based on a qualitative evaluation of the calculations documented in RPP-13470 and the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13978 (i.e., “flammable gas accident” releases and consequences bound “transportation related waste sample handling accidents” releases and consequences). Offsite toxicological consequence is based on scoping calculations documented in RPP-13978, Section 4.1. RPP-13978 assumes the maximum volume of waste for the representative fire accident involving sample containers is 6.0 L, which results in offsite toxicological (PAC-2) guidelines (1.9 E-04). Multiplying the ratio of the maximum volume of the significantly larger waste containers (50 gal or 190 L assumed) and the 6.0 L MAR assumed for sample containers by the consequences in RPP-13978, shows that offsite toxicological consequences for the fire accident involving waste containers are more than two orders of magnitude below guidelines. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: Onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are based on scoping calculations documented in RPP-13978, Section 4.1. Based on the 6.0 L MAR assumed in RPP-13978 for the representative fire accident involving sample containers, the onsite consequences are more than three orders of magnitude below onsite radiological guidelines and two orders of magnitude below onsite toxicological (PAC-3) guidelines (6.0 E-02 rem and 2.0 E-03 PAC-3, respectively). Multiplying the ratio of the maximum volume of significantly larger waste containers (50 gal or 190 L assumed) and the 6.0 L MAR assumed for sample containers by the consequences in RPP-13978, shows that onsite radiological consequences and toxicological consequences for the fire accident involving waste containers are more than one order of magnitude below guidelines. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The impact to the facility worker resulting from the fire does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria provided in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. Facility workers are not expected to be standing near the staged containers when the impact occurs, but would be close enough to observe the release. They are expected to take self-protective actions (e.g., evacuate area). Although they may be exposed to some portion of the initial release plume, the resultant exposure to radioactive or toxic materials is not expected to be of sufficient magnitude to cause death or require ongoing large-scale medical intervention.

The “anticipated” frequency is based on operational experience, which indicates that fire events have occurred in the tank farms. Note that a frequency of “unlikely” could be assigned to the vehicle fuel fire event.

E1


Waste in approved inter- or intra-facility shipping containers (analysis assumes no credit for containers)

Release of radioactive and/or hazardous materials from load drop / impact involving waste containers Applies to: Waste samples packaged in approved inter- or intra-facility transport containers

All causes of load drop / impact events (e.g., vehicle impact, human error, mechanical failure, seismic)


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Offsite radiological and toxicological consequence bounded by Above Ground Structure Failure hazardous condition AGSF 02 (Release of radioactive and/or hazardous material from waste containing equipment to the atmosphere). Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: Onsite radiological and toxicological consequence are estimated to be below 100 rem and PAC-3 based on hazardous condition AGSF-02 (Release of radioactive and/or hazardous material from waste containing equipment to the atmosphere). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. This determination is based on the judgment that the waste release that could be in a worker occupied area as a result of the drop is limited to less than approximately 1,000 m3; 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area; and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 6.7 E+04 Sv/L and USOF of 3.3 E+07 [both values from RPP-14618]). This conclusion is not sensitive to these assumptions. Even though the waste could potentially contain high pH, caustic solutions, chemical burns caused by skin contact with caustic waste during a planned work activity (contaminated equipment removal or handling) are an occupational hazard addressed by safety management programs. The remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “anticipated” frequency is based on operational history, which has shown that load drop / impact events initiated by human error or equipment malfunction have occurred. Note that a frequency of “unlikely” could be assigned to the seismically initiated load drop based on the frequency of the evaluation basis seismic event.

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 13-1

UR-01a Filtration Failures Leading to Unfiltered Releases (DSA Section 3.3.2.3.1)

Applies to: Waste materials in the DST HEPA filters and ductwork plus waste aerosols originating from tank headspace where amount of aerosol is dependent on the ongoing in-tank activities Aerosol generating activities and activities that add contaminants to headspace that are within MAR scope include: ALC operations in DSTs, sluicing, and HIHTL air blowout directly into headspace or under the waste surface Also encompasses other waste disturbing activities where the partition fraction is bounded by that for sluicing in DSTs including waste storage, waste transfers, chemical additions, and waste sampling

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from HEPA filters to the atmosphere due to HEPA filter damage that does not crush the filters (such as from high temperature, high pressure, mechanical contact, material degradation) and subsequent unfiltered release (i.e., scenario assumes that ventilation system continues to operate without filtration after event, which encompasses the condition where the active ventilation system is shut down when the event occurs). Applies to: DST primary ventilation systems annulus ventilation systems, and portable ventilation systems used to provide DST ventilation Note: Hazardous condition includes mechanical contact hazards (e.g., vehicle, crane load) that jar system and cause partial release of inventory but do not cause sufficient damage to prevent continued operation. Hazards associated with crushing filters where ventilation system does not continue to operate are addressed in the aboveground structure failure accident (See AGSF-03 in Table 11).

High temperature including fire in or around ventilation system, high pressure, mechanical contact, chemical degradation, and effects from ventilated matter. All causes including range fire, nearby vehicle fire, fires initiated by electrical failures, lightning strike, malfunctions of glycol heater, compressed air additions into tank headspace, activities resulting in excessive HEPA loading and failure from high dP, conditions when the fan is turned on, contact with crane load, vehicle, scaffolding, etc. Applies to: • In-tank: Waste storage,

waste transfers, chemical additions, compressed air additions, purge gas additions (e.g., to purge cameras) into headspace from bottles, air lance operation, HIHTL air blowout directly into headspace or under the waste surface, sluicer operation during tank retrieval, annulus waste pumping, ALC operations, and waste sampling.

• Ex-tank on or near ventilation system: Operations and maintenance activities (including vehicle operations) involving combustibles and/or heat sources. Activities that could increase pressure in tank headspace or ventilation system. Vehicle operations, crane operations, construction activities (e.g., erecting or removing scaffolding) that could contact ventilation system.

Release of radioactive and/or hazardous materials to the atmosphere

A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-CALC-55156. Basis for NC Onsite consequence: The onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations presented in RPP-CALC-55156. Consequences for HIHTL air blowout directly into tank headspace are qualitatively judged to be bounded by those documented for an accidental disconnection of an HIHTL in an uncovered pit in RPP-37922. Consequences for an HIHTL air blowout under the waste surface are documented in RPP-37922. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, considering that collocated worker consequences calculated in RPP-55156 are far below evaluation guidelines for the most bounding cases and sensitivity evaluations. Furthermore, there is no significant potential for chemical burns from the small aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

Events such as range fires, lightning strikes, or vehicle fires, compressed air additions, activities resulting in excessive HEPA loading and failure from high dP, conditions where the filter becomes saturated with water and the fan is turned on, and contact with crane loads, vehicles, or scaffolding have occurred, or are likely to occur, sometime during the life of these facilities. The event frequency is therefore assumed to be “anticipated.” Note that “anticipated” is the bounding frequency among the initiators; some initiators may have a lower frequency.

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 13-2

UR-01b Filtration Failures Leading to Unfiltered Releases (DSA Section 3.3.2.3.1)

Applies to: • Waste materials in

the SST HEPA filters and ductwork plus waste aerosols originating from tank headspace where amount of aerosol is dependent on the ongoing in-tank activities

• Aerosol generating activities and activities that add contaminants to headspace that are within MAR scope include retrieval operations using modified sluicing, air lance operation, 5,000 lb/in2 high pressure water jet operations in 100-Series SSTs, and HIHTL air blowout directly into headspace or under the waste surface

Also encompasses other waste disturbing activities where the partition fraction is bounded by that for retrieval operations in 100-Series SSTs including waste storage, waste transfers, chemical additions, and waste sampling

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from HEPA filters to the atmosphere due to HEPA filter damage from high temperature, high pressure, or mechanical contact (that does not crush filters) and subsequent unfiltered release (i.e., scenario assumes that ventilation system continues to operate without filtration after event, which encompasses the condition where the active ventilation system is shut down when the event occurs). Applies to: SST portable exhausters Note: Hazardous condition includes mechanical contact hazards (e.g., vehicle, crane load) that jar system and cause partial release of inventory but do not cause sufficient damage to prevent continued operation. Hazards associated with crushing filters where ventilation system does not continue to operate are addressed in the aboveground structure failure accident (see AGSF-03 in Table 11).

High temperature including fire in or around ventilation system, high pressure, and mechanical contact All causes including range fire, nearby vehicle fire, fires initiated by electrical failures, lightning strike, malfunctions of glycol heater, compressed air additions into tank headspace, slucier malfunctions resulting in excessive HEPA loading and failure from high dP, conditions when the fan is turned on, contact with crane load, vehicle, scaffolding, etc. Applies to: • In-tank: Waste storage,

waste transfers, chemical additions, compressed air additions, purge gas additions (e.g., to purge cameras) into headspace from bottles, air lance operation, HIHTL air blowout directly into headspace or under the waste surface, waste sampling, and retrieval operations in 100-Series SSTs.

• Ex-tank on or near ventilation system: Operations and maintenance activities (including vehicle operations) involving combustibles and/or heat sources. Activities that could increase pressure in tank headspace or ventilation system. Vehicle operations, crane operations, construction activities (e.g., erecting or removing scaffolding) that could contact ventilation system.


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations documented in RPP-CALC-48383. Basis for NC Onsite consequence: Onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations documented in RPP-CALC-48383. Consequences for HIHTL air blowout directly into tank headspace are qualitatively judged to be bounded by those documented for an accidental disconnection of an HIHTL in an uncovered pit in RPP-37922. Consequences for an HIHTL air blowout under the waste surface are documented in RPP-37922. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47 applying the methodology for the determination of significant facility worker hazards in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, assuming a release rate of 1.0 E-04 L/s (sum of unfiltered release and HEPA filter failure for fire event which is the bounding release) from RPP-CALC-48383, a dilution volume of 1,000 m3, 600 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area, and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 20,000 Sv/L; USOF of 2 E+07). This conclusion is not sensitive to these assumptions. There is no significant potential for chemical burns from the small aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

Events as range fires, lightning strikes, or vehicle fires, compressed air additions, sluicer malfunctions resulting in excessive HEPA loading and failure from high dP, conditions where the filter becomes saturated with water and the fan is turned on, and contact with crane loads, vehicles, or scaffolding have occurred, or are likely to occur, sometime during the life of these facilities. The event frequency is therefore assumed to be “anticipated.” Note that “anticipated” is the bounding frequency among the initiators; some initiators may have a lower frequency.

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 13-3

UR-02 Filtration Failures Leading to Unfiltered Releases (DSA Section 3.3.2.3.1)


the HEPA filters and ductwork plus waste aerosols originating from ventilated tank/facility headspace where amount of aerosol is dependent on the ongoing in-tank activities.

• Aerosol generating activities and activities that add contaminants to headspace that are within MAR scope include: retrieval operations using modified sluicing, air lance operation, and HIHTL air blowout directly into headspace or under the waste surface

Also encompasses other waste disturbing activities where the partition fraction is bounded by that for ALC operation in DSTs and/or retrieval operations in 100-Series SSTs including waste storage, waste transfers, chemical additions, and waste sampling

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from HEPA filters to the atmosphere due to HEPA filter damage from high temperature, high pressure, or mechanical contact (that does not crush filters) and subsequent unfiltered release from a passively ventilated tanks/facilities Applies to: SST (100 and 200 Series) passive ventilation systems, DCRT, catch tank, and IMUST breather filters, and passive ventilation installed in waste transfer associated structures such as the 6241-A Diversion Box, 6241-V Vent Station, and vacuum retrieval structures.

High temperature including fire in or around ventilation system, high pressure, and mechanical contact All causes including range fire, nearby vehicle fire, fires initiated by electrical failures, lightning strike, compressed air additions, HIHTL air blowout directly into headspace or under the waste surface, waste sampling, contact with crane load, vehicle, scaffolding etc. Applies to: • In-tank: Waste storage,

waste transfers, chemical additions to 100-Series Waste Group C SSTs, compressed air additions, purge gas additions (e.g., to purge cameras) into headspace from bottles, air lance operation, HIHTL air blowout directly into headspace or under the waste surface, waste sampling, and modified sluicing in 100-Series SSTs.

• Ex-tank on or near ventilation system: Operations and maintenance activities (including vehicle operations) involving combustibles and/or heat sources. Activities that could increase pressure in tank headspace or ventilation system. Vehicle operations, crane operations, construction activities (e.g., erecting or removing scaffolding) that could contact ventilation system


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are bounded by UR-01a or UR-01b. Basis for NC Onsite consequence: Onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are bounded by UR-01a or UR-01b. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria, since the consequence is bounded by that of UR-01a or UR-01b.

Events such as range fires, lightning strikes, or vehicle fires, compressed air additions, sluicer malfunctions resulting in excessive HEPA loading and failure from high dP, conditions where the filter becomes saturated with water and the fan is turned on, and contact with crane loads, vehicles, or scaffolding have occurred, or are likely to occur, sometime during the life of these facilities. The event frequency is therefore assumed to be “anticipated.” Note that “anticipated” is the bounding frequency among the initiators; some initiators may have a lower frequency.

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 13-4


Applies to: Waste materials in the HEPA filters and ductwork plus waste aerosols originating from ventilated tank headspaces or rooms

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from HEPA filters to the atmosphere due to HEPA filter damage from high temperature, high pressure, or mechanical contact (that does not crush filters) and subsequent unfiltered release from a passively ventilated facility Applies to: 242-T Evaporator, 244-AR Vault, 244-CR Vault

High temperature including fire in or around ventilation system, high pressure, and mechanical contact All causes including range fire, nearby vehicle fire, fires initiated by electrical failures, lightning strike, compressed air additions, contact with crane load, vehicle, scaffolding etc. Applies to: • In-tank: Residual waste

storage • Ex-tank on or near

ventilation system: Maintenance activities (including vehicle operations) involving combustibles and/or heat sources. Activities that could increase pressure in tank headspace or ventilation system. Vehicle operations, crane operations, construction activities (e.g., erecting or removing scaffolding) that could contact ventilation system


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are bounded by UR-01a or UR-01b. (Rationale provided in note below) Basis for NC Onsite consequence: Onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are bounded by UR-01a or UR-01b. (Rationale provided in note below) Note: There is uncertainty with respect to the residual MAR contained in these ventilation systems particularly in light of the fact that both 244-AR and 244-CR Vaults have filter banks that were abandoned when the facilities were still active. However, consequences for these inactive systems are qualitatively judged to be bounded by UR-01a or UR-01b based on the following rationale. The large volume of waste assumed to be affected in the W-314 exhausters (5.2 L of dried waste) was also assumed to have bounding source terms for tank farm wastes. The resultant radiological and toxicological consequences from the release from ventilation equipment in RPP-CALC-55156 or RPP-CALC-48383 are more than an order of magnitude below 1 rem (offsite), 100 rem (onsite), PAC-2 (offsite), and PAC-3 (onsite). Based on these margins, the consequences from the filter release in the 242-T Evaporator, 244-AR Vault, or the 244-CR Vault, are qualitatively judged to be < 1 rem (offsite), < 100 rem (onsite), < PAC-2 (offsite), and < PAC-3 (onsite). The unfiltered release component for these inactive facilities is judged to be negligible because the passive flow rates are low and the interconnected tanks/facilities are quiescent. Thus, the overall consequences for this hazardous condition are judged to be <1 rem (offsite), < 100 rem (onsite), < PAC-2 (offsite), and < PAC-3 (onsite). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria, because the consequence is consistent with that of UR-01a or UR-01b.

Events such as range fires, lightning strikes, vehicle fires, compressed air additions, and contact with crane load, vehicle, or scaffolding have occurred, or are likely to occur, sometime during the life of these facilities. The event frequency is therefore assumed to be “anticipated.” Note that “anticipated” is the bounding frequency among the initiators; some initiators may have a lower frequency.

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 13-5



Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from HEPA filters to the atmosphere due to HEPA filter damage from high temperature, high pressure, or mechanical contact (that does not crush filters) and subsequent unfiltered release from an actively ventilated facility Applies to: 242-S Evaporator (Hot Side)





A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are bounded by UR-01a or UR-01b. (Rationale provided in note below) Basis for NC Onsite consequence: Onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are bounded by UR-01a or UR-01b. (Rationale provided in note below) Note: The 242-S Evaporator (Hot Side) K1 ventilation system is run intermittently. Because of its higher flow rates and greater number of HEPA filters, the K1 ventilation system is not physically bounded by the active ventilation systems evaluated in UR-01a or UR-01b. However, a previous hazard evaluation RPP-6599 offers the following insights. The 242-S Evaporator was shutdown in 1981 and the evaporator vessel was drained and flushed and both the evaporator room and pump room were washed down. There is some remaining waste in the facility which is not well documented. With respect to the HEPA filters associated with the K1 exhaust system, RPP-6599 states that “The filters have not been changed for several years and do not indicate increased levels of radiation (e.g., approximately 1 mrem/hr or less).” RPP-6599 postulated an unfiltered release hazard and concluded that the hazard did not pose potentially significant onsite worker consequences. This conclusion is re-affirmed considering that the facility has been shut down for decades, the evaporator vessel was drained and flushed, the evaporator and pump rooms were washed, the HEPA filters have previously shown no evidence of increasing radiation levels, and there is no ongoing or planned activity that would increase the facility MAR. The consequences from a filter release are qualitatively judged to be bounded by UR-01a or UR-01b based on the following rationale. The large volume of waste assumed to be affected in the W-314 exhausters (5.2 L of dried waste) was also assumed to have bounding source terms for tank farm wastes. The resultant radiological and toxicological consequences from the release from ventilation equipment in RPP-CALC-55156 or RPP-CALC-48383 are more than an order of magnitude below 1 rem (offsite), 100 rem (onsite), PAC-2 (offsite), and PAC-3 (onsite). Based on these margins, the consequences from the filter release are qualitatively judged to be < 1 rem (offsite), < 100 rem (onsite), < PAC-2 (offsite), and < PAC-3 (onsite). The unfiltered release component for this inactive facility is judged to be negligible because the facility is quiescent. Based on the above, the overall consequences for this hazardous condition are judged to be < 1 rem (offsite), < 100 rem (onsite), < PAC-2 (offsite), and < PAC-3 (onsite). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria, because the consequence is consistent with that of UR-01a or UR-01b.

Events such as range fires, lightning strikes, vehicle fires, compressed air additions, and contact with crane loads, vehicles, or scaffolding, have occurred, or are likely to occur, sometime during the life of these facilities. The event frequency is therefore assumed to be “anticipated.” Note that “anticipated” is the bounding frequency among the initiators; some initiators may have a lower frequency.

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 13-6



Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from HEPA filters to the atmosphere due to HEPA filter damage from high temperature, high pressure, or mechanical contact (that does not crush filters) and subsequent unfiltered release from actively ventilated facility Applies to: 204-AR Waste Unloading Facility





A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are bounded by UR-01a. (Rationale provided in note below) Basis for NC Onsite consequence: Onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are bounded by UR-01a. (Rationale provided in note below) Note: Historical analysis documented in WHC-SD-WM-CN-062 provides information on system parameters which is considered valid because the 204-AR ventilation system has not been modified. According to WHC-SD-WM-CN-062, this ventilation system has two HEPA filters, a prefilter and a low efficiency filter treated as a prefilter. This configuration is bounded by the W-314 systems which has four HEPA filters and two prefilters. From a flow perspective, WHC-SD-WM-CN-062 indicates that the flow rate for the 204-AR ventilation system is 0.94 m3/s which equates to 2,000 ft3/min – less than the 3,000 ft3/min evaluated nominal flow rate for the W-314 ventilation system. In addition, the analysis of the W-314 system assumes worst-case waste and partition fractions associated with ALC operation whereas the 204-AR MAR consists of < 1,500 gal of dilute (and quiescent) waste stored in a catch tank and any other residual contamination in the facility. Also, waste transfers into the 204-AR Waste Unloading Facility [which could potentially add new MAR] are not currently authorized. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria, since the consequence is bounded by that of UR-01a.

Events such as range fires, lightning strikes, vehicle fires, compressed air additions, and contact with crane loads, vehicles, or scaffolding, have occurred, or are likely to occur, sometime during the life of these facilities. The event frequency is therefore assumed to be “anticipated.” Note that “anticipated” is the bounding frequency among the initiators; some initiators may have a lower frequency.

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 13-7


Applies to: Waste materials in the HEPA filters and ductwork plus waste aerosols originating from interconnected tank annulus

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from HEPA filters to the atmosphere due to HEPA filter damage from high temperature, high pressure, or mechanical contact (that does not crush filters) and subsequent unfiltered release from actively ventilated tank annulus when annulus contains waste due to leak from primary tank or misroute into annulus Applies to: DST annulus ventilation system

High temperature including fire in or around ventilation system, high pressure, and mechanical contact All causes including range fire, nearby vehicle fire, fires initiated by electrical failures, lightning strike, compressed air additions, contact with crane load, vehicle, scaffolding etc. Applies to: • In-tank: Post primary tank

leak or misroute into annulus situation where focus would be on removing waste from annulus

• Ex-tank on or near ventilation system: Operations and maintenance activities involving combustibles and/or heat sources. Vehicle operations


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are bounded by UR-01a. (Rationale provided in note below) Basis for NC Onsite consequence: Onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are bounded by UR-01a. (Rationale provided in note below) Note: With the exception of 241-AY-102, which has leaked under normal operating conditions, the DST annulus does not contain waste and there is no MAR available for release. MAR would become available for release from a single DST annulus (or conservatively, two DST annuli from the same farm) if the primary tank leaked or there were a misroute (considering 241-AY-102 has already leaked). Based on MAR location, an important distinction needs to be drawn between evaluations of the annulus vs. primary ventilation systems for the unfiltered release (the dominant contributor to accident consequences). Because all DST primary tanks contain waste the actual flow distribution among the tanks is not important (base case), since the individual distributions are additive and equal the total flow of the primary ventilation system which is multiplied by the partition fraction. For the unfiltered release from the annulus, the MAR distribution is limited to one or at most two annuli so the flow distribution among the annuli is important. The 241-AP annulus ventilation system has the highest nominal flow per tank (1075 ft3/min per RPP-15123, Section 4.1.1.1). The unfiltered release for the W-314 primary ventilation system assumed a nominal flow rate of 3,000 ft3/min which is more than twice the nominal flow rate in a given AP annulus and exceeds the additive flow rates from two DST annuli, thus is considered reasonably bounding. Note that the unfiltered release consequences (base case) in RPP-CALC-55156 are more than two orders of magnitude below guidelines. With respect to the release from the HEPA filters, the 241-AP annulus ventilation system is also bounding and contains 18 HEPA filters (two banks of 9 in series as documented in RPP-15123, Section 4.1.1.2) which is more than the number in the W-314 primary system. However, under normal conditions the filters are “clean” and radiological and toxicological material will only start to accumulate on the filters when waste enters the annulus which would be reasonably bounded by the 5.2 L of dried waste [with worst case source terms] evaluated in UR-01a. Note that loading on the AY farm annulus HEPA filters is low based on radiation readings. Note also that the consequences (base case) from the release of waste material from the ventilation system (including HEPA filters) in RPP-CALC-55156 is at least two orders of magnitude below guidelines. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria, because the consequence is consistent with that of UR-01a.

Events such as range fires, lightning strikes, or vehicle fires, compressed air additions, activities resulting in excessive HEPA loading and failure from high dP, conditions where the filter becomes saturated with water and the fan is turned on, and contact with crane loads, vehicles, or scaffolding have occurred, or are likely to occur, sometime during the life of these facilities. The event frequency is therefore assumed to be “anticipated.” Note that “anticipated” is the bounding frequency among the initiators; some initiators may have a lower frequency. The “anticipated” frequency is also based on the postulated accident scenario that requires a waste leak or misroute into the annulus. (Note that misroute into an annulus has not occurred during the operating history of the DSTs; however, failure of the 241-AY-102 primary tank and waste leak into the annulus has occurred.)

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 13-8


Applies to: Waste aerosols originating from interconnected tanks/facilities and from water lancing/ flushing in SN-278 which is an existing waste transfer line that is being removed and replaced. (See WTL-C-26a)

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from unfiltered release from actively ventilated or passively ventilated tank/facility. No release of inventory from HEPA filters is assumed. Applies to: • Active ventilation systems

including DST primary and annulus ventilation systems, SST portable exhausters (POR03, POR04, POR05, POR06, POR-008), 242-S Evaporator (Hot Side), and 204-AR Waste Unloading Facility.

• Passive ventilation systems including SSTs (100 and 200 Series), DCRT, catch tank, and IMUST breather filters, passive ventilation installed in waste transfer associated structures such as the 6241-A Diversion Box, 6241-V Vent Station, and vacuum retrieval structures, 242-T Evaporator, 244-AR Vault, 244-CR Vault

Also encompasses unfiltered releases from DSTs/SSTs from open risers (or riser sheared off by vehicles or cranes) and other unfiltered pathways (e.g., open test ports, break in sensing lines, incorrect valve line-up), unfiltered releases that occur when DST ventilation systems are not operating (all causes), and unfiltered releases that occur during or are caused by push mode core sampling Also encompasses unfiltered releases from water lancing/ flushing in SN-278

All causes including failure to install HEPA filter, improper installation of HEPA filter, defective or degraded HEPA filter, ductwork failures, failures caused by natural phenomena. Also includes unfiltered releases caused by open risers (or riser sheared off by vehicles or cranes) and other unfiltered pathways (e.g., open test ports, break in sensing lines, incorrect valve line-up), unfiltered releases that occur when DST ventilation systems are not operating (all causes), unfiltered releases that occur during or are caused by push mode core sampling, and unfiltered releases that occur during water lancing/ flushing in SN-278.


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are bounded by UR-01a or UR-01b. (Rationale provided in note below) Basis for NC Onsite consequence: Onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are bounded by UR-01a or UR-01b. (Rationale provided in note below) Note: Primary considerations in unfiltered releases are the flow rate and the aerosol loading of the tank/facility being ventilated. UR-01a and UR-01b evaluate unfiltered releases and releases from ventilation equipment and, therefore, bound events where there is only an unfiltered release (no release from ventilation equipment). The rationale for UR-01a or UR-01b representing the consequences for release from ventilation equipment and unfiltered releases in other facilities is described in UR-03, UR-04, UR-05, and UR-06. Unfiltered releases that occur during water lancing/flushing in SN-278 are limited by the low volume of the lance/flush and because most particles are going to be entrained within the water. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria, because this condition involves an unfiltered release only (i.e., there is no release from the HEPA filters) and thus the consequence is bounded by that of UR-01a or UR-01b.

Events such as failure to install HEPA filter, improper installation of HEPA filter, defective or degraded HEPA filter, ductwork failures, failures caused by natural phenomena or vehicle collisions have occurred, or are likely to occur, sometime during the life of these facilities. The event frequency is therefore assumed to be “anticipated.” Note that “anticipated” is the bounding frequency among the initiators; some initiators may have a lower frequency.”

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 13-9

UR-08 Filtration Failures Leading to Unfiltered Releases (DSA Section 3.3.2.3.1) Note: Formerly known as Steam Intrusion from Interfacing Facilities candidate accident

Applies to: Waste aerosols displaced from DST 241-AW-102 tank headspace and waste materials in the HEPA filters

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from DST 241-AW-102 to the atmosphere due to overpressure caused by uncontrolled influx of steam/hot air. Waste transfer to DST 241-AW-102 is initiated from the 242-A Evaporator pump room sump using a steam jet. After transfer is complete the steam jet is not shut off and saturated steam pressure of 90 lb/in2 and 2,400 lb/h flow rate is injected into the headspace and this steam flow continues until an equilibrium pressure of 18 lb/in2 absolute is reached in the headspace. (It is conservatively assumed that the primary ventilation system is not operating.) This moisture and pressure fails the HEPA filters and displaces aerosols from the headspace through ventilation system (or through unsealed cracks in the cover blocks). Applies to: DST 241-AW-102

Human error or equipment failure - steam block valve inadvertently left opened or failed open to steam jet pump at 242-A resulting in over pressurization of tank 241-AW-102 Applies to: DST 241-AW-102 when the 242-A evaporator is performing steam jet transfers. Consequences bound those for generation of steam in waste transfer line from excessive input from heat trace.

Release of radioactive and other hazardous aerosols to the atmosphere

A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are bounded by UR-01a based on calculations presented in RPP-CALC-55156. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: Onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are bounded by UR-01a based on calculations in RPP-CALC-55156. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria, because the consequence is bounded by UR-01a.

Events involving operator error and/or equipment malfunction have occurred, or are likely to occur, sometime during the life of these facilities. The event frequency is therefore assumed to be “anticipated.”

E1

UR-09 Filtration Failures Leading to Unfiltered Releases (DSA Section 3.3.2.3.1) Note: Formerly known as Evaporator Dump candidate accident

Applies to: Waste aerosols from DST 241-AW-102 tank headspace

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from DST 241-AW-102 to the atmosphere due to pressurization of DST 241-AW-102 from an uncontrolled dump of 242-A Evaporator. The 242-A Evaporator is assumed to dump its entire contents of 26,000 gal to DST 241-AW-102 in the minimum achievable time of 11 minutes. A concurrent loss of active ventilation is assumed. The reduction of tank headspace volume and addition of heat due to the evaporator dump pressurize the headspace. Although no credit is taken for filtration, the HEPA filter contents are not released because of the low pressure produced by this event. Waste aerosols are released through the ventilation system as the headspace pressure is relieved Applies to: DST 241-AW-102

Uncontrolled evaporator dump from all causes (e.g., electrical power failure, loss of compressed air, operator action) which causes headspace pressurization Applies to: Operations during 242-A Evaporator campaign. Note that this hazardous condition bounds controlled dumps of the 242-A Evaporator to 241-AW-102 and from a pressurization stands point bounds transfers of evaporator waste to the receiver tank because of the lower flow rates.


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are bounded by UR-01a based on calculations presented in RPP-CALC-55156. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: Onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are bounded by UR-01a based on calculations presented in RPP-CALC-55156. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria, because the consequence is bounded by UR-01a.

Frequency based on evaporator design which allows for uncontrolled dump of entire evaporator vessel contents on emergency shutdown. Frequency also based on four partial dumps in eleven years as reported in RPP-12159.

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 13-10



an SST HEPA breather filter and riser plus waste aerosols originating from ventilated tank/facility headspace where amount of aerosol is dependent on the ongoing in-tank activities.

• Aerosol generating activities and activities that add contaminants to headspace that are within MAR scope include: modified sluicing in 100-Series SSTs, and HIHTL air blow directly into headspace.

Also encompasses other waste disturbing activities where the partition fraction is bounded by that for ALC operation in DSTs and/or modified sluicing in 100-Series SSTs including waste storage, waste transfers, chemical additions, and waste sampling.

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from an SST HEPA breather filter to the atmosphere due to HEPA filter damage from caustic chemical addition, and subsequent unfiltered release from breather filter pathway. Applies to: SST (100 and 200 Series)

Concentrated caustic solution being added to SST for dissolution retrieval backs up in breather filter riser and damages breather filter, producing an unfiltered release pathway. Applies to: • In-tank: Caustic addition to

100-Series SSTs for hard heel removal.


U N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Bounded by UR-02. Basis for NC Onsite consequence: Bounded by UR-02. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: Bounded by UR-02.

The frequency of “unlikely” is based on operating experience, which shows that two truckloads of caustic is not enough to cause plugging of the riser and backup of caustic that damages the HEPA breather filter.

E1


Applies to: Waste materials in DST HEPA inlet filter and inlet air station plus waste aerosols originating from ventilated tank

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from damaged DST inlet air station, inlet HEPA filter, vacuum control damper, expansion joint, etc. Applies to: DST primary ventilation systems

All causes of releases from inlet air station including damage to air inlet station structure (e.g., seismic, high wind, vehicle impact), damage to inlet HEPA filters (e.g., flow controller configuration changes due to operator error or procedural error), damaged or stuck open damper (e.g., ice buildup, mechanical failure), damaged expansion joint (e.g., solar-induced), etc.


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Bounded by UR-01a. Basis for NC Onsite consequence: Bounded by UR-01a. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: Bounded by UR-01a.

Events involving operator error and/or equipment malfunction have occurred, or are likely to occur, sometime during the life of these facilities. The event frequency is therefore assumed to be “anticipated.” Note that “anticipated” is the bounding frequency among the initiators; some initiators may have a lower frequency.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 13-11


Applies to: Waste materials in HEPA filters and ductwork plus waste aerosols originating from ventilated tank/facility headspace where amount of aerosol is dependent on the ongoing in-tank activities

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from HEPA filters to the atmosphere due to HEPA filter damage from explosion and subsequent unfiltered release (i.e., scenario assumes that ventilation system continues to operate without filtration after event, which encompasses the condition where the active ventilation system is shut down when the event occurs). Applies to: DST primary ventilation systems

Ammonium nitrate buildup on ventilation system HEPA filters and ductwork causes an explosion.


BEU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Bounded by UR-01a. Basis for NC Onsite consequence: Bounded by UR-01a. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: Bounded by UR-01a.

The “beyond extremely unlikely” frequency is qualitatively estimated based on the following. RPP-RPT-33609 evaluated the potential for ammonium nitrate loaded on tank farms ventilation system HEPA filters and ductwork to represent an explosion hazard and concluded that the conditions required for an explosion (i.e., temperature confinement, quality) are not present.

E1


Contaminated rain water from DST primary ventilation system stack

Contaminated intrusion water (rain or snowmelt) that enters stack when exhauster is not operating is blown out when exhauster is operated.

All causes of intrusion water (e.g., rain or snowmelt) entering stack.


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Bounded by UR-01a. Basis for NC Onsite consequence: Bounded by UR-01a. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: Bounded by UR-01a.

An “anticipated” frequency is assigned based on a qualitative assessment that intrusion water entering a DST primary ventilation system stack due to a variety of causes could be expected to occur if no controls were in place. Note that the frequency due to a specific cause may be lower.

E1


Applies to: Waste materials in the AY-102 headspace, ventilation ducts, and HEPA filters

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from AY-102 ventilation system HEPA filter damage from any cause concurrent with both 702-AZ and POR127 simultaneously exhausting AY-10 (unintended operation). Applies to: AY-102 during retrieval and sluicing activities.

Operator error or equipment failure results in both the 702-AZ and POR127 simultaneously exhausting AY-102. Errors include positioning the ventilation system valves, where they do not isolate 702-AZ from AY-102 while POR127 is exhausting. HEPA filter failure assumed.

Release of radioactive and hazardous materials to the atmosphere

EU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: RPP-CALC-55156, Rev 2, analyzed extreme exhaust rates and found that flow rates higher than the maximum should both 702-AZ and POR127 simultaneously exhaust AY-102, would not result in onsite and offsite evaluation guidelines being approached. Basis for NC Onsite consequence: Onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are bounded by UR-01a based on calculations presented in RPP-CALC-55156. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria, because the consequence is bound by UR-01a.

The frequency of “extremely unlikely” is based on both ventilation systems operating concurrent with HEPA filter failure.

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 14-1

OSF-01 Organic Solvent Fire (DSA Section 3.3.2.3.1)

SST or DST contents including waste liquids, contaminated solvent and tank headspace vapors

Organic solvent pool fire involving a separable organic layer of degraded PUREX solvent (NPH/TBP). Applies to: Passively ventilated organic solvent containing SSTs or passively ventilated DSTs (e.g., ventilation shutdown)

Ignition of organic solvent pool in the tank by burning vehicle fuel from a vehicle fuel fire or lightning strikes.

Release of combustion products, headspace vapors and waste liquid aerosols from tank to the atmosphere

EU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence is below guidelines based on a qualitative evaluation of the calculations documented in RPP-13384 and the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13354 (i.e., “flammable gas accident” releases and consequences bound “organic solvent fire” releases and consequences). The offsite toxicological consequence is below guidelines qualitatively based on the scoping calculations documented in RPP-13384. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: Onsite radiological consequence is below guidelines based on scoping calculations described in RPP-13384 (see Table 6, Cases H and J). Onsite toxicological consequence is below guidelines based on scoping calculations described in RPP-13384 (see Table 7, Cases H and J). The analysis assumes that HEPA filters are ruptured by the pressure of the fire-generated headspace gases. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The hazardous condition is not a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. The bounding accident scenario for co-located worker radiological consequence from RPP-13384 is Case L. The bounding scenario for co-located worker toxicological consequence is Case J. These two cases were analyzed for significant facility worker consequence using the methodology in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The conclusion that a significant facility worker consequence does not exist is based on a dilution volume of 3.23E+3 m3 (the total volume of headspace gas released, per RPP-13384), a 10 second evacuation time (selected because the fire would produce easily visible smoke), and ULD and USOF values either taken from RPP-13384 (contaminated solvent smoke, headspace gases, P2O5 smoke) or selected to bound worst case tank waste based on the current BBI (aqueous boil-off, HEPA filter release). Also, the fire is not expected to result in SSC failure or overpressure that could result in a fatality or serious injury (i.e., fragmentation, missiles, falling objects), there is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “extremely unlikely” frequency is based on an analysis of frequencies presented in RPP-13384, Section 2.1.2. Credible ignition sources are limited to burning fuel (e.g., vehicle accident) entering the tank and a lightning strike. The “extremely unlikely” frequency of ignition by burning fuel is based on analysis in RPP-13261 for Scenario 7. The “extremely unlikely” frequency of ignition by lightning is based on evaluation described in RPP-13384, Section 2.1.2 and considers the number of SSTs and DSTs that could support a solvent fire based on a reasonably conservative evaluation.

E1


SST or DST contents including waste liquids, contaminated solvent and tank headspace vapors

Organic solvent pool fire involving a separable organic layer of degraded PUREX solvent (NPH/TBP). Applies to: Actively ventilated organic solvent containing SSTs or actively ventilated DSTs (e.g., ventilation operating)

Ignition of organic solvent pool in the tank by burning vehicle fuel from a vehicle fuel fire or lightning strikes).


EU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence and offsite toxicological consequence are below guidelines based on being bounded by OSF-01. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: Onsite radiological consequence is below guidelines based on scoping calculations described in RPP-13384 (see Table 6, Cases G and L). Onsite toxicological consequence is below guidelines based on scoping calculations described in RPP-13384 (see Table 7, Cases G and L). The analysis assumes that HEPA filters are ruptured by the pressure of the fire-generated headspace gases. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The hazardous condition is not a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. The bounding accident scenario for co-located worker radiological consequence from RPP-13384 is Case L. The bounding scenario for co-located worker toxicological consequence is Case J. These two cases were analyzed for significant facility worker consequence using the methodology in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The conclusion that a significant facility worker consequence does not exist is based on a dilution volume of 3.23E+3 m3 (the total volume of headspace gas released, per RPP-13384), a 10 second evacuation time (selected because the fire would produce easily visible smoke), and ULD and USOF values either taken from RPP-13384 (contaminated solvent smoke, headspace gases, P2O5 smoke) or selected to bound worst case tank waste based on the current BBI (aqueous boil-off, HEPA filter release). Also, the fire is not expected to result in SSC failure or overpressure that could result in a fatality or serious injury (i.e., fragmentation, missiles, falling objects), there is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “extremely unlikely” frequency is based on an analysis of frequencies presented in RPP-13384, Section 2.1.2. Credible ignition sources are limited to burning fuel (e.g., vehicle accident) entering the tank and a lightning strike. The “extremely unlikely” frequency of ignition by burning fuel is based on analysis in RPP-13261 for Scenario 7. The “extremely unlikely” frequency of ignition by lightning is based on evaluation described in RPP-13384, Section 2.1.2 and considers the number of SSTs and DSTs that could support a solvent fire based on a reasonably conservative evaluation.

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 14-2


Waste tank contents including waste liquids, contaminated solvent and tank headspace vapors

Organic solvent pool fire involving a separable organic layer of degraded PUREX solvent (NPH/TBP). Applies to: DCRTs Note: The presence of organic solvents in quantities sufficient to support a fire is unknown for all tanks (i.e., the only known hazard was in 241-C-103, which has since been retrieved). However, waste liquid removal activities, evaporation of the more volatile (and thus more flammable) compounds, and chemical degradation (e.g., hydrolysis) is judged to have eliminated any significant organic solvent fire hazards from catch tanks, 244-CR Vault, 244-AR Vault, 242-T Evaporator tanks, 242-S Evaporator tanks, and IMUSTs.

Ignition of organic solvent pool in the tank by burning vehicle fuel from a vehicle fuel fire or lightning strikes).


EU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence and offsite toxicological consequence are below guidelines based on being bounded by OSF-01. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: Onsite radiological consequence is below guidelines based on scoping calculations described in RPP-13384 (see Table 6, Case O). Onsite toxicological consequence is below guidelines based on scoping calculations described in RPP-13384 (see Table 7, Case O). Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The hazardous condition is not a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. The bounding accident scenario for co-located worker radiological consequence from RPP-13384 is Case L. The bounding scenario for co-located worker toxicological consequence is Case J. These two cases were analyzed for significant facility worker consequence using the methodology in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The conclusion that a significant facility worker consequence does not exist is based on a dilution volume of 3.23E+3 m3 (the total volume of headspace gas released, per RPP-13384), a 10 second evacuation time (selected because the fire would produce easily visible smoke), and ULD and USOF values either taken from RPP-13384 (contaminated solvent smoke, headspace gases, P2O5 smoke) or selected to bound worst case tank waste based on the current BBI (aqueous boil-off, HEPA filter release). Also, the fire is not expected to result in SSC failure or overpressure that could result in a fatality or serious injury (i.e., fragmentation, missiles, falling objects), there is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

“Extremely unlikely” frequency is based on an analysis of frequencies presented in RPP-13384, Section 2.1.2 for SSTs and DSTs (see OSF-01) and is judged to be applicable to DCRTs.

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 14-3


Waste tank contents including waste liquids, contaminated solvent and tank headspace vapors

“Wick-stabilized” organic solvent fire. A “wick-stabilized” fire results when a sludge or saltcake layer is permeated by the organic solvent, but there is no pool of solvent on the waste surface. Applies to: DSTs, SSTs, DCRTs Note: The presence of organic solvents in quantities sufficient to support a fire is unknown for all tanks (i.e., the only known hazard was in 241-C-103, which has since been retrieved). However, waste liquid removal activities, evaporation of the more volatile (and thus more flammable) compounds, and chemical degradation (e.g., hydrolysis) is judged to have eliminated any significant organic solvent fire hazards from catch tanks, 244-CR Vault, 244-AR Vault, 242-T Evaporator tanks, 242-S Evaporator tanks, and IMUSTs.

Ignition of organic solvent “wick-stabilized” fire by burning fuel, lightning strikes, or torch cutting.


U N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence and offsite toxicological consequence are below guidelines based on being bounded by OSF-01. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: Onsite radiological consequence is below guidelines based on scoping calculations described in RPP-13384 (see Table 6, Cases O, Q, Q1 and V). Onsite toxicological consequence is below guidelines based on scoping calculations described in RPP-13384 (see Table 7, Cases O, Q, Q1 and V). Note that no analysis was performed for a case assuming a DST with passive ventilation. However, cases were performed assuming an SST with both active and passive ventilation. For these SST cases, the radiological consequence for the active ventilation case bounds the radiological consequence for the passive ventilation case. Therefore, it is judged that the radiological consequences for a DST with active ventilation (which was analyzed) will bound the radiological consequences for a DST with passive ventilation (which was not analyzed). The SST toxicological consequence for the active ventilation does not bound the SST toxicological consequence for passive ventilation (the passive ventilation case is about a factor of 2-1/2 higher than the active ventilation case). However, the DST active ventilation case is more than an order of magnitude below guidelines, so if the toxicological consequence for the DST passive ventilation case is assumed to be the same 2-1/2 times higher than the DST active ventilation case, the toxicological consequence for the DST passive ventilation case will still be well below guidelines. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The hazardous condition is not a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. The bounding accident scenario for co-located worker radiological consequence from RPP-13384 is Case L. The bounding scenario for co-located worker toxicological consequence is Case J. These two cases were analyzed for significant facility worker consequence using the methodology in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The conclusion that a significant facility worker consequence does not exist is based on a dilution volume of 3.23E+3 m3 (the total volume of headspace gas released, per RPP-13384), a 10 second evacuation time (selected because the fire would produce easily visible smoke), and ULD and USOF values either taken from RPP-13384 (contaminated solvent smoke, headspace gases, P2O5 smoke) or selected to bound worst case tank waste based on the current BBI (aqueous boil-off, HEPA filter release). Also, the fire is not expected to result in SSC failure or overpressure that could result in a fatality or serious injury (i.e., fragmentation, missiles, falling objects), there is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “unlikely” frequency is based on an analysis of frequencies presented in RPP-13384, Section 2.1.2. Credible ignition sources for wick-stabilized fires are limited to burning fuel (e.g., vehicle accident) entering the tank, lightning strikes, and torch cutting.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 14-4


SST or DST contents including waste liquids and tank headspace vapors

In-tank fire due to burning diesel fuel flowing into waste tank. A pool of diesel fuel rather than an organic solvent layer is burning.) Applies to: SSTs, DSTs

Various causes including: 1. Vehicle drives into riser

puncturing diesel fuel tank and ignition occurs.

2. Failure of diesel fuel from package boiler fuel tank (all causes) that causes a spill large enough to enter tank farm (i.e., AW farm) with ignition source present, then burning fuel entering a tank.

3. Refueling truck rollover causing spill large enough to enter tank farm with ignition source present, then burning fuel entering a tank

4. Leak or spill of diesel fuel from a portable heater or during refueling activities with an ignition source present, then burning fuel entering a tank.

Release of headspace vapors and waste liquid aerosols from the tank to the atmosphere

EU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence and offsite toxicological consequence are below guidelines based on being bounded by OSF-01. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological consequence and onsite toxicological consequence are below guidelines based on a comparison to an organic solvent pool fire (OSF-01). The consequences of a diesel fire are significantly less than the organic solvent fire because fire and consequence parameters are the same or similar to the organic solvent fire, but the organic solvent fire has a significant contributor to toxicological consequences from the burning of TBP (i.e., P2O5 is a combustion product) that a diesel fuel fire does not include. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The hazardous condition is not a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. The bounding accident scenario for co-located worker radiological consequence from RPP-13384 is Case L. The bounding scenario for co-located worker toxicological consequence is Case J. These two cases were analyzed for significant facility worker consequence using the methodology in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The conclusion that a significant facility worker consequence does not exist is based on a dilution volume of 3.23E+3 m3 (the total volume of headspace gas released, per RPP-13384), a 10 second evacuation time (selected because the fire would produce easily visible smoke), and ULD and USOF values either taken from RPP-13384 (contaminated solvent smoke, headspace gases, P2O5 smoke) or selected to bound worst case tank waste based on the current BBI (aqueous boil-off, HEPA filter release). Also, the fire is not expected to result in SSC failure or overpressure that could result in a fatality or serious injury (i.e., fragmentation, missiles, falling objects), there is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “extremely unlikely” frequency is based on: 1. The scenario in which

a vehicle strikes a tank riser and a subsequent fuel leak/fire enters the tank through the damaged riser is determined to be “extremely unlikely” as documented in RPP-13261 Table 4-2 Scenario 7.

2. The package boiler fuel tank spill event is judged to be “extremely unlikely” due to the distance the spill must travel to reach a DST, the difficulty in igniting a diesel spill, and limited availability of at grade tank entry points (e.g., pit and pit drain).

3. The refueling truck spill event is judged to be “extremely unlikely” due to the distance the spill must travel to reach a tank (i.e., the refueling truck is outside of the tank farm), the difficulty in igniting a diesel spill, and limited availability of at grade tank entry points (e.g., pit and pit drain).

4. The portable heater leak/spill event is judged to be “extremely unlikely” due to the limited amount of fuel available (i.e., less than 100 gal), the difficulty in igniting diesel fuel, and limited availability of at grade tank entry points (e.g., pit and pit drains).

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 14-5


Tank contents including waste liquids and tank headspace vapors

In-tank fire due to burning diesel fuel flowing into waste tank. A pool of diesel fuel rather than an organic solvent layer is burning.) Applies to: DCRTs, catch tanks, 244-AR Vault tanks, 244-CR Vault tanks, IMUSTs

Various causes including: 1. Vehicle drives into riser

puncturing diesel fuel tank and ignition occurs.

2. Failure of diesel fuel from package boiler fuel tank (all causes) that causes a spill large enough to enter tank farm (i.e., AW farm) with ignition source present, then burning fuel entering a DST.

3. Refueling truck rollover causing spill large enough to enter tank farm with ignition source present, then burning fuel entering a tank

Release of headspace vapors and waste liquid aerosols from the tank to the atmosphere

EU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence and offsite toxicological consequence are below guidelines based on being bounded by OSF-03. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological consequence and onsite toxicological consequence are below guidelines based on a comparison to an organic solvent pool fire (OSF-03). The consequences of a diesel fire are significantly less than the organic solvent fire because fire and consequence parameters are the same or similar to the organic solvent fire, but the organic solvent fire has a significant contributor to toxicological consequences from the burning of TBP (i.e., P2O5 is a combustion product) that a diesel fuel fire does not include. The consequences of a fuel fire in these facilities are therefore bounded by OSF-03. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The hazardous condition is not a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. The bounding accident scenario for co-located worker radiological consequence from RPP-13384 is Case L. The bounding scenario for co-located worker toxicological consequence is Case J. These two cases were analyzed for significant facility worker consequence using the methodology in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The conclusion that a significant facility worker consequence does not exist is based on a dilution volume of 3.23E+3 m3 (the total volume of headspace gas released, per RPP-13384), a 10 second evacuation time (selected because the fire would produce easily visible smoke), and ULD and USOF values either taken from RPP-13384 (contaminated solvent smoke, headspace gases, P2O5 smoke) or selected to bound worst case tank waste based on the current BBI (aqueous boil-off, HEPA filter release). Also, the fire is not expected to result in SSC failure or overpressure that could result in a fatality or serious injury (i.e., fragmentation, missiles, falling objects), there is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “extremely unlikely” frequency is based on: (1) The vehicle driving into a tank riser accident is “extremely unlikely” based on RPP-13261 Table 4-2 Scenario 7, which evaluate SSTs and DSTs and is judged to be conservative relative to DCRTs, catch tanks, 244-AR vault tanks, 244-CR Vault tanks and IMUSTs. (2) The package boiler fuel tank spill event is judged to be “beyond extremely unlikely” due to the distance the spill must travel to reach a catch tank or DCRT. (3) The refueling truck spill event is judged to be “extremely unlikely” due to the distance the spill must travel to reach a tank (i.e., the refueling truck is outside of the tank farm), the difficulty in igniting a diesel spill, and limited availability of at grade tank entry points (e.g., pit and pit drain).

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 14-6


Waste tank contents including waste liquids, contaminated solvent and tank headspace vapors Applies to: DSTs, SSTs, DCRTs

In-tank organic solvent fire (pool fire or wicked-stabilized fire)

Ignition by low energy ignition sources of organic solvent pool or wick-stabilized fire. Applies to: In tank instrumentation, transfer pumps, welding and grinding, reel tapes, conductivity probes, ENRAFs (primary tank level), thermocouples used to monitor the waste, still and television cameras, video cameras, self-powered wireless camera systems, lighting, either fixed or portable, high-mast lighting, in-tank flammable gas sampling, in-tank gamma/neutron measurement, acoustic sensors, push mode core sampling, auger sampling, infrared scanning, LDM


BEU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence and offsite toxicological consequence are below guidelines based on being bounded by OSF-01. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological consequence and onsite toxicological consequence are below guidelines based on being bounded by OSF-01. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The hazardous condition is not a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. The bounding accident scenario for co-located worker radiological consequence from RPP-13384 is Case L. The bounding scenario for co-located worker toxicological consequence is Case J. These two cases were analyzed for significant facility worker consequence using the methodology in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The conclusion that a significant facility worker consequence does not exist is based on a dilution volume of 3.23E+3 m3 (the total volume of headspace gas released, per RPP-13384), a 10 second evacuation time (selected because the fire would produce easily visible smoke), and ULD and USOF values either taken from RPP-13384 (contaminated solvent smoke, headspace gases, P2O5 smoke) or selected to bound worst case tank waste based on the current BBI (aqueous boil-off, HEPA filter release). Also, the fire is not expected to result in SSC failure or overpressure that could result in a fatality or serious injury (i.e., fragmentation, missiles, falling objects), there is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

“Beyond extremely unlikely” since the initiators considered in this hazardous condition have insufficient energy or temperature to be credible initiators of solvent fires. A wick-stabilized fire is more easily ignited than a pool fire and thus provides the minimum ignition requirements for solvent fires. Ignition requirements for wick-stabilized fires are described in HNF-4240, Section 4.2.2 and Chapter 7, and are summarized as follows. • Small heated objects

and sparks with energies ≤ 270 J (e.g., 0.385-in dia steel ball heated to 2372 oF) could not cause ignition.

• Electrical and instrumentation faults (e.g., shorts) are insufficient to cause ignition.

• Welding sparks and hot slag could not cause ignition.

• Cameras and lights (including hot light filaments) could not cause ignition.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 14-7


Tank contents including waste liquids and tank headspace vapors, as well as hydraulic fluid combustion products

In-tank fire due to burning hydraulic fluid spray inside waste tank. Applies to: SSTs, DSTs, DCRTs, catch tanks, 244-AR Vault tanks, 244-CR Vault tanks, IMUSTs

Ignition of leaking hydraulic fluid spray by burning fuel from a vehicle fuel fire or lightning strikes

Release of combustion products, headspace vapors and waste liquid aerosols from the tank to the atmosphere

EU N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: The offsite radiological consequence and offsite toxicological consequence are below guidelines based on being bounded by OSF-01. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite radiological consequence and the onsite toxicological consequence are below guidelines based on a comparison with an organic solvent pool fire (OSF-01). The consequence of a hydraulic fluid spray fire are significantly less than the bounding organic solvent fire because consequence parameters are the same or similar to the organic solvent fire, but the organic solvent fire has a significant contributor to toxicological consequences from the burning TBP (i.e., P2O5 is a combustion product) that a hydraulic spray fire does not include. Also, the average heat release rate of the bounding organic solvent fire is substantially greater than that of a hydraulic fluid spray fire. The onsite radiological and onsite toxicological consequences of a hydraulic fluid spray fire are therefore judged to be below guidelines. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The hazardous condition is not a significant facility worker hazard based on the consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47. The bounding accident scenario for co-located worker radiological consequence from RPP-13384 is Case L. The bounding scenario for co-located worker toxicological consequence is Case J. These two cases were analyzed for significant facility worker consequence using the methodology in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The conclusion that a significant facility worker consequence does not exist is based on a dilution volume of 3.23E+3 m3 (the total volume of headspace gas released, per RPP-13384), a 10 second evacuation time (selected because the fire would produce easily visible smoke), and ULD and USOF values either taken from RPP-13384 (contaminated solvent smoke, headspace gases, P2O5 smoke) or selected to bound worst case tank waste based on the current BBI (aqueous boil-off, HEPA filter release). Also, the fire is not expected to result in SSC failure or overpressure that could result in a fatality or serious injury (i.e., fragmentation, missiles, falling objects), there is no significant potential for chemical or thermal burns from the aerosol release, and the remaining criteria are not applicable.

The “extremely unlikely” frequency is based on an analysis of frequencies presented in RPP-13384, Section 2.2. The leak would have to occur during another low likelihood, high energy, event such as a lightning strike or vehicle accident that results in burning vehicle fuel entering the riser, or the spray would have to be oriented to contact another ignition source such as a very hot object or concurrent electrical short. The only hot object expected to be in the tank (camera lighting) was judged to be insufficient to ignite the spray (HNF-SD-WM-FHA-020). The only other potential ignition source that was identified was an electrostatic charge, which was evaluated and shown not to be credible (HNF-SD-WM-FHA-020). Therefore, the frequency is judged to be “extremely unlikely.”

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 15-1

AGTF-01 Above-Ground Tank Failure (DSA Section 3.3.2.3.1)

Radioactive and other hazardous materials in 242-T Evaporator or 242-S Evaporator (Hot Side) vessels

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials to the atmosphere due to 242-T Evaporator or 242-S Evaporator (Hot Side) vessel failure

Failure of 242-T Evaporator or 242-S Evaporator (Hot Side) vessel from any cause (e.g., part of roof or wall panel falls down due to aging, natural phenomena event (seismic, snow or ash load, wind), water infiltration through roof foam corrodes truss attachment points; load handling).

Release of radioactive and other hazardous material to the atmosphere.

A

N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations documented in RPP-13175. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are based on scoping calculations presented in RPP-13175. Assumptions for the consequence include: • The maximum volume of waste in an above ground tank is 300 gal of worst case SST or

DST waste. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, assuming a release amount of 1.1 E-03 L for radiological and 5.4 E-03 L for toxicological; a dilution volume of 1000 m3; 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area; and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 1.5 E+04 Sv/L and USOF of 2.0 E+07. This conclusion is not sensitive to these assumptions. Even though these evaporator vessels potentially contain high pH, caustic solutions, there is no significant potential for chemical burns to the facility worker from the failure of these vessels because workers are excluded from the structures containing these vessels, and so would not be in the vicinity of the vessels at the time of their failure. The remaining criteria of Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, are not applicable.

The “anticipated” frequency is based on the degradation of the 242-T Evaporator structure, which has received minimal maintenance. This frequency bounds those of failures of the 242-T Evaporator or 242-S Evaporator (Hot Side) vessels from other causes.

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 15-2


Condensate, chemicals, and contaminants

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials to the atmosphere due to condensate seal pot or collection tank failure Applies to: • All active ventilation

systems • (i.e., AZ301-COND-TK-

001 and the staged 8,000 gallon tanker installed by the AZ-301 Tanker Option Project; 241-AN tank farm - seal pot SP-101, 102, 103, 170, 380, and 480; 241-AP tank farm – Seal pot SP-101; 241-AW tank farm – seal pot SP-101, SP-170, SP-380, and SP-480; 241-AY/AZ tank farms ‒ seal pot AZ-PC-SP-1; 241-SY tank farm – (A train) Seal pot SP-401 and (B train) seal pot SP-001; PORs (003, 004, 005, 006, and 008) – seal pot VTP-SP-001

• All inactive ventilation systems

Failure of condensate seal pot or collection tank from any cause (e.g., seismic or other NPH event, load drop, vehicle collision)


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: AZ301-COND-TK-001. Offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on a qualitative evaluation that the consequences are bounded by AGTF-01 (see below). AZ301 staged tanker. Offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations documented in RPP-13175. Basis for NC Onsite Worker consequence: AZ301-COND-TK-001. For onsite radiological and toxicological consequences, RPP-35850, Section 4.4, states the consequences of condensate system releases, including ventilation system seal pots and collection tanks, are bounded by the 242-T Evaporator releases described in RPP-13175. This conclusion is based upon the following factors. • The most limiting value is the condensate TEEL-3 USOF of 7.8 E+06, and the

radiological source term of 1.4 E+01 SV/L (for the AZ301-COND-TK-001, which is considered bounding for condensate releases).

• Lower source terms offset larger volume than the 242-T Evaporator release (1,200 gal for AZ301-COND-TK-001 versus 300 gal for 242-T).

Section 2.1 of RPP-35850 makes the engineering judgment that the evaluation of active ventilation condensate systems provides an adequate evaluation of inactive condensate systems. AZ301 staged tanker. The onsite worker radiological and toxicological consequences are based on scoping calculations presented in RPP-13175. Assumptions for the calculations include: • The ULD and USOF values are taken from RPP-35850 (see values listed above for

AZ301-COND-TK-001). • The maximum volume of condensate in the tanker truck is approximately 8,000 gallons Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, assuming a release amount of 4.9 E-05 L for radiological and 2.4 E-04 L for toxicological (both are the amount released in 10 s and based on four times larger volume than RPP-13175 to account for a four times larger vessel) for the AZ301-COND-TK-001; and a release amount of 2.9 E-03 L for radiological and 7.3 E-03 L for toxicological for the AZ301 staged tanker (based on 10 s release); a dilution volume of 1000 m3; 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area; and reasonably conservative source terms (i.e., ULD of 1.4 E+01 Sv/L and USOF of 7.8 E+06 [both values from RPP-35850]). This conclusion is not sensitive to these assumptions. Even though these seal pots or collection tanks potentially contain high pH, caustic solutions, there is no significant potential for chemical burns to the facility worker from the failure of these vessels. For the seal pots, this conclusion is based on their small size and the fact that they are vented to atmosphere. For the AZ301-COND-TK-001, it is based on its being vented to atmosphere, and its containment below grade in an outer steel structure, separated from the facility workers by a steel grating (i.e., the workers are above the sump containing the collection tank). For the AZ301 staged tanker, this conclusion is based on the tanker being vented to atmosphere and having an installed pressure relieving device and vacuum breaker to prevent overpressure and siphon events, an overflow basin for containment of leaks at the tanker inlet (at top of the tanker); the tanker has a capacity of 8,000 gallons, but a fill limit of 7,000 gallons will be administratively imposed to prevent overfilling of the tanker (per operating procedure TF-200-110); and use of sleeving over single-walled pipe exterior to the AZ301 structure for containment of condensate leaks. The remaining criteria of Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, are not applicable.

The “anticipated” frequency is based on the observation that there are a number of events (dropped loads, vehicle collisions, or natural events) that might cause condensate seal pot or collection tank failure. This bounds the frequency of the evaluation basis NPH (“unlikely”).

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 15-3


Radioactive and other hazardous materials in the 241-C-200 SST vacuum retrieval system slurry tank or water separator

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials to the atmosphere due to vacuum retrieval slurry tank or water separator failure

Failure of vacuum retrieval slurry tank or water separator from any cause (e.g., load drop; vehicle impact to pump/vessel or vacuum enclosure; range fire; NPH event [i.e., high wind, seismic event]; vehicle or hydraulic fluid fire in enclosure)


A N N N N N N Basis for NC Offsite consequence: Offsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations documented in RPP-13175. Basis for NC Onsite consequence: Onsite radiological and toxicological consequences are based on calculations documented in RPP-13175. Basis for NC Facility Worker consequence: The potential hazardous condition does not meet the significant facility worker consequence criteria in Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F. The potential radiation dose and toxicological exposure are well below the 100 rem and PAC-3 thresholds for a significant worker hazard based on the simple, reasonably conservative estimating methods in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, assuming a release amount of 1.1 E-03 L for radiological and 5.4 E-03 L for toxicological; a dilution volume of 1000 m3; 10 s for a facility worker to evacuate the area; and reasonably conservative tank waste (i.e., ULD of 1.5 E+04 Sv/L and USOF of 2.0 E+07). Even though the vacuum retrieval slurry vessel and water separator potentially contain high pH, caustic solutions, there is no significant potential for chemical burns to the facility worker from the failure of these vessels. This conclusion is based on the small volume of this solution remaining in these vessels after pump-down, and potential dilution by intrusion water (i.e., rain or snow melt) entering these vessels subsequent to pump-down. The remaining criteria of Table 7 of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-47, Attachment F, are not applicable.

“Anticipated” based on the highest probability of a multitude of causes, such as aging, vehicle impacts, or NPH events.

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 16-1

RP-01 RP Small portion of resuspendable radioactive material present in crib, ditch, UPR site, or other radioactively contaminated 200 area soils.

Ionizing radiation exposure to the facility worker during routine/planned work activities from radioactive contamination dispersed from crib, ditch or UPR site to the environment as a result of high winds or range fires.

Inadvertent contact with contaminated soil during normal work activities resulting from high winds or range fire releasing/mobilizing radioactive materials present in soil or present in plants growing in areas where roots can access radioactive contamination.

Potential minor ionizing radiation exposure to facility workers from contact, ingestion, or inhalation. This is an ALARA concern; the dose received is not considered to cause significant worker harm.

A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N The offsite and onsite consequence for this event is N/A because no significant dispersal of material with subsequent radiation exposure is postulated to occur. The radiation exposure from this event is local to the facility worker. The radiation exposure potential from exposure to radioactive contamination associated with releases of contamination from cribs, ditches, ponds, and UPRs when not associated with the accidents evaluated in the DSA does not represent the potential for severe injury or death to the worker.

The frequency of this accident is “anticipated” because contamination spread events have been observed to occur on the Hanford Site. The contractually mandated Radiation Protection SMP provides the control of this event. The program is described in Chapter 7 of the DSA. The program is also required by the requirements of the 10 CFR 835.

E1

RP-02 RP Small portion of the total available solid radioactive material present in crib, ditch, UPR site, or other radioactively contaminated 200 area soils.

Ionizing radiation exposure to the facility worker during routine/planned work activities from contamination released to soil surface from crib, ditch or UPR site as a result of animal intrusion or flooding (e.g., water line breaks, rain, or snow melt).

Inadvertent facility worker contact during normal/routine work activities with contaminated soil mobilized by animal intrusion (burrowing) or flooding that disperses buried radioactive material to the soil surface.

Exposure of onsite personnel to ionizing radiation from buried contaminated soils brought to the surface and dispersed. This is an ALARA concern; the dose received is not considered to cause significant worker harm.

A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N The consequence of this event is N/A because it involves local movement/dispersal of residual quantities of radioactive contamination that animals or water can mobilize and disperse. The radiation exposure potential from mobilization and dispersal of radioactive contamination in cribs, ditches, or UPR sites by animals or water does not represent the potential for severe injury or death to the worker.

The frequency of this accident is “anticipated” because contamination spread events caused by animal intrusion and water action have been observed to occur on the Hanford Site. The contractually mandated Radiation Protection SMP, described in Chapter 7 of the DSA, provides the control of this event. The program is also required by 10 CFR 835.

E1

RP-03 RP Radioactive and hazardous material from general soil surface or near-surface release points. Applies to: General contaminated soils mobilized by high pressure air or water.

Exposure to radioactive materials in soil dispersed from surface or near surface release points to the general area due to a failure of a pressurized line. Applies to: Unburied or uncovered pressurized compressed air, instrument or water line, above ground cylinder/bottle including air compressor, air tool exhaust, air driven pumps, pneumatic testing of lines, or nitrogen tanker impingement on soils.

Pressurized line failure due to corrosion, mechanical failure or improper assembly.

Exposure to radioactive and hazardous material particulates in the soil dispersed to the general area.

A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N The offsite and onsite consequence for this event is N/A because no significant dispersal of material with subsequent radiation exposure is postulated to occur. The radiation exposure from this event is local to the facility worker. The radiation exposure potential from exposure to radioactive contamination associated with releases from general contamination soils when not associated with the accidents evaluated in the DSA does not represent the potential for severe injury or death to the worker.

A frequency of “anticipated” is conservatively assigned to the event. A range of frequencies can be assigned to this event due to the nature of the initiating event; from operator error to non-mechanistic failures.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 16-2

RP-04 RP Radioactive contamination (liquid or solid) present inside or on the surfaces of equipment or structures associated with waste storage, processing, or transfer.

Ionizing radiation exposure to the facility worker during routine/planned work activities associated with physical contamination of facility worker by radioactive material from tank waste. The radioactive contamination is caused by past storage, processing, transfer, or handling of tank waste. Applies to: Routine/planned operations, maintenance, installation, removal, or construction activities that result in: • Physical contamination

from opening pits, access ports, tank risers, removing cover blocks, installing/removing HIHTLs, installing/removing jumpers, removing contaminated equipment

• Physical contamination from performing planned installation, removal, repairs, or maintenance on contaminated waste storage and handling equipment, waste tank ventilation systems, tank monitoring and surveillance equipment

• Physical contamination during surveillance of contaminated facilities, equipment, or operation.

Changed working conditions, changes in environmental conditions, or human error causes facility worker to come in contact with residual radioactive contamination present in/on equipment or facilities.

Facility worker exposure to ionizing radiation from skin contact, ingestion, or inhalation of residual radioactive contamination. This is an ALARA concern; the dose received is not considered to cause significant worker harm.

A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N The offsite and onsite consequence for this event is N/A because no significant dispersal of material with subsequent radiation exposure is postulated to occur. The radiation exposure from this event is local to the facility worker. The radiation exposure potential from exposure to radioactive contamination associated with releases of contamination from cribs, ditches, ponds, and UPRs when not associated with the accidents evaluated in the DSA does not represent the potential for severe injury or death to the worker.

The frequency of this event is “anticipated” because contamination of workers during routine operation, maintenance, construction, and equipment installation/removal has occurred on the Hanford site. The contractually mandated Radiation Protection SMP, described in Chapter 7 of the DSA, is specifically tasked with the control of this event. The program is also required by 10 CFR 835.

E1

RP-05 RP Ionizing radiation from tank waste

Ionizing radiation exposure to the facility worker (no physical contact) from radioactive waste and contamination present in or on facilities and equipment used to store, process, transfer, or handle tank waste (including connected supporting systems such as compressed air, steam, hydraulic system, or raw water). Applies to: Routine/planned work activities in the TOC facilities.

Routine/planned work activities expose facility worker to direct ionizing radiation from radioactive waste contamination present in or on facilities and equipment that handle/transfer waste.

Facility worker exposure to ionizing radiation associated with the presence of tank waste contamination. This is an ALARA concern; the dose received is not considered to cause significant worker harm.

A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N The offsite and onsite consequence for this event is N/A because no significant dispersal of material with subsequent radiation exposure is postulated to occur. The radiation exposure from this event is local to the facility worker. The radiation exposure potential from exposure to ionizing radiation in the tank farms when not associated with the accidents evaluated in the DSA does not represent the potential for severe injury or death to the worker.

The frequency of this event is “anticipated” because tank waste is present in the tank farms. The contractually mandated Radiation Protection SMP is specifically tasked with the control of this event. The program is described in Chapter 7 of the DSA. The program is also required by the requirements of the 10 CFR 835.

E0

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 16-3

RP-06 RP Ionizing radiation from industrial radioactive check sources

Ionizing radiation exposure to the facility worker (no contact) while using, storing, or otherwise being in proximity with radioactive check sources.

Routine/planned work activities expose facility worker to direct ionizing radiation from radioactive check sources.

Facility worker exposed to ionizing radiation associated with radioactive check sources. This is an ALARA concern; the dose received is not considered to result in significant worker harm.

A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N The offsite and onsite consequence for this event is N/A because no significant dispersal of material with subsequent radiation exposure is postulated to occur. The radiation exposure from this event is local to the facility worker. The radiation exposure potential from exposure to ionizing radiation from radioactive check sources does not represent the potential for severe injury or death to the worker.

The frequency of this event is “anticipated” because radioactive check sources are routinely handled in TOC facilities. The contractually mandated Radiation Protection SMP provides the control of this event. The program is described in Chapter 7 of the DSA. The program is also required by the requirements of the 10 CFR 835.

E0

RP-07 RP Ionizing radiation from naturally occurring radioactive materials

Ionizing radiation exposure to the facility worker during routine/planned work activities resulting from naturally occurring radioactive materials (radon) that buildup in TOC facilities.

Opening/entering TOC facilities expose facility worker to ionizing radiation from the buildup of natural radiation sources.

This is an ALARA concern; the dose received does not result in prompt worker harm.

A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N The offsite and onsite consequence for this event is N/A because no significant dispersal of material with subsequent radiation exposure is postulated to occur. The radiation exposure from this event is local to the facility worker. The radiation exposure potential from exposure to ionizing radiation from natural sources does not represent the potential for severe injury or death to the worker.

The frequency of this event is “Anticipated” because natural radioactive sources are always present in tank waste storage, processing, and transfer associated facilities. The contractually mandated Radiation Protection SMP provides the control of this event. The program is described in Chapter 7 of the DSA.

E0

RP-08 RP Ionizing radiation from radioactive material in transfer line or waster transfer-associated structure during a waste transfer.

Ionizing radiation exposure to the facility worker during waste transfers or as a result of waste tank shielding reduction. Applies to: • Surveillance of waste

transfer lines during a waste transfer.

• Workers performing normal work in the vicinity of exposed buried transfer lines being used to transfer waste.

• Excavation activities occurring over waste transfer lines, structures or tanks.

1. Reduced radiation shielding on waste transfer lines, waste transfer associated structures, or waste storage tanks due to excavation or flood washout that result in removal of soil or overburden (gravel) with facility worker unaware of waste transfer.

2. Routine/planned work requires facility worker to be in proximity to waste containing structures or transfer lines during waste transfers.

Facility worker exposed to direct ionizing radiation during waste transfers tank waste. This is an ALARA concern; the dose received is not considered to result in significant worker harm.

U N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N The offsite and onsite consequence for this event is N/A because no significant dispersal of material with subsequent radiation exposure is postulated to occur. The radiation exposure from this event is local to the facility worker. The radiation exposure potential from exposure to ionizing radiation from a decrease in shielding over a waste tank does not represent the potential for severe injury or death to the worker.

The frequency of this event is “unlikely” because a very large quantity of soil/overburden over a waste tank would have to be removed. The contractually mandated Radiation Protection SMP provides the control of this event. The program is described in Chapter 7 of the DSA.

E0

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 16-4

RP-09 RP Isotopic material from soil sampling sensor

Facility worker exposure to ionizing radiation or physical contamination from isotope source in the cone penetrometer multi-sensor probe. Applies to: All soil sampling activities using isotopic radiation sources.

Human error or equipment failure during cone penetrometer operation causes the radioactive source to be unshielded or broken resulting in ionizing radiation exposure and spread of isotopic material.

Facility worker exposed to ionizing radiation associated with isotopic source in sensor. This is an ALARA concern; the dose received is not considered to result in significant worker harm.

A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N The offsite and onsite consequence for this event is N/A because no significant dispersal of material with subsequent radiation exposure is postulated to occur. The radiation exposure from this event is local to the facility worker. The radiation exposure potential from exposure to ionizing radiation from vadose zone soil samples does not represent the potential for severe injury or death to the worker.

The frequency of this event is “anticipated” because general industry experience with radioactive sources shows that exposure events have occurred during the last 10 years. The contractually mandated Radiation Protection SMP provides the control of this event. The program is described in Chapter 7 of the DSA.

E1

RP-10 RP Ionizing radiation from radioactive material in sample retrieved during soil sampling activities.

Facility worker exposure to ionizing radiation or physical contamination with soil contaminated with tank waste that is inadvertently released during soil sampling activities. Includes ingestion, inhalation, and direct physical contact. Applies to: All soil sampling methods and associated activities.

1. Human error or equipment failure during soil sampling operation when retrieving/handling soil sample.

2. Higher than anticipated contamination levels in soil.

3. Breach of waste storage tank or inactive transfer line during soil sampling activities.

Facility worker exposed to ionizing radiation or physical contamination from contaminated soil as a result of soil sampling activities. This is an ALARA concern; the dose received is not considered to result in significant worker harm.

A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N The offsite and onsite consequence for this event is N/A because no significant dispersal of material with subsequent radiation exposure is postulated to occur. The radiation exposure from this event is local to the facility worker. The radiation exposure potential from exposure to ionizing radiation from natural sources does not represent the potential for severe injury or death to the worker.

The frequency of this event is “anticipated” because releases of contamination and ionizing radiation exposure during other types of sampling activities have occurred on the Hanford site. The contractually mandated Radiation Protection SMP provides the control of this event. The program is described in Chapter 7 of the DSA.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 17-1

STD_IND-CHEM-01 OCC Toxic industrial chemical

Facility worker is exposed to a toxic industrial chemical, or hazardous material such as; pesticides, cleaning chemicals, asbestos, or beryllium, by absorption through the skin, inhalation, or through the blood stream that causes illness, disease, or death.

Facility worker is exposed to a toxic material, chemical, or toxic products of chemical reaction during course of work performance.

Effects of toxic chemical exposure to the facility worker range from minor irritation to long-term harm or death. The amount and toxicity of the chemical exposure determines the hazardous effects.

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A The consequence of this accident is N/A because it only involves an occupational hazard. The frequency is N/A because it only involves an occupational hazard. Controls for this accident are established and maintained by the contractually mandated TOC safety management programs.

E1

STD_IND-CHEM-02 OCC Corrosive industrial chemical

Facility worker is exposed to a corrosive industrial chemical that damages the skin, eyes, or lungs causing injury or death, including chemical burns caused by skin contact with caustic waste during a planned work activity (e.g., jumper changes, HIHTL airblow, disconnection/removal/handling of contaminated equipment, flushing of ventilation equipment, pneumatic testing of transfer line encasements, waste sampling).

Facility worker is exposed to a corrosive industrial chemical (acids or bases) during work performance.

Effects of corrosive industrial chemical exposure to the facility worker range from minor irritation to long-term harm or death. The amount and corrosiveness of the chemical determines the hazardous effects.


E1

STD-IND-CHEM-03 OCC Toxic chemical vapors contained in tank waste

Facility worker is exposed to chemical vapors released from waste tank head spaces, or waste transfer-associated structures causing discomfort, irritation, illness, or long-term disability.

Facility worker is exposed to tank waste chemical vapors while working around locations such as open risers, passive ventilation filters, vacuum relief devices, and active ventilation systems where vapors are present.

Effects of facility worker exposure to tank waste chemical vapors range from minor irritation to long-term harm. The amount and composition of the vapors determines the hazardous effects. Exposure to unconfined tank waste chemical vapors is not expected to cause severe injury or death (i.e., chemical vapor exposures < PAC-3).

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A The consequence of this accident is N/A because tank waste chemical vapor exposure is considered an occupational hazard. Chemical vapor exposure is addressed by compliance with the national OSHA Permissible Exposure Limits (PEL) and the ACGIH Threshold Limit Values (TLV) and is verified by facility worker monitoring and periodic measurement/ monitoring of vapor concentrations at points where workers could be exposed to the vapors. The exposure to tank chemical vapors, when not associated with the accidents evaluated in the DSA, does not present the potential for severe injury or death to the worker (i.e., exposures < PAC-3).

The frequency is N/A because it only involves an occupational hazard. Controls for this accident are established and maintained by the contractually mandated TOC safety management programs.

E1

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 17-2

STD-IND-CHEM-04 OCC Toxic/corrosive chemicals contained in tank waste

Facility worker skin contact with tank waste that does not occur during a waste transfer or an accident involving waste stored in tanks (e.g., DSTs, SSTs, DCRTs) resulting in burns or toxic chemical absorption.

Equipment failures, human error, unanticipated presence of tank waste during routine/planned work activities cause facility worker to come into contact with tank waste. Examples of sources of tank waste that this hazardous condition applies to: • Potential waste release from

contaminated equipment removed from a tank.

• Potential release from condensate tank AZ301-CONF-TK-001 or the transfer system that pumps the condensate to DST 241-A-101.

• Potential release of caustic solutions used to flush ventilation systems.

• Potential release of waste during jumper changes when the waste transfer-associated covers are not in place.

• Potential release of waste during blowout of a HIHTL primary hose and connections and connected waste transfer system primary piping.

• Potential waste releases during plugged slurry distributor flushing and grouting activities.

• Potential waste releases during plugged transfer pump pressure clearing, flushing, and punching/draining activities.

Effects of facility worker skin exposure to tank waste range from minor irritation to long-term harm. The quantity, constituents and concentration of the material involved, and duration of exposure determines the level of harm that can occur.

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A The consequence of this accident is N/A because physical exposure to tank waste during routine/planned work that does not occur during waste transfers or as a result of accidents involving waste stored in tanks is defined to be an occupational hazard. Consensus codes and standards (OSHA, among others) were developed to provide controls to address this hazard. The quantity, constituents and concentration of the material involved, and duration of exposure determines the level of harm that can occur.

The frequency is N/A because it only involves an occupational hazard. The contractually mandated TOC Industrial Hygiene safety management program is responsible for protecting the facility worker from this type of hazard.

E1

STD_IND-FIEX-01 OCC N/A Facility worker is exposed to heat from nontank waste associated fire or deflagration involving motor fuel, solvents, or combustible solids/dusts that cause injury or death.

Ignition source and nontank waste associated combustible/flammable solids/dusts, liquids, or vapors present where facility worker is working. Sources of ignition include welding, fired heaters, operating internal combustion engines, electrical arcs, and static discharge.

Exposure to fire consequence ranges from minor injury to long-term disability, or death. Combustible materials such as clothing, plastic sheets, and bags, tents require more robust ignition sources than flammable liquids or gases but the consequence is estimated to be the same for either material in the worst case.


N/A

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 17-3

STD_IND-FIEX-02 OCC N/A Facility worker is exposed to an explosion caused by ignition of a flammable industrial gas or reactive chemical runaway reaction that results in injury or death from burns or high energy impacts.

Flammable industrial gas (propane, butane, welding gases, bottled hydrogen) is ignited in an uncontrolled manner or explosive chemical reaction occurs while facility worker is working on or near associated equipment.

Explosions produce impact and heat related injuries in proportion to the amount of energy released. Sever injury or death often occurs.


N/A

STD_IND-HS-01 OCC N/A Facility worker exposed to hot surfaces associated with diesel or gasoline engines, fired or electrical heaters, hot hydraulic fluids, heated chemicals, flame welding, high temperature lighting, hot power tools, etc. that causes injury or death.

Facility worker comes into contact with hot surface because of human error.

The consequences of exposure to hot surfaces range from minor injury to long-term disability, or death from injury complications.


N/A

STD_IND-SE-01 OCC N/A Facility worker is exposed to a sudden and violent release of energy from a pressurized fluid container such as; compressed gas or boiler steam causing severe injury, long-term disability, or death from burns or mechanical impact.

Facility worker handling of compressed gas cylinders, compressed gas hoses, or in proximity of an operating boiler when equipment failure occurs.

Sudden releases of stored energy cause a range of consequences from minor to severe injury, long-term disability, or death.


N/A

STD_IND-SE-02 OCC N/A Facility worker is exposed to pressurized hot water resulting from a leak in flush water lines causing severe injury, long-term disability, or death from burns or mechanical impact.

Facility worker handling of pressurized hot water during failure of flush water lines.



N/A

STD_IND-SE-03 OCC Contaminated propylene glycol

Facility worker is exposed to pressurized hot glycol liquid/vapors resulting from boil-over or leak in in-line glycol heater causing severe injury, long-term disability, or death from scalding or burns.

All causes including heater set-point failure, heater operated without pump running, etc., causes facility worker to be exposed to pressurized hot glycol liquid/vapors.



N/A

STD_IND-ELEC-01 OCC N/A Facility worker is exposed to heat from electrical arcs or shorted equipment causing injury or death from flash burns.

Equipment failure (insulation damage or failure) or human error causes facility worker to be exposed to electrical arc generated heat.

Exposure to unplanned electrical arc consequence ranges from minor injury to long-term disability, or death.


N/A

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 17-4

STD_IND-ELEC-02 OCC N/A Facility worker exposed to electrically energized equipment, switch gear, or power lines resulting in injury or death from electrocution.

Human error during work on electrical equipment or positioning cranes, ladders, or other long reach equipment near power lines results in contact with energized power source.

Electrical shock can produce a range of consequences ranging from minor discomfort to burns, permanent nerve damage, severe injury or death.


N/A

STD_IND-STAT-01 OCC N/A Facility worker exposed to static electrical discharge resulting in damage to the body’s nervous system.

Buildup of static electricity from Movement of conveyor belts, flow of nonconductive liquids, movement of nonconductive powders coupled with person being present when discharge occurs.

Static discharge is generally a minor problem that causes discomfort. However, static discharge is also an initiator of other types of accidents such as falling from elevated surfaces or ignition of combustible liquids or gases.


N/A

STD_IND-OD-01 OCC N/A Facility worker exposed to oxygen deficient atmospheres causing severe injury or death

Human error results in worker entry into a confined space that has oxygen deficient atmosphere or workers are present in an area where significant quantities of asphyxiating gases are present or can be released.

Exposure to oxygen deficient atmospheres often causes severe and permanent injury to bodily organs or death by asphyxiation.


N/A

STD_IND-STF/SB-01 OCC N/A Facility worker involved in soil collapse in a trench or excavation resulting in severe injury or death.

Human error or equipment failure while facility worker present near or in trenches or holes results in worker falling into excavation or being buried.

Trench collapse consequence can range from minor work stoppage to severe injury or death to the facility worker.


N/A

STD_IND-STF/SB-02 OCC N/A Facility worker involved in falls from elevated locations (e.g., ladders, platforms, towers) or on walking surfaces (e.g., slippery floors, poor housekeeping, uneven walking surfaces, exposed ledges, etc.) resulting in injury or death.

Human error coupled with enabling conditions such as; wet, frosty, or frozen surfaces or physical surface discontinuities.

Falls from elevated locations can cause a wide range of injuries from minor bruises to internal injuries that result in death. Slips and trips on walking surfaces also have a range of injury consequences, however death is not as likely as from falls from elevated locations.


N/A

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 17-5

STD_IND-STF/SB-03 OCC N/A Facility worker exposed to mechanical vibration that causes damage to nerve endings.

Worker required to use equipment such as picks or sledge hammers or powered equipment with high levels of vibration (jackhammer) on a frequent or long duration basis.

Injuries from mechanical vibration are not life threatening. However, such injuries can result in permanent disability.


N/A

STD_IND-STF/SB-04 OCC N/A Facility worker exposed to crushing, caught-between, cutting, tearing, shearing equipment and operating hazards resulting in severe injury or death.

Human error causes worker to be crushed between fixed object and material being moved by vehicle or crane. Worker error results in extremity being crushed or cut in machinery or tools.

Injuries to workers caught between a fixed object and a large moving object can result in long-term disability, or death. Crushing and shearing that occurs in machinery and shearing tools can result in loss of limb or long-term disability or even death.


N/A

STD_IND-STF/SB-05 OCC N/A Facility worker struck by moving/accelerated mass such as falling objects, rotating equipment, moving vehicles, or projectiles causing severe injury or death.

Crane load drops caused by human error or equipment failure. Worker hit by moving trucks, cars, or other vehicles as a result of inattention or equipment failure. Worker coming into contact with rotating equipment or struck by objects ejected from pressurized systems.

Worker injuries from “struck-by” accidents can range from minor bruises and scrapes to death, depending on the situation and shape and form of the projectile.


N/A

STD_IND-STF/SB-06 OCC N/A Facility worker strikes body part against tool or object with sufficient force to cause injury (head impact with fixed object, knife cuts, screwdriver punctures, shin scrapes).

Facility worker bumps head while entering a congested area or while working on equipment with projecting edges. Worker using excessive force on screwdriver or other pointed object slips and punctures skin. Worker using sharp knife cuts self as a result of inattention or excessive force.

Worker injuries from “striking-against” accidents can vary from minor to potential long-term disability. Death is not impossible, but is very unlikely.


N/A

STD_IND-STF/SB-07 OCC N/A Facility worker experiences strains or sprains including hernia due to overexertion or repetitive motion causing reduced efficiency and lost time reportable injuries.

Worker attempts to lift excessively heavy object, lifts object in awkward position, attempts to negotiate an obstacle in an awkward manner, or works in awkward position for long period of time

Strains and repetitive motion injuries can range from minor to causing permanent disability. Death is not an expected outcome.


N/A

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 17-6

STD_IND-STF/SB-08 OCC N/A Facility worker exposed to noise levels that result in hearing damage or loss.

Worker works for long periods in areas where high noise levels are present, or is exposed to sudden loud noises such as gun shots or compressed air releases.

Hearing damage can range from temporary minor to permanent loss with a potential for permanent disability.


N/A

STD_IND-ION-01 OCC N/A Facility worker exposed to nonwaste associated ionizing radiation (x-ray equipment or radioactive sources used in nondestructive testing equipment) that causes injury or death.

Human error such as inadvertent equipment actuation or equipment failure during NDE with ionizing radiation causes unintended radiation exposure.

Worker injuries from NDE related radiation exposure can vary from minor whole body to acute local exposure to potential long-term disability, or death.


N/A

STD_IND-NION-01 OCC N/A Facility worker exposed to nonionizing radiation (ultraviolet, laser, visible light, infrared, and microwaves) that cause injury to tissue by thermal or photochemical means.

Human error or equipment failure when using powerful sources of ultraviolet, laser, infrared or microwave energy damages eyes or sensitive tissues.

Ultraviolet and laser light can cause skin damage and eye injury. In addition, high powered sources can affect individuals not directly involved with the activity. Microwave and infrared energy sources have a much more limited range. Death is not an expected outcome of exposures to nonionizing radiation.


N/A

STD_IND-TEMP-01 OCC N/A Facility worker exposed to high environmental temperatures or work conditions that result in heat stress or heat exhaustion.

Worker performing activities in situations where body heat cannot be adequately rejected. Such situations involve work in summer temperatures, work in enclosures, or work in protective clothing that prevents heat loss.

Consequences of a human body overheating can range from minor discomfort to death.


N/A

STD_IND-TEMP-02 OCC N/A Facility worker exposed to low environmental temperatures that result in skin freezing or metabolic slow down such as hypothermia.

Worker performs activities in very cold weather or in conditions that cause high rates of heat loss such as rain and/or wind with moderately cold conditions. In cases where temperatures are sufficiently low freezing of skin can occur.

Exposure to cold can cause consequences that range from minor discomfort to death. Hypothermia can also lead to worker injury due to loss of coordination or impaired decision-making ability.


N/A

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Freq


Tox >PAC 2

NC Onsite

Rad ≥100 rem

NC Onsite

Tox >PAC 3

NC Sig FW


Frequency NC Env


A 17-7

STD_IND-BIO-01 OCC N/A Facility worker exposed to biological hazards such as stinging or biting insects or animal borne diseases such as hanta virus that results in injury, disease, and death.

Stinging insects such as bees or wasps present in work location. Venomous insects such as spiders hidden in PPE. Exposure to rodent droppings containing infectious agents.

Exposure to insect stings and venoms can cause a range of consequences ranging from minor discomfort, necrotic lesions to death from anaphylactic shock. Hanta virus or similar diseases can cause death.


N/A

STD_IND-BIO-02 OCC N/A Facility worker exposed to blood borne pathogens resulting in infection and long-term disability.

Facility worker accidents result in exposure of other workers to blood borne pathogens.

Exposure to blood borne pathogens can result in long-term disability, chronic illness and death.


N/A

STD_IND-NPH-01 OCC N/A Facility worker exposed to lightning strike, either directly, or through equipment resulting in injury or death from electrocution.

Facility worker working in an exposed area or in contact with elevated equipment during an electrical storm.

Exposure to high voltages and currents of the lightning strike causes long-term disability, or death.


N/A

STD_IND-NPH-02 OCC N/A Facility worker exposed to falling debris or fall into open hole into underground facility from seismic event resulting in injury or death from crushing or fall.

Facility worker working within or near a falling structure or over an underground structure which fails.

Falling long distances or being struck by falling debris causes long-term disability, or death.


N/A

STD_IND-NPH-03 OCC N/A Facility worker exposed to debris from high wind event resulting in injury or death from trauma.

Facility worker working in an exposed area being struck by wind-driven missile.

Exposure to wind-driven missile causes trauma to worker, long-term disability, or death.


N/A

STD_IND-NPH-04 OCC N/A Facility worker exposed to volcanic ash fall event resulting in injury or death from suffocation.

Facility worker working in an exposed area falling into or being covered by large ash falls.

Falling into or being covered by large amounts of volcanic ash fall causes long-term disability or chronic lung ailments, or death through suffocation.


N/A

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APPENDIX B

HAZARD EVALUATION DATABASE WITH CONTROL FIELDS

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LIST OF TABLES

Table B 01. Flammable Gas Accidents ................................................................................. B 01-1 Table B 02. Nuclear Criticality Accidents ............................................................................ B 02-1 Table B 03. Waste Transfer Leak Accidents ........................................................................ B 03-1 Table B 04. Release from Contaminated Facility ................................................................. B 04-1 Table B 05. Air Blow Accidents ........................................................................................... B 05-1 Table B 06. External Events ................................................................................................. B 06-1 Table B 07. Tank Failures Due to Excessive Loads ............................................................. B 07-1 Table B 08. Mixing of Incompatible Materials Accidents ................................................... B 08-1 Table B 09. Unplanned Excavations & Drilling Accidents .................................................. B 09-1 Table B 10. Tank Bump Accidents ....................................................................................... B 10-1 Table B 11. Aboveground Structure Failures ....................................................................... B 11-1 Table B 12. Transportation Related Waste Handling Accidents .......................................... B 12-1 Table B 13. Filtration Failures Leading to Unfiltered Releases ........................................... B 13-1 Table B 14. Organic Solvent Fires ........................................................................................ B 14-1 Table B 15. Aboveground Tank Failures .............................................................................. B 15-1 Table B 16. Radiation Exposures.......................................................................................... B 16-1 Table B 17. Occupational Exposures .................................................................................... B 17-1

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B-iv

LIST OF TERMS

AC administrative control ALC Air Lift Circulator BEU Beyond Extremely Unlikely CAM continuous air monitor CFR Code of Federal Regulations DCRT double-contained receiver tank DDT deflagration-to-detonation transition DOE U.S. Department of Energy DSA documented safety analysis DST double-shell tank ENRAF Enraf-Nonius Series 854 (gauge) ERT electrical resistivity tomograph FVT Filtered Vacuum Truck GRE gas release event HEPA high-efficiency particulate air (filter) HIHTL hose-in-hose transfer line HRR high resolution resistivity IMUST inactive miscellaneous underground storage tank KE Key Element LDM leak detection and monitoring LDP leak detection pit LFL lower flammability limit LPG liquefied petroleum gas NESL non entry systems limited NFPA National Fire Protection Association NPH normal paraffin hydrocarbon OTC onsite transfer cask PUREX Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (Plant) RCSTS replacement cross-site transfer system SAC specific administrative control SHMS standard hydrogen monitoring system SMP safety management program SS safety-significant SSC structures, systems, and components SST single-shell tank TBP Tri-Butyl Phosphate TOC Tank Operations Contractor TRU transuranic TSR technical safety requirements UPR unplanned release

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REFERENCES 29 CFR 1910.119, “Occupational Safety and Health Standards,” Code of Federal Regulations, as

amended. 40 CFR 68, Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions, “Code of Federal Regulations, as

amended. DOE-STD-3014-96, 1996, Accident Analysis for Aircraft Crash into Hazardous Facilities,

U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. RPP-RPT-26718, Dome Load Collapse Assessment for Hanford Double- and Single-Shell Tanks,

as amended, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington. TFC-ESHQ-S_IS_C-03, Excavating, Trenching, and Shoring, as amended, Washington River

Protection Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington. TFC-ESHQ-RP_MON-C-18, Radiological Posting, as amended, Washington River Protection

Solutions LLC, Richland, Washington.

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RPP-15188 REV 12-H Appendix B. Hazard Evaluation Database With Controls Fields.

ID Candidate Accident Hazardous Condition Preventive SSC/SAC Mitigative SSC/SAC Important Contributor to Defense-in-Depth

(SSC or Key Element of AC) Defense-in-Depth Features

(Non-safety SSC, non-TSR, or SMP) NC Env

Category Environmental Controls Change Memo

B 01-1


Release of DST waste due to a DST headspace deflagration (steady-state flammable gas deflagration)

SS: DST Primary Tank Ventilation Systems LCO: DST Primary Tank Ventilation Systems

None required Supporting AC KE: DST and SST Time to Lower

Flammability Limit KE: Ignition Controls

None selected E2 Controls selected for this hazardous condition to address nuclear safety risk also address environmental risk.

JMG ‒ 09/15/15: Revised to address RPP-ASMT-60038.

FG-DST-02a Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

Release of DST waste due to a DST headspace deflagration (spontaneous BDGRE flammable gas deflagration)

None required None required KE: Ignition Controls Supporting AC

KE: Ignition Controls KE: Waste Characteristics Controls

• Waste Surface Level Monitoring and Trending

E2 None required due to the BEU frequency of the hazardous condition.


FG-DST-02b Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

Release of DST waste due to a DST headspace deflagration (spontaneous DSGRE flammable gas deflagration)

None required None required None required • Waste Surface Level Monitoring and Trending

E2 None required due to the BEU frequency of the hazardous condition.



Release of DST waste due to a DST headspace deflagration (operation induced GRE flammable gas deflagration)

SS: DST Primary Tank Ventilation Systems SAC: DST Induced Gas Release Event

Flammable Gas Controls LCO: DST Induced Gas Release Event

Flammable Gas Control

None required Supporting AC KE: Waste Characteristics Controls


--


Release of DST waste due to a DST headspace deflagration (seismic induced GRE flammable gas deflagration)

None required None required KE: Emergency Preparedness* *ORP directed.


--


Steady-state generation and accumulation, a spontaneous GRE, and/or an operation or seismic induced GRE causes a flammable gas concentration in the DST headspace above the concentration required for a detonation or a deflagration-to-detonation transition (DDT); an ignition source is assumed

None required None required None required None selected E2 None required due to the BEU frequency of the hazardous condition.



Release of DST waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in a DST annulus (DST primary tank leak into the annulus)

SS: DST Annulus High-Level Safety Instrumented Alarm System

SAC: DST Annulus Flammable Gas Control



• DST annulus leak detection E2 Controls selected for this hazardous condition to address nuclear safety risk also address environmental risk.

SOC − 09/27/2018: Added DST annulus high-level safety instrumented alarm system for DST annulus leak detection.


Release of waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in a DST annulus (waste transfer misroute to a DST annulus)

SS: Waste Transfer Primary Piping Systems (Configuration Management)

None required None required • Material balance monitoring E2 Controls selected for this hazardous condition to address nuclear safety risk also address environmental risk.

--


Release of waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in a DST annulus (DST 241-AY or 241-AZ tank overflows and side fill line leak into the annulus)

SS: DST Annulus High-Level Safety Instrumented Alarm System

SAC: DST Annulus Flammable Gas Control



• Material balance monitoring • DST annulus leak detection

E2 Controls selected for this hazardous condition to address nuclear safety risk also address environmental risk.

SOC − 09/27/2018: Added DST annulus high-level safety instrumented alarm system for DST annulus leak detection.


Release of SST waste due to a SST headspace deflagration (steady-state flammable gas deflagration)

SAC: SST Steady-State Flammable Gas Control






Release of SST waste due to a SST headspace deflagration (spontaneous GRE flammable gas deflagration)




Release of SST waste due to a SST headspace deflagration (operation induced GRE flammable gas deflagration)

None required None required None required None selected E2 None required because there are no authorized operations that could release sufficient retained flammable gases to achieve 100% of the LFL in the SST headspace.

--


Release of SST waste due to a SST headspace deflagration (seismic induced GRE flammable gas deflagration)



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B 01-2


Release of SST waste due to a SST headspace deflagration in multiple SSTs





--


Release of SST waste due to a SST headspace detonation



FG-LDM-01 Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

Release of SST waste due to a SST headspace deflagration





--

FG-HF-01 Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

Release of SST waste due to a SST headspace deflagration




Release of residual waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in a DCRT (244-BX, 244-S, 244-TX) (steady-state flammable gas deflagration)

SAC: DCRT Steady-State Flammable Gas Control

None required Supporting AC KE: Ignition Controls


--


Release of residual waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in a DCRT (244-BX, 244-S, 244-TX) (spontaneous GRE flammable gas deflagration)




Release of residual waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in a DCRT (244-BX, 244-S, 244-TX) (operation induced GRE flammable gas deflagration)

None required None required None required None selected E2 None required because there are no authorized operations that could release sufficient retained flammable gases to achieve 100% of the LFL in the DCRT headspace.



Release of residual waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in a DCRT (244-BX, 244-S, 244-TX) (seismic induced GRE flammable gas deflagration)




Release of residual waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in a catch tank (241-S-304, 241-TX-302C, 241-U-301B,* 241-UX-302A, 241-A-350, 241-AZ-151, 241-ER-311, 244-A, 241-EW-151, 204-AR-TK-1, 241-A-302A, 241-A-417, 241-AX-152, 241-AZ-154) (steady-state flammable gas deflagration) *241-U-301B = 241-U-301

SAC: Flammable Gas Controls None required Supporting AC KE: Ignition Controls


JMG ‒ 06/13/2017: Revised to better align with National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Hazard Classification and to consolidate catch tanks.


Release of residual waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in Polar Tanker during filling with 241-UX-302A waste

None required None required None required None selected E2 None required MJH – 05/14/2015: Added to represent hazardous conditions related to 241-UX-302A Catch Tank waste retrieval


Release of residual waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in Polar Tanker when the tanker is being emptied into 241-SY-102

None required None required None required None selected E2 None required MJH – 05/14/2015: Added to represent hazardous conditions related to 241-UX-302A Catch Tank waste retrieval


Release of residual waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in a catch tank (241-S-304, 241-TX-302C, 241-U-301B,* 241-UX-302A, 241-A-350, 241-AZ-151, 241-ER-311, 244-A, 241-EW-151, 204-AR-TK-1, 241-A-302A, 241-A-417, 241-AX-152, 241-AZ-154) (spontaneous GRE flammable gas deflagration) *241-U-301B = 241-U-301


None selected E2 None required due to the BEU frequency of the hazardous condition.

JMG ‒ 06/13/2017: Revised to consolidate catch tanks. JMG ‒ 09/15/15: Revised to address RPP-ASMT-60038.

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B 01-3


Release of residual waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in a catch tank (241-S-304, 241-TX-302C, 241-U-301B,* 241-UX-302A, 241-A-350, 241-AZ-151, 241-ER-311, 244-A, 241-EW-151, 204-AR-TK-1, 241-A-302A, 241-A-417, 241-AX-152, 241-AZ-154) (operation induced GRE flammable gas deflagration) *241-U-301B = 241-U-301

None required None required None required None selected E2 None required because there are no authorized operations that could release sufficient retained flammable gases to achieve 100% of the LFL in the active catch tank headspace.



Release of residual waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in a catch tank (241-S-304, 241-TX-302C, 241-U-301B,* 241-UX-302A, 241-A-350, 241-AZ-151, 241-ER-311, 244-A, 241-EW-151, 204-AR-TK-1, 241-A-302A, 241-A-417, 241-AX-152, 241-AZ-154) (seismic induced flammable gas deflagration) *241-U-301B = 241-U-301




FG-ITM-01A Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

Release of residual waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in an IMUST (steady-state flammable gas deflagration)



JMG ‒ 06/13/2017: Revised to better align with NFPA Hazard Classification.

FG-ITM-01B Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

Release of residual waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in 244-CR Vault tank (244-CR-TK-001, -002, -003, -011) (steady-state flammable gas deflagration)




FG-ITM-01C Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

Release of residual waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in a 244-AR Vault tank (i.e., 244-AR-TK-001, -002, -003, and -004) (steady-state flammable gas deflagration)




Release of residual waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in an IMUST or 244-CR Vault tank (244-CR-TK-001, -002, -003, -011) (spontaneous GRE flammable gas hazard)





Release of residual waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in an IMUST or 244-CR Vault tank (244-CR-TK-001, -002, -003, -011) (operation induced GRE flammable gas hazard)

None required None required None required None selected E2 None required because there are no authorized operations that could release sufficient retained flammable gases to achieve 100% of the LFL in the active catch tank headspace.



Release of residual waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in an IMUST or 244-CR Vault tank (244-CR-TK-001, -002, -003, -011) (seismic induced flammable gas hazard)





Release of residual waste/contamination due to a flammable gas deflagration in evaporator vessel 242-T-101





Release of residual waste/contamination due to a flammable gas deflagration in feed tank 242-T-102





Release of residual waste/contamination due to a flammable gas deflagration in pre-heater tank 242-T-103 or 242-T-104




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B 01-4


Release of residual waste/contamination due to a flammable gas deflagration in cyclone separator 242-T-105





Release of residual waste/contamination due to a flammable gas deflagration in packed scrubber 242-T-106 or condenser 242-T-107


None selected E1 None required JMG ‒ 06/13/2017: Revised to better align with NFPA Hazard Classification.


Release of residual waste/contamination due to a flammable gas deflagration in condenser catch tank 242-T-108 or 242-T-109




Release of residual waste/contamination due to a flammable gas deflagration in cyclone catch tank 242-T-110





Release of residual waste/contamination due to a flammable gas deflagration in the feed tank room of the 242-T Evaporator building




Release of residual waste/contamination due to a flammable gas deflagration in the evaporator room of the 242-T Evaporator building




Release of residual waste/contamination due to a flammable gas deflagration in the catch tank room of the 242-T Evaporator building



FG-242S-HOTSIDE-01

Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

Release of residual waste/contamination due to a flammable gas deflagration in the 242-S Evaporator (Hot Side)



FG-A431-01 Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

Release of residual contamination due to a flammable gas deflagration within the 241-A-431 ventilation building de-entrainer

None required None required None required None selected E1 None required JMG ‒ 09/15/15: Revised to address RPP-ASMT-60038.

FG-ITS1-01 Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

Release of residual contamination due to a flammable gas deflagration in ITS-1 equipment




FG-AXIX-01 Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

Release of contaminated resin due to a flammable gas deflagration in the 241-AX-IX ion exchanger





















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B 01-5

FG-GT-01 Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1)

Release of tank waste due to flammable gas deflagration in gas-trapping systems or equipment


None selected E1 None required SOC − 09/27/2018: Changed waste-intruding to gas-trapping. JMG ‒ 06/13/2017: Revised definition of WIE and control title.

FG-WIE-02 This hazardous condition has been deleted.

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- JMG ‒ 06/13/2017: Due to change in terminology, FG-GT-01 now covers this condition.


-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- JMG ‒ 06/13/2017: Due to change in terminology, FG-GT-01 now covers this condition.


Release of waste due to flammable gas deflagration in buried/bermed primary waste transfer piping (active transfer)



-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- JMG ‒ 06/13/2017: Deleted to better align with NFPA Hazard Classification. Addressed by FG-XFR-07.


-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- JMG ‒ 06/13/2017: Deleted to better align with NFPA Hazard Classification. Addressed by FG-XFR-07. JMG ‒ 12/28/15: Revised to clarify FW consequence basis. JMG ‒ 09/15/15: Revised to address RPP-ASMT-60038.


Release of waste due to flammable gas deflagration in the primary hose of HIHTL (active transfer)



-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- JMG ‒ 06/13/2017: Deleted to better align with NFPA Hazard Classification. Addressed by FG-XFR-07.


Release of waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in active or inactive waste transfer piping or HIHTL systems (primary or encasement)




Release of waste due to flammable gas deflagration in the waste transfer lines from the 222-S Laboratory (i.e., SNL-5350 and SNL-5351)



Release of waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in the 6241-A Diversion Box


JMG ‒ 12/28/15: Revised to clarify NC frequency basis. JMG ‒ 09/15/15: Revised to address RPP-ASMT-60038.

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B 01-6


Release of waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in the 6241-V Vent Station


JMG ‒ 12/28/15: Revised to clarify NC frequency basis. JMG ‒ 09/15/15: Revised to address RPP-ASMT-60038.


Release of residual waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in the slurry tank





Release of residual waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in the water separator





Release of tank waste due to a fire or flammable gas deflagration in the tank headspace (internal vehicle accident causes fuel tank failure and fuel leak into a tank)

None required None required None required Fire protection requirements (vehicle access, fuel handling within tank farms, fire marshal permitting




Release of tank waste due to a fire or flammable gas deflagration in the tank headspace (external vehicle accident causes fuel tank failure and fuel leak into a tank)





Release of tank waste due to a fire or flammable gas deflagration in the tank headspace (Fueling accident causes fuel leak into a tank)





Release of tank waste due to a fire or flammable gas deflagration in the tank headspace (LPG leaks from a container located near a tank flows into the tank)





Release of DST 241-AW waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in the tank headspace (242-A Evaporator package boiler diesel fuel storage tank failure causing a spill that enters the 241-AW Tank Farm)




Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials due to a flammable gas deflagration in the condensate receiving tank AZ301-COND-TK-001 headspace

None required None required None required None selected E1 None required --


Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials due to a flammable gas deflagration in the condensate receiving tanker truck headspace



Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials due to a flammable gas deflagration in a condensate seal pot or collection tank headspace



Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials due to a flammable gas deflagration in ventilation system ducting, demister, or SST breather filter assembly



Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials due to a flammable gas deflagration in an instrumentation line and/or cabinet


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B 01-7


Release of tank waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in a flex receiver bag

SS: DST Primary Tank Ventilation Systems LCO: DST Primary Tank Ventilation Systems SAC: SST Steady-State Flammable Gas

Control SAC: DST Induced Gas Release Event


Flammable Gas Control SAC: DCRT Steady-State Flammable Gas

Control SAC: Flammable Gas Controls for

Inactive/Miscellaneous Tanks/Facilities and Gas-Trapping Systems or Equipment

None required KE: Ignition Controls Supporting AC

KE: DST and SST Time to Lower Flammability Limit


None selected E1 None required SOC − 09/27/2018: Changed waste-intruding to gas-trapping.


Release of tank waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in the tank headspace (reactive material in tank causes chemical reaction with waste generating flammable gases)


JMG ‒ 12/28/15: Revised to add detail on equipment considered. JMG ‒ 09/15/15: Revised to address RPP-ASMT-60038.


Release of tank waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in the tank headspace (vendor supplies flammable gas for purge gas supply)

None required None required None required None selected E2 This hazardous condition is prevented by DOE-prescribed occupational safety and health standards.



Release of tank waste due to the deflagration of a pocket of flammable gases in the waste



Release of tank waste due to a subsurface flammable gas deflagration



Release of residual contamination due to a flammable gas deflagration in an ALC compressed air supply line



Release of tank waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in a riser










None selected E1 None required SOC − 09/27/2018: Changed waste-intruding to gas-trapping. JMG ‒ 09/15/15: Revised to address RPP-ASMT-60038.


Release of waste material from waste contaminated equipment stored for re-use.




Release of DST waste due to a DST headspace deflagration (steady-state flammable gas deflagration)




Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials due to SST, DCRT, or active catch tank headspace deflagration (steady-state flammable gas deflagration



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RPP-15188 REV 12 Appendix B. Hazard Evaluation Database With Controls Fields.





B 02-1

NuCr-01 N/A Nuclear criticality event in the Tank Farm facilities

None required None required None required None selected N/A None required --

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RPP-15188 REV 12-D Appendix B. Hazard Evaluation Database With Controls Fields.





B 03-1


Fine spray leak from primary piping in a structure into the waste transfer-associated structure during a transfer using a high head pump due to all causes.

SS: Waste Transfer Primary Piping Systems SS: HIHTL Primary Hose Assemblies

None required KE: Waste Transfer-Associated Structure Cover Installation and Door Closure

KE: Emergency Preparedness* *ORP Directed

• Vehicle barriers or vehicle restrictions • Spotters • Pre-transfer verification of valve lineup • Winterization/freeze protection • Design/procedures for draining transfer

systems • Flushing of waste transfer lines • Hoisting and rigging program (SMP) • Fire protection requirements • Interfacing water system overpressure and

flow transient protection • Compressed air system overpressure

protection • Interfacing water system high temperature

protection • Compressed air system high temperature

protection • Waste transfer system overpressure and flow

transient defense-in-depth features

E2 Controls selected for this hazardous condition to address nuclear safety risk also address environmental risk. See DSA Section 3.3.2.3.4 for additional design and operational features for protecting the environment from this impact

RDS – 01/31/17: Revised to remove Mobile Arm Retrieval Systems.


Waste leak from failed primary piping in a structure into a waste transfer-associated structure or waste leak in encased primary piping that drains from the encasement to a structure or leak in HIHTL primary hose to a waste transfer-associated structure due to drainage from HIHTL encasement to the structure using a high head pump due to all causes (non-fine spray leaks, e.g., large break).

None required None required KE: Waste Transfer-Associated Structure Cover Installation and Door Closure


None selected E2 Controls selected for this hazardous condition to address nuclear safety risk also address environmental risk. See DSA Section 3.3.2.3.4 for additional design and operational features for protecting the environment from this impact



-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --


Waste leak from failed primary piping in a structure into a waste transfer-associated structure or waste leak in failed encased primary piping that drains from the encasement to a structure or leak in a HIHTL primary hose to a waste transfer-associated structure due to drainage from HIHTL encasement to the structure during a transfer using a low head transfer pump.





WTL-A-05 Waste Transfer Leak (DSA Section 3.3.2.4.3 and 3.4.2.2)

Waste leak from primary piping into AW02D pit during 242-A Evaporator vessel dump, sump overflow transfer or steam jet pump (J-B-1) assisted gravity sump pump out transfer




--

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B 03-2


Waste leak from failed primary piping in a structure into a waste transfer-associated structure or waste leak in failed encased primary piping that drains from the encasement to a structure or leak in a HIHTL primary hose to a waste transfer-associated structure due to drainage from HIHTL encasement to the structure during a 242-A Evaporator gravity transfer through supernatant or slurry transfer lines or due to gravity head in waste transfer lines due to waste hold up (structure covers on)






Waste leak from failed primary piping into siphon standpipe station during a transfer from the 222-S Laboratory using pump WT-P-1



None selected E1 None required --


Waste leak from failed sump pump system while pumping waste from a siphon standpipe station (SNL-5350 or SNL-5351) using a sump pump





Waste leak into a waste transfer-associated structure from failed primary piping between a sump pump discharge and the first isolation valves towards the waste transfer primary piping





Waste leak from RCSTS Diversion Box 6241-A or Vent Station 6241-V sump pump system (downstream of the second isolation valve off of the RCSTS supernatant transfer line)




WTL-A-11a Waste Transfer Leak (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.3 and 3.4.2.2)

Waste leak from failed shaft seal into the pit during a waste transfer using a high head or low head waste transfer pump.



• Design of waste transfer pump shaft sealing systems

• Pre-transfer verification of valve lineup

E1 None required --

WTL-A-11b This hazardous condition has been deleted.

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --


Fine spray leak from primary piping in a structure into the waste transfer-associated structure during a high head waste transfer pump rotation check or pump bump


None required KE: Waste Transfer-Associated Structure Cover Installation and Door Closure


• Vehicle barriers or vehicle restrictions • Spotters • Winterization/freeze protection • Design/procedures for draining transfer

systems • Flushing of waste transfer lines • Hoisting and rigging program (SMP) • Fire protection requirements • Interfacing water system overpressure and






E2 Control selected for this hazardous condition to address nuclear safety risk also address environmental risk. See DSA Section 3.3.2.3.4 for additional design and operational features for protecting the environment from this impact

--

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B 03-3


Non fine spray leak from failed primary piping in a structure into a waste transfer-associated structure or waste leak in encased primary piping that drains from the encasement to a structure or leak in HIHTL primary hose to a waste transfer-associated structure due to drainage from HIHTL encasement to the structure (non-fine spray leaks, e.g., large break) during a high head waste transfer pump rotation check or pump bump.






Waste leak from failed primary piping in a structure into a waste transfer-associated structure or waste leak in failed encased primary piping that drains from the encasement to a structure or leak in a HIHTL primary hose to a waste transfer-associated structure due to drainage from HIHTL encasement to the structure during a low head waste transfer pump rotation check or pump bump.






Waste leak from failed shaft seal into the pit during a waste transfer pump rotation check or pump bump




E1 None required --


-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --


Waste leak while removing/repositioning a waste transfer primary piping jumper due to gravity head from waste holdup


WTL-A-18A This hazardous condition has been deleted.

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

WTL-A-18B This hazardous condition has been deleted.

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --


Pressurized waste leak from a waste transfer system (jumper, piping) within a waste transfer-associated structure (e.g., pit, valve box) due to thermal expansion of trapped waste.


WTL-A-20 Waste Leak (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.3 and 3.4.2.2)

Either a pressurized fine spray leak or a low pressure large break leak occurs in some portion of the retrieval path during pumping of the catch tank

None required None required None required None selected El None required MJH – 05/14/2015: Added Transfer to support pumping of catch tank 241-UX-302A.


Waste leak in buried/bermed transfer line into the soil or leak into an in-ground waste transfer associated structure that then leaks from the bottom of the structure to the soil (e.g., through cracks in the structure or leaking drain line) during a transfer using a waste transfer pump (high head, low head, pumps used to pump waste from DST annuli, 242-A Evaporator steam jet pump [J-B-1])

None required None required KE: Emergency Preparedness* *ORP Directed

None selected E2 See DSA Section 3.3.2.3.4 for design and operational features for protecting the environment from this impact

--

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B 03-4


Waste leak in buried/bermed transfer line into the soil or leak into an in-ground waste transfer associated structure that then leaks from the bottom of the structure to the soil (e.g., through cracks in the structure or leaking drain line) during 242-A Evaporator vessel dump



--


Waste leak in buried/bermed transfer line into the soil or leak into an in-ground waste transfer associated structure that then leaks from the bottom of the structure to the soil (e.g., through cracks in the structure or leaking drain line) during 242-A Evaporator gravity transfers through supernatant or slurry transfer lines, or leak resulting from gravity head in waste transfer lines due to line hold up



--


Waste leak from failed primary piping into soil or leak into an in-ground waste transfer associated structure that then leaks from the bottom of the structure to the soil (e.g., through cracks in the structure or leaking drain line) during waste transfers from the 222-S Laboratory using pump WT-P-1




Waste leak from transfer line SNL-5350 or SNL-5351 encasements to soil while pumping waste from the siphon standpipe station using a sump pump




Waste leak in buried/bermed transfer line to the soil or leak into an in-ground waste transfer associated structure that then leaks from the bottom of the structure to the soil (e.g., through cracks in the structure or leaking drain line) during transfers using sump pumps in SST retrieval system aboveground manifold boxes or sump pumps in the RCSTS Diversion Box 6241-A and Vent Station 6241-V




Waste leak from underground tank, annulus, vault, or sump to soil column

None required None required None required None selected E2 See DSA Section 3.3.2.3.4 for design and operational features for protecting the environment from this impact

--


Waste leak to the soil surface due to overfilling and overflowing the receipt tank



--


Waste leak to the soil surface due to water/fluid intrusion that overfills and overflows the tank, cell, or vault

None required None required None required None selected E2 See DSA Section 3.3.2.3.4 for design and operational features for protecting the environment from this impact

--


Waste leak in buried/bermed transfer line into the soil that remains subsurface due to all causes that are not readily detected (e.g., corrosion, material flaw, freezing, thermal expansion of fluids, flammable gas deflagration in the line)

SS: Waste Transfer Primary Piping Systems None required KE: Emergency Preparedness* *ORP Directed

• Material balance monitoring • Waste transfer line encasements


--

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B 03-5


Fine spray leak to the atmosphere from unburied or exposed waste transfer primary piping or encasement test riser during a transfer using a high head waste transfer pump


• Vehicle barriers or vehicle restrictions • Spotters • Excavation Program • Pre-transfer excavation walkdown • Pre-transfer verification of valve lineup • Design/procedures for draining transfer

systems • Winterization/freeze protection • Waste transfer line encasements • Fire protection requirements • Flushing of waste transfer lines • Hoisting and rigging program (SMP) • Interfacing water system overpressure and







--


Waste leak from unburied or exposed waste transfer primary piping or encasement test riser (non-fine spray, e.g., large break) using a high head waste transfer pump


• Vehicle barriers or vehicle restrictions • Spotters • Excavation program • Pre-transfer excavation walkdown • Design/procedures for draining transfer








--

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B 03-6


Waste leak from unburied or exposed waste transfer primary piping or encasement test riser (non-fine spray, e.g., large break) using a low head waste transfer pump










--


Waste leak from unburied or exposed primary piping (DR-335 or DR-334) during 242-A Evaporator vessel dump through DR-335, sump overflow through DR-334, or sump gravity transfers through DR-334



systems • Winterization/freeze protection • Waste transfer line encasements • Fire protection requirements • Flushing of waste transfer lines • Hoisting and rigging program (SMP)


--


Waste leak from unburied or exposed waste transfer primary piping or encasement test riser during 242-A Evaporator gravity transfers through supernatant or slurry transfer lines or due to gravity head in waste transfer lines due to line hold up










--

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B 03-7


Waste leak from unburied or exposed waste transfer primary piping or encasement test riser during a transfer from 222-S Laboratory



systems • Winterization/freeze protection • Waste transfer line encasements • Fire protection requirements • Flushing of waste transfer lines • Hoisting and rigging program (SMP) • Waste transfer system overpressure and flow



--


Waste leak from unburied or exposed SNL-5350 and SNL-5351 encasement during pumping of waste from a siphon standpipe station using a sump pump. Note that the sump pumps transfer through the pipe encasements.



systems • Winterization/freeze protection • Waste transfer line encasements • Fire protection requirements • Flushing of waste transfer lines • Hoisting and rigging program (SMP) • Waste transfer system overpressure and flow



--


Fine spray leak to the atmosphere from overground transfer hose connector or connection during a transfer using a high head waste transfer pump

SS: HIHTL Primary Hose Assemblies None required SS: HIHTL Encasement Hose Assemblies KE: Emergency Preparedness* *ORP Directed

• Vehicle barriers or vehicle restrictions • Spotters • Pre-transfer verification of valve lineup • Design/procedures for draining transfer

systems • Winterization/freeze protection • Fire protection requirements • Flushing of waste transfer lines • Hoisting and rigging program (SMP) • Interfacing water system overpressure and







--

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B 03-8


Waste leak from overground transfer hose, connector, or connection (non-fine spray, e.g., large break) during a transfer using a high head waste transfer pump

SS: HIHTL Primary Hose Assemblies • None required SS: HIHTL Encasement Hose Assemblies KE: Emergency Preparedness* *ORP Directed

• Vehicle barriers or vehicle restrictions • Spotters • Design/procedures for draining transfer








--


Waste leak from overground transfer hose, connector, or connection (non-fine spray, e.g., large break) (Pressure provided by compressed air or water flushing)

None required None required None required None selected E2 None required MJH ‒ 05/14/2015 Added to represent hazardous conditions related to 241-UX-302A Catch Tank waste retrieval


Waste leak from overground transfer hose, connector, or connection during a transfer using a low head waste transfer pump

SS: HIHTL Primary Hose Assemblies None required SS: HIHTL Encasement Hose Assemblies KE: Emergency Preparedness* *ORP Directed









--


Waste leak from overground transfer hose, connector, or connection (pressure at maximum pump is rated for – leaks occur during tanker loading)


WTL-C-09-POLAR Waste Transfer Leak (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.3 and 3.4.2.2)

Waste leak from Polar Tanker, tanker connector, or hose connection (leaks occur during tanker unloading using compressed air pressure or during flushing with water)


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B 03-9


Waste leak from overground transfer hose, connector, or connection due to gravity head in waste transfer lines due to line hold up

SS: HIHTL Primary Hose Assemblies None required SS: HIHTL Encasement Hose Assemblies • Vehicle barriers or vehicle restrictions • Spotters • Design/procedures for draining transfer

systems • Winterization/freeze protection • Fire protection requirements • Flushing of waste transfer lines • Hoisting and rigging program (SMP) • Emergency preparedness program (SMP) • Interfacing water system overpressure and







--


Waste leak from unburied or exposed waste transfer primary piping or encasement test riser or overground transfer hose during a waste transfer pump rotation check or pump bump


None required SS: HIHTL Encasement Hose Assemblies KE: Emergency Preparedness* *ORP Directed

• Vehicle barriers or vehicle restrictions • Spotters • Excavation program • Pre-transfer excavation walkdown • Pre-transfer verification of valve lineup • Design/procedures for draining transfer








--


Waste leak from unburied or exposed piping involving contaminated rain water from U Plant stack



Leak of waste due to jet momentum – waste jet through tank headspace


None selected E1 None required RDS – 01/31/17: Revised to remove Mobile Arm Retrieval Systems. EIM ‒ 02/25/16: Revised to include DST sluicing in the event.


Leak of waste due to jet momentum – water jet through tank headspace

None required None required None required None selected E1 None required EIM ‒ 02/25/16: Revised to include DST sluicing in the event.

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B 03-10


Leak of waste due to jet momentum – liquid jet through supernatant or low strength solids



Leak of waste due to channeling within high strength waste – pressurized liquids or gases



Waste leak due to air lift None required None required None required None selected E1 None required JMG ‒ 09/15/15: Revised to address RPP-ASMT-60038.


Leak of contaminated hydraulic fluid or direct radiation exposure from contaminated hydraulic fluid



Waste leak from waste transfer pump power cable due to leakage through submersible pump shaft seals into the electrical motor (without shorting out the motor) with subsequent leakage through electrical connections and power cabling outside of waste-transfer-associated structure (pump pit)




Leak through instrument’s waste transfer primary confinement boundary through instrument housing and then through instrument cable outside of waste-transfer-associated structure (pump pit, manifold box)


• Design/procedures for draining transfer systems

• Winterization/freeze protection • Flushing of waste transfer lines • Interfacing water system overpressure and






E1 None required --


Pressurized waste leak from the transfer system that includes overground transfer hose, due to thermal expansion of trapped waste



Leak of waste due to direct jetting out of the tank (DST or SST modified sluicing, DST operations)

None required None required None required None selected E1 None required EIM ‒ 02/25/16: Revised to include DST sluicing in the event. JMG ‒ 09/15/15: Revised to address RPP-ASMT-60038.


Leak of waste due to direct jetting out of the tank (Extended Reach Sluicer Systems)


None selected E1 None required RDS – 01/31/17: Revised to remove Mobile Arm Retrieval Systems. EIM ‒ 02/25/16: Revised to include DST sluicing in the event.


Leak of process condensate or contaminated glycol from ventilation system

None required None required None required None selected E1 None required SDK ‒ 06/04/15: Revised to add leak of contaminated glycol. Identified in 241-AP ventilation system upgrades PrHA (RPP-RPT-58674)

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RPP-15188 REV 12-F Appendix B. Hazard Evaluation Database With Controls Fields.





B 03-11


Leak of gray water while pumping from the Water Buffalo to a DST



Leak of intrusion water while pumping from the LDP

None required None required None required None selected E1 None required SDK – 01/05/15: Revised Hazard ID No. to WTL-C-24a due to addition of WTL-C-24b.

WTL-C-24b Waste Transfer Leak (DSA Section 3.3.2.4.3 and 3.4.2.2)

Waste leak from overground transfer hose, connector, or connection during inadvertent pumping of waste from DST leak detection pits

SAC: DST Leak Detection Pit Pumping Control

None required None required None selected E2 Controls selected for this hazardous condition to address nuclear safety risk also address environmental risk. See DSA Section 3.3.2.3.4 for additional design and operational features for protecting the environment from this impact

SDK – 02/15/15: Added new hazardous condition for inadvertent pumping of waste from DST leak detection pits. Supports closure of LDP PISA/USQ (Ref. WRPS-PER-2013-1102).


Leak of 242-A Evaporator process condensate and flush solutions during transfer to Tank Farms



Leak of flush water and residual waste from transfer line or HIHTL to soil surface or atmosphere during flushing operations

None required None required None required None selected E1 None required MVS – 04/12/17: Hazardous condition cause modified by addition of pressurized pump clearing and column punching/draining (RPP-RPT-58712, Rev. 0). SDK – 05/25/2016: Revised pH value for waste leaks that pose a significant facility worker hazard in response to an ORP comment on SB amendment that supports closure of, but is unrelated to, the LDP PISA/USQ (Ref. WRPS-PER-2013-1102).


Leak of lance/flush water and residual waste from transfer line SN-278 to soil surface or atmosphere during water lancing or flushing operations



Flush water, residual waste, and or grout contained inside the slurry distributor



Leak of test water and residual waste from transfer line or HIHTL to soil surface or atmosphere during leak testing of waste transfer primary piping system/HIHTL connections


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B 03-12


Fine spray leak in unintended transfer line, interfacing water line, or inactive facility due to a misroute into unintended transfer line, interfacing water system, or inactive facility through failed or mispositioned isolation valve during a transfer using a high head waste transfer pump

None required SS: Isolation Valves for Double Valve Isolation

SAC: Double Valve Isolation


• Vehicle barriers or vehicle restrictions • Spotters • Pre-transfer verification of valve lineup • Design/procedures for draining transfer







E2 Controls selected for this hazardous condition to address nuclear safety risk also address environmental risk. See DSA Section 3.3.2.3.4 for additional design and operational features for protecting the environment from this impact.

--


Waste leak in unintended transfer line, interfacing water line, or inactive facility (non-fine spray, e.g., large break) due to a misroute into unintended transfer line, interfacing water system, or inactive facility through failed or mispositioned isolation valve during a transfer using a high head waste transfer pump












--


Waste leak in unintended transfer line, interfacing water line, or inactive facility due to a misroute into unintended transfer line, interfacing water system, or inactive facility through failed or mispositioned isolation valve during a transfer using a low head waste transfer pump












--

RPP-15188 Rev.12H 10/8/2018 - 2:27 PM 216 of 250






B 03-13

WTL-D-03-UX-302A Waste Transfer Leak (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.3 and 3.4.2.2)

241-UX-302A waste leak into water truck or onto the ground



Waste leak in unintended transfer line, interfacing water line, or inactive facility due to a misroute into unintended transfer line, interfacing water system, or inactive facility through failed or mispositioned isolation valve during 242-A Evaporator gravity transfers through supernatant or slurry transfer lines




• Design/procedures for draining transfer systems

• Winterization/freeze protection • Fire protection requirements • Flushing of waste transfer lines • Hoisting and rigging program (SMP) • Interfacing water system overpressure and







--


-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --


-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

WTL-D-06 This hazardous condition has been deleted.

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --


Waste leak (fine spray) in unintended transfer line, interfacing water system, or inactive facility due to a misroute into unintended transfer line through cross-connected flexible jumper (discharge end of jumper connected to the wrong nozzle) during a transfer using a high head waste transfer pump

SS: Waste Transfer Primary Piping Systems (configuration management)

None required KE: Emergency Preparedness* *ORP Directed

None selected E2 Controls selected for this hazardous condition to address nuclear safety risk also address environmental risk. See DSA Section 3.3.2.3.4 for additional design and operational features for protecting the environment from this impact.

--


Waste leak (non-fine spray) in unintended transfer line, interfacing water system, or inactive facility due to a misroute into unintended transfer line through cross-connected flexible jumper (discharge end of jumper connected to the wrong nozzle) during a transfer using a high head or low head waste transfer pump




--

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B 03-14


Waste leak in unintended transfer line, interfacing water system, or inactive facility due to a misroute into unintended transfer line through cross-connected flexible jumper (discharge end of jumper connected to the wrong nozzle) during 242-A Evaporator gravity transfers through supernatant or slurry transfer lines

SS: Waste transfer primary piping systems (configuration management)



--


Waste leak into unintended tank and tank/vault overflows due to a misroute into unintended tank through failed or mispositioned isolation valve or through cross-connected flexible jumper (discharge end of jumper connected to the wrong nozzle) during transfers using a waste transfer pump or gravity transfers from the 242-A Evaporator


None selected E2 See DSA Section 3.3.2.3.4 for additional design and operational features for protecting the environment from this impact.

--


Waste leak due to inadvertent pump start when transfer system in not configured as intended

None required None required TSR Definition: Administrative Lock KE: Emergency Preparedness* *ORP Directed


--


-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --


-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --


Waste leak in unintended transfer line, interfacing water line, or inactive facility during a waste transfer pump rotation check or pump bump


SS: Isolation Valves for Double Valve Isolation




• Pre-transfer verification of valve lineup • Spotters • Design/procedures for draining transfer







E2 Controls selected for this hazardous condition to address nuclear safety risk also address environmental risk. See DSA Section 3.3.2.3.4 for additional design and operational features for protecting the environment from this impact.

--

RPP-15188 Rev.12H 10/8/2018 - 2:27 PM 218 of 250






B 03-15


Some of the dissolved waste/caustic solution being sampled is diverted up the sampling sleeve by the water pressure from the sluicer and splashes onto a worker Applies to: Sampling activity in SST.



Waste aerosol release from active ventilation system. Aerosol generated by in-tank spray leak during DST or SST transfer. Filtration degraded (without controls) – extremely unlikely event



WTL-E-01b Waste Transfer Leak (DSA Sections 3.3.2.4.3 and 3.4.2.2)

Waste aerosol release from active ventilation system. Aerosol generated by in-tank spray leak during DST or SST transfer. Filtration degraded (without controls) – beyond extremely unlikely event



Waste aerosol release from DST annulus ventilation system. Aerosol generated by spray leak in the DST annulus during transfer of waste that had leaked into a DST annulus. Filtration degraded (without controls)




Waste aerosol release from DST annulus ventilation system. Aerosol generated by splash and splatter from waste leaking from the DST primary tank to the DST annulus. Filtration degraded (without controls)


WTL-E-03b This hazardous condition has been deleted.

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- JMG ‒ 09/15/15: Hazardous condition subsumed into WTL-E-03a.

WTL-E-03c This hazardous condition has been deleted.

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- JMG ‒ 09/15/15: Hazardous condition subsumed into WTL-E-03a.


Waste aerosol release from DST annulus ventilation system. Aerosol generated by splash and splatter from a misrouted waste transfer into a DST annulus. Filtration degraded (without controls).


None selected E1 None required JMG ‒ 09/15/15: Revised to address RPP-ASMT-60038.

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B 04-1


Release of residual waste/contamination due to a flammable gas deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure (flammable gases at a concentration above the LFL enter a waste transfer-associated structure from a connected tank headspace)










None selected E1 None required SOC − 09/27/2018: Changed waste-intruding to gas-trapping.


Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials due to a flammable gas deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure (waste transfer leak into a waste transfer-associated structure)

SS: Waste Transfer Primary Piping Systems SS: HIHTL Primary Hose Assemblies SS: Isolation Valves for Double Valve

Isolation SAC: Double Valve Isolation

None required None required • Transfer leak detection/alarm response • Material balance monitoring • Vehicle barriers or vehicle restrictions • Spotters • Pre-transfer verification of valve lineup • Design/procedures for draining transfer

systems • Winterization/freeze protection • Fire protection requirements (vehicle access,

fuel handling within tank farms, fire marshal permitting)

• Flushing of waste transfer lines • Interfacing water system overpressure and






E1 None required JMG ‒ 12/28/15: Revised to clarify frequency basis. JMG ‒ 09/15/15: Revised to address RPP-ASMT-60038.


Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials due to a flammable gas deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure (waste transfer leak into a waste transfer-associated structure due to a pump seal leak)

Note: Safety-significant waste transfer primary piping systems is not allocated, however, the TSR in-service test/inspection for waste leaks addresses this hazard.

None required None required • Transfer leak detection/alarm response • Pre-transfer verification of valve lineup • Design of waste transfer pump shaft sealing systems

E1 None required JMG ‒ 12/28/15: Revised to clarify frequency basis. JMG ‒ 09/15/15: Revised to address RPP-ASMT-60038.


Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials due to a flammable gas deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure (waste transfer leak into an encasement)


None required None required • Pre-transfer verification of valve lineup • Design/procedures for draining transfer

systems • Winterization/freeze protection • Flushing of waste transfer lines • Interfacing water system overpressure and






E1 None required JMG ‒ 09/15/15: Revised to address RPP-ASMT-60038.


Release of contaminated intrusion water due to a flammable gas deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure


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B 04-2


Release of residual waste/contamination due to flammable gas deflagration in the waste transfer-associated structure (hydraulic fluid leak into structure creates flammable vapor [fine spray])



Release of residual waste/contamination due to a flammable gas deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure (flammable gases generated in equipment submerged in tank waste and open in a waste transfer-associated structure)



Release of residual waste/contamination due to a flammable gas deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure (flammable gases generated by residual waste/contamination in a waste transfer-associated structure)



Release of residual waste/contamination due to a flammable gas deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure (leak and ignition of gasoline or LPG that is stored or transported in or near a waste transfer-associated structure)

None required None required None required • Fire protection requirements (vehicle access, fuel handling within tank farms, fire marshal permitting)

E1 None required --


Waste or residual contamination in the tank vault; ventilation system filters and residual contamination (Flammable gases generated by the waste and residual contamination in the tank vault) Note: Tank vaults (i.e., vaults that provide secondary confinement for tanks) including DCRT vaults, 244-CR Vault cells, 244-AR Vault cells, and catch tank vaults.



Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials due to a flammable gas deflagration in an IMUST vault


None selected E1 None required JMG ‒ 06/13/2017: Revised to better align with National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Hazard Classification.


Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials due to a flammable gas deflagration in a tank vault (leak and ignition of gasoline or LPG that is stored or transported in or near a tank vault) Note: Tank vaults (i.e., vaults that provide secondary confinement for tanks) include DCRT vaults, 244-CR Vault cells, 244-AR Vault cells, and catch tank and IMUST vaults



Release of DST waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in a leak detection pit


None selected E1 None required JMG ‒ 06/13/2017: Revised to better align with NFPA Hazard Classification. SDK – 01/05/15 Revised event frequency from “extremely unlikely” to “unlikely” based on documented failure of the 241-AY-102 primary tank and waste leak into the annulus leaving only the annulus as the remaining passive barrier. Supports closure of LDP PISA/USQ (Ref. WRPS-PER-2013-1102).

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B 04-3


Release of SST 241-AX waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in a leak detection pit


RCF-FG-12c Release from Contaminated Facility (DSA Section 3.3.2.4.4)

Release of waste due to a flammable gas deflagration in a SST leak detection drywell




Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials due to a flammable gas deflagration in the AZ-301 structure



Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials due to a flammable gas deflagration in a ventilation system seal pot pit or condensate pump enclosure



Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials due to a flammable gas deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure (waste transfer leak into a waste transfer-associated structure due to a failed waste transfer pump mechanical shaft seal)

None required None required None required • Design of waste transfer pump shaft sealing systems

• Pre-transfer verification of valve line-up • Transfer leak detection/alarm response

E1 None required --


Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials due to a flammable gas deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure due to a leak of waste into the structure due to jet momentum.

None required None required None required None selected E1 None required RDS – 01/31/17:

Revised to remove Mobile Arm Retrieval Systems.

EIM ‒ 02/25/16: Revised to include DST sluicing in the event. JMG ‒ 09/15/15: Revised to address RPP-ASMT-60038.


Release of residual waste/contamination due to a load handling accident (e.g., load drop) in a waste transfer-associated structure



Release of residual waste/contamination due to a load handling accident (e.g., load drop) in a contaminated facility



Release of residual waste/contamination due to fire in a waste transfer-associated structure



Release of residual waste/contamination in a contaminated facility due to fire



Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials due to a fire in a tank vault



Release of radioactive and other hazardous material due to a fire in or involving the vessel/pump enclosure (NESL enclosure for retrieval of 241-C-200-series tanks)



Release of residual waste/contamination due to a compressed gas system failure (leak) in a waste transfer-associated structure


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B 04-4


Release of residual contamination due to a compressed gas system failure (leak) in a contaminated facility



Release of residual contamination due to disconnecting a compressed air system or a compressed air system failure



Release of residual waste/contamination due to a compressed air leak in a waste transfer-associated structure during compressed air blowout of a HIHTL



Release of residual waste/contamination resulting from compressed air flow into waste transfer-associated structure due to open or failed encasement drain valve during pneumatic testing of a waste transfer primary piping system encasement.



Release of residual waste/contamination resulting from compressed air flow into waste transfer-associated structure due to failure of waste transfer primary piping system in the structure during pneumatic testing of HIHTL and/or waste transfer primary piping system connections in tank farms (i.e., HIHTL primary hose assembly connections, HIHTL encasement hose assembly connections, or waste transfer primary piping system connections). (Note: Pneumatic testing is only allowed if the HIHTL and waste transfer primary piping systems have never been used and are not connected to HIHTL or waste transfer primary piping systems that have been used.)


RCF-O-01 Release from Contaminated Facility (DSA Section 3.3.2.4.4)

Release of residual waste/contamination due to flooding of a contaminated facility



Release of low-level radioactive, hazardous, or mixed waste due to a fire or explosion at the 616 Facility



Low-Level Radioactive, Hazardous, and Mixed Waste Accidents (DSA Section 3.3.2.3.1)

None required None required None required None selected E1 None required JMG ‒ 12/28/15: Revised to clarify scenario and frequency basis. JMG ‒ 09/15/15: Revised to address RPP-ASMT-60038.







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B 04-5































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B 04-6










LLHM-18 Flammable Gas Accidents (DSA Section 3.3.2.4.1)

Release of radioactive and other hazardous material from drum due to flammable gas deflagration in drum

SS: Low-Level Radioactive, Mixed, and TRU Waste Packaging Vents

SAC: Low-Level Radioactive, Mixed, and TRU Waste Packaging Flammable Gas Controls

None required None required None selected E1 None required --


Release of radioactive and other hazardous material from drum due to drum breach when high wind causes drum to fall off truck before being secured



Release of radioactive and other hazardous material due to breach resulting from wind driven missile


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B 05-1


Release of radioactive and other hazardous material aerosols from a HIHTL primary hose assembly and connected waste transfer primary piping system and/or a waste transfer-associated structure due to leak during compressed air blowout. Applies to: 2-in diameter HIHTL primary hose assembly and connected waste transfer primary piping system, waste transfer-associated structures (e.g., pits)

None required SS: Compressed Air System Pressure Relieving Devices

None required • Flushing of waste transfer lines. E1 None required --


Release of radioactive and other hazardous material aerosols from a HIHTL primary hose assembly and connected waste transfer primary piping system and/or waste transfer-associated structure due to misroute during compressed air blowout. Applies to: 2-inch diameter HIHTL primary hose assembly and connected waste transfer primary piping system, waste transfer associated structures (e.g., pits)

None required SS: Compressed Air System Pressure Relieving Devices

None required • Flushing of waste transfer lines. E1 None required --


Release of radioactive and other hazardous material aerosols from a DST headspace due to compressed air blowout through HIHTL flow path that terminates below the waste level in the receiving tank. As the compressed air bubbles up through the supernatant, it entrains supernatant. Some of this supernatant aerosol is then swept out of the DST headspace by the DST ventilation system (no filtration assumed). Applies to: HIHTL, DSTs


ABD-03-UX-302A Air Blow Accidents (DSA Section 3.3.2.4.5)

Release of radioactive and other hazardous material aerosols from Polar Tanker headspace due to compressed air blowout through overground hose flow path that terminates below the waste level in the tanker. As the compressed air bubbles up through the waste, it entrains radioactive and other hazardous materials. Some of this waste aerosol is then swept out of the Polar Tanker headspace by pressure of the compressed air (no filtration assumed). Applies to: 241-UX-302A waste transfer.

None required None required None required None selected E1 None required MJH ‒ 05/14/15: Added to represent hazardous conditions related to 241-UX-302A Catch Tank waste retrieval.


Release of radioactive and other hazardous material due to RCSTS encasement breach and inert nitrogen blowdown (de-pressurization) Applies to: RCSTS encasement in line WT-SNL-3150 Note: Only the supernate line (WT-SNL-3150) is currently authorized for use.


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RPP-15188 REV 12-E Appendix B. Hazard Evaluation Database With Controls Fields.





B 05-2


Release of radioactive and other hazardous material aerosol from waste transfer primary piping system during pneumatic testing of a waste transfer primary piping system encasement due to the pressure in the encasement increasing to a point where the primary pipe is breached, leading to pressurization of the primary piping system. Residual waste is then expelled from the primary through a separate leak location. Applies to: Waste transfer primary piping system encasements being pneumatically tested.

SS: Waste Transfer Primary Piping Systems SS: Compressed Air System Pressure Relieving Devices

Note: Only used when the operability of the

SS waste transfer primary piping system is indeterminate.

None required None selected E1 None required RDS – 01/22/18: Revised to add note.


Release of radioactive and other hazardous material aerosol from waste transfer primary piping system during pneumatic testing of a waste transfer primary piping system encasement, with a pre-existing breech between the primary pipe and the encasement that allows pressurization of the primary during encasement testing. Residual waste is then expelled from the primary through a separate leak location. (High pressure spray leak) Applies to: Waste transfer primary piping system encasements being pneumatically tested.

SS: Waste Transfer Primary Piping Systems SS: Compressed Air System Pressure Relieving Devices

Note: Only used when the operability of the

SS waste transfer primary piping system is indeterminate.

None required None selected E1 None required RDS – 01/22/18: Revised to add note.


Release of radioactive and other hazardous material aerosol from waste transfer primary piping system during pneumatic testing of a waste transfer primary piping system encasement due to the pressure in the encasement increasing to a point where the primary pipe is breeched. Air flows into the primary pipe but the primary pipe has an open flow path and therefore does not become pressurized internally. Residual waste is expelled from the primary through a separate leak location to the environment. (Low pressure leak) Applies to: Waste transfer primary piping system encasements being pneumatically tested.

None required None required None required None selected E1 None required JMG ‒ 12/28/15: Revised frequency relative to ABD-05.


Release of radioactive and other hazardous material aerosol from waste transfer primary piping system during pneumatic testing of a waste transfer primary piping system encasement with a pre-existing breech between the primary pipe and the encasement. Air flows into the primary pipe but the primary pipe has an open flow path and therefore does not become pressurized internally. Residual waste is expelled from the primary through a separate leak location to the environment. (Low pressure leak) Applies to: Waste transfer primary piping system encasements being pneumatically tested.


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B 05-3


Release of radioactive and other hazardous material aerosol from waste transfer primary piping system encasement during pneumatic testing of the encasement due to a pressurized air leak. The leak releases air and residual waste to the environment. Applies to: Waste transfer primary piping system encasements being pneumatically tested

None required None required None required • Encasement leak detection and waste removal.

E1 None required --


Release of radioactive and other hazardous material aerosol from jumper that connects pump AN02A-WT-P-004 to the slurry distributor during air blowout. The leak releases air and residual waste to the environment. Applies to: Jumper that connects pump AN02A-WT-P-004 to the slurry distributor during air blowout that occurs as part of DST 241-AN-102 caustic addition governed by procedure TO-020-936.



Release of flush water and residual contamination from a primary piping system encasement during compressed air blowout performed to evaporate the residual flush water from the encasements. Applies to: Primary piping encasements for lines SL-167 and SL-168. (This is expected to be a one-time activity for each encasement.)



A leak in the waste transfer route during flushing and blowdown of the 241-UX-302A pump discharge assembly including filter housing.

None required None required None required None selected E1 None required MJH ‒ 05/14/15: Added to support pumping of catch tank 241-UX-302A.


Leak in transfer line within the 241-UX-302A headspace during blow down of transfer line.

None required None required None required None selected El None required MJH ‒ 05/14/15: Added to support pumping of catch tank 241-UX-302A.

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B 06-1


Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from an underground storage tank when struck by aircraft. Applies to: DSTs, SSTs, DCRTs, catch tanks, and IMUSTs.

None required None required None required None required E2 None required because this event is not caused by any activity under the control of the TOC.

--


Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from an aboveground tank farms facility. Applies to: • 204-AR Waste Unloading Facility, 242-S

Evaporator [Hot Side], 244-AR Vault, and the 244-CR Vault.

• DOE-STD-3014-96 is applicable to Hazard Category 1 and 2 facilities and facilities that contain hazardous chemicals in quantities that make it subject to the requirements of 29 CFR 1910.119 or 40 CFR 68. The 242-T Evaporator, and the 616 Facility are Hazard Category 3 facilities and are not subject to either 29 CFR 1910.119 or 40 CFR 68.

None required None required None required None required N/A None required --


Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from a waste transfer. Applies to: All active waste transfer systems including those connected to the 242-A Evaporator and the 222-S Laboratory


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B 07-1


Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials to the atmosphere through a failed tank dome Applies to: DST, 100-Series SST, or 200-Series SST

None required None required None required • Dome Loading. E3 Defense-in-depth features allocated to this hazardous condition to address nuclear safety risk also address environmental risk. See DSA Section 3.3.2.3.4 for additional design and operational features for protecting the environment from this impact.

--


Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials to the atmosphere through a failed tank dome, or dome perforation. Applies to: DSTs, 100-series SSTs, or 200-series SSTs. Also applies to vehicles driving off of ramps into pits.

None required None required None required None selected E3 Hoisting & Rigging program prevents load drops that could challenge the integrity of a waste tank.

--


Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials to the atmosphere through a failed tank dome. Applies to: DST, 100-Series SST, or 200-series SST

None required None required None required None selected E3 None required due to the frequency of the hazardous condition.



Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials to the atmosphere through a cracked tank dome. Applies to: DST, 100-Series SST, or 200-series SST

None required None required None required None selected E3 The ability of DSTs and 100-series SSTs to withstand seismic loading is addressed in RPP-RPT-26718, which concludes that the seismic capacity of the DSTs and 100-series SSTs far exceeds the evaluation basis earthquake for this region. Further, because of the complex physical geometry of the 200-series SSTs, a dome collapse accident is not credible for these tanks.

--









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B 07-2


Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials to the atmosphere through failed tank/vault. Applies to: • DCRTs • catch tanks • IMUSTs • 244-AR vault • 244-CR vault Based on physical similarities between the analysis performed for DCRTs and other inactive facilities (i.e., 244-AR Vault, 244-CR vault), these facilities are added to the listing of applicable facilities (below-grade tanks in reinforced concrete vaults with thick concrete slabs between the vaults and an above-grade concrete structure).

None required None required None required • Dome Loading. E2 Defense-in-depth features allocated to this hazardous condition to address nuclear safety risk also address environmental risk.

--

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B 08-1


Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from DST or 100-Series SST to the atmosphere due to gas generation and tank pressurization from reaction of acid with tank waste. Applies to: Bulk chemical additions to DSTs or 100-Series SSTs

None required None required None required • Verification of paperwork prior to bulk chemical additions

E2 Defense-in-depth features allocated to this hazardous condition to address nuclear safety risk also address environmental risk.

--


Release of liquids, solids, and/or vapors from DST or SST due to chemical reaction of incompatible wastes Applies to: DST transfer to another DST, DST transfer to a SST (for recycle sluicing retrieval operations), DST or SST sluicing retrieval transfers (SST to DST or DST to DST), transfer waste from DST annulus to a DST, waste transfer out of a waste transfer-associated structure using a sump pump

None required None required None required None required E1 None required EIM ‒ 02/25/16: Revised to include DST sluicing in the event.


Release of liquids, solids, and/or vapors from DST due to chemical reaction of incompatible wastes Applies to: Transfers from the 222-S Laboratory

None required None required None required None required E1 None required --


Release of liquids, solids, and/or vapors from DST due to chemical reaction of incompatible wastes Applies to: Transfers from the 242-A Evaporator



Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from DST or SST to the atmosphere due to gas generation and tank pressurization from reaction of acid with tank waste. Applies to: Adding caustic solution (NaOH in water) or sodium nitrite solution (NaNO2 in water) to DST or SST, adding corrosion inhibiting chemicals to the AZ301-COND-TK-001 condensate tank, flushing the 702-AZ ventilation system (including using caustic solutions), pumping condensate from AZ301-COND-TK-001 to DST



Release of radioactive and other hazardous aerosols from DCRT or catch tank to the atmosphere due to chemical reaction


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B 08-2


Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from tank headspace to the atmosphere due to tank waste reaction with incompatible material (e.g., aluminum, rubber, plastic) inserted into or dropped into tank waste. Applies to: DSTs, SSTs, DCRTs, catch tanks, IMUSTs, 244-AR Vault, 244-CR Vault, 241-AX Leak Detection Pits Examples of in-tank equipment or items that may be dropped are: • ENRAFs (primary tank level) • push-mode core sampling tools, mirrors,

gauge plugs • thermocouples used to monitor the waste • periscopes • still and television cameras • pit shielding plug • small submersible pumps • waste transfer pumps • waste mixer pumps • zip cords • spark resistant tools • sampler bit • liquid observation wells • sludge weight clamps and thimbles • cone penetrometer



Release of radioactive and other hazardous aerosols from tank vapor space to the atmosphere due to release of toxic vapors from waste Applies to: DSTs, SSTs, DCRTs, catch tanks, IMUSTs, 244-AR Vault, 244-CR Vault, 242-T Evaporator

None required None required None required None required E1 None required EIM ‒ 02/25/16: Revised to include DST sluicing in the event.


Release of toxic gases from SST to the atmosphere due to high resolution resistivity (HRR) or electrical resistivity tomography (ERT) leak detection and monitoring (LDM) off-normal condition



Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from tank headspace to the atmosphere due to tank waste reaction with minor additions of incompatible material (e.g., liquids or solids) that inadvertently drain into the waste tank or are intentionally added to the waste. Applies to: DSTs, SSTs, DCRTs, catch tanks, IMUSTs, 244-AR Vault, 244-CR Vault Examples of materials that may be added or drain into the waste are: • Hydraulic fluid • Intrusion water from leak detection pits • Spray fixative used for contamination

control • “Gray” water from decontamination units

and safety showers • Conditioned water used to wash down pits


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B 09-1


Release of contaminated soil to the atmosphere during excavation using the Guzzler®1 FVT.

None required None required None required • Guzzler® Air Permitting Requirements. E1 None required --


Excavation by backhoe into a 200 Area crib, ditch, pond, or UPR site. Applies to: Excavation by hand (shovel) and power tool Any excavation in soils using backhoe. Bounds drilling using auger drill string, push mode, but does not apply to air rotary drilling which is outside of WRPS (TOC) scope

None required None required None required • Excavation program. • Radiological posting.

E1 None required --


Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from below surface release points to the atmosphere due to a failure of a pressurized line from excavation activities. Applies to: A buried pressurized compressed air, instrument or water line

None required None required None required • Excavation program. • Radiological posting.

E1 None required --


Release of contaminated soil to the atmosphere due to a failure of a buried pressurized line or primary piping system encasement during pneumatic testing. Applies to: A buried pressurized compressed air, instrument or water line; and pneumatic testing of lines or waste transfer primary piping system encasements during pneumatic testing


1 Guzzler is a registered trademark of Guzzler Manufacturing, Inc., Streator, Illinois.

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B 10-1


Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from a DST or SST to the atmosphere due to tank bump Applies to: DSTs and SSTs

None required None required None required • End State Analysis for Tank Bump in DSTs E1 None required JMG ‒ 09/15/15: Revised to address RPP-ASMT-60038.


Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from DST to the atmosphere due to boiling waste Applies to: DSTs


BMP-03a Tank Bump (DSA Section 3.3.2.3.1)

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from a SST to the atmosphere due to sudden flashing of water added to tank Applies to: SSTs

None required None required None required None selected E1 None required EIM ‒ 02/25/16: Revised ID to reflect addition of BMP-03b. JMG ‒ 09/15/15: Revised to address RPP-ASMT-60038.

BMP-03b Tank Bump (DSA Section 3.3.2.3.1)

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from a DST to the atmosphere due to sudden flashing of water sprayed on hot sludge after supernate has been removed. Applies to: DSTs

None required None required None required None selected E1 None required EIM ‒ 02/25/16: Added new hazardous condition to reflect the potential for flashing in DSTs that are being retrieved and have no supernate covering the sludge.


Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from SST to the soil and aerosol release to the atmosphere due to steam bump in liner gap Applies to: SSTs



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B 11-1


Release of radioactive and/or hazardous material from load drop of waste containing equipment, load drop onto waste contaminated equipment, or spill from surface and/or cavities of elevated equipment to the atmosphere Applies to: • pumps • reel tapes • ENRAFs (primary tank level) • thermocouple trees • multiple instrument trees • weight factor instrumentation • zip cords • sluicers • salt well screens • slurry distributors • air lances • air lift circulators • liquid observation wells • manual tapes • specific gravity probes • HIHTLs • jumpers • cone penetrometer



Release of radioactive and/or hazardous material from waste containing equipment to the atmosphere Applies to: Any contaminated aboveground structure (e.g., equipment removed from a tank, SHMS cabinets, CAMs cabinets)



Release of radioactive and/or hazardous material to the atmosphere from ventilation system HEPA filters and ductwork due to load drop on HEPA filter housing (i.e. crushing) Applies to: • DST primary tank ventilation systems • breather filter systems • portable ventilation system skids • SST inactive ventilation systems

(e.g., SX-Farm) • DST annulus ventilation systems • DCRT breather filter assemblies • 242-T ventilation system • 242-S ventilation system • SHMS cabinets • CAMs cabinets



Release of radioactive material from facility to the atmosphere due to structure failure Applies to: • 244-AR Vault • 244-CR Vault • 204-AR Waste Unloading Facility


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B 11-2


Release of radioactive material from facility to the atmosphere due to structure failure Applies to: Miscellaneous Inactive Processing Facilities (241-AX-IX Ion Exchanger, 241-SX-401 and 241-SX-402 Condenser Shielding Buildings, 241-A-431 Ventilation Building, 241-C-801 Cesium Loadout Facility, 241-BY-ITS1 In-Tank Solidification System)



Release of surface contamination (i.e., waste) on a waste transfer pump removed from a tank during its decontamination with a water spray ring located outside of the tank (i.e., in a waste transfer-associated structure) due to confinement barrier failure Note: Releases of waste that could be trapped inside a waste transfer pump are addressed in AGSF-01


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RPP-15188 REV 12-A Appendix B. Hazard Evaluation Database With Controls Fields.





B 12-1



None required None required None required None required E1 None required MVS 03/15/17: Revised hazardous condition and material at risk to address PER 2016-2187.


Release of radioactive and/or hazardous materials from load drop / impact involving waste sample containers Applies to: Waste samples packaged in approved inter- or intra-facility transport containers



Release of radioactive and/or hazardous materials from over pressure or flammable gas deflagration in waste sample containers Applies to: Waste samples packaged in approved inter- or intra facility transport containers



Release of radioactive and/or hazardous materials from fire involving waste containers Applies to: Waste packaged in approved inter- or intra-facility transport containers

None required None required None required None required E1 None required MVS 03/15/17: Added hazardous condition to address PER 2016-2187.


Release of radioactive and/or hazardous materials from load drop / impact involving waste containers Applies to: Waste packaged in approved inter- or intra-facility transport containers

None required None required None required None required E1 None required MVS 03/15/17: Added hazardous condition to address PER 2016-2187.

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B 13-1

UR-01a Filtration Failures Leading to Unfiltered Releases (DSA Section 3.3.2.3.1)

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from HEPA filters to the atmosphere due to HEPA filter damage that does not crush the filters (such as from high temperature, high pressure, mechanical contact, material degradation) and subsequent unfiltered release (i.e., scenario assumes that ventilation system continues to operate without filtration after event, which encompasses the condition where the active ventilation system is shut down when the event occurs). Applies to: DST primary ventilation systems, annulus ventilation systems, and portable ventilations systems used to provide DST ventilation. Note: Hazardous condition includes mechanical contact hazards (e.g., vehicle, crane load) that jar system and cause partial release of inventory but do not cause sufficient damage to prevent continued operation. Hazards associated with crushing filters where ventilation system does not continue to operate are addressed in the aboveground structure failure accident.

None required None required None required None selected E1 None required EIM ‒ 02/25/16: Revised to include annulus and portable ventilation systems and to reflect sluicing operations in a DST including sluicer nozzle injecting jet stream into ventilation ducting. SDK ‒ 06/04/15: Removed “and Unfiltered Releases” in Candidate Accident column for consistence with DSA Section 3.3.2.3.1.

UR-01b Filtration Failures Leading to Unfiltered Releases (DSA Section 3.3.2.3.1)

Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from HEPA filters to the atmosphere due to HEPA filter damage from high temperature, high pressure, or mechanical contact (that does not crush filters) and subsequent unfiltered release (i.e., scenario assumes that ventilation system continues to operate without filtration after event, which encompasses the condition where the active ventilation system is shut down when the event occurs). Applies to: SST using a portable exhauster including retrieval operations (modified sluicing) Note: Hazardous condition includes mechanical contact hazards (e.g., vehicle, crane load) that jar system and cause partial release of inventory but do not cause sufficient damage to prevent continued operation. Hazards associated with crushing filters where ventilation system does not continue to operate are addressed in the aboveground structure failure accident.

None required None required None required None selected E1 None required RDS – 01/31/17: Revised to remove Mobile Arm Retrieval Systems. SDK ‒ 06/04/15: Removed “and Unfiltered Releases” in Candidate Accident column for consistence with DSA Section 3.3.2.3.1.


Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from HEPA filters to the atmosphere due to HEPA filter damage from high temperature, high pressure, or mechanical contact (that does not crush filters) and subsequent unfiltered release from a passively ventilated tanks/facilities Applies to: SST (100 and 200-Series) passive ventilation systems, DCRT, catch tank, and IMUST breather filters, and passive ventilation installed in waste transfer associated structures such as the 6241-A Diversion Box, 6241-V Vent Station, and vacuum retrieval structures.

None required None required None required None selected E1 None required RDS – 01/31/17: Revised to remove Mobile Arm Retrieval Systems. SDK ‒ 06/04/15: Removed “and Unfiltered Releases” in Candidate Accident column for consistence with DSA Section 3.3.2.3.1.

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B 13-2


Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from HEPA filters to the atmosphere due to HEPA filter damage from high temperature, high pressure, or mechanical contact (that does not crush filters) and subsequent unfiltered release from a passively ventilated facility Applies to: 242-T Evaporator, 244-AR Vault, 244-CR Vault

None required None required None required None selected E1 None required SDK ‒ 06/04/15: Removed “and Unfiltered Releases” in Candidate Accident column for consistence with DSA Section 3.3.2.3.1.


Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from HEPA filters to the atmosphere due to HEPA filter damage from high temperature, high pressure, or mechanical contact (that does not crush filters) and subsequent unfiltered release from an actively ventilated facility Applies to: 242-S Evaporator (Hot Side)



Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from HEPA filters to the atmosphere due to HEPA filter damage from high temperature, high pressure, or mechanical contact (that does not crush filters) and subsequent unfiltered release from actively ventilated facility Applies to: 204-AR Waste Unloading Facility



Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from HEPA filters to the atmosphere due to HEPA filter damage from high temperature, high pressure, or mechanical contact (that does not crush filters) and subsequent unfiltered release from actively ventilated tank annulus when annulus contains waste due to leak from primary tank or misroute into annulus Applies to: DST annulus ventilation system

None required None required None required None selected E1 None required SDK – 01/05/2015 Revised event frequency from “unlikely” to “anticipated” based on failure of the 241-AY-102 primary tank and waste leak into the annulus leaving only the annulus as the remaining passive barrier. Supports closure of LDP PISA/USQ (Ref.WRPS-PER-2013-1102). SDK ‒ 06/04/15: Removed “and Unfiltered Releases” in Candidate Accident column for consistence with DSA Section 3.3.2.3.1. JMG ‒ 09/15/15: Revised to address RPP-ASMT-60038.

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B 13-3


Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from unfiltered release from actively ventilated or passively ventilated tank/facility. No release of inventory from HEPA filters is assumed. Applies to: • Active ventilation systems including DST

primary and annulus ventilation systems, SST portable exhausters (POR03, POR04, POR05, POR06, POR-008), 242-S Evaporator (Hot Side), and 204-AR Waste Unloading Facility.

• Passive ventilation systems including SSTs (100 and 200-Series), DCRT, catch tank, and IMUST breather filters, passive ventilation installed in waste transfer associated structures such as the 6241-A Diversion Box, 6241-V Vent Station, and vacuum retrieval structures, 242-T Evaporator, 244-AR Vault, 244-CR Vault

Also encompasses unfiltered releases from DSTs/SSTs from open risers (or riser sheared off by vehicles or cranes) and other unfiltered pathways (e.g., open test ports, break in sensing lines, incorrect valve line-up), unfiltered releases that occur when DST ventilation systems are not operating (all causes), and unfiltered releases that occur during or are caused by push mode core sampling Also encompasses unfiltered releases from water lancing/ flushing in SN-278


UR-08 Filtration Failures Leading to Unfiltered Releases (DSA Section 3.3.2.3.1) Note: Formerly known as Steam Intrusion from Interfacing Facilities candidate accident

Release radioactive and other hazardous materials from DST 241-AW-102 to the atmosphere due to overpressure caused by uncontrolled influx of steam/hot air. Waste transfer to DST 241-AW-102 is initiated from the 242-A Evaporator pump room sump using a steam jet. After transfer is complete the steam jet is not shut off and saturated steam pressure of 90 lb/in2 and 2,400 lb/h flow rate is injected into the headspace and this steam flow continues until an equilibrium pressure of 18 lb/in2 absolute is reached in the headspace. (It is conservatively assumed that the primary ventilation system is not operating.) This moisture and pressure fails the HEPA filters and displaces aerosols from the headspace through ventilation system (or through unsealed cracks in the cover blocks). Applies to: DST 241-AW-102


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B 13-4

UR-09 Filtration Failures Leading to Unfiltered Releases (DSA Section 3.3.2.3.1) Note: Formerly known as Evaporator Dump candidate accident

Release radioactive and other hazardous materials from DST 241-AW-102 to the atmosphere due to pressurization of DST 241-AW-102 from an uncontrolled dump of 242-A Evaporator. The 242-A Evaporator is assumed to dump its entire contents of 26,000 gal to DST 241-AW-102 in the minimum achievable time of 11 minutes. A concurrent loss of active ventilation is assumed. The reduction of tank headspace volume and addition of heat due to the evaporator dump pressurize the headspace. Although no credit is taken for filtration, the HEPA filter contents are not released because of the low pressure produced by this event. Waste aerosols are released through the ventilation system as the headspace pressure is relieved Applies to: DST 241-AW-102



Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from an SST HEPA breather filter to the atmosphere due to HEPA filter damage from caustic chemical addition, and subsequent unfiltered release from filter breather pathway. Applies to: SST (100 and 200 Series)

None required None required None selected None selected E1 None required SDK ‒ 06/04/2015: Removed “and Unfiltered Releases” in Candidate Accident column for consistence with DSA Section 3.3.2.3.1.


Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from damaged DST inlet air station, inlet HEPA filter, vacuum control damper, expansion joint, etc. Applies to: DST primary ventilation systems

None required None required None selected None selected E1 None required SDK ‒ 06/04/2015: New hazardous condition identified in 241-AP ventilation system upgrades PrHA (RPP-RPT-58674).


Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from HEPA filters to the atmosphere due to HEPA filter damage from explosion and subsequent unfiltered release (i.e., scenario assumes that ventilation system continues to operate without filtration after event, which encompasses the condition where the active ventilation system is shut down when the event occurs). Applies to: DST primary ventilation systems



Contaminated intrusion water (rain or snowmelt) that enters stack when exhauster is not operating is blown out when exhauster is operated.


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B 13-5


Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials from HEPA filters to the atmosphere due to HEPA filter damage that does not crush the filters (such as from high temperature, high pressure, mechanical contact, material degradation), and subsequent unfiltered release (i.e., scenario assumes that ventilation system continues to operate without filtration after event, which encompasses the condition where the active ventilation system is shut down when the event occurs). Applies to: DST primary ventilation systems, annulus ventilation systems, and portable ventilation systems used to provide DST ventilation. Note: Hazardous condition includes mechanical contact hazards (i.e., vehicle, crane load) that jar system and cause partial release of inventory, but do no cause sufficient damage to prevent continued operation. Hazards associated with crushing filters where ventilation system does not continue to operate are addressed in the aboveground structure failure accident (see AGSF-03 in Table 11).

None required None required None selected None selected E1 None required EIM ‒ 02/25/16: New hazardous condition added to support the AY-102 Recovery Pr9oject covering both 702-AZ and a portable ventilation system simultaneously drawing on the Tank 241-AY-102 headspace.

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B 14-1


Organic solvent pool fire involving a separable organic layer of degraded PUREX solvent (NPH/TBP). Applies to: Passively ventilated organic solvent containing SSTs or passively ventilated DSTs (e.g., ventilation shutdown)



Organic solvent pool fire involving a separable organic layer of degraded PUREX solvent (NPH/TBP). Applies to: Actively ventilated organic solvent containing SSTs or actively ventilated DSTs (e.g., ventilation operating)



Organic solvent pool fire involving a separable organic layer of degraded PUREX solvent (NPH/TBP). Applies to: DCRTs Note: The presence of organic solvents in quantities sufficient to support a fire is unknown for all tanks (i.e., the only known hazard was in 241-C-103, which has since been retrieved). However, waste liquid removal activities, evaporation of the more volatile (and thus more flammable) compounds, and chemical degradation (e.g., hydrolysis) is judged to have eliminated any significant organic solvent fire hazards from catch tanks, 244-CR Vault, 244-AR Vault, 242-T Evaporator tanks, 242-S Evaporator tanks, and IMUSTs.



“Wick-stabilized” organic solvent fire. A “wick-stabilized” fire results when a sludge or saltcake layer is permeated by the organic solvent, but there is no pool of solvent on the waste surface. Applies to: DSTs, SSTs, DCRTs Note: The presence of organic solvents in quantities sufficient to support a fire is unknown for all tanks (i.e., the only known hazard was in 241-C-103, which has since been retrieved). However, waste liquid removal activities, evaporation of the more volatile (and thus more flammable) compounds, and chemical degradation (e.g., hydrolysis) is judged to have eliminated any significant organic solvent fire hazards from catch tanks, 244-CR Vault, 244-AR Vault, 242-T Evaporator tanks, 242-S Evaporator tanks, and IMUSTs.



In-tank fire due to burning diesel fuel flowing into waste tank. A pool of diesel fuel rather than an organic solvent layer is burning.) Applies to: SSTs, DSTs

None required None required None required None required E1 None required RSD – 03/26/2018: Revised to correct basis for NC frequency.

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B 14-2


In-tank fire due to burning diesel fuel flowing into waste tank. A pool of diesel fuel rather than an organic solvent layer is burning.) Applies to: DCRTs, catch tanks, 244-AR Vault tanks, 244-CR Vault tanks, IMUSTs



In-tank organic solvent fire (pool fire or wicked-stabilized fire)



In-tank fire due to burning hydraulic fluid spray inside waste tank. Applies to: SSTs, DSTs, DCRTs, catch tanks, 244-AR Vault tanks, 244-CR Vault tanks, IMUSTs


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B 15-1


Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials to the atmosphere due to 242-T Evaporator or 242-S Evaporator (Hot Side) vessel failure



Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials to the atmosphere due to condensate seal pot or collection tank failure Applies to:

• All active ventilation systems (i.e., AZ301-COND-TK-001 and the staged 8,000 gallon tanker installed by the AZ-301 Tanker Option Project; 241-AN tank farm – seal pot SP-101, 102, 103, 170, 380, and 480; 241-AP tank farm – Seal pot SP-101; 241-AW tank farm – seal pot SP-101, SP-170, SP-380, and SP-480; 241-AY/AZ tank farms – seal pot AZ-PC-SP-1; 241-SY tank farm – (A train) Seal pot SP-401 and (B train) seal pot SP-001; PORs (003, 004, 005, 006, and 008) – seal pot VTP-SP-001

• All inactive ventilation systems



Release of radioactive and other hazardous materials to the atmosphere due to vacuum retrieval slurry tank or water separator failure


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B 16-1

RP-01 RP Ionizing radiation exposure to the facility worker during routine/planned work activities from radioactive contamination dispersed from crib, ditch or UPR site to the environment as a result of high winds or range fires.


RP-02 RP Ionizing radiation exposure to the facility worker during routine/planned work activities from contamination released to soil surface from crib, ditch or UPR site as a result of animal intrusion or flooding (e.g., water line breaks, rain, or snow melt).


RP-03 RP Exposure to radioactive materials in soil dispersed from surface or near surface release points to the general area due to a failure of a pressurized line. Applies to: Unburied or uncovered pressurized compressed air, instrument or water line, above ground cylinder/bottle including air compressor, air tool exhaust, air driven pumps, pneumatic testing of lines, or nitrogen tanker impingement on soils.


RP-04 RP Ionizing radiation exposure to the facility worker during routine/planned work activities associated with physical contamination of facility worker by radioactive material from tank waste. The radioactive contamination is caused by past storage, processing, transfer, or handling of tank waste. Applies to: Routine/planned operations, maintenance, installation, removal, or construction activities that result in: • Physical contamination from opening pits,

access ports, tank risers, removing cover blocks, installing/removing HIHTLs, installing/removing jumpers, removing contaminated equipment

• Physical contamination from performing planned installation, removal, repairs, or maintenance on contaminated waste storage and handling equipment, waste tank ventilation systems, tank monitoring and surveillance equipment

• Physical contamination during surveillance of contaminated facilities, equipment, or operation.


RP-05 RP Ionizing radiation exposure to the facility worker (no physical contact) from radioactive waste and contamination present in or on facilities and equipment used to store, process, transfer, or handle tank waste (including connected supporting systems such as compressed air, steam, hydraulic system, or raw water). Applies to: Routine/planned work activities in the TOC facilities.


RP-06 RP Ionizing radiation exposure to the facility worker (no contact) while using, storing, or otherwise being in proximity with radioactive check sources.


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B 16-2

RP-07 RP Ionizing radiation exposure to the facility worker during routine/planned work activities resulting from naturally occurring radioactive materials (radon) that buildup in TOC facilities.


RP-08 RP Ionizing radiation exposure to the facility worker during waste transfers or as a result of waste tank shielding reduction. Applies to: • Surveillance of waste transfer lines during

a waste transfer. • Workers performing normal work in the

vicinity of exposed buried transfer lines being used to transfer waste.

• Excavation activities occurring over waste transfer lines, structures or tanks.


RP-09 RP Facility worker exposure to ionizing radiation or physical contamination from isotope source in the cone penetrometer multi-sensor probe. Applies to: All soil sampling activities using isotopic radiation sources.


RP-10 RP Facility worker exposure to ionizing radiation or physical contamination with soil contaminated with tank waste that is inadvertently released during soil sampling activities. Includes ingestion, inhalation, and direct physical contact. Applies to: All soil sampling methods and associated activities.


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B 17-1

STD_IND-CHEM-01 OCC Facility worker is exposed to a toxic industrial chemical, or hazardous material such as; pesticides, cleaning chemicals, asbestos, or beryllium, by absorption through the skin, inhalation, or through the blood stream that causes illness, disease, or death.


STD_IND-CHEM-02 OCC Facility worker is exposed to a corrosive industrial chemical that damages the skin, eyes, or lungs causing injury or death.


STD-IND-CHEM-03 OCC Facility worker is exposed to chemical vapors released from waste tank head spaces, or waste transfer-associated structures causing discomfort, irritation, illness, or long-term disability.

None required None required None required None required E1 None required MVS ‒ 04/24/17: Revised to clarify consequences and their basis as it relates to vapors.

STD-IND-CHEM-04 OCC Facility worker skin contact with tank waste that does not occur during a waste transfer or an accident involving waste stored in tanks (e.g., DSTs, SSTs, DCRTs) resulting in burns or toxic chemical absorption.

None required None required None required None required E1 None required MVS ‒ 04/12/17: Hazardous condition cause modified by addition of pressurized pump clearing and column punching/draining (RPP-RPT-58712, Rev. 0).

STD_IND-FIEX-01 OCC Facility worker is exposed to heat from nontank waste associated fire or deflagration involving motor fuel, solvents, or combustible solids/dusts that cause injury or death.


STD_IND-FIEX-02 OCC Facility worker is exposed to an explosion caused by ignition of a flammable industrial gas or reactive chemical runaway reaction that results in injury or death from burns or high energy impacts.


STD_IND-HS-01 OCC Facility worker exposed to hot surfaces associated with diesel or gasoline engines, fired or electrical heaters, hot hydraulic fluids, heated chemicals, flame welding, high temperature lighting, hot power tools, etc. that causes injury or death.


STD_IND-SE-01 OCC Facility worker is exposed to a sudden and violent release of energy from a pressurized fluid container such as; compressed gas or boiler steam causing severe injury, long-term disability or death from burns or mechanical impact.


STD_IND-SE-02 OCC Facility worker is exposed to pressurized hot water resulting from a leak in flush water lines causing severe injury, long-term disability or death from burns or mechanical impact.


STD_IND-SE-03 OCC Facility worker is exposed to pressurized hot glycol liquid/vapors resulting from boil-over or leak in in-line glycol heater causing severe injury, long-term disability, or death from scalding or burns.

None required None required None required None required N/A None required SDK ‒ 06/04/15: New hazardous condition identified in 241-AP exhauster upgrades PrHA (RPP-RPT-58674, Rev. 0).

STD_IND-ELEC-01 OCC Facility worker is exposed to heat from electrical arcs or shorted equipment causing injury or death from flash burns.


STD_IND-ELEC-02 OCC Facility worker exposed to electrically energized equipment, switch gear, or power lines resulting in injury or death from electrocution.


STD_IND-STAT-01 OCC Facility worker exposed to static electrical discharge resulting in damage to the body’s nervous system.


STD_IND-OD-01 OCC Facility worker exposed to oxygen deficient atmospheres causing severe injury or death.


STD_IND-STF/SB-01 OCC Facility worker involved in soil collapse in a trench or excavation resulting in severe injury or death.


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B 17-2

STD_IND-STF/SB-02 OCC Facility worker involved in falls from elevated locations (e.g., ladders, platforms, towers) or on walking surfaces (e.g., slippery floors, poor housekeeping, uneven walking surfaces, exposed ledges, etc.) resulting in injury or death.


STD_IND-STF/SB-03 OCC Facility worker exposed to mechanical vibration that causes damage to nerve endings.


STD_IND-STF/SB-04 OCC Facility worker exposed to crushing, caught-between, cutting, tearing, shearing equipment and operating hazards resulting in severe injury or death.


STD_IND-STF/SB-05 OCC Facility worker struck by moving/accelerated mass such as falling objects, rotating equipment, moving vehicles, or projectiles causing severe injury or death.


STD_IND-STF/SB-06 OCC Facility worker strikes body part against tool or object with sufficient force to cause injury (head impact with fixed object, knife cuts, screwdriver punctures, shin scrapes).


STD_IND-STF/SB-07 OCC Facility worker experiences strains or sprains including hernia due to overexertion or repetitive motion causing reduced efficiency and lost time reportable injuries.


STD_IND-STF/SB-08 OCC Facility worker exposed to noise levels that result in hearing damage or loss.


STD_IND-ION-01 OCC Facility worker exposed to nonwaste associated ionizing radiation (x-ray equipment or radioactive sources used in nondestructive testing equipment) that causes injury or death.


STD_IND-NION-01 OCC Facility worker exposed to nonionizing radiation (ultraviolet, laser, visible light, infrared, and microwaves) that cause injury to tissue by thermal or photochemical means.


STD_IND-TEMP-01 OCC Facility worker exposed to high environmental temperatures or work conditions that result in heat stress or heat exhaustion.


STD_IND-TEMP-02 OCC Facility worker exposed to low environmental temperatures that result in skin freezing or metabolic slow down such as hypothermia.


STD_IND-BIO-01 OCC Facility worker exposed to biological hazards such as stinging or biting insects or animal borne diseases such as hanta virus that results in injury, disease, and death.


STD_IND-BIO-02 OCC Facility worker exposed to blood borne pathogens resulting in infection and long-term disability.


STD_IND-NPH-01 OCC Facility worker exposed to lightning strike, either directly, or through equipment resulting in injury or death from electrocution.


STD_IND-NPH-02 OCC Facility worker exposed to falling debris or fall into open hole into underground facility from seismic event resulting in injury or death from crushing or fall.


STD_IND-NPH-03 OCC Facility worker exposed to debris from high wind event resulting in injury or death from trauma.


STD_IND-NPH-04 OCC Facility worker exposed to volcanic ash fall event resulting in injury or death from suffocation.


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