Document of The World Bank · Document of The World Bank ... PPEs Personal Protective Equipment PPF Project Preparation Facility ... 2,190, 256 # of Boys 1.08 mln

Document of The World Bank

Report No: ICR00001455

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-33670 IDA-3367A TF-90848)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 26.1MILLION (US$ 35 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF RWANDA

FOR A

HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

June 25, 2010

AFTED AFCTRW Africa Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective 00000000)

Currency Unit = 1.00 = US$ [ ] US$ 1.00 = [ ]

FISCAL YEAR

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ARAP Abbreviated resettlement Action Plan CAS Country Assistance Strategy CDCs Community Development Committees CEPEX Central Public Investments and External Finance Bureau CFO Chief Financial Officer CNDP CNER CNLS National AIDS Control Commission CRDP Community Reintegration and Development Project CSR Country Status Report CSRDP Community Based School Rehabilitation and Development Program DCA Development Credit Agreement DFID Department for International Development (UK) DHS Demographic and Health survey EFA-FTI Education For All- Fast Track Initiative EICV Enquête Intégrale sur les Condition de Vie EMSP Environmental and Social Management Plan EPDF Education Program Development Fund EPO Education Project Office ESIA Environmental and Social Impact Assessment ESMP Environmental and Social Management Plan ESSP Education Strategic Sector Plan ETO FAWE Forum for African Women Educationists FESP First Education Sector Project GDP Gross Domestic Product GER and NER Gross and Net Enrollment Rates GFATM Global Fund to Fight Aids Malaria and Tuberculosis GOR Government of Rwanda HIV/AIDS Human Immuno Deficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome HRDP Human Resource Development Project IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICB International Competitive Bidding ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report IDA International Development Association IEC internal efficiency coefficient ILI IPR Independent Procurement Review

ISAE ISR Information Systems Renewal JESS Joint Education Sector Support JRES Joint Review of the Education Sector KIE Kigali Institute of Education KIST Kigali Institute of Science and Technology KPIs Key Performance Indicators LIL Learning and Innovation loan MINALOC Ministry of Local Government MINEDUC Ministry of Education MoU Memorandum of Understanding NEC Rwanda National Examination Council NGO non-governmental organization NUR PAD Project Appraisal Document PAPs Project Affected Persons PDO Project Development Objectives PEPFAR President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief PER Public Expenditure Review PIM Project Implementation Manual PPEs Personal Protective Equipment PPF Project Preparation Facility PPR Post Procurement Review PTA Preferential Trade Area RAP Resettlement and Compensation Action Plan RAPs Resettlement Action Plan REMA Rwanda Environment Management Authority RPF Resettlement Policy Framework RwFr Rwanda Franc S&T Science and Technology SBS Sector Budget Support SWAp Sector-Wide Approach TTC Teacher Training Centers TTCs Teacher Training Colleges TTLs Task Team Leaders

Vice President: Obiageli Ezekwesili

Country Director: Johannes C.M. Zutt

Sector Manager: Christopher J. Thomas

Project Team Leader: Margo Hoftijzer

ICR Team Leader: Elizabeth Ninan

RWANDA Human Resources Development Project

CONTENTS

Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................... 12. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................. 63. Assessment of Outcomes .......................................................................................... 124. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ......................................................... 206. Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................... 227. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners .......... 22Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 25Annex 2. Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 26Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................. 31Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................... 37Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ................................................... 38Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ..................... 39Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ....................... 41Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 42Annex 10: ISR ratings .................................................................................................. 43Annex 11: CSRDP Schools ......................................................................................... 46Annex 12: Environmental and Social Safeguards Review .......................................... 47Annex 13: Newspaper Article of MINEDUC’s collaboration with communities to build schools ................................................................................................................. 67MAP .............................................................................................................................. 69

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A. Basic Information

Country: Rwanda Project Name: Human Resources Development Project

Project ID: P045091 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-33670,IDA-3367A,TF-90848

ICR Date: 06/29/2010 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: GOVERNMENT

Original Total Commitment:

USD 35.0M Disbursed Amount: USD 35.8M

Revised Amount: USD 32.9M

Environmental Category: C

Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Education, Science, Technology and Scientific Research

Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual

Date(s)

Concept Review: 08/05/1999 Effectiveness: 01/19/2001 01/19/2001

Appraisal: 02/22/2000 Restructuring(s): 06/26/2006 05/19/2008 06/29/2009

Approval: 06/06/2000 Mid-term Review: 12/02/2003

Closing: 06/30/2006 12/31/2009 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR

Outcomes: Moderately Unsatisfactory

Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate

Bank Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory

Borrower Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Moderately Unsatisfactory

Government: Moderately Unsatisfactory

Quality of Supervision: Moderately Unsatisfactory

Implementing Agency/Agencies:

Moderately Unsatisfactory

Overall Bank Performance:


Overall Borrower Performance:


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C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance IndicatorsImplementation

Performance Indicators

QAG Assessments (if any)

Rating

Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

No Quality at Entry (QEA):

None

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

No Quality of Supervision (QSA):

None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:

Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Central government administration 4 4

Primary education 39 39

Secondary education 39 39

Sub-national government administration 8 8

Tertiary education 10 10

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Child health 13

Education for all 25 72

Gender 13

HIV/AIDS 24 5

Participation and civic engagement 25 23 E. Bank Staff

Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Callisto E. Madavo

Country Director: Johannes C.M. Zutt Emmanuel Mbi

Sector Manager: Christopher J. Thomas Arvil Van Adams

Project Team Leader: Margo A. Hoftijzer Peter N. Ngomba

ICR Team Leader: Elizabeth Ninan

ICR Primary Author: Elizabeth Ninan

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F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The main objective of this project is to build up Rwanda's human resources and institutional capacity to deliver education services following the 1994 genocide, with attention to the poorest members and regions of the country. Specific actions are geared to: (i) improve access to basic education by increasing its intake capacity through community participation in rehabilitating, constructing and equipping schools; (ii) improve the quality of inputs (teaching, instructional materials, methods of supervision)in primary and secondary education; (iii) heighten awareness and train students, parents and educators to combat the AIDS epidemic; (iv) build institutional capacity and improve efficiency in the management of the education system through focused training, studies and policy development, and initiation of a Sector-Wide Investment Program. Note: The above are consistent with the objectives agreed at negotiations but were reformulated for clarity in October 2004 by the Government and Bank teams (ref. letter from Rwanda Finance Minister to IDA on October 18, 2004, regarding expenditures for the second half of the project; see following sections of this PSR.) Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) (a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : The transition rate from primary to secondary education (original) Value quantitative or Qualitative)

37% 50% 55%

Date achieved 01/19/2001 06/30/2006 11/12/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement)

Indicator 2 : The qualification level of the teaching corps (i.e. share of qualified teachers) (original)

Value quantitative or Qualitative)

Prim. 49% Sec. 26% Tert. 5%

Prim. 65% Sec. 52% Tert. 10%

Prim. 99% Sec. 36% Tert. 18 %


Indicator 3 : The success rate in the national examination at the end of primary education

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(original) Value quantitative or Qualitative)

40% 70% 52.5%


Indicator 4 : Gross and net enrollment rates increase as a consequence of project (revised) Value quantitative or Qualitative)

Gross 103.7% Net 74.5% Gross 127.9% Net 94.2%

Date achieved 01/19/2000 06/11/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement)

While no formal end-of-project targets were determined, the sector targets for 2012 are 123% gross and 100% net

Indicator 5 : Regional offices for school inspectorate established and operational (revised)

Value quantitative or Qualitative)

0

Decentralized system and general inspectorate implemented and operational

6 regional offices for school inspectorate were established.


Indicator 6 : Students enrolled in primary education (number of girls and boys) (revised) Value quantitative or Qualitative)

1,534,510 # of Boys 763,277 # of Girls 771,233

No targets set 2,190, 256 # of Boys 1.08 mln # of Girls 1.11 mln


(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised

Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : Component 1: At least ten sub-projects planned and executed by local communities every year (original)

Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0 50 124

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Indicator 2 : Component 1: Additional number of pupils due to additional classroom construction of HRDP (revised)


0 No targets set 54,000


Assuming average of 71 students per classroom and 765 classrooms built.

Indicator 3 : Component 1: Classrooms built and/or rehabilitated (number) (revised). This is an African region core indicator which was included later in the project.


0 No targets set 765


Indicator 4 : Component 2: In-service trained provided to 1000 teachers every other year for duration of project (original)


0 1000 teachers every other year (3000)

10920


Indicator 5 : Component 2: Primary pupil/textbook ratio of 2:1 in mathematics and one teacher's guide per teacher (original)


3:1 2:1 1:1


Indicator 6 : Component 2: 45 technical personnel trained and able to evaluate examination results every year (original)


0 45 50

Date achieved 01/19/2001 06/30/2006 11/30/2009 Comments (incl. %

Not directly funded through the HRDP but through other partners and the GoR

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achievement)

Indicator 7 : Component 2: S&T disciplines taught at primary level by end of project (original)


S&T not taught at primary level

S&T taught at primary level

No data


Indicator 8 : Component 2: Education facilities built and/or rehabilitated (units) (revised)


0 Extend and rehabilitate 6 TTCS

Extension and rehabilitation work completed for all 6 TTCs


Indicator 9 : Component 3: HIV/AIDS-related teaching, learning and informational materials available and used in all schools by the end of the year (original)


no data at baseline 100% of schools Unclear/ No data available


Indicator 10 : Component 3: Proportion of schools with functioning anti-AIDS clubs with an approach appropriately targeting girls and boys (original)


No baseline data 70% 7% "functioning" (see note)


The Project reported 86% (1024 out of 1186) of schools had an AIDS club, but according to the 2009 evaluation, only 7% of clubs were #functioning#, in that they had a budget and premises.

Indicator 11 : Component 3: Decline in teenage pregnancy rate (as a proxy for an increase in condom use) (original)


no baseline no targets set no data collected


Indicator 12 : Component 3: All known pupils, students and teachers infected with or affected by HIV/AIDS offered information on the nearest testing, counseling and support

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opportunities (original)


no data 100% students and teachers infected or affected

No data collected on numbers of students trained. 567 trainers at secondary level trained


Indicator 13 : Component 3: AIDS prevention program integrated into curricula, school manuals and activities (revised)


no data AIDS prevention program integrated by end of project

HIV/AIDS is integrated into the school curricula. In addition, 567 trainers in secondary schools have been trained, all schools have received radios, education al materials distributed to schools


Indicator 14 : Component 4: Gender-sensitive education policy framework formulated (original)


no policy Policy formulated Girls# Education Policy ratified by Cabinet in 2008


Indicator 15 : Component 4: An average of at least 20% of planned training programs executed every year (original)


N/A 20% of planned training programs executed

No data since this indictaor was not tracked after the first three years of the project

Date achieved 01/19/2001 06/30/2006 11/30/2009 Comments (incl. %

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achievement)

Indicator 16 : Component 4: Sector-Wide Investment Program prepared and adopted, and implementation initiated (original)


No SWAP established SWAP adopted, and under implementation

SWAP adopted, and under implementation


Indicator 17 : Component 4: Reports of project studies prepared, approved and adopted by MINEDUC (original)


N/A Reports adopted by MINEDUC

Country Status Report (CSR) of 2003 prepared in collaboration with MINEDUC and results used to design the Education Sector Strategy Plan.


Indicator 18 : Component 4: Focused training and management capacity building within the education system (original)


N/A

An average of at least 20% of planned training programs executed every year

Financed 119 Masters and 15 PhDs


Indicator 19 : Component 4: Primary school faculty meeting minimum qualification (numbers) (revised)


17,995 no targets set 32, 675


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G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived

DO IP Actual

Disbursements (USD millions)

1 12/21/2000 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 06/26/2001 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.26 3 12/28/2001 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.88 4 05/06/2002 Satisfactory Satisfactory 3.74 5 12/26/2002 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 5.71 6 06/25/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 7.02 7 12/24/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 10.99 8 06/28/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 13.87 9 12/21/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 16.27

10 06/01/2005 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 20.06 11 01/06/2006 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 23.08 12 09/11/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 25.73 13 06/29/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 28.29 14 12/28/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 29.10 15 06/28/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 30.44 16 08/31/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 31.29 17 04/22/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 33.24 18 06/29/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 34.00 19 12/28/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 35.49

H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring Date(s)

Board Approved

PDO Change

ISR Ratings at Restructuring

Amount Disbursed at

Restructuring in USD millions

Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made

DO IP

06/26/2006 U U 24.16

Reallocation of proceeds for the addition of FAWE secondary school construction; project lagged due to misprocurement during May 05-April 06 period and hence additional time required to complete Project activities.

05/19/2008 N S S 29.10 To allow completion of FAWE construction and the acquisition of textbooks

06/29/2009 N S S 34.00 To complete remaining activities (FAWE was 70% complete at that time) and

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Restructuring Date(s)

Board Approved

PDO Change

ISR Ratings at Restructuring

Amount Disbursed at

Restructuring in USD millions

Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made

DO IP

implement the findings of the resettlement audit which was ongoing.

I. Disbursement Profile

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1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

1. By the turn of the millennium, Rwanda was only beginning to recover from the human and economic

devastation caused by the war and genocide of 1994. After its military victory in 1994, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) established a coalition government which was faced with ominous internal and regional security issues. By late 2006/early 2007, there was a massive repatriation of Rwandese exiles from neighboring Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda and the then Zaire.

2. At the time of project preparation in 1999/2000, Paul Kagame had just become President of the Republic

of Rwanda , the internal security situation had dramatically improved and the focus had shifted towards promoting National reconciliation and economic growth.

3. Despite the untold havoc caused by the 1994 genocide, the Rwandan education system was recovering

extremely well, at least in quantitative terms, by early 2000. There was a government-wide effort to improve both the efficiency and effectiveness of public expenditures and within the education sector, to improve donor coordination and support through a broader Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp). Funding for the social sectors became more of a priority after the genocide and by 2001, public expenditure on education was approximately 5.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in addition to increased donor aid. Only five years after the genocide, the number of children in primary school had already surpassed the number that would have been enrolled had the system expanded at historical rates of increase. By 2000, the gross enrollment ratio for primary school was 104 percent which exceeded the corresponding ratio for the average low-income countries in Africa at the time.

4. The challenges for the education sector and the entire Rwandan economy were immense and the

government was faced with the colossal task of rebuilding the social and economic fabric of the country at the time of project preparation. The central theme in the government’s agenda was nation-building which sought to engage communities and social networks to build an environment of partnership. The needs were diverse, ranging from infrastructural development to reintegration of vulnerable groups such as female heads of household, unaccompanied children, orphans, out-of-school youth, internally displaced people and returnees. The education sector had firmly moved into a development stage with a focus on increasing coverage and quality of education, particularly for the poorest and most isolated children as well as improving the education system management.

5. Building on the experience of the First Education Sector Project (FESP), the Human Resource

Development Project (HRDP) was conceived as a bridging operation between the first project which closed in September 1999 and a Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) for the education sector which was to be developed by 2003/04.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators

6. The main objective of the project was to assist Rwanda in its effort to develop and implement a sustained program of capacity building through education and skills development in order to redress human resources deficiencies and develop a critical mass of trained human resources. Specific actions were geared towards: (i) increasing access to primary and secondary education through the involvement of local communities in school rehabilitation and construction; (ii) improving the quality of primary and secondary education; (iii) heightening awareness of HIV/AIDS and promoting behavioral change

2

prevention strategies among children and youth; (iv) building capacity within the education sector and the overall economy including support for the provision of focused training in key areas; and (v) undertaking analytical work and experimentation in preparation for a Sector-Wide Investment Program.

7. The Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) as per Annex 1 in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) are

shown in Table 1. There was no reference to the KPIs within the Development Credit Agreement (DCA) and it should be noted that this was not a requirement at the time the DCA was signed.

Table 1: Original Key Project Indicators

PDO Indicators 1. Transition rate from primary to secondary education increased from 35% to at least 50% by

the end of the Project. 2. The success rate in the national examination at the end of primary education to increase from 40%

to at least 70% by the end of the Project. 3. The qualification level of the teaching corps to increase by the end of the Project from: - 49% to 65% by the end of the Project at the primary level; - 6% to 52% at the secondary level. - 5% of professors with doctorates at the tertiary level to at least double Component Output Indicators Component One: Community Based School Rehabilitation and Development Program 4. At least 10 subprojects per year planned and executed by local communities (total of 50 by end of Project)

Component Two: School Quality Improvement Program 5. In-service training provided to 1000 teachers every other year for the duration of the Project 6. Primary pupil/textbook ratio of 2:1 in math by end of Project and one teacher’s guide per teacher

by 2004 7. 45 technical personnel trained and able to evaluate examination results every year 8. S&T disciplines taught at primary level by end of project Component 3: HIV/AIDS 9. HIV/AIDS related-teaching , learning and informational materials available and used in all schools b

of project 10. At least 70% of schools with functioning anti-AIDS clubs by end of project, with an approach

appropriately targeting girls and boys 11. Decline in the teenage pregnancy rate (as a proxy for an increase in condom use) 12. All known pupils, students and teachers infected with or affected by HIV/AIDS offered

information on the nearest testing, counseling and support opportunities Component 4: Capacity Building Program, Studies and Development of SWAp 13. Gender-sensitive education policy framework formulated 14. An average of at least 20% of planned training programs executed every year for duration

of project 15. Sector Wide investment Program prepared and adopted, and implementation initiated by end

of project 16. Report of project studies prepared, approved and adopted by MINEDUC

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1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification 8. The PDO did not change during project implementation. However, the objectives agreed at negotiations were reformulated for clarity in October 2004 by the government in collaboration with the Bank team. The wording of the PDO in the PAD lacked clarity and precision which made it more difficult to track effectively. This new wording of the PDO, which was the same as the old PDO in terms of intent, was reflected in the December 2004 Implementation Supervision Report (ISR). The principal difference is that the clarified PDO sought to; (a) target of the poorest members and regions of the country; (b) focus on improving the quality of education inputs rather than broadly addressing the quality of the primary and secondary education; (c) focus on building capacity within the education system rather than the economy as a whole. 9. The main objective of this project was to build Rwanda's human resources and institutional capacity to deliver education services following the 1994 genocide, with attention to the poorest members and regions of the country. Specific actions were to: (i) improve access to basic education by increasing its intake capacity through community participation in rehabilitating, constructing and equipping schools; (ii) improve the quality of inputs (teaching, instructional materials, methods of supervision)in primary and secondary education; (iii) heighten awareness and train students, parents and educators to combat the AIDS epidemic; (iv) build institutional capacity and improve efficiency in the management of the education system through focused training, studies and policy development, and initiation of a Sector-Wide Investment Program. 10. The ICR will focus on achievements related to “clarified” PDO as it was used for most of the Project period.

11. The key performance indicators were revised and refined through the course of the Project and there are different iterations of the KPIs within the ISRs (see Annex 11). There were two main turning points with respect to the KPIs; one was in October 2003 when MINEDUC held a workshop to review project indicators and build consensus on what indicators to track for the remainder of the Project. The workshop participants were able to document more detailed indicators based on two years of implementation experience, particularly with respect to HIV/AIDS, the capacity building program, studies and development of the SWAp. 12. The more strategic revision of the KPIs was reflected within the second extension of the Project in May 2008 and in what constituted a second order restructuring, when the Project Results Framework was updated and refined as per the table below. The revised KPIs included some of the Bank’s core indicators for the education sector. However, given that almost 85% of project funds were disbursed by the time the project was restructured, this ICR focuses on achievement of the original KPIs with some discussion of achievement of the core indicators. Table 2: Revised Key Project Indicators

PDO Indicators 1. Gross and net enrollment rates increase as a consequence of the project 2. Transition rate from primary to secondary education increased from 35% to at least 50%

by the end of the Project. 3. The success rate in the national examination at the end of primary education to increase from

40% to at least 70% by the end of the Project. 4. The proportion of schools with functioning anti-AIDS clubs by the end of the project, with an

approach of appropriately targeting girls and boys. 5. Sector-Wide Investment Program prepared and adopted and implementation initiated by the

end of the project Component Output Indicators Component One: Community Based School Rehabilitation and Development Program

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6. Additional # of pupils due to additional classroom construction of HRDP 7. Additional constructed classrooms by HRDP 8. At least 10 subprojects per year planned and executed by local communities

(total of 50 by end of Project) Component Two: School Quality Improvement Program 9. Primary pupil/textbook ratio of 2:1 in mathematics and one teacher’s guide per teacher by 2004 10. Training of teachers identified in Teacher Training Colleges (TTCs), Kigali Institute for

Education and teachers in schools 11. Rehabilitation and extension work for Teacher Training Colleges (TTCs) Component 3: HIV/AIDS 12. AIDS prevention program integrated into curricula, school manuals and activities Component 4: Capacity Building Program, Studies and Development of SWAp 13. Regional offices for school inspectorate established and operational 14. Focused training and management capacity building within the education system

1.4 Main Beneficiaries 13. The primary beneficiaries were students; teachers; parents and community groups; non-governmental organization (NGOs); Ministry of the Education, educational institutions; local governments and employers. Clearly, stakeholders within the education system directly benefited from the implementation of the Project through increased access to educational infrastructure; improved quality through capacity-building of teachers, parents, inspectors, and education sector managers; textbook provision; improved knowledge of HIV/AIDS; and more efficient resource allocation within the sector through the SWAp. 14. The benefits of the Project extended beyond the education system to include local governments and the private sector who were involved through local level contracting of civil works activities.

15. Though the project was supposed to target the poorest members and regions of the country, no data was collected to assess whether the poor were indeed reached through the project.

1.5 Original Components (as approved)

I. Community Based School Rehabilitation and Development Program (CSRDP) (US$ 8.48 million), the main objective of which was to support local community initiatives and demand-driven sub-projects such as the rehabilitation of classrooms, the provision of equipment, and the construction of new schools. This component was designed building off the success of the Community Reintegration and Development Project (CRDP), a US$5million project approved in 1998, which sought to introduce an innovative implementation mechanism to nurture partnership between communities and the communal administration as well as the decentralize planning, project cycle and financial management to the community level.

II. School Quality Improvement Program (US$ 17.17 million), which sought to raise the quality of education by improving the quality of inputs to the education system with specific focus on (a) teachers training; (b) textbooks and pedagogical materials; (c) curriculum development; (d) strengthening the examination/assessment system; and (e) improving the quality of teaching in science and technology (S&T).

III. HIV/AIDS (US $3.31 million) prevention and education was to protect children and youth ( both in school and out of school) and teaching staff from the AIDS epidemic. Activities within this component

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included: (a) sensitization activities including seminars and conferences education officials and local authorities, class instruction for students and anti-AIDS clubs; (b) curriculum development and teacher training on HIV/AIDS and life skills from primary school through university; (c) culturally-sensitive materials production and dissemination through radio, theatre, music and art; (d) strengthening AIDS program management by MINEDUC; and (e) providing quality counseling, caring and testing to assist students and teachers infected and affected by HIV/AIDS.

IV. Capacity Building Program, Studies and Development of a Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) (US$ 6.64 million), which aimed to: (a) strengthen capacities for educational management and planning; (b) reinforcing the system of decentralization and general inspectorate; (c) focused training and staff development in key tertiary institutions; and (d) undertaking strategic studies which would facilitate the development of the SWAp.

V. Project Technical Support, Monitoring and Evaluation (US$ 1.47 million) which supported capital and operating expenditures of the Education Project Office (EPO) to effectively carry out its coordination and monitoring responsibilities.

1.6 Revised Components 16. Whereas the components themselves were never formally amended, there were two modifications to the Project documented in the project extensions and reallocation of credit proceeds in June 2006 and May 2008. The first modification was introduced by the government in 2006. The modification was for the construction of the Forum for African Women Educationists (FAWE) girls’ secondary school for a total projected cost of US$ 1.4 million (4percent of project costs), which sought to focus on improving science and technology education for girls. 17. This activity did not fit within component 1 that focused on community-initiated construction, nor did it fit within the component 2, which included the extension and rehabilitation of six science and technology centers. This was a new activity that expanded the scope of the project beyond its existing components. The Credit Agreement was not amended to explicitly include the FAWE School. However, the Agreement did require the appraisal of the construction of the FAWE School, including the consideration of appropriate environmental and social management, as a condition of the extension. There is no Bank documentation on why the FAWE School was added to the Project. 18. The second modification was related to the HIV/AIDS component. The government and the Bank decided to focus on awareness-raising, rather than a larger agenda of prevention and treatment. This change was first documented in the April 2006 aide-memoire, though formal agreement from management on the change and related KPIs was only approved in the 2008 extension. The narrowing of focus within the HIV/AIDS component was a response to new interventions provided by donors and partners that focused on treatment and care of infected and affected persons and insufficient capacity at the EPO and MINEDUC to implement the component effectively.

1.7 Other significant changes 19. The Project was extended three times from June 30, 2006 through the final closing date of December 31, 2009. 20. The first Project extension and restructuring was in June 2006. This extended the Project by two years through the end of June 2008. The restructuring reallocated funds towards civil works, consultancies, strengthening monitoring and evaluation and operating costs as well as added an appraisal for the construction

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of the FAWE school to the Project. It should be noted that the scaling down of the HIV/AIDS component, which was initiated after the April 2006 supervision mission, was not addressed in this extension/restructuring. 21. The second extension was in May 2008 to (i) extend the closing date of the Project by 12 months through end June 2009 in order to complete the construction of the FAWE school as well as; (ii) reallocate funds from civil works activities (given many subprojects were approved at lower cost) and from savings in operating costs towards the acquisition of textbooks in mathematics, social sciences and the English language and (iii) update and refine the Project Results Framework to provide greater focus on the outcomes of the Project, i.e. amending indicators for HIV/AIDS in line with scaling down activities within the HIV/AIDS component and including the Bank’s core indicators for the education sector. 22. The third and final extension was in June 2009, taking the Project through to completion in December 2009. The extension was to facilitate a resettlement audit to assess whether the individuals affected by the construction of the Forum for African Women’s Educationalists (FAWE) secondary school for girls were adequately compensated; and the completion of the construction FAWE school. 23. There were four funding reallocations, three corresponding with the extensions mentioned above and one in February 2005. Lastly, an amount of US$ 1.56 million was cancelled from the Credit for misprocurement of goods in December 2005.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 24. At the time of project preparation in 1999/2000, Rwanda was viewed as a special case for assistance to overcome the legacy of the genocide, with strong support and political commitment within the country. 25. Project preparation took 12 months during 1999/2000 period with a US$ 600,000 Project Preparation Facility (PPF). In the view of senior MINEDUC officials, the HRDP preparation was a more consultative process compared to previous Bank funded projects because it was led by the Government of Rwanda ensuring a sense of Project ownership. In addition to working closely with representatives from government, the Bank team consulted widely with NGOs as well as the donor community in forging consensus on the main objectives of the Project. While the ICR of the FESP pointed to an acute lack of collaboration with partners, the HRDP include one component focused on the development of a SWAp that consequently encourraged greater coordination and alignment of donor resources in support of a locally owned comprehensive sector strategy. 26. The project successfully engaged government and partners in preparation but failed to address other lessons learned through the FESP, some of which are highlighted below. 27. The mid-term evaluation of late 2003, criticized the HRDP for its complex design and structure and for its ambitious scope. This was against the backdrop of the recently completed FESP, which was also criticized for being over-ambitious in scope given the inherent capacity constraints within the country and unrealistic time frame for implementation. The HRDP would also be extended three times from its original target completion date and experienced staff shortages much like the FESP. Within the Bank, the Project was faulted for not being selective and prioritizing needs within the sector by simplifying the components to accommodate the limited implementation capacity during the post-war/genocide period. It should be noted however, that the time of preparation the needs of the country were immense and the political pressure to deliver services was strong. The country context and needs were such that a more streamlined project was not an option for the government at the time as all aspects of the education sector were in dire straits.

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28. Risk identification and mitigation measures. One of the critical risks identified at preparation was the sustainability of project outputs given the weak resource capacity of government to adequately finance recurrent costs of facilities established by the project. The previous operation had identified the limited capacity of communities to maintain new infrastructure and recommended the government and Bank put in place arrangements to ensure the preservation of new assets, such as instituting trained site inspectors to supervise construction. However, the HRDP continued to shift the burden of school maintenance back to the community. 29. While the limited government capacity to implement the program and maintain the integrity of the approach was identified at preparation, there were insufficient mitigation activities to address this issue. In addition, the implementation arrangements required the participation of representatives from seven ministries, donor partners, private sector and civil society who were all part of the oversight committee (which was to provide overall guidance during implementation). The complexity of involving a range of actors in the implementation of the project should have been identified as a critical risk during preparation. 30. Project-specific risks such as the availability of qualified private sector contractors to work in remote areas to support the community-based school rehabilitation program were not addressed even though it was identified as a concern following the FESP. Further, the procurement assessment of 1999 showed a weakened construction sector during the war and genocide. 31. The inevitable policy changes following the genocide and the second Congo war, particularly with respect to decentralization (which was already underway at the time), and its potential impact on the community construction process, were also overlooked. In particular the consolidation of districts through decentralization would have an impact on who was responsible for engaging communities within each new jurisdiction. These issues became critical bottlenecks in the implementation of the first component of HRDP.

2.2 Implementation 32. The five year project was extended three times and took eight and a half years to complete. Though the project achieved some of its objectives (as outlined in Section 3.2), it faced several constraints in implementation. 33. The School Quality Improvement and the Capacity Building/SWAp components (2 and 4) began well, with the civil works activities of various science and technology schools underway within the first year and the formation of the SWAp mechanism by 2003. In contrast, components 1 and 3 (community based construction and HIV/AIDS) were slow to start. By the end of the third year, the actual disbursement level was 30 percent, which was about half of the planned expenditure. The main constraints to implementation are summarized below. 34. Lack of staff and continuity throughout the project. A critical issue leading to the lag in implementation was understaffing in both the Education Project Office (EPO) and the World Bank. By mid-term, the project had only filled three of the required seven managerial/technical positions and did not have a dedicated procurement officer, social scientist, education or HIV/AIDS specialists. This lack of human resources, according to the mid-term review, resulted in weak forward planning and slow implementation which continued to persist through the life of the project. 35. The understaffing within the EPO as well as the lack of capacity below the director level within MINEDUC was compounded with a lack of adequate support from the World Bank to provide continuity in policy dialogue and practical backup. During the first five years of the project, there was no education

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specialist within the Kigali Bank office and the procurement support was provided by Washington, DC until 2005. 36. In addition, there was high staff turnover within key project positions which potentially had some negative repercussions in terms of continuity and institutional memory over eight and a half years. From the Bank’s side, there were three task team leaders (TTLs) and from the EPO side, there were three project coordinators and three chief financial officers (CFOs). 37. Insufficient involvement of MINEDUC in the management of the project: During the first half of the project, the relationship between the EPO and technical staff within MINEDUC was challenging. Members of MINEDUC expressed significant ownership through the preparation of the HRDP but did not feel adequately involved in the management of the project after effectiveness. This was accentuated by geographically locating the EPO outside the MINEDUC offices until 2008. The lack of ownership and involvement in the management of the project was further compounded by a largely dormant oversight committee (comprised of representatives from MINEDUC, other ministries and the EPO), which was supposed to be responsible for providing overall guidance and oversight during implementation. 38. The disconnect between MINEDUC and the EPO seemed to be resolved with the appointment of the national coordinator in 2007, who is also the Director for the National Curriculum Center. While the project lacked a full-time national coordinator, it benefitted from having a MINEDUC staff member to coordinate the HRDP which increased collaboration with the EPO, and facilitated greater involvement and ownership by the ministry in managing the project. 39. Insufficient understanding and ownership of the Community School-Based Reintegration and Development Program (CSRDP): The CSRDP lagged at inception of the HRDP for three main reasons; (i) insufficient training of beneficiary CDCs and their local governments, (ii) latent mistrust between communities and the government against the backdrop of the genocide aftermath and (iii) difficulties in raising the 10 percent community contribution. It appears the CSRDP may have been ahead of its time in designing a component which required close collaboration between communities and government. Communities were still recovering from the war and the value placed on education by communities was potentially overestimated. While communities may have been hesitant to work with government, there was little effort made by the EPO (nor did it have adequate capacity) to train communities on the design and implementation arrangements of this component, which were detailed in the Project Implementation Manual (PIM). The PIM itself was never translated from French to Kinyarwanda, nor was it distributed to stakeholders. 40. The mid-term review in October 2003 noted that CDCs had difficulty in meeting the 10 percent contribution (cash or in-kind) criterion and that basing project applications on a District Development Plan had not proved realistic since most districts did not have one. The CSRDP initially stagnated for the reasons mentioned above, but implementation gained momentum when the EPO started working directly with the districts rather than targeting the CDCs. Though the districts put forward the 10 percent contribution, there is little evidence of community involvement in the construction, supervision or management of the schools beyond the functions of the Parent-Teachers Associations (PTAs). 41. Institutional changes through decentralization: Project implementation was adversely affected by changes in local government jurisdiction over the course of the project. At project preparation, there were approximately 150 districts in Rwanda. The decentralization policy led to the consolidation of these districts by phases to approximately 106 in 2002 and finally, to 30 districts in 2005. This became a huge administrative burden for the project since contracts with districts for the CSRDP had to be shifted to the newly formed district entities. While some contract transfers were smoothly executed, other transfers created confusion and in some cases, led to a temporary void in accountability as some ‘new’ districts were not able to provide detailed financial reports on advance payments that were made by MINEDUC.

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42. As stated previously, the EPO did not provide any training to districts on procurement, financial reporting, monitoring and evaluation or contracts management. Compounded by the lack of district level capacity, this resulted in irregular and insufficient reporting by the district to the EPO on the community construction component. It should be noted that the project never formalized the proposed collaboration between the Ministry of Local Government (MINALOC) and MINEDUC. 43. Delays due to misprocurement: Project activities more or less came to a halt with the detection of misprocurement in the October 2005 audit and the Post Procurement Review (PPR) of FY06. The EPO National Coordinator of HRDP was suspended by the Minister in October 2005 and by December 2005 (six months prior to the original closing date of the Project) an amount of $1.56 million was cancelled from the Credit for misprocurement of goods for the Teacher Training Centers during the period June 2004 through May 2005. Project activities only began to resume approximately seven months later in April 2006.

44. Involuntary Resettlement: During the April 2009 supervision mission, the Bank team received verbal information that 42 people, who used to cultivate the publicly-owned land where the FAWE School was built, were expropriated for the purpose of the construction. In response to this information the Bank conducted a resettlement audit. The audit found that the process followed to identify affected persons and determine the compensation level was, by and large, satisfactory though the cultivators were asked to vacate the land before the end of the harvest season which contravened the Environmental and Social Management Plan (EMSP). There were substantial delays in paying compensation to affected persons (details in Section 2.4). 45. The resettlement issue led to further delays and the project was extended for the third and final time in June 2009. Changing landscape in the fight against HIV/AIDS: 46. At project preparation in 1999/2000, large-scale international assistance for HIV/AIDS was limited to the World Bank’s Multi-Country AIDS Program (MAP) but by 2002, the Global Fund to Fight Aids Malaria and Tuberculosis (GFATM) had become the main financial institution for mobilizing and disbursing funding for HIV programs and in 2003, the U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) pledged US$15million over five years to deliver a comprehensive response to the epidemic. Annual funding for HIV/AIDS programs in low and middle income countries had increased from US$300 million in 1996 to US$8.3 billion in 2005. 47. With the increase in global financial support for HIV/AIDS, the EPO and the Bank task team decided to narrow the focus of component 3 in 2006 to awareness-raising by shifting activities related to counseling, caring and testing to other partners such as the GFATM, PEPFAR, UNICEF, UNCESCO and the Commission National de la Lutte contre le SIDA. 48. The HIV/AIDS component had been problematic since inception of the HRDP, with a lack of staff to direct the program as well as a lack of vision in terms of activities and achievable outputs/outcomes from the project. This coupled with the changing landscape of HIV/AIDS in terms of funding sources, and new strategies to deal with the epidemic, created confusion within the project on the roles and responsibilities of the HRDP in relation to other stakeholders (particularly CNLS and the HIV/AIDS unit within MINEDUC). It also lacked direction with the absence of a dedicated HIV/AIDS specialist to drive activities in this arena forward.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 49. Data compilation for the Project by the EPO and MINEDUC’s Department of Planning was impressive given the design of the project included over 15 implementing units and the Districts to be responsible for

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monitoring project performance. However, the Bank task team repeatedly expressed frustration in the time taken by MINEDUC to finalize the Project indicators (the Ministry only conducted a workshop to agree on indicators towards the end of 2003) as well as the poor quality of information on performance outcomes. 50. It should however be noted, that the key performance indicators (KPIs) outlined in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) were not included within the legal agreement of the Credit. As such, the KPIs evolved during the Project (see Annex 10), but not necessarily in line with changes in the scope of the Project. For example, the inclusion of the FAWE school were not reflected in the Results Framework nor were the rehabilitation and construction of six science schools, the faculty of Science at the Kigali Institute of Education (KIE) and the National Examinations Center captured.

51. The main document used in tracking performance during the early years of the Project was the annual action plan and while this provided details on each activity and its associated outputs, it did not capture higher level outcome indicators. Further, focusing on annual plans created an issue of moving targets – for example, the target for the capacity building program which was measured as “an average of at least 20% of planned trained programs executed every year” would depend on the GoR’s training program, which could shift dramatically from year to year. 52. In contrast, some of the PDO indicators in the Results Framework were broad, sector level indicators which formed part of the Joint Review of the Education Sector (JRES) in 2006. However many of the sector level indicators could not be specifically attributed to the Project. For example, the gross and net enrollment increases were national level data that were affected by other factors beyond the scope of the HRDP, least of which was the introduction of fee-free primary education in 2003. 53. Some of the indicators were ambiguous such as “proportion of schools with functioning anti-AIDS clubs by the end of the project, with an approach appropriately targeting girls and boys”. For one, it is unclear what a functioning anti-AIDS club is defined as given that clubs could exist but not have sufficient funds to operate effectively. Further, the data was not disaggregated by the numbers of girls and boys participating in the clubs. There were no outcome indicators related to HIV/AIDS awareness such as general knowledge, attitudes and behavior surveys of students, teachers or parents. 54. Capacity building indicators were output based such as “in-service training provided to 1000 teachers every other year for the duration of the Project”, which tends to miss how the quality of teaching changed due to skills/knowledge acquired during training. While quality could potentially be measured through increases in “transition rates” from primary to secondary schools, the challenge here again is attributing the increase to better quality of teaching through the in-service teacher training program. 55. Though data was captured on a regular basis, it was neither consistent in the type of data being collected, nor was there a clear link between the PDO indicators and the project. As such, the focus seemed to shift from outcome towards output indicators, collected by the EPO.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 56. Financial Management: HRDP conformed to most of the identified best financial reporting practices though the Bank pointed to the poor quality of financial monitoring reports, non operation of the internal audit function and lack of clear budget systems in various reports. Despite this, the audit opinions through the project have all expressed that financial statements have been fairly stated. 57. Though the project required the districts to prepare and submit monthly financial statements, this was not consistently followed. According to the EPO, most districts only sent reports when seeking a replenishment of funds. However, it should be noted that the districts never received any training on financial management nor

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were they given a template specifying the requirements for reporting. Further, there was no evaluation process in place to determine the reliability and efficiency of districts to manage funds by EPO. 58. One issue that was raised repeatedly by the Bank in its financial management reviews is the lack of backup or data recovery system of the HRDP’s financial information. It appears that this issue was not resolved by the close of the project. 59. Procurement: The project developed a procurement manual that contained internal procurement procedures and regulations. 60. The World Bank’s Independent Procurement Review (IPR) carried out in Oct 2005 detected 21 contracts awarded were in violation of World Bank procurement regulations which resulted in US$1.56 million being cancelled from the Credit. A large contract was fragmented in order to avoid the thresholds for International Competitive Bidding (ICB) and all awarded to the same supplier without seeking the Bank's non-objection. The reasons given for the misprocurement were: (i) contract fragmentation to avoid prior review by the World Bank; (ii) prices were higher than usual and from the same supplier; (iii) international competitive bidding should have been used for a large consolidated contract; and (iv) non-objection should have been sought from the Bank. 61. The IPR report put in place an action plan and the Ministry of Finance intervened in the process of implementing the action plan. There was a person designated from CEPEX to follow the HRDP implementation and a new national coordinator and procurement officer were hired. A new procurement plan was prepared with contracts grouped by the procurement and Bank review method. These factors all contributed to steering the project back on track though the project was still delayed due to several reasons highlighted in Section 2.2. 62. The Bank repeatedly reported that the EPO lacked sufficient information on file related to several procurement activities. For example, the asset registry was not frequently updated, though it was eventually provided. 63. Safeguards: The HRDP was categorized as C under the Environmental Assessment OP 4.10, which did not require the preparation of an EMSP at the time of project preparation. Even so, the design of schools under the CSRDP took into account the need to ensure little if not minimal destruction of vegetation cover, landscaping and re-vegetation, construction of pit latrines and sanitation blocks among others. 64. As part of this ICR, the World Bank undertook an environmental and social management review (see annex 12) to assess whether the HRDP was in compliance with the World Bank safeguards as per the current policies and procedures. The review found that the HRDP supported all the CSRDP schools visited with new sanitary facilities (pit latrines); tap water including portable water in toilets and showers; trees had been planted all around the school compound and landscaping undertaken, which contributes towards the carbon sequestration process and reducing soil run off. However, even though the schools visited had sufficient pit latrines, these were found to be dirty and a potential health risk. Further, the project did not follow the PAD proposal to construct the schools with hydra form blocks in order to reduce the need for firewood, but used baked bricks for all schools with the exception of FAWE School. This component of the project does not have any social concerns in relation to resettlement. Of the 10 schools visited, only 2 of these had to deal with the issue of resettlement; in both cases, the project affected persons (PAPs) were consulted and duly compensated in a timely manner. 65. The Bank approved the construction of the FAWE school on condition that an EMSP be submitted, which was completed in July 2007. In April 2009, the Bank supervision mission aide memoire reported concern that the construction of the FAWE School was adversely affecting its surrounding community through the

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resettlement of persons who were cultivating the public land on which the school was being built. Contrary to the recommendations of the ESMP, the construction work began before the harvest season leading to clearing and loss of crops before maturity. The resettlement process (asset inventory, socio-economic survey and valuation) occurred during November-December 2008 and by January 2009 all the PAPs had vacated the land for construction work to commence. The resettlement audit (August 2009) found that a total of 42 PAPs were to be compensated for land lost and crops destroyed as a result of school construction. The ESMP stipulated that the PAPs be accorded priority in terms of securing jobs in the construction site and it has been ascertained to be the case by the audit which confirmed that over 75 percent of the 42 PAPs were workers on the site offering skilled and unskilled labor. 66. While PAPs were eventually compensated (completed on December 12, 2009), the delays in compensation were in contravention of OP 4.12 which requires that displacement must not occur before all necessary measures for resettlement are in place. The World Bank recommended an increase in payment amounts by approximately 2.5 percent of the originally awarded amount to make up for the delay and inappropriate timing of resettlement, but the government deemed it unnecessary. 67. Apart from the resettlement issues related to the FAWE school project, the HRDP complied with the Bank’s environmental and social safeguards according to the findings of the Bank’s assessment. However, there was limited monitoring of the expropriation process for FAWE. There was no Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) or Resettlement Action Plan (RAPs) but the significant outcome is that the process and procedures followed by HRDP in spite of the absence of these documents were, to a high degree and quality, in compliance of environmental and social safeguards.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 68. The establishment of the SWAp in 2003 facilitated the Government of Rwanda’s acceptance to the Education for All – Fast Track Initiative (EFA-FTI), when it received US$70 million in the form of an EFA-FTI Catalytic Fund Grant for 2007 and 2008 and follow-on “bridge grant” for US$35 million. Rwanda intends to apply in 2010 for a new three-year grant for the period 2010-2012 based on the Education Sector Strategic Plan for 2010-2015. 69. In addition, the GoR has requested IDA support for a four-year Skills Development Program which aims to alleviate the current and longer term skills constraints to contribute to Rwanda’s transition to a lower-middle income, export- and service-oriented knowledge economy by 2020. 70. Maintenance of civil works activities related to teacher training colleges and science and technology schools will be responsibility of MINEDUC, while maintenance of the CSRDP schools will be the responsibility of the schools. While some maintenance can be financed through the school capitation grants, the state of some of the pit latrines within schools currently indicates that the grants may be inadequate for the routine maintenance. Inevitably, partial funding for maintenance and repair will fall back on the communities and PTAs.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

The relevance of the project is substantial because: (i) the objectives of the HRDP were highly relevant to the post-conflict development priorities of the GoR in terms of capacity building, infrastructural development and national reconciliation; (ii) the objectives of the project sought to bridge the gap between the former FESP project and the establishment of the SWAp mechanism; and (iii) the project was consistent with the World

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Bank’s country assistance strategy for Rwanda. However, implementation was constrained, amongst others, by limited in-country capacity and complex project design.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives 71. As stated in section 1.3, the PDO was clarified in 2004 and as such, this section will use this more recent PDO for assessment. According to Bank’s current procedures, this change should have been formally effected by restructuring the Project but at the time, restructuring was a less common practice and clarification did not warrant approval from the Regional Vice President or the Board. The clarification of the PDO was documented in ISRs and was used consistently since 2004. 72. The clarified PDO itself was broad and several of the outcome indicators referred to sector- rather than project-specific performance. This was not atypical of projects designed during this time, prior to the launch of the Results Agenda within the Bank, which brought a greater focus on attribution of results to specific projects. However, in the case of the HRDP, the focus on sector performance had an unintended, positive outcome, since a major goal of the Project was to develop an education sector-wide approach. Many of the activities that were originally planned under the HRDP were delivered by other partners or through the Education For All-Fast Track Initiative Grant (see section 3.2 (iv) for more details). The conundrum is that although most of the KPIs were met (and some surpassed), the PDO and its associated indicators were too broad to attribute success to the Project. Furthermore, sector integration and partner harmonization was precisely one of the goals of the Project.

73. Consequently, this assessment of the project’s achievements also examines the explicit objectives of the project components. While this section does track achievement of the PDO indicators, it rates the project on the basis of the intermediate/output indicators of the four components, which can be evidenced through a results chain back to the Project. In cases where outputs/outcomes measured by the intermediate/output indicators were funded by other donors, it is specifically mentioned.

74. In addition, performance is assessed based on the indicators established in 2003, as well as the revised ones. However, the 2003 set of indicators are privileged in this analysis, since the project was only restructured in 2008 when more than 85% of funds were disbursed. 75. PDO: Build Rwanda's human resources and institutional capacity to deliver education services following the 1994 genocide, with attention to the poorest members and regions of the country. Original KPIs: Transition rate from primary to secondary education; Success rate in the national examination at the end of primary education; Qualification level of teaching corps 76. Transition rates from primary to secondary education increased from 37% at the beginning of the Project to 55% by the end (the target was 50%). However, the success rate for the national examination which at the beginning of the Project was 40% did not reach its target of 70% (52.5% by the end of the Project). Both outcomes could possibly be linked to the introduction of the fee-free nine year-basic education policy in 2007. Prior to this, primary school constituted 6 years followed by 3 years lower and 2 years upper secondary school. This could be one reason why there was a big increase in transition rates as lower secondary schools became free of school fees. Similarly, the fee-free policy increased participation of children from the poorest households with more intense learning difficulties, and this is perhaps one of the reasons for the tempered increase in the success rate of the national examination.

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Qualification level of the Teaching Corps % of Qualified Teachers Baseline (2001) End of Project (2008) Target

Primary 49% 99% 65% Secondary 26% 36% 52% Tertiary 5% 18% 10%

77. Rwanda has seen a phenomenal increase in qualified primary school teachers over the last decade, with close to 100% of its staff qualified by the end 2008. Further, the percentage of qualified tertiary level teachers (18%) far exceeded the target of 10% The underachievement in terms of the target for qualified secondary school teachers is not surprising for several reasons such as poor incentives in the teaching profession and the lack of continuous professional development amongst others (further details in Section 4). Revised KPIs, 2008: (NEW) Gross and net enrollment rates as a consequence of the Project; 78. Gross and Net Enrollment Rates (GER and NER) for the country increased during the project period (Baseline GER: 103.7 percent and NER: 74.5 percent to end of Project GER: 127.9 percent and NER 94.2 percent), though the project’s contribution to this increase is not possible to quantify. One factor which could have potentially led to this increase was the implementation of the fee-free primary education policy in 2003, when school fees were abolished and replaced by school capitation grants. The fee-free policy was extended to nine years of basic education in 2007, following the adoption of the Nine-Year Basic Education Policy in 2006. 79. It should be noted that there were no indictors to effectively track whether the poorest members and regions of the country benefitted from the project. Annex 11 shows that all provinces in Rwanda were reached through the CSRDP with the least number of sub-projects in Kigali City, which is the wealthiest of the provinces. Most of the sub-projects were located in Eastern and Western provinces, which were sites of the conflict for several years. However, it is unclear if the distribution of sub-projects within provinces targeted the poorest communities, since the poverty data available through the “Enquête Intégrale sur les Conditions de Vie des ménages de Rwanda, 2005/06” survey is grouped by the old districts prior to the decentralization process. As described in Section 2.2, the requirement that districts submit District Development Plans in addition to a 10% contribution towards the sub-projects may have limited the participation of the poorest districts in this program. In the absence of specific indicators and a clear definition of the ‘poorest members of the country’, it is difficult to determine whether this aspect of the PDO was achieved.

(i) Component 1: Improve access to basic education by increasing its intake capacity through community participation in rehabilitating, constructing and equipping schools (US$ 7.68m disbursed) Original Intermediate/Output Indicator: At least ten sub-projects planned and executed by local communities every year (total of 50). 80. Achievement of this Component Objective is rated moderately unsatisfactory. Civil works activities were initiated in 124 schools (with an initial target of 50), with 89 percent of site construction completed and 11 percent incomplete (see Annex 11). 765 classrooms, 172 latrine blocks, 111 administrative offices, 6 laboratories and one library have been completed through the project. There were 2,093 primary schools in Rwanda according to MINEDUC’s 1999-2000 School Census1 and this number increased to 2,432 by 20082. The share of schools supported through the HRDP is about 6 percent of the national total in 2000.

1 World Bank, 2003, Education in Rwanda: Rebalancing to Accelerate Post-Conflict Development and Poverty Reduction, World Bank 2 Forthcoming 2010, Country Status Report for Rwanda, World Bank

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81. The results indicate that targets in terms of sub-projects/schools to be built (target was 50, and achievement 125) were exceeded. However, the design of the project (per the Project Implementation Manual) was more in line with building the capacity of communities to rehabilitate, construct and equip schools, which as explained in section 2.2, was not achieved given the lack of capacity of the EPO to train communities and the lack of ownership by communities to focus on education in the post-genocide period. Instead, the government worked through the districts to facilitate the construction of the schools. There was no evidence of involvement of Community Development Committees (CDCs) and it is unclear whether the districts themselves necessarily had the capacity to engage effectively with the communities. 82. In the absence of adequate capacity at the EPO level, it devolved responsibility for this component to the districts, though the districts were not given training nor was there evidence that they received the implementation manual for the CSRDP. The districts were therefore not only responsible for preparing district development plans that incorporated the education sub-projects, but had to monitor the projects both technically and financially as well as contribute 10 percent of the total value of each sub-project. The huge burden placed on the districts presumably meant that the better-off districts with relatively more capacity, were able to access the funds compared to poorer districts. 83. The quality of the civil works construction under the CSRDP was variable across schools as per the findings of the PER, 20093. For the most part, the PER found the quality of construction to be good, but in a few cases it noted classrooms had no ceilings, interior walls were not plastered and fences not installed. The variability of quality is presumably tied to the capacity of districts to supervise contractors. Most of the civil works activities that were not completed (11 percent of the total) were as a result of the contractor abandoning the project due to disagreements with the districts, arising from the re-organization through the decentralization process. Revised KPIs, 2008: (NEW- core indicators) Additional number of pupils due to additional classroom construction of HRDP; Classrooms built and/or rehabilitated; 84. Given 765 classrooms were built through the HRDP and assuming 71 students per classroom (average classroom size for basic education according to the forthcoming CSR, 2010), there were approximately 54,000 pupils within HRDP financed classrooms. However, in the absence of baseline data, it is difficult to get a precise measure of additional pupils as a result of the new classrooms. Since several of the classrooms were not new, but rather rehabilitated (and in some cases, taught outside under a tree), the students were potentially already enrolled within that school. (ii) Component 2: Improve the quality of inputs (teaching, instructional materials, methods of supervision) in primary and secondary education (US$13.09m disbursed) Original Intermediate/Output Indicators: In-service training provided to 1000 teachers every other year for the duration of the Project; Primary pupil/textbook ratio of 2:1 in mathematics and one teacher’s guide per teacher; 45 technical personnel trained and able to evaluate examination results every year; Science and Technology taught at primary level by end of project 85. Achievement of this component objective is rated moderately satisfactory. The project trained a total of 10,920 primary and secondary school teachers far exceeding its end-of-project target of 5,000. (1,264 primary school teachers were trained in teaching methodology, sciences and elementary technology and mathematics; 424 lower secondary school teachers and 172 upper secondary school teachers were trained in mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology and teaching methodology financed through the HRDP.) A further 9,000 primary school teachers received training in French and English languages. The HRDP funded the recruitment of 50

3 Public Administration International, 2009, Performance Evaluation Review of the Human Development Project, London.

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specialist teachers from Kenya in 2005 to assist in teaching science and technology in secondary schools through Rwanda. Though the targets for in-service teacher training were exceeded, there were no assessments on how the training contributed towards the overall improvement in the quality of teaching. 86. Despite some constraints in the initial procurement process for textbooks in 2006, Primary school textbooks for mathematics (2.7 million), social studies (378,000) and English (378,000) were purchased and distributed by the end of May 2009. This accomplishment has contributed to achieving the desired increases in pupil to textbook ratios for Rwanda's pupils, particularly in the area of mathematics, where the ratio is now 1:1, outperforming the original target of 2:1. 87. The Rwanda National Examinations Council (RNEC) manages examinations for primary and secondary schools. By the end of the Project, RNEC had a trained staff contingent of 504, exceeding the target of 45. Over 80 percent of staff has varying levels of university education. In addition, RNEC appears to be well managed: (i) in 2008 there was no leakage of examination items; and (ii) in 2006 RNEC won the United Nations Public Service Award in the category of “improving transparency, accountability and responsiveness.” Though the HRDP did not specifically fund the training of RNEC staff, it funded the construction of the RNEC Center in Kigali.

88. In the course of 2009, the mandate of addressing science and technology in schools was transferred from the Ministry of Science, Technology and Scientific Research (MINISTR) to MINEDUC. This transfer came at a time when the Cabinet was discussing proposals to strengthen the institutional framework for the implementation of the Government’s Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) Policy. The HRDP did not support this aspect of the Government’s program given the African Development Bank agreed with MINEDUC to provide further support for teaching of science in schools5. Revised Intermediate/Output Indicator: (NEW) Education facilities built and/or rehabilitated (units); 89. The complete list of achievements for this component are reflected in Annex 2, but amongst them are the extension of the faculty of science at KIE (graduates of KIE teach in secondary schools and teacher training colleges, which will enable the training of more primary school teachers.); rehabilitation of six teacher training centers (TTCs) and six science schools; construction of the FAWE school; construction of the Rwanda National Examinations Council; construction of the Kigali Health Institute Laboratories, as well as the provision of equipment and furniture for some of these institutions. (iii) Component 3: Heighten awareness and train students, parents and educators to combat the AIDS epidemic (US$ 1.81 disbursed) Original Intermediate/Output Indicators: HIV/AIDS related teaching, learning and informational materials available and used in all schools; At least 70% of schools with functioning anti-AIDS clubs with an approach appropriately targeting girls and boys; Decline in teenage pregnancy rate (as a proxy for an increase in condom use); All known pupils, students and teachers infected with or affected by HIV/AIDS offered information on the nearest testing, counseling and support activities 90. Achievement of this component objective is rated unsatisfactory. Progress within this component was slow given the lack of a dedicated HIV/AIDS Specialist within the EPO except for the period 2005-2007.

4 Forthcoming 2010, Country Status Report for Rwanda, World Bank 5 Public Administration International, 2009, Performance Evaluation Review of the Human Development Project, London.

17

91. One indicator for this component was the existence of functioning anti-AIDS clubs within 70 percent of schools, though as described in section 2.2, the indicator itself is rather ambiguous. A recent evaluation (2009) of the anti-AIDS clubs found that they existed in 90 percent of schools, but 93 percent had no source of funding, office space, materials or equipment. In the absence of these, it is hard to see how these clubs are ‘functional’ beyond having a name and potentially, some members. 92. The HRDP purchased and distributed of 6,000 radios to the schools (to facilitate mass media communication of the topic of HIV/AIDS), which given there were 2,432 primary and 689 secondary schools n Rwanda in 2008, would mean that each school got close to 2 radios each. However, the recent Performance Evaluation Review of the HRDP found that in some schools there was no evidence of the radios and in others, they were either broken or not used. This was the same finding of the World Bank ICR mission which also found no evidence of printed materials on HIV/AIDS within the schools. 93. The difficulties experienced under this component were accentuated by the lack of formal collaboration with other ministries (particularly the CNLS) given the nonfunctional oversight committee. There also appeared to be some level of inertia by the EPO management to move forward with this component (as evidenced by the gradual scaling down of the component through the life of the project), given there was no in-house HIV/AIDS specialist for several years to strategically guide them on how to address the issue within schools and its surrounding communities effectively. MINEDUC has not had an HIV/AIDS specialist to run its health in schools unit since the departure of the last specialist in 2008. Revised Intermediate/Output Indicator: (NEW) AIDS prevention program integrated into curricula, school manuals and activities 94. The HIV/AIDS lifeskills program was integrated into the standard primary school curriculum, and thus this indicator was met. However, the corresponding activity was not directly funded through the HRDP. (iv) Component 4: Build institutional capacity and improve efficiency in the management of the education system through focused training, studies and policy development, and initiation of a Sector-Wide Investment Program (US$ 9.66 disbursed) Original Intermediate/Output Indicator: Gender-sensitive education policy framework formulated; An average of atleast 20% of planned training programs executed every year; Sector-Wide Investment prepared and adopted and implementation initiated; Report of project studies prepared, approved and adopted by MINEDUC 95. Achievement of this component objective is rated moderately satisfactory. The Education Ministry is acclaimed in Rwanda as the first to have moved to sector-wide planning using indicators commonly agreed with all donors. Rwanda established a sector wide approach (SWAp) in education in 2003 and several development partners signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Government of Rwanda in 2006 to provide sector budget support for implementation of the Education Strategic Sector Plan (ESSP) through government systems. Though the education sector continues to display commitment to the SWAp, it is not clear how the HRDP itself directly contributed towards its development. 96. Sector Budget Support (SBS)6 increased substantially in 2006 (from 60 percent in 2007, to 90 percent in 2008 i ) after agreement on the Joint Education Sector Support (JESS) program, which included the development of an education capacity building pooled fund. This combined with the establishment of the

6 The education sector in Rwanda receives three types of aid which can be categorized as sector budget support, or hybrid approaches which show some characteristics of sector budget support: (1) un-earmarked general budget support (GBS) programs with a specific education window; (2) sector budget support (SBS) programs notionally earmarked as additional resources to the education sector; and (3) earmarked support to the education capacity building pooled fund through earmarked budget support.

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SWAp facilitated the Government of Rwanda’s acceptance to the Education for All – Fast Track Initiative (EFA-FTI), when it received US$70 million in the form of an EFA-FTI Catalytic Fund Grant for 2007 and 2008 and follow-on “bridge grant” for US$35 million. 97. The PAD indicated that the HRDP would finance several studies ranging from costs and financing of higher education to a training needs assessment in order to develop the analytical basis for the ESSP. Only one study on costs and financing of the education sector was financed through the HRDP while other donors, such as DFID, undertook other studies. In the end, the analytical basis for the development of the ESSP was the education Country Status Report for Rwanda in 2003 funded through the Education Program Development Fund (EPDF) and administered by the World Bank. Given this, there was perhaps no need for the HRDP to allocate resources towards research but the Project was never adequately restructured to reflect downsizing of this PDO.

98. The Girls’ Education Policy, which particularly addresses girls’ participation and achievement at secondary levels, was ratified by Cabinet in 2008. The ratification of this policy constituted one of the prior actions for (DPO) the 2008 EFA-FTI Catalytic Fund Bridge Grant, which was a Development Policy Operation. Revised Intermediate/Output Indicators: (NEW) Regional offices for school inspectorate established and operational; Focused training and management capacity within the education system 99. Training was provided for 123 school inspectors in addition to constructing and equipping the country’s six existing regional Inspectorate offices in order to improve decentralized teacher management and supervision. 100. The HRDP made a significant contribution towards improving institutional capacity to efficiently manage the education system by providing scholarships for lecturers from various educational institutions. The project financed 119 lecturers to undertake a Masters degree and 15 to undertake PhDs as shown in the table below. The Performance Evaluation Review traced the whereabouts of 87 of these Masters and 6 PhD staff. About 4 percent did not return to Rwanda after their studies abroad; 33 percent returned to their respective institutions; 24 percent returned to their institutions but are pursuing further studies (indicating a drive for professional advancement); but more worrying is that close to 40 percent of the staff left the education sector after their studies. This issue is explored further in Section 4, Risk to Development Outcome.

Institution Total number of probationary Lecturers

Number of trained probationary lecturers Master’s level PhD level

National University of Rwanda (NUR) 44 41 3 Kigali Institute of Science and technology (KIST) 26 21 5 Kigali Health Institute (KHI) 27 25 2 Kigali Institute of Education (KIE) 25 21 4 Institue Superiuer d'agronomie et elevage (ISAE) 12 11 1 Total 134 119 15

3.3 Efficiency 101. The following is a summary of the analysis provided in Annex 3, which reports information from the forthcoming Country Status Report (CSR) 2010.

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102. Education nominal recurrent expenditures increased from RwFr 22 billion in 1999 to RwFr 82 billion in 2008. At the same time, the nominal development budget rose from RwFr 6 billion to RwFr 18 billion over the same period. The pooling of US$70 million from the Education for All-Catalytic Fund Grant into the education budget in 2007 and 2008 resulted in a marked increase of resources from 2006. 103. Despite the abolition of school fees at the primary level in 2003, the amount invested by households at this level still remains high compared to 2000 (22 percent against 19 percent). However, it has allowed almost universal access to primary education in Rwanda. The probability for a generation to access primary education was estimated at 96 percent in 2006 which represents a substantial improvement since 2000 when the entry rate to primary 1 was estimated at 88 percent (DHS 2000, CSR 2003). The abolition of school fees allowed children from the poorest households to join school and thus increased the number of children with more learning difficulties and at risk of dropping out. This potentially affected the internal efficiency coefficient (IEC) at primary level which dropped from 56 percent in 2002/03 to 39 percent in 2008, implying that 61 percent of public resources are used for repeated years or for school years of students who drop out before completing the cycle. 104. Data show that gender parity has not been an issue at the primary level through the life of the HRDP, with 51 percent of girls enrolled in 2008 and 50 percent in 2000/01. In terms of income group disparities, GERs increase with the level of income and that discrepancy across income groups grows as one progresses up the education ladder. Improvements were registered at the primary level with the wealth parity index improving from 0.78 in 2000 to 0.87 in 2006. However, the challenge of retaining the poorest students in primary schools and ensuring their transition to post-primary cycles persists.

105. At the project level, most of the Intermediate/Output Indicators were met in 8.5 years, three and half years longer than expected. In some cases (such as teacher-training and the CSRDP), targets were met even before the end of the original five years allocated to the project. Though the project was extended three times, there was no additional financing allocated to achieve the original targets. The targets were not revised during the course of the project and most of them were surpassed at project close.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating 106. As mentioned above, the PDO of the project was highly relevant to the development priorities of the GoR and overall most of the KPIs were achieved, though it is difficult to attribute achievements directly to the HRDP in some cases. However, progress towards the KPIs (and thus the PDO), as defined in the results agreement could not be attributed to the activities financed under the project. Consequently, the project is assessed on the basis of the Intermediate/Output Indicators of the components. On that basis, overall outcome rating is moderately unsatisfactory based on substantial relevance and an average of moderately unsatisfactory performance towards the component objectives (Component 1: MU, Component 2: MS, Component 3: U, Component 4: MS). Considering that the funding for Components 2 and 4 combined was over 68% of the total project costs and since its ratings were both moderately satisfactory, the overall outcome rating is pulled down to moderately unsatisfactory due to the moderately unsatisfactory and unsatisfactory ratings of the CSRDP and the HIV/AIDS components respectively.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development 107. The Community Based Rehabilitation Program was operational is all 30 districts in Rwanda. The districts themselves decided on which schools would be targeted based on the needs of their respective communities. The assumption is that resources were allocated in a pro-poor manner to communities with inadequate access to education services. Clearly, the addition of sanitation facilities (172 pit latrines) within the schools contributes towards the well-being of students.

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108. Regarding enrollment of girls, data show that gender parity has not been an issue at the pre-primary and primary levels, with 51 percent of girls enrolled in 2008 and this proportion remaining quite stable over the last decade7. Disparities according to geographical location are apparent with sixty rural students are enrolled against every 100 urban students at the end of primary. The HRDP sought to address this by targeting the Community Schools Program within rural areas. 109. Though the PAD indicated that the component 1 would help allocate and channel funds to poor communities, it is unclear how many communities actually benefited from either designing the projects themselves or how many were remunerated for services rendered during the civil works construction. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening The partnership principles and the Joint Education Sector Support (JESS) program provided a framework which gave donors confidence to move to sector budget support in a harmonized way. The establishment of the annual Joint Review of the Education Sector (JRES) also addressed an important gap in the monitoring of sector performance and contributed to increased trust and transparency. These structures have provided the institutionalized basis for the SWAp mechanism which continues to function as evidenced by: (i) the development of the revised Country Status Report for education (forthcoming, 2010); (ii) ESSP (2010-2015); and (iii) the Long-Term Strategy and Financial Framework (2008-2012) through collaborative consultation between the Government of Rwanda and development partners. 110. While the HRDP may not have been successful in building the capacity of communities to develop initiatives in the area of school rehabilitation and development, it perhaps planted the seed for effectively involving communities in education infrastructure development. By the end of January 2010, the GoR announced the completion of construction of 3,172 classrooms and over 10,000 pit latrines in four months through a community driven process. The school construction program cost the government RwFr9.9 billion as opposed to over RwFr35billion if it had gone through the regular tendering process (see annex 13). (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Moderate 111. The assessment of the risk to development outcomes is moderate because: (i) there continues to be strong commitment from the GoR to building human resources and institutional capacity for education services; (ii) the SWAp mechanism continues to operate in Rwanda with the ESSP built upon strong analytical base of the Country Status Reports; (iii) the quality of construction under component 2 is good and the buildings continue to be maintained by MINEDUC; and (iv) the engagement of communities to participate in schools rehabilitation/construction has been strengthened through the GoR’s recent program. 112. The main risk to the development outcome is with regards to the maintenance and repair of the school construction. Aside from the Capitation Grant, there are no arrangements in place for maintenance and repairs of the schools. Some of the schools already show signs of the poor maintenance as ascertained through the environmental and social management review (Section 2.2). The financial burden for maintenance will

7 Forthcoming, CSR 2010

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more than likely fall on the PTA and indirectly, upon poor rural households which is a risk to the sustainability of the investment in school construction and rehabilitation. 113. Another apparent risk is that return on investment in training teachers (through Masters and PhD programs), will not go directly back the education sector (see section 3.2(iv)). The forthcoming CSR 2010 reveals that the net income wage of a degree holding teacher is almost three times less than that of other similarly qualified civil servants. Further, teacher salaries for primary teachers are 2.6 times the GDP per capita, compared with 4.8 times, on average in the region. As long as teacher salaries remain low compared to others, trained staff will continue to leave the sector for better paying jobs in other sectors.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

114. Bank performance at entry is rated moderately unsatisfactory. The Project clearly fit within the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Rwanda and the project team spent significant effort in preparing the Project collaboratively with the GoR and other partners. However, the Project design was complex and was expected to be implemented within a short time frame without ensuring sufficient human resource capacity up front. The assessment of risks was inadequate given the post-conflict nature of the country in terms of (i) access to private civil works Contractors; (ii) the engagement of communities to work alongside the government; and (iii) ensuring sufficient human resources to manage the Project itself. (b) Quality of Supervision (including of fiduciary and safeguards policies) 115. The quality of Bank supervision is rated moderately unsatisfactory. The Bank team did not sufficiently document changes within the Project namely, (i) reasons why the FAWE school was included in the HRDP (which was in effect a new component in the Project); and (ii) changes in the implementation arrangements for the CSRDP (i.e. working through Districts instead of Community Development Committees). In addition, the KPI’s were only revised one year before closing of the Project (at the request of the Quality and Knowledge Learning Group (QK), which had not requested it in the past) through a restructuring process. In addition, the EPO reported significant delays in the processing on non-objections at the beginning of the Project, which was also documented in aide-memoires by the Task Team Leader (TTL). 116. On the other hand, the Bank processed three extensions and four reallocations during the course of the project. It also accurately identified and handled the misprocurement and involuntary resettlement issues in a timely and efficient manner. Further, the Bank appointed procurement and education specialists within the Kigali country office by 2005 to provide closer, hands-on support to the Project. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance 117. The overall Bank performance is rated moderately unsatisfactory. The Bank was able to collaboratively work with the GoR and partners in preparing the Project as well as accurately detecting and addressing fiduciary and safeguards issues. However, the Bank did not give sufficient credence to ensuring adequate capacity to support the Project, particularly given the complex nature of the Project within a post-conflict setting. Further, it failed to adequately document changes within the Project, particularly why the FAWE school construction was added.

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5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance 118. Government performance is rated moderately unsatisfactory. The GoR contributed USD2.07 million towards various components of the Project. There was political support for the Project at preparation though there was insufficient collaboration with the EPO during the first few years of the Project. Further, the Government did not focus on finalizing the results indicators early on in the Project, which led to some issues of tracking achievements through the life of the HRDP. (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance 119. The EPO performance is rated moderately unsatisfactory. The EPO did not hire sufficient staff as per the Project’s design early on. Staffing shortages were acute which led to implementation lags throughout the Project, thereby extending the Project by three and a half years. The misprocurement and involuntary resettlement issues detected adversely affected the Project and led to further delays. Despite these delays and staffing shortages, the EPO managed to implement several activities within Component 2 (which had the largest share of financing) and Component 4. It also found a way to work through Districts in implementing the community construction program to deliver substantially more sub-projects than originally anticipated. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance 120. The overall borrower performance is rated moderately unsatisfactory. The GoR and the EPO achieved some of the project results which were substantial, though sometimes not directly in line with the stated PDO and not in the time frame anticipated. Other shortcomings include the misprocurement, the failure to appoint adequate staff to implement the project and the involuntary resettlement issues related to FAWE School.

6. Lessons Learned Balancing technical realism with political pressure and social needs of post-conflict States 121. At the time of project preparation, the education sector in Rwanda faced numerous challenges which were complex and diverse. The post-conflict nature of the country meant there was significant political and social pressure to address a multitude of issues through the HRDP. However, one of the lessons learned from the former education project (FESP) was that project objectives need to take account of local implementation capacity. Specifically, it noted that project activities should not commence until the technical and implementation capacity had reached the required level. Post-conflict societies will continue to face the tension between the urgent need to do address a plethora of issues and balance these against limited human and financial resources. In future, it would be prudent for projects to include the hiring of all project implementation unit staff as a condition of effectiveness. Weak institutions in post-conflict States 122. In most cases, post-conflict States have weak or dysfunctional institutions and policies. In the case of civil works activities, there may be very few local contractors within the private sector who could provide the required services given the risks (i.e. security of contractors staff and property andconcerns that the country will revert back to conflict and the government may not honor outstanding payments) of working in a post-conflict environment. In addition, the risks for international contractors may be too high to warrant their involvement. Post-conflict societies have weak systems to regulate the building industry and thus the quality of the civil works may suffer. Future projects should ensure that: (i) the public sector have sufficient technical capacity (i.e. civil engineers and quantity surveyors) to regulate, monitor and supervise civil works activities; and (ii) there is sufficient supply of contractors to provide quality services. If the latter is not the case, the project should potentially consider procuring services of contractors by increasing the thresholds for “shopping” in order to expedite the process.

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Readiness of communities to work with government in post-conflict period 123. Though the objective of nation-building through increased participation and ownership of communities of school construction and maintenance was noble, it was perhaps too soon after the genocide to forge partnership between the government and communities. There was an inherent assumption by the project preparation team that communities considered education a priority for themselves and their children but evidence from the Country Assistance Strategy of 2002 reported a survey of the population found that poverty/economic hardship, security, healthcare, and lack of trust/sincerity as the major social problems- education did not feature within communities top priorities. Since communities were only beginning to secure their basic needs, their ability and willingness to contribute 10 percent to the cost of building the schools was perhaps overestimated. There was also latent mistrust by communities so soon after the genocide and war. In this kind of situation, it was ambitious to assume that communities would participate to the extent envisaged in the HRDP. Providing sufficient support to build capacity at the community level 124. Project designs which involve community-driven development processes need to nurture and support the huge potential that exists at the community level. However, it is unrealistic to think that communities have the infrastructure and fiduciary capacity to deliver services and monitor progress without significant training and continuous guidance. Future project designs should consider what communities are willing and able to contribute instead of setting rigid criteria (e.g.10 percent contribution to civil works) which does not acknowledge the diversity of communities both across and within countries.

Integrating demand-driven development with supply-driven Projects 125. The HRDP was building upon the success of the Bank-financed Community Reintegration and Development Project (CRDP) in order to engage communities. However, the success of the CRDP was based on communities deciding their needs (e.g. in the area of health, education, water and sanitation, roads etc.). In the case of the HRDP the focus was predetermined. It was decided that the focus would be construction/rehabilitation of schools and these activities would be delivered through active engagement and contribution of communities which was very similar to the CRDP implementation arrangements. The CRDP implementations arrangements were created for a more demand-driven model of development. This may have been confusing for communities since one Bank-financed project focuses on the demands/needs of communities whereas in the other had a predetermined focus. Future Bank operations teams should be aware that success in one type of project may not translate into success in another substantially different type of project. They should also be aware of the conflicting messages it gives to communities by following different models of development with similar institutional arrangements. Adequately documenting changes and additions to projects 126. The addition of the construction of FAWE girls’ secondary school in 2006 was not adequately documented by the Bank. The inclusion of such a large activity costing US$1.4 million (4 percent of project costs) during the year the project was initially scheduled to close, was not sufficiently justified. Bank documentation did not include detailed justification of why the FAWE school project was included and it incorrectly related the activity within the overall components of the project. It’s possible the HRDP would not have been extended multiple times had the FAWE school not been added. Bank task teams should weigh the impact of adding new activities (regardless of the availability of funding) towards the end of the project period. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies (b) Cofinanciers

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(c) Other partners and stakeholders (e.g. NGOs/private sector/civil society)

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Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Components Appraisal Estimate

(USD millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate (USD

millions – @ 571Rfw to 1USD)

Percentage of Appraisal

COMMUNITY-BASED SCHOOL REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

7.70 7.68

SCHOOL QUALITY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

16.11 13.09

HIV/AIDS 3.29 1.81 CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAM, STUDIES AND DEVELOPMENT OF A SECTOR WIDE APPROACH (SWAP)

6.56 9.66

PROJECT TECHNICAL SUPPORT, MONITORING AND EVALUATION

1.34 1.46

Total Baseline Cost 35.00 33.7

Physical Contingencies

0.00

0.00

0.00

Price Contingencies

0.00

0.00

0.00 Total Project Costs 35.00 33.7

Front-end fee PPF 0.00 0.00 .00 Front-end fee IBRD 0.00 0.00 .00

Total Financing Required 35.00 0.00

(b) Financing

Source of Funds Type of

Cofinancing

Appraisal Estimate

(USD millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate

(USD millions)

Percentage of Appraisal

Borrower 2.00 2.07 .00 International Development Association (IDA)

35.00 33.7 .00

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Annex 2. Outputs by Component Component (as per PAD)

Output

Community Based School Rehabilitation and Development Program (CSRDP)

Number of sub-projects Additional Number of pupils

124 subprojects: 765 classrooms, 172 latrine blocks, 111 administrative offices, 6 laboratories and one library 54,000 students

School Quality Improvement Program

Teacher Training Textbooks Training of Examination

Council staff Strengthening examinations

system Improving quality of teachers

in science and technology

Training of KIE, CNDP, CNER staff 10,264 primary school teachers trained 424 lower secondary & 172 upper secondary school teachers trained 50 expatriates brought to support KIE and science schools Construction of Rwanda National Examination Council (RNEC) 50 trained staff in RNEC Extension of KIE, rehabilitation of 6 teacher training centers and 6 science schools, Rehabilitation of l'ETO Tumba, construction of KHI laboratories, Construction of FAWE girls’ secondary school. 2.7 million mathematics , 378,000 social studies and 378,000 English textbooks purchased and distributed

HIV/AIDS Sensitization Activities Curriculum development and

teacher training Materials production and

dissemination Strengthening AIDS program

management Counseling, Caring and

Testing (dropped in 2006)

Purchase and distribution of 6000 radios , radio program developed Purchase of TVs and HIV/AIDS films for schools Purchase of HIV/AIDS textbooks Evaluation of anti-AIDS clubs Training on AIDS sensitization World AIDS Day events Attendance of international HIV/AIDS conference and study tours

Capacity Building Program,. Studies and Development of a Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp)

Strengthening capacities for educational management and planning

Reinforcing the system of decentralization and general inspectorate

Focused training and staff development

Gender sensitive education policy

Studies and Policy Development

SWAP established in 2003 119 lecturers financed to undertake a Masters degree and 15 to undertake PhDs 123 school inspectors trained 6 Regional offices of education constructed Equipment and office supplies for MINEDUC, computers for KIST, laboratory equipment for NUR and ISAE Vehicle for inspection and planning Gender-sensitive education policy developed

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Project Technical Support, Monitoring and Evaluation

Rehabilitation of EPO offices Equipment, software, vehicles Seminars and workshop Training Consultancy services

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Outputs by Indicators Indicator Level Indicator Name Baseline Target Value

PDO indicator(s)

The transition rate from primary to secondary education (original)

37% 50% 55%

The qualification level of the teaching corps (i.e. share of qualified teachers) (original)

Prim. 49% Sec. 26% Tert. 5%

Prim. 65% Sec. 52% Tert. 10%

Prim. 99% Sec. 36% Tert. 18 %

The success rate in the national examination at the end of primary education (original)

40% 70% 52.50%

Gross and net enrollment rates increase as a consequence of project (revised)

Gross 103.7% Net 74.5%

While no formal end-of-project targets were determined, the sector targets for 2012 are 123% gross and 100% net

Gross 127.9% Net 94.2%

Regional offices for school inspectorate established and operational (revised)

0 Decentralized system and general inspectorate implemented and operational

6 regional offices for school inspectorate were established.

Students enrolled in primary education (number of girls and boys) (revised)

1,534,510 # of Boys 763,277 # of Girls 771,233

N/A 2,190, 256 # of Boys 1.08 mln # of Girls 1.11 mln

Intermediate outcome indicator(s) – Component 1

At least ten sub-projects planned and executed by local communities every year (original)

0 50 124

Additional number of pupils due to additional classroom construction of HRDP (revised)

0 N/A 54000 (assuming average of 71 students per classroom and 765 classrooms built)

Classrooms built and/or rehabilitated (number) (revised)

0 N/A 765

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Component 2 In-service trained provided to 1000 teachers every other year for duration of project (original)

0 1000 teachers every other year (3000)

10920

Primary pupil/textbook ratio of 2:1 in mathematics and one teacher's guide per teacher (original)

3:1 2:1, 1:1 teacher guides 1:1

45 technical personnel trained and able to evaluate examination results every year (original)

- 45 50

S&T disciplines taught at primary level by end of project (original)

- S&T taught at primary level

??

Education facilities built and/or rehabilitated (units) (revised)

6 TTCs Extend and rehabilitate 6 TTCS

Extension and rehabilitation work completed for all 6 TTCs

Component 3 HIV/AIDS-related teaching, learning and informational materials available and used in all schools by the end of the year (original)

- 100% of schools Unclear/ no data collected

Proportion of schools with functioning anti-AIDS clubs with an approach appropriately targeting girls and boys (original)

0 70% 86% (1024 out of 1186) Though the evaluation in 2009 found that only 7% of clubs were “functioning” (see section 3.2 (iii))

Decline in teenage pregnancy rate (as a proxy for an increase in condom use) (original)

- No targets set No data collected

All known pupils, students and teachers infected with or affected by HIV/AIDS offered information on the nearest testing, counseling and support opportunities (original)

- 100% students and teachers infected or affected

No data collected on numbers of students trained. 567 trainers at secondary level trained

AIDS prevention program integrated into curricula,

N.A. yes Teachers integrate HIV/AIDS in the subject

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school manuals and activities (revised)

taught. In addition, 567 trainers in secondary schools have been trained, all schools have received radios, education al materials distributed to schools

Component 4 Gender-sensitive education policy framework formulated (original)

No policy framework Policy formulated Girls’ Education Policy ratified by Cabinet in 2008

An average of at least 20% of planned training programs executed every year (original)

20% of planned training programs executed

Only tracked during the first 3 years after which new indicators developed

Sector-Wide Investment Program prepared and adopted, and implementation initiated (original)

N.A. SWAP adopted, and under implementation

SWAP adopted, and under implementation

Reports of project studies prepared, approved and adopted by MINEDUC (original)

Reports adopted by MINEDUC

Country Status Report (CSR) of 2003 prepared in collaboration with MINEDUC and results used to design the Education Sector Strategy Plan.

Focused training and management capacity building within the education system (revised)

N.A. An average of at least 20% of planned training programs executed every year

Financed 119 Masters and 15 PhDs

Primary school faculty meeting minimum qualification (numbers) (revised)

17,995 N/A 32, 675

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Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis 1. The project related reforms sought to improve the internal and external efficiency of the

education system. Project investments were expected to yield direct benefits through the construction of schools and provision of equipment as well as indirect benefits, such as increased access to primary education, improved quality of education and a long-term joint government/partner approach to developing the education sector. 2. As mentioned earlier 765 classrooms were built through the project which, assuming a ratio of 71

pupils to 1 classroom, means a total of over 54,000 students have access through the classrooms built by HRDP. This constitutes about 3.7 percent of enrollments in 2000/01 and 2.5 percent of enrollments in 2008. It should be noted that in the absence of baseline data for the HRDP, the enrollments within the HRDP schools may not necessarily have increased the total national enrollment, since the students may have been attending the school before the classroom was built or attending a nearby school. Public Expenditure on Education 3. In nominal and real terms, recurrent and development budgets have increased since 1999.

Education nominal recurrent expenditures increased from RwFr 22 billion in 1999 to RwFr 82 billion in 2008. At the same time, the nominal development budget rose from RwFr 6 billion to RwFr 18 billion over the same period. The pooling of US$70 million from the Education for All-Catalytic Fund Grant into the education budget in 2007 and 2008 resulted in a marked increase of resources from 2006. The majority of the budget was allocated to recurrent expenditures (between 68 percent and 99 percent, averaging 86 percent over the last decade). Education Public Expenditures, 2008 (current price, billions of Rw Francs) (Recurrent) (Development)

Source: MINECOFIN (in forthcoming CSR, 2010)

4. Across the sub-sectors, the share of secondary and primary education has increased to the detriment of tertiary education, with the share of the latter decreasing from a high 35 percent to 26 percent in 2008. The trend reflects the GoR’s decision in 2003 to reduce the relative share of the higher education budget, following various recommendations to limit expenditures at this level (both in absolute and relative terms, and in spending per student) (PER, 2007). The cut in public support relied on a growth in private financing to support the development and continued expansion of higher education institutions.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Nominal

Cst in 2008 RwF

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Nominal

Cst in 2008 RwF

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5. The share of spending allocated to primary education has increased since 2005 to reach 46 perecent in 2008. If one takes into account support budget allocated to primary education, Rwanda is investing nearly 49 percent of its recurrent budget in primary education, which is similar to what is found on average in other African countries. Rwanda’s spending on primary education is also approaching the indicative benchmark set by the Education For All- Fast Track Initiative (EFA-FTI), which is 50 percent. However, the country is still far from universal primary education (only 54 percent of children have access to primary 6). The GoR recognizes this challenge and is seeking ways to increase the share of funds allocated to basic education.

Equitable access to primary schools 6. Data show that gender parity has not been an issue at the primary level through the life of the HRDP, with 51 percent of girls enrolled in 2008 and 50 percent in 2000/01. At the primary level, GERs have structurally exceeded 100 percent and have registered an upward trend over the period, to reach 151 percent in 2008, since GERs are artificially inflated by repetition and late entry.

7. According to the forthcoming Country Status Report (2010), the fee-free education policy (instituted in 2003) has allowed almost universal access to primary education in Rwanda. The probability for a generation to access primary education was estimated at 96 percent in 2006 which represents a substantial improvement since 2000 when the entry rate to primary 1 was estimated at 88 percent (DHS 2000, CSR 2003).

Primary school Beginning of Project (2000) 2008 Enrollments 1,476,272 2,190,270 Share of Female Students % 50.0 50.9 GER (%) 103.7 151 Internal Efficiency Coefficient 56 (2002/03) 39 Number of schools 2093 2432

8. In terms of income group disparities, GERs increase with the level of income and that discrepancies across income groups grow as one progresses up the education ladder. Improvements can be registered at the primary level with the wealth parity index improving from 0.78 in 2000 to 0.87 in 2006. However, the challenge of retaining the poorest students in primary schools and ensuring their transition to post-primary cycles is a major issue.

9. Despite the abolition of school fees at the primary level in 2003, the amount invested by households at this level still remains high compared to 2000 (22 percent against 19 percent). Data from the Enquête Intégrale sur les Condition de Vie (EICV) show that while school fees accounted for 23 percent of household spending on education in 2000 (for children in public primary schools), 45 percent as allocated to pay for uniforms and 24 percent for the purchase of books and school supplies. Overall, household spending on education in 2000 amounted to approximately 1.5 percent of GDP, at US$5 annually per child in public primary schools to US$318 in higher education.

Primary Public b/ Private

Composition of spending per student (%)

School fees 22.7 60.2

PTA contribution and other charges c/ 6.4 0.9

Books and school supplies 24.3 15.6

School uniforms 45.0 20.1

Transportation to and from school 0.2 2.3

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Other expenses 1.3 1.0

Source: CSR 2003, based on the 1999-2001 Enquête Intégrale sur les Condition de Vie (EICV) 10. The table below shows that that while 72 percent of pupils that leave the school system after primary school absorb 27 percent of public resources, those who reach higher education (5 percent of the cohort) benefit from 40 percent of public resources.

Distribution of Public Resources among a Theoretical Cohort of 100 School-Aged Individuals, 2008

Cohort Public resources Cumulative distribution %

GER/ access rate (a)

Final school level attained (b)

Average Public spending per student (RwFr) (c)

Nb of years within the cycle (d)

Cost of final level (RwFr) (e)

Absorbed by the cohort Cohort (h)

Resources (i) (f) = (b)x(e)

(RwFr) (g) %

Primary 100% 72% 18,227 6 109,361 7,874,019 27% 72% 27%

Tronc commun 28% 12% 76,086 3 337,618 4,051,417 14% 84% 41% Upper Secondary

16% 11% 54,858 3 502,193 5,524,120 19% 95% 60%

Tertiary education

5% 5% 454,729 4 2,333,110 11,665,550 40% 100% 100.0%

Source: CSR forthcoming, 2010 11. The table below displays the results corresponding to the benefit analysis. Urban people, while accounting for 17 percent of the total population of 6 to 30 year-olds, benefit from 49 percent of public resources for education, or 4.6 times more than their rural counterparts. Boys are also more favored than girls, benefiting from 50 percent more of the resources than girls. Important disparities also exist between socioeconomic groups: while each group accounts for a fifth of the population, the top 20 percent richest benefits from 59 percent of public resources against 7 percent for those coming from the poorest households. This is reflected by an appropriation index of 7.7 times higher for the richest than for the poorest. Major gaps appear in relation to the last quintile, while little differences appear across groups belonging to the first four quintiles.

Benefit- Incidence in Rwanda, 2008

Share of Global Resources Allocated to Education Share in the Population (b)

(a) /(b) Appropriation index

No ed. Primary

Lower secondary

Upper Secondary

Higher Education

Total (a)

Gender

Girls 0% 13% 7% 8% 15% 43% 53% 0.82 1.0

Boys 0% 13% 7% 10% 26% 57% 47% 1.21 1.5

Location

Rural 0% 23% 9% 10% 9% 51% 83% 0.62 1.0

urban 0% 4% 4% 8% 32% 49% 17% 2.87 4.6 Wealth Index

q1 0% 5% 1% 1% 0% 7% 20% 0.37 1.0

q2 0% 5% 2% 1% 0% 8% 20% 0.41 1.1

q3 0% 6% 2% 2% 1% 11% 19% 0.55 1.5

q4 0% 5% 3% 4% 2% 15% 20% 0.73 2.0

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q5 0% 5% 6% 11% 37% 59% 21% 2.83 7.7

12. The internal efficiency coefficient (IEC) at primary level remains particularly low at 39 percent in 2008, implying that 61 percent of public resources are used for repeated years or for school years of students who drop out before completing the cycle. The system requires 18 student-years to produce one graduate instead of 6 years with perfect efficiency. The situation has worsened since 2002/03, when the IEC was 56 percent. High dropout rates have the greatest adverse impact on the internal efficiency in primary schools. The abolition of school fees in 2003/04, which allowed children from the poorest households to join school and thus increased the number of children with more intense learning difficulties and at risk of dropping out, has negatively affected schooling retention.

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Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/

Specialty Lending

Supervision/ICR Otieno Ayany Financial Management Specialist AFTFM Renee M. Desclaux Senior Finance Officer CTRFC Margo A. Hoftijzer Economist AFTED

Sylvie Ingabire Team Assistant AFMR

W

Bathilde Jyulijyesage Program Assistant AFMR

W

Chantal Kajangwe Procurement Analyst AFTPC

Antoinette Kamanzi Procurement Asst. AFMR

W

Alex Kamurase Social Protection Specialist AFTSP Pierre Morin Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPC Joseph Kizito Mubiru Sr Financial Management Specialist LCSFM Susan Opper Sr Education Spec. SASED Dung-Kim Pham Operations Officer MNSHE Annelie Gunborg Strath Education Spec. AFTED Emmanuel Tchoukou Financial Management Specialist AFTFM Elizabeth Ninan Human Development Specialist AFTED

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)

Lending FY98 0.00 FY99 188.04 FY00 41 0.00 FY01 0.00 FY02 0.00 FY03 0.00 FY04 0.00 FY05 0.00 FY06 0.00 FY07 0.00

Total: 41 188.04 Supervision/ICR

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FY98 0.00 FY99 0.02 FY00 57.64 FY01 24 124.24 FY02 27 111.46 FY03 36 60.51 FY04 27 53.77 FY05 19 91.18 FY06 36 105.26 FY07 32 202.14 FY08 45 0.00 FY09 26 0.00

Total: 272 806.22

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Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results (if any)

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Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results (if any)

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Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR The Government of Rwanda submitted its ICR for the HRDP to the Bank at the end of April 2010. This is a summary of the GoR’s ICR: Project Preparation: (i) The design of the project was complex with too many disparate components; (ii) the results indicators were not well-designed (some of the indicators were not useful, such as number of training programs, since it had no indication of the quality of training); and (iii) the institutional arrangements for staffing of the EPO did not include an internal audit function, which was a key element for effective monitoring of the CSRDP, which had several sub-projects. Implementation: The reorganization of local government at the end of 2005 led to issues supervision and accountability of the CSRDP. Given that several of these local governments were in their infancy, the implementation arrangements (as set out in the Project Implementation Manual of the CSRDP) were unrealistic. Further, reliable building contractors were in short supply in many rural parts of the country. The GoR’s ICR noted a serious shortage of staff in the HRDP, particularly education and social specialists as well as engineers and procurement specialists. These shortages potentially led to the poor quality of Terms of References submitted to the Bank for non-objection, which were consequently rejected. The Government’s decision in 2005 of “zero fleet” affected the EPO’s ability to supervise the 124 sub-projects around the country, as no official vehicles were available for site visits. The Government noted significant delays on the Bank’s side in responding to requests for non-objection, particularly during the period of 200-2004. The Government’s ICR states that in some cases, responses to non-objections could take up to six months. This issue was only conclusively addressed in 2007 with the following actions: (i) An Education Specialist was posted in Kigali; (ii) monthly video-conferences between the EPO and the Bank task team were instituted; (iii) a new TTL was brought on board. Achievement of Project Development Objective: The ICR states that the project achieved its objective of improving efficiency in primary and secondary education. There was also improved capacity in the Ministry and other agencies to lead changes in the education sector. Amongst the achievements are:

(i) Increased transfer of pupils from P6 to S1: In January 2009, 100% of students (compared to the HRDP target of 50% by the end of the project) were enrolled in Senior 1 due to the Nine Year Education Policy established by the Ministry of Education.

(ii) National examinations: The success rate for primary school examinations was 74% in 2008 (compared to the HRDP of 70% by the end of the project).

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(iii) Primary level qualified teacher status: By 2008, 80% of primary school teachers in Rwanda had achieve qualified teacher status, with the support of the HRDP.

(iv) Secondary level qualified teacher status: The percentage of graduate secondary school teachers increased from 33% in 1999 to 53% in 2007.

Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome: The main risks identified in the GoR’s ICR were: (i) There are signs of ‘rapid depreciation’ of the CSRDP constructed schools, though maintenance is supposed to be funded through the school capitation grants; (ii) Infrastructure constructed under the second component, i.e. examinations center, teacher training centers etc, appear to be of much higher quality than the CSRDP schools however, the sustainability of other inputs (such as curriculum, materials and human resource development) is dependent on the strategies adopted within the ESSP and technical and financial support from development partners; (iii) there is currently no HIV/AIDS focal person within MINEDUC; (iv) there needs to be a more comprehensive framework for in-service and human resource development across the sector. World Bank Performance The Bank’s performance was rated satisfactory. The ICR states that the Bank was helpful in framing and facilitating the GOR in designing the Project. However, the GOR reports that during implementation, all the principal project staff were based in Washington and the Bank had its own internal capacity shortcomings, particularly in procurement and financial management. Further, the ICR states that the Bank did not respond quickly or constructively to the issues of poor capacity within the EPO as well as complaints about delays in granting non-objections. Government of Rwanda’s Performance The GoR’s performance is rated satisfactory. The ICR states that the GoR monitored the project closely through annual reviews of project activities. It also contributed more than its share of counterpart funding towards the project. However, the national administrative reform adversely affected the CSRDP component. Lessons Learned The main lessons outlined in the GoR’s ICR were:

Competent staff should be hired and training provided by the Bank at the time of loan effectiveness

The oversight mechanism (in the HRDP’s case, the Steering Committee) should be formalized at loan effectiveness and should monitor activities through the life of the project

If a substantial portion of project resources are to be transferred to local authorities, there needs to be some basic assessment of their capacity as well as associated risks. The central management unit should provide orientation and training to local authorities on the specific project expectations.

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Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

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Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents Ministry of Education, 2010, Implementation Completion Report, Rwanda Public Administration International, 2009, Performance Evaluation Review of the Human Development Project, London World Bank, forthcoming 2010, Country Status Report, Rwanda World Bank, 2003, Education in Rwanda: Rebalancing to Accelerate Post-Conflict Development and Poverty Reduction, Rwanda World Bank, 2008, Country Assistance Strategy, Rwanda World Bank, 2000, Project Appraisal Document: Human Resources Development Project, Rwanda World Bank, 2000, Implementation Completion Report: First Education Sector Project, Rwanda World Bank, 2000, Development Credit Agreement, 3367 Rwanda World Bank, Aide-Memoires, Back-to-Office reports, Memos to Vice President, Project Status Reports/Implementation Reports, and available audit reports, 2000-2009o World Bank, 2009, The Changing Landscape of HIV/AIDS: Selected Papers for The World Bank's Agenda for Action in Africa, 2007-2011, Washington DC

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Annex 10: ISR ratings 2000 (PAD) end 2002 end 2003 end 2005 Jun-08

PDO Indicators PDO Indicators PDO Indicators

1. Transition rate from primary to secondary education increased from 35% to at least 50% by the end of the Project.

1. Transition rate from primary to secondary education increased from 35% to at least 50% by the end of the Project.

Increase intake capacity of primary and secondary schools as reflected by number of Community based school construction sub-projects (50 total)

Gross and net enrollment rates increase as a consequence of the project

2. The success rate in the national examination at the end of primary education to increase from 40% to at least 70% by the end of the Project.

Improve quality of inouts for primary school as shown by pupil/ math texbook ratio to 2:1

Transition rate from primary to secondary education increased from 35% to at least 50% by the end of the Project.

3. The qualification level of the teaching corps to increase by the end of the Project from:

The qualification level of the teaching corps to increase by the end of the Project from:

The qualification level of the teaching corps to increase by the end of the Project from:

Create Sector Wide Investment Program and initiate its implementation by end of Project

The success rate in the national examination at the end of primary education to increase from 40% to at least 70% by the end of the Project.

- 49% to 65% by the end of the Project at the primary level;



The proportion of schools with functioning anti-AIDS clubs by the end of the project, with an approach of appropriately targeting girls and boys.

- 6% to 52% at the secondary level.



5. Sector-Wide Investment Program prepared and adopted and implementation initiated by the end of the project

- 5% of professors with doctorates at the tertiary level to at least double

Component One: Community Based School Rehabilitation and Development Program

Intermediate Outcome Indicators Intermediate Outcome Indicators

4. At least 10 subprojects per year planned and executed by local communities (total of 50 by end of Project)

At least 10 subprojects per year planned and executed by local communities (total of 50 b d f P j )

100 Community-based demand driven school construction and rehabilitation sub-projects

l d d fi

50 Community based school construction sub-projects completed

Additional # of pupils due to additional classroom construction of HRDP

Increase in number of enrollments in primary and secondary schools in areas reached by Project

106 Districts in which community development staff and accountants recruited and trained

h i h CDC

Issue tenders for procurment of primary school mathematics textbooks and teachers' guides

Additional constructed classrooms by HRDP

44

Component Two: School Quality Improvement Program

National S&T Plan developed and Implemented

At least 10 subprojects per year planned and executed by local communities (total of 50 by end of Project)

5. In-service training provided to 1000 teachers every other year for the duration of the Project

Average of at least 20% of plannedtraining programs executed each year of the project

In-service training provided to 5000 (pre-pimary, primary and secondary) school teachers by end of Project

9. Primary pupil/textbook ratio of 2:1 in mathematics and one teacher’s guide per teacher by 2004

6. Primary pupil/textbook ratio of 2:1 in math by end of Project and one teacher’s guide per teacher by 2004

Primary pupil/textbook ratio of 2:1 in English and math by end of Project and one teacher’s guide per teacher by 2004

Primary pupil/textbook ratio of 2:1 in math by end of Project and one teacher’s guide per teacher by end of Project

10. Training of teachers identified in Teacher Training Colleges (TTCs), Kigali Institute for Education and teachers in schools

7. 45 technical personnel trained by year 2000 (should this be by end of project?), and able to evaluate examination results every year

Technical personnel trained and able to evaluate examination results every year

45 technical personnel trained in Evaluation and Assessment, Data Processing and Management, and Policy formulation by end of Project

11. Rehabilitation and extension work for Teacher Training Colleges (TTCs)

8. S&T disciplines taught at primary level by end of project

National S&T plan developed and implemented

AIDS prevention program integrated into curricula, school manuals and activities

National Examination Center constructed and operational

13. Regional offices for school inspectorate established and operational

Extension and Rehabilitation of Kigali Institute of Education

14. Focused training and management capacity building within the education system

Extension and Rehabilitation of 6 Teacher Training Colleges45 curriculum developers trained by end of ProjectUpdated curriculum available and usedExtension and Rehabilitation of 6 Model S&T schools Extension and Rehabilitation of ETO TUMBA Laboratory and store constrcuted for Kigali Institute of Health

Component 3: HIV/AIDS

9. HIV/AIDS related-teaching , learning and informational materials available and used in all schools by end of project

HIV/AIDS related-teaching , learning and informational materials available and used in ll h l b d f

1000 schools using HIV/AIDS related-teaching , learning and informational materials available and used i ll h l b d f10. At least 70% of schools with

functioning anti-AIDS clubs by end of project, with an approach appropriately targeting girls and boys

At least 70% of schools with functioning anti-AIDS clubs by end of project, with an approach appropriately targeting girls and boys

11. Decline in the teenage pregnancy rate (as a proxy for an increase in condom use)12. All known pupils, students and teachers infected with or affected by HIV/AIDS offered information on the nearest testing, counseling and support opportunities

All known pupils, students and teachers at all levels infected with or affected by HIV/AIDS offered information on the nearest testing, counseling and support opportunities90% of HIV/AIDS awareness raising program executed

45

Component 4: Capacity Building Program, Studies and Development of SWAp

13. Gender-sensitive education policy framework formulated14. An average of at least 20% of planned training programs executed very year for duration of project

100% of planned training programs executed by end of Project

15. Sector Wide investment Program prepared and adopted, and implementation initiated by end of project

Sector Wide investment Program prepared and adopted, and implementation initiated by end of project

Studies and policy papers contributing to development of a SWAP and education sectorwide policy/strategy

16. Report of project studies prepared, approved and adopted by MINEDUC

Number of provincial education officers having developed an electronic database and exchanging data with central Ministry100% MINEDUC directors trained in education management and planning by end ProjectComplete construction of 6 inspectorate regional offices, no. of vehicles provided, no. of schools with trained inspectors

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Annex 11: CSRDP Schools Total Schools Built under CSRDP

Province Number of Projects

Kigali City 15

Western Province 31

Southern Province 17

Eastern Province 34

Northern Province 27

TOTAL 124 List of schools not completed under CSRDP

Schools % of Project Completed

1. Kigali

Kicukiro District- Nyakabanda school 98%

Nyarugenge District- Cyahafi school 98%

Shyorongi District- Rubingo school 90%

2. Western Province

Gasiza District- Nyiragikokora school 75%

Mutura District- Rega school 95%

Mutura District- Vuga school 90%

Mutura District- Bihangara school 75%

Mutura District- Gihorwe school 90%

Mutura District- Kora school 75%

Nyagisagara District- Muhororo school 98%

Nyagisagara District- Rusebya school 90%

3. Eastern Province

Ngarama District- Gokama school 50%

Kabare District- Nyamiyonga 80%

4. Northern Province

Kisaro District- Mutete school 80%

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Annex 12: Environmental and Social Safeguards Review

Executive Summary 1. The Human Resource Development Project (HRDP) became effective in January 2001 and was completed in December 2009. The objectives of the HRDP were to: (i) improve access to basic education by increasing its intake capacity through community participation in rehabilitating, constructing and equipping schools; (ii) improve the quality of inputs (teaching, instructional materials, methods of supervision) in primary and secondary education; (iii) heighten awareness and train students, parents and educators to combat the AIDS epidemic; and (iv) build institutional capacity and improve efficiency in the management of the education system through focused training, studies and policy development, and initiation of a Sector-Wide Investment Program. 2. As part of the project, about 765 classrooms (spread across 125 sub-projects) were constructed or rehabilitated through the Community-Based School Rehabilitation and Development Program. In addition, 6 Teacher Training Colleges (TTCs) were rehabilitated/extended and in December 2008, the Federation of African Women Educationists (FAWE) secondary technical school for girls was constructed as part of the project’s activities. 3. In mid-2009, there was concern that the construction of the FAWE school was adversely affecting its surrounding community, namely through the resettlement of persons who were cultivating the public land on which the School was being built. A resettlement Audit was conducted following this close and prior to the project close out. 4. Given this background, it was deemed necessary to conduct a broader review of the environmental and social issues related to the HRDP as a whole before its official close out. This review will form part of the Project’s Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR), which is a self-assessment of the Project experience. 5. This study was undertaken by reviewing relevant literature related to the project including land acquisition, land valuation and expropriation in Rwanda, environmental regulations under the Organic Law and how they relate to this project as well as the review of the bank’s policies on involuntary resettlement and environmental assessment. 6. Stakeholder consultation and field surveys were conducted targeting the Project Affected Persons (PAPs), relevant HRDP and government staff at the selected districts. 7. In each of the 5 provinces in Rwanda, a total of 2 schools funded under the HRDP were randomly selected using the lottery method, where all the schools were listed in a piece of paper by province and then 2 schools were randomly selected and became the study subject for the review. Quality of environmental safeguards plans/activities 8. The environmental safeguards plan prepared for the FAWE school was adequate and comprehensively addressed the potential adverse effects associated with construction and operation of schools (boarding) including plans to address solid and waste water disposal

48

from construction debris, wastes from the toilets, showers and kitchen, borrow pit reclamation plans, greening and landscaping of schools among others. A few issues could have however made the ESMP much more robust and better including addressing issues related to fire hazards in the school (school lacks fire suppression equipments), security concerns (school has no wall boundary) and energy conservation strategies (equipping school with CFLs bulbs, training on energy saving techniques) etc. 9. Even though there were no ESMP for the Community Based Schools Rehabilitation Program, and primarily because the project was categorized as C under the Environmental Assessment OP 4.10, the design of the schools took into account the need to ensure little if not minimal destruction of vegetation cover, landscaping and re-vegetation, construction of pit latrines and sanitation blocks among others. A major proposal was to have the schools constructed with hydra form blocks instead of baked bricks that increase pressure on the biomass. 10. These were proposed in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) but did not feature in the sub project design and hence as observed in the study most of the schools visited were constructed with baked bricks with the exception of the FAWE school. Quality of environmental mitigation measures implemented 11. The mitigation measures proposed for the FAWE school construction is considered fairly adequate with most of the measures having been fulfilled except for the lack of clearance of constriction debris including glass and wood that was observed to be still within the school compound in spite of the completion of construction and handing over of the facility by the contractor to the school administration. 12. The ESMP stipulated that the PAPs be accorded priority in terms of securing jobs in the construction site and this has been ascertained to indeed be the case by the audit which confirmed that over 75% of the 42 PAPs are workers in the site offering skilled and unskilled labor. 13. However, contrary to the recommendations of the ESMP, the construction work began before the harvesting season leading to clearing and loss of crops before maturity. Quality of social safeguards plans/activities 14. A social safeguard plan (Resettlement Action Plan) or Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) was not prepared for the overall HRDP or for individual sub project as required by the bank operational procedures. The FAWE school project certainly features higher up in this review owing to the numbers of PAPs involved in the displacement. 15. In spite of the lack of a RAP for the FAWE school project, it must be noted that the Government of Rwanda through the Kayonza District (location of school) had committed to compensating the PAPs. Similarly there were no social safeguards plans for the Community Based School Rehabilitation Project and hence making it difficult to assess the quality of the same.

49

Quality of social safeguards mitigation measures implemented 16. It must be noted that even though there were no social safeguards mitigation measures against which to measure compliance during resettlement and compensation, the actions or processes that was used by the Government of Rwanda (GOR) especially the Kayonza District Land Authorities was immensely similar to the banks OP 4.12 ion involuntary resettlement. 17. The resettlement process (asset inventory, socio-economic survey and valuation) occurred in November-December 2008 and by January 2009 all the PAPs had vacated the land for construction work to commence. 18. The 2009 resettlement audit study found out that the resettlement and compensation process undertaken by the Kayonza District Land Authorities was very much compliant with the Bank’s OP 4.12 in terms of socio-economic survey, stakeholder consultation and valuation of assets. Even though the grievance redress mechanism was not fully explained to the PAPs, it is noted that they were at least informed that any displeasure should be reported to the District Land Officials or the Mayor. 19. The only set back to the process was the delay in compensation which not only contravened the OP 4.12 but has been the single most factor that can be concluded as a cause of project negative impact to the PAPs. The national land acquisition legislation requires that property must be handed over 90 days after financial compensation has been paid, while OP4.12 requires that displacement must not occur before all necessary measures for resettlement are in place. In this project the land was handed over before the compensation was paid to the PAPs but was in complete contrast with the national legislation as well as the bank’s policies all which require expedited compensation before vacating the land. 20. There was also limited monitoring of the expropriation process a role that could have been performed by HRDP staff especially by ensuring participation in all meetings, asset valuation process, recording of complaints among others. This way record of all meetings, communications and data would have been available for reference. 21. The Community Based School Rehabilitation Development component of the HRDP according to the findings of the environmental and social review does not have any social concerns in relation to resettlement. Of the 10 schools visited, only 2 of these had resettlement background issues and were well handled with the PAPs consulted, engaged and compensated duly in time and using rates that were acceptable to the PAPs. Conclusion 22. Apart from the resettlement issues related to the FAWE school project, the HRDP is fairly compliant to the bank’s environmental and social safeguards according to the findings of this review. There are inadequacies identified including the lack of a Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) or Resettlement Action Plan (RAPs) but the significant outcome is that the process and procedures followed in spite of the absence of these documents were of a high degree and quality in diligence albeit with slight shortcomings as is the case of the

50

delayed payments of the PAPs for the FAWE school. 23. Environmental safeguards were well handled starting with the preparation of an Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP) for the FAWE school which was equally adhered to almost to the last detail. 24. Capacity building and training in environmental and social safeguards especially for the MINEDUC and local communities was lacking and could be the reason why monitoring during implementation was somewhat weak. Rationale for the Review 25. In mid-2009, there was concern that the construction of the FAWE school which was one of the target infrastructures to be constructed under this project was adversely affecting its surrounding community, namely through the resettlement of persons who were cultivating the public land on which the School was being built. 26. While the Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP) prepared in 2007 for the FAWE school ensured that environmental standards were applied throughout the project’s activities, the implementation of the FAWE school sub-component was assessed for consistency with the Bank’s resettlement policy. 27. As reported in the Resettlement Audit (August 2009), a total of 42 Project Affected Persons (PAPs) were compensated for land lost and crops destroyed as a result of school construction. 28. The findings of the audit indicated that the compensation process was in compliance with Bank’s policies and procedures for involuntary resettlement; involvement of PAPs in identification, valuation, and compensation was consultative and participatory, and a grievance mechanism was sufficiently operational throughout the process. 29. The project also ensured that appropriate procedures were used in the acquisition of additional land for installation of a water tank for the FAWE school. 30. However, the Audit also found the delays in finalizing compensation and the timing of construction (before the harvest season) to be problematic. The interview of PAPs showed some dissatisfaction for the project and was inconsistent with national legislation that stipulated timely payments. 31. Given this background, it was deemed necessary to conduct a broader review of the environmental and social issues related to the HRDP as a whole prior to the project close out. This Review will form part of the Project’s Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR), which is a self-assessment of the Project experience

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Objectives of the Review The Review will cover the following aspects: 32. Update of the Involuntary Resettlement aspects of the FAWE school since the audit. This includes an assessment of the quality of implementation of safeguards mitigation measures. i.e. have all the beneficiaries been paid due compensation and are there any arising issues? 33. Review of FAWE school compliance with all aspects of the ESMP, beyond resettlement issues. 34. Review of environmental/social issues for the other activities within the HRDP which involved construction (such as the Community-Based School Rehabilitation and Development Program and the rehabilitation of Teacher Training Colleges). 35. Evaluate changes in capacities of institutions (MINEDUC, the Education Project Office and communities) for implementing environment and social safeguards programs. Scope and methodology of the review 36. A consultant was hired for the review of environmental and social safeguards mitigation measures undertaken by the project. The following topics were to be addressed in the review: Quality of environmental safeguards plans/activities Quality of environmental mitigation measures implemented Quality of social safeguards plans/activities Quality of social safeguards mitigation measures implemented Tasks and Methodology The consultant would evaluate the following key areas: 37. FAWE School- (i) follow-up on the resettlement audit, compensation of PAPs and any arising issues; (ii) ESMP implementation particularly on environmental and social aspects not covered in the resettlement audit and (iii) capacities developed for ESMP implementation and monitoring. 38. Community-Based School Rehabilitation and Development Program and TTCs: The consultant will conduct site visits to 10% of the schools built through the Community Project (13 schools) and one TTC to gather the necessary information on (i) whether there was any resettlement; (ii) which environmental standards were followed and assess its consistency with appropriate national and local legislation and regulations; (iii) how the environmental and social practices of the Project compare with the World Bank’s practices.

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Literature Review 39. The consultant reviewed appropriate national and local legislation and regulations in Rwanda related to land acquisition and compensation. The consultant also undertook a detailed review of the World Bank safeguards policies related to Involuntary Resettlement OP.4.12 and Environmental Assessment OP4.10. 40. The local legislation and regulatory materials reviewed included;- Rwanda’s Land Expropriation Law 2007 Rwanda’s Land and Crops Valuation Law 2007 The Rwandan Constitution, promulgated in 2003; Organic Law Land and Crop Compensation Rates Presidential Order N° 54/01 of 12/10/2006 determining the structure, the responsibilities, the functioning and the composition of Land Commissions; and Ministerial Order N° 001/2006 of 26/09/2006 determining the structure of Land Registers, the responsibilities and the functioning of the District Land Bureau. Stakeholder Dialogue and Consultation 41. A series of consultation and stakeholder engagement was conducted by the consultant during the 5 day field study as part of the review. Those consulted included;- Project Affected Persons at the project site HRDP Project Implementation Unit District Officials School administrative staff in the districts of focus Officials from Rwanda Environment Management Authority 42. A total of 13 individuals representing the school administration and HRDP staff and REMA were directly interviewed by the consultant during the 5 day field study. Field Survey 43. The consultant conducted a 5 day visit to the project sites primarily to evaluate the extent to which the HRDP complied with the environmental and social safeguards of the bank including the quality of the same. The consultant also visited the 2 PAPs whose land were most recently acquired to pave way for the construction of the FAWE school water tank with an aim of ascertaining the compensation process and overall compliance to the Bank’s operation polices for involuntary resettlement. 44. The consultant visited all the 5 provinces (Southern, Western, Eastern, Northern and Kigali Provinces) respectively. In each of the 5 provinces, 2 schools constructed or rehabilitated under the HRDP were randomly selected using the lottery method bringing the total number of schools evaluated to 10.

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Findings and Conclusion Status of the Involuntary Resettlement aspects of the FAWE School since the 2009 audit including an assessment of the quality of implementation of safeguards mitigation measures. 45. The Resettlement Audit study conducted in 2009 concluded that the resettlement and compensation process undertaken by the Kayonza District Land Authorities for the FAWE school was very much compliant with the Bank’s OP 4.12 in terms of socio-economic survey, stakeholder consultation, grievance redress mechanism and valuation of assets. 46. The only set back or exception to the process was the delay in compensation which not only contravened the OP 4.12 but was concluded as the single most factor that was the cause of project negative impact to the PAPs. The Rwanda national land acquisition legislation requires that property must be handed over 90 days after financial compensation has been paid, while OP 4.12 requires that displacement must not occur before all necessary measures for resettlement are in place including payment. 47. In this project the land was handed over for the construction of the school by the PAPs before the compensation was paid to the PAPs (which is understandable based on the explanation given on need to hasten the construction and end it before June 2009) but was in complete contrast with the national legislation as well as the Bank’s policies both which require expedited compensation before vacating the land. 48. The 2009 FAWE resettlement audit study recommended that the PAPs be compensated with immediate effect in order to avoid any further adverse impacts owing to the displacement by the HRDP activities. 49. Similarly, the audit study recommended that since PAPs had already lost out on the second harvest because of the delay in compensation which could have afforded them the opportunity to lease other parcels of land in time and undertake cultivation they should thus be compensated for the first and second harvest lost in order to minimize the adverse impacts. 50. Status following 2010 March Review;- This review study has determined and is able to conclude that as per the recommendation of the audit study in 2009, the PAPs were expressly paid after the GOR expedited the payments which also included compensation for loss of second harvest following loss of land. Copies of the individual cheques paid to each PAP based on the valuation of assets and agreement by the PAPs are attached as annex. PAPs met during the field study visit also indicated that they were fully satisfied with the process now that they had all received payments.

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Compensation for the Proposed Land Acquisition for Water Tank Construction 51. The FAWE school project had in 2009 also identified another piece of land adjacent to the existing land where the school is constructed and wanted to acquire the land for constructing a water tank to supply water to the school. 52. The owners of the land been identified by the time of conducting the 2009 audit. The local administration has already approached the 2 PAPs with intention to acquire the land. One of the PAPs had however refused negotiations or consultation citing the delay in compensation of her FAWE school land as in indicator that the same fate will befall her again if she obliges to give out her land for the tank before payments are made. 53. The audit study had recommended that the owners of the land identified for construction of the water tank be duly engaged, consulted and compensated before acquisition occurs. A repeat of how the FAWE school land was acquired before compensation was cautioned. 54. Status following review; - This review has determined and is confidently concluding that the land targeted for construction of the school water tank was duly acquired and all the procedures for land acquisition and compensation for the Bank and Rwanda were followed to the letter in displacing these 2 PAPs before transfer of land ownership occurred. There were no delays in payment, the PAPs were meaningfully consulted and the valuation was done as required by the Bank’s procedures. The PAPs agreed to the land valuation rates including crops which involved asset valuation and measurement of land conducted in their presence. They finally signed an agreement indicating their acceptance to offer their land for the construction of the water tank and received compensation before moving from the land. During the field visit, the consultant held discussions with the 2 PAPs to find out if they had any issues or complaints related to the compensation process. The PAPs were fully satisfied with the process and had no complaints whatsoever in relation to this issue. 55. Preparation of Implementation Completion Report The audit study had also recommended that an Implementation Completion Report (ICR) of the entire resettlement process for this project be prepared as required by the Bank and should include a hand over certificate which will ostensibly provide a verification of when the compensation and assistance were undertaken and to whom these services were provided as well as to indicate that indeed all the compensation has been delivered. 56. Status following review;- This report is under preparation and this Environmental and Social review report will form part of the ICR that is being prepared and led by Ms. Elizabeth Ninan Human Development Specialist from World Bank Washington DC. 57. Monitoring and Evaluation of Expropriation Process on FAWE project There was also limited monitoring of the expropriation process according to the 2009 audit report a role that could have been performed by HRDP staff especially by ensuring participation in all meetings, asset valuation process, recording of complaints among others. This way record of all meetings, communications and data would have been available for reference. The audit report recommended that HRDP should move quickly and engage

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intensively on the compensation process including monitoring as is required by the Bank’s OP 4.12 58. Status following review;- This environmental and social review is able to report that HRDP staff took up the recommendation seriously as shown by their involvement that ensured the quick payment of the PAPs after several months of delay including the equally prompt payment of the 2 PAPs whose land was to be acquired for the construction of the water tank.

Review of FAWE school compliance with all aspects of the ESMP, beyond resettlement issues. 59. The aim of this objective was to determine the extent to which the FAWE school complied with all the mitigation measures outlined in the 2007 Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP) that was prepared prior to construction. This objective is to specifically look into issues that are not resettlement related because these had already been highlighted in the resettlement audit report. 60. It must be noted that the ESMP document is divided into 2 main parts in terms of projection of potential adverse impacts namely; - (1) Construction Phase Impact and Mitigation Measures and (2) Operational Phase Impacts and Mitigation Measures. 61. Reviewing compliance to mitigation measures proposed during the construction phase of the project is somewhat difficult at this point because the construction is complete thus making it difficult to make conclusions or analysis but inferences can be made based on observable indicators which would point towards non compliance or otherwise. 62. Environmental compliance at operational phase of the project was possible through direct observation and cross checking with the ESMP document as well as consultation with the school administration and local community members. 63. Construction Phase Compliance Review Indicators The following tables below highlights the key issues (adverse impacts) that were identified in the ESMP and which required compliance during construction. Adverse Impacts Mitigation Measures Comment on compliance Accidents from increased traffic from trucks and machinery along the Kayonza highway.

Erect traffic warning signs, speed bumps, use certified drivers etc

Even though it cannot be said that these measures were followed, the mere fact that no accident was reported during the construction period could suffice in concluding that additional measures were undertaken. During the study the consultant enquired from the Director of Infrastructure MINEDUC if there were

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any cases of road accidents registered during the construction and the answer was negative.

Construction related accidents from workers operating the construction equipment etc

Ensure workers health and safety, provide adequate Personal Protective Equipment (PPEs), employ skilled workers and ensure stringent supervision.

There were no accidents (workers) reported during construction and could well indicate that a high degree of compliance in Workers Health and Safety was complied to. During the 2009 audit, the consultant observed that all the workers were equipped with the necessary PPEs.

Soil Erosion and run off including degradation of borrow pits after accessing construction materials.

Construct drains around the construction site, and restore borrow pit areas to almost original condition.

The presence of drainage systems for run off all around the school indicates compliance. It was not possible to visit the borrow pit areas used for this school due to time constraints. However, MINEDUC’s director of Infrastructure confirmed that the borrow site was a government approved quarry. In Rwanda construction materials can only be sourced from a government registered borrow site.

Dust and Noise Impacts from construction machinery and equipment.

Sprinkle water all around the construction site to keep down dust; Provide workers with PPEs to prevent noise and dust impacts; Avoid use of heavy machinery in the evenings to minimize noise related impacts to the communities.

During the resettlement audit, even though environmental concerns were not part of the study, the consultant noticed that a truck was sprinkling water to keep down dust and hence indicating compliance. Communities consulted stated that there were no construction activities going on in the site after 6.00pm thereby reducing noise exposure related impacts that are pronounced in early morning and late evening.

Pollution from construction material debris i.e. broken glass, wood, stones, etc

Contractor to clear the site of all construction debris including glass, stones, metal etc upon completion of

At the time of this review, broken glass and wood debris was still noticeable in the school compound implying

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construction and before official handing over of facility.

non compliance.

HIV/AIDS spread from construction workers especially if foreign workers are brought and construction camps erected.

Use local workers from the project areas, undertake HIV/Aids awareness, avoid setting up of construction camps for workers

This indicator was difficult to ascertain or verify due to time constraints.

Vegetation clearing and loss for construction purposes.

Re-plant trees and other vegetation types in the school compound as a restoration strategy for destroyed vegetation.

The school administration has already begun planting trees all around the compound of the school as part of this effort.

\ Operational Phase Compliance Review Indicators Adverse Impacts Mitigation Measures Comment on compliance Human Waste Impacts i.e. toilet and shower wastes and impact on underground and surface water bodies could lead to pollution of adjacent Lake Muhazi and impact on human health.

Construct pit latrines, flush toilets complete with septic tanks for disposal of different types of wastes from the school. Train teachers and students on human hygiene and keep them clean at all times

All the toilets in the FAWE school have been fitted with a septic tank hence indicating compliance. However, the toilets are dirty showing a laxity in health and hygiene capacity building on the part of the teachers to the students and cleaners. If this continues, the toilets can be a cause of disease outbreak.

Pollution and contamination of Lake Muhazi and the immediate environment from domestic wastes emanating from the kitchen, classrooms, staff quarters etc

Install general waste disposal receptacles and a waste management plan including recycling and outsourcing collection of the garbage.

The FAWE school has a specific site for disposal of other forms of solid wastes from the kitchen and staff housing. This is a waste pit and all the wastes are incinerated in this pit.

Extraction of water for use in the school from Lake Muhazi leading to pollution and depletion of this resource in the process.

Construct water tank to act as a source of water for the school.

A water tank has already been constructed and in use indicating compliance. (Inconsistency in supply is leading the school to buy water a factor that might with time make the school resort to using the Lake Muhazi water).

Impacts related to inadequate monitoring or lack of understanding of environmental safeguards.

Train Staff and HRDP personnel on Environmental and Social Safeguards

No staff of FAWE or HRDP has been given any form of training in environmental and social safeguards related to ESMP implementation.

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64. In summary, the review can ascertain that there was a high degree of quality in compliance to the ESMP especially on issues not related to resettlement as shown in the tables above. 65. However, there are issues that the ESMP should have addressed and was lacking which could equally improve compliance and minimize potential adverse effects hence highlighting the inadequacy of the ESMP in terms of quality based on the stated oversights highlighted below. They include;- 66. Energy Consumption;-The ESMP left out major components which include energy saving measures. There is need to have the school use energy saving bulbs (CFLs) and inculcate the principles of saving electricity in the school as a whole. This can include routine switching off of lights when not in use.

1. Fire hazards;- remain part and parcel of an institution of this nature and thus require that fire safety prevention and safety training including installation of appropriate fire suppression equipment be available in the school compound. This critical element was lacking in this school and action is needed urgently before a hazard of this nature occurs.

2. Security;- The FAWE school lacks a boundary wall or fence thus making it easily

accessible and could be a target for intruders. There is need to erect a fence all around this school to enhance security and privacy needed for such institutions and more so an all girls’ boarding facility.

3. Sanitation; - This is a boarding facility and requires adequate and constant supply

of clean water to avert disease outbreaks. Even though it has a water tank there is no supply from a regular source. The machine that is providing water to the tank is located 60 kilometers away from the school and has broken down (during the review period). The school is now buying water from Kayonza Town which is not adequate especially since the toilets use the flush mechanism to dispose the wastes. There is need to both have RECO/RWASCO engaged and assure consistent water supply to the school or alternatively roof catchment and borehole should be considered as viable alternatives if not complimentary.

67. Review of environmental/social issues for the other activities within the HRDP which involved construction (such as the Community-Based School Rehabilitation and Development Program and the rehabilitation of Teacher Training Colleges). The main objective of the CSRDP was to support local community initiatives and demand-driven sub-projects such as the rehabilitation of classrooms, the provision of equipment, and the construction of new schools. The grant was part of the first pillar of an education strategy for Rwanda which included: (i) participation of communities in the rehabilitation, extension and construction of community primary and secondary schools; (ii) generation of employment and rural liquidity; and (iii) generation of resources to restore and improve the delivery of adequate levels of essential private and public education services.

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68. This approach was in line with the Rwandan government's decentralization policy. This component was envisaged to build on the successful experience under the Bank-financed Community Reintegration and Development Project (CRDP) which was developed as a learning and innovation loan (LIL). 69. The environmental and social review of the HRDP component involving the construction and rehabilitation of Community Based School including Teacher Training Centers (TTC) was guided by the following sampling protocol. 70. The total number of schools constructed or rehabilitated under this component were 125 including Teacher Training Centers and the review randomly selected 10 schools using the lottery method with 2 schools out of the total per province standing an equal chance of getting selected hence representing 10% of total schools constructed. 71. The schools selected and the province/district location are shown in the table below;-

School District Province Nyakabanda Primary School

Kicukiro District Kigali Province

G.S Ntarama Bugesera District Eastern Province Kacyiru II Primary School Gasabo District Kigali Province Ecole secondaire de Nyanza Nyanza District Southern Province E M P TTC Save Gisagara District Southern Province G.S Rega Catholic Nyabihu District Western Province G.S Shingiro Musanze District of the Northern Province G.S Karugunda Gakenke District Northern Province G.S Rwamashyongoshyo Rwamagana District Eastern Province FAWE School Kayonza District Eastern Province Cyahafi Primary Nyarugenge Kigali Province

Resettlement Issues 72. There were no major resettlement issues of the schools that were selected (randomly) for the social review with the exception of FAWE School. Of all the 10 schools visited, only 2 (G.S. Ntarama and Nyakabanda Primary School) required compliance with the Bank’s and Government of Rwanda’s procedures for land acquisition. The rest of the schools already existed in land that was either owned by the Government of Rwanda (GOR) or the Catholic Church and hence the rehabilitation or improvements did not trigger resettlement issues or safeguards. 73. This section highlights the schools visited and the support that the Bank provided upon which a determination of whether resettlement issues were triggered or otherwise was evaluated.

1. G.S Rwamashyongoshyo; This school is Rwamagana District in the Eastern Province of the country. Through the HRDP component, 3 classrooms, 1 office block and 4 pit latrines were constructed. The construction was done in an already existing school so there was no resettlement issues triggered.

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2. G.S Karugunda; This school is based at Gakenke District in the Northern Province.

Through the HRDP, 3 classrooms, 1 office and 14 pit latrines were built. The land was already hosting the school so these were additional facilities. The land is the property of the Catholic Church which runs the school in collaboration with MINEDUC.

3. G.S Shingiro; this school is based in Musanze District of the Northern Province.

The HRDP built six (6) classrooms, 1 office and 14 latrines. The land belongs to the Republic of Rwanda and the school was already in existence hence no resettlement issues were triggered.

4. G.S Rega Catholic; this school is situated in Nyabihu District of Western Province.

The HRDP component built 15 classrooms and an office in the school together with 14 latrines. The land belongs to the Catholic Church which runs the school together with MINEDUC.

5. EMP TTC Save; this Teachers Training Centre is situated in Gisagara District of

Southern Province. The HRDP constructed 2 Laboratories, 16 classrooms, a hall and toilets including shower blocks. The land belongs to the Catholic Church through the Marist Brothers, they also run the school.

6. Ecole secondaire de Nyanza; Situated in Nyanza District of Southern Province the

HRDP constructed 3 classrooms, 1 office and 14 latrines. The school is built on government land hence no issues of resettlement.

7. Kacyiru II Primary School; this school is located in Gasabo District in Kigali City.

Through the HRDP 12 classrooms, an office block and 14 latrines were constructed. The land belonged to the Police hence no resettlement issues arose.

8. G.S Ntarama; This school is based in Bugesera District in Southern Province. It is

also known as Cyugaro. The school is built on land that formerly belonged to The Rwanda Women’s Association (ASOFERWA). The former owners of the land were compensated through an exchange whereby they had new homes built for them in alternative land. This form of compensation is known as land for land and included the complete construction of the houses destroyed which is another highly accepted and recommended compensation process by the Bank especially when dealing with vulnerable groups like women etc.

There are no grievances, the community is happy with he school as it’s the only one serving the locals

9. Nyakabanda Primary School; This is a primary school located in Kicukiro District of Kigali Province. It has a student population of 900 students. The school is new i.e. it was not in existence before 2005. The land the school is built on belonged to Mr. Murenzi who was compensated for the acquisition of his land. 12 classrooms,

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an office, a store and 14 latrines were constructed through HRDP. 74. There were no individual Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs) for each of the schools or an overall Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) for the HRDP and hence it is impossible to determine the quality of the social safeguards plans. However, as shown from the schools sampled above, there were little instances where the involuntary resettlement policy of the bank was triggered and in cases where individuals were to be displaced 9as shown in the 2 cases) the procedures followed indicating a high degree of quality in implementation of social safeguard plans or processes. Environmental Issues 75. It is worth beginning by stating that for this component of HRDP (Community-Based School Rehabilitation and Development Program) there was no ESMP prepared because the project is categorised as C under the Bank’s Environmental Assessment Policy OP 4.01, BP 4.01 and GP 4.01. 76. According to the Banks PDA prepared in 2000:-The project is not expected to have any negative impact on the environment. On the contrary, the CSRDP will provide a unique opportunity to develop environmental awareness and education activities in association with parent associations and school clubs. There will be a limited amount of civil works and these will be mainly rehabilitation of existing structures. New schools or classrooms to be constructed under the project will be small and dispersed in rural areas. Construction methods would avoid putting pressure on scarce natural resources. The project would explore the use of hydra form block technology (based on pressure on a mixture of lots of soil and very little cement) and not baked bricks, in order to reduce the need for firewood, avoiding any detrimental impact on the environment. Field research to verify the sustainability of soil for clay compaction in the brick making process of hydra form blocks should be executed in advance in order to avoid design modifications. Meanwhile, the construction of new schools and the rehabilitation of existing structures should result in improvements in sanitary conditions (potable water in schools and building of latrines). The planting of sapling shade trees and landscaping to prevent erosion will also have positive effects on the environment. 77. Except for the FAWE School which was correctly identified during the HRDP extension in 2006 as potentially leading to negative impacts and for which an ESMP was prepared, the review can confirm that the categorization of the project and identified negative impacts are correct. 78. HRDP has supported all the schools visited as summarized above with new sanitary facilities (toilets) and tap water including portable water in toilets and showers for washing, trees had been planted all around the school compound and landscaping undertaken thereby increasing the ambience, contributing to the carbon sequestration process and reducing soil run off. 79. The schools visited did not have any major environmental concerns worth highlighting other than the one major one which is hygiene and sanitation in relation to the pit latrines.

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80. Even though pit latrines constructed in each of these schools remain the first and most significant step in ensuring good hygiene and sanitation and hence minimizing environmental health risks, there is need for the school administration to step up the cleaning bit as most of the toilets were dirty and could certainly cause health related infections. 81. The other issue of concern is the fact that the HRDP recommended the use of hydra form blocks for construction in order to reduce pressure on natural soils and wood products that was being used to construct baked bricks made from clay. The review observed that most of the schools were constructed using bricks made from clay and could in effect have exacerbated the pressure on firewood. Environmental standards followed and assess its consistency with appropriate national and local legislation and regulations; In 2000 the Government of Rwanda (GOR) did not have an Environmental Law as is the case at present and thus, the project followed the Bank’s environmental procedures as evidenced above. (The Organic Law is the existing legislation in Rwanda responsible for addressing environmental protection in the country including the need for preparation of ESMP for projects). 82. In 2006 with the extension of the HRDP, the Bank policy for Environmental Assessment was again followed in the case of the FAWE School which was identified as potentially causing adverse effects on the environment. The citation below highlights the keen attention paid by the project to ensure environmental safeguards following the project extension. 83. The 2006 amendment made the extension of the project conditional upon the appraisal of the construction of the FAWE School (an activity which was not foreseen in the original project), including the consideration of appropriate environmental and social management of the FAWE School. 84. An Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) for the FAWE School, including the Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP), was submitted to the World in June 2007. In December 2007, the World Bank issued a no objection to issuing the call for tenders for construction of the FAWE School (contingent on a number of changes to the architectural plans). In February 2008, the Project Implementation Unit transmitted the Dossier d’Appel d’Offres for the FAWE School to the National Tender Board. In October 2008, the World Bank provided a no objection to the bid evaluation selecting a contractor for the construction of the school. Oversight 85. The single oversight in all this was the lack of involvement of Rwanda Environment Management Authority (REMA) in this process especially for the FAWE School ESMP which was prepared in 2007 when REMA was fully functional and should have been provided with the report for review and approval. REMA would have perhaps provided

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oversight roles in ensuring adequate monitoring even though this institution is still under staffed and would probably not paid keen attention to this project in terms of priority and in comparison with other high profile projects with the potential for adverse impacts as compared to the HRDP. Comparison of the Project environmental and social practices with the World Bank’s practices. 86. The HRDP compares fairly well if not extremely well with the Bank’s practices in relation to ensuring environmental and social safeguards. This is demonstrated by the recognition in 2007 that even though the project was overall categorized as C under the EA OP 4.01, the FAWE School was certainly going to trigger this OP and hence an ESMP was prepared specifically for this sub project. 87. The bank policy also prescribes compensation and other resettlement measures to achieve its objectives and requires that borrowers prepare adequate resettlement planning instruments prior to project appraisal of proposed projects. The objective of this policy to avoid where feasible, or minimize, exploring all viable alternative project designs, to avoid resettlement. 88. The policy requires the displaced persons and their communities, and any host communities receiving them, are provided timely and relevant information, consulted on resettlement options, and offered opportunities to participate in planning, implementing, and monitoring resettlement. Appropriate and accessible grievance mechanisms are established for these groups. In new resettlement sites or host communities, infrastructure and public services are provided as necessary to improve, restore, or maintain accessibility and levels of service for the displaced persons and host communities. 89. In the case of the FAWE schools project, all the above requirements were met and fulfilled with the exception of payment which was somewhat delayed. 90. In order to comply with this policy, a Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) which is a document that sets out the resettlement objectives and principles, organizational arrangements and funding mechanisms for any resettlement that may be necessary during project implementation is required by the bank. 91. This document (RPF) was not prepared as required during the initial appraisal phase of the project because the HRDP was not anticipated to trigger OP 4.12 in 2000 because this construction was not anticipated. 92. Similarly, for any resettlement activity, a Resettlement and Compensation Action Plan (RAP) or an Abbreviated resettlement Action Plan (ARAP) is required before the execution of the project. The policy specifically states that;- “Where the impacts on the entire displaced population are minor (i.e. if affected people are not physically displaced and less than 10% of their productive assets are lost) or fewer than 200 people are displaced (economically or physically) for the entire project, and then

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the bank will approve the preparation of an Abbreviated Resettlement 93. Resettlement issues were certainly not well handled in the case of the FAWE School as reported in the 2009 audit which highlighted the weaknesses including primarily the lack of preparation of a Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) for this project. Even though the GoR had committed to compensating the Project Affected Persons (PAPs), for the loss of crops and land, since this is a Bank funded project, the Bank should have gone ahead and facilitated the RAP preparation as demanded. 94. However, it must be noted that the process followed by Kayonza District in relation to land acquisition, involved stakeholder consultation, asset valuation, census survey and provision of channels for grievance redress. These are all hallmarks of the Bank’s Involuntary Resettlement procedures OP 4.12. The only inadequacy was the delay in paying the PAPs that led to complaints and thus getting the Bank involved through the audit which in the end resolved the impasse. 95. Resettlement issues of the 2 PAPs whose land were acquired for the construction of the community schools were apparently well handled unlike the FAWE school with payments made on time. This is probably because the numbers of PAPs involved were not as many as that of the FAWE school hence not complicating the process.

Evaluate changes in capacities of institutions (MINEDUC, the Education Project Office and communities) for implementing environment and social safeguards programs. 96. There were no capacity building actions integrated in the HRDP in terms of implementing environment and social safeguards. The staff from MINEDUC, the Education Project Office and communities received no form of training or capacity enhancement to equip them with ensuring safeguards. 97. There was also limited monitoring of the expropriation process a role that could have been performed by HRDP staff especially by ensuring participation in all meetings, asset valuation process, recording of complaints among others.

Conclusion and Recommendations 98. This environmental and social review attests that the involuntary resettlement safeguards process undertaken by the HRDP was very much compliant with the Bank’s OP 4.12 and OP 4.01 in terms of socio-economic survey, stakeholder consultation valuation of assets and environmental safeguards. In the case of the FAWE school, the Kayonza District Land Authorities followed a process that was 100% similar to the bank in terms of compensation for loss of land and crops with the only set back or exception to the process was the delay in compensation which not only contravened the OP 4.12 but has been the single most factor that can be concluded as a cause of project negative impact to the PAPs. 99. The main recommendation of the 2009 audit was the need to expedite the compensation of the PAPs including payment for loss of second season of crop harvest. These recommendations were embraced quickly by MINEDUC through the facilitation and urging

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by the Bank and thus leading to the full compensation of the PAPs by the December 12, 2009. The HRDP had also identified another piece of land adjacent to the existing land where the FAWE School is under construction and wanted to acquire the land for constructing a water tank to supply water to the school. The main recommendation during the 2009 audit study was that the PAPs in this area should be compensated to the letter in accordance with the bank procedures and a repeat in delay of payment as was the case with the FAWE School was cautioned against. During the overall project review, it was noted that these 2 PAPs have been fully compensated and they have no issues with the process which they state was smooth and efficient. 100. The CSRDP component did not trigger any major resettlement issues based on the schools sampled. It can be concluded that since this component focused heavily on rehabilitation of schools, it would not lead to land acquisition or crop losses hence triggering the OP 4.12. As shown in the section 4 of this report of the 1o schools visited, only 2 of them triggered resettlement concerns because the land was owned by private individuals. However, the compensation was undertaken through procedures that are found to be satisfactory and consistent with the Bank’s procedures. 101. Environmental safeguards did not feature prominently in this project in terms of concern mainly because the project was already determined as Category C under the Banks Environmental Assessment OP 4.01. This determination indicated that the HRDP would not have any negative impacts on the environment with minimal civil works and vegetation loss expected through out the county where the projects are located. 102. An Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) and Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP) was prepared for the FAWE school and this document interpreted in detail the potential negative impacts and proposed feasible mitigation measures which has been duly followed during construction and operation almost to the last detail with only a few oversight issues. 103. Even though there were no ESIA or ESMPs for the community school projects and deservedly so because they involved rehabilitation of existing schools infrastructure hence limited negative impact, due consideration to environmental safeguards was all the same observed. Pit latrines were constructed in all the schools, vegetation was re-planted in areas where destruction occurred and water provided aspects which indeed helped improve the environmental situation. 104. The HRDP project is more or less closed and the recommendations should be used primarily to help in the design of future projects through the lessons learned which should be documented and used to improve other projects in Rwanda of similar nature. 105. The projects are now going to be fully run by the school administration under MINEDUC and a key recommendation is the need for the school administration to elevate sanitation and hygiene issues by keeping the latrines clean as they can be to avoid disease spread or public health and sanitation concerns.

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106. Select staff from MINEDUC should be exposed to training in Environmental and Social Safeguards especially those from the Department of Infrastructure. This form of capacity building will help in monitoring of safeguards in future projects not necessarily supported by the bank.

Reference 1. World Bank OP. 4.12 Involuntary Resettlement, 2. FAWE School Environmental and Social Impact Assessment Report-2007 3. HRDP Project Appraisal Document 4. Law N° 18/2007 Of 19/04/2007 Relating To Expropriation In The Public Interest 5. Rwanda Human Resources Development Project (HRDP) Timeline concerning

safeguards: 6. Organic Law: is the Organic Law n° 08/2005 of 14/07/2005 7. World Bank OP 4.10 Environmental Assessments 8.

List of persons consulted

1. Eddie Ruvugabigwi –HRDP Finance Manager and Acting PIC 2. KANKINDI JANE - Director of Studies at F A W E School 3. MUYOBOKE LIEVIN – Teacher at G.S Rwamashyongoshyo 4. NIYONSABA ALPHONSE – Education Office at Gakenke 5. UWUMCYA PERPETUA – Teacher at G.S Karugunda 6. DUKUZURURENYI ALEXIS – Head master at G.S Shingiro 7. NZIGIRA FIDELE – MINEDUC office at Musanze 8. UWIMANA J M IANNEY – Head master at G.S REGA 9. Br.KAYISHEMA AUGUSTINE – Head master at EMP TTC Save 10. NIYONSABA PATRICIE – MINEDUC office at Nyanza 11. MUGOREWERA ADLIENNE – Head mistress at Kacyiru II 12. MUREKATETE ANASTACIE – Head Mistress at Nyakabanda Pri. 13. TWAGIRIMANA CHARLES – Director of studies at G.S Ntarama 14. KARAMAGA CHARLES – Head master at FAWE School. 15. HABIMANA WARREN – Director of school construction MINEDUC 16. HARERIMANA SIMEON – Officer at REMA

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Annex 13: Newspaper Article of MINEDUC’s collaboration with communities to build schools

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N O R T H

P R O V I N C E

W E S TP R O V I N C E

S O U T H

P R O V I N C E

KIGALI CITY

E A S T

P R O V I N C E

N YA G ATA R E

G AT S I B O

K AY O N Z A

RWAMAGANA

K I R E H EN G O M A

B U G E S E R A

GASABO

KICUKIRO

B U R E R A

GICUMBI

R U L I N D OG A K E N K E

M U S A N Z A

RUBAVUN YA B I H U

NGOROREROR U T S I R O

K A R O N G I

N YA M A S H E K EN YA M A G A B E

N YA R U G U R U

R U S I Z I GISAGARA

H U Y E

N YA N Z A

R U H A N G O

MUHANGA

KAMONYI

NYARUGENGE

Bugarama

Rwumba Kitabi

Ruramba

KigembeMunini

Karama

Karaba

Gatagara

Masango

Rusatira

Shyorongi

Muhura

Kinyami

Mbogo

Kigarama

Sake

Rukara

Kiziguru

Gabiro

Gatunda

RilimaBugesera

Gikoro

Bicumbi

Gashora

Kanzi

Rwesero

Cyangugu

Bulinga

Ngaru

Mulindi

Muvumba

Kagitumba

Kirambo

Butaro

Nemba

Busogo

Muramba

Kagali

Nyondo

Kabaya

Mabanza

Murunda

GishyitaBwakira

Ngoma

Kidaho

Gikongoro

Gitarama

Butare

Kinihira

Burera

Rubavu Karago

Rutsiro

Gatsibo

Nyagatare

Kabarore

Mukarange

Kigabiro

Ndora

Gasaka

Ngoma

Kagano

RubengeraNyamabuye

Rukoma

Nyamata

Kicuro

RugengeNdera

Ruhango

Busasamana

Ngororero

MuhozaCyeru

Gakenke

Tare

Kamembe

Kibeho

Kibungo

Kirehe

Gisenyi

Mukamira

Gihingo

Nyanza

Kibuye

Rwamagana

Byumba

KIGALI

D E M . R E P .O F

C O N G O

B U R U N D I

T A N Z A N I A

U G A N D A

Lac Kivu

LacIhema

LacKivumba

LacHago

LacMikindi

LacRwanyakizinga

LacBurera

LacRuhondo

LacNasho

LacCywambwe

LacMpangaLac

Mugesera

LacRweru

LacCyohoha

Sud

Lac Muhazi

Kagera

Nyabarongo

Akany

aru

Kagi

tum

ba

Kagera

To Sake

To Rutshuru

To Kisoro

To Kabale

To Kikagati

To Kafunzo

To Bugene

To Lusahanga

To Kirundo

To Ngozi

To Kayanza

To Cibitoke

To Cibitoke

To Walangu

To Nyya-Ghezi

Virunga M

ts.

VolcanKarisimbi(4519 m)

30°00'E 31°00'E29°30'E 30°30'E

29°00'E

29°00'E

30°00'E29°30'E 30°30'E

2°00'S

2°30'S

2°00'S

1°00'S

1°30'S1°30'S

RWANDA

0 10 20 30

0 10 20 30 Miles

40 Kilometers

IBRD 33471R2

JUN

E 2008

RWANDA

This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, o r any endo r s emen t o r a c c e p t a n c e o f s u c h boundaries.

SELECTED CITIES AND TOWNS

AKARERE (DISTRICT) CAPITALS

INTARA (PROVINCE) CAPITALS

NATIONAL CAPITAL

RIVERS

MAIN ROADS

AKARERE (DISTRICT) BOUNDARIES

INTARA (PROVINCE) BOUNDARIES

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES