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Document of
The World Bank
Report No: ICR00003344
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(IDA-H4970, TF-96439, TF-94654)
ON A
GRANT
IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 10.1 MILLION
(US$ 15 MILLION EQUIVALENT)
TO THE
REPUBLIC OF BURUNDI
FOR AN
EMERGENCY DEMOBILIZATION AND TRANSITIONAL REINTEGRATION
PROJECT
Global Practice Social, Urban, Rural, and Resilience (GSURR)
Country Department AFCE1
Africa Region
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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Rate Effective on October 31, 2014)
Currency Unit = Burundi Francs (BIF)
US$1.00 = BIF 1,562
FISCAL YEAR 2014
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AF Additional Financing
AFRVP Africa’s Office of the Vice President
APPMs Armed Political Parties and Movements
BETF Bank Executed Trust Fund
CAAF/G Children Associated with Armed Forces/Groups
CAS Country Assistance Strategy
CD Country Director
CFDC Centre Familial de Dévelopment Communautaire
CFDR Compte Fiduciaire de Décaissement Rapide
CNDD-FDD Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces de la Défense de la
Démocratie
CNDRR National Commission for Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration
D&R Demobilization and Reintegration
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
EDRRP Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Project
EDTRP Emergency Demobilization and Transitional Reintegration Project
FA Financing Agreement
FNL Forces Nationales de la Libération
FNL-D Forces Nationales de la Libération-Dissidents
FPs Focal Points
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GoB Government of Burundi
HI Handicap International
IA Implementing Agency
IGAs Income Generating Activities
IPs Implementing Partners
IRC International Rescue Committee
ISR Implementation Status and Results
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
MDRP Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program
MDTF Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MIS Management Information System
MTR Mid-Term Review
PDO Project Development Objectives
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SGBV Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
TAs Technical Assistants
TCT Technical Coordination Team
TSA Transitional Subsistence Allowance
UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme
VCT Voluntary Counseling and Testing
Regional Vice President: Makhtar Diop
Country Director: Philippe Dongier
Senior Global Practice Director: Ede Jorge Ijjasz-Vasquez
Practice Manager:
Task Team Leader:
Markus Kostner (acting)
Leanne Bayer
ICR Task Team Leader: Natacha Lemasle
BURUNDI
Emergency Demobilization and Transitional Reintegration Project
CONTENTS
Data Sheet
A. Basic Information
B. Key Dates
C. Ratings Summary
D. Sector and Theme Codes
E. Bank Staff
F. Results Framework Analysis
G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs
H. Restructuring
I. Disbursement Graph
1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ........................................................... 1
2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ........................................................... 4
3. Assessment of Outcomes ...................................................................................................... 10
4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ..................................................................... 15
5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance .................................................................. 15
6. Lessons Learned .................................................................................................................... 17
7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners ....................... 17
Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing ...................................................................................... 18
Annex 2. Outputs by Component .............................................................................................. 20
Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ............................................................................. 31
Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ......................... 34
Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ....................................................................................... 36
Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ............................................................... 41
Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ................................. 42
Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ................................... 50
Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents................................................................................... 51
Annex 10. List of interviews conducted for ICR preparation…………………………………53
Annex 11. Synergies……………………………………..……………………………………56
MAP
Datasheet
A. Basic Information
Country: Burundi Project Name:
Emergency
Demobilization and
Transitional
Reintegration Project
Project ID: P113506 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-H4970,TF-96439,
TF-94654
ICR Date: 12/08/2014 ICR Type: Core ICR
Lending Instrument: ERL Borrower: GOVERNMENT OF
BURUNDI
Original Total
Commitment: USD 15.00M Disbursed Amount: USD 10.55M
Revised Amount: USD 9.98M
Environmental Category: B
Implementing Agencies:
National Commission for Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:
B. Key Dates
Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual
Date(s)
Concept Review: 12/18/2008 Effectiveness: 09/25/2009
Appraisal: 02/02/2009 Restructuring(s):
04/10/2010
09/09/2011
09/22/2011
10/16/2012
12/03/2012
12/21/2012
12/23/2013
05/26/2014
Approval: 06/16/2009 Mid-term Review: 10/18/2010 11/08/2010
Closing: 12/31/2011
IDA Grant:
12/30/2013 /
MDTF:
06/30/2014
C. Ratings Summary
C.1 Performance Rating by ICR
Outcomes: Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial
Bank Performance: Satisfactory
Borrower Performance: Satisfactory
C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)
Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings
Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Satisfactory
Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Implementing
Agency/Agencies: Satisfactory
Overall Bank
Performance: Satisfactory
Overall Borrower
Performance: Satisfactory
C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators
Implementation
Performance Indicators
QAG Assessments
(if any) Rating
Potential Problem Project
at any time (Yes/No): No
Quality at Entry
(QEA): None
Problem Project at any
time (Yes/No): No
Quality of
Supervision (QSA): None
DO rating before
Closing/Inactive status: Satisfactory
D. Sector and Theme Codes
Original Actual
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Other social services 100 100
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction 100 100
E. Bank Staff
Positions At ICR At Approval
Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili
Country Director: Philippe Dongier John McIntire
Practice
Manager/Manager: Markus Kostner Ian Bannon
Project Team Leader: Leanne Michelle Bayer Marcelo Jorge Fabre
ICR Team Leader: Natacha Caroline Lemasle
ICR Primary Author: Natacha Caroline Lemasle
F. Results Framework Analysis
Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The objective of the Project is to support the efforts of the Recipient to: (i) demobilize members
of the National Liberation Forces and the National Liberation Forces-Dissidents; and (ii) provide
socioeconomic reintegration support to said members following demobilization, as well as to Ex-
Combatants demobilized under the Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration
Project, with a particular focus on the provision of such support to such female, child, and
disabled Ex-Combatants.
Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) n/a
(a) PDO Indicator(s)
Indicator Baseline Value
Original Target
Values (from
approval
documents)
Formally
Revised
Target
Values
Actual Value
Achieved at
Completion or
Target Years
Indicator 1 : Number of demobilized/released out of the total number eligible (Disaggregate:
FNL adults demobilized, Dissidents adults demobilized, minors released)
Value
(quantitative or
qualitative)
0 100%
100% (4,950 FNL,
1,554 FNL-D,
including 380
minors)
Date achieved 06/16/2009 06/30/2012 06/30/2010
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
100% of demand for demobilization was met.
Indicator 2 :
Percentage of beneficiaries (and/or families in the case of children) reporting
using the majority of reinsertion support to provide for basic needs for
themselves and/or dependents (Disaggregate adults and children: Gender,
FNL/FNL-D/EDRRP, disabled)
Value
(quantitative or
qualitative)
0 70%
92.9% - (including:
92.8% of men
adults, 95.9% of
women adults,
92.1% of FNL,
91.8% of FNL-D,
94.8% of EDRRP,
95.3% of Disabled,
87.2 of children -
children not
disaggregated by
Gender or
affiliation).
Date achieved 06/16/2009 06/30/2012 06/19/2014
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Data presented here slightly differs from last ISR that included preliminary
results of the final survey.
Indicator 3 :
Percentage of beneficiaries who report being in a similar economic situation to
that of their peers in their community (Disaggregated: Gender, Adult/Child,
EDRRP/FNL/FNL-D, ill/disabled adults).
Value
(quantitative or
qualitative)
0 70%
60.8% in 2010,
60.2% in 2011,
46.9% in 2012.
Date achieved 06/16/2009 06/30/2012 12/31/2012
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Indicator on economic reintegration was revised and rephrased in 2013, as it was
too difficult to measure and subject to bias (see indicator 4 below).
Indicator 4 : Percentage of beneficiaries who contribute more than 50% of the household
income (Disaggregate: Gender, FNL/Dissidents/EDRRP, ill/disabled)
Value
(quantitative or
qualitative)
70% n/a
63.98% (including:
68.1% of men
adults, 31.6% of
women adults, 64.9
of EDRRP, 62.4%
of FNL, 67.3% of
FNL-D, 55.7% of
disabled, and
49.8% of minors)
Date achieved 08/05/2013 06/19/2014 06/19/2014
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
No target stipulated. Other data show ex-combatants' successful economic
reintegration (Annex 2): ex-combatants have better access to employment than
their peers in communities and access to shelter for ex-combatants improved
continuously during implementation.
Indicator 5 :
Percentage of beneficiaries who report greater social acceptance by their
communities than during the first three months after demobilization/release
(Disaggregate: Gender, child/adult, EDRRP/FNL/FNL-D, ill/disabled adults)
Value
(quantitative or
qualitative)
0
Year 1: 60%, Year
2: 90%, Year 3:
90%
86.1% (including
56.4% better
accepted, and
29.7% feeling the
same level as
acceptance - with
same or better
acceptance for
86.5% of adult
men, 85.3% of
adult women,
86.7% of EDRRP,
86.1% of FNL,
86.4% of FNL-D.
86.5%, 86.5 of
Disabled, 86.1% of
minors).
Date achieved 06/16/2009 06/30/2012 06/19/2014
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Target was almost reached. The slight shortcoming could be a transitional
setback explained by pre-2015 election tensions or commodity prices increase.
Indicator 6 :
Number of handicapped ex-combatants who achieve medical progress as
intended by their individual rehabilitation or treatment regimen (Disaggregate:
Gender, FNL/FNL-D/EDRRP, medical handicap severity level)
Value
(quantitative or
qualitative)
0 80%
518 in May 2011
(28% of estimated
1,800 caseload),
1,270 in December
2011 (48% of 2,643
identified
caseload), 1,870 in
July 2012, (62% of
3,002 identified
caseload), 2,071 in
December 2012
(61% of 3,395
identified caseload)
Date achieved 06/16/2009 06/30/2012 12/31/2012
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Indicator was revised in 2013, due to complexity of measuring "medical
progress"(See revised indicator 7 below).
Indicator 7 :
Percentage of identified disabled ex-combatants who received all foreseen
treatment as identified in their medical treatment plan (Disaggregate: Gender,
FNL-FNL-D/ medical handicap severity)
Value
(quantitative or
qualitative)
0 90%
93.5% (3,307 out of
the 3,538 identified
caseload - no
disaggregated data
available)
Date achieved 08/05/2013 06/30/2014 06/19/2014
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Target of 90% exceeded with 93.5% of disabled ex-combatants who received all
foreseen treatment as identified in their medical treatment plan.
Indicator 8 :
Number of eligible severely disabled ex-combatants who received a house under
the conditions stipulated by the project manual (Disaggregate: Gender, FNL,
FNL-D, EDRRP)
Value
(quantitative or
qualitative)
0 100% of eligible
beneficiaries
150 (100% of
eligible)
(Disaggregated data
not available)
Date achieved 08/05/2013 06/30/2014 06/19/2014
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
100% of eligible beneficiaries received a house.
Indicator 9 : Direct project beneficiaries
Value 0 10,112
(quantitative or
qualitative)
Date achieved 06/16/2009 06/19/2014
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
n/a
(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)
Indicator Baseline Value
Original Target
Values (from
approval
documents)
Formally
Revised
Target Values
Actual Value
Achieved at
Completion or
Target Years
Indicator 1 : Number of ex-combatants who are registered, receive non-transferable ID cards,
and have their data captured in the MIS (Disaggregate: Gender, FNL/FNL-D)
Value
(quantitative
or qualitative)
0 Year 1: 100%
100% - 6,504 adults
(including 245
women adults and
6,259 men adults;
4,950 FNL, and
1,554 FNL-D)
Date achieved 06/16/2009 06/30/2010 06/30/2010
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
100% of eligible beneficiaries received an ID card and had their personal data
registered in year 1.
Indicator 2 : Number of identified minors reunified with family or placed in alternative care
arrangements (Disaggregate: Gender, FNL/FNL-D)
Value
(quantitative
or qualitative)
0 Year 1: 100% 626 (100%)
Date achieved 06/16/2009 06/30/2010 06/30/2010
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
100% of eligible children were reunited with families or placed in alternative
care arrangements in year 1.
Indicator 3 : Number of conflict affected people to whom benefits have been delivered during
the first year of the project.
Value
(quantitative
or qualitative)
8,616
Date achieved 06/19/2014
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Indicator added in 2013, as part of the revision of the RF under AF (as per new
guidelines on conflict core indicators).
Indicator 4 : Number of adults that receive timely reinsertion support as stipulated in the
project manual (Disaggregate: Gender, FNL/FNL-D)
Value
(quantitative
or qualitative)
0 95%
98.75% (8,033
including: 1,536
EDRRP, 4943 FNL,
1553 FNL-D, data
disaggregated by
gender not
available).
Date achieved 06/16/2009 06/30/2012 06/19/2014
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
98.75% received reinsertion support as per the project manual (within 3, 6, and 9
months of demobilization). Data presented here differs slightly from the ISR
(data presented in the ISR includes all reinsertion benefits provided regardless of
timing).
Indicator 5 :
Number of children that receive appropriate (ie in kind, to families) and timely
reinsertion support as stipulated in the project manual (Disaggregate: Gender,
EDRRP, FNL, FNL-D)
Value
(quantitative
or qualitative)
0 95%
95.2% - 596 out of
626 caseload)
(including 316
FNL, 40 FNL-D,
240 EDRRP, data
disaggregated by
Gender not
available).
Date achieved 06/16/2009 06/30/2012 06/19/2014
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
95 % target met with 95.2%. Note that data presented here differs slightly from
data in the ISR that reported on beneficiaries of at least one of the three tranches
of payment. Data reported here reflects beneficiaries of all three tranches.
Indicator 6 :
Number of adults that receive appropriate and timely reintegration support as
stipulated in the project manual (Disaggregate: Gender, EDRRP, FNL, FNL-D,
kind of reintegration support, able/disabled)
Value
(quantitative
or qualitative)
0 90%
99.7 % - 7,417 out
of 7,441 eligible
(including 254
women / 7,163
men, 932 EDRRP,
4,936 FNL, 1,549
FNL-D, 762
disabled ex-
combatants, and
620 minors)
Date achieved 06/16/2009 06/30/2012 06/19/2014
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
99.7% received reintegration support.
Indicator 7 :
Number of children that receive appropriate reintegration support as stipulated in
the project manual (Disaggregate: EDRRP/FNL/FNL-D, kind of reintegration
support)
Value
(quantitative
or qualitative)
0 100%
99% - 620 received
reintegration
support.
Date achieved 06/16/2009 06/30/2012 06/19/2014
Comments 99% of children received reintegration support (timeliness not stipulated in
(incl. %
achievement)
project manual). 85.4% of children received reintegration support within 18
months after demobilization (on average sooner than the rest of the caseload).
Indicator 8 : Number of associations supported by the project that receive transitional
economic reintegration support
Value
(quantitative
or qualitative)
0 634 721
Date achieved 08/05/2013 06/30/2014 06/19/2014
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Number of associations supported exceeded target.
Indicator 9 :
Number of handicapped ex-combatants who receive timely medical intervention
(rehabilitation and/or treatment) (Disaggregate: Gender, EDRRP, FNL,FNL-D,
medical handicap severity level, support in progress/complete)
Value
(quantitative
or qualitative)
0
Year 1: 20%, year
2: 60%, year 3:
100%
n/a
Date achieved 06/16/2009 06/30/2012 12/31/2012
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
This indicator was dropped in 2013 (redundant with revised indicator PDO 7
above).
Indicator 10 : Number of beneficiaries trained in conflict mitigation (Disaggregate: ex-
combatants (FNL, FNL-D, CNDD-FDD), local authorities).
Value
(quantitative
or qualitative)
0 90%
100% - 1,644
(including 947
community
members -
Disaggregated data
for ex-combatant
military affiliation
not available)
Date achieved 08/05/2013 06/30/2014 06/30/2014
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
100% of 1,644 identified beneficiaries received training. Data slightly differs
from data reported in ISR because the ISR does not include the 118 who received
training under the original project.
G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs
No. Date ISR
Archived DO IP
Actual
Disbursements
(USD millions)
1 12/23/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.00
2 05/24/2010 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 6.76
3 09/19/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 9.27
4 09/19/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 9.27
5 04/30/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 9.76
6 10/10/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 9.85
7 04/24/2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 9.92
8 10/28/2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 10.00
9 05/26/2014 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 10.57
10 07/04/2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 10.55
H. Restructuring (if any)
Restructur
ing Date(s)
Board
Approved
PDO
Change
ISR Ratings
at
Restructuring
Amount
Disbursed at
Restructuring
in USD
millions (IDA
funds only)
Reason for Restructuring & Key
Changes Made
DO IP
04/10/2010 N S S 6.21
Cancellation of US$ 5 million
equivalent IDA. During project
preparation it was foreseen that the
project would be funded through a
US$10 million IDA grant and a
US$12.5 million MDTF. The IDA
allocation was increased to US$15
million prior to the Board meeting to
cover a potential short-term shortfall of
donor contributions to the MDTF. An
MDTF Grant of US$ 12.5 million
became effective on April 21, 2010,
covering the full project cost. Pursuant
to Section 6.03, paragraph 6 of the
General Conditions of the Financing
Agreement, the Country Director (CD)
approved the cancellation of the
equivalent of US$5 million from the
IDA Grant.
09/09/2011 N MS MS 9.27
IDA Grant no cost extension from
December 31, 2011 to December 31,
2012. In response to the slow progress
in provision of medical support (limited
local capacity) as well as to the need to
improve the variety of economic
reintegration support.
09/22/2011 S S 9.27
Extension of MDTF (TF96439) to
match the extension of the IDA grant,
from December 31, 2011 to December
31, 2012.
10/16/2012 S S 9.85
Reallocation of MDTF funds including
the allocation of unallocated funds and
an increase in Category 3 (from 2.7 to
10.1%) (Operational costs), due to
project extension.
12/03/2012 N S S 9.85 IDA Grant no cost extension from
December 31, 2012 to December 30,
Restructur
ing Date(s)
Board
Approved
PDO
Change
ISR Ratings
at
Restructuring
Amount
Disbursed at
Restructuring
in USD
millions (IDA
funds only)
Reason for Restructuring & Key
Changes Made
DO IP
2013. The extension was due to slow
progress in implementation of the
medical component. All targets were
achieved by the end of the project.
12/21/2012 S S 9.85
Extension of MDTF (TF96439) to
match the extension of the IDA grant,
from December 31, 2012 to December
30, 2013.
12/23/2013 S S 10.00
Reallocation of IDA funds including
the allocation of unallocated funds as
well as a decrease in Category 2 (from
22.1 to 5.73%) (Goods, works, non-
consulting services, consultants’ and
Training) and an increase in Category 3
(from 13.2 to 19.7 %) (Operational
costs), in response to project extension.
05/26/2014 S S 10.00
Reallocation of MDTF to cover
increased expenses in Category 2 (from
16.5 to 36.2%), (works related to
construction of houses) due to an
increase in commodity prices between
February 2013 and January 2014.
I. Disbursement Profile
1
1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design
1.1 Context at Appraisal
Country Context: Since the early 1990s, the Great Lakes Region had been embroiled in a series
of closely interlinked conflicts. In Burundi, the most recent period of violence started in 1993
following the assassination of the democratically-elected President Melchior Ndadaye during a
coup attempt. In August 2000, Burundi began emerging from seven years of brutal civil war upon
the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement. The country made a successful transition to a multi-
party system of government between 2000 and 2005. Social indicators sharply deteriorated as a
result of the civil war. At appraisal, Burundi ranked 167 out of 177 countries in the 2007/2008
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index. Burundi was
from the onset and remains today, a fragile country, with all the challenges it entails for project
implementation (including limited in-country capacity and instability).
Sector Context: A first diplomatic breakthrough occurred on August 28, 2000 when 19
Burundian parties signed the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement. The Conseil National
Pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces de la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD) and the
Forces Nationales de la Libération-Palipehutu (FNL-P) were absent from the Arusha process and
continued their armed struggle against the government. A comprehensive cease-fire agreement
between the Government of Burundi (GoB) and a portion of CNDD-FDD was finally signed in
Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania on November 16, 2003. In response to a GoB request to the World
Bank, the Burundi Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Project (EDRRP) -
the first of the two Demobilization and Reintegration (D&R) projects - was prepared and
approved by the World Bank Board of Directors on March 18, 2004. This first D&R operation
was supported through an IDA grant of US$36 million and a complementary grant from the
Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) of US$41.8 million. The
EDRRP closed on December 31, 2008.
Rationale for Bank Involvement and Alignment with High Level Objectives: In light of
EDRRP’s closure and the recognition of pending activities required for the consolidation of the
peace process, the continued support to D&R in Burundi was an urgent strategic priority. In
addition, following the successful conclusion of peace negotiations and the transformation of the
FNL into a political party, there was a demand for D&R from the FNL. The proposed activity
was to directly contribute to the achievement of the World Bank Country Assistance Strategy
(CAS FY09-12) for Burundi, particularly CAS Outcome 2.1: “Improved reintegration of ex-
combatants and vulnerable groups”. The new operation would allow for continued support to a
key element of the Burundi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP I)—improve governance
and security—through the coordinated use of IDA resources and a single-purpose Multi Donor
Trust Fund (MDTF) supported by key development partners.
1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved)
The objective of the Burundi Emergency Demobilization and Transitional Reintegration Project
(EDTRP) is to support the efforts of the Recipient to: (i) demobilize members of the National
Liberation Forces and the National Liberation Forces-Dissidents; and (ii) provide socioeconomic
reintegration support to said members following demobilization, as well as to Ex-Combatants
demobilized under the Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration Project, with a
particular focus on the provision of such support to such female, child, and disabled Ex-
Combatants.
2
Key original PDO level Indicators:
1. Number of demobilized/released from FNL and Dissidents out of total number eligible
(disaggregated by adults and minors, gender, and ill/disabled)
2. Percentage of beneficiaries (and/or families, in the case of children) reporting using the
majority of reinsertion support to provide for basic needs for themselves and/or
dependents (disaggregated by adult/child, gender, FNL/Dissidents/EDRRP; ill/disabled)
3. (a) Percentage of beneficiaries who report being in a similar economic situation to that of
their peers in their community (disaggregated by adult/child, gender,
FNL/Dissidents/EDRRP; ill/disabled)
3. (b) Percentage of beneficiaries who report greater social acceptance by their communities
than during the first three months after demobilization/release (disaggregated by
adult/child, gender, FNL/Dissidents/EDRRP; ill/disabled)
3. (c) Number of handicapped ex-combatants who achieve medical progress as intended by
their individual rehabilitation or treatment regimen (disaggregated by gender,
EDRP/FNL/Dissident/PNDDR, medical handicap severity level)
1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and
reasons/justification
Given the satisfactory performance of the project, strong commitment from the GoB to provide
housing for severely disabled ex-combatants as well as the availability of resources (MDTF
balance), the GoB requested Additional Financing (AF) from the Bank to provide housing for
severely disabled ex-combatants among other activities aimed at strengthening support to
vulnerable groups. An AF of US$ 7.9 million (US$4.25 million funded by MDTF and US$3.63
million by the GoB) was approved by the Executive Directors on August 26, 2013 and became
effective on November 26, 2013. PDO level indicators were modified as follows (note that there
were also changes in intermediate indicators):
Revisions to PDO indicators Rationale for Change
Parent project Restructuring
3a. % of beneficiaries who report
being in a similar economic
situation to that of their peers in
their community
Disaggregate: gender;
FNL/Dissidents/EDRRP;
ill/disabled (adults)
Revised
3a. % of beneficiaries who contribute
more than 50% to the household income
Previous indicator was
subjective and prone to bias.
3c. # of handicapped ex-combatants
who achieve medical progress as
intended by their individual
rehabilitation or treatment regimen.”
Disaggregate: gender;
EDRP/FNL/Dissident/PNDDR;
medical handicap severity level
Revised
3c. # of identified disabled ex-combatants
who received all foreseen treatment as
identified in their medical treatment plan.
Target was revised from 80% to 90%, in
light of the progress of provision of
medical support.
“Medical progress” was not
defined, and too complex a
concept to be adequately
measured for such a large
caseload of beneficiaries.
N/A New
3d. # of eligible severely disabled ex-
combatants who receive a house under
the conditions stipulated by the project
manual
Disaggregate: FNL/Dissidents/PNDDR
Additional PDO indicator to
measure provision of
additional benefits.
N/A New
3e. Direct Project Beneficiaries (number),
of which female (%)
Addition of Core indicator to
measure the overall number of
beneficiaries of the project.
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1.4 Main Beneficiaries,
As per the Project Paper, the project’s main beneficiaries included: (i) a limited caseload of
approximately 1,500 beneficiaries remaining from the previous project (EDRRP) (reinsertion,
reintegration, and medical services), (ii) up to 5,000 FNL combatants and 1,564 FNL-D
(demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration), and (iii) up to 600 children associated with the
armed groups FNL and FNL-D (specialized services for reintegration). Further, the GoB would
receive implementation support assistance to preserve its operational and technical capacity to
demobilize and reintegrate combatants from the FNL and FNL-D. By the end of the project: (i)
1,630 beneficiaries from the EDRRP received reinsertion and reintegration support, (ii) 4,950
FNL combatants and 1,554 FNL-D along with 626 children associated with FNL and FNL-D
received D&R support, and (iii) 3,538 disabled ex-combatants received medical support.
1.5 Original Components (as approved)
Component 1: Demobilization of FNL and FNL-D forces including encampment, sensitization,
validation of combatant status, registration, socio-economic profiling of ex-combatants, surveying
expectations for reintegration, pre-discharge orientation programs, medical triage, voluntary
counseling and testing for HIV/AIDS, and transport support to communities of return.
Component 2: Reinsertion support of new demobilized ex-FNL and ex-FNL-D, including
reinsertion kits and a monetized unconditional cash transfer allowance (known as transitional
subsistence allowance) as well as extensive counseling and orientation during the pre-discharge
orientation (PDO) process. A small caseload from the previous program received the outstanding
payments of their reinsertion support.
Component 3: Transitional socio-economic reintegration support for all demobilized adult
ex-combatants, as well as a small pending caseload from the EDRRP, to include beneficiaries’
selection of their personal reintegration path. Transitional economic reintegration included a
range of interventions such as the provision of scholarships, employment opportunities,
vocational and skills training, and microenterprise generation and promotion (including training
on basic business development, accounting skills, and promotion of associations). Further,
transitional social reintegration included the provision of information and sensitization events
with ex-combatants and communities, fostering reconciliation, psycho-social trauma counseling,
and HIV/AIDS counseling and referral.
Component 4: Support to vulnerable groups included specialized support and/or additional
protection to vulnerable groups including children associated with armed forces, female ex-
combatants, and disabled ex-combatants.
1.6 Revised Components
Component 3 and component 4 were revised under the AF to include additional activities as
follows:
Component 3: Transitional socio-economic reintegration support to include: (a) provision of
conflict mitigation training to ex-combatants and their host communities; (b) provision of
technical assistance to relevant local associations of ex-combatants; and (c) provision of psycho-
social counselling and gender sensitization.
4
Component 4: Support to vulnerable groups with a focus on disabled ex-combatants through:
(a) construction of disability-appropriate houses; (b) provision of specialized medical support; (c)
implementation of training activities to support the autonomy and general health of the disabled
ex-combatants; and (d) communications strategy to ensure timely and transparent communication
on the provision of houses.
1.7 Other significant changes
Cancellation of US$5 million IDA grant. During project preparation it was foreseen that the
project would be funded through a US$10 million IDA grant and a US$12.5 million MDTF. The
IDA allocation was increased to US$15 million prior to the Board meeting to cover a potential
short-term shortfall of donor contributions to the MDTF. An MDTF Grant of US$ 12.5 million
became effective on April 21, 2010, covering the full project cost. Pursuant to Section 6.03,
paragraph 6 of the General Conditions of the Financing Agreement, the Country Director (CD)
approved the cancellation of the equivalent of US$5 million from the IDA Grant on April 20,
2010.
Extensions. Two consecutive one year, no-cost extensions of the IDA grant and the MDTF (from
December 31, 2011 to December 31, 2012 and from December 31, 2012 to December 30,
2013)—responding to the slow progress in provision of medical support (related to limited local
capacity) as well as to the need to improve the variety of economic reintegration support—were
approved by the CD. In addition, project activities were extended until June 30, 2014 through
additional financing to the MDTF. The MDTF’s extension at the trustee level (extended from
June 30, 2012 to December 31, 2014) resulting in an extension of the MDTF for more than two
years, was approved by the Africa Region’s Office of the Vice President (AFRVP).
Reallocations. Three reallocations of funds were approved by the CD: (i) reallocation of MDTF
funds including the allocation of unallocated funds and an increase in Category 3 (from 2.7 to
10.1%) (Operational costs) on October 16, 2012, (ii) reallocation of the original IDA Grant on
December 23, 2013 including the allocation of unallocated funds as well as a decrease in
Category 2 (from 22.1 to 5.73%) (Goods, works, non-consulting services, consultants’ and
Training) and an increase in Category 3 (from 13.2 to 19.7 %) (Operational costs), in response to
project extension, and (iii) reallocation of MDTF funds under the AF on May 26, 2014 to cover
increased expenses in Category 2 (from 16.5 to 36.2%), (works related to construction of houses)
due to an increase in commodity prices between February 2013 and January 2014 (note that this
reallocation does not appear in the data sheet, because the project code for the AF to the MDTF
was not linked to the parent project at the time of the finalization of this ICR).
2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes
2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry
The Burundi National Commission for Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration
(NCDDR), established on August 28, 2003, was the implementing agency for the Burundi
EDRRP (2004-2008). The EDRRP demobilized over 26,000 adult ex-combatants, supported the
release of over 3,000 children associated with the fighting forces, and provided reinsertion
support to approximately 29,000 former Gardiens de la Paix and combattants militants. Several
activities initiated under the EDRRP were not completed (reintegration, support to children
associated with armed forces and disabled ex-combatants). This caseload was transferred to the
second project, the EDTRP. The previous project was rated moderately unsatisfactory, due to
financial management issues, and shortcomings in the provision of reintegration benefits, among
other issues.
5
Soundness of background analysis and project design. The EDTRP was designed based on
lessons learnt from the previous project, with a simplified implementation framework, and
activities organized around clear components articulated around the project’s PDOs. Lessons
learnt from the EDRRP successfully incorporated in project design included:
(i) Project implementation by a small technical coordination team with project
activities mostly outsourced to implementing agencies. The project Technical
Coordination Team (TCT) was significantly reduced in scope in comparison with the
EDRRP and staffed with competitively recruited technical personnel. This
successfully contributed to de-politicize the project and ensure high technical
capacity of project staff.
(ii) Highly qualified financial and procurement staff were included in the TCT to
verify financial and procurement tasks with support from an independent
international consultant.
(iii) An active role for the NCDRR. The appointment of a D&R advisor to the President
proved crucial to solving issues as they arose and ensuring strong Government
ownership.
(iv) A single-purpose, single country MDTF with an associated trust fund
committee. While the previous project was co-financed by the MDRP, IDA funds
and a single country, single purpose MDTF including a Bank Executed Trust Fund
(BETF) were combined in the new project. This was key in providing flexible and
responsive assistance to the borrower’s needs as well as ensuring the presence of a
Bank field-based staff to ensure close monitoring and support to the project.
(v) Improved communications. During the EDRRP’s implementation, many negative
reactions among beneficiaries could have been minimized through adequate
communication. The new project included a communications specialist, specifically
recruited for this task, who closely monitored the impact of the communications
strategy and regularly updated it.
Risk assessment. Risks were overall candidly and accurately identified in both the parent project
and the AF: (i) risk of insecurity and political instability in Burundi, and (ii) related potential
reputational risk for the Bank supporting an operation closely tied to both political and security
issues. Mitigation measures included: (i) ensuring the program remained a key priority for the
GoB; (ii) close harmonization with other members of the international community, and (iii) clear
analysis of options and exit strategies if conditions deteriorate. There was also an acute awareness
of the challenges that emerged in the previous project and of the fragility of the implementation
environment. The main risks and mitigation measures identified at the project level were:
(i) Weak institutional capacity and weak financial and procurement management: This was
addressed through: (a) project implementation by a small technical and competitively recruited
team, including financial management and procurement experts, (b) hiring of a DDR expert based
in Bujumbura through the Bank Executed portion of the MDTF, and (c) hiring of a World Bank
international financial management consultant to provide technical support to the TCT;
(ii) Potential perceptions of CNDD-FDD versus FNL demobilization and reintegration
program: The project was designed based on the principle of parity with benefits provided to ex-
combatants during the EDRRP;
(iii) Real or perceived gap in support for demobilization and reintegration: Provision of
US$4 million retroactive financing to avoid gaps in the provision of benefits; and
(iv) A short-fall in future financing due to lack of support for the MDTF: US$5 million
additional IDA allocation was agreed to mitigate the risk of underfunding from donors.
6
While a number of mitigation measures aimed at addressing limited in-country capacity were
employed through highly competitive recruitment and provision of technical assistance, limited
availability of medical and psychosocial services was not clearly identified as a specific
challenge, despite being signaled in a 2005 disability report commissioned under the previous
project (Jadin and Minani, 2005). Along with other issues that could not have been predicted,
including higher than anticipated caseload of disabled ex-combatants from the previous project,
this resulted in the slow identification and provision of support to disabled ex-combatants and two
successive project extensions, was eventually addressed and successfully implemented.
In the AF, additional project level risks were also accurately identified and adequately mitigated:
(i) Potential negative reactions from ex-combatants not selected to receive housing: This
was mitigated efficiently through: (a) clear selection criteria, and (b) a communication strategy to
ensure transparency and prevent conflicts;
(ii) Availability of land for the construction of houses for disabled ex-combatants: Close
collaboration with the GoB for the pre-selection of land during project preparation, and provision
of Government-owned land plots for construction; and
(iii) Complexity of procurement and management of multiple contracts with construction
firms in multiple locations and within a short timeframe. This was addressed through: (a)
recruitment of a full time engineer by the TCT to augment quality control and supervision, (b)
provision of additional training for the TCT procurement specialist, and (c) recruitment of an
international engineer to support the Bank team during critical stages.
2.2 Implementation
Project implementation was characterized by efficient demobilization and reintegration processes,
with the project addressing project and context-related issues in an efficient and timely manner.
Overall economic context. In 2009 when the project started, inflation was high at 11% but
decreased in the following years. The inflation rate, however, increased again in 2012 and
reached 18.0%. This unpredictable increase impacted the construction of specialized housing for
disabled ex-combatants as the budget had been prepared on the basis of a lower inflation rate (this
was addressed through reallocation). During project implementation, GDP growth steadily
increased while unemployment remained stable around 7.8% for the general population and
12.9% for youth (in parallel, unemployment for ex-combatants consistently decreased) (see PDO
outcome section).
Political context and conflict mitigation. In the aftermath of the May 2010 communal elections,
Burundi experienced escalating violence. The opposition political parties including the FNL
garnered fewer votes nationally than expected and pulled out of subsequent elections (legislative
and presidential elections in July and August 2010) citing election fraud by the ruling party. The
ruling party went on to win at all levels (communal, legislative, and presidential). Opposition
political parties organized themselves politically into a coalition called Ikibiri ADC. The FNL
was the only political party in the coalition that comprised of ex-combatants. Following the
political breakdown between the ruling party and opposition parties, some FNL militants in
Bujumbura Rural mobilized into armed gangs. Clashes between these gangs and local police
rapidly escalated. The ruling party mobilized an offensive in Bujumbura Rural comprised of local
police, intelligence agents, and members of the ruling party’s (CNDD-FDD) Youth wing (Human
Rights Watch, 2012). Eventually, violence spread throughout the country (International Crisis
Group, 2011 and 2012). Ahead of the 2010 elections, the project had formalized a network of ex-
combatant representatives including technical assistants and focal points (annex 2). This played a
strong function for ex-combatants to report back concerns and issues to the TCT. The Mid Term
Review (MTR) noted that ex-combatants reported feeling intimidated in their local communities,
7
while some were put in jail or interrogated by intelligence services. In response to increased
tensions, the project provided conflict mitigation training to IPs and representatives of ex-
combatants. The training evaluation indicated that participants felt equipped to successfully
address conflicts, especially those between local governments and ex-combatants. Based on the
positive results of the training evaluation, this activity was scaled up under the AF and extended
to members of the municipal administration, ex-combatants, and community leaders. In 2011 and
2012 in particular, the TCT and IPs also played a strong role in advocating for ex-combatants
from the FNL in cases where they were harassed or arrested, which again further emphasizes
successful project de-politicization.
Development context and synergies. The project was designed to establish synergies with
development partners to complement project implementation. While the MTR noted that it was a
challenge to establish long term synergies, the project managed to collaborate with key partners
to support the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants (see annex 11 for a full list of all
partnerships established):
(i) United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Bureau des Nations United au
Burundi (BNUB), and the GoB provided support to 10,186 adults associated with FNL
combatants (including 1,051 women)(UNDP, 2010).
(ii) The International Rescue Committee (IRC) provided support through Villages de Paix to
children whose family members could not be traced.
(iii) UNICEF and the African Union contributed to the reinsertion and demobilization of
children through the provision of reinsertion benefits and vocational training to 150 children.
(iv) The Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) supported Handicap
International (HI) from 2010 to 2013 through a full time international prosthetics expert at the
Centre National d'Appareillage et de Réadaptation (CNAR). This partnership helped build local
capacity and accelerate the provision of prosthetics to disabled ex-combatants while ensuring that
prosthetics continued to be provided to the rest of the population in parallel. In addition, HI
provided economic reintegration support to 2,020 disabled ex-combatants (Handicap
International, 2013).
In-country capacity context. Coordination and capacity building of implementing partners. The
TCT had a centralized structure and was intentionally organized around a small technical team
coordinating the work of 11 Implementing Partners (IPs). The project recruited an umbrella
organization to avoid bottlenecks in coordination and payment of IPs, as well as to ensure close
field monitoring and consistency of approaches. IPs interviewed identified this decision as key to
overcoming bottlenecks, avoiding delays, and building their management and planning skills.
Psycho-social support. The EDTRP is one of the pioneer D&R projects to include psycho-social
trauma counselling. Psycho-social support, however, proved challenging due to limited in-
country mental health structures and capacity, limited field presence of the mental health IP, and
ex-combatant reticence in admitting the need for mental health support. To address the limited
field presence, the project added three psychosocial assistants between 2012 and 2013 (from 20 to
23). Eventually, all identified cases benefitted from some type of mental health support. When the
original grant closed, the caseload of psychiatric and epileptic cases was transferred to the
medical team who provided them with treatment until the project closed. Issues were not entirely
overcome, however, as an evaluation conducted found the frequency of the various types of
support received by beneficiaries to be low (annex 2).
Medical support. The MTR noted a number of external constraints negatively affecting the
implementation of the medical component: (i) underestimation of the remaining caseload from
8
the EDRRP (2,982, versus the 1,500 estimated for the old caseload), (ii) limited in-country
capacity for the provision of prosthetics and medical services (Handicap International 2012 and
2013), and (iii) limited capacity of the TCT to manage the medical component. Numerous efforts
were made to address these challenges including: (i) two project extensions; (ii) hiring of a
medical expert to manage disability support within the TCT; (iii) hiring of an international
disability expert through the BETF to provide technical support and develop an improved
database for disabled ex-combatants, and eventually hiring of a second expert for planning of
activities; (iv) hiring of a medical IP to identify the caseload and plan provision of medical
support; (v) provision of additional equipment, transport, and staff to the medical IP; (vi)
rehabilitation of buildings for increased accessibility at the prosthetics center; (vii) identification
of additional service providers for the production of prosthetics; and (viii) increased frequency of
coordination meetings with the medical IP. These efforts led to improvements but progress was
too slow to guarantee the completion of the medical component before project closure.
Eventually, in light of the IP’s low performance, it was decided not to renew the IP’s contract and
to integrate the best elements of the medical team into the TCT. Support to disabled ex-
combatants improved after the major change to absorb the medical team (graph in annex 2). In
the end, 93.5% of disabled ex-combatants received all treatments included in their medical plan.
2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization
M&E Design. The project’s M&E was designed to be supported by a Management Information
System (MIS) that recorded all data related to ex-combatants’ status and benefits received. The
MIS system was transitioned from the EDRRP with very minor changes. Most indicators were
disaggregated by caseload (EDRRP and EDTRP), gender, adult/minor status, and ill/disabled
status. Progress was measured with a heavy focus on output indicators (11), versus outcome
indicators (3) (revised Results Framework). Some indicators were subject to bias (“percentage of
beneficiaries who report being in a similar economic situation to that of their peers in their
community”), or not clearly defined (“number of handicapped ex-combatants who achieve
medical progress as intended by their individual rehabilitation or treatment regimen”; “number of
handicapped ex-combatants who receive timely medical intervention”, as “medical progress” or
“timeliness” were not defined). The Task Team, however, seized the opportunity to improve these
indicators with the restructuring of the project for the AF: “percentage of beneficiaries who
contribute more than 50% to the household income” was added, assessing economic reintegration
in terms of ex-combatants’ financial dependence to their family; and “number of identified
disabled ex-combatants who receive all foreseen treatment as identified in their medical treatment
plan”, significantly clarifying the two previous indicators on medical support.
M&E Implementation. Implementation of M&E by the project was considered best practice, as
reflected by the 2012 invitation by the World Bank Transitional Demobilization and
Reintegration Program (TDRP) of the project M&E specialist to share the experience of the
project with other D&R teams. The M&E department consisted of six staff: an M&E Specialist,
an MIS Specialist, and four data entry clerks. The staff received technical assistance from the
World Bank and the TDRP. An international consultant helped develop a new database to include
data related to disabled ex-combatants. The project delivered all quarterly reports, beneficiary
surveys, and annual independent evaluations and put in place a rigorous process for data
collection and verification. Only one report (the second annual beneficiary survey) was rejected
by the TCT due to low quality. In addition, the project undertook an independent evaluation on
the provision of psychosocial support and an impact assessment of communication activities.
M&E Utilization. MIS data was consistently used to inform management, technical, and
budgetary decisions. For example, data on ex-combatants’ area of resettlement was used to divide
the 11 reintegration partners in eight operational zones to ensure stronger presence in high density
9
areas. Data on the disabled caseload revealed the slow progress in provision of medical support
and precipitated decisions to first strengthen the medical IP, and eventually to integrate the
medical staff directly into the TCT. The external evaluation on communication activities led to
changes in broadcasting time of radio programs, cancellation of some stations with limited
impact, increased coverage of stations with a larger impact, and the cancellation of journal
distribution because of lack of impact. The TCT prepared a hand-over strategy upon project
closure for the MIS database as part of the project’s hand-over strategy. The MIS database was
handed over to the President’s cabinet that became responsible for safekeeping of the sensitive
data. A liaison was appointed by the President’s cabinet as a member of the Inventory
Commission specifically handling the transfer of the MIS, and the Government MIS expert was
trained to manage the database.
2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance
Financial Management. The TCT maintained a sound financial management system throughout
implementation. The project staff received several trainings on World Bank fiduciary procedures
as well as project software. Unaudited Interim Financial Reports (IFRs) were submitted on time
and satisfactory. External auditors issued clean audit reports. Management letters from the
external auditors did not raise any major issues; there were no overdue audit reports and interim
financial reports from the project. The project had a financial management manual, updated as
relevant, which detailed key internal control procedures. One designated bank account was
opened in a commercial bank for the purposes of project implementation. There were no
ineligible expenditures. The project maintained proper books of accounts and prepared the
necessary records and books of accounts which adequately identified the goods and services
financed out of the Grant proceeds. The overall financial management system was rated as
satisfactory during the last supervision missions.
Procurement. Initial issues related to non-compliance with the procurement plan in the process
of contracting IPs, as well as delays in the renewal of IP contracts causing gaps in implementation
of activities, were eventually addressed. Under the AF, multiple contracts with multiple firms for
constructions sites countrywide were successfully managed by the procurement department,
supported by an engineer hired to review all contracts with constructing firms. The overall
procurement performance of the project was rated as satisfactory during the last supervision
missions.
Safeguards. At appraisal, the project was classified as category B and safeguards policy
Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01) was triggered. As per the Environmental and Social
Management Framework (ESMF), each ex-combatant’s micro project (average value of US$390
equivalent) was screened to identify and mitigate potential negative social and environmental
impacts. Under the AF, the project remained classified as category B, the ESMF was revised,
OP/BP 4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement was triggered, and a Resettlement Policy Framework
(RPF) was prepared. The TCT hired a Safeguards Specialist to ensure the fulfillment of
safeguards requirements under the AF. The project was advised to construct three new houses for
Batwa families living in the area of construction sites, similar to the houses for the project
beneficiaries and to include additional environmental works at four sites (retaining walls and
water canalization). Budget constraints to fulfill safeguards requirements were overcome through:
(i) support from a World Bank urban project (PTPGU) that completed the environmental works,
and (ii) a US$40,000 transfer from the GoB to the PIU to ensure the construction of the Batwa
houses. GoB and the Bank’s collaboration in meeting all safeguards requirements were
exceptional and provided for strict compliance with environmental and social safeguards policies
and procedures. Per the final mission in October 2014, all environmental works in all the sites
10
were confirmed to be completed. The project was granted a satisfactory rating for overall
safeguards during the last supervision missions.
2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase
The D&R process is completed and there is no planned follow up operation. The project was to
provide transitional economic and social reintegration of eligible ex-combatants. However,
notably, several measures were taken to facilitate the sustainability of project gains, including: (i)
development of an exit strategy with the GoB to ensure continuity of support to disabled ex-
combatants needing permanent care and continued monitoring of ex-combatant issues through the
“Office de Gestion des Anciens Combattants” under the Ministry of Defense, (ii) provision of
conflict mitigation training to help community leaders, authorities, and ex-combatants prevent
conflict escalation, and (iii) design of houses for disabled ex-combatants with local and
sustainable materials, and low maintenance features.
3. Assessment of Outcomes
3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation
The overall relevance of the project is rated substantial. First, the relevance of project objectives
is rated high because activities under the project are highly consistent with the Burundi CAS for
FY13-16, in particular with Pillar 2 on “increasing resilience by consolidating peace and social
stability” and especially with results area 4 on “increasing safety nets to reduce livelihood
volatility for the ex-combatants and their family”. Second, project design is rated substantial, as
lessons learnt from the previous project were successfully implemented, including through
simplifying and de-politicizing the project implementation framework. There were however some
shortcomings in the design of the Results Framework. Third, the relevance of project
implementation is rated high, because of regular implementation support missions, the
recruitment of a field based staff for daily project support, and key highly relevant decisions
(including preparation of AF to construct houses for disabled ex-combatants – a high risk given
the short timeframe for the completion of the activity in a fragile environment, but an activity
extremely well prepared, that responded to an urgent need, and was implemented successfully).
3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives
PDO 1: Demobilize members of the National Liberation Forces and the National Liberation
Forces – Dissidents
The achievement of this PDO is rated high. First, 100% of the 4,950 FNL (5,000 estimated) and
1,554 (1,500 to 1,564 estimated) FNL-D eligible were demobilized (PDO indicator 1.a and b).
The project was able to overcome delays in the start due to the late transmission of the list of
eligible FNL candidates and completed demobilization activities ahead of schedule. Second,
100% (6,504) of the demobilized received an ID card (Intermediate indicator 1.a).
PDO 2: Provide socioeconomic reintegration support to said members following
demobilization, as well as to Ex-Combatants demobilized under the Emergency
Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration Project with a particular focus on the
provision of such support to such female, child, and disabled Ex-Combatants. Reinsertion: Provision of reinsertion support is rated high. First, the target of 95% of eligible
adult ex-combatants receiving reinsertion benefits as per the conditions defined in the project
11
manual (Intermediate indicator 2.a), was exceeded with 98.75%1 achieved (annex 2). Second,
Reinsertion benefits were used for their intended purpose as 92.9% of beneficiaries (70% target
as per PDO indicator 2) indicated that they used the majority of their reinsertion benefits to
provide for basic needs for themselves and/or their dependents.
Transitional Social Reintegration: Provision of social reintegration support is rated substantial.
First, social reintegration support was diverse and comprehensive: sensitization and
reconciliation, conflict mitigation, and psycho-social trauma counselling (annex 2). Second,
under the AF, the target of 90% of identified beneficiaries receiving conflict mitigation training
(Intermediate indicator 3.g) was exceeded with 100% of the identified caseload receiving training
(total of 1,644). Third, as per the 2014 beneficiary survey, only 86.1% of beneficiaries felt better
accepted (56.4%) or felt the same level of social acceptance (29.7%) by their communities as
during the first three months after demobilization (PDO indicator 3.b). The 90% target for greater
acceptance was thus almost reached. The slight shortcoming could be only a transitional setback
explained by tensions arising in the pre-2015 election period, or increase in commodity prices and
related competition for scarce resources (as per the 2013 beneficiary 90.1% of ex-combatants felt
better or similarly accepted). This is confirmed by other indicators such as feeling of closeness to
neighbors, or participation in community activities (annex 5), confirming a high level of social
integration of ex-combatants in communities. Fourth, while quality and frequency of mental
health support was found to have limitations (annex 2), the provision of such support is a
remarkable effort at addressing a key aspect that few D&R projects undertake, and all identified
cases received some type of mental health support. As per the 2014 beneficiary survey, over 85.2%
of those who received psychosocial assistance claimed that it helped them through socioeconomic
reintegration.
Transitional Economic Reintegration: Provision of transitional economic reintegration is rated
substantial. First, the target of 95% of beneficiaries receiving reintegration support
(Intermediate indicator 3.a) was exceeded with 99.7% receiving reintegration support (total of
7,417, including 4,936 FNL, 1,549 FNL-D, and 932 EDRRP).2 Indicator 3.a however refers to
timely provision of benefits as per the PIM. While the PIM does not define timeliness, one
assumption is that beneficiaries ideally would receive reintegration support within 18 months
after demobilization (when their reinsertion benefits run out). The dataset of the 2011 beneficiary
survey indicates that 71.8% of beneficiaries received reintegration support within 18 months after
demobilization, and 88% within two years. Second, ex-combatants were encouraged to form or
join associations (Revised RF - Intermediate indicator 3c), and the project exceeded the target
number of associations to receive support (721 economic associations supported, target of 634)
consisting of both ex-combatants (9,407) and community members (23,179), and the 56 best
performing ones received additional in-kind support. Third, the initial economic reintegration
outcome indicator on ex-combatants’ perception of their situation in comparison to that of their
peers (PDO Indicator 3.a) went from 60.8 % in 2010, to 60.2% in 2011, to 46.9% in 2012 (target:
70%). This could have reflected general increasing pressure on households due to high inflation
rather than an actual increased difference between ex-combatants and community members. The
revised indicator, reflecting financial independence, was almost met with 64% of beneficiaries
1 Data provided here slightly differs from the ISR that present all reinsertion benefits provided. Data
provided here only includes reinsertion benefits provided as per the timeline specified in the PIM. See
CNDDR and Universalia, Première Evaluation Indépendante du PDRT, 2010, p.15 2 Note that this differs slightly from data in the final ISR, where the overall number for reintegration is
accurate, but contains typos in the disaggregated numbers entered in the comments. Data provided here
comes from Aide Memoires and the GoB final report.
12
reporting earning more than 50% of the household income (baseline: 70%). Most importantly,
numerous indicators in beneficiary surveys indicate successful economic reintegration of
beneficiaries with a continuous decrease of unemployment rates (from 9.3% in 2010 to 5.3% in
2014) which contrasts with the relative stability of the unemployment rate of the rest of the
population (consistently around 7.8%). In addition, there was an improvement of housing quality
with fewer beneficiaries living in huts (from 9.2% in 2011 to 6.8% in 2014) and more in houses
(from 84.6% in 2011 to 92.0% in 2014) (annex 5).
Support to female, child, and disabled ex-combatants. “Particular focus” on support for
female, children, and disabled ex-combatants was meant to ensure that (i) vulnerable groups have
equal access to project benefits as the rest of the caseload, and (ii) the project paper for the
original project states that the project provides “specialized support and/or additional protection
to vulnerable groups” (p.11).This was achieved through the design of a specific component
dedicated to vulnerable groups, representing 34% of the project total cost (US$10.2 million).
Support to female ex-combatants: Support to female ex-combatants is rated substantial. First,
female ex-combatants were not discriminated against in the provision of benefits which they
received in similar proportions as the rest of the caseload with 100% of eligible female ex-
combatants demobilized (245 total for new caseload), 99.6% receiving reinsertion benefits (254
total), and 99.6% (254 total) receiving transitional individual economic reintegration support,
including 87.6% within 18 months after demobilization (sooner after demobilization than the rest
of the caseload). Second, gender-sensitive support was comprehensive: (i) prioritization of
provision of demobilization support to women before the rest of the caseload; (ii) separate areas
at the demobilization camps; (iii) gender-sensitive demobilization kits; and (iv) training on
household budget management and sexual gender-based violence. Third, by the end of the
project, unemployment rate of female ex-combatants (10.0%) was close to that of women in
Burundi (8.2%) (annex 5).
Support to children ex-combatants: Support to children ex-combatants is rated substantial.
First, 100% of the 626 caseload (246 EDRRP and 380 EDTRP) was reunited with families or
provided with alternative care (Intermediate indicator 1.b). Second, children received support in
similar proportion as the rest of the caseload with 100% demobilized (380 out of the estimated
350 to 400) (PDO indicator 1.c), 95.5% (596 out of 626)3 receiving all three reinsertion payments
as defined in the project manual meeting the 95% target (Intermediate indicator 3.b), and 99.0%
(620) receiving economic reintegration support (Intermediate indicator 3.b), almost meeting the
100% target, including 85.4% within 18 months after demobilization (sooner than the rest of the
caseload) .4 Third, tailored support was provided by two expert IPs and follow up was conducted
in collaboration with UNICEF. Fourth, the project adapted support to the changing needs of
children, who were on average 17 at the time of demobilization, and who became adults over the
course of the project (annex 5). They were encouraged to join associations and were integrated in
the adult caseload for follow up by IPs. Fifth, former children ex-combatants (now young adults,
mostly male) have equal or better access to employment as their peers in the communities, with
only 9.9 % of former children ex-combatants unemployed, versus 12.3% of male youth in
Burundi (annex 5).
3 The ISRs report that 99% of children received reinsertion support, but this corresponds to the percentage
of children who received at least one of the three tranches of reinsertion payments. The indicator refers to
the Project manual, which stipulates that children should receive all three tranches. The total of 596 was
established based on lists provided in: CNDRR, Rapport D’achèvement Du Projet D’Urgence De
Démobilisation et de Réintégration Transitoire au Burundi, June 2014, pp. 42-44 4 As per the dataset of the 2011 Beneficiary survey
13
Support to disabled ex-combatants: Support to disabled ex-combatants is rated substantial,
because: First, disabled ex-combatants were not discriminated against in the provision of benefits
which they received in similar proportions as the rest of the caseload, with 100% of eligible
disabled ex-combatants demobilized, 99% receiving reinsertion benefits5, and 99.6% receiving
transitional individual economic reintegration support. Provision of reintegration support to
disabled ex-combatants was slower than for the rest of the caseload (due to identification
challenges, and prioritization of medical support), with 57.1% receiving their reintegration
benefits within 18 months, and 81.5% within two years after demobilization (dataset analysis of
2011 beneficiary survey). Second, 93.5% (3,307 out of 3,538) of disabled ex-combatants
(exceeding the original 80% and the 90% revised targets) received all treatments included in their
medical plan (PDO indicator 3.c). While there was no external assessment of the quality or
timeliness of medical support, no complaints were received through the elaborate communication
system with ex-combatants. According to the 2014 beneficiary survey, 67.3% of disabled ex-
combatants stated that they physically felt better after treatment and treatment helped them
achieve economic reintegration (annex 5). Third, 100% of eligible severely disabled ex-
combatants (150) received specialized houses (PDO indicator 3.d). Fourth, an intermediate
indicator on timeliness of medical support in the RF of the parent project (former Intermediate
indicator 3.c) was eventually dropped (timeliness was too complex to define and measure at an
individual level for such a large caseload). However, provision of medical support to disabled ex-
combatants initially progressed slowly due to limited in-country capacity, which led to project
extension. This activity would be rated high, but is downgraded to substantial to account for these
delays.
Aggregation of PDO ratings. Sub-ratings for PDO2 are aggregated based on ratings of its four
main components: Reinsertion is rated high, Social Reintegration is rated substantial, Economic
Reintegration is rated substantial, and Support to Vulnerable Groups is rated substantial. All
ratings are assigned a number on a rating scale from 1 to 4 (from 1 to Negligible to 4 for High),
with an average of 3.25, corresponding to a Substantial rating. Based on a high rating for PDO1
and a substantial rating for PDO2, the overall PDO rating is substantial.
3.3 Efficiency
Efficiency is rated substantial. First, the project was designed to minimize and control costs
through robust financial and procurement controls by the PIU through: (i) recruitment of highly
qualified procurement and financial management experts, (ii) verification of financial
management by an independent international financial advisor, (iii) recruitment of a medical
expert within the TCT and an international disability expert to verify and monitor costs of
medical services and equipment, and (iv) recruitment of a local and of an international engineer to
help manage contracts with construction firms, and monitor costs of houses. Second, a
comparative analysis of unit costs per beneficiary with other D&R projects implemented recently
in Central Africa indicates that with a cost of Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration of
US$2,132 per beneficiary, the EDRRP is within the range of efficiency of D&R projects, albeit
on the higher end of the spectrum (US$ 2,495 for Burundi EDDRP, US$1,817 for DRC EDRRP,
and US$1,786 for Rwanda EDRRP). Average cost per beneficiary for additional specialized
support to vulnerable ex-combatants (including medical and housing costs) is substantially higher
for Burundi EDTRP with US$2,331 per beneficiary, than in the Rwanda EDRRP with US$778.
Higher costs on vulnerable support in Burundi mainly relate to provision of medical support,
5 Disaggregated data on provision of reinsertion benefits to disabled was not available. However, per the
2011 beneficiary survey (p.162-165), 99% disabled ex-combatants interviewed stated they received all
reinsertion payments.
14
which required more resources due to significantly more limited in-country capacity. Average
cost of houses for disabled ex-combatants (US$358 per square meter) compares favorably to
similar houses built for disabled ex-combatants in Rwanda, under the Rwanda Project (US$370
per square meter) (Annex 3).
3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating
Rating: Satisfactory based on high project relevance, an average of substantial PDOs, and
substantial efficiency. The rating is consistent with the significant results achieved by the project,
in a challenging fragile context. The rating is also consistent with the unique achievements of the
project, providing tailored support to vulnerable groups (including female ex-combatants),
pioneering provision of mental health support in the field of D&R, and providing medical and
housing services for disabled ex-combatants, all rarely included in D&R projects.
3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts
(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development
Gender aspects. Beyond providing a gender-sensitive approach, the project aimed at promoting
gender equality between ex-combatants and their spouses and within communities. The MTR
stressed the need to increase project performance on gender aspects. With technical assistance
from the World Bank, a Gender Action Plan was established to mainstream gender activities,
(training on sexual and gender based violence, cultural activities, radio programming on gender
topics, listening clubs, training on women leadership and management of household budget). The
project collaborated with the Centre pour le Development Familial with a focus on including
gender sensitization as an integral part of each social reintegration activity. Only one activity
identified in the action plan, mainly psychosocial support to female ex-combatants, was not
completed due to the phasing out of mental health support. Spouse participation in micro-projects
significantly increased over time, with 76.7% of beneficiaries indicating that their spouse
participated in carrying out their micro-project in 2011 and 93.3% in 2014. Spouse attendance in
male ex-combatants’ training however remained low (12.8%), due to lack of child care
opportunities, and reluctance from male ex-combatants to include their wives.6
Poverty impacts. The purpose of the project was to provide transitional economic and social
support to facilitate ex-combatant reintegration in society at the level of their peers in their
communities of resettlement. Most indicators (annex 5) show that this was accomplished.
(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening
Institutional strengthening was not a component of the project as D&R activities are transitional
by nature. The institution in charge of implementing the project was not intended to outlast the
project. It is worth noting, however, that while the TCT will not be sustained after project closure,
a national agency was empowered to further coordinate the D&R process. The TCT staff
benefitted from continued technical assistance, and the institutional experience and capacity
gathered during this process allowed for significant institutional strengthening and capacity
building within GoB through the support of the BETF, as emphasized in the counterpart’s ICR.7
6 CNDDR and CARD Engineering, Troisième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, December 2011, p. 218
7 CNDRR, Rapport D’achèvement Du Projet D’Urgence De Démobilisation et de Réintégration
Transitoire au Burundi, June 2014
15
(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) There are no unintended outcomes or impacts that can be measured. An argument could be made
that the project was a pioneer in including mental health support to ex-combatants, demonstrating
the importance of addressing trauma. Since then, mental health support has been included in the
Rwanda Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project and in the Great Lakes
Sexual and Gender Based Violence and Women’s Health Project, to address the needs of SGBV
survivors. The project also shed light into the needs of disabled ex-combatants in Burundi, and
paved the way for the current collaboration between the Dutch embassy and the GoB to
strengthen the capacity of the Kamenge military hospital.
3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops
See annex 5.
4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Substantial. The risk to development outcome is rated substantial because: (i) the overall
political context in Burundi remains uncertain and the upcoming 2015 elections could lead to
civil unrest and political instability, and (ii) consolidation of transitional economic and social
gains will depend on economic and political stability.
5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance
5.1 Bank Performance
(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Satisfactory. Both the parent project and the AF were well designed, allowing for
successful implementation, despite initial shortcomings on the design of the results framework
and related to mitigation of in-country capacity. First, Project preparation and design were highly
relevant to the country context and the Bank’s assistance strategy. The project was able to
respond to a critically urgent need from the Government in a timely and efficient manner,
including fast project preparation. Second, project design was highly relevant to the PDO, and
lessons learnt from the previous project were successfully integrated in project design. Third,
main risks were appropriately identified and adequately mitigated (especially fiduciary aspects),
despite initial shortcomings in mitigation of limited in-country capacity for medical support.
Fourth, the financing arrangements, in particular the US$1.1 million BETF, allowed for
responsive assistance to the borrower’s needs through intense supervision and technical
assistance which could not have been possible under regular Bank budget. Fifth, while there were
issues with the Results Framework, these were rectified during the design of the AF. Sixth, the
high quality of the design of the AF (including establishment of clear criteria for land
identification, recruitment of international engineer and disability expert for design of house
plans, strengthening of TCT team with safeguards and engineering experts, reinforcement of
procurement capacity) allowed for the successful construction of houses for disabled ex-
combatants in a short timeframe (6 months), in a low capacity and fragile environment.
(b) Quality of Supervision (including of fiduciary and safeguards policies)
Rating: Satisfactory. First, the Bank closely monitored the achievement of the PDOs through: (i)
regular implementation support missions (total of 12 missions, average two per year), (ii) a field-
based Bank staff funded through the BETF who played a key role throughout implementation,
particularly in the successful implementation of the AF, and (iii) close monitoring of fiduciary
compliance, including independent financial reviews, and follow up on safeguards after project
closure. Second, the Bank consistently took corrective actions to address project and context-
16
specific challenges, and ensure achievement of PDOs (revision of implementation arrangements
to strengthen medical component, strengthening of mental health support, inclusion of conflict
mitigation training). Third, the Bank used opportunities to improve project design and
implementation (revision of results framework, inclusion of specialized housing for severely
disabled ex-combatants).
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Satisfactory. While it took some adjustments to mitigate all aspects of limited in-country
capacity and there were initial shortcomings with the results framework, the Bank designed a
highly relevant original project and AF that efficiently responded to urgent needs and achieved
results that in many instances are far beyond what most D&R projects are able to achieve, in a
country that remains fragile. In addition, risks taken with the AF, given the short timeframe for
the construction of houses, were rewarded with success, thanks to effective performance in design
and supervision.
5.2 Borrower Performance
(a) Government Performance Rating: Satisfactory. First the Government collaborated closely with the Bank during project
preparation and agreed on the need to depoliticize the structure of the implementing agency
(lessons learnt). Second, the Government demonstrated strong ownership through: (i) counterpart
funding of US$3.6 million for the AF, (ii) appointment of a D&R advisor to the President who
played a key role in ensuring that D&R related issues were addressed promptly and efficiently,
(iii) identification and provision of land plots, and land titling for construction of specialized
housing for the severely disabled in a record amount of time, and (iv) implementation of an exit
strategy with collaboration between Ministries of Defense, Health, and Solidarity to ensure
continuity of support to disabled ex-combatants needing permanent care and continued
monitoring of ex-combatant issues through the newly created “Office de Gestion des Anciens
Combattants” under the Ministry of Defense. Third, the Government ensured adequate
compliance with safeguards requirements, including funding of houses for Batwa families under
the AF.
(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Satisfactory. Despite initial challenges in coordinating IPs and adequately monitoring the
medical component, management by the project’s Implementing Agency (IA) was consistently
rated satisfactory (appointment of key technical staff, fiduciary compliance, satisfactory
implementation, and utilization of M&E arrangements). Project management was rated highly
satisfactory in the final Implementation Status and Results (ISR), in light of the strong
performance, efficient planning and management, and professionalism of the TCT in
implementing complex activities in a very short time under the AF.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Satisfactory. Despite initial coordination and management challenges experienced by the
IA, both the Government and the IA demonstrated strong project ownership of the project and
commitment to the achievement of the PDOs
6. Lessons Learned (both project-specific and of wide general application) (i) DDR projects providing medical and mental health support should be designed
based on a clear assessment of related in-country capacity. Mitigation measures were adopted
during implementation, but a clearer identification of the risks associated with limited in-country
capacity for provision of medical and mental health support would have allowed: (i) designing
17
adequate mitigation measures from the onset, including a capacity building plan, to use the
project as an opportunity to strengthen national medical and mental health services; and (ii)
ensuring that some limited in-country services (prosthetics) were not temporarily overwhelmed
by demand from project beneficiaries, at the detriment of the general population.
(ii) DDR projects should invest on mental health. While provision of mental health
support was a challenge, beneficiary surveys show that mental health support played a strong role
in ex-combatants’ economic reintegration. Moving forward, it would be important to: (i) analyze
more in depth the links between mental health support and ex-combatant economic and social
reintegration, (ii) invest in early provision of mental health support, starting at demobilization
camps and throughout reinsertion, to ensure that ex-combatants receiving reintegration support,
are ready to make the most efficient use of it, and (iii) from an operational perspective, as support
is intended to eventually come to an end, it would be important to clearly define the type of
mental health support to be provided and what the completion of mental health support would
entail.
(iii) Direct channels of communication with high political levels can facilitate
implementation of D&R projects. Besides its technical challenges, the Burundi D&R process
had strong political impacts, and was highly sensitive. The nomination of a D&R advisor in close
link with the project, at the Presidency, played a key role in (i) facilitating direct government
ownership of the process, and (ii) ensuring that urgent and sensitive issues could be resolved
promptly and efficiently. While this model might not be relevant or possible in all contexts, it
should be considered in other complex and sensitive settings.
(iv) A small implementation structure with activities outsourced to local organizations
can help mitigate limited institutional capacity and risks of political interference. The
implementation framework used in Burundi, while not transferrable to all settings, could be used
where there are high risks of political interference in the D&R process, to ensure that technical
activities are implemented by technical agencies, competitively recruited, and somewhat sheltered
from direct political interference.
(v) Post completion follow up missions can be a strong incentive to ensure and monitor
full completion of activities and compliance with safeguards. The Bank team conducted two
post completion missions to ensure compliance with all safeguards requirements, and follow up
on the project exit strategy and follow up action taken by the GoB. While this was not mandatory,
these missions signaled the Bank’s concern for completion of the project, and helped ensure
adequate handling of the most vulnerable groups of beneficiaries.
7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies The recipient and the implementing partner both indicated that they agreed with the document
and had no further comment.
(b) Cofinanciers The draft ICR was shared with representatives of donors to the MDTF (the European
Commission, Norway, Belgium, and the Netherlands). No comments were received from donors,
except from representatives of Norway who emphasized the importance of describing project’s
sustainability.
18
Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing
(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)
Component Appraisal
Estimate Original
Project (IDA
Grant H497-
BI+TF096439)
Appraisal
Estimate
Additional
Financing
(TF014654+GOB)
Total Appraisal
Estimate (Original
Project+AF)
Actual/Latest
Estimate
Percentage of
Appraisal
1 Demobilization 1.2 - 1.2 0.3 25
2 Reinsertion 5.1 - 5.1 3.7 73
3 Reintegration 8.4 1.5 9.9 11.1 112
4 Support to
vulnerable groups
2.6 5.1 7.7 10.2 132
5 Project
Management
4.5 0.8 5.3 4.9 92
Unallocated 0.7 0.5 1.2 - -
Undisbursed n/a n/a n/a 0.17 n/a
Total 22.5 7.9 30.4 30.2 99.3
NB: Appraisal estimate for the original project is based on component allocation after
cancellation of US$5 million
(b) Financing (US$ equivalent)
Project cost by source of financing (US$ million equivalent)
Appraisal (before
cancellation)
Appraisal (after
cancellation)
Actual/Latest
Estimate
Percentage of
appraisal
Parent Project IDA H497 15 10 10.2 102
MDTF096439 7.5 12.5 12.5 100
Additional
Financing
TF014654 n/a 4.3 4 93
GoB n/a 3.6 3.5 97
Total
n/a 30.4 30.2 99.3
Project cost by Disbursement Category (US$ million equivalent)
Appraisal
Estimate
Original project
(IDA Grant
H497-
BI+TF096439)
Appraisal
Estimate
Additional
Financing
(TF014654+GO
B)
Total Appraisal
Estimate
Actual/Latest
Estimate
Percentage of
Appraisal
1 Beneficiary services and
Grants
17.3 2.8 20.1 20.3 101
2 Consultancies, goods, works,
and services
2.9 3.9 6.8 6.1 90
3 Operating costs 1.7 0.8 2.5 3.8 152
Unallocated 0.6 0.4 1.0 n/a n/a
Undisbursed n/a n/a n/a 0.17 n/a
Total 22.5 7.9 30.4 30.2 99.3
19
NB: Appraisal estimate for the original project is based on component allocation after
cancellation of US$5 million
Main discrepancies between appraisal estimates and actual costs:
Demobilization costs were only 25% of appraisal estimates. This is due to: (i) the use of
existing facilities, availed by the GoB, and (ii) the acceleration of the demobilization
process, with a shorter than anticipated encampment time for beneficiaries.
Costs of support to vulnerable groups reached 132% of appraisal estimates. This is due
to: (i) a larger than anticipated caseload of disabled ex-combatants from the previous
project, (ii) higher than anticipated medical costs, and (iii) higher than anticipated costs
for construction of specialized housing, due to inflation and increased commodity prices.
Operating costs reached 152% of appraisal estimates, due to two one year project
extensions, and an additional six months through additional financing.
20
Annex 2. Outputs by Component This annex presents a detailed overview of project outputs per component and subcomponent.
This complements section 3 of the ICR.
Table 1: Summary of outputs
Demobilization Reinsertion Reintegration
8
Demand Actual Eligible Actual (all
three
payments
received)
Eligible Actual
EDRRP
(old)
Adults 0 0 1,630 1,557 952 932
Children 0 0 246 239 246 241
EDTRP
(new)
FNL 4,950 4,950 4,950 4,947 4,939 4,936
FNL-D 1,554 1,554 1,554 1,553 1,550 1,549
Total
adults
EDTRP
6,504 6,504 6,504 6,500 6,489 6,485
Children 380 380 380 359 380 379
Total
adults
6,504 6,504 8,134 8,057 7,441 7,417
Total
children
380 380 626 596 626 620
Component 1. Demobilization (US$0.3 million equivalent). 100% of the 4,950 FNL and 1,554
FNL-D adult eligible were demobilized (total of 6,504 – target 100%). The project was able to
overcome delays in the start due to the late transmission of the list of eligible FNL candidates and
completed demobilization activities by August 10, 2009 ahead of schedule and 100% of the
demobilized received an ID card and had their data entered into the MIS (target 100%). The
project prioritized the demobilization of female ex-combatants to ensure their security.
Component 2. Reinsertion (US$3.7 million equivalent). The target of 95% of eligible adult ex-
combatants receiving reinsertion benefits as per the project manual (within 3, 6, and 9 months of
demobilization)9 (Intermediate indicator 2.a), was met with 98.75% receiving their reinsertion
support as scheduled.10
The first independent evaluation indicated that provision of reinsertion
benefits to adults was done as per the timeframe indicated in the project manual and was
consistent in quality and quantity with the project manual. Only 101 ex-combatants did not get
their reinsertion payments as per the foreseen schedule, either because they could not be located
or because they had not opened a Bank account or there were processing errors related to their
account number. The project continued searching for the remaining beneficiaries, and in the end,
99.1% of the caseload (total of 8,057), including 95.5% of the EDRRP pending caseload (1,557
out of 1,630 eligible), 99.9% of the FNL caseload (4,947 out of 4,950) and 99.9% of the FNL-D
8 Note that disaggregated data differs slightly from data in the final ISR, where the overall number for
reintegration is accurate, but contains few typos in the disaggregated numbers entered in the comments. See
CNDRR, Rapport D’achèvement Du Projet D’Urgence De Démobilisation et de Réintégration Transitoire
au Burundi, June 2014, p.22 9 CNDDR, Manuel des Procédures de Mise en Œuvre du Projet, October 2009, p. 49
10 CNDDR and CURDES, Première Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2010, p. 15
21
caseload (1,553 out of 1,554) received their reinsertion benefits. In the 2011 beneficiary survey,
92.9% of beneficiaries (70% target) indicated that they used the majority of their reinsertion
benefits to provide for basic needs for themselves and/or their dependents.11
Table 2: Distribution of Reinsertion Benefits
Category Identified Achieved Total Percentage
Tranche 1 Tranche 2 Tranche 3
Old
Caseload
(EDRRP)
1,630 One Installment 1,557
95.5%
FNL 4,950 4,947 4,947 4,947 4,947 99.9%
FNL-D 1,554 1,553 1,553 1,553 1,553 99.9%
Total 8,134 6,500 6,500 6,500 8,057 99.1%
Male
(adults) 7,879
Male and female data not disaggregated by
tranche
7,803 99.9%
Female
(adults) 255 254
99.6%
Total 8,134 6,500 6,500 6,500 8,057 99.1%
Beneficiary surveys indicate that reinsertion benefits were increasingly used for long term
investment, with the first two tranches used for buying clothes and food, with a progressive shift
towards income generating activities by the second and third tranches.
Component 3. Transitional Socio-Economic Reintegration Support (US$11 million
equivalent). Socio-economic reintegration activities were outsourced to 11 IPs according to the
geographical distribution of the ex-combatants’ reintegration location. Each of the IPs consisted
of a communications expert, a psychosocial expert, and an economic reintegration expert. The 11
IPs were eventually coordinated by an umbrella NGO to harmonize efforts. Both social and
economic reintegration supports were intended as transitional with beneficiaries eventually
integrated in mainstream systems, and accessing the same economic and social support as all
other Burundi citizens.
11 CNDDR and CARD Engineering, CNDDR and SOGES, Cinquième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT,
2014, p.476, table 224, on the first use of the initial payment of reinsertion benefits. This data slightly
differs from data in the last ISR, that indicates 90.2%, based on preliminary results of the survey before
finalization.
22
Figure 1: Geographical Distribution of the 11 Implementation Zones
Transitional Social Reintegration. Per the 2014 beneficiary survey, only 86.1% of beneficiaries
felt better accepted (56.4%) or felt the same level of social acceptance (29.7%) by their
communities as during the first three months after demobilization (PDO indicator 3.b). The 90%
greater acceptance target was thus almost met. The slight shortcoming in reaching 90% could be
explained by tensions arising in the pre-2015 election period. Levels of reported acceptance were
for instance higher in the 2011 beneficiary survey with 90% reporting being treated by their peers
like any other community member. Transitional social reintegration support was diverse and
comprehensive and included sensitization and reconciliation activities, conflict mitigation
training, psycho-social trauma counseling support, as described below:
o Sensitization and reconciliation activities. IPs carried out information, sensitization, and
reconciliation activities for ex-combatants and host communities including on conflict
resolution, management of rumors, and women's leadership in peace building to promote
social cohesion. Technical Assistants (TAs) and IPs reported anecdotal evidence
indicating the positive impact of these sessions including the fact that they: (i) helped
dispel stigma, (ii) served as a warning system and reveal underlying tensions before
escalation; and (iii) functioned as a conflict management tool.12
These activities were
highly attended by both ex-combatants and community members. Sensitization and
communication with ex-combatants was facilitated through the formalization of the
structure of ex-combatant representatives ahead of the 2010 elections. All IPs recruited
12World Bank, Aide Memoire, EDTRP Technical Assistance Mission, December 2012
23
one TA for 100 ex-combatants (one third were women), and each TA was allocated two
Focal Points (FPs). Each FP was responsible for 50 ex-combatants. It was confirmed that
the TAs met daily with the FPs and that each ex-combatant was visited by a FP once
every two weeks (more if there was a pressing issue).13
o Conflict Mitigation. The project provided conflict management training initiated as a
direct response to an escalation of violence at the community level with reports of
intimidation against the beneficiaries and the risk of negative impacts on social
reintegration efforts. Initially, 118 participants were identified among IPs (including
experts and TAs) to undergo a six-month training of trainers. Participants reported they
felt equipped to successfully address conflicts, especially those between local
government and ex-combatants.14
Under the AF, the training was expanded to include
members of the municipal administration, ex-combatants, and community leaders. The
project carried out six training sessions in each zone (a total of 48) with 1,526 total
participants (579 ex-combatants and 947 community members). Training was provided to
100% of identified trainees (1,644 including from the original project and under the AF)
and exceeded the 90% target. IPs and representatives of the TCT interviewed for this ICR
considered this activity as one of the most successful of the project.15
Anecdotal evidence
reported by the IPs also indicate that the project played a strong role in advocating for
project beneficiaries when they were harassed or imprisoned, emphasizing the successful
de-politicization of the TCT.
o Psycho-social trauma counseling. The project provided psycho-social support through a
specialist IP until December 2013. The support included individual, family, and group
counseling, home visits, discussion groups, community sensitization as well as treatment,
monitoring, and referral of psychiatric cases. This activity was carried out by 23
psychosocial assistants in eight areas of project intervention. Expert psychosocial
supervisors (one per region) had oversight over the activities of psychosocial assistants
and nurse psychiatrists. Serious psychosocial cases requiring attention were treated and
followed by psychosocial assistants in the form of regular meetings and group treatment.
Psychiatric cases were referred to regional hospitals. Per the 2014 beneficiary survey,
over 85.2% of those disabled ex-combatants who received psychosocial assistance
claimed that it helped them through socioeconomic reintegration. The quality and
frequency of such support, however, was found to be limited.16
Nevertheless, the
provision of psychosocial support is a noticeable effort at addressing an aspect of
reintegration that few D&R projects undertake (only one other example in Rwanda) and
100% of identified cases received some type of mental health support.
Table 3: Caseload of Psychosocial Cases
Category Identified Discharged Stabilized Ongoing by
end of activity
Total who
received some
support
Percentage
who received
some mental
health support
13 World Bank, Aide Memoire, EDTRP Implementation Support Mission, May 2011
14 World Bank, Aide Memoire, EDTRP Technical Assistance Mission, December 2012
15 Interviews conducted with representatives of Implementing Partners between May 12-16, 2014
16 CNDDR and BESD, Evaluation du Processus de Réalisation des Activités d’Encadrement et
d’Assistance Psychosociale du PDRT, November 2013
24
Psychosocial
Cases 3,050 781 255 2,269 3,050 100%
Psychiatric
Cases 250 6 142 244 250 100%
Findings from an independent evaluation of the project’s psychosocial intervention
17
suggested that the quality of diagnostic was likely limited given the fast pace of the
diagnostic process, and emphasized the mixed responses from beneficiaries regarding
impact and quality of support received. This was due, among other factors, to the limited
number of qualified staff and limited presence of the IP in the field.
Figure 2: Frequency of mental health support sessions received (2013)
Source: CNDDR and BESD, Evaluation Du Processus De Réalisation Des Activités D’Encadrement Et
D’Assistance Psychosocial Du PDRT, November 2013.
The closing of the psycho-social component was prepared more than a year in advance,
with the task team urging the project to inform beneficiaries of the conclusion of
psychosocial support and orienting beneficiaries in need of continued support to the
Centre Familial de Dévelopment Communautaire (CFDC) in their respective areas.
When the original grant closed, the caseload of psychiatric and epileptic cases was
transferred to the medical team who provided them with treatment until the project
closed, while support was stopped for the remaining 2,269 ongoing caseload. As for
economic reintegration, social reintegration support including psycho-social support was
intended as a transitional support and was, therefore, not meant to be permanent. As for
17 CNDDR and BESD, Evaluation du Processus de Réalisation des Activités d’Encadrement et
d’Assistance Psychosociale du PDRT, November 2013
40.3%
27.6%
16.3%
8.7%
2.6% 1.5% 1.5% 1.0% 0.5% 0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
45.0%
At LeastOnce aMonth
OnceEveryTwo
Months
Once PerYear
At LeastOnce aWeek
Do NotKnow
Twice aYear
Everyday OnceEveryTwo
Weeks
EveryThree
Months
25
the rest of the Burundi population, EDTRP beneficiaries were meant to access services
available to all citizens in Burundi at project closure.
Transitional Economic Reintegration. The first economic reintegration outcome indicator
comparing ex-combatants perception of their situation to that of their peers (PDO Indicator 3.a)
was consistently under the 70% target (60.8% in 2010, 60.2% in 2011, and 46.9% in 2012). The
indicator, based on self-perception, could have reflected general increasing pressure on
households due to high inflation and increase of commodity prices rather than actual differences
between ex-combatants and community members. The revised indicator, reflecting financial
independence, indicates that 64% of beneficiaries reporting earning more than 50% of the
household income (baseline: 70%). Beneficiary surveys also indicate successful economic
reintegration with a continuous decrease of unemployment rates (from 9.3% in 2009 to 5.3% in
2014) and improvement of housing quality with fewer beneficiaries living in huts (from 9.2% in
2011 to 6.8% in 2014) and more in houses (from 84.6% in 2011 to 92% in 2014 as per
beneficiary surveys) (Annex 5). The positive evolution of ex-combatants’ situation contrasts with
the relative stability of the unemployment rate of the rest of the population, consistently around
7.8% during the course of the project. Transitional economic reintegration support included both
individual support and support through associations, as follows:
o Individual economic reintegration support. The project provided reintegration support to
99.7% of eligible ex-combatants (including 4,936 FNL, 1,549 FNL-D, and 932 EDRRP)
receiving the planned individual transitional reintegration support, exceeding the 95%
target. The Project manual18
does not stipulate a timeframe other than the closing date of
the project for provision of reintegration support. The 2014 beneficiary survey indicates
that reintegration benefits were provided in a relatively short amount of time in
comparison with the previous project, with 88% of beneficiaries receiving reintegration
within two years after demobilization including 51% within a year.19
The 2011
beneficiary survey showed that some ex-combatants accumulated sufficient capital to
increase the scope of their economic activities with 66.7% of respondents who used their
income for basic needs while 23.4% reinvested in their businesses.20
Transitional
economic reintegration options included scholarships, employment generation, vocational
and skills training, and microenterprise generation and promotion. The MTR noted that in
practice 99% of beneficiaries chose income generation support which had a clear
monetary direct impact.21
The task team urged the TCT to ensure that IPs provide
adequate information on options available. The 2013 beneficiary survey found that over
90% of the demobilized who were surveyed reported receiving sufficient information on
their reintegration options.22
While individual economic reintegration support, therefore,
was not as diverse and comprehensive as originally envisioned, the goal of offering
various options and ensuring that ex-combatants were able to make an informed and free
decision was reached.
o Support to economic associations. In order to improve the success rate of economic
reintegration, ex-combatants were encouraged to form or join associations. A total of 721
18 CNDDR, Manuel des Opérations de la Réintégration des Ex-Combattants, Avril 2010
19 CNDDR and SOGES, Cinquième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2014, p. 518
20 CNDDR and CARD Engineering, Troisième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2011, p.234
21 The 2011 and 2013 annual beneficiary surveys showed that ex-combatants chose their reintegration
options based, among other factors, on the possibility of making money in the short term. 22
CNDDR and Card Engineering, Quatrième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2013, p. 190
26
associations received training and technical assistance (exceeding the 634 target)
reaching both ex-combatants (9,407) and community members (23,179). Under the AF,
the 56 best performing associations received additional in-kind support.
Component 4. Support to Vulnerable Groups (US$ 10.2 million equivalent). Female Ex-
combatants. All 245 female ex-combatants, 100% of those eligible, were demobilized by the
project. As in most D&R projects,23
women represent a very small proportion of the caseload as
few are willing to self-identify as ex-combatants due to fear of stigmatization. The project
circumvented this issue by providing support to spouses of ex-combatants (see section 3.5 on
gender aspects). The TCT provided gender-sensitive demobilization support to female ex-
combatants including: (i) providing demobilization to women ex-combatants earlier than the rest
of the caseload; (ii) ensuring separate and secure areas at the demobilization camps for female ex-
combatants and their children; and (iii) providing gender-sensitive demobilization kits as well as
including additional sugar and flour and baby clothes for lactating mothers.24
As per the 2013
beneficiary survey, 94.2 % of female ex-combatants indicated that they felt that they had been
treated equally or better than men during the demobilization process. In addition, 99.6% of
women (254) received their reinsertion benefits, and 99.6% (254) received their reintegration
support, including 87.6% within 18 months after demobilization.25
Table 4. Distribution of Reinsertion and Reintegration Benefits for female ex-combatants
Identified EDRRP
(old
caseload)
FNL FNL-D Total
Supported
Percentage
Demobilization 245 N/A 206 39 245 100.0
Reinsertion 255 9 206 39 254 99.6
Reintegration 255 9 206 39 254 99.6
As part of gender mainstreaming, IPs provided specific training geared towards female ex-
combatants including on sexual and gender based violence (SGBV), organized cultural activities,
conducted radio programming on gender topics, formed listening club and provided a series of
training on women leadership and on management of household budget. Further, the project
collaborated with the Centre pour le Development Familial with a focus on including gender
sensitization as an integral part of each social reintegration activity. Only one activity identified
in the action plan, mainly psychosocial to all female ex-combatants, was not completed due to the
phasing out of mental health support. In the 2014 beneficiary survey, 79.3 % of female ex-
combatants indicated that IPs had not provided child care, which made their attendance to
training challenging (however, 87.1% of female respondents indicated they had attended training
nonetheless).26
While social stigma is usually a key challenge for female ex-combatants,27
their
situation improved during the project as 75% considered they were discriminated against when
looking for employment in the 2011 beneficiary survey, while this dropped to 67.1% in the 2014
23 Hanson, Stephanie, 2007. “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) in Africa”,
Backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations, February 24
World Bank, Aide Memoire, EDTRP Implementation Support Mission, October-November 2009 25
As per the dataset of the 2011 Beneficiary survey 26
CNDDR and SOGES, Cinquième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, p. 351 27
Hanson, Stephanie, 2007. “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) in Africa”,
Backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations, February
27
beneficiary survey. Women are also members of associations in larger proportion than men (34%
versus 21%).28
Children Associated with Armed Forces/Groups. The project aimed for all children associated
with FNL and FNL-D (including a caseload from EDRRP) to be separated from those groups,
reunited with their families or placed in alternative care, and receive full reinsertion and
reintegration support as appropriate to their status as minors. All of the identified 626 children ex-
combatants identified (100% of eligible) including 246 from the EDRRP and 380 from the
EDTRP received support from the project and were reunited with families. In contrast to what
was initially foreseen, reinsertion support to children was provided in tranches (6, 12, and 18
months after demobilization). 97.9% of eligible children (613 children) received at least one
payment, and 95.5% (596) received all three payments, meeting the 95% target. The two IPs
providing support to children operated in coordination and maintained regular contact, allowing
for a coherent approach between the two organizations in their respective northern and southern
zones. The IPs provided sensitization activities to mitigate conflicts in school and within families.
Both agencies utilized a large network of field-based FPs to ensure adequate coverage and local
follow-up of children ex-combatants.29
The large number of children who chose income
generating activities over schooling can be explained by the average age of the caseload, 17 years
of age, and their reluctance to delay income generation further. A total of 92 children initially
opted for formal education, but 3530
dropped out due to lack of motivation and stigmatization, and
received IGA support instead.31
In the end, 99% (620 out of 626) children received their
reintegration benefits, almost meeting the 100% target, including 85.4% within 18 months after
demobilization.32
The project adapted support to the changing needs of children, who were on
average 17 at the time of demobilization and who became adults over the course of the project.
They were encouraged to join associations, and were integrated in the adult caseload, for follow
up by IPs, along with other adult ex-combatants.
Disabled Ex-combatants. Disabled ex-combatants were not discriminated against in the provision
of benefits which they received in similar proportions as the rest of the caseload, with 100% of
eligible disabled ex-combatants demobilized, 99% receiving reinsertion benefits33
, and 99.6%
receiving transitional individual economic reintegration support, including 57.1 % within 18
months and 81.5% within two years after demobilization.34
Despite initial delays in the provision
of medical support, 93.5% (3,307 out of 3,538) of disabled ex-combatants (exceeding the 90%
target) received all treatments included in their medical plan, and all 100% of eligible severely
disabled ex-combatants (150) received specialized housing. According to the 2014 beneficiary
survey, 67.3% of disabled ex-combatants stated that they physically felt better after treatment.35
No complaints or issues were reported by beneficiaries on the quality of support received.
28 CNDDR and SOGES, Cinquième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2014, p.34
29World Bank, Aide Memoire, EDTRP Implementation Support Mission, March-April 2010
30 This number varies from 27 to 35 depending on sources
31 World Bank, Aide Memoire, EDTRP Technical Assistance Mission, May 2011
32 As per the dataset of the 2011 Beneficiary survey
33 Disaggregated data on provision of reinsertion benefits to disabled was not available. However, per the
2011 beneficiary survey (p.162-165), 99% disabled ex-combatants interviewed stated they received all
reinsertion payments 34
As per the dataset of the 2011 Beneficiary survey 35
CNDDR and SOGES, Cinquième enquête des bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2014, p. 207
28
o The medical component was the most challenging project component due to: (i) an
underestimation of the remaining caseload from the EDRRP (actual remaining caseload
of eventually 2,982 versus the 1,500 estimated), (ii) limited in-country capacity for the
provision of prosthetics and medical services,36
and (iii) limited capacity of the TCT on
medical support to manage the medical IP. Numerous efforts were undertaken to address
these challenges including hiring of additional TCT staff, provision of technical
assistance from international disability experts as well as additional staff, resources and
equipment to the IP. Eventually, in light of the low performance of the IP, it was decided
not to renew their contract and to integrate the best elements of the medical team in the
TCT. In the end, 93.5% of disabled ex-combatants received all treatments included in
their medical plan.37
Ex-combatants in the 2013 survey cited the following reasons for
not completing their treatment plan: lack of information (46.5%), being accustomed to
his/her disability (9.3%), lack of transportation (18.6%), private treatment (7.0%), and
still waiting for treatment (11.6%).38
Table 5: Treatment/Services Provided and Status
Type of Treatment39
Needs Identified Received Relevant
Treatment Percentage Achieved
General Medicine 1,295 1,249 96.45
Ophthalmology 404 364 90.10
Stomatology 141 131 92.91
Neurology 380 354 93.16
ENT 119 112 94.12
Dermatology 9 8 88.89
Gastro-enterology 33 28 84.85
Urology 52 39 75.00
Pneumology 39 35 89.74
Cardiology 7 7 100.00
Nephrology 7 7 100.00
Physiotherapy 911 895 98.24
Orthotic 474 455 95.99
Surgery 2,075 2,043 98.46
Prostheses MI 244 240 98.36
Prostheses MS 38 38 100.00
TOTAL 6,465 6,242 96.55
36 Handicap International, Etude sur la situation des personnes handicapées au Burundi, 2012 ; Handicap
International, Leçons apprises du Projet Turi Kumwe Réinsertion socio-économique des anciens
combattants handicapés au Burundi 2010-2013, August 2013 37
CNDDR, Rapport d’Achèvement du Projet d’Urgence de Démobilisation et de Réintégration Transitoire
au Burundi 2009-2014, June 2014 38
CNDDR and CARD Engineering, Troisième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2011, p. 155 39
A patient can be treated in two or more services.
29
Progress to support disabled ex-combatants improved significantly in 2013 after the best
elements of the medical team were absorbed into the TCT.
Figure 3. Evolution of provision of medical treatment (before and after change in
implementing structure)
A key challenge for the disability support in the long term was the caseload of 555 ex-
combatants requiring permanent medical care including: 7 tetraplegics, 23 hemiplegics,
44 paraplegics, 118 epileptics, 90 with osteitis and chronic wounds, 66 with chronic pain
and neurological disorders, and 237 patients with psychiatric disorders.40
To ensure
continuity of support to disabled ex-combatants needing permanent care and continued
monitoring of ex-combatant issues, the GoB established the “Office de Gestion des
Anciens Combattants” under the Ministry of Defense.
o Houses for disabled ex-combatants. Under additional financing, 150 severely disabled ex-
combatants were provided with specialized housing. Construction of the houses in 12
locations started in January 2014. By the closing date of the project, 115 of the 150
houses were completed. The two sites that were delayed included Karurama in Rugombo
Commune and Bugarama in Mpanda Commune. Additional earthworks were identified
by the engineer during a March 2014 mission that caused the delay in those sites. A
mission by the project engineer in July 2014 confirmed that all 150 houses and relevant
site work, including retaining walls, were completed.
40World Bank, Aide Memoire, EDTRP Technical Assistance Mission, December 2013
3,002 3,280
3,409 3,245 3,304 3,309 3,332
3,538 3,538
1,870
2,302
2,617 2,857
3,129 3,265 3,296
3,504 3,504
1,539
1,931
2,664
2,966
3,307 3,307
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
Identified
Consulted a Doctor Once
Received Treatment
30
o Training to Support Health and Autonomy. Per the AF project paper, autonomy support
was to include: (i) general health promotion and training of beneficiaries and caretakers
on prevention of complications, (ii) provision of medical kits, (iii) sensitization of
medical staff in nearby health facilities, (iv) autonomy training for paraplegic
beneficiaries, double amputees and the blind carried out in two phases, before and after
moving in the new house, and (v) training of local artisans (bike shops) in the repair of
wheelchairs and other mobility devices. Most activities planned were undertaken: the
TCT prepared and implemented an autonomy plan, provided training to beneficiaries and
caretakers, trained nurses in 13 local health clinics, and distributed medical kits and food
supplies to beneficiaries. However, due to time constraints and delays in the construction
of houses, foreseen in-house training of beneficiaries and training of local artisans in
wheel chair repairs could not be implemented by the end of the project,
31
Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis (including assumptions in the
analysis) Most recently completed D&R projects in Africa that would be comparable to the Burundi D&R
project include: the Democratic Republic of Congo Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration
Project (P078658) (2002-2011), the Rwanda Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion and
Reintegration Project (P075129) (2002-2008), and the Burundi Emergency Demobilization,
Reinsertion, and Reintegration Project (P081964) (2004-2008).
D&R projects present significant particularities that affect the cost per beneficiary. Potential
limitations to the comparison of cost per unit include: (i) operating costs vary significantly from
one operating environment to the other. For instance, quality of roads, distances, and accessibility
are very different in DRC and Rwanda; (ii) in all above mentioned projects, not all beneficiaries
receive all types of benefits. For instance, in several cases pending caseloads from previous
projects receive only pending benefits, which could artificially lower the cost per unit; and (iii)
the range of benefits provided varies from one project to the other. For instance the EDTRP
provides advanced medical and housing support to disabled ex-combatants, which was not the
case in the EDRRP or in the DRC projects.
To facilitate comparisons, costs per units are thus calculated: (i) without including operating
costs, (ii) by first establishing the cost per beneficiary per type of benefit (demobilization,
reinsertion, etc), and presenting the average cost per unit for one beneficiary receiving all types of
benefits, and (iii) presenting cost per unit for comparable benefits only. The DRC EDRP and the
Burundi EDRRP both include a component on vulnerable groups. However, this component only
includes basic support to vulnerable groups, corresponding to support mostly covered under D, R
and R components in the Burundi EDTRP and the Rwanda EDRRP projects. Under these last two
projects, the vulnerable groups’ component covers additional advanced support, including
medical support, and specialized housing for disabled ex-combatants. For that reason, for
comparison purposes, it is assumed that support provided under D, R, and R components under
the Burundi EDTRP and the Rwanda EDRRP project covers similar activities as under all four
components (including vulnerable groups), under the DRC, and Burundi EDRRP. As only
Rwanda and the Burundi EDTRP provided advanced medical and housing support to disabled,
efficiency for these particular services are assessed separately (see below).
One significant limitation cannot, however, be addressed: only quantity of services provided is
assessed, and quality, while discussed below based on anecdotal evidence, cannot be measured or
compared.
Table 6. Summary of unit cost per beneficiary for D, R, & R benefits, in US$ (excluding
operating costs) Burundi EDTRP Burundi
EDRRP41
DRC42
Rwanda43
Unit cost 2,132 2,495 1,817 1,786
41 World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report of the Burundi Emergency Demobilization,
Reinsertion, and Reintegration Project, 2009, p. 25-26 42
World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report of the Democratic Republic of Congo
Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project, 2012, p. 28 43
World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report of the Rwanda Emergency Demobilization
and Reintegration Project, 2009, p.32-45
32
Based on the cost per unit, the EDRRP appears in the general range of unit cost for D&R projects,
with an improvement since the previous project. Lower cost per beneficiary in DRC in
comparison to Rwanda and the two Burundi projects, can partially be explained by the large
caseload and related economies of scale.
Table 7. Detailed Burundi EDRRP and DRC EDRP unit cost per beneficiary, in US$
(excluding operating costs)
Burundi EDRRP44
DRC EDRP (as per
ICR)45
Total cost (US$) Number of
beneficiaries
Cost per
beneficiary per
component (US$)
Cost per beneficiary
per component
(US$)
Demobilization 2,300,000 26,283 88 627
Reinsertion 16,800,000 23,022 730 430
Reintegration 16,000,000 21,996 727 534
Vulnerable
Groups
5,400,000 5,684 950 226
Total 2,495 1,817
Table 8. Detailed Burundi EDTRP and Rwanda EDRP unit cost per beneficiary for
Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration, in US$ (excluding operating costs) Burundi EDTRP Rwanda EDRRP
46
Total cost
(US$)
Number of
beneficiaries
Cost per
beneficiary
per
component
(US$)
Total cost
(US$)
Number of
beneficiaries
Cost per
beneficiary
per
component
(US$)
Demobilizati
on
259,700 727 357 5,300,000 45,353 117
Reinsertion 3,712,193 8,057 461 17,200,000 29,092 591
Reintegratio
n
9,744,605 7,417 1,314 24,434,725 22,675 1,078
Total - - 2,132 - - 1,786
Table 9. Detailed unit cost per beneficiary for additional support to vulnerable groups
(mainly through specialized medical support and housing to disabled ex-combatants)
(excluding operating costs) Burundi EDTRP Rwanda
Total cost (US$ million) 10.2 8.5
Total caseload 4,375 10,968
Cost per disabled (US$) 2,331 778
44 World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report of the Burundi Emergency Demobilization,
Reinsertion, and Reintegration Project, 2009, p. 25-26 45
World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report of the Democratic Republic of Congo
Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project, 2012, p. 28 46
World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report of the Rwanda Emergency Demobilization
and Reintegration Project, 2009, p.32-45
33
Unit cost for additional support to vulnerable groups (main costs related to specialized medical
support and housing) is significantly higher in the EDTRP than in the Rwanda project. This
indicates a lower efficiency in Burundi. Higher costs on vulnerable support in Burundi mainly
relate to provision of medical support, which required more resources due to significantly more
limited in-country capacity. In addition, a higher proportion of the most expensive benefits
(surgery and provision of houses) was provided in Burundi:
Table 10. Comparison of percentage of beneficiaries receiving houses and surgeries in
Burundi and Rwanda
Burundi Rwanda
Number Percentage Number Percentage
Total disabled
caseload 3,538 8,400
House 150 4.3 176 2.1
Surgery 2,043 57.7 704 8.4
Data on cost of specialized houses shows that EDTRP’s efficiency of housing benefits is
comparable to the Rwanda project. While quality of houses cannot be measured, houses in
Burundi were designed by the same international engineer as the one who designed houses in
Rwanda, following the same principles and criteria. Houses in both countries are thus of
reasonably comparable quality.
Table 11. Comparison of cost per m2
for comparable specialized disabled housing in
Burundi and Rwanda (US$ equivalent)
Burundi Rwanda
Average Unit cost (US$ equivalent) 25,513 25,887
Surface (m2) 71.2 70
Cost per m2 358 370
Based on the above information, the EDRRP is assessed to be within the range of efficiency of
D&R projects, while admittedly being overall on the higher end of the spectrum.
34
Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes
(a) Task Team members
Name Title Unit
Bank Staff
Andrew Osei Asibey Sr. Monitoring & Evaluation Specialist GPSOS
Aurore Simbananiye Program Assistant AFMBI
Bella Lelouma Diallo Sr. Financial Management Specialist GGODR
Benjamin Burckhart Social Development Specialist GSURR
Chantal Rigaud Communications Associate DFGPE
Charlotte McClain-
Nhlapo
Senior Operations Officer GSPDR
Cheick Sagna Senior Social Development Specialist GSURR
Daksha Shakya E T Consultant GSURR
Emmanuel
Sinzohagera
E T Consultant GSURR
Emilie Reese-Smith ET Consultant GSURR
Fanny Robert E T Consultant GSURR
Helene Bertaud Sr. Counsel LEGAM
Leanne Michelle Bayer Senior Social Development Specialist GSURR
Marcelo Jorge Fabre Senior Social Development Specialist GSURR
Marco Nicoli Sr. Knowledge Management Officer LEGKL
Melance Ndikumasabo Procurement Specialist GGODR
Natacha Lemasle Social Development Specialist GSURR
Pacifique Ndoricimpa Team Assistant AFMBI
Pamela Ording
Beecroft
Operations Analyst GSURR
Philip Beauregard Sr. Counsel LEGAM
Pia Peeters Senior Social Development Specialist GSURR
Stavros George
Stavrou
Senior Social Development Specialist GSURR
Sylvain Auguste
Rambeloson
Senior Procurement Specialist GGODR
Non-Bank Staff
Abdel Bensavvy Consultant - safeguards n/a
Davide Naggi Consultant – disability expert n/a
Edeltraut Gilgan-Hunt Consultant - environmental safeguards n/a
Fernando Martins
Goncalves
Consultant - financial management n/a
Olivier Jadin Consultant – disability expert n/a
Richard Coppinger Consultant - engineer n/a
35
(b) Staff Time and Cost
Stage of Project Cycle
Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)
No. of staff weeks USD (including travel and
consultant costs)
Lending
2009 (Original project) 14.36 78, 078.28
2013 (additional financing) 0 26
Lending sub-total: 14.36 78,084.28
Supervision/ICR
2010 32.25 138,694.10
2011 19.21 129,081.80
2012 16.71 114,713.95
2013 29.96 191,127.06
2014 17.88 78,815.56
2015 19.87 66,534.38
Supervision sub-total: 135.88 718,966,85
Total 150.24 797,051.13
36
Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results Introduction
From 2009 to 2014 the EDTRP was implemented to facilitate the social and economic
reintegration of ex-combatants in communities, with the goal of ensuring that their social and
economic integration matched that of their peers in communities. To monitor reintegration of
beneficiaries, the project undertook yearly beneficiary surveys. The first beneficiary survey
(2010) focused on demobilization (the only activity implemented under the project at the time)
and the second beneficiary survey was rejected due to low quality. The findings presented here
cover mostly the last three beneficiary surveys with a focus on the evolution of the social and
economic situation of beneficiaries: the third (2011), the fourth (2013), and the fifth (2014). The
surveys were designed to include a wide variety of social and economic indicators, and used
similar questionnaires and sampling methods over the years, allowing for comparison of findings
over time.
However, one important element for the evaluation was not included in the surveys: while the
project aims at ensuring that beneficiaries reach similar levels of economic and social prosperity
as their peers in communities, the questionnaire was not systematically administered to
community members. Community members were included in the survey, but administered a
different and much shorter questionnaire related to their perception of ex-combatants.
Administering the same questionnaire to both community members and beneficiaries, as was
done for instance in the Rwanda Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project, would
have allowed for a more informative monitoring and assessment of beneficiaries social and
economic integration in comparison to the rest of the population.
In addition, the beneficiary surveys lacked a systematic review of the relevant literature to
contextualize statistical results, as well as a qualitative approach, for instance through focus
groups, to establish causality between statistical findings and project activities.
Reintegration
Beneficiaries’ social participation. As is often the case in D&R programs, ex-combatants
resettling in communities first tend to isolate themselves before they progressively become more
engaged with the community. It is not possible to establish direct causality between project
activities and increased social participation of ex-combatants. Beneficiary surveys, however,
indicate that ex-combatants became increasingly more involved in the community over the course
of the project. For instance, in 2011, 42.5% of beneficiaries reported that they belonged to a
management committee for a local group or organization, which increased to 51.3% in 2013, and
54.9% in 2014. Anecdotal evidence suggests that project activities targeting both ex-combatants
and community members, such as sensitization and reconciliation activities, conflict mitigation
training, and psychosocial support, contributed to this positive evolution.
Ex-combatants’ perception of social reintegration. Ex-combatant’s perception of progress in
social acceptance by their peers in communities was high in 2014, with 86.1% of beneficiaries
feeling better accepted (56.4%) or feeling the same level of social acceptance (29.7%) by their
communities as during the first three months after demobilization. Compared to 2011, where
86.6% of beneficiaries reported feeling better accepted (64.2%) or feeling the same level of social
acceptance (22.4%) by their communities as during the first three months after demobilization, a
slightly higher proportion of beneficiaries (90.1%) reported feeling better accepted (68.0%) or
feeling the same level of social acceptance (22.1%) by their communities as during the first three
37
months after demobilization in 2013. Therefore, while the situation progressed between 2011
(86.6%) and 2013 (90.1%), the 2014 (86.1%) data suggests a slight decrease in perception of
social acceptance. This could suggest that progress in social acceptance reached a peak at the end
of the project. However, a similar drop is observed on a similar but slightly different indicator on
social integration: while in 2011 83.8% of ex-combatants indicated that they felt like they were
treated as anyone else in their communities, this proportion reached 90% in 2013, to slightly drop
to 86.6% in 2014. It is unclear what explains the slight reversal on this community acceptance
indicator. One explanation is that this relates to tensions arising in 2014 in the context of the pre-
2015 election period. This could also be related to increased pressure on households due to
inflation and increased commodity prices, increasing competition for resources. At the immediate
neighborhood level, however, beneficiaries have reported a consistently increased feeling of
closeness to their neighbors in their communities, with 83.9% reporting they felt very close to
their neighbors in 2011, 84.9% in 2013, and 89.3% in 2014.
Community perceptions of ex-combatants’ social reintegration. The steady improvement of social
reintegration of ex-combatants is confirmed by community members. In 2011, 90.8% of
community members surveyed indicated that they thought that in their town, over the previous
two years, the trust level towards ex-combatants had improved or remained the same.47
This
proportion increased to 93.3%48
in 2013, and 94%49
in 2014. Regrettably, community members
were asked about their assessment of the general perception of ex-combatants rather than their
personal opinion of ex-combatants. However, while the question might have facilitated a biased
response, it is expected that the level of bias would be similar each year, and the consistent
increase is likely to reflect an improvement of the situation over time.
Economic Reintegration
Individual economic reintegration support. As described in annex 2, economic reintegration
support included both individual support and support through associations. As part of individual
support, ex-combatants overwhelmingly chose to receive a grant to implement an income
generating activity through a micro-project. This reintegration support was meant to be
transitional and help beneficiaries cope while they find or create more sustainable sources of
income. However, it is noticeable that by the end of the project, 40.8% of beneficiaries indicated
that they were still implementing their micro-project. As expected, this proportion decreased over
the course of the project with 58.1% in 2011, and 42.8% in 2013, as beneficiaries transitioned to
other activities. Interestingly, a large proportion of beneficiaries who sold their initial micro-
project, used benefits to create a new micro-project, although this proportion decreased over time
with 45.8% in 2011, 50.1% in 2013, and 24.7% in 2014. It is unclear whether this decreasing
tendency to reinvest in new micro-projects is an indication of failure or a sign that beneficiaries
found other, potentially more durable, sources of income. The project also strongly encouraged
beneficiaries to include their spouse in the implementation of their income generating activity, to
encourage gender equality in the household, and ensure more efficient management of resources.
As a result, spouse participation in micro-projects significantly increased over time, with 76.7%
47 CNDDR and CARD Engineering, Troisième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2011, p. 295
48 CNDDR and CARD Engineering, Quatrième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2013, p. 402
49 CNDDR and SOGES, CNDDR and SOGES, Cinquième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2014, p.
669
38
of beneficiaries indicating that their spouse participated in carrying out their micro-project in
2011 and 93.3% in 2014.
Support to associations. In addition to individual economic reintegration support, the project
encouraged ex-combatants to join associations and to work in collaboration with community
members. As a result, an increasing number of ex-combatants joined associations: from 19.6% in
2011, to 31.4% in 2013. However, a noticeable drop occurred in 2014, with only 21.7% reporting
being part of an association. This could be explained by the slowdown of support to associations
at the end of the project (except for the 56 most performing ones). This could also reflect a
general trend in the country; however, lack of comparable data among community members does
not allow drawing firm conclusions. The surveys show a steady tendency for ex-combatants to
join or open their associations to community members, with 78% of beneficiaries indicating their
associations included community members in 2011, versus 92.3% in 2013, and 93.6% in 2014.
This tendency confirms the successful implementation of project activities and campaign to
encourage mixed associations, but also emphasizes the general successful social reintegration and
peaceful cohabitation of ex-combatants with community members.
Overall economic situation of ex-combatants.
(i) Food and shelter. While it is not possible to establish with certainty direct causality between
project activities and ex-combatants’ economic situation, it is noticeable that the economic
situation of ex-combatants improved steadily over the course of the project, in particular
regarding access to shelter, food and employment. For instance, the proportion of ex-combatants
living in huts decreased over time (from 9.2%50
in 2011 to 6.8%51
in 2014), while an increasing
proportion moved to houses (from 84.6%52
in 2011, to 92%53
in 2014). Similarly, ex-combatants
became increasingly owners of their dwelling (from 51.8%54
in 2011 to 65.3%55
in 2014). Access
to food, however, remains a challenge for ex-combatants, as for the rest of the population, and has
worsened over the course of the project, 42.3% of beneficiaries reported having enough food to
keep a healthy diet “almost always” or “generally” in 2011, versus 38.7% in 2013, and 21.7% in
2014. This reflects a general issue for the Burundi population. According to the latest UN
estimates, over 7.1 million Burundian people live in food conditions defined as “crisis and
emergency”56
, representing approximately 70% of the total population,57
in a context where
growth of agricultural productivity is stagnating.58
Access to shelter for female and former children ex-combatants is also often more challenging
than for male ex-combatants. Per the 2014 survey, 88.3% of female ex-combatants, and 89.7% of
former children ex-combatants, live in houses versus 91.5% of male ex-combatants. Female ex-
combatants, however, perform well in terms of access to food in comparison to other groups, with
22.8% of female ex-combatants and 11.1% of former children ex-combatants reporting as having
50 CNDDR and CARD Engineering, Troisième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2011, p. 44
51 CNDDR and SOGES, Cinquième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2014, p. 276
52 CNDDR and CARD Engineering. Troisième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2011, p. 44
53 CNDDR and SOGES, Cinquième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2014, p. 276
54 CNDDR and CARD Engineering, Troisième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2011, p. 45
55 CNDDR and SOGES. Cinquième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2014, p. 277
56 United Nations World Food Program, Overview of Food Security in Burundi
57 World Development Indicators, World Bank Databank: Burundi total population in 2013, 10.2 million
58 Burundi – Food Crisis Response Development Policy Grant Project, World Bank, 05/15/2012
39
enough food to keep a healthy diet “almost always”, or “generally” in 2014, versus 21.9% of
male ex-combatants.59
(ii) Employment. Indicators related to employment of ex-combatants showed that ex-combatants
made substantial advances over the course of the project, with 9.3% of ex-combatants reporting
being unemployed in 2009, versus 5.3% in 2014. In comparison, the unemployment rate in
Burundi has been consistent at 7.8% on average between 2009 and 2012.60
In addition, surveys
suggest that ex-combatants are more likely to focus on one paid employment rather than on
multiple employments with variable and unpredictable income, with 20.1% ex-combatants having
more than one paid activity in 2011, versus 7% in 2014. In the 2014 beneficiary survey, 10.0% of
female ex-combatants (in comparison with 8.2% for women in Burundi) and 9.9 % of former
children ex-combatants (mostly male) (in comparison with 12.3% for young males in Burundi as
per 2012 data) reported being unemployed versus 4.9% male ex-combatants.61
Female and former
children ex-combatants suffer from unemployment in higher proportions than male ex-
combatants. However, the project overall successfully supported the economic reintegration of
children and female ex-combatants to the level of their peers in communities.
Consistent with recent draw backs observed in 2014 for the overall population of Burundi, while
64.3% were confident their economic situation would improve in the future in 2011, and 70% in
2013, by the end of the project in 2014, only 58.4% believed so.
Female Ex-Combatants. Beneficiary surveys indicate that the provision of benefits to female ex-
combatants was done in a gender-sensitive way, and that there was no discrimination against
women in the provision of project benefits. As per the 2014 survey, 92.3% reported that they
were treated in a similar manner or better than men in the demobilization process and 86.6%
reported being treated in a similar manner or better than men in the reintegration process. While
the surveys show that there was a lack of child care provision by IPs (only 20.7% of women were
provided with child care), 87.1% of female ex-combatants still managed to attend trainings.
While the situation of women in their communities has improved over time, with approximately
70% of female ex-combatants reporting in 2014 that they had been treated better or equally than
other women by other women in their communities and approximately 73% of the female ex-
combatants reporting they were treated better or equally by men in their communities. However,
some stigma against female ex-combatants remains as in the 2014 survey, 67.1% of the female
ex-combatants feel discriminated when seeking employment.
Children ex-combatants. Beneficiary surveys indicate that the general situation for children ex-
combatants has improved since demobilization, with the majority reporting in 2014 as being
treated as anyone else by other adults (73.8%), family members (88.0%), and authorities (69.6%).
90.4% in 2014 also rated their relations with their neighbors and schoolmates or workmates as
average or good.
Children ex-combatants, however, in general noted their dissatisfaction with the project with 61.4%
reporting in 2013 that the reintegration process was poor or very poor in the 2011 survey. Initially,
59 CNDDR and SOGES, Cinquième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2014, p. 289
60 World Development Indicators, World Bank Databank (2012 is the latest available data on Burundi,
however, based on the fact that unemployment data has been consistent over the past few years, it is
assumed that data for 2014 would be in the same range) 61
World Development Indicators, World Bank Databank
40
children surveyed in the beneficiary surveys consistently reported their displeasure with IPs as
well. For example, per the 2011 survey, 52.5% reported that they did not trust the IPs. However,
this improved over the course of the project, as per the 2013 survey only 35.2% reported not
trusting the IPs. Initial dissatisfaction with the support received is attributed to children’s
disappointment with benefits received (no cash), in comparison to adult ex-combatants (who
received cash). At the time of demobilization, the average age of children was 17 years old,
while the cut-off age to access adult benefits was set at 18. This was seen as unfair to children
ex-combatants who would have preferred to be treated as adults and provided with the same
reintegration options and comparable monetary benefits. The improving trust in the IPs relates to
the project’s commitment to integrate former children ex-combatants, once they became young
adults, and provide economic support to associations.
Disabled ex-combatants. A total of 3,538 ex-combatants were identified as needing medical care.
In the 2014 survey, 67.3% disabled ex-combatants stated that they physically felt better after
treatment. As per the 2014 survey, over 85.2% of those who received psychosocial assistance
claimed that it helped them through socioeconomic reintegration.
Encouragingly, employment prospects of disabled ex-combatants have improved over time as
well. Based on the data collected in the 2013 survey, 60.8% of the disabled ex-combatants
surveyed were employed or involved in income generating activities. Lack of access to
employment for disabled ex-combatants, however, relates more to their disability than to their ex-
combatant status. 69.2% of interviewed disabled ex-combatants reported in the 2013 survey that
when looking for work they felt discriminated as a disabled ex-combatant and 61.7% felt
discriminated due to their disability. However, for employed, workplace discrimination has been
decreasing over time with 41.8% in 2011 versus 36.7% in 2013 survey reporting workplace
discrimination.
41
Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results
n/a
42
Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR Component 1: Demobilization
Key lessons learned in the implementation of the demobilization process are:
A good business plan is important;
The coordination of different services such as Operations, Finance, Procurement (for
logistical support), Monitoring and Evaluation (Data Collection on demobilized Monitoring
activities) is necessary;
The expert in Monitoring and Evaluation needs to work closely with the Head of Operations;
and
Increased awareness and psychosocial assistance in the demobilization center to reduce false
expectations by the demobilized.
Component 2: Reinsertion
Key lessons learned to ensure successful reinsertion are:
Collect and record accurate data on recipients' bank accounts for the success of bank
transfers;
Increase awareness among beneficiaries to report their bank accounts to avoid cases of
reinsertion support non-payment;
Follow the payment schedule for reinsertion support to avoid revolts of the beneficiaries in
the event of late payments;
Record regular payments made by the partner Bank in the MIS; and
Ensure adequate recruitment of registration agents to ensure regular updating of the database.
Impact of Reinsertion on Beneficiaries:
Interviews with beneficiaries conducted confirmed that the distribution of the transitional
reinsertion support went well. In general, the demobilized said they were faced with problems of
indebtedness accumulated during their stay in the bush or garnered upon leaving it. In general,
beneficiaries expressed that the support was not enough to respond to the debt. However,
beneficiaries considered reinsertion benefit as a factor in their reintegration in that the money
allowed their participation in social events in the community and helped them respond to the
needs of their families. Per the fourth beneficiary survey, the percentage of beneficiaries who
claim to have used most of their Transitional Subsistence Allowance to ensure the satisfaction of
their basic needs and those of their families was 63.8%, 62.3%, and 59.4% respectively for the
first, second, and third installments. In conclusion, various studies have confirmed that the
reinsertion support facilitated beneficiaries’ reinsertion.
Component 3: Socio-Economic Reintegration
Reintegration of adults began in June 2010 with the signing of contracts for 11 IPs. An umbrella
NGO was hired to coordinate the activities of the 11 IPs. When the project was extended, eight
IPs were retained. The main activities carried out by the IPs were:
Identification of 7,441 demobilized eligible for reintegration support;
Sensitization information on economic opportunities;
Identification and development of micro income generating activities, entrepreneurship,
employment promotion, formal education, and vocational training;
Specific training on the operation and management of micro projects;
43
Assistance to 30 ex-combatants who chose formal education;
Provision of support in full to 7,417 beneficiaries, a rate of 99.66% of all ex-combatants
identified including 7,390 who opted for IGAs and 27 who received all tranches for formal
education; and
The provision of in-kind support to 56 pre-cooperative groupings.
In all areas of project intervention, capacity building for ex-combatants and members of the host
community who participate in pre-cooperative groups were completed. The training topics
included structuring near-cooperative groups, the concepts of simplified accounting, design and
development of a project, agro-pastoral management, and community solidarity. 56 selected
associations benefitted from in-kind support.
Throughout the duration of the project, more than 100 activities were organized in regards to
Social Reintegration including:
Awareness of ex-combatants, receiving communities, and administrative authorities;
Promotion of peaceful coexistence, peaceful conflict resolution, community and socio-
cultural reconciliation activities;
Psychosocial support for traumatic events via TPO;
Counseling and referrals for HIV/AIDS; and
Training in mediation, communication, negotiation and peaceful conflict resolution.
Key lessons learned from the socio-economic reintegration include:
A good business plan is very important;
Recruit very competent IPs;
Regularly monitor the implementation of activities, especially during the start-up of IPs’
contracts;
Involve beneficiaries in steps to support their economic reintegration;
Organize workshops for IPs to harmonize their interventions;
Promote associations including ex-combatants and the host community;
Provide in-kind support for micro-economic reintegration after the receipt of reinsertion
support;
Follow the schedule of the various stages of reintegration support to ensure adequate
management of beneficiaries’ expectations.
Impact of socio-economic reintegration:
The third annual independent evaluation has identified the following observation: "The economic
performance of individual socio-economic reintegration are mixed…their absolute failure rate is
very low and more than one quarter of the target has seen a significant improvement in its
income. This improvement is more pronounced in urban areas while EAFGA (children associated
with armed groups) have consistently experienced the lowest performance (85% of target getting
a FBU income 50,000 or less)."
The third annual independent evaluation concluded that there is a positive impact of individual
economic reintegration on social integration. The report noted, "The element of individual
economic reintegration promoted the social integration of PDRT [EDTRP] demobilized,
stabilizing their economic and social situation, and creating the conditions for networking and
social fabric necessary for strengthening and continuation of project achievements.” The impact
of the economic reintegration component on social reintegration is difficult to fully grasp but this
impact is certain. The main achievements which testify to the positive impact are:
44
Stabilized helpless social groups evenly throughout the country;
It has made possible some integration by creating the basic conditions for its development:
basic dignity, respect for self and others, initiatives in productive and income-generating
activities as well as for professions or training; and
It built, in less than a year, a network and a social fabric first between the IPs and the
demobilized and then between the demobilized which will develop the ex-combatants’
confidence to other constituent activities such as the development of associations.
Component 4: Assistance to Vulnerable Groups
Female Ex-combatants
i. Assistance to Females
A Gender Action Plan was developed by the project to guide the implementation of mitigation
measures already identified and additional activities to strengthen the gender sensitive activities
within the transitional reintegration activities. In all activities organized by the project and
partners, they took into account the gender dimension. In this area the project has achieved the
following:
Production of 32 radio programs specifically dealing with issues related to gender
Creation of 8 listening clubs composed of female ex-combatants and women ex-
combatants whose role was to listen to the radio programs together, to critically suggest
new topics to be covered relating to the experiences of women in general and female ex-
combatants in particular
35 participatory theater presentations on topics related to gender were conducted in
different parts of the country
A documentary showing the role of women in the various joint associations (host
communities and ex-combatants) was been produced, distributed to partners, and shown
in different communities
A series of training was conducted for the benefit of ex-combatants and members of host
communities on the management of the household budget
Leadership training in general and in particular on the role of women in leadership in
Burundi
o on violence against women
o on support for victims of violence against women
A traditional dance competition involving mainly ex-combatants and developing themes
related to socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants
A women's football competition
ii. Assistance to Children Associated with Armed Forces/Groups (CAAF/G)
The main challenges concerned the school reintegration, vocational training, and reinsertion:
Change of name or surname: The situation of some children was complicated by the fact that
they changed their name or first name. This act is not acceptable by law because their records
cannot be changed. Faced with this difficulty, the two IPs in consultation with the project
opted for education of these children under their original names and surnames before they
were enrolled in the rebellion;
Lack of vocational training centers in the area: Some children associated with armed groups
wanted vocational training while there were no such training centers;
45
Impatience for and reservations on in-kind support: The vast majority of children associated
with armed groups and even parents continued to call for cash money to be paid immediately.
The IPs had to explain that support will be given in kind, in a multi-step procedure in order
for reinsertion and reintegration to succeed;
The high mobility of children associated with armed groups: In regards to both the granting
of support for reintegration or reinsertion, the two IPs experienced mobility problems of the
children who did not want to stay with their families because of their discrimination by
surrounding communities;
The abandonment of formal education by some CAAF/G: The project provided grant support
for the reintegration of children having resumed formal education for three years. Of the 102
children who chose formal education, 74 completed the study and 28 dropped out of school;
Children who dropped out of formal education received further income generation activities
support;
Dissatisfaction with the amount of support: Children separated in 2008 wanted to believe they
were entitled to 405,000 FBU for reinsertion as other ex-combatants; and
Concerns related to the election period: Associated children and their host families thought
that the elections were going to stop their support and they called day and night to know
when they would receive their support. IPs took time to reassure them as how the project
would not stop support due to the elections.
iii. Medical rehabilitation of Disabled Ex-combatants
Challenges and key lessons learned in medical rehabilitation are:
Medical rehabilitation requires different skills and a significant logistics organization as the
identification is not just simple counting but a diagnosis on a case-by-case basis to determine
the sequence of treatments that are necessary;
Medical planning and organizing needs to take into account the availability of partner
stakeholders (hospitals, pharmacies physio-therapy, workshops for making prostheses or
orthoses);
Coordination with IPs and medical partners is crucial in the organization of treatment,
transport, and follow-up for rehabilitation;
The implementation of care planning with ex-combatants is challenging (transportation
issues, irregularity in taking medication);
The institutions that can make upper prosthetics are rare and hard to find in the country;
The consultations and surgeries were too numerous to be completed on time; and
The construction of 150 houses was pledged over a short period of five months and required
huge efforts that needed to be closely monitored by the project.
Communications
This section covers all communications and outreach activities. These activities began with the
establishment of a preventive communication strategy with adequate and constant messages to
different target groups. The project recruited Cabinet BESD to conduct an impact survey of its
communication activities between 1 April 2009 and 31 July 2011. From this impact survey of
communication activities, the key findings, lessons, and recommendations that emerged were:
Participants in the focus group stated that the most accessible channels are the
community focal point, radio, and mobile phone use;
All provinces visited by the evaluation mission were sufficiently covered by the radio
stations broadcasting from the city of Bujumbura;
46
Information about the project passing through its partner radio stations were not sufficient
because some were placed in low-audience time slots and were not advertised to the
target group;
Participatory theater was supported by a limited number of demobilized. However, those
who participated appreciated it a lot because it provided valuable advice and help to
reduce the stigma on demobilized by the rest of the community;
The messages communicated by the project were relevant including information on the
process of demobilization and reintegration, the economic opportunities, and ways of
prevention and fight against HIV/AIDS. Radio channels played an important role but
information conveyed at the Demobilization Center was regarded as more critical;
The messages conveyed, especially in the Demobilization Centre, have helped to change
the behavior of demobilized, in particular to understand that they are no longer military
personnel but need to become like other civilians. This behavior has positively influenced
the coexistence of demobilized and the rest of the community members although there
are still prejudices and stereotypes about the target group.
Although less than half of the demobilized "heard" the radio shows, 67% of those who
listened were satisfied to very satisfied with 20% of women being very satisfied versus
10% of men. Activities related to communication such as listening clubs and
participatory theater directed to a mixed audience (male/female ex-combatants/host
community) positively affected social cohesion.
Monitoring and Evaluation
As part of the Monitoring and Evaluation, the project conducted the following studies: five
beneficiary surveys; four independent annual evaluations; impact survey of communication
activities between April 1, 2009 to July 31, 2011; and a Process evaluation of implementation of
supervisory activities and psychosocial support between November 2010 and the end of June
2012.
The third annual independent evaluation confirmed that within four years, the project identified
many of the challenges. The identification of the disabled and the mentally ill, both of which
belong to the component of vulnerable groups, however, took longer. The impact of the
demobilization (2009) and reinsertion (2009-2010) components, covering substantially most
target indicators on the results framework, included targets achieved. Despite the difficulties of
survival faced by ex-combatants, they returned home and, in general, invested in different
livelihoods. The results of individual economic reintegration are more difficult to assess. The
project strategy and its support reflected the participation of demobilized in community life from
the second half of 2011. The creation of associations including both ex-combatants and
community members promoted immediate reinsertion of the demobilized within host
communities.
Support for vulnerable groups is an essential component of the project that remains unfinished.
The analysis of the project’s gender aspect shows that female ex-combatants feel less stigmatized
than at the beginning of their rehabilitation. Their experience today tends to be assimilated to that
of Burundian women in general. Reintegration seems to have had less impact on CAAF/G who
generally show less success economically and dissatisfaction with their reintegration during
beneficiary surveys. The project, therefore, recommends CAAF/G receive targeted learning or
training activities, also in the framework of participation in community life, in the future.
47
Care of the disabled, leaves an important task unfinished. The increase in managed care will
depend on the availability of specialized services for their care. The future of chronic disabilities
is worrying as well. It raises a question of public health in Burundi and will require the
involvement of different partners: Government of Burundi, donors, specialized care units.
Project Supervision
Given the urgent nature of the project and past performance of World Bank operations, at least
four supervision missions during the first year of project implementation followed by at least
three supervision missions during the rest of the project duration until June 30, 2014 were carried
out by the World Bank team. A representative of this team, Senior Social Development Specialist
was recruited and based in Bujumbura who later became the Task Team Leader during activities
from November 2013 to June 2014. At least two missions of the World Bank team were carried
out regularly as assistance to project implementation each year. Recommendations provided in
the different aide memoires have been applied by the project team and the World Bank. In
addition, a mission of the World Bank visited Burundi between 9 and 19 November 2010 to
jointly conduct with the Government of Burundi the project mid-term review.
Finally, supervision missions carried out by the World Bank have helped to strengthen the
operational capacity of the national structure, especially in planning operations / activities,
financial management, procurement, monitoring and evaluation, and management in general.
Innovations and improvements have been made periodically in the implementation of project
activities to achieve the planned objectives.
Recommendations based on Lessons Learned during Implementation
i. The Government of Burundi
In general, create and/or strengthen the structures responsible for the socio-administrative
supervision of the population in each county. Indeed, it would help in controlling the
experienced psychosocial and socioeconomic households and, therefore, in setting up
structures for monitoring and supervision of the population on these issues;
Hire an exit strategy manager;
Always encourage work in synergy with the leadership of the State in the supervision and
management of its population process: learn from others, build the best expertise, use and
retain primary responsibility that guides and directs;
The state should do everything possible to enable access to mental health care in all hospitals
and other existing care in the country. Indeed, the long distances with all support systems,
heavy price to pay for transportation and health care, bureaucratic paperwork requirements
and other obstacles make it a difficult and painful life for a mental health patient and his
family;
Hold meetings of thematic coordination between stakeholders at national and regional levels
in order to avoid a fragmented effort and involve administering agents where they exist as a
strategy for intervention sustainability;
Consider how the name "ex-combatant" could gradually be out of use to complete an ex-
combatant’s transition to a community member as some ex-combatants interviewed are
embarrassed to keep the name;
Initiate programs to strengthen the capacity of households to enable them to take charge of
their own problems (diseases, accidents, etc.);
48
Avoid stigmatizing ex-combatants in general and those with psychosocial problems and/or
mental health in particular to make them feel like full citizens because stigma can worsen
psychosocial and/or health;
Facilitate the accreditation process after which associations of ex-combatants and community
members can work within the law, as some lenders may require, among other conditions;
Analyze court records of ex-combatants held as soon as possible so they may change their
status to sentenced instead of alleged perpetrators.
ii. Implementing Partners
Assign adequate staff to make interventions possible. Indeed, the investigation and the results
of the SWOT analysis reveal that the staff on site was a small number compared to territory
that was to be covered and the number of beneficiaries that were to be followed;
Identify existing structures that can supplement possible referrals. This could reduce agents’
responsible for monitoring the beneficiaries stress because it is difficult to answer all
questions of the ex-combatants;
Share relevant information to carry out a coordinated response. It was indeed found between
the different partners involved in the project that information was not shared properly;
Involve beneficiaries actively in activities that affect them. IPs reported they were organizing
community events or reconciliation but sometimes they did not necessarily consult the
participation of ex-combatants provided that such activities often include limited resources;
Increase awareness campaigns to raise awareness among beneficiaries and their communities
on the need to work towards their progressive empowerment; and
Psychosocial officers should ensure patients under treatment take their medication as
prescribed.
Conclusion
The project objectives are divided into four components. The first three can be considered
completed, namely demobilization, reinsertion, and socio-economic reintegration. The fourth
component consists of an appropriate response to basic needs in material terms as well as relief of
physical, psychological and moral consequences for vulnerable groups. In less than four years,
the project addressed most of the challenges posed to its initial objectives. Through a system of
adequate management and monitoring, the project achieved its target of over 99% for the first
three components’ results indicators. The identification of the disabled and the mentally ill
required more attention and, therefore, took longer.
Given the remaining challenges, the project, originally scheduled for three years (2009-end
2011), was extended until the end of 2013. The extension helped provide effective rehabilitation
and treatment of demobilized with disabilities, psychological or psychiatric illnesses as well as
further economic and social reintegration by strengthening the capacity of ex-combatants linked
to the organization and management of associations. A new component of construction and
allocation of new housing for seriously disabled ex-combatants was completed in a very short
period of five months during the additional financing period. The extension of the project until
30 June 2014, however, has achieved all the goals, even with regard to the rehabilitation of
disabled ex-combatants.
Immediately after the completion of the houses, the beneficiaries must be installed in these
homes. The Government of Burundi and its development partners should take the necessary steps
49
to monitor this situation and project closing. Thus, the following activities will need to be
supported:
Continued medical management of ex-combatants with chronic disabilities who require
permanent care: supply of drugs (eg anticonvulsants) and other pharmaceutical supplies for
paraplegics with urinary incontinence or colostomy, repair or replacement of orthopedic
equipment like prosthetics for mobility;
Continued care for psychiatric cases;
Preparation of all chronic disabilities to self-care and/or through synergies, identifying other
potential stakeholders who can take care of the permanently disabled caseload; and
Provision of solutions for sustainable medical insurance (Ministry of Health, Ministry of
Solidarity, etc.).
In addition, the following recommendations would need to be implemented to ensure the full
installation of severely disabled ex-combatants into their new homes:
Provision of basic medical kits depending on the type of disability for the first moments of
the houses’ occupation;
Provision of food necessities for the first three months of tenure;
Provision and delivery of furniture and kitchen equipment for households;
Supervision of beneficiaries for starting income generating activities such as agriculture and
small businesses as they live in rural or urban areas; and
Support to autonomy and health of severely disabled beneficiaries to ensure the prevention of
medical complications related to disability.
Overall Recommendations
i. The Government of Burundi
Continue tracking demobilized ex-combatants in their socio-economic reintegration by
developing a sustainable project that targets them along with some members of the host
community through the Country Assistance Strategy 17 (CAS 17) of the World Bank and the
PRSP II of Burundi;
Continue to support CAAF/G who came of age at least in the context of associations
including other vulnerable children;
Further rehabilitate chronically ill ex-combatants who should be entrusted to another state
structure at the end of the project because they need to be monitored continuously;
Continue psychosocial assistance of the mentally ill who are not yet recovered;
Invite disabled ex-combatants to participate in joint associations or associations of services to
disabled ex-combatants; and
Support the integration effort of disabled ex-combatants in terms of (media radio)
communication and income generating activities in general, and particularly the 150 which
have been installed in homes.
ii. The World Bank and Other Development Partners
Advocate for new projects to be developed for sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants
under the Country Assistance Strategy 17 (CAS 17) of the World Bank and the PRSP II of
Burundi;
Support initiatives undertaken for demobilized to ensure peace and security in Burundi and in
the sub-region.
50
Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders
(a) Borrower/implementing agencies The recipient and the implementing partner both indicated that they agreed with the document
and had no further comment.
(b) Cofinanciers The draft ICR was shared with representatives of donors to the MDTF (the European
Commission, Norway, Belgium, and the Netherlands). No comments were received from donors,
except from representatives of Norway who emphasized the importance of describing project’s
sustainability.
While the project was intended as transitional, it contributed to strengthen in-country capacity
through technical assistance and training. In addition, various follow up initiatives suggest the
recipient’s willingness to ensure the sustainability of project results, in particular through: (i) the
strengthening of in-country capacity to provide support to Disabled ex-combatants (Kamenge
military hospital), (ii) the creation of an “Office de Gestion des Anciens Combattants” to ensure
follow up and continued support to ex-combatants.
51
Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents CNDDR
o All Quarterly Progress Reports (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014)
o Annual Reports (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013)
o CNDDR and CURDES, Première Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2010
o CNDDR and CARD Engineering, Troisième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2011
o CNDDR and CARD Engineering, Quatrième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2013
o CNDDR and SOGES, Cinquième Enquête des Bénéficiaires du PDRT, 2014
o CNDDR, Gender Action Plan, March 2011
o CNDRR, Rapport D’achèvement Du Projet D’Urgence De Démobilisation et de
Réintégration Transitoire au Burundi, June 2014
o CNDDR and BESD, Evaluation Du Processus De Réalisation Des Activités
D’Encadrement Et D’Assistance Psychosocial Du PDRT, November 2013
o CNDDR and BESD, Enquête D’Impact des Activités de Communication du Projet de
Démobilisation et de Réintégration Transitoire, December 2011
o CNDDR, Autonomie Plan, May 2014
o TPO Burundi, Rapport D’achèvement des Activités sur le Traitement des Cas et la
Reference, December 2013
o CM Partners, Projet De L’harmonisation De la Formation des Formateurs Devant Assurer
la Formations Des Ex-combattants et membres de la Communauté Influents en
Techniques de Communications, Facilitation/Médiation et la Résolution des Conflits,
Final Report, March 2014
o CNDDR, Soins des Démobilisés Handicapés, Situations au mois d’avril 2014
o CNDDR, Manuel des Procédures de Mise en Œuvre du Projet, Octobre 2009
o CNDDR, Manuel des Opérations de la Réintégration des Ex-Combattants, Avril 2010
World Bank
o World Bank, EDTRP, Supervision Mission Aide-Mémoire, February 2009
o World Bank, EDTRP, Supervision Mission Aide-Mémoire, October-November 2009
o World Bank, EDTRP, Supervision Mission Aide-Mémoire, March-April 2010
o World Bank, EDTRP, Mid-Term Review, November 2010
o World Bank, EDTRP, Supervision Mission Aide-Mémoire, May 2011
o World Bank, EDTRP, Supervision Mission Aide-Mémoire, November-December 2011
o World Bank, EDTRP, Supervision Mission Aide-Mémoire, June 2012
o World Bank, EDTRP, Supervision Mission Aide-Mémoire, December 2012
o World Bank, EDTRP, Supervision Mission Aide-Mémoire, February- April 2013
o World Bank, EDTRP, Supervision Mission Aide-Mémoire, December 2013.
o World Bank, EDTRP, Supervision Mission Aide-Mémoire, February 2014
o World Bank, EDTRP, Supervision Mission Aide-Mémoire, March 2014
o World Bank, EDTRP, Supervision Mission Aide-Mémoire, June 2014
o AFTCS, Emergency Project Paper on a Proposed Emergency Recover Grant in the
Amount of SDR 10.1 Million (US$l5.0 Million Equivalent) to the Republic of Burundi
for an Emergency Demobilization and Transitional Reintegration Project, June 2009
o Implementation Status and Results Report (ISR), December 2009, May 2010, February
2011, September 2011, April 2012, September 2012, April 2013, October 2013, May
2014, June 2014
52
o AFTCS, Emergency Project Paper on a Proposed Restructuring and Additional
Emergency Recover Grant in the Amount of US$4.25 Million to the Republic of Burundi
for an Emergency Demobilization and Transitional Reintegration Project, August 2013
o IDA Financing Agreement, Grant Number H497-BI, June 2009
o Trust Fund Grant Agreement, MDTF Grant Number TF 096439
o Administration Agreement, TF 071297, December 2009
o Additional Financing Agreement, MDTF Grant Number TF 014654, September 2013
o World Bank Group, Country Partnership Strategy for Rwanda, FY 2014-2018, June 2014
o International Development Association and International Finance Corporation, Country
Assistance Strategy for the Republic of Burundi for the Period FY09-FY 12, July 2008
o International Development Association and International Finance Corporation, Country
Assistance Strategy for the Republic of Burundi for the Period FY13-FY 16, September
2012
o World Bank, Restructuring Paper on a Proposed Project Restructuring of Emergency
Demobilization and Transitional Reintegration Project to the Republic of Burundi, April
13, 2010
o World Bank, Restructuring Paper on a Proposed Project Restructuring of Emergency
Demobilization and Transitional Reintegration Project to the Republic of Burundi,
September 10, 2012
o World Bank, Restructuring Paper on a Proposed Project Restructuring of Emergency
Demobilization and Transitional Reintegration Project to the Republic of Burundi,
December 23, 2013
o World Bank, Restructuring Paper on a Proposed Project Restructuring of Emergency
Demobilization and Transitional Reintegration Project to the Republic of Burundi, May
26, 2014
o World Bank, TDRP Quarterly Report, January-March 2011
o World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report of the Burundi Emergency
Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration Project, 2009
o World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report of the Democratic Republic
of Congo Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project
o World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report of the Rwanda Emergency
Demobilization and Reintegration Project, 2009
Other
o Amnesty International, Burundi: Locked Down- A Shrinking of Political Space, 2014
o Handicap International, Annuaire des services sociaux et économiques existants dans les
provinces de Bujumbura-Mairie, Bubanza, Bururi, Gitega et Muramvya, Edition 2012
o Handicap International, Etude sur la situation des personnes handicapées au Burundi,
2012
o Handicap International, Leçons apprises du Projet Turi Kumwe Réinsertion socio-
économique des anciens combattants handicapés au Burundi 2010-2013, August 2013
o Hanson, Stephanie, Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) in Africa,
Backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations, February 2007
o Human Rights Watch, “We’ll Tie You Up and Shoot You” Lack of Accountability for
Political Violence in Burundi, 2010
o Human Rights Watch, “You Will Not Have Peace While You Are Living” The
Escalation of Political Violence in Burundi, 2012
o IMF, Burundi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, February 2007
53
o IMF, Burundi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper II, August 2012
o International Crisis Group, Burundi : du Boycott Electoral a l’Impasse Politique, Rapport
Afrique N°169 – 7 février 2011
o International Crisis Group, Burundi : Bye Bye Arusha ?, Rapport Afrique N°192 – 25
octobre 2012
o International Crisis Group, Burundi: réussir l’intégration des FNL, Briefing Afrique
N°63, 30 juillet 2009
o Jaremey McMullin, Expanded After Action Review: Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration in Burundi: 2000-2011, UNDPKO OROLSI DDR SECTION (April 2011)
o Jadin, Minani, Appui à la Réadaptation Médicale et à la Réintégration Socio-
Economique des Démobilisés Handicapés, Rapport commissionné par le PNDDR, 2005
o United Nations World Food Program, Overview of Food Security in Burundi
o World Bank, Burundi – Food Crisis Response Development Policy Grant Project, May
2012
54
Annex 10. List of Interviews Conducted for ICR Preparation
GoB
Denise Sinankwa Présidence de la
République, Burundi
Senior Economics Advisor
Implementing Agency: Technical Coordination Team (TCT) of the National Commission
for DDR (NCDDR)
Jeroboam Nzikobanyanka TCT Program Coordinator
Albert Sezirahiga TCT Operations Officer
Alexis Sinzakaraye TCT Chief Medical Officer
Sylvie Nsavyimana TCT Financial Management Specialist
Adolphe Hasabindero TCT Monitoring and Evaluation
Specialist
Gordien TCT Management Information
Systems Specialist
Desire Ndagijimana TCT Gender and Communications
Specialist
Pascal Mafyiritano TCT Procurement Specialist
Implementing Partners of the TCT
Portien Bikebako Umbrella NGO
Twitezimbere
Director
Ladislas Kabwa Umbrella NGO
Twitezimbere
Technical Director
Herman Ndayisaba TPO Director
Francois Xavier Nsababana TPO Coordinator / Psychosocial
Expert
Annick Comexcell Director
Alphonse Ndabiseruye ODDBU Executive Secretary
Jean Bosco Ngomirakiza ODDBU Coordinator Income Generating
Activities
Athanase Barunsaze ODDBU Expert in Synergies and
Communications/ Head of
Training and Communications
Department
Gilbert Batungwanayo ADL Director
Representatives of Donors to the MDTF
Yves Nindorera Belgium Embassy,
Bujumbura
Program Manager
Elizabeth Droyer
(NB – assignment ends in June
2014 – replacement Achilles
Kiwanuka based in Uganda:
Norway Embassy,
Bujumbura
Counsellor
Niels Veenis
Embassy of the
Netherlands, Bujumbura
First Secretary
Political and Military Affairs
Charlotte Tilli Blomhammard European Union
Delegation,
Bujumbura
Counsellor
55
Natacha Meden Center for Security
Development and the Rule
of Law, Geneva,
Switzerland
Senior SSR Advisor
Olivier Jadin Belgian Cooperation International Disability Expert
Caroline Duconseille Handicap International,
Bujumbura, Burundi
Program Director
World Bank
Leanne Bayer World Bank Task Team Leader of the
EDTRP (December 2013-June
2014)
Pia Peeters World Bank Task Team Leader of the
EDTRP (April 2010-November
2013)
Marcelo Fabre World Bank Task Team Leader of the
EDRRP (July 2008-March 2010)
56
Annex 11. Synergies
Partner organizations Contribution to project
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United
Nations Development Program (UNDP),
International Rescue Committee (IRC)
Support to children whose families could not be
identified through Villages de Paix
UNDP, United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi
(BINUB), and GoB
Support to 10,186 adults associated with FNL
combatants (including 1,051 women)
UNICEF, African Union
Contribution to the reinsertion and demobilization
of children through the provision of reinsertion
benefits and the provision of vocational training to
150 children
Swedish International Development Agency
(SIDA), Handicap International (HI)
Funding of full time international prosthetics expert
at the Centre National d'Appareillage et de
Réadaptation (CNAR). Provision of economic
reintegration support to 2,020 disabled ex-
combatants
World Food Organization (WFP) Implementation of Work for Food project
supporting 124 ex-combatants, as well as
community members in Bubanza, Cibitoke, and
Bujumbura Rural Provinces
BINUB, UNICEF, IRC, Stamm Foundation,
American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative
(ABA-ROLI), Burundian Association for Human
Rights and the Rights of Detainees (APRODH),
Ministry of Human Rights and Gender, Ministry of
National Solidarity, Repatriation of Refugees and
Social Reintegration, Burundian Non-Governmental
Organizations (ODDBU, BDDB)
Design and implementation of a collaboration
framework for reintegration support to children
associated with armed groups
UNICEF, Burundian NGOs (ODDBU, BDDB) Design and implementation of project to support
children associated with armed groups and other
minors in communities
Local associations (Dufashanye in Karusi, ADDP in
Kamenge, and AEM in Cibitoke)
Collaboration between associations of ex-
combatants and project to ensure the inclusion of
former FNL ex-combatants in associations
WFP Design and implementation of project for the
benefit of about 100 ex-combatants in Kabezi,
Muhuta and Bugarama (Bujumbura Province),
Bubanza (Bubanza Province) and Buganda
(Cibitoke Province)
Belgian Technical Cooperation (CTB) Hiring of ex-combatants for road construction in
Kinama and Kamenge
HI, Ministry of National Solidarity, Repatriation of
Refugees and Social Reintegration
Design of a collaboration framework for support to
disabled ex-combatants
Cord (International NGO) In-kind support to associations of ex-combatants
Local NGOs Provision of vocational training, leadership training
to ex-combatants in some communes in Cibitoke,
Bubanza and Bujumbura Mairie Provinces
World Vision, Local NGOs Provision of in-kind support and loans to ex-
combatant associations
57
