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Document of
The World Bank
Report No: ICR00001313
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(TF-90077)
ON A
GRANT
IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 6.6 MILLION
(US$ 10 MILLION EQUIVALENT)
TO THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN
FOR A
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY PROGRAM
June 12, 2012
Governance and Public Sector
Afghanistan
South Asia Region
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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Rate Effective June 04, 2012)
Currency Unit = Afghani (AFN)
US$ 1.00 = AFN 50
FISCAL YEAR: March 20-March 21
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AEP Afghan Expatriate Program MIP Management Internship Program
ARTF Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust
Fund
MoCI Ministry of Commerce and
Industries
CDS Capacity Development Secretariat MoE Ministry of Education
GDPD
M
General Directorate of Program
Design and Management
MoJ Ministry of Justice
GoA Government of Afghanistan MoM Ministry of Mines
HRM Human Resource Management MoWA Ministry of Women Affairs
IARCS
C
Independent Administration Reform
and Civil Service Commission
PAR Public Administration Reform
ITA International Technical Assistance PMU Program Management Unit
LEP Lateral Entry Program PRR Priority Reform & Restructuring
Program
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation TAFSU Technical Assistance and
Feasibility Support Unit
MAIL Ministry of Agriculture and
Livestock
TER Technical Evaluation Report
MCP Management Capacity Program
Vice President: Isabel M. Guerrero, SARVP
Country Director: Robert Saum, SACAF
Sector Manager: Antonius Verheijen, SASGP
Project Team Leader: Satyendra Prasad, SASGP
ICR Team Leader: Richard Spencer Hogg, SASGP
Afghanistan
Management Capacity Program
CONTENTS
Data Sheet
A. Basic Information
B. Key Dates
C. Ratings Summary
D. Sector and Theme Codes
E. Bank Staff
F. Results Framework Analysis
G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs
H. Restructuring
I. Disbursement Graph
A. Basic Information ........................................................................................................ i B. Key Dates .................................................................................................................... i
C. Ratings Summary ........................................................................................................ i
D. Sector and Theme Codes ........................................................................................... ii
E. Bank Staff ................................................................................................................... ii F. Results Framework Analysis ...................................................................................... ii
G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs .................................................................... v H. Restructuring (if any) ................................................................................................. v I. Disbursement Profile .................................................................................................. v
1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................. 3
3. Assessment of Outcomes ............................................................................................ 8 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ......................................................... 13 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................... 14 6. Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................... 17 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Grantee/Implementing Agencies/Donors .............. 19
Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 20 Annex 2. Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 21
Annex 3. Grant Preparation and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ....... 23 Annex 4. Summary of Grantee's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ........................ 24 Annex 5. List of Supporting Documents and MCPs Interviewed ................................ 28
MAP
i
A. Basic Information
Country: Afghanistan Project Name: AF: Management
Capacity Program
Project ID: P106170 L/C/TF Number(s): TF-90077
ICR Date: 10/05/2009 ICR Type: Core ICR
Lending Instrument: TAL Grantee: GOVERNMENT OF
AFGHANISTAN
Original Total
Commitment: USD 10.00M Disbursed Amount: USD 11.05M
Revised Amount: USD 10.00M
Environmental Category: C
Implementing Agencies:
Independent Administrative Reform & Civil Service Commission
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:
B. Key Dates
Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual
Date(s)
Concept Review: 10/27/2006 Effectiveness: 10/31/2007 10/17/2007
Appraisal: 12/27/2006 Restructuring(s):
Approval: 02/13/2007 Mid-term Review: 09/29/2010
Closing: 03/31/2010 12/31/2011
C. Ratings Summary
C.1 Performance Rating by ICR
Outcomes: Moderately unsatisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome: High
Bank Performance: Moderately satisfactory
Grantee Performance: Moderately satisfactory
C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)
Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings
Quality at Entry: Moderately
unsatisfactory Government:
Moderately
unsatisfactory
Quality of Supervision: Moderately satisfactory Implementing
Agency/Agencies: Moderately satisfactory
Overall Bank
Performance: Moderately satisfactory
Overall Borrower
Performance: Moderately satisfactory
ii
C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators
Implementation
Performance Indicators
QAG Assessments
(if any) Rating
Potential Problem Project
at any time (Yes/No): No
Quality at Entry
(QEA): None
Problem Project at any
time (Yes/No): No
Quality of
Supervision (QSA): None
DO rating before
Closing/Inactive status:
Moderately
Satisfactory
D. Sector and Theme Codes
Original Actual
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Central government administration 50
General public administration sector 50
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Poverty strategy, analysis and monitoring 100
E. Bank Staff
Positions At ICR At Approval
Vice President: Isabel.M.Guerrero Praful.C.Patel
Country Director: Robert Saum Alastair.J.Mckechnie
Sector Manager: Antonius Verheijen Ijaz Nabi
Project Team Leader: Satyendra Prasad Anne Tully
ICR Team Leader: Richard Spencer Hogg
ICR Primary Author: Richard Spencer Hogg
F. Results Framework Analysis
Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) To achieve sustained improved performance in the management capacity of key
departments dealing with any or all of the common functions including financial
management, human resource management, policy and regulatory design, and
administration. This should ultimately result in improved utilization and cost
effectiveness of budgetary resources and faster and better development results on the
ground.
iii
Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)
Not Applicable
(a) PDO Indicator(s)
Indicator Baseline Value
Original Target
Values (from
approval
documents)
Formally
Revised
Target
Values
Actual Value
Achieved at
Completion or
Target Years
Indicator 1 : Numbers of MCP's in key centre and sub-national positions
Value
quantitative or
Qualitative)
0 175 161
Date achieved 10/17/2007 12/31/2011 12/31/2011
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
161 appointments are made till date which includes resignations, terminations and end of
contract appointments. Current active number of MCPs is 95.
Indicator 2 : Departments with MCPs achieving rating of satisfactory (or equivalent) following annual
performance assessment
Value
quantitative or
Qualitative)
0 70% 0
Date achieved 10/17/2007 12/31/2011 12/31/2011
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Monitoring mechanism for measuring departmental outcomes is weak and was not
established properly.
(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)
Indicator Baseline Value
Original Target
Values (from
approval
documents)
Formally
Revised
Target Values
Actual Value
Achieved at
Completion or
Target Years
Indicator 1 : Appointment of MCPs
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
0 175 161
Date achieved 10/17/2007 12/31/2011 12/31/2011
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
161 appointments are made till date which includes resignations, terminations and end of
contract appointments. Current active number of MCPs is 95.
Indicator 2 : Percentage of appointments at sub-national level
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
0 20 5
Date achieved 10/17/2007 12/31/2011 12/31/2011
iv
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
9 MCP appointments made at sub-national level. 4 resigned due to various reasons.
Indicator 3 : Focus MCPs on 10 priority ministries
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
0 70% 54.2%
Date achieved 10/17/2007 12/31/2011 12/31/2011
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
54.2 % of MCPs are targeted at the priority ministries.
Indicator 4 : HR practices are merit based
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
n/a Annual Audit of HR
Practices
All appointments
conducted in
accordance to the
Civil Service Law,
Civil Servants Law
and other regulations
of the IARCSC. The
Audit department of
IARCSC conducts
review of HR
activities of GDPDM
annually.
Date achieved 10/17/2007 12/31/2011 12/31/2011
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Indicator 5 : Percentage terminations following performance appraisal process
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
0 5 3.5
Date achieved 10/17/2007 12/31/2011 12/31/2011
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
5 terminations carried out till date.
Indicator 6 : Departments with MCPs achieving rating of satisfactory (or equivalent) following annual
performance assessment
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
0 70% 0
Date achieved 10/17/2007 12/31/2011 12/31/2011
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Monitoring mechanism for measuring departmental outcomes is weak and was not
established properly.
v
G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs
No. Date ISR
Archived DO IP
Actual
Disbursements
(USD millions)
1 06/26/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0.00
2 03/17/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0.55
3 03/09/2010 Moderately
Unsatisfactory
Moderately
Unsatisfactory 3.31
4 12/28/2010 Moderately
Unsatisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 6.47
5 01/07/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 10.59
H. Restructuring (if any)
Not Applicable
I. Disbursement Profile
1
1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design
1.1 Context at Appraisal
By 2002, years of conflict had eroded Afghanistan‘s public sector. An administrative
structure still existed in many parts of the country after the war, but few senior staff were
left in Kabul to manage relations with the provinces, and even fewer resources remained
to deliver any services. Given the low skills base and the need for an immediate impact
on the ground, donors launched various initiatives to raise government capacity, but
progress in building capacity in government institutions has been slow. Many efforts
relied more on substituting for civil service capacity than strengthening it, and often
included the following range of modalities: regular civil servants on standard government
terms; civil servants receiving higher salaries or top-ups via government or donor-funded
initiatives; contract positions in the civil service filled by national or international
consultants; national staff in NGOs, the United Nations, and international agencies on
secondment to the government; and contractors employed either directly or through
donors to carry out development projects.
Several civil service reform programs were implemented in the 2000s in order to
strengthen public administration. The Independent Administration Reform and Civil
Service Commission (IARCSC) was established in 2003 with a mandate to lead civil
service reforms. The priority reform and restructuring program (PRR) was introduced to
improve how critical departments in key ministries functioned and to enable these
departments to recruit staff on merit, and at modestly better pay. Other activities included
promulgating laws and regulations for the civil service. At the same time several
programs were launched to build or inject capacity. The government initiated the
Technical Assistance and Feasibility Studies Unit in 2003, with support from the World
Bank and Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), to provide the civil service
with skilled national and international expertise to carry out technical feasibility studies.
But the unit provided mainly short-term inputs and did little to build longer term
capacity. In 2002–04 the government, through the ARTF, approved the Afghan
Expatriate Program and Lateral Entry Program. (These two programs were merged in
2005.) The former program sought to hire a small number of expatriate Afghans as senior
advisers, while the latter aimed to address the widespread shortage of competent and
experienced civil servants in upper- and middle- management positions in key ministries
and agencies, offering ―lateral‖ entry to suitably qualified Afghans, many of them from
the Diaspora. Both programs were succeeded by the Management Capacity Program
(MCP) in 2007, which aimed primarily to develop a cadre of senior tashkeel civil
servants in line ministries, who would undertake reform in departments such as finance,
procurement, human resources, and policy and planning.
The MCP provided line ministries with the resources and implementation structure to
recruit highly qualified staff transparently through merit to fill key ―Tashkeel‖ positions,
to create a management team accountable to the minister that provides a critical mass to
implement ministry reforms through strengthening systems and enhancing standards. The
2
MCP focused primarily on supporting the execution of common functions at senior or
managerial levels, including policy and strategy development, project management,
financial management, procurement and human resource management. In addition, it also
facilitated critical positions in the change management process in various ministries as
well as senior key line management positions of core sector functionality in those
ministries that contribute to economic development, such as education, health care, and
infrastructure sectors.
Rationale for Bank Assistance
Building government capacity to deliver services was one of the primary areas of focus of
the donor community after the conflict. Public administration reform was essential to
rebuilding the state, institutionalizing improved governance and combating corruption.
The Bank had extensive experience in promoting public administration reform in
Afghanistan through a series of development policy credit/grants intended to bolster
reforms. The MCP followed two previous capacity injection projects; Afghan Expatriate
Program (AEP) and Lateral Entry Program (LEP) designed to attract expatriate and
qualified Afghans from different backgrounds and areas of work to key ministries. Both
programs were funded through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF).
Considering the comparative advantage of ARTF with respect to the institutional
knowledge and lessons learnt from these previous operations, there was strong rationale
for the Bank‘s involvement in MCP.
1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as
approved)
The original project objective was ―To achieve sustained improved performance in the
management capacity of key departments dealing with any or all of the common
functions including financial management, human resource management, policy and
regulatory design, and administration. This should ultimately result in improved
utilization and cost effectiveness of budgetary resources and faster and better
development results on the ground‖.
1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators,
and reasons/justification
Not Applicable.
1.4 Main Beneficiaries,
All line ministries and agencies of the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) were the
intended beneficiaries of the project. However positions in the judiciary, military, law
and enforcement agencies or politically appointed positions were not eligible to receive
funding. Through the MCP, line ministries and agencies are expected to receive support
to strengthen one or several of the basic functions of public administration. The program
was expected to primarily support common function senior management positions. Areas
covered under common functions were financial management (budgeting and accounting),
human resource management (recruiting, performance monitoring, benefits management,
3
career management and severance), policy and regulatory design, and general
administration and procurement.
1.5 Original Components (as approved)
Component One: Provision of Management Services on Demand.
This component was designed to provide experienced managerial staff to line
ministries/agencies to assume line management responsibility for executing common
functions as well as key managerial responsibility in some sectoral ministries that
contribute to key areas of economic development. Positions under civil service grades 1,
2 and 3 under the current eight-grade system received support through MCP funding.
Positions filled through MCP were authorized under the ministry ―Tashkeel‖ or
establishment structure. Under this component it was intended that MCP recruits would
be provided with two year contracts at the beginning which could be renewed for a
further one year. Assignment of newly recruited MCP experts into the line ministry
positions was facilitated through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed
between the Capacity Development Secretariat (CDS) also known as the General
Directorate of Program Design and Management (GDPDM) of IARCSC and the line
ministry. The ARTF Management Committee (MC) approved in principle an allocation
of USD 30 million for three years with an initial allocation of USD 10 million to cover
technical assistance requirements and the first year of program costs.
Component Two: Program Management
This component was aimed to strengthen the CDS of GDPDM within the IARCSC which
was the implementing agency of the project. The CDS was responsible for the
management of the program including outreach and communications with line ministries;
screening and evaluating proposals; managing and overseeing recruitment of executives;
managing the monitoring and evaluation of candidates‘ performance in the employing
ministries; contract management and program financial management; and reporting on
and accounting for program results.
1.6 Revised Components
Not Applicable.
2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes
2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry
Since 2002, the government has used a variety of approaches and projects to acquire
operational and advisory expertise under contractual arrangements including the Afghan
Expatriate Program (AEP), the Lateral Entry Program (LEP), Technical Assistance and
Feasibility Support Unit (TAFSU), the Priority Reform and Restructuring (PRR) ―Super
Scale‖, and the hiring of numerous experts mobilized by donors in specific sector
4
contexts. These programs were introduced as part of an attempt to make the
Government/Civil Service more competitive as an employer in the face of a limited pool
of skilled Afghans and a labor market where NGOs and international organizations
competed with government for the best qualified Afghans. The AEP was originally
designed to finance the services of experienced Afghan professionals who were willing to
return to the country to participate in the reconstruction effort as senior advisors. It was
complemented in 2004 by the LEP which was designed to bring Afghan nationals
working in-country or regionally, into line positions at senior and middle management
levels on a contractual basis. Both programs were originally financed through the ‗third‘
window of the ARTF, which had been financed to bring qualified Afghans into
government. In 2005 both schemes were merged and financed by the ARTF through its
investment window as the Civil Service Capacity Building Project, TF053940.
MCP was designed with a view to improve upon the shortcomings of AEP and LEP.
From its inception, the AEP‘s operational objectives were intuitively defined, but there
was ambiguity on what specific results to expect, making it difficult to measure
effectiveness. LEP on the other hand, while it was successful in attracting some highly
qualified Afghans from national and regional markets into line ministry positions (not
advisory) had the unintended negative effect of encouraging line ministries to avoid the
implementation of other on-going civil service reforms such as PRR. LEP was also
undermined by capacity constraints on part of the Independent Appointments Board
(IAB) of IARCSC which was tasked with the implementation of the new pay and grading
reform. Both programs recruited relatively few staff: the Afghan Expatriate Program
recruited only 95 Afghans into the government and the Lateral Entry Program some 138.
In 2007 the Civil Service Capacity Building Project was re-designed as the MCP.
Substantial risks were identified during the design phase which were expected to impede
the achievement of MCP objectives. These included the risk of failing to attract sufficient
skilled staff even with the improved MCP salary scales, considering the small size of the
talent pool and competition from NGOs and donors. A second major risk identified was
the expected resistance from within the civil service among other civil servants who
remained on the normal civil service pay scale. This risk was expected to be partly
mitigated by the establishment of a transparent process of recruitment, clarity about the
roles and responsibilities of the MCP recruits and the temporary nature of their
employment. A third risk was that the program would continue to support the
appointment and retention of candidates who made little substantial contribution to the
program‘s objectives. It was envisaged that an annual performance audit of the program
would help mitigate this risk along with a continued emphasis on merit based
appointments and transparency in appointments. The risks and the anticipated mitigation
measures during the time of appraisal are set out in Table 1 below.
The PDO of the project was ambitious. The ―demand driven‖ approach to provide
managerial capacities to line ministries was largely ad-hoc and rarely part of a wider
government or ministry wide capacity building strategy. Communication and outreach
activities were inadequate to inform the line ministries of the purpose of the project. As a
result, during the first two years of project implementation, a large number of positions
5
requested by the line ministries were not aligned to their strategic plans. Instead of
following an ―across the board‖ approach to all ministries, it would have been useful to
prioritize certain key service delivery ministries. This would have allowed the MCP to be
used much more strategically to build the performance of critical ministries. During the
later stages of implementation (2010-2011), this approach was eventually followed and
ministries such as Ministry of Mines (MoM), Ministry of Commerce & Industries
(MoCI), Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAIL) and Ministry of Education (MoE)
were supported with cohorts of experts to create a critical mass of MCPs to implement
the ministry reform initiatives. However, this change of approach came too late in the
project life time (December 2011) to adequately impact its objectives.
Table 1: Risks and Mitigation Measures
Risks Identified Mitigation Measures (At Appraisal)
Unavailability of Skilled Candidates Competitive Salary scales, Senior Managerial
Tashkeel Positions in Ministry and Better
Communication and Outreach Measures
Resistance from Existing Civil Servants Clear Definition of MCP Roles, Transparent
Process of Recruitment and Temporary Nature
of Appointments
Appointment and Retention of Non-Performing
Candidates
Annual performance Audits
Capacity Building of National Staff (Civil
Servants) and Knowledge Transfer
GoA to Train and Mentor the Next Generation
of Managers. Beyond the Scope of MCP
2.2 Implementation
Implementation of MCP has never been easy. A mid-term review (MTR) conducted in
September 2010 and subsequent supervision missions repeatedly raised the following
issues which were further explored during the ICR mission.
Inadequate Funding: The initial funds committed to the project through the Afghanistan
Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) were inadequate to accommodate all the requests
made by ministries/agencies for MCP appointees. This led to frustration on part of many
Ministers. However, while additional finance was available from the approved
‗earmarked‘ ARTF funds, there was concern in the Bank to scale up too rapidly given
capacity constraints in the implementing agency, the time it took to recruit and
uncertainty about impact. 1
Salary Negotiations: MCP salaries were determined in an ad-hoc manner based on
salary history, rather than salary scales. As a result some Director-Generals (grade 1)
received near to the MCP ceiling of USD $7,000 while others received much less. The
inequities in pay between comparable posts across the civil service that have been created
due to MCP will need to be resolved under the follow-on CBR program. During
1 USD $35 million was originally approved by the ARTF Management Committee, but only USD $15 million was committed.
6
interviews with the MCP experts, the ICR mission noted that the salary negotiations
between the MCP appointees and the Civil Service Commission have been unsatisfactory.
A considerable number of MCPs had grievances about the salary packages offered to
them, citing inequities with other MCPs.
Low Quality of Applications: For many skilled posts, there were too few qualified
applicants. This reflects the highly competitive labor market conditions, lack of skilled
Afghan professionals, and perception that even high paying public sector jobs are not
desirable when compared to donor financed jobs. Poor quality of the applicants has
resulted in re-advertisements for many of these positions and the associated delays
created a source of frustration for the MCP-receiving ministers.
Capacity Development for MCP Recruits: In some ministries and agencies the MCP
recruits have faced logistical problems for several months such as not having access to a
dedicated computer or phone because of procurement delays and/or other reasons.
Further, the Management Capacity Program itself had no dedicated resources to support
MCPs once appointed to ministries, such as professional or job related development
training. The CBR project will need to resolve both these issues for the different cadres of
civil servants that it wishes to create for a well performing and structured Afghanistan
Civil Service.
Focus on Sub-National Positions: It was envisaged during the design of the program
that 20 per cent of total MCP recruitments would be at the sub-national level. This
objective has not been fulfilled. Only a total of 7 MCP appointments have been made at
the sub-national level by December 2011. This was not entirely the fault of the
implementing agency, which advertised for sub-national staff, but largely the result of
combination of Ministry preferences to keep senior staff in Kabul, insecurity in some of
the provinces and lack of a developed incentive structure to get staff to apply to hardship
areas.
2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization
The results framework for the project was inadequate to assess the actual outcomes of the
project activities. While there is anecdotal evidence that individual MCPs made a
difference to department performance, too much reliance was placed on ‗inputs‘, such as
the total number of recruitments and terminations rather than focusing on indicators
pertaining to service delivery improvements and budget execution performance.
Monitoring of line ministry departmental performance by IARCSC was weak and was
not addressed properly under the project design. The PDO level indicator ―Departments
with MCPs achieving rating of satisfactory (or equivalent) following annual performance
assessment‖ is too broad and the project does not detail any underlying mechanism to
measure performance of the line ministry departments under this indicator. Due to
shortfall in original budget allocated adequate Technical Assistance (TA) support to
strengthen the monitoring and evaluation unit of GDPDM could not be provided under
the project. Further, there was no formal high level oversight of the MCP by either the
IARCSC leadership or a more broadly based cross-ministerial committee. As a result
7
there was weak government oversight to determine if the program was achieving its
objectives and no mechanism to achieve consensus on corrective actions to be taken in a
timely manner to address implementation issues.
The performance appraisal process for MCP recruits established at GDPDM was strong.
All MCPs were appraised at the end of six months of their appointment, at the end of
their first year and annually thereafter. The performance appraisal process is a 360°
review involving the appointee, his/her supervisor and four subordinates selected by
MCP program staff. The monitoring and evaluation of project activities also suffered
from frequent changes of Bank Task Team Leaders (4 TTLs over the life of the project)
and inadequate transfer of institutional memory during these changes. It is a
recommendation of this ICR that to achieve effective results on the ground for all present
and future projects of this nature in fragile institutional contexts such as Afghanistan,
task-teams implementing such projects should be based in country with longer term
tenures to work alongside the implementing partners.
2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance
Regular implementation support missions (ISM) by the Bank ensured fiduciary
compliance during the life of the project. However the mid-term review (MTR) of the
project highlighted weaknesses in the internal control system of the implementing agency
(GDPDM) which included lack of monthly reconciliation of bank books and inadequate
internal audit arrangements. The scope of the internal audit unit of IARCSC mandated to
carry out internal audit of the project was only limited to checking compliance of the
project with government rules and regulations to be followed for submission of payment
request (form M16) to Ministry of Finance, and did not cover the activities of the project
as prescribed in the agreed financial management arrangements.
The MTR and the last implementation support mission Aide Memoire (AM) also noted a
number of deficiencies in the procurement arrangements of the project. These include
submission of incomplete procurement documents for prior review which caused
significant delays, deficiencies in the selection process of individuals and re-opening of
some vacancies without obtaining prior Bank approval.
2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase
A much larger project named Capacity Building for Results (CBR) Facility has been
designed by the Bank as a successor to the MCP. Many of the lessons of the MCP have
contributed to the design of the CBR:
As mentioned earlier, the approach towards implementation of the project
changed from 2010 onwards. Instead of the ‗scattergun‘ approach of providing
―ad-hoc‖ MCP experts to large number of line ministries and agencies, it was
considered that clustering of MCPs in critical line ministries in important
common function positions such as HR, Procurement and Financial Management
(FM) would lead to better results and improved service delivery. But this change
8
of strategy was effected too late during the project life time to impact project
results and outcomes as set out in the PDO.
A major concern of the MCP has been the lack of skills and expertise of lower
rank civil servants who were subordinate to the MCP experts. The MCP could
only recruit staff to grades 1, 2 and 3 of the civil service and this became a serious
bottleneck in many ministries which needed a second tier of managers under the
MCP experts to execute the ministry mandates in Kabul as well as in the
provinces. The new CBR initiative addresses this issue head on and focuses on the
creation of different cadres of civil servants under Senior Management Group
(SMG), Common Function (FM, Procurement, HR and Admin) and Professional
Cadres (Health Specialists, Economists, Mining Engineers etc.) with definitive
career development plans. This could pave the way for the third generation of
civil service reforms and the genesis of an Afghanistan Civil Service (ACS)
structure in line with more developed civil services such as in UK and New
Zealand.
At the end of the project in December 2011, contracts for more than 100 MCP experts
were active. Based on discussions with the GDPDM/IARCSC these contracts were
extended till July 31, 2012 with an understanding that all active positions will be re-
advertised and recruited as part of the new CBR project. At the time of writing, the
migration of MCP's into the CBR program was awaiting a formal decision by the
Steering Committee (SC) of the CBR comprised of the Minister of Finance and the
Chairman of the IARCSC. The technical recommendation being considered by the SC
was that MCP contracts would be brought into the CBR framework for the period until
the end of the MCP contract period. MCP's would retain their pay scales if this was
higher than the CBR pay scales (for around 15 persons) until the end of their contracts.
At the end of their contracts, individuals would need to reapply for their posts if they
wished and if appointed their salaries would be consistent with the CBR pay scales. This
formulation if accepted would ensure that there was a smooth transition between the two
projects.
3. Assessment of Outcomes
3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation (to current country and global priorities, and Bank assistance strategy)
Capacity building of the civil service has been a major concern of the donor community
from 2002 to-date. But much of this capacity building effort has been to pay for
externally funded staff outside the ‗tashkeel’ to carryout civil service functions. The MCP
was different. It was designed to build capacity from within the civil service by recruiting
qualified Afghans as contract civil servants to fill ‗tashkeel‘ positions. The objective was
to transform government‘s capacity to deliver services from within. The project to some
extent has been able to improve the utilization and cost effectiveness of donor resources
flowing through the national budget and importantly contribute to the overall legitimacy
of the state in the eyes of citizens. The Bank‘s new ISN (approved by the Board in April)
9
will maintain this objective for the Bank engagement in Afghanistan over the Transition
Period through to 2014.
Afghanistan‘s experience of capacity development over the last 10 years is far from
unique. The immediate post-conflict experience of most low- and middle-income
countries—such as Georgia, Liberia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste—has been
similar to Afghanistan‘s, especially in their initial widespread dependency on mostly ad
hoc, donor-driven technical assistance and salary supplementation schemes to fill the
vacuum left by the lack of government capacity immediately after the conflict. During the
immediate transition local consultants‘ salaries often increase sharply, as the best and
brightest leave the civil service (if they had not already) to join donor-funded programs or
NGOs on much higher wages. Rebuilding the civil service after such interventions is
therefore extremely difficult without donor-supported salary-supplement schemes, as
most skilled civil servants show little interest in working directly for the government.
With regard to design and implementation, the main lessons from MCP (mentioned later)
and other previous projects reflect the weak capacity of the IARCSC in implementing
large and complex civil service capacity building projects, as well as the need to align the
placement of appointees within a broader strategic framework. One MCP recruit will not
change a Ministry, but a cluster of MCPs supported by a clear Ministry reform plan and
with committed ministerial leadership might.
3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives (including brief discussion of causal linkages between outputs and outcomes, with details on
outputs in Annex 2)
The project development objective ―To achieve sustained improved performance in the
management capacity of key departments dealing with any or all of the common functions
including financial management, human resource management, policy and regulatory
design, and administration. This should ultimately result in improved utilization and cost
effectiveness of budgetary resources and faster and better development results on the
ground‖ is considered ambitious by this ICR. The project was initially designed for 3
years and was extended for another year in 2010 after the MTR. Initial recruitments of
MCP experts started much later than project effectiveness in October 2007. Part of this
delay was caused by the protracted mobilization of International Technical Assistance
(ITA) to assist GDPDM with Human Resource Management (HRM) issues, Monitoring
and Evaluation (M&E) and Communication and Outreach. Procurement issues caused
major delays throughout the project. During the first year of project implementation line
ministries had little knowledge of MCP objectives which resulted in incomplete
proposals and inadequate terms of References (ToR) for the requested positions causing
delays in procurement and recruitment.
This ICR also feels that the outputs and outcomes under the project were disconnected.
The results framework of the project was flawed and did not reflect the actual intended
outcomes of the project. The outputs as measured by the results indicators mentioned in
the project documents are based on the performance of the project in terms of quantitative
targets achieved such as total number recruited at center and sub-national positions,
10
percentage of terminations etc. On the other hand, the outcomes of the project as defined
by the PDO should have been captured by improvement in business processes, budget
execution and service delivery results accruing to the end user.
Brief discussion of the project components is mentioned below:
Provision of Management Services “On Demand”
During the life of the project a total of 153 appointments were made by IARCSC across
28 ministries/agencies. During the first two years of project implementation, a number of
positions requested by the line ministries were rejected by IARCSC due to their nature
and incomplete terms of references (ToR). The first procurement plan under the project
was approved by the Bank in August 2008. The following table represents the total
number of positions requested by the ministries/agencies as well as the number of
approved positions by end December 2011.
Table 2: Positions by Ministries / Agencies
Ministry
proposal
received
Position
requested
Positions
approved
Applications
received
August 2008 –
July 2009
7 174 83 924
August 2009 –
July 2010
37 373 74 1714
August 2010 –
December 2011
43 107 0 /a 1776
Source: General Directorate of Program Design and Management (IARCSC)
/a: recruitment continued under the previous procurement plan
During four years of implementation, more than 650 positions were requested by the line
ministries/agencies and approximately 4650 applications in total were received for the
positions that were approved and advertised. A total of 34 MCP experts resigned during
the life of the project and contracts ended for another 16 MCP recruits. The MTR and the
last Supervision Mission Aide Memoire (December 2011) have discussed the advantages
of recruiting cohorts or ―clusters‖ of MCP experts in line ministries/agencies which
started from late 2009 under the project. The ministries which received clusters of MCP
experts and improved their functions considerably relative to other ministries which
received fewer experts include Ministry of Finance (MoF), Ministry of Commerce and
Industry (MoCI), Ministry of Mines (MoM) and Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock
(MAIL). The distribution of MCP experts in different line ministries/agencies is
represented in the following graph.
11
The project was unsuccessful in recruiting sufficient number of people in sub-national
positions. Over the project implementation period of four years only 7 MCP
appointments were made at sub-national level as against a target of 20 per cent of total
appointments under the project. Recruitments of sub-national positions have suffered
because of security reasons, lack of suitable incentives for such positions and insufficient
infrastructure and logistical facilities in the provinces. These constraints are also likely to
affect the Capacity Building for Results (CBR) program as well since a large number of
positions to be funded by the CBR Facility will be targeted at the provinces. This ICR
recommends the implementing partners for the CBR program and the Bank to work
together towards devising suitable incentives for attracting qualified Afghan nationals for
sub-national positions.
Program Management
This component was aimed at strengthening the capacity of the Capacity Development
Secretariat which was later renamed as GDPDM. At the time of project effectiveness, this
component was provided with a total of USD 5 million for overall program management
including outreach and communication, technical evaluation of ministry proposals,
recruitment and contract management. The program management unit at GDPDM also
received International Technical Assistance (ITA) during the initial implementation
period in terms of executive search/recruitment/HR management and M&E of the project
under this component. However TA support was not successful in building capacity in
GDPDM due to lack of proper co-ordination and engagement. A request for further
technical assistance from GDPDM under this component could not be accommodated
due to budget constraints and protracted administrative processes. The program
management unit (PMU) at GDPDM had significant weaknesses in terms of staff strength
and capacities. Attrition of staff from the MCP PMU made project implementation
difficult considering the small size of talent pool and the competitive labor market in the
country. The Human Resources (HR) and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) department
of the GDPDM in particular were faced with severe staff shortages and lack of technical
support.
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
AN
SA
HO
O
IAR
CSC
MA
IL
Mo
CI
Mo
CIT
Mo
CN
Mo
Ec
Mo
E
Mo
EW
Mo
F
Mo
HE
Mo
IC
Mo
J
Mo
LSA
MD
Mo
M
Mo
PH
Mo
PW
MR
RD
Mo
TCA
Mo
UA
Mo
WA
Oo
P
12
There was no significant involvement of other departments of the IARCSC in
management and oversight of the MCP. As a result GDPDM leadership exercised full
control over program management. In the views of this ICR, this concentration of power
and responsibilities in terms of managing the senior most civil servants of the
Government in a standalone directorate of IARCSC was not beneficial to the project.
Communication and information sharing with other departments would have provided
more flexibility and strategic direction to the project.
In spite of these difficulties, GDPDM managed to recruit some excellent MCPs, place
them in ministries, monitor their individual performance and within the constraints of any
operation in a fragile conflict affected environment such as Afghanistan, achieve a degree
of success in terms of capacity development in some limited areas. This was not as much
as the PDO required, and depended on the individual qualities of the MCPs recruited, but
the PDO was always over-ambitious.
3.3 Efficiency
This section is not applicable for this project.
3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating
(combining relevance, achievement of PDOs, and efficiency)
Rating: Moderately unsatisfactory (MU)
There is no doubt that the project has recruited many well qualified Afghans who,
anecdotally, appear to have raised the standard of management in their Ministries. But
this is extremely difficult to measure systematically as no baseline data was collected to
allow for such measurement. The project M&E system could not capture very clearly
ministry outcomes and the cause and effect linkages between MCP appointments and
improvements in service delivery. To this extent the project falls short of its stated
development objectives. The intention of the project was to significantly enhance
budgetary performance and service delivery standards of the line ministries with which it
worked. Strictly, this was not achieved, although towards the end of the project life a shift
of approach towards the clustering of MCP experts in critical line ministries does appear
to have made a significant difference.
The project was unable to recruit sufficient number of MCP experts during its years of
operation. Lack of qualified candidates was the major reason for this shortfall. But delays
in No Objection (NOL) issuances by the World Bank for qualified candidates throughout
the implementation period made the recruitment process lengthy and complicated which
acted as a deterrent to the achievement of PDOs. Discussions with the Bank‘s Financial
Management and Procurement units revealed that incomplete documentation and
safeguards on the part of the implementing agency were the primary reason for these
delays. Regular Bank supervision and guidance on financial management and
procurement standards improved the quality of document submission and reporting which
subsequently reduced the administrative delays during the later stages of the project.
The project could not deliver on sub-national recruitments. In spite of the difficulties,
only 7 MCP recruitments in provincial positions over a period of four years of project
13
implementation is poor, but this was not entirely in the hands of the GDPDM leadership
to deliver, but depended on combination of factors, including lack of Ministry demand,
lack of individual incentives, poor security, etc.
3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts
(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development
None of the project development objective indicators directly dealt with poverty
reduction and social development aspects. It is therefore impossible to say to what extent
these benefitted from the project. The number of women inducted as MCPs under the
project was too small to create a critical mass which would facilitate any cultural change
in the civil service. Furthermore, no incentive mechanisms were designed under the
project to make the civil service a more attractive environment for women.
(b) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)
The strongest unintended outcome of MCP was that it helped expand the technocrat pool
from which future leaders of Afghanistan would be drawn. For instance, the current
Director General Budget in Ministry of Finance, the Deputy Ministers for Policy and
Planning in Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MoCI) and Ministry of Mines (MoM)
were all previously recruited through the MCP.
4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome
Rating: High
The outcomes of any project in a fragile and conflict affected context are associated with
substantial risks. In Afghanistan civil service reform is one of the most delicate and
politically sensitive areas because of political, economic and ethnic considerations.
Technocratic approaches to state building in Afghanistan have historically had to contend
with the nature of politics in the country, where formal office and position are used as
resources to balance competing elite interests. The Afghan state—while having a highly
centralized, unitary character as embodied in successive Constitutions—has always had
weak central control and has needed to build coalitions of common interest with a strong
periphery. The use of state position and office as bargaining tools in the wider political
process has a long history, ensuring that attempts to introduce modern, merit-based public
sector reforms face an uphill struggle.
In hindsight the MCP recruitment and selection process should have been subject to more
careful oversight from within government itself. To leave this process almost exclusively
to a single unit within the IARSC was a high risk strategy, and put considerable burden
on that department.
The PDO of MCP was extremely ambitious to be achieved within a short period of 3
years. Better performance of line ministries in terms of service delivery to end users and
efficient use of budgetary resources is a long term goal for the Government and the
14
donors. In a weak capacity environment like Afghanistan very little is likely to be
achieved in just 3 years. But nevertheless MCP experts managed to improve capacities in
key departments such as HR, Finance, Policy and Planning and Administration in a
number of key ministries including Ministry of Finance (MoF), Ministry of Commerce
and Industry (MoCI), Ministry of Education (MoE) and Ministry of Agriculture,
Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL).
The project could not deliver on the number of sub-national recruitments due to the
absence of proper incentive measures for those positions. This poses a significant risk for
the follow-on Capacity Building for Results (CBR) project.
5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance (relating to design, implementation and outcome issues)
5.1 Bank Performance
(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry
Rating: Moderately unsatisfactory
(b) Quality of Supervision
Rating: Moderately satisfactory
(c) Overall Bank Performance
Rating: Moderately satisfactory
Quality at Entry
The MCP was initiated at a time when there was considerable demand for capacity
injection into the civil service. Its design drew on the lessons from the implementation of
the Afghan Expatriates Program (AEP) and Lateral Entry Program (LEP). MCP satisfied
the need for a unified program which followed a single set of criteria for identifying need,
recruitment, remuneration and supervision. However it had two principal design
weaknesses: firstly, it adopted a scattergun approach to providing capacity injection to
ministries. It would have been far better to ensure a) that capacity injection was linked to
a clear ministry reform plan, and b) provided a cluster of MCPs that could have operated
at scale. Neither of these was achieved through the life of the project. Preparation and
implementation of a ministry reform plan was never a condition of receiving MCP
appointees, while, at the same time, too much faith was given to the transformative power
of one or two qualified MCPs to change a ministry‘s culture and service delivery
performance.
Secondly, it was over-ambitious in terms of what it could achieve within three years. In a
fragile and conflict affected environment like Afghanistan affecting long term
institutional change requires a much longer time horizon. Given the delays in recruitment
of MCP staff there was very little time for the project to make its mark. Thirdly, its
results framework did not capture the necessary indicators to measure ministry outcomes.
As a result it is difficult to measure its impact. There is some anecdotal evidence that
15
good MCPs made a difference to Ministry outputs and helped improve management
performance, but there was never any systematic evidence collected that this actually led
to improved outcomes. In terms of design, the project had only one major component
dealing with the provision of management services. Interviews with various MCP experts
during the ICR mission indicate that a separate component on training and capacity
building of the MCP recruits would have delivered better results.
Quality of Supervision
Three major issues affected the implementation of the project. First, the Bank team had
four task team leaders during the course of the project. This rapid turnover of TTLs was
detrimental to effective and continuous supervision of the project. Secondly, the quality
of some of the supervision was variable. As a result the project suffered from significant
delays in NOL approvals issued by the Bank team. These delays were not entirely the
fault of the Bank team but in part were caused by incomplete documentation provided to
the Bank which included deficient terms of references (ToR) and technical evaluation
reports (TER) for the recruitments, incomplete withdrawal applications and procurement
plans. Thirdly, many of the MTR recommendations in late 2010 were never taken
forward because the project was overtaken by planning for its successor the CBR, which
took up large amount of Bank staff time. Rather than re-structure the project it was
decided to incorporate many of the recommendations and lessons learnt from MCP into
the new project.
For the preparation of this ICR, a significant number of MCP experts were interviewed
by the project team whose names are provided in annex 5. Interviews were designed to
capture the advantages of recruiting clusters of MCPs to that of individual positioning of
these experts. The ICR team interviewed cohorts of MCPs based in Ministry of Mines
(MoM), Ministry of Education (MoE) and Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and
Livestock (MAIL) to assess the performance of these ministries. Interviews were
conducted with individual MCPs present in Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and Ministry of
Women Affairs (MoWA) to ascertain the significance of the cluster approach. Focus
group discussions were held with MCPs in specific common function positions such as
HR, FM and Procurement to understand the shortcomings of the MCP and improve upon
them while implementing CBR. In addition, the ICR team also benefitted from the views
provided by the supervisors (Deputy Ministers) of the MCP experts.
The ICR team also reviewed several policy notes prepared during the design of the CBR
which contained valuable insights on issues such as civil service cadre development,
training of potential CBR recruits and creation of a Management Internship Program
(MIP). These topics were not included under the MCP structure and were developed after
in-depth discussions with various stakeholders including the MCP experts.
5.2 Borrower Performance
(a) Government Performance
Rating: Moderately unsatisfactory
16
(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance
Rating: Moderately satisfactory
(c) Overall Borrower Performance
Rating: Moderately satisfactory
Government Performance
Since 2002, civil service reform has been an important government priority. After
implementing projects such as AEP and LEP, MCP was designed to build capacity within
the civil service. A separate IDA financed project named Civil Service Reform Project
(CSRP, P097030) was developed simultaneously to implement public administration
reforms in five key ministries. While there were significant linkages between the MCP
and CSRP as MCP provided the skilled managers to the ministries to carry out the
planned activities under CSRP, the synergies between the two were never adequately
exploited. The two programs were also implemented by two different departments within
the IARSC which made coordination between them more difficult. At the same time
other government capacity building initiatives such as the Civilian Technical Assistance
Program, which provided non-tashkeel technical assistance to ministries at much higher
wage rates than MCP, were never properly coordinated with the MCP.
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize firstly, that there was considerable demand for
MCPs on the part of government ministries that the project was unable to meet. Ministers
valued the contribution of MCP appointees, and while the project could have been better
embedded within an overall ministry led reform process, it was recognized across
government as an important way to build capacity within the civil service rather than in
project implementation unit enclaves. Secondly, given the nature of the overall reform
environment with large numbers of externally funded staff implementing a series of often
disconnected donor driven interventions, it was extremely difficult for government to
harmonize capacity development approaches around the MCP alone.
Implementing Agency Performance
The implementing agency for MCP was the General Directorate of Programs Design and
Management (GDPDM) unit of the IARCSC. According to the implementation
arrangements stated in the PAD, oversight of the project was assigned to the Public
Administration Reform (PAR) Steering Committee of the Government. However, in
practice communication linkages between the MCP Project Management Unit (PMU) and
the PAR Steering Committee were never established properly. As a result GDPDM
functioned as a standalone department within IARCSC with no reporting obligation to the
higher echelons of the Government.
A majority of MCP experts interviewed during the ICR mission and preceding
supervision missions have raised concerns on substantial delays in payment of salaries.
One of the reasons for the delayed salary payments was the low special account ceiling
approved for MCP expenses. Still, delays in payments in some cases for more than 6
months poses serious questions about the financial management and documentation
17
systems of the GDPDM. In addition, a considerable number of MCPs had grievances
about the salary packages offered to them citing inequities with other MCPs in similar
positions. The MCP salary scales were determined in an ad-hoc manner based on salary
history rather than the salary scales approved for the project.
In spite of this, it should be acknowledged that GDPDM had had to deal with a series of
Bank TTLs who bought little consistency to the relationship. Project funding to finance
international TA to support the department was inadequate and was quickly exhausted,
and while discussions took place to recruit new international TA to support the project
this was overtaken by planning for the new CBR follow-on project to the MCP.
6. Lessons Learned (both project-specific and of wide general application)
There are both more general lessons of approach and specific lessons from
implementation.
Design
On design the main lesson is that capacity injection schemes like MCP need to be aligned
with a wider reform process. Unless they are it is difficult to see how injecting capacity
alone in an unreformed ministry will make any difference to performance. The strength
of MCP will only be fully realized when it is tied to a wider strategic reform pathway. To
this extent capacity injection has to be part and parcel of a whole of ministry reform
program, which includes MCP appointees as part of a package of wider ministry support.
The second lesson is that capacity injection has to be at scale. Dropping one or two MCPs
into a ministry and expecting them to make a difference is fanciful. The real effect and
impact will only be achieved by ensuring a ‗cluster‘ approach to MCP placement. In this
way a ministry gets the full benefit of the program at scale. The consequence of this is the
approach has to be selective and phased. Not all of government can benefit at the same
time.
The third lesson is that the PDO needs to SMART (Specific, Measurable, Achievable,
Realistic and Time bound). There is no point having a wonderful and smooth running
capacity injection program if at the end of the day you do not know its impact on
improving government services. Much more work therefore needs to go into
understanding and measuring the linkages between capacity inputs and ministry outputs
and this needs to be captured adequately in the results framework and identification and
articulation of appropriate indicators.
Implementation
The following experiences from MCP bear special attention:
Inclusion of Middle-management and Junior Professionals under MCP: The MCP
only catered to the senior grades of the Afghan Civil Service (Grades 1 & 2). A common
issue raised by a majority of the MCP experts was the deficient skill levels and lack of
18
support for lower grade staff in their ministries/agencies. Under future such programs,
such as CBR, these issues need to be addressed through the creation of a Senior
Management Group (SMG), Common Function and Professional Staff cadres.
Recruitment under common function and professional staff cadres should be expanded to
include lower grades of the civil service.
Training and Capacity Building of Recruits: Many MCP experts expressed their need
for on-the-job training and capacity building during the interviews. MCP had no training
component to address these issues. A key lesson is that such programs require a dedicated
project component on training and capacity building of recruits through specialized
courses and exposure visits to other countries as part of the overall approach to capacity
development.
Sub-National Outreach: The civil service infrastructure at sub-national levels in
Afghanistan is extremely weak. The MCP envisaged to build line ministry functioning in
the provinces but failed to mobilize expert personnel at the relevant positions. Future
programs (such as CBR) must develop appropriate measures to increase sub-national
recruitments, including tackling the issue of appropriate hardship allowances, to bring
about changes in provincial recruitment and service delivery across Afghanistan.
Country Based Bank Task Team: MCP faced enormous amount of delays in NOL
approvals and continuous change of Bank task team leaders (TTL) throughout the project
period. A country based Bank task team with longer term continuity will significantly
increase project performance in fragile contexts such as Afghanistan.
Transparent Salary Negotiations: A majority of MCP experts expressed their
grievances on the determination of salary scales which were largely based on their salary
history. Salaries should be based on the skills, qualifications and experience required for
the positions rather than personal salary history. This is a general lesson but has also been
incorporated into the CBR which will emphasize the establishment of fixed salary scales
for the different categories of civil servants it intends to support.
Quality of Recruits: While it was sometimes difficult for the program to recruit good
quality experts, when it did they made all the difference to the success of the program.
This is an important lesson for the future and shows the importance of maintaining a high
standard in terms of caliber of experts even at the risk of not recruiting at all.
Discontinue/Merge other parallel capacity building initiatives: Interviews with
several MCP recruits reflected that similar civil service capacity building programs such
as Civilian Technical Assistance program (CTAP) are creating negative incentives for the
MCP staff. CTAP supports advisory level positions which are not part of the Government
Tashkeel (Establishment) and salary scales under CTAP are generally two to three times
of MCP scales. Such proliferation of capacity development programs should be avoided
as it undermines the overall reform effort.
19
7. Comments on Issues Raised by Grantee/Implementing Agencies/Donors
(a) Grantee/Implementing agencies
The government‘s response lays particular stress on the fact that the MCP was never allowed to
expand to its total allocation of $35 million, as it was overtaken by its successor program, the
Capacity Building for Results initiative, so it could never achieve its planned recruitment of staff
at sub-national level, that during individual ministry assessments all MCP teams displayed an
increase in percentage of expenditures in critical ministries, and that far from lacking oversight
from other departments, the GDPDM was fully embedded within the IARCSC. On the basis of
the achievements of the MCP the IARCSC-GDPDM believe the project warrants an overall
―Highly satisfactory‖ rating.
While we recognize the government‘s disappointment, we do not feel that such a rating would be
warranted in the circumstances nor would it be supported by the evidence. The MCP had both
design and implementation failings. As this ICR makes plain these were not necessarily the fault
of the implementing agency, but often reflected the broader difficulties of operating in
Afghanistan, and lack of an overall capacity development plan. Nevertheless, the project never
collected the necessary evidence to indicate level of project achievement against PDO. While it is
clear that some MCPs performed extremely well, there were significant weaknesses in the overall
approach which were only addressed towards the end of the project lifetime. While it is true that
failure to appoint MCPs at sub-national level was result of combination of factors, a more
concentrated effort might have seen better results in this regard. At the same time, it is important
to acknowledge that the GDPDM had to contend with a series of Bank TTLs over the life of the
project. This inevitably caused some inconsistency in messaging and supervision of the project.
(b) Cofinanciers/Donors
Not applicable
(c) Other partners and stakeholders (e.g. NGOs/private sector/civil society)
Not applicable
20
Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing
(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)
Components Appraisal Estimate
(USD millions)
Actual/Latest
Estimate (USD
millions)
Percentage of
Appraisal
provision of management
services (on demand) 27.00 30.00 111
program management 3.00 5.00 166
Total Baseline Cost 30.00 35.00 116
Physical Contingencies
Price Contingencies
Total Project Costs 30.00 35.00 116
Project Preparation Costs
Total Financing Required 30.00 35.00 116
(b) Financing
Source of Funds Type of
Cofinancing
Appraisal
Estimate
(USD
millions)
Actual/Latest
Estimate
(USD
millions)
Percentage of
Appraisal
Trust Funds 0.00 0.00
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust
Fund 10.00 15.00 150
21
Annex 2. Outputs by Component
Provision of Management Services “On Demand”
The project recruited a total of 161 MCP experts over a period of four years against a
target of 175 over the same period. Recruitments under MCP started almost 10 months
after the effectiveness of the project. Initially the line ministries were slow to grasp the
objective of MCP and thus requested a variety of positions to be funded through MCP
which were outside its mandate. Many of these positions were not aligned to the ministry
strategic plans and reflected ad-hoc requirements. Performance of the communication and
outreach activities of the GDPDM in informing the line ministries about the MCP
approach and objectives could be termed as unsatisfactory in this regard. This is also
supported by the information provided in table 2 above. The number of positions
approved is considerably lower than the requested number of positions throughout the
project period.
The MCP was able to attract talented and qualified Afghan nationals from the Diaspora
and other private and donor-funded positions into the core Civil Service. The program
was able to create a critical mass of champions in ministries such as Ministry of Finance
(MoF), Ministry of Commerce and Industries (MoCI), Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation
and Livestock (MAIL) and Ministry of Mines (MoM) who led their ministry-wide reform
processes. The majority of the MCP recruits possessed at least an undergraduate degree.
About 25 per cent of the MCP experts obtained a post graduate qualification or a
Master‘s in Business Administration (MBA). The ICR mission noted that administrative
procedures associated with the verification of educational documents caused major delays
in postings and salary payments of the selected individuals.
Sub-national recruitments needed more attention under the program. GDPDM failed to
achieve significant numbers for sub-national positions during the project life-time. It is
important that under CBR, the IARCSC needs to prepare a well-designed strategy for
provincial recruitments given the enormous responsibility it bears with respect to the
Transition period and beyond. A snapshot of challenges faced by some of the regional
offices of Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL), Ministry of Public
Health (MoPH) and IARCSC is provided in Table 3 below.
Table 3: Sub-national Challenges
Ministry/Agency Department/Directorate Challenges
Helmand Provincial Office (i)Lack of Infrastructure
(ii)Vacant positions and lack of skilled staff.
(iii)Lack of Tashkeel (Establishment) for certain areas such as
forestry and research.
Nangarhar Valley Development (i)Shortage of budget under operations and development
component
(ii)Inadequate office facilities
(iii)Shortage of managerial and technically skilled staff
(iv)Lack of training facilities for staff
MoPH Farah Provincial Office (i)Security Condition
22
(ii)Lack of female doctors
(iii)Low salaries for P&G staff
IARCSC Kandahar Regional Office (i)Lack of professional cadres at provincial levels
(ii)Educational and training programs for the P&G staff
(iii)Inadequate office Infrastructure
(iv)Lack of a comprehensive capacity development plan
Some Achievements under the “Cluster” Approach
During late 2009/early 2010, the program started recruiting batches or ―clusters‖ of
MCPs for key ministries. A brief account of the achievements of this approach for some
of the ministries is mentioned below.
Ministry of Commerce & Industries (MoCI): The MCP expert for International
Trade department facilitated the World Trade Organization (WTO) accession
process and the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) has been signed.
The MCP expert for the Business Licensing Department conducted a capacity
needs assessment and has prepared a Capacity Development Plan. Six zonal
offices are now connected to the online database. The MCP expert has also
modified the legal framework for licensing.
Ministry of Finance (MoF): The MCP expert for State Owned Enterprises (SoE)
has led the liquidation of a number of government establishments according to the
Privatization Policy of the government. The MCP appointee for the large
taxpayers office have simplified the tax filing procedures as a result of which
taxpayers compliance have increased from 60% to 90%. An Aid Effectiveness
Policy Unit under the Aid Management Directorate has been established and a
capacity development plan has been prepared.
Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (MoCIT): MoCIT has
three MCPs currently, Director General of Information and Communication
Technology, Director General of Planning and International Relations and the
Head of the National Data Center. Specific achievements include designing of
eighty government websites under the E-Government Interoperability Framework
Standards and collection of statistical data for telecommunications, postal and IT
services from 34 provinces. Overseas training for 32 staff members of MoCIT has
been facilitated through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
23
Annex 3. Grant Preparation and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes
(a) Task Team members
Names Title Unit Responsibility/
Specialty
Lending
Anne Tully Senior Operations Officer OPCFC Public Sector Management, TTL
Nigel Peter Coulson Senior Public Sector Specialist SASGP TTL
Ranjana Mukherjee Senior Public Sector Specialist SASGP Public Sector Management
Hossai Mahak Aliffi Team Assistant SASPF Program Assistance
Vidya Kamath Program Assistant SASGP Program Assistance
Supervision/ICR
Satyendra Prasad Senior Governance Specialist SASGP TTL
Richard Spencer Hogg Governance Adviser SASGP TTL (ICRR)
Deepal Fernando Senior Procurement Specialist ECSO2 Procurement
Monali Chowdhurie -Aziz Senior Public Sector Specialist WBIOG Public Sector Management
Asif Ali Senior Procurement Specialist SARPS Procurement
Kenneth O. Okpara Sr Financial Management Specialist SARFM Financial Management
Asha Narayan Financial Management Specialist SARFM Financial Management
Zohra Farooq Financial Management Specialist SARFM Financial Management
Rahimullah Wardak Procurement Specialist SARPS Procurement
Vishal Gandhi Consultant SASGP Public Sector Management
Maha Ahmed Consultant SASGP Public Sector ; Monitoring and
Evaluation
Jalpa Patel Consultant SASGP Public Sector Management
Vidya Kamath Program Assistant SASGP Program Assistance
Mohammed Edreess Sahak Team Assistant SASEP Program Assistance
Kaushik Sarkar Consultant SASGP Public Sector Management
(b) Staff Time and Cost
Stage of Project Cycle
Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)
No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including travel
and consultant costs)
Lending
FY07 0 0
Total: 0 0
Supervision/ICR
FY07 BB – 4.83 20,971.38
FY08 BB – 9.13 55,971.42
FY09 BB – 22.02 113,313.36
FY10 BBTF – 28.70 125,743.69
FY11 BBTF – 15.35 106,206.11
FY12 BBTF – 4.10 31,039.89
Total: 453,245.85
24
Annex 4. Summary of Grantee's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR
BORROWER’S EVALUATION
Implementation Completion and Results Report
ARTF funded Management Capacity Program (MCP)
The Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC) of the
Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GoIRA) implemented the ARTF
(Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund) funded Management Capacity Program (MCP)
to achieve sustained improved performance in the management capacity of key
departments of GoIRA ministries dealing with any or all of the common functions,
including financial management, policy and regulatory design, and administration. The
implementation was spread over 4 & ½ years from 2007 to 2011. Within IARCSC, the
General Directorate of Programs‘ Design and Management (GDPDM), formerly Capacity
Development Secretariat (CDS) was responsible for the implementation of MCP.
The GDPDM is the lead IARCSC general directorate on institutional capacity
development, project design and management, and donor relation and coordination. The
mandate of GDPDM includes development, review, and coordination of strategic options
for delivering development programs as part of Public Administration Reform (PAR) in
the context of Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS).
The MCP was a successor to a series of earlier operations of World Bank to support civil
service reform in Afghanistan. The two interventions envisaged in MCP were:
Provision of executive services ―on demand‖ and to provide experienced
managerial level staff to ministries; and,
To put in place an establishment for the efficient management of the program that
evolves into a permanent service of the IARCSC.
These interventions had the objective of improving performance of management capacity
of key departments of GoIRA ministries and thereby contributing to enhanced and cost
effective utilization of budgetary resources and better delivery of public services.
25
During the lifetime of the project, a total of 193 positions were processed under the MCP.
The MCP appointees were placed across 28 ministries / agencies of GoIRA including
provinces. During the initial years, the implementation of the program was supported by
a consulting firm (Adam Smith International) which helped to improve the foundations of
a robust and transparent recruitment process as well as a sound monitoring & evaluation
(M&E) system. GDPDM has used lessons learnt from other projects to improve the
management of MCP, increase the number of MCP applicants and the number of MCP
support requests from Ministries, improve the MCP Appointee selection process for more
transparency, and adopt a clustering approach for a more holistic support through MCP.
The GDPDM has strived hard to ensure transparency in the MCP recruitment process.
The recruitment was fully aligned with the principles of merit based recruitment process
under the civil servants‘ law. The decision making process had involvement of
beneficiary ministries / agencies at all stages of recruitment. Commissioners of
IARCSC‘s Boards chaired the panels and external experts such as university professors
and sector specialists were invited to assist and observe the MCP interviews and provide
their inputs in the recruitment process.
The salary scale which is approved by steering committee where the World Bank was the
observer has always been the base for any salary determinations. The confusion has
mostly been arisen due to different understanding of three different task team lead for the
MCP. The recommended revisions in using the scale have always been adapted by the
IARCSC. Referring to past salary history of candidates was one of recommendations
made by previous WB task team who was clearing the NoLs. The market distortion
caused by donor salary top ups has always been a challenge in determining salary for a
candidate under the MCP.
The M&E section of GDPDM developed a standardized M&E system inclusive of
comprehensive tools to assess departmental performance of MCP experts at regular
intervals (baseline, six months, annual, two years and on ad-hoc basis). The assessment
reports / feedback were regularly shared with respective departments including MCP
experts and other stakeholders to portray the ratio of change in the aforementioned
intervals within the departments under the support of MCP. While the system served very
well for performance assessment of individual MCP experts, at the systems level,
measuring change for broader objectives of improved service delivery proved to be
challenging. Frequent communication regarding the requirement of system modification
took place with the Bank Task Team. However, on account of limited timeframe of the
program and preoccupation of both Bank Task Team and GDPDM with designing a
follow on operations of MCP namely, the Capacity Building for Results (CBR) Facility,
further enhancement to the MCP M&E tools could not be taken up. Service delivery and
budget execution performance are two long term indicators which were difficult to be
achieved over the life cycle of the MCP. However, despite such constraints, the GDPDM
provided the Bank with data indicating the extent to which MCP experts had been
effective in improving the delivery of services and executing their departments‘ budgets.
For example, during the individual Ministry assessments, all MCP teams displayed an
increase in percentage of expenditure in critical Ministries, e.g. Ministry of Finance,
26
Agriculture, Health and etc. As a result of this impact, the procurement process and
contract management systems also improved and most of these Ministries qualified for
Direct Funding by donors and direct procurement authority.
The overall goal of the government is to improve the delivery of public services which
primarily takes place at sub-national level. Capacity for service delivery needs to improve
dramatically at sub-national level to ensure on-going legitimacy of the state and the peace
and stability of Afghanistan. MCP had a target of allocating twenty percent of the
appointments for sub-national level positions. This could not become feasible primarily
on account of the preferences of ministries/ agencies to prioritize for their immediate
needs of strengthening management capacity at central level. Secondly, the program as
envisaged intended to expand to a total allocation of USD 35 million which would have
supported 240 positions. However, within the available resources, only 153 appointments
could be supported under the program, limiting the planned subsequent expansion to sub-
national level. The follow-on program namely the CBR Facility, with its revamped
approach and enhanced allocation is likely to respond to the requirement of expanding
the program to sub-national level.
Further, the MCP could only recruit staff to grades 1, 2 and 3 of the civil service and this
became a serious bottleneck in many ministries which needed a second tier of managers
under the MCP experts to execute the ministry mandates in Kabul as well as in the
provinces. Considering the lessons learnt from the implementation of MCP, GDPDM has
emphasized on the expansion of the scope of the project to support the second and third
tier managers under the follow-on CBR Facility. Also, GDPDM initiated injecting
clusters into the line ministries during the last year of MCP implementation which led not
only to the recognition of MCP at the country level but also increased the productivity of
the respective government ministries. The MCP experts contributions in their respective
areas of work was endorsed and felicitated by the President and their respective
supervisors (mostly deputy ministers) and three of them have been promoted to the
positions of deputy ministers (Ministry of Commerce and Industries, Ministry of Mines
and Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs Martyred and Disabled).
The program assumed that MCP appointees do not need any additional capacity
development and that the ministries / agencies to which they are appointed will provide
them office facilities, etc., for their effective functioning. The IARCSC signed MoUs
with respective ministries / agencies and the responsibility of providing MCP experts
with necessary office supplies, such as computer, phone etc., rested with respective
ministry / agency. There was no provision in the program to step in and provide an
alternative in cases where the ministries / agencies failed to respond to the needs of MCP
appointees in a timely manner. The GDPDM continued with its promotional activities to
sensitize the ministries / agencies in this regard. Further, in coordination with other
capacity development programs, implemented by IARCSC, the MCP appointees were
included in the exposure visits to other countries (Korea, Italy, India) to widen their
knowledge and upgrade their skills.
27
MCP implementation was fully embedded in IARCSC and its relevant departments
played crucial roles in the management of MCP. For example, Appointments Boards‘
Commissioners chaired and led the recruitment process. All cases of grievances /
complaints regarding MCP recruitment process were processed by the IARCSC Appeals
Board. The MCP expert‘s performance evaluation forms were attested by the Chairman.
All financial arrangements of MCP were coordinated with the Finance department of the
Commission. GDPDM also coordinated and communicated MCP‘s provincial related
agendas with the IARCSC Provincial Affairs Directorate (PAD). GDPDM‘s
communication and outreach department frequently shared the MCP progress reports
with IARCSC‘s Communication and Media Relations Directorate. It is therefore not a
correct conclusion that there was no significant involvement of other departments of the
IARCSC in management and oversight of the MCP and GDPDM leadership exercised
full control over program management. In fact, the foremost and significant achievement
of MCP was to mainstream the CDS, an erstwhile PMU of IARCSC responsible for MCP
implementation into GDPDM, a full-fledged general directorate of IARCSC with a
defined mandate such that the processes of GDPDM were fully embedded with the
processes of other directorates of IARCSC.
Under a visionary leadership accompanied by competent staff, the IARCSC-GDPDM has
been able to transform MCP into a well-known project at country level, signified in
Kabul Conference and acknowledged by the President indicating the impact it made in
the government. The overall implementation progress of the project is strongly believed
to be “Highly satisfactory” and not “Moderately satisfactory”.
The Kabul Conference marked a new phase in the partnership with donor community
namely, the Kabul Process. The Afghan Government‘s program has been defined by
measurable benchmarks contained in National Priority Programs (NPPs) that represent
the prioritized requirements of the ANDS. The hallmark of the Kabul Process is Afghan
leadership and ownership. Earlier, the Consultative Peace Jirga of June 2010 was an
expression of national consensus and gave a mandate to adopt a ―whole of the state‖
approach and ―whole of government‖ path to national renewal. The essence of the ―whole
of the state‖ is constitutionalism and the essence of the ―whole of government‖ approach
is structural reform to create an effective, accountable and transparent government that
can deliver services to the population and safeguard national interests.
The IARCSC is implementing the NPP3 for ―efficient and effective government‖
following the ―whole of government‖ approach and has now taken lead in implementing
Capacity Development programs for Afghan Civil service under the overall Public
Administration Reform agenda that follows a ―whole of ministry‖ approach. The cluster
approach promoted by MCP towards later part of its implementation lays the foundations
of a ―whole of ministry‖ approach which has now been fully embedded in the MCP
follow-on program – ―Capacity Building for Results (CBR) Facility‖.
28
Annex 5. List of Supporting Documents and MCPs Interviewed
World Bank: Management Capacity Program (MCP) Documents (P106170)
MCP Implementation Support Mission Aide Memoire (February, 2009)
Implementation Status and Results (March 2010)
Implementation Status and Results (November 2010)
Mid-Term Review (October-November 2010)
Implementation Status and Results (December 2011)
MCP Technical Annex
Implementation Completion Report for AEP and LEP, IARCSC (August 2010)
Assessment of the TAFSU, AEP and LEP
Review of the Lateral Entry Program (LEP), NORAD (May, 2006)
Interviews
Mr. Rohullah Osmani, Director General, GDPDM
Mr.A.Foshanji, Director (Operations), GDPDM
Mr.Faizan Ahmad, Director (Human Resources), Ministry of Women‘s Affairs
Mr.A.W.Arian, General Director for Policy and Planning, Ministry of Education
Mr.Khair Mohammad ―Niru‖, Director General, Manpower & Labor Affairs Regulations,
Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (MoLSAMD)
Mr.J.H.Samadey, Director (HR), MoLSAMD
Dr.Q.Qaeym, Director General, Directorate of Oil & Gas Survey, Ministry of Mines
(MoM)
Ms.G.Habibyar, Director (Policy), MoM
Mr.M.W.Etabar, Director (Finance & Accounts), Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and
Livestock (MAIL)
Mr.M.Y.Hotak, Director (Human Resources & Capacity Development), MAIL
Prof.S.W.Ataye, Director (Policy, Planning and Foreign Affairs), Ministry of Justice
(MoJ)
Mr.A.N.Baizayee, Director General (HR), Ministry of Education (MoE)
Mr.M.Ebrahim, Director (Finance), MoM
Ms.M.Akbari, Director (Investment Promotion), MoM
Mr.S.Z.Hashemi, Director (Legal), MoM
Mr.M.Aqa, Director General (Treasury), Ministry of Finance (MoF)
Mr.H.Jalil, Director of Aid Management Directorate, MoF
Tirich MirTirich Mir(7690 m)(7690 m)
D a s h t - I M a r g oD a s h t - I M a r g o
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30°N
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35°N
60°E
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75°E
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65°E 70°E
65°E 70°E
AFGHANISTAN
0 50 100
0 50 100 Miles
150 Kilometers
IBRD 33358R1
OC
TOBER 2011
AFGHANISTANPROVINCE CAPITALS
NATIONAL CAPITAL
RIVERS
MAIN ROADS
RAILROADS
PROVINCE BOUNDARIES
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES
This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other informationshown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World BankGroup, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or anyendorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.
