Doctrines ULP

LABOR RELATIONS

DOCTRINES, CBA AND ULP CASES

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INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE) vs. HON. LEONARDO A.

QUISUMBING G.R. No. 128845 June 1, 2000

Labor Law; Constitutional Law; That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond

contention. That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our

Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution in the Article on Social

that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and

exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties , [to] act with justice, give everyone his due,

Same; Same; International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes

discrimination. International law, which springs from general principles o f law, likewise proscribes

discrimination. General principles of law include principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of

fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable. The Universal Declaration of Human

Rights, the International C ovenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the International

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention against

Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of

Employment and Occupation all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very

antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this

principle as part of its national laws.

Same; Same; State directe The

ess of

spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its

eyes to unequal and discriminatory ter ms and conditions of employment.

Same; Same; Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code.

Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135, for

example, prohibits and penal izes the payment of lesser compensation to a female employee as against

a male employee for work of equal value. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an

employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage members hip in any

labor organization.

Same; Same; If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that

these employees perform equal work. The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence

that local -hires perform work e qual to that of foreign -hires. The Court finds this argument a little

cavalier. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these

employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience . If the

employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives

less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has

discriminated against that employee; it is for the e mployer to explain why the employee is treated

unfairly.

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Same; Same; The State has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital.

between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with

public interest that labor contracts, collective bargainin g agreements included, must yield to the

common good. Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts

will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations. [International School Alliance of Educators vs.

Quisumbing, 333 SCRA 13(2000)]

ACOJE WORKERS' UNION vs. NATIONAL MINES AND ALLIED WORKERS' UNION

(NAMAWU) G.R. No. L -18848 April 23, 1963

Labor unions; Certification election; Voters list may not be contested where petitioner was given an

opportunity to object in the lo wer court but did not do so. Where the labor unions concerned agreed,

not only to the holding of the election, but also to the use of the company payroll as of a given date as

the basis for determining who are qualified to vote subject to the approval of t he lower court, and said

unions were given an opportunity to make comments and observations on said list contained in the

on the matter of inclusion and e xclusion of voters, and, although two other unions and the company

moved for reconsideration of the ruling of the lower court on said matter, the petitioning onion failed

to do so, the petitioner may no longer contest the accuracy of said voters list.

Same; Same; General allegation of duress not sufficient to invalidate election. A general allegation

that workers threatened, coerced, and intimidated to vote for respondent union, without anything to

indicate the number of workers involved, without the su pporting affidavit of any of them, and without

an offer to introduce their testimony or the testimony of any of them, was in the light of the

attending circumstances clearly insufficient to warrant the invalidation of the certifica-tion election

in the present case.

Same; Same; Alleged disorder disproven by minutes. As regards the disorder that allegedly

characterized the election, the minutes thereof, stating that said election was peaceful, sufficient to

ion vs. National Mines and Allied Workers' Union

(NAMAWU), 7 SCRA 730(1963)]

YOKOHAMA TIRE PHILIPPINES, INC vs. YOKOHAMA EMPLOYEES UNION G.R. No.

159553 December 10, 2007

Labor Law; Certification Elections; Dismissals; Without a final judgment declaring th e legality of

dismissal, dismissed employees are eligible to participate and vote in certification elections. Section

2, Rule XII, the rule in force during the November 23, 2001 certification election clearly, unequivocally

and unambiguously allows dismiss ed employees to vote during the certification election if the case

they filed contesting their dismissal is still pending at the time of the election. Here, the votes of

employees with illegal dismissal cases were challenged by petitioner although their ca ses were still

pending at the time of the certification election on November 23, 2001. These cases were filed on June

only on August 29, 2003. Even the new r ule has explicitly stated that without a final judgment

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declaring the legality of dismissal, dismissed employees are eligible or qualified voters. [Yokohama

Tire Philippines, Inc. vs. Yokohama Employees Union, 539 SCRA 556(2007)]

SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA P ACIFIC PLASTIC vs. HON. BIENVENIDO

LAGUESMA G.R. No. 111245 January 31, 1997

Labor Law; Collective Bargaining; Certification Election; In order to have a valid election at least a

majority of all eligible voters in the unit must have cast their votes. The certification election held on

October 6, 1992 is valid. Art. 256 of the Labor Code provides that in order to have a valid election, at

least a majority of all eligible voters in the unit must have cast their votes. The certification election

results show that more than a majority, i.e., 62 out of a total of 98 eligible voters included in the list of

employees obtained from the SSS, cast their votes. Hence, the legal requirement for a valid election

was met.

Same; Same; Same; The policy of the Labor Code of encouraging the holding of a certification election

as the definitive and certain way of ascertaining the choice of employees as to the labor organization

in a collective bargaining unit underscored by the Court. It should ideally be the payroll which

should have been used for the purpose of the election. However, the unjustified refusal of a company to

submit the payroll in its custody, despite efforts to make it produce it, compelled resort to the SSS list

as the next best source of information. After al l, the SSS list is a public record whose regularity is

presumed. In Port Workers Union of the Philippines (PWUP) v. Undersecretary of Labor and

Employment, this Court underscored the policy of the Labor Code of encouraging the holding of a

certification el ection as the definitive and certain way of ascertaining the choice of employees as to the

labor organization in a collective bargaining unit.

Same; Same; Same; Grounds of protests not raised before the close of the proceedings and duly

formalized within five (5) days after the close of the election proceedings are deemed waived. At the

have been raised during the elections and

formalized in its election protest. We agree with private respondent MNMPP in its Opposition to

protests not raised before the close of the proceedings and duly formalized within five (5) days after

the close of the election proceedings are deemed waived.

Same; Same; Same; The representation case shall not be adversely affected by a collective bargaining

agreement registered before or during the last 60 days of a subsisting agreement or during the

pendency of the representation case. -

election Conference was that the CBA between it and the PPC signed during the pend ency of the

representation proceedings, rendered the certification election moot and academic. Rule V, Book V of

the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, 4 provides: The representation case shall not,

however, be adversely affected by a collective bargaining agreement registered before or during the last

60 days of a subsisting agreement or during the pendency of the representation case.

Same; Same; Same; A CBA which was prematurely renewed is not a bar to the holding of a

certification election. Thi s rule was applied in the case of ALU -TUCP v. Trajano where we held that

the representation case will not be adversely affected by a CBA registered before or during the freedom

period or during the pendency of the representation case. In ALU v. Calleja, we also held that a CBA,

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which was prematurely renewed, is not a bar to the holding of a certification election. Hence, the CBA

entered into between petitioner and PPC during the pendency of the representation case and after the

filing of the petition for ce rtification election on August 24,1990, cannot possibly prejudice the

certification election nor render it moot.

Same; Same; Same; A certification election can be conducted despite pendency of a petition to cancel

the union registration certificate. With r

in Association of Court of Appeals Employees vs. Calleja, a certification election can be conduc ted

despite pendency of a petition to cancel the union registration certificate. For the fact is that at the

time the respondent union filed its petition for certification, it still had the legal personality to perform

such act absent an order directing it s cancellation.

[Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Pacific Plastic vs. Laguesma, 267 SCRA 303(1997)]

KIOK LOY vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC) G.R. No. L -54334

January 22, 1986

Labor Law; Unfair Labor Practice; Collective Bargaining Agreement; Collec tive bargaining, concept

of. Collective bargaining which is defined as negotiations towards a collective agreement, is one of

the democratic frameworks under the New Labor Code, designed to stabilize the relation between

labor and management and to create a climate of sound and stable industrial peace. It is a mutual

responsibility of the employer and the Union and is characterized as a legal obligation. So much so

that Article 249, par. (g) of the Labor Code makes it an unfair labor practice for an employe r to refuse

agreement with respect to wages, hours of work, and all other terms and conditions of employment

including proposals for adjusting any grievance or question arising under such an agreement and

Same; Same; Same; Same; Preconditions for setting in motion mechanics of collective bargaining.

While it is a mutual obligation of the parties to bargain, the employer, however, is not under any legal

duty to initiate contract negotiation. The mechanics of collective bargaining is set in motion only when

the following jurisdictional preconditions are present, namely, (1) possession of the status of majority

designation provided for by the Labor Code; (2) proof of majority representation; and (3) a demand to

bargain under Article 251, par. (a) of the New Labor Code . . . . all of which preconditions are

undisputedly present in the instant case.

Same; Same; Same -

collective bargaining agreement, an indication of its bad faith. We are in total conformity with

actice. It

has been indubitably established that (1) respondent Union was a duly certified bargaining agent; (2)

it made a definite request to bargain, accompanied with a copy of the proposed Collective Bargaining

Agreement, to the Company not only once bu t twice which were left unanswered and unacted upon;

and (3) the Company made no counter proposal whatsoever all of which conclusively indicate lack of a

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request for a counter proposal is left unanswered. Even during the period of compulsory arbitration

ude stalling the negotiation by a series of

postponements, non-appearance at the hearing conducted, and undue delay in submitting its

financial statements, lead to no other conclusion except that it is unwilling to negotiate and reach an

agreement with the Union. Petitioner has not at any instance, evinced good faith or willingness to

discuss freely and fully the claims and demands set forth by the Union much less justify its opposition

thereto.

Same; Same; Same; Same; When unfair labor practice, committed; Case at bar. The case at bar is

not a case of first impression, for in the Herald Delivery Carriers Union (PAFLU) vs. Herald

that the respondent employer, a fter having been served with a written bargaining proposal by the

petitioning Union, did not even bother to submit an answer or reply to the said proposal. This

doctrine was reiterated anew in Bradman vs. Court of Industrial Relations wherein it was furthe r

both parties will approach the negotiation with an open mind and make a reasonable effort to reach a

Same; Same; Same; Due

successive letters to bring the company to the bargaining table. resaid submittal

failed to impress Us. Considering the various postponements granted in its behalf, the claimed denial

of due process appeared totally bereft of any legal and factual support. As herein earlier stated,

petitioner had not even honored respon

geared towards bringing the Company to the bargaining table. It did not even bother to furnish or

serve the Union with its counter proposal despite persistent requests made therefor. Certain ly, the

moves and over-all behavior of petitioner -company were in total derogation of the policy enshrined in

the New Labor Code which is aimed towards expediting settlement of economic disputes. Hence, this

Court is not prepared to affix its imprimatur to such an illegal scheme and dubious maneuvers.

Same; Same; Same; Employer should not be allowed with impunity to resort to schemes feigning

negotiations by going through empty gestures; Findings of NLRC of reasonableness of any collective

bargaining agreem ent, accorded respect. We agree with the pronouncement that it is not obligatory

upon either side of a labor controversy to precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of the other. But

an erring party should not be tolerated and allowed with impunity t o resort to schemes feigning

negotiations by going through empty gestures. More so, as in the instant case, where the intervention

of the National Labor Relations Commission was properly sought for after conciliation efforts

undertaken by the BLR failed.

The instant case being a certified one, it must be resolved by the NLRC pursuant to the mandate of

P.D. 873, as amended, which authorizes the said body to determine the reasonableness of the terms

and conditions of employment embodied in any Collective Barg aining Agreement. To that extent,

utmost deference to its findings of reasonableness of any Collective Bargaining Agreement as the

governing agreement by the employees and management must be accorded due respect by this Court.

[Kiok Loy vs. NLRC, 141 SCRA 179(1986)]

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GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION vs HON. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 146728

February 11, 2004

Labor Law; Collective Bargaining Agreements; Unfair Labor Practices; The law mandates that the

representation provision of a CBA should last for five years; Where the company refuses to send a

counter-proposal to the union and to bargain anew on the economic terms of the CBA, it commits an

unfair labor practice. The law mandates that the representation provision of a CBA should las t for

five years. The relation between labor and management should be undisturbed until the last 60 days

of the fifth year. Hence, it is indisputable that when the union requested for a renegotiation of the

economic terms of the CBA on November 29, 1991, i t was still the certified collective bargaining agent

of the workers, because it was seeking said renegotiation within five (5) years from the date of

prescribed 3-year period from the date of effectivity of the CBA, albeit just before the last day of said

period. It was obvious that GMC had no valid reason to refuse to negotiate in good faith with the

union. For refusing to send a counterproposal to the union and to bargain anew on the economic terms

of the CBA, the company committed an unfair labor practice under Article 248 of the Labor Code,

which provides that: ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. It shall be unlawful for an

employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice: . . . (g) To violate the duty to bargain

collectively as prescribed by this Code; . . .

Same; Same; Same; The crucial question whether or not a party has met his statutory duty to bargain

in good faith typically turns on the facts of the individual case there is no per se test of good faith in

bargaining; It bears stressing that the procedure in collective bargaining prescribed by the Code is

mandatory because of the basic interest of the state in ensuring lasting indus trial peace. We have

held that the crucial question whether or not a party has met his statutory duty to bargain in good

faith typically turns on the facts of the individual case. There is no per se test of good faith in

bargaining. Good faith or bad faith is an inference to be drawn from the facts. The effect of an

-faith bargaining, but the impact of

all such occasions or actions, considered as a whole. Under Article 252 abovecited, both parties are

required to perform their mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good

faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement. The union lived up to this obligation when it

presented proposals for a new CBA to GMC within three (3) years from the effectivity of the original

CBA. But GMC failed in its duty under Article 252. What it did was to devise a flimsy excuse, by

questioning the existence of the union and the status of its membership to prevent any negotiation. It

bears stressing that the procedure in collective bargaining prescribed by the Code is mandatory

because of the basic interest of the state in ensuring lasting industrial peace.

Same; Same; Same; Where the employer did not even bother to submit an answer to th e bargaining

proposals of the union, there is a clear evasion of the duty to bargain collectively.

make a timely reply to the proposals presented by the union is indicative of its utter lack of interest in

bargaining with the union. Its ex cuse that it felt the union no longer represented the workers, was

-

Where the

employer did not even bother to submit an answer to the bargaining proposals of the union, there is a

clear evasion of the duty to bargain collectively.

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Same; Same; Same; Where the ill -timed letters of resignation from the union members indicate that

the employer had interfered with the right of its employees to self -organization, the company may be

found guilty of unfair labor practice. -

organization? The CA found that the letters between Februa ry to June 1993 by 13 union members

signifying their resignation from the union clearly indicated that GMC exerted pressure on its

employees. The records show that GMC presented these letters to prove that the union no longer

enjoyed the support of the wor kers. The fact that the resignations of the union members occurred

-timed letters of

resignation from the union members indicate that GMC had interfered with the right of its employees

to self-organization. Thus, we hold that the appellate court did not commit grave abuse of discretion

in finding GMC guilty of unfair labor practice for interfering with the right of its employees to self -

organization.

Same; Same; Same; The general rule is that when a CBA already exists, its provision shall continue to

govern the relationship between the parties, until a new one is agreed upon , unless one of the parties

abuses this grace period by purposely delaying the bargaining process, in which case a departure from

the general rule is warranted. The provision mandates the parties to keep the status quo while they

are still in the process o f working out their respective proposal and counter proposal. The general rule

is that when a CBA already exists, its provision shall continue to govern the relationship between the

parties, until a new one is agreed upon. The rule necessarily presupposes that all other things are

equal. That is, that neither party is guilty of bad faith. However, when one of the parties abuses this

grace period by purposely delaying the bargaining process, a departure from the general rule is

warranted.

Same; Same; Same; Under ordinary circumstances, it is not obligatory upon either side of a labor

controversy to precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of the other, but an erring party should not

be allowed to resort with impunity to schemes feigning negotiations by going through empty gestures;

If the company committed unfair labor practice by thwarting the negotiations for new economic terms

of the CBA, the draft CBA proposed by the union may be imposed on the company. Under ordinary

circumstances, it is not obligat ory upon either side of a labor controversy to precipitately accept or

agree to the proposals of the other. But an erring party should not be allowed to resort with impunity

to schemes feigning negotiations by going through empty gestures. Thus, by imposin g on GMC the

provisions of the draft CBA proposed by the union, in our view, the interests of equity and fair play

were properly served and both parties regained equal footing, which was lost when GMC thwarted the

negotiations for new economic terms of the CBA. The findings of fact by the CA, affirming those of the

NLRC as to the reasonableness of the draft CBA proposed by the union should not be disturbed since

they are supported by substantial evidence. On this score, we see no cogent reason to rule other wise.

Hence, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack

or excess of jurisdiction when it imposed on GMC, after it had committed unfair labor practice, the

draft CBA proposed by the union for the remaining two (2) years of the duration of the original CBA.

decision on this issue. [General Milling Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 422 SCRA 514(2004)]

SAN PEDR O HOSPITAL OF DIGOS, INC. vs. SECRETARY OF LABOR G.R. No. 104624

October 11, 1996

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Labor Law; Suspension of Operations; Temporary suspension of operations is recognized as a valid

exercise of management prerogatives provided it is not carried out in order to circumvent the

provisions of the Labor Code or to defeat the rights of the employees under the Code. Temporary

suspension of operations is recognized as a valid exercise of management prerogative provided it is not

carried out in order to circumvent the provisions of the Labor Code or to defeat the rights of the

employees under the Code. The determination to cease or suspend operations is a prerogative of

management that the State usually does not interfere with, as no business can be required to continu e

operating at a loss simply to maintain the workers in employment. Such an act would be tantamount

to a taking of property without due process of law, which the employer has a right to resist. But where

it is shown that the closure is motivated not by a d esire to prevent further losses, but to discourage the

workers from organizing themselves into a union for more effective negotiations with management, the

State is bound to intervene.

Same; Same; Evidence; Burden of Proof; The burden of proving that a tem porary suspension is bona

fide, falls upon the employer. The burden of proving that such a temporary suspension is bonafide,

falls upon the employer. In this instance, petitioner had to establish the fact of its precarious financial

health, that its cessat ion of operations was really necessitated by its financial condition, and that said

condition would probably be alleviated or improved, or its losses abated, by undertaking such

suspension of operation. Peti-tioner could have at least partly met the forego ing requirements by

submitting its financial statements or records as proof of its financial crisis, since the purported

and continued failure to submit its financial statements could not but raise grave doubts as to the

truth of the claimed financial crisis and the real purpose of the suspension of operations. It is not

enough to merely raise this issue nor to discuss it only in passing. The precarious financ ial condition

must be established by evidence, e.g., balance sheets and income statements, and the figures therein

must be interpreted and discussed at length. Peti-tioner was recklessly pushing its luck when it

believed that the Secretary could be convinc

financial statements and the notes thereto. The fact that the conciliator never asked for them is no

Same; Same; Same; Same; It is a hornbook rule that employers who contemplate terminating the

services of their workers must base their decisions on more than just flimsy excuses, and this same

principle applies in temporary suspension of operations. It is a hornbook rule that em ployers who

contemplate terminating the services of their workers must base their decisions on more than just

flimsy excuses, considering that the dismissal of an employee from work involves not only the loss of

his position but, what is more important, hi s means of livelihood. The same principle applies in

temporary suspension of operations, as in this case, considering that it involves laying off employees

for a period of six months.

Same; Same; If a legitimate, valid and legal suspension of operations does not terminate but merely

suspends the employee-employer relationship, with more reason will an invalid and illegal suspension

of operations not affect the employment relationship. A

fide suspension of the operation of a business or undertaking for a period not exceeding six (6) months

Implementing the L abor Code provides that the employer -employee relationship shall be deemed

suspended in case of the suspension of operation referred to above, it being implicitly assumed that

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once operations are resumed, the employer-employee relationship is revived and r estored. If a

legitimate, valid and legal suspension of operations does not terminate but merely suspends the

employee-employer relationship, with more reason will an invalid and illegal suspension of

operations, as in this case, not affect the employment relationship.

Same; Same; Collective bargaining can be conducted, and a new CBA may be entered into, during the

effectivity of a temporary suspension of operations. The foregoing premises considered, it is clear that

there is no basis for petitioner to cla im that a new CBA should not be entered into or that collective

bargaining should not be conducted during the effectivity of a temporary suspension of operations. In

this instance, petitioner expressly represented that the suspension was to be for six mont hs only. In the

absence of any other information, the plain and natural presumption will be that petitioner would

resume operations after six months, and therefore, it follows that a new CBA will be needed to govern

the employment relations of the parties, the old one having already expired. Clearly then, under the

circumstances, the respondent Secretary cannot be faulted nor considered to have gravely abused his

discretion for ordering the parties to enter into a new CBA.

Same; Collective Bargaining; Assum ption of Jurisdiction; Where an employer refuses to bargain,

without valid and sufficient cause, the Secretary of Labor may, in the exercise of his powers under

Article 263(i) of the Labor Code to decide and resolve labor disputes, properly grant wage incr eases.

Did the Secretary act in excess of jurisdiction in imposing the wage increases and union shop

provision on the petitioner? We hold that he did not. While petitioner cannot be forced to abandon its

suspension of operations even if said suspension be declared unjustified, illegal and invalid, neither

can petitioner evade its obligation to bargain with the union, using the cessation of its business as

reason therefor. For, as already indicated above, the employer -employee relationship was merely

suspended (and not terminated) for the duration of the temporary suspension. Using the suspension

as an excuse to evade the duty to bargain is further proof of its illegality. It shows abuse of this option

and bad faith on the part of petitioner. And since it ref used to bargain, without valid and sufficient

cause, the Secretary in the exercise of his powers under Article 263(i) of the Labor Code to decide and

resolve labor disputes, properly granted the wage increase and imposed the union shop provision.

Same; Same; Same; Backwages; Under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, the Secretary of Labor is

authorized to penalize an erring employer who refuses to accept returning employees by ordering such

employer to pay backwages. Under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, th e Secretary is authorized to

penalize an erring employer who refuses to accept returning employees by ordering such employer to

pay backwages. This is within his jurisdiction and is warranted by his finding as to the invalidity of

the temporary suspension.

Same; Dismissal of Employees; Business Losses; Business reverses or losses are recognized by law as a

just cause for terminating employment. Business reverses or losses are recognized by law as a just

cause for terminating employment. This Court held in C olumbia Development Corporation vs.

expected, the law recognizes the same as a just cause for terminating an employment [Art. 283(a) of

the Labor Code] and in many

dismiss employees because of losses in the operation of its business, lack of work and considerable

N Pictures, Inc., 35

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Same; Same; Same; Where an employer suffers serious and actual business reverses, management has

the final say as to whether it will continue to risk its capital in its business or not. The losses

patients prior to the temporary suspension. It is beyond cavil then that petitioner suffered serious and

actual business reverses. In such a case, management has the final say as to whether it will continue

to risk its capital in its business or not. This is properly its prerogative. Since there is basis for the

permanent closure of the business, we cannot read into it any attempt to defeat the rights of its

employees under the law, nor any oppressive and high -handed motives.

Same; Collective Bargaining; An employer which has already decided to close shop cannot be

compelled to enter into a new CBA. Thus, despite the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the

part of the respondent Secretary, this Court cannot impose upon petitioner the directive to enter into a

new CBA with the union for the very simple reason that to do so would be to compel petitioner to

continue its business when it had already decided t o close shop, and that would be judicial tyranny on

our part. [San Pedro Hospital of Digos, Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor, 263 SCRA 98(1996)]

SUNDOWNER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON G.R.

No. 82341 December 6, 1989

Labor Relations; Colle ctive Bargaining Agreement; Rule that labor contracts are not enforceable

against a transferee of an enterprise unless expressly assumed; Reasons. The rule is that unless

expressly assumed, labor contracts such as employment contracts and collective bargai ning

agreements are not enforceable against a transferee of an enterprise, labor contracts being in

personam, thus binding only between the parties. A labor contract merely creates an action in

personam and does not create any real right which should be re spected by third parties. This

conclusion draws its force from the right of an employer to select his employees and to decide when to

engage them as protected under our Constitution, and the same can only be restricted by law through

the exercise of the police power.

Same; Same; Same; No duty on the part of petitioner to inform the employees of its lease and purchase

of the assets and properties of Mabuhay; Reasons. Moreover, the court does not subscribe to the

theory of public respondent that petitioner should have in formed NUWHRAIN of its lease of the

premises and its purchase of the assets and personal properties of Mabuhay therein so that said

employees could have taken steps to protect their interest. The court finds no such duty on the part of

petitioner and its f ailure to notify said employees cannot be an indicium of bad faith.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Employer-employee relationship; Petitioner cannot be compelled to absorb

the employees of Mabuhay and to pay them backwages; Reasons. Much less is there any evidenc e

that petitioner and respondent Mabuhay are joint tortfeasors as found by public respondent. While it

is true that petitioner is using the leased property for the same type of business as that of respondent

Mabuhay, there can be no continuity of the busin ess operations of the predecessor employer by the

successor employer as respondent Mabuhay had not retained control of the business. Petitioner is a

corporation entirely different from Mabuhay. It has no controlling interest whatever in respondent

Mabuhay. Petitioner and Mabuhay have no privity and are strangers to each other. What is obvious is

that the petitioner, by purchasing the assets of respondent Mabuhay in the hotel premises, enabled

Mabuhay to pay its obligations to its employees. There being no e mployer -employee relationship

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between the petitioner and the Mabuhay employees, the petition must fail. Petitioner can not be

compelled to absorb the employees of Mabuhay and to pay them backwages. [Sundowner Development

Corporation vs. Drilon, 180 SCRA 14 (1989)]

GERARDO F. RIVERA vs. HON. EDGARDO ESPIRITU G.R. No. 135547 : January 23, 2002

Actions; Certiorari; Prohibition; Requisites. Petitioners allege grave abuse of discretion under Rule

65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The essential requisites for a petition for certiorari under Rule

65 are: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising judicial or quasi -

judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or

wi th grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or

any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For writs of prohibition, the

requisites are: (1) the impugned act must be that of

whether exercising judicial, quasi -

Same; Same; Same; Certiorari and Prohibition are not proper where what exists is a contract between

a private firm and one of its labor unions, albeit entered into with the assistance of an Inter -Agency

Task Force created to address the problems between the contracting parties. The assailed agreement

is clearly not the act of a tribunal, board, officer, or person exercising judicial, quasi -judicial, or

ministerial functions. It is not the act of public respondents Finance Secretary Edgardo Espiritu and

Labor Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma as functiona ries of the Task Force. Neither is there a

judgment, order, or resolution of either public respondents involved. Instead, what exists is a contract

between a private firm and one of its labor unions, albeit entered into with the assistance of the Task

Force. The first and second requisites for certiorari and prohibition are therefore not present in this

case.

Same; Same; Same; Contracts; Where the object of the action is actually the nullification of a contract

between an employer and one of its labor union s, the proper remedy is an ordinary civil action for

annulment of contract, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the regional trial

courts, not certiorari or prohibition. Furthermore, there is available to petitioners a plain, speedy,

and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. While the petition is denominated as one for

certiorari and prohibition, its object is actually the nullification of the PAL -PALEA agreement. As

for annulment of contract, an action which

properly falls under the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts. Neither certiorari nor prohibition is

the remedy in the present case.

Labor Law; Words and Phrases; Collective Bargaining Agreement, Defined; The primary purpose of a

CBA is the stabilization of labor -management relations in order to create a climate of a sound and

stable industrial peace, and in construing a CBA, the courts must be practical and realistic and give

due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and the purpose which it is intended to

serve.

representative incorporating the agreement reached after negotiations with respect to wag es, hours of

work and all other terms and conditions of employment, including proposals for adjusting any

stabilization of labor -management relations in order to cre ate a climate of a sound and stable

LABOR RELATIONS


Page 12 of 41

industrial peace. In construing a CBA, the courts must be practical and realistic and give due

consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and the purpose which it is intended to serve.

Same; Collective Bargai ning; Article 253 -A of the Labor Code has a two -fold purpose one is to

promote industrial stability and predictability, and the other is to assign specific timetables wherein

negotiations become a matter of right and requirement; Nothing in Article 253 -A prohibits the parties

from waiving or suspending the mandatory timetables and agreeing on the remedies to enforce the

same. The assailed PAL -PALEA agreement was the result of voluntary collective bargaining

negotiations undertaken in the light of the severe financial situation faced by the employer, with the

peculiar and unique intention of not merely promoting industrial peace at PAL, but preventing the

-A of the Labor Code.

Article 253-A has a two -fold purpose. One is to promote industrial stability and predictability.

Inasmuch as the agreement sought to promote industrial peace at PAL during its rehabilitation, said

agreement satisfies the first purpose of Article 253 -A. The other is to assign specific timetables wherein

negotiations become a matter of right and requirement. Nothing in Article 253 -A, prohibits the parties

from waiving or suspending the mandatory timetables and agreeing on the remedies to enforce the

same.

Same; Same; The right to free collective bargaining, after all, includes the right to suspend it. In the

voluntarily entered into the CBA with PAL. It was also PALEA that v oluntarily opted for the 10 -year

right to free collective bargaining, after all, includes the right to suspend it.

Same; Same; The acts of the public fun ctionaries in sanctioning the 10 -year suspension of the PAL -

The acts of

public respondents in sanctioning the 10 -year suspension of the PAL -PALEA CBA did not contravene

the

promoted the shared responsibility between workers and employers; and the exercised voluntary

modes in settling disputes, including conciliation to foster in dustrial peace.

Same; Same; Union Security Clauses; Unfair Labor Practice; The Court is unable to declare the

objective of union security an unfair labor practice. The questioned proviso of the agreement reads:

a. PAL shall continue recognizing PALEA as th e duly certified bargaining agent of the regular rank -

and-file ground employees of the Company. Said proviso cannot be construed alone. In construing an

instrument with several provisions, a construction must be adopted as will give effect to all. Under

Ar ticle 1374 of the Civil Code, contracts cannot be construed by parts, but clauses must be interpreted

in relation to one another to give effect to the whole. The legal effect of a contract is not determined

alone by any particular provision disconnected fr om all others, but from the whole read together. The

-PALEA CBA shall be respected. The

aforesaid p

during the period of the suspension of the CBA. Its objective is to assure the continued existence of

PALEA during the said period. We are unable to declare the objective of union security an unfair

labor practice. It is State policy to promote unionism to enable workers to negotiate with management

on an even playing field and with more persuasiveness than if they were to individually and

LABOR RELATIONS


Page 13 of 41

separately bargain with

protection of their rights and interests vis --vis the employer.

Same; Same; Under Article 253 -A of the Labor Code, the representation limit for the exclusive

bargaining agent applies only when there is an extant CBA in full force and effect. We also do not

agree that the agreement violates the five -year representation limit manda ted by Article 253 -A. Under

said article, the representation limit for the exclusive bargaining agent applies only when there is an

extant CBA in full force and effect. In the instant case, the parties agreed to suspend the CBA and put

in abeyance the limi t on the representation period.

Same; Same; The PAL-PALEA agreement dated 27 September 1998 is a valid exercise of the freedom

to contract, and under the principle of inviolability of contracts guaranteed by the Constitution, the

contract must be upheld. In sum, we are of the view that the PAL -PALEA agreement dated

September 27, 1998, is a valid exercise of the freedom to contract. Under the principle of inviolability

of contracts guaranteed by the Constitution, the contract must be upheld. [Rivera vs. Espi ritu, 374

SCRA 351(2002)]

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION -PTGWO vs. HON. MA. NIEVES D.

CONFESOR; G.R. No. 111262 September 19, 1996

Labor Law; Labor Unions; Collective Bargaining; Legislators inclined to have the effectivity of the

CBA for three (3) years insofar as the economic as well as non -economic provisions are concerned.

From the aforesaid discussions, the legislators were more inclined to have the period of effectivity for

three (3) years insofar as the economic as well as non -economic provisions are concerned, except

representation.

Same; Same; Same; No grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary of Labor in ruling that

the effectivity of the renegotiated terms of the CBA shall be for three (3) years. Thus, we do not find

any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary of Labor in ruling that the effectivity of the

renegotiated terms of the CBA shall be for three (3) years.

Same; Same; Same; No merit in petition er-

SMFI should still be considered part of the bargaining unit of SMC. With respect to the second issue,

there is, likewise, no merit in petitioner - FI

should still be considered part of the bargaining unit of SMC.

Same; Same; Same; Transformation of the companies is a managerial prerogative and business

judgment which the courts can not look into unless it is contrary to law, public policy or morals.

Undeniably, the transformation of the companies was a management prerogative and business

judgment which the courts can not look into unless it is contrary to law, public policy or morals.

Neither can we impute any bad faith on the part of SMC so as to jus tify the application of the doctrine

concerned employees that they will be absorbed by the new corporations without loss of tenure and

retaining their pres ent pay and benefits according to the existing CBAs.

LABOR RELATIONS


Page 14 of 41

Same; Same; Same; Magnolia and SMFI became distinct entities with separate juridical

personalities. Indubitably, therefore, Magnolia and SMFI became distinct entities with separate

juridical personalitie s. Thus, they can not belong to a single bargaining unit as held in the case of

Diatagon Labor Federation Local 110 of the ULGWP v. Ople.

Same; Same; Same; The employees sought to be represented by the collective bargaining agent must

have substantial mutu al interests in terms of employment and working conditions as evinced by the

type of work they performed. Moreover, in determining an appropriate bargaining unit, the test of

grouping is mutuality or commonality of interests. The employees sought to be rep resented by the

collective bargaining agent must have substantial mutual interests in terms of employment and

working conditions as evinced by the type of work they performed. Considering the spin -offs, the

companies would consequently have their respectiv e and distinctive concerns in terms of the nature of

work, wages, hours of work and other conditions of employment.

Same; Same; Same; It would then be best to have separate bargaining units for the different

companies where the employees can bargain separately according to their needs and according to their

own working conditions. Interests of employees in the different companies perforce differ. SMC is

engaged in the business of beer manufacturing. Magnolia is involved in the manufacturing and

processing of dairy products while SMFI is involved in the production of feeds and the processing of

chicken. The nature of their products and scales of business may require different skills which must

necessarily be commensurated by different compensation packages. T he different companies may have

different volumes of work and different working conditions. For such reason, the employees of the

different companies see the need to group themselves together and organize themselves into distinctive

and different groups. I t would then be best to have separate bargaining units for the different

companies where the employees can bargain separately according to their needs and according to their

own working conditions. [San Miguel Corporation Employees Union -PTGWO vs. Confesor, 262 SCRA

81(1996)]

LMG CHEMICALS CORPORATION vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF

LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT G.R. No. 127422 April 17, 2001

Labor Law; Collective Bargaining Agreements; If an employer could grant a wage increase to its

supervisors, there is n o valid reason why it should deny the same to union members. Petitioner

company granted its supervisory employees, during the pendency of the negotiations between the

parties, a wage increase of P4,500 per month or P166 per day, more or less. Petitioner ju stified this by

saying that the said increase was pursuant to its earlier agreement with the supervisors. Hence, the

company had no choice but to abide by such agreement even if it was already sustaining losses as a

result of the strike of the rank -and-fil

against respondent union members. If it could grant a wage increase to its supervisors, there is no

valid reason why it should deny the same to respondent union members. Significantly, while

petitioner asserts that it sustained losses in the first part of 1996, yet during the May 9, 1996

conciliation meeting, it made the offer of P135 daily wage to the said union members.

Same; Same; Assumption of Jurisdiction; The authority of the Secretary o f Labor to assume

It must be

emphasized that respondent Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the dispute because it is impressed

LABOR RELATIONS


Page 15 of 41

with national interest. As noted by t

sulfate requirements of MWSS as well as the sulfuric acid of NAPOCOR, and consequently, the

continuation of the strike would seriously affect the water supply of Metro Manila and the power

su

authority of the Secretary of Labor to assume jur isdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to

cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to national interest includes and extends to all

questions and controversies arising therefrom. The power is plenary and discretionary in nature to

enable him to effectively and efficiently dispose of the primary dispute.

Same; Same; Same; The Court should help labor authorities in providing workers immediate benefits,

without being hampered by arbitration or litigation processes that prove to be not o nly nerve -wracking

but financially burdensome in the long run. To deprive respondent Secretary of such power and

discretion would run counter to the well -established rule that all doubts in the interpretation of labor

laws should be resolved in favor of la bor. In upholding the assailed orders of respondent Secretary,

this Court is only giving meaning to this rule. Indeed, the Court should help labor authorities in

providing workers immediate benefits, without being hampered by arbitration or litigation proc esses

that prove to be not only nerve -wracking but financially burdensome in the long run. [LMG Chemicals

Corporation vs. Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, 356 SCRA 577(2001)]

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. Hon. SECRETARY OF LABOR LEONARDO

QUISUMBING G.R. No. 127598 February 22, 2000

Labor Law; Salaries; Bonus; As a rule, a bonus is not a demandable and enforceable obligation; it

may nevertheless be granted on equitable considerations as when the giving of such bonus has been

As a rule, a bonus is not a demandable and enforceable

obligation; it may nevertheless be granted on equitable considerations as when the giving of such

giving of the bonus sho uld have been done over a long period of time, and must be shown to have been

consistent and deliberate. Thus we have ruled in National Sugar Refineries Corporation vs. NLRC:

ing that the employer

agreed to continue giving the benefits knowing fully well that said employees are not covered by the

Same; Same; Same. In the case at bar, the record shows that MERALCO, aside from complying with

the regular 13th month bonus, has further been giving its employees an additional Christmas bonus

at the tail -end of the year since 1988. While the special bonuses differed in amount and bore different

titles, it can not be denied that these were given voluntari ly and continuously on or about Christmas

time. The considerable length of time MERALCO has been giving the special grants to its employees

indicates a unilateral and voluntary act on its part, to continue giving said benefits knowing that

such act was not required by law.

Same; Same; Same; The giving of the special bonus can no longer be withdrawn by the company as

Indeed, a company practice

favorable to the employees has been established and the payments made by MERALCO pursuant

thereto ripened into benefits enjoyed by the employees. Consequently, the giving of the special bonus

LABOR RELATIONS


Page 16 of 41

existing benefits.

Same; Labor Union; Prohibition to Join Labor Union; Employees holding a confidential position are

prohibited from joining the union of the rank and file employees. Both MERALCO and the Office of

the Solicitor General dispute this ruling because it d isregards the rule We have established on the

exclusion of confidential employees from the rank and file bargaining unit. In Pier 8 Arrastre vs.

confidential employee

him eligible to join his rank and file co -

Thus, in Metrolab Industries vs. Roldan -

exclude the confidential employees from the regular rank and file employees qualified to become

holding a confidential position a re prohibited from joining the union of the rank and file employees.

Same; Job-Contracting; The company can determine in its best business judgment whether it should

contract out the performance of some of its work for as long as the employer is motivated by good faith,

and the contracting out must not have been resorted to circumvent the law or must not have been the

result of malicious or arbitrary action. We recognize that contracting out is not unlimited; rather, it

is a prerogative that management enjo ys subject to well -defined legal limitations. As we have

previously held, the company can determine in its best business judgment whether it should contract

out the performance of some of its work for as long as the employer is motivated by good faith, and the

contracting out must not have been resorted to circumvent the law or must not have been the result of

malicious or arbitrary action. The Labor Code and its implementing rules also contain specific rules

governing contracting out (Department of Labor O rder No. 10, May 30, 1997, Sections 1 -25).

Same; Collective Bargaining Agreement; Article 253 -A serves as the guide in determining when the

CBA is to take effect. Article 253 -A serves as the guide in determining when the effectivity of the CBA

at bar is to take effect. It provides that the representation aspect of the CBA is to be for a term of 5

-negotiated

not later than 3 years after its execution. Any agreement on such other provision of the Collective

Bargaining Agreement entered into within 6 months from the date of expiry of the term of such other

provisions as fixed in such Collective Bargaining Agreement shall retroact to the day immediately

following such d ate. If such agreement is entered into beyond 6 months, the parties shall agree on the

Same; Same; If no agreement is reached within six (6) months from the expiry date of the three (3)

years that follow the CBA execution, the law expressly gives the parties the discretion to fix the

effectivity of the agreement. Under these terms, it is clear that the 5 -year term requirement is specific

to the representation aspect. What the law additionally requires is that a C BA must be re-negotiated

-negotiation that gives rise to the present CBA

deadlock. If no agreement is reached within 6 months from the expiry date of the 3 years that follow

the CBA execution, the law e xpressly gives the parties not anybody else the discretion to fix the

effectivity of the agreement.

LABOR RELATIONS


Page 17 of 41

Same; Same; Principle of Hold Over; In the absence of a new CBA, the parties must maintain the

status quo and must continue in full force and effect the ter ms and conditions of the existing

agreement until a new agreement is reached. Significantly, the law does not specifically cover the

situation where 6 months have elapsed but no agreement has been reached with respect to effectivity.

In this eventuality, w e hold that any provision of law should then apply for the law abhors a vacuum.

One such provision is the principle of hold over, i.e., that in the absence of a new CBA, the parties

must maintain the status quo and must continue in full force and effect th e terms and conditions of

the existing agreement until a new agreement is reached. In this manner, the law prevents the

existence of a gap in the relationship between the collective bargaining parties. Another legal principle

that should apply is that in t he absence of an agreement between the parties, then, an arbitrated CBA

takes on the nature of any judicial or quasi -judicial award; it operates and may be executed only

respectively unless there are legal justifications for its retroactive application. [M anila Electric

Company vs. Quisumbing, 302 SCRA 173(1999)]

FVC LABOR UNION -PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS

ORGANIZATION (FVCLU -PTGWO) vs. SAMA -SAMANG NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA

SA FVC -SOLIDARITY OF INDEPENDENT AND GENERAL LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

(SANAMA -FVC -SIGLO) G.R. No. 176249 November 27, 2009

Labor Law; Labor Unions; Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs); The law allows a challenge to

the exclusive representation status of a collective bargaining agent through the filing of a certification

election petition only within 60 days from the FVC Labor Union -Philippine Transport and General

Workers Organization (FVCLU -PTGWO) vs. Sama-Samang Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa FVC -

Solidarity of Independent and General Labor Organizations (SANAMA -FVC-SIGLO)

expiratio n of the five -year Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). The legal question before us

centers on the effect of the amended or extended term of the CBA on the exclusive representation status

of the collective bargaining agent and the right of another union to ask for certification as exclusive

bargaining agent. The question arises because the law allows a challenge to the exclusive

representation status of a collective bargaining agent through the filing of a certification election

petition only within 60 d ays from the expiration of the five -year CBA.

Same; Same; Same; By express provision of Article 253 -A, the exclusive bargaining status cannot go

beyond five years and the representation status is a legal matter not for the workplace parties to agree

upon. We hold this FVCLU -PTGWO position to be correct, but only with respect to the original five -

representation status. While the parties may agree to extend th -year term together

with all other CBA provisions, any such amendment or term in excess of five years will not carry with

-

quoted Artic le 253-A, the exclusive bargaining status cannot go beyond five years and the

representation status is a legal matter not for the workplace parties to agree upon. In other words,

despite an agreement for a CBA with a life of more than five years, either as an original provision or

Labor Union -Philippine Tran sport and General Workers Organization (FVCLU -PTGWO) vs. Sama-

LABOR RELATIONS


Page 18 of 41

Samang Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa FVC -Solidarity of Independent and General Labor

Organizations (SANAMA -FVC-SIGLO), 606 SCRA 198(2009)]

BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC. vs. BCI EMPLOYEES and WORKERS U NION -PAFLU;

G.R. No. L -24711 April 30, 1968

The principle of substitution, formulated by the

National Labor Relations Board, counterpart of our Court of Industrial Relations, means that where

there

contract with their employer, the employees can change their agent the labor union, but the collective

bargaining contract which in still subsisting, continues to bind the employees up to its expiration

date. They may, however, bargain for the shortening of said expiration date. And the only

contract; Exception.

validly executed collective bargaining contract with their employer by the simple expedient of

changing their bargaining agent. The new agent must respect the contract. The employees, thru their

new bargaining agent, cannot renege on the collective bargaining con tract, except to negotiate with

management for the shortening hereof.

Same; Same; Same; New collective bargaining agent does not automatically assume all personal

undertakings of deposed union; Substitutionary doctrine, held inapplicable. ary

automatically assumes all personal undertakings, such as the no -strike stipulation in this case,

assumed by the deposed union. When the BBWU bound itsel f and its officers not to strike, it could not

bind all the rival unions because the BBWU was the agent only of the employees, not of the other

unions which possess distinct personalities.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Liability of labor union or board or commit tee members for non-fulfillment

of collective bargaining contract. Under Art. 1704 of the Civil Code, in collective bargaining, the

labor union or members of the board or committee signing the contract shall be liable for non -

fulfillment thereof. Where the defendants are not signatories to the contract, nor are they participants

thereof, there can be no liability on their own.

Damages; No liability for damages of labor union, officers or members, in absence of clear proof; Rule

of vicarious liability, Repea led. The rule now is that for a labor union and/or its officers and

members to be liable, there must be clear proof of actual participation in, or authorization or

Republic Act

875 been expressly legislated out.

Agency; Everything binding on agent duly authorized binds principal, not vice -versa. Everything

that is binding on a duly authorized agent, acting as such, is binding on the principal; not vice -versa,

unless there is a mutual agency, or unless the agent expressly binds himself to the party with whom he

contracts, Art. 1897, Civil Code. As here, BBWU the previous agent was the one that expressly bound

LABOR RELATIONS


Page 19 of 41

itself to the other party, Benguet, Union, the new agent di d not assume the undertaking of BBWU.

[Benguet Consolidated, Inc. vs. BCI Employees & Workers Union -PAFLU, 23 SCRA 465(1968)]

CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER OF CONCERNED EMPLOYEES -UNIFIED FILIPINO

SERVICE WORKERS vs. HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA; G.R. No. 118915 Fe bruary 4,

1997

Actions; Due Process; Pleadings and Practice; A party cannot merely anchor its position on erroneous

names typographical errors which cannot materially alter the substance and merit of an assailed

resolution just to attain a reversal of said resolution. Petitioner alleges that public respondent

Undersecretary Laguesma denied it due process when it ruled against the holding of a certification

election. It further claims that the denial of due process can be gleaned from the manner by which the

assailed resolution was written, i.e., instead of the correct name of the mother federation UNIFIED, it

-AFW was referred to as

CMCEA -AFLO. Petitioner maintains that such errors indicate that the assailed resolution was

petitioner can be classified as mere typographical errors which cannot materially alter the substance

and merit of th e assailed resolution. Petitioner cannot merely anchor its position on the

ng to make a

Same; Same; A party cannot complain of denial of due process when it failed to file its opposition to

Petitioner also assails public responde

-

fair hearing was a clear case of a denial of its right to due process. Such contention of petitioner

deserves scant consideration. A perusal of the record shows that petitioner failed to file its opposition

n opportunity to be heard but lost

it -

Labor Law; Certification Elections; Collective Bargaining; Even if one year had lapsed since the time

of declaration of a final certification result, and there is no c ollective bargaining deadlock, there is no

grave abuse of discretion committed by the DOLE when it ruled against another certification election

filed by another union where the delay in forging of the CBA could not be attributed to the fault of the

union w ho won the earlier certification election. While it is true that, in the case at bench, one year

had lapsed since the time of declaration of a final certification result, and that there is no collective

bargaining deadlock, public respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it ruled in

of the latter, A scrutiny of the records will further reveal that after respondent union was certified as

the bargaining agent of CMC, it invited the employer hospital to the bargaining table by submitting

its economic proposal for a CBA However, CMC refused to negotiate with respondent union and

on for cancellation of the certificate of

registration which eventually reached this Court. The decision affirming the legal status of

respondent union should have left CMC with no other recourse but to bargain collectively, but still it

did not. Responden t union was left with no other recourse but to file a notice of strike against CMC for

LABOR RELATIONS


Page 20 of 41

unfair labor practice with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board. This eventually led to a

strike on April 15, 1993.

In the case of Divine Word University

of Tacloban v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, we had the occasion to define what a deadlock is,

deadlock when there is a complete blocking or stoppage resulting from the action of equal and opposed

effort at good faith bargaining which, despite noble intention s, does not conclude in agreement

between the parties.'"

Same; Same; Same; Same. If the law proscribes the conduct of a certification election when there is a

bargaining deadlock submitted to conciliation or arbitration, with more reason should it not be

conducted if, despite attempts to bring an employer to the negotiation table by the certified bargaining

Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code

should be interpreted liberally so as to include a circumstance, e.g. where a CBA could not be

concluded due to the failure of one party to willingly perform its duty to bargain collectively. This is

what i s strikingly different between the Kaisahan case and the case at bench for in the latter case,

there was proof that the certified bargaining agent, respondent union, had taken an action to legally

coerce the employer to comply with its statutory duty to ba rgain collectively, i.e., charging the

to bargain. It is only just and equitable that the circumstances in this case should be considered as

similar in na

to make sure that no floodgates will be opened for the circumvention of the law by unscrupulous

employers to prevent any certified bargaining agent from negotiating a CBA. Thus, Section 3, Rule V,

Book V of the Implementing Rules should be interpreted liberally so as to include a circumstance, e.g.

where a CBA could not be concluded due to the failure of one party to willingly perform its duty to

bargain collectively.

[Capitol Medical Center Alliance of Concerned Employees -Unified Filipino Service Workers vs.

Laguesma, 267 SCRA 503(1997)]

CALTEX REFINERY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (CREA) vs. HON. JOSE S. BRILLANTES

G.R. No. 123782 September 16, 1997

Labor Law; Administrative Law; Factual findings of quasi -judicial agencies, when supported by

substantial evidence, are binding on the Supreme Court and entitled to great respect, considering the

expertise of these agencies in their respective fields. The factual fin dings of quasi -judicial agencies

(such as the Department of Labor and Employment), when supported by substantial evidence, are

binding on this Court and entitled to great respect, considering the expertise of these agencies in their

respective fields. It i s well -established that findings of these administrative agencies are generally

accorded not only respect but even finality.

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