Field ManualNo. 31-20

*FM 31-20Headquarters

Department of the ArmyWashington, DC, 20 April 1990

DOCTRINEFOR

SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTIONDistribution authorized to US government agencies only to protect technical or operationalinformation from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or byother means. This determination was made on 29 January 1988. Other requests for thisdocument will be referred to Commander, US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Centerand School, ATTN: ATSU-DT-PDM, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.

DESTRUCTION NOTICEDestroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

*This publication supersedes FM 31-20, 30 September 1977.

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Table of Contents

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Preface

Field Manual (FM) 31-20 is the Special Forces (SF)principles manual. It is directly linked to andmust be used in conjunction with the doctrinalprinciples found in FMs 100-5 and 100-20 and theprojected FM 100-25. It describes SF roles,missions, capabilities, organization, command andcontrol, employment, and support across theoperational continuum and at all levels of war. Itprovides the authoritative foundation for SF sub-ordinate doctrine, force design, materiel acquisition,professional education, and individual and collec-tive training. It supports the doctrinal requirementsof the Concept Based Requirements System.

This manual provides the doctrinal principles to planand prepare SF operational elements for commit-ment and to direct and sustain those elements aftercommitment. The user must adapt the principlespresented here to any given situation using hisown professional knowledge, skills, and judgment.Because this manual articulates the collective visionof the senior SF leadership, users must understandthat it describes emerging doctrinal requirements aswell as current operational capabilities.

This manual is unclassified to ensure its Armywidedissemination and the integration of SF into theArmy’s systems. As the preparing agency for thismanual and all SF doctrinal and training publications,

the US Army John F. Kennedy Special WarfareCenter and School (USAJFKSWCS) will publish aseries of subordinate field manuals to disseminatethe specific SF tactics, techniques, and procedures(TTP) necessary to plan and conduct SF operations.The provisions of this publication are the subject ofthe international agreements listed in the referencesin the back of this book.

There are numerous terms, acronyms, and abbre-viations found within this manual. Users should referto Parts I and II of the Glossary for their meaningsor definitions.

SF commanders and trainers at all levels should usethis manual in conjunction with Army Training andEvacuation Program (ARTEP) mission training plansto plan and conduct their training.

The proponent of this publication is Headquarters,Training and Doctrine Command (HQ TRADOC).Users of this manual should submit comments andrecommended changes on DA Form 2028 (Recom-mended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms)to Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: ATSU-DT-PDM, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculinegender is used, both men and women are included.

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SF operations occur across the operational continuum and at all levels of war. They are an integral part ofthe broader category, special operations (SO). This chapter provides an overview of the strategic environ-ment in which SF operations occur. It defines and describes the nature of SO. It discusses the principlesthat govern the design and execution of SO. It defines SF and discusses its roles in peace, conflict, andwar. By placing SF operations in contemporary perspective, this chapter provides the foundation for all SFdoctrine.

StrategicEnvironment

The threats to US national interests and objectivesare more diverse now than ever before. The USnational security policy and strategy are designed toprotect US national interests from these threats. ThePresident’s annual report, National Security Strategyof the United States, and the annual Secretary ofDefense’s Defense Planning Guidance outline USnational interests, major threats to those interests,

and major US national security objectives, policy,and strategy. Key US national interests include—

The survival of the United States as a free andindependent nation, with its basic values intactand its institutions and people secure.A healthy and growing US economy that providesindividual opportunity for prosperity and aresource base for US national endeavors.A stable world without major threats to USinterests.The growth of human freedom, democratic insti-tutions, and free market economies throughout

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the world, linked by a fair and open internationaltrading system.

Healthy and vigorous alliance relationships.

The Soviet Union still poses the main threat to USinterests worldwide. Its military power and activediplomacy continue to threaten our interests in manyparts of the world. However, the United States alsofaces other serious threats. These threats include–

Regional conflicts.Proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical(NBC) and high-technology weapons.International terrorism.International drug trafficking.Radical politico-religious movements.Instability in countries that are important to theUnited States and its friends and allies.

National security strategy is the art and science ofdeveloping and synchronizing the political, military,economic, and informational elements of nationalpower to secure national security objectives. TheNational Security Council (NSC) assists the Presi-dent in formulating national security strategy. USnational security strategy appears in classified na-tional security directives (NSDs) and other classifiedNSC documents. In general, the goal of USpeacetime strategy is to deter aggression and acts ofintimidation against the United States and its allies.The goal of US national security strategy in conflictis to protect US and allied interests while precludingor limiting the direct employment of US combatforces. In war, the US strategic goal is to rapidly end

war on favorable terms at the lowest possible level ofhostilities. National security objectives include—

Securing the interests of the United States and itsallies.Encouraging and assisting US allies and friends todefend themselves against aggression, coercion,subversion, insurgency, and terrorism.Ensuring US access to critical resources, markets,the oceans, and aerospace.Defending and advancing the cause of democracy,freedom, and human rights throughout the world.Resolving peacefully those regional disputes thataffect US interests.Building effective and friendly relationships withall nations with whom there is a basis of sharedconcerns.

National military strategy is the art and science ofemploying the armed forces of a nation to securenational security policy objectives by the threat orapplication of force. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)formulate national military strategy for the Secretaryof Defense. National military strategy appears in theJoint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and otherjoint strategic planning documents. It supports thegoals of national security strategy. National militarystrategic objectives include—

Deterring Soviet direct and indirect expansionismworldwide.Defending North America and the WesternHemisphere.Promoting the collective security of WesternEurope.Promoting regional stability in Latin America,East Asia, the Pacific, the Middle East, SouthAsia, and Africa.

ContemporaryPerspective

have stressed deterrence through preparation for warwith the Soviet Union and its allies and surrogates.The effectiveness of US nuclear and conventionaldeterrence has made the likelihood of such a war

Historically, US national security strategy, national improbable. Nevertheless, the risks remain dispro-military strategy, and military force development portionately high.

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While the United States has successfully deterred The contemporary strategic environment dictateswar with the Soviet Union, conflicts short of war have that the US armed forces think in terms of an opera-become pervasive. These conflicts can directly affect tional continuum made up of three conditions: peace,each of the national security objectives stated above. conflict, and war (Figure 1-1).

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Peace is defined as nonmilitary competition betweenstates and other organized parties. Competitionamong foreign powers is inevitable in peace. Peacefulcompetition may promote conditions that lead toconflict or war. The military element of nationalpower supports the three nonmilitary elements bypreventing and deterring conflict and war.

Conflict is defined as a politico-military struggle shortof conventional armed hostility between states orother organized parties. It is often protracted andgenerally confined to a geographic region, but mayhave global implications. The parties to a conflictoften use military power in a strategically indirectmanner to support or counter subversion, sabotage,terrorism, and insurgency. However, they can alsouse military power directly in short-duration,limited-objective contingency operations by conven-tional military forces and special operations forces(SOF). The term low-intensity conflict (LIC) repre-sents the US perspective of a conflict. The termsuggests that the conflict does not directly threatenUS vital national interests. Another party to thesame conflict may consider it a struggle for national

survival. From the US perspective, LIC includes theactive support of parties to a conflict.

War, declared or undeclared, is defined as con-ventional, unconventional, or nuclear armed actionbetween states or other organized parties. It mayinclude any of the actions described in conflict, above.War may be general, involving the national survivaland the total resources of nations. However, it ismore commonly limited, with restraints on resourcesand objectives. The same war may be general for oneparty and limited for another party. War may includeany of the actions included in the description ofconflict.

The United States must have credible and competentmilitary options to protect its national interests acrossthe operational continuum. Strategic success re-quires a balanced force structure of strategic(nuclear) forces, general purpose forces, and SOF.These forces must deal with the full range of globalthreats—from the certainty of peacetime compe-tition and conflict to the unlikely but potentiallydevastating threat of strategic nuclear war.

Nature ofSpecial Operations

SO are actions conducted by specially organized,trained, and equipped military and paramilitaryforces to achieve military, political, economic, orpsychological objectives by nonconventional meansin hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. Theyare cxmducted in peace, conflict, and war, inde-pendently or in coordination with operations ofconventional forces. Politico-military considerationsfrequently shape SO, requiring clandestine, covertor low-visibility techniques, and oversight at thenational level. SO usually differ from conventionaloperations in their degree of risk, operational

techniques, mode of employment, independencefrom friendly support, and dependence uponoperational intelligence and indigenous assets.Public law (10 USC 167) states that SO activitiesinclude the following as far as they relate to SO:

Direct action (DA).Strategic reconnaissance, which the US Spe-cial Operations Command (USSOCOM) hasincorporated into a broader activity called specialreconnaissance (SR).Unconventional warfare (UW).Foreign internal defense (FID).Civil affairs (CA).Psychological operations (PSYOP).Counterterrorism (CT).Humanitarian assistance (HA).

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Theater search and rescue (SAR).Such other activities as may be specified by theNational Command Authorities (NCA).

SOF are those forces specifically organized, trained,and equipped to conduct SO activities or providedirect support (DS) to other SOF. They provide aversatile military capability to defend US nationalinterests. They are an integral part of the total

defense posture of the United States and a strate-gic instrument of national policy. These forces serveas force multipliers. They can function in aneconomy of force role to provide substantial leverageat a reasonable cost and effort. SOF thus providemilitary options for national response that canstabilize an international situation with minimumrisk to US interests (Figure 1-2).

SO Principles battle, the US Army’s keystone warfighting doctrine,explains how Army forces plan and conduct majoroperations battles, and engagements in conjunction

When conducting tactical combat operations, SOF with other services and allied forces. It does notconduct their operations in accordance with the address military strategy or the formulation offundamentals of AirLand battle (ALB). AirLand strategic guidance. However, it does favor a strategy

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that quickly and decisively attains the militarystrategic objectives of the war. (For a detaileddiscussion on AirLand battle, see FM 100-5.)

At the tactical level, SO often share many of thecharacteristics of light infantry combined arms oper-ations. However, the fundamentals of AirLandbattle doctrine focus primarily on conventional warfighting. The traditional objective of military powerin war has been to generate maximum combat powerat the decisive time and place to defeat hostilemilitary forces. The traditional dynamics of militarypower are inappropriate in a conflict environmentwhere—

Nonmilitary aspects of the situation dominatemilitary operations, or where

No clearly defined enemy or battlefield exists.

In such an environment, the focus of militaryoperations is different (Figure 1-3). Consequently,the contemporary dynamics of military power aremore subtle. Commanders must influence (ratherthan dominate) their operational environment tocreate favorable politico-military conditions forachieving specific national security objectives. Be-cause SO normally occur in such an environment,SOF commanders must adapt the fundamentals ofAirLand battle to account for the politico-militaryimplications of SO (Figure 1-4). They must learn toapply military power indirectly through the militaryand paramilitary forces of a foreign government orother political group or directly through the surgicaluse of combat power.

Application of thePrinciples of War

SOF commanders must apply the principles. of wardifferently than conventional commanders. SOFcommanders must recognize the effect of theiroperational environment and force capabilities ontheir application of the principles of war (Figure 1-5).

ObjectiveObjectives assigned SOF may often be as political,economic, or psychological as they are military. In warand protracted conflict, SO objectives usually focuson hostile military vulnerabilities. In other situations,SOF may be assigned objectives that lead directly toaccomplishing national or theater political, eco-nomic, or psychological objectives.

Offensive

SO are inherently offensive actions. SOF may beemployed as part of a strategic defensive, and hostileactivities may force SOF to assume a tactical

defensive posture. Nevertheless, at the operationallevel, SOF are an offensive capability.

Mass

In contrast to conventional forces, SOF cannot hopeto bring overwhelming combat power against a targetexcept at the lowest tactical level. They do notnormally seek dominance in size of force orfirepower. Instead, SOF focus on selecting andapplying sufficient military power to accomplish themission without adverse collateral effects. The appli-cation of minimum force is dangerous, but SOFcommanders must sometimes accept the higher riskassociated with not massing in the conventionalsense. They may have to compensate for their lackof combat power through the use of such combatmultipliers as surprise, superior training, and uncon-ventional tactics Nonetheless, SOF commandersmust concentrate their combat power, albeit subtlyand indirectly, so that the effects of their actions arefelt at decisive times and places. SOF must not be atthe margin of their operational capabilities at criticalpoints of mission execution. Care must be taken notto fragment the efforts of SOF by committing them

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against targets that are tactically attractive, butoperationally or strategically irrelevant.

Economy of Force

SOF are often employed as a strategic economy offorce measure to allow the concentration of otherforces elsewhere. Many SO are specifically designedto divert hostile forces into secondary theaters,preventing hostile concentration against the friendlymain effort. SOF are particularly effective whenemployed in combination with indigenous orsurrogate forces to create a force multiplier effect.

Maneuver

SOF do not maneuver against an enemy in the classicsense. Once committed, SOF often lack the tactical

mobility and reinforcement capability of the hostileforces opposing them. With respect to SO, maneuverimplies the ability to infiltrate and exfiltrate deniedareas so as to gain a positional advantage from whichSOF can attack hostile vulnerabilities. They mustanticipate hostile reactions and pre-position combatpower to counter those reactions. This characteristicof SO dictates that SOF commanders accept calcu-lated high risks to achieve decisive results. Indecisionand hesitation may result in a lost opportunity,mission failure, or needless loss of life.

Unity of Command

To achieve unity of command, SOF organize jointlywith clean, uncluttered chains of command thatminimize the layering of headquarters. However, SO

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are often conducted as interagency activities of theUS government. In such cases the Department ofDefense (DOD) will often play only a supporting role,and interagency cooperation will be the only meansof achieving unity of effort. SOF commanders mustsynchronize their activities with nonmilitary membersof the Country Team. During combined operationswith indigenous military forces, SOF commandersmust stress the requirement for cooperation betweenindigenous military and civilian organizations.

Security

In SO, security is often a dominant consideration,rather than a supporting consideration as is often thecase in conventional operations. Because of thenature of many SO, a breach in security can affectnational credibility and legitimacy as well as missionsuccess. SOF commanders must emphasize securitythroughout mission planning, during execution, andpossibly for many years after the mission incomplete.As a result, SO may require compartmentationand/or deception measures. Active and passivecounterintelligence (CI) efforts must minimize thepotential for hostile penetration or accidentaldisclosure of sensitive information.

SOF achieveapproaches and

Surprise

surprise by exploiting indirectdoing the unexpected. SO often

require bold, imaginative, and audacious actions,particularly when applying combat power directly andwith surgical precision. In other SO, however,surprise can take on a more subtle meaning. SOFoften conceal not only their capabilities andintentions, but also their activities. Indirect SOexploit the hostile power’s inadaptability ormisunderstanding of the operational environment.These operations can create unsettling conditionswithin a hostile power’s environment withoutrevealing the source. The effects of surprise aremaximized when the hostile power cannot define themeans of the disruption and, therefore, cannotimplement effective countermeasures.

Simplicity

Although SOF often use sophisticated and un-orthodox methods and equipment, their plans andprocedures must be simple and direct. A complex andinflexible plan that relies on precise timing is lesslikely to withstand changing situations and the stressand confusion that accompany its execution.

SO Imperatives

While the principles of war characterize successfulSO, the SO imperatives discussed below prescribe keyoperational requirements. SOF commanders mustincorporate these imperatives into their missionplanning and execution if they are to use their forceseffectively (Figure 1-6).

Understand theOperational Environment

SOF commanders cannot dominate their environ-ment. They must assess and understand all aspects of

the environment-political, economic, sociological,psychological, geographic, and military-before act-ing to influence it. The conditions of conflict canchange based on military successor defeat, a changein hostile strategy or tactics, or fluctuating levels ofUS support. They must know who the friendly andhostile decision makers are, what their objectives andstrategies are, and how they interact. They mustinfluence friendly decision makers to ensure theyunderstand the implications of SO mission re-quirements and the consequences of not adequatelysupporting them. SOF commanders must remainflexible and adapt their operations to changingrealities. They must anticipate these changes in theirenvironment to exploit fleeting opportunities. They

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must also assist their supported indigenous militaryforces to adjust their strategy and tactics.

Recognize PoliticalImplications

SOF commanders must not anticipate a conventionalbattlefield environment where military concernsdominate. The role of SOF infrequently a supportingone that creates the conditions for decisive non-military activities to occur. Whether conducting SOindependently or in coordination with conventionalmilitary operations, SOF commanders must considerthe political effects of their military activities.

Facilitate InteragencyActivities

When participating in an interagency and oftencombined effort such as SO, commanders must strivefor unity of effort (synchronization), but recognizethe difficulty of achieving it. They must anticipateambiguous missions conflicting interests and objec-tives, compartmentation of activity, and disunity ofcommand. Lacking unity of command, SOF com-manders must facilitate unity of effort by—

Requesting clear mission statements and thedecision makers’ intent.

Actively and continuously coordinating theiractivities with all relevant parties (US and non-US, military and nonmilitary).

Engage the ThreatDiscriminately

SOF commanders have limited resources they cannoteasily replace. Their missions often have sensitivepolitical implications. Therefore, SOF commandersmust carefully select when, where, and how to employSOF (Figure 1-7).

Consider Long-TermEffects

SOF commanders must place each discrete problemin its broader political, military, and psychologicalcontext. They must then develop a long-termapproach to solving the problem. They must acceptlegal and political constraints (such as less thanoptimal rules of engagement [ROE]) to avoidstrategic failure while achieving tactical success. SOFcommanders must not jeopardize the success ofnational and theater long-term objectives by theirdesire for immediate or short-term effects. SOpolicies, plans, and operations must be consistentwith the national and theater priorities and objectives

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they support. Inconsistency can lead to a loss oflegitimacy and credibility at the national level.

Ensure Legitimacy andCredibility of SO

There are significant legal and policy considerationsto many SO, particularly in conflict situations short ofwar. In modem conflict, legitimacy is the most crucialfactor in developing and maintaining internal andinternational support. Without this support theUnited States cannot sustain its assistance to aforeign power. The concept of legitimacy is broaderthan the strict legal definition contained in inter-national law. The concept also includes the moral andpolitical legitimacy of a government or resistanceorganization. Its legitimacy is determined by thepeople of the nation and by the internationalcommunity based on their collective perception ofthe credibility of its cause and methods. Withoutlegitimacy and credibility, SO will not receive the

support of foreign indigenous elements, the USpopulation, or the international community. SOFcommanders must ensure their legal advisors reviewall sensitive aspects of SO mission planning andexecution.

Anticipate and ControlPsychological Effects

All SO have significant psychological effects. Somemay be conducted specifically to produce a desiredpsychological effect. SOF commanders must inte-grate PSYOP into all their activities to control theseeffects.

Apply CapabilitiesIndirectly

Whenever participating in combined operations, theprimary role of SOF is to advise, train, and assistindigenous military and paramilitary forces. Thesupported non-US forces then serve as forcemultipliers in the pursuit of US national security

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objectives with minimum US visibility, risk, and cost.SOF commanders must avoid taking charge whensupporting a foreign government or group. ‘heforeign government or group must assume primaryauthority and responsibility for the success or failureof the combined effort. All US efforts must reinforceand enhance the legitimacy and credibility of thesupported foreign government or group.

Develop MultipleOptions

SOF commanders must maintain their operationalflexibility by developing a broad range of options andcontingency plans. They must be able to shift fromone option to another before and during missionexecution.

Ensure Long-TermSustainment

SOF are currently engaged in protracted conflictaround the world. They must prepare to continue thiseffort for the foreseeable future. The US response toconflict varies from case to case. Resourcing of anyparticular US support effort may also vary. SOFcommanders must recognize the need for persis-tence, patience, and continuity of effort. They shouldnot begin programs that are beyond the economic ortechnological capacity of the host nation (HN) tomaintain without US assistance. US funded programscan be counterproductive if the population becomesdependent on them and funding is lost. SO policy,

strategy, and programs must therefore be durable,consistent, and sustainable.

Provide SufficientIntelligence

SOF normally cannot infiltrate denied territory anddevelop an ambiguous situation. They do not have thecombat power or the reinforcement and supportcapabilities of conventional forces to deal withunanticipated hostile reactions. The success of SOmissions often depends on the executors receivingdetailed, near-real-time, all-source intelligenceproducts. This need for national and theaterintelligence at the tactical level is unique to SOF.SOF intelligence requirements (IR) impose greatdemands on supporting intelligence capabilities. SOFcommanders must identify their IR in priority. Theymust note which are mission essential and which arejust nice to have. Without realistic priorities to guideit, the intelligence community can quickly becomeovercommitted attempting to satisfy SOF IR.

Balance Security andSynchronization

Security concerns often dominate SO, but compart-mentation can exclude key personnel from theplanning cycle. SOF commanders must resolve theseconflicting demands on mission planning andexecution. Insufficient security may compromise amission, but excessive security will almost alwayscause the mission to fail because of inadequatecoordination.

Special Forces supported by conventional forces. The role of SFvaries with the environment and the level of activity.As a component of Army SOF (ARSOF), SF plans, SF is an unconventional combat arm. It combines atconducts, and supports SO in all operational envi- the lowest tactical level the functions performed byronments in peace, conflict, and war. SF operations several conventional branches of the Army. Inare normally joint and may be combined and/or part effect it is a combined arms branch. As a result,of an interagency activity. They may support or be neither SF nor the conventional Army has thought

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of SF operations as being combined arms operations.At best, SF commanders have employed the tacticsof supplementary or reinforcing combined arms.They have used PSYOP, lift assets, and otherresources to increase the effectiveness of independentSF operations. The old H-series table of organizationand equipment (TOE) supported this concept ofemployment by consolidating all combat support (CS)and combat service support (CSS) assets at grouplevel. Battalion commanders dealt only with opera-tional matters. Their CS and CSS assets were providedfrom external sources when required.

The L-series TOE and the concept of SF employ-ment in this publication recognize the comple-mentary combined arms nature of SF operations.They also shift the level of combined arms integrationfrom group to battalion. SF commanders must nowintegrate and synchronize their organic capabilitieswith those of other SOF and theater assets. By doingso, they generate sufficient military power toinfluence their operational environment. They applythis military power through indirect means orthrough the direct application of combat power in aspecific, usually surgical, economy of force operation.The Army uses seven battlefield operating systems(BOS) to analyze and integrate its activities (Figure1-8). These BOS represent a new way of thinkingabout war because they orient on functions ratherthan the units that perform them. The BOS focus on

battlefield functions performed in a combat zone byArmy units at corps level and below. In contrast, SFunits normally focus on functions performed in atheater of operations by joint and combined forces atechelons above corps (EAC). Therefore, SF com-manders must apply the BOS differently than con-ventional Army commanders do (see Appendix A).

The centerpiece of SF operations is the SF opera-tional detachment (SFOD) A, also known as the Adetachment. The SFOD A is a simple but versatilecombined arms organization. Its activities do notrevolve around a single weapon system (like a tankcrew) or a single battlefield function (like a riflesquad). They cut across all BOS functions,Detachment members are generalists with expertisein at least one specialty, not functional specialists.Each member performs multiple functions duringmission planning and execution.

Like the conventional Army, SF task organizes itselements into teams to execute a specific mission. AnSF team is any size operational element composedmainly of SF members and led by a member of an SFchain of command. An SF team may be organizedaccording to modification table(s) of organization andequipment (MTOE). It may be an SFOD A acomposite team of hand-picked individuals or acombined arms team organized for a specific mission.It may also be as small as a two-man team or as largeas a reinforced SF company.

Role of SpecialForces in War

of hostile states that threaten lines of communi-cation (LOC) in the friendly strategic rear. Theimpact of these operations may be felt throughout thetheater of war.

In a limited or general war, SF can perform itsmissions at the strategic, operational, or tactical level During war, the strategic role of SF focuses on theto influence, deep, close, or rear operations. How- hostile power’s long-term capacity to continueever, the primary role of SF is to conduct and support hostilities. This role has two aspects.deep operations beyond the forward limits of con- The NCA, through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs ofventional military forces. Such operations may extend Staff (CJCS), may direct a unified commander tointo a hostile power’s homeland or into the territory conduct SO in pursuit of national strategic objectives.

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For example, SF teams may deploy into denied Disrupt the economy.territory to— Protect friendly strategic LOC threatened by

Collect and report information of national hostile regimes in the theater’s strategic rear.strategic importance. Accomplish other missions with decisive strategicDevelop and support insurgences in the hostile implications but with no near-term effect onpower’s strategic rear. conventional military operations.

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MYTH:

FACT:

SF operates at the strategic level andis not part of the AirLand battle.In war, SF conducts SO to support,complement, and extend con-ventional military operations. Theemployment of SF depends on themission, not the environment inwhich it operates or its location onthe battlefield. SF can be committedanywhere on the battlefield—deep,close, or rear (Figure 1-9).

SF also supports the unified commander’s theatercampaign plan by conducting deep operations inpursuit of theater strategic military objectives. Theunified commander may employ SF teams to inter-dict the advance of hostile forces to gain more timefor employing conventional forces. SF teams mayperform SR tasks at the theater strategic level toidentify hostile capabilities, intentions, and activitiesof importance to the unified commander. SF teamsmay also delay, disrupt, or harass the hostile power’sstrategic second-echelon forces (or divert them tosecondary theaters of operations) to—

Alter the momentum and tempo of hostileoperations.Prevent the hostile power from conductingcontinuous theater strategic operations.

SF also conducts SO as strategic economy of forceoperations in secondary theaters. These operationsmay include FID missions in the strategic rear of thetheater of war.

At the operational level, SF deep operations supportthe theater of operations commander and his sub-ordinate land, air, and naval force commanders. Atthis level, SF operations have a near-term effect oncurrent theater operations. By attacking hostileoperational follow-on forces, SF disrupts theircombined-arms operations and breaks their mo-mentum, creating opportunities for friendly decisiveaction. SF operations can also—

Collect and report military information ofoperational significance.Screen an operational land force commander’sopen flank.

Attack or secure (for limited periods) criticalfacilities of operational significance.Divert hostile forces from the main effort.

At the tactical level, SF supports (and is supportedby) conventional military forces whenever theiroperational areas converge. SF units lack thefirepower, tactical mobility, real-time communi-cations, and CSS capabilities to conduct sustainedclose combat operations. SF teams gain mobilityand protection advantages through stealth and theuse of restrictive terrain. They gain firepower ad-vantage through surprise and superior training. SFmissions generally rely on detailed pre-missionpreparation that is unsuitable for fluid closeoperations. An SF team may conduct a DA orSR mission of strategic or operational significance inthe corps main battle area. However, the priority ofthe mission and the nature of the target must justifythe diversion of SF assets to a mission more suitablefor conventional forces.During a limited or general war, SF units may con-duct operations in friendly rear areas. Friendly rearsecurity forces may be nonexistent, particularly whenUS forces are operating in liberated or occupiedterritory. Available HN rear security forces may needadvisory assistance or other support similar to thesupport SF provides in a FID mission. SF rearoperations are proactive rather than reactive. SFteams do not defend base clusters or perform militarypolice (MP) functions. They organize, train, andsupport (or direct) indigenous tactical combat forcesto actively locate and destroy hostile insurgent and/orSO forces in contested areas. SF teams only conductunilateral rear operations as an extreme measure.SF rear operations are proactive rather than reactive.SF teams do not defend base clusters or performmilitary police (MP) functions. They organize, train,and support (or direct) indigenous tactical combatforces to actively locate and destroy hostile insurgentand/or SO forces in contested areas. SF teams onlyconduct unilateral rear operations as an extrememeasure.Once hostilities end, SF plays an important role inUS posthostility consolidation activities. SF teamsfacilitate the early redeployment of US conventionalcombat forces by performing security assistance andFID missions that enhance the military capabilitiesof US allies in the region.

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Role of SpecialForces in Conflict

In conflict situations short of war, the commitmentof conventional combat forces may be premature,inappropriate, or infeasible. It may also increase therisk of further escalation to an unacceptable level. Inthese situations, when nonmilitary instruments ofnational power are inadequate to respond to a

conflict, SF provides the NCA with options fordiscriminate engagement that preclude or limit theneed to employ conventional combat forces. The lowvisibility of SF operations helps the United Statesand its allies to maintain diplomatic flexibility. SFoperations also allow other powers (friendly, neutral,and hostile) to accept the outcome of an operationbecause they avoid the publicity of a more obvioususe of military force. Some operations, such as overtDA and CT missions, may have high visibility andaffect the prestige of the nation.

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United States may undertake long-term operations

MYTH: SF is primarily a LIC force.

FACT: SF has great utility in conflict shortof war. However, it can perform anyof its five primary missions acrossthe operational continuum—duringpeace, conflict, or war (Figure 1-10).(For a detailed discussion of LIC,see FM 100-20.)

in support of selected resistance organizations thatseek to oppose or overthrow foreign powers hostileto vital US interests. When directed, SF units advise,train, and assist indigenous resistance organizations.These units use the same TTP they employ to con-duct a wartime UW mission. Direct US militaryinvolvement is rare and subject to legal and policyconstraints. Indirect support from friendly territorywill be the norm.

SF can conduct a FID mission to support a friendlygovernment against an insurgent threat. The SForganization and its capabilities and operationalmethods make it ideally suited to conduct or supportFID programs in a counterinsurgency environ-ment. The primary SF mission in FID is to advise,train, and assist HN military and paramilitary forces.

SF can conduct a UW mission to support an in-surgent or other armed resistance organization. The

SF can conduct a DA or SR mission in support of acontingency operation. Contingency operations arepolitically sensitive military operations normallycharacterized by the short-term, rapid projection oremployment of military forces in conditions short ofwar. Such employment can also require a large, high-ly visible buildup of military forces over extendedperiods. SF units task organize to participate incontingency operations either unilaterally or inconjunction with other military forces or governmentagencies.

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Role of SpecialForces in Peace

SF has both preventive and deterrent roles in peace.In its preventive role, SF participates in foreigninternal development efforts and other programsdesigned to improve Third World conditions. In itsdeterrent role, SF maintains strategic capabilitiesthat help convince hostile powers to respect US

national interests and refrain from acts of inter-national aggression and coercion.

In peacetime, many SF training activities also haveoperational real world significance. For example,they may provide US presence in a troubledregion, demonstrate US commitment, or otherwisecontribute to collective security. The strategic valueand political sensitivity of SF units make theminappropriate for employment in peacekeepingoperations.

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The threats to SF operations are global and vary with the geopolitical environment, the SF mission, andthe nature of conflict. Threat capabilities increase each year. The Soviets, their allies and surrogates, andnonaligned Third World countries continually improve the quantity and quality of their military capabilities.SF commanders must analyze the specific threats that exist in their particular operational areas. Theymust also recognize that threats considered under conflict also exist within the context of general andlimited war, making threat analysis even more difficult. This chapter examines the diverse nature ofthese threats in terms of what SF can expect to face in general war, limited war, and conflict.

General War Hostile rear area security operations directedagainst deployed SF teams.In general war, the survival of the nation is at stake. Hostile interception and disruption of SF com-The use of chemical and nuclear weapons is probable. munnications.

Nature of the Threats Hostile NBC operations directed against SF basesand deployed SF teams.General war poses the greatest threats to SF Hostile surveillance and deep attack of SF basescapabilities to infiltrate, communicate, and conduct and deployments in the continental United Statesoperations in denied territory. The primary threats to (CONUS) and overseas.SF in general war are— Infiltration and ExfiltrationHostile early warning, air defense, and coastal

security and border security systems encountered The threats to each method of infiltration andby SF teams during infiltration and exfiltration. exfiltration are different. The following paragraphs

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illustrate typical threats SF teams face when infil-trating and exfiltrating by air, land, and sea.SF teams infiltrating and exfiltrating by air must avoidan extensive and integrated air defense system. Thissystem provides complete coverage at medium tohigh altitudes with a high redundancy of coverage inheavily defended areas. The Soviets in particularhave made concerted efforts to improve low-altitudedetection by–

Increasing radar site density.Elevating radar antennas to overcome terrainlimitations.Using height-finding early warning radars.Exploiting new radar technologies.Employing airborne early warning systems todetect aircraft flying at low altitudes.

SF teams infiltrating and exfiltrating by sea mustpass through coastal security forces arrayed inoverlapping zones. The outer ring consists of hostilesurface craft and patrol submarines supported byland-based naval aviation. Closer to shore, coastalpatrol vessels protect the coast from clandestinedelivery and recovery. Fixed and mobile land-basedcoastal security forces defend key coastal installationsand frontiers.SF teams infiltrating and exfiltrating by land mustavoid hostile border security forces. These forcesemploy sensors, minefield, other barriers, patrols,checkpoints, and other populace control measuresto detect clandestine movement across closedborders. Once SF teams cross the border, they stillface the rear area security threats discussed below.

Hostile Rear Area Security

SF teams must be able to operate in a restrictivesocial environment. Hostile powers rely on active andpassive defense measures to protect their rear areasfrom disruption. They normally impose stringentpopulace and resources control (PRC) measures. IfSF teams threaten their rear, hostile powers maydislocate entire civilian populations and dedicatesignificant combat power to isolate and neutralizethe teams. In addition to regular military and internalsecurity units, hostile powers employ local defenseunits drawn from the civilian population in threat-ened areas. A variety of fixed- and rotary-wingaircraft normally support these ground forces and

pose a significant threat to SF. Hostile police activityand informer networks also make SF operationsdifficult, even with the use of clandestine techniques.Moreover, significant portions of the population arelikely to report any SF activity they detect.

Electronic Warfare

Hostile forces have an extensive electronic warfare(EW) capability. The Soviets in particular have largenumbers of EW systems with broad coverageat great distances. Because SF communications havea unique electronic signature, their detection com-promises the presence of an SF team even if thehostile force cannot locate it.

Hostile NBC Capabilities

Hostile forces have NBC weapons and plan for theiruse. Special Forces operational bases (SFOBs) havealways been likely NBC targets in general war. NowNBC weapons proliferation has greatly increased thelikelihood of these bases becoming targets in aregional conflict. Moreover, recent combat experi-ences in the Third World indicate that SF teamsdeployed in remote and denied areas may alsobecome targets. The risks for SF are significant.The principal nuclear risk to SF teams is from thecollateral damage effects of friendly nuclear bursts.There is also a danger of widespread fallout fromlarge battlefield and theater weapons.Biological weapons and toxins pose a significantthreat to SF teams and their indigenous forces inremote areas. These weapons effectively cover wideareas with minimal resources. Their use is hard toverify, and defensive warning systems and protectivemeasures are rudimentary.Chemical weapons are generally low technology,inexpensive, and militarily significant even inmodest quantities. The psychological impact of theseweapons is tremendous, even when they producerelatively few casualties. Use of these weapons causesuntrained or unequipped personnel to abandon theirmission and leave the area.

Surveillance and Deep Attack

Hostile SOF and intelligence and sabotage agentspose a significant threat to SF in and around US

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military installations, both in CONUS and abroad. and direct attack. Strategic sabotage may adverselyDuring their normal peacetime activities, SF units affect an SF unit’s transition to active operations.are vulnerable to surveillance, sabotage, terrorism,

Limited War

From the US perspective, a limited war is generallyconfined to a specific region of the world. It is foughtfor limited objectives and does not threaten USnational survival.

Nature of the Threats

In a limited war, SF may face all the threats asso-ciated with general war. Many regional powers nowhave military capabilities similar to those previouslybelonging only to superpowers. The armed forcesof many Third World countries have a mix of Westernand Communist weapons. These countries blend US,North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), andSoviet doctrine to meet their particular wartimeneeds and their existing technologies. As a result,their military capabilities are difficult to analyze.

Infiltration and Exfiltration

Most regional powers do not have border or coastalsecurity or air defense systems as integrated andcomprehensive as those of the Warsaw Pact nations.SF infiltration and exfiltration usually do not posethe same problem anticipated in general war.

Hostile Rear Area SecurityInternal security measures vary widely from countryto country. The threat faced by SF teams may besimilar to that discussed under general war, depend-ing on the following factors:

Density and capabilities of internal securityforces.Severity of hostile PSYOP and PRC measures.Attitude of the local population.

Electronic WarfareHostile EW capabilities may not be extensive orintegrated in a limited war. However, they still posea significant threat to the SF command and control(C2) system.

Hostile NBC Capabilities

The use of nuclear weapons in limited war isimprobable, but the likelihood of their use increaseswith Third World nuclear proliferation. The proba-bility of biological and chemical weapons use inlimited war varies from region to region. Chemicalproliferation has greatly increased the likelihood ofSF units becoming chemical targets during a conflict.Nonnuclear nations may use biological or chemicalweapons for their psychological effect or as weaponsof mass destruction.

Conflict easily identifiable. Much of the Third World isplagued by high population growth rates, socialConflict encompasses a broad range of complex unrest, and political and economic instability. Theseenvironments for SF operations. The threats are not conditions provide fertile ground for banditry,

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terrorism, and insurgency. The Soviets and theirallies have developed an effective strategy thatsupports and encourages wars of national liberation.Their aim is to establish Marxist-Leninist regimesand obtain bases of geostrategic importance.However, the Soviet Union is not the only foreignpower exploiting Third World instability. Radical andreactionary states and other self-directed politicalgroups also use armed conflict to pursue theirinterests. These interests may either threaten orcomplement US national interests.

Nature of the Threats

When operating in hostile or denied territory, SFteams face threats similar to those found in a limitedwar. When operating in friendly or contestedterritory, SF units are still subject to acts of es-pionage, sabotage, terrorism, and insurgency. Thissection addresses only those threats not addressed in thepreviouus paragraph.

Insurgent organizations are the primary threats to SFin a counterinsurgency environment. Each insurgentorganization is unique. Nevertheless, insurgentorganizations can be categorized according to thegeneral strategy they pursue.

The subversive strategy employs both legal and illegalmeans to penetrate and seize control of theestablished political system. Subversive insurgencescan quickly shift to the critical-cell strategy whenconditions dictate. Examples of subversive insur-gences include Hitler’s rise to power and theCommunist takeover of Czechoslovakia.

The critical-cell strategy employs armed violence asa catalyst to create dissatisfaction and undermine thelegitimacy of the established government withoutextensive political organization. A critical-cell insur-gency may co-opt a mass popular revolution, asLenin did in Russia. The insurgency may insteadprovide an armed cell around which mass popularsupport can rally in an atmosphere of disintegratinglegitimacy. The Cuban revolution is an example.

The mass-oriented strategy emphasizes mobilizationof the masses and extensive political organization asa prerequisite for a protracted politico-militarystruggle. Examples of this strategy include the Maoist

revolution in China, the Communist insurgency inVietnam, and the Shining Path insurgency in Peru.

The traditional strategy employs existing tribal, racial,religious, linguistic, or other similar groups as thebasis for a resistance organization. The traditionalinsurgency frequently seeks withdrawal fromgovernment control through autonomy or semi-autonomy, usually in response to governmentviolence or other very specific grievances. Examplesof this strategy include the Mujahideen inAfghanistan, the Ibo revolt in Biafra, and the Karenseparatists in Burma.

International terrorist organizations have sophis-ticated covert and clandestine infrastructures andsupport mechanisms. Many receive support fromforeign governments hostile to the United States andits allies. These organizations can inflict heavydamage and casualties that would preclude SF mis-sion success. They generally consider SF personnelto be lucrative and legal targets.

Terrorist strategies are usually shorter range thaninsurgent strategies. Terrorists frequently do notseek popular support. They exploit mass media topublicize a cause, obtain a policy change, or intimi-date a particular group.

Insurgences seldom follow precisely one of thesefour strategies. Terrorists and insurgents modify theirstrategies to fit their existing situation.

Hostile Rear Area Security

In a friendly nation, the security threat takes the formof espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and subversiveactivity. The severity of the threat varies widely fromcountry to country.

Electronic Warfare

Hostile EW capabilities vary widely. SF must notequate intensity of conflict with sophistication of EWthreat. Even insurgent and terrorist organizationsmay have significant EW capabilities.

Hostile NBC Capabilities

Hostile NBC capabilities also vary widely fromconflict to conflict. Insurgents and terrorists mayacquire and use NBC weapons to advance their cause.

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SF plans, conducts, and supports SO in all operational environments and across the operational continuum.The US Army organizes, trains, equips, and provides SF to perform five primary missions– UW, FID, DA, SR,and CT. (For SF, CT is a primary mission only for designated and specially organized, trained, and equippedSF units.) Mission priorities vary from theater to theater. SF missions are dynamic because they are directlyaffected by politico-military considerations. A change in national security policy or strategy may radically alterthe nature of an SF mission. Indeed, a policy change may add or drop a mission. This chapter describes eachSF mission in detail. Although the missions are treated separately, they are all interrelated.

UnconventionalWarfare

UW is a broad spectrum of military and paramilitaryoperations, normally of long duration, predomi-nantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forceswho are organized, trained, equipped, supported, anddirected in varying degrees by an external source. UWincludes guerilla warfare (GW) and other directoffensive low-visibility, covert, or clandestine opera-tions, as well as the indirect activities of subversion,sabotage, intelligence collection, and evasion andescape (E&E).

MYTH: Insurgency differs from UW becauseinsurgency gives priority to infrastruc-ture and political development, whileUW emphasizes military operations.SF conducts UW only during war.

FACT: Successful UW combat employmentdepends on an insurgent infrastruc-ture resilient enough to withstand thehostile power’s retaliation. SF canconduct UW in conflict or war.

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UW is the military and paramilitary aspect of aninsurgency or other armed resistance movement.Armed resistance provides UW with its envi-ronmental context. UW is thus a protractedpolitico-military activity. SF units do not createresistance movements. They provide advice, train-ing, and assistance to indigenous resistanceorganizations already in existence. From the USperspective, the intent is to develop and sustain thoseorganizations and synchronize their activities tofurther US national security objectives. Whenconducted independently, the primary focus of UWis on politico-military and psychological objectives.Military activity represents the culmination of asuccessful effort to organize and mobilize the civilpopulation. When UW operations support conven-tional military operations, the focus shifts to primarilymilitary objectives. However, the political andpsychological implications remain. Regardless ofwhether UW objectives are strategic or operational,the nature of resistance and the fundamental UWdoctrine, tactics, and techniques remain unchanged.UW includes the following interrelated activities:GW, E&E, subversion, and sabotage.

GW consists of military and paramilitary operationsconducted by irregular, predominantly indigenousforces in enemy-held or hostile territory. It is theovert military aspect of an insurgency or other armedresistance movement.

E&E is an activity that assists military personnel andother selected persons to move from an enemy-held,hostile, or sensitive area to areas under friendlycontrol. The special operations command (SOC)plans and directs all E&E activities in the theater.

The SOC may task the SF group to conduct andsupport these special category (SPECAT) activities.(See FM 21-77A for a detailed discussion of E&E.)

Subversion is an activity designed to underminethe military, economic psychological, or politicalstrength of a nation. All elements of the resistanceorganization contribute to the subversive effort, butthe clandestine nature of subversion dictates thatthe underground perform the bulk of the activity.

Sabotage is an activity designed to injure or obstructthe national defense of a country by willfully dam-aging or destroying any national defense or warmateriel, premises, or utilities, to include human andnatural resources. Sabotage may be the most effec-tive or the only means of attacking specific targetsbeyond the capabilities of conventional weaponssystems. It is used to selectively disrupt, destroy, orneutralize hostile capabilities with a minimum ofmanpower and materiel resources.

In UW, intelligence collection is designed to collectand report information concerning the capabilities,intentions, and activities of the established govern-ment, or occupying power, and its external sponsors.In this context, intelligence collection includes bothoffensive and defensive low-level source operations.

Contemporary UW takes on new significance forseveral reasons. Historically, SF has focused on UWas an adjunct to general war. However, the new USpolicy of supporting selected anti-communist resis-tance movements requires SF to focus on UW duringconflicts short of war. Moreover, global urbanizationdictates a shift in emphasis from rural GW to allaspects of clandestine resistance.

Foreign InternalDefense

programs taken by another government to free andprotect its society from subversion, lawlessness,andinsurgency. The primary SF mission in this inter-

FID is the participation by civilian and military agency activity is to organize, train, advise, and assistagencies of a government in any of the action HN military and paramilitary forces.

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MYTH: SF is the Army’s answer to counter-insurgency.

FACT: SF is well suited for FID missions in acounterinsurgency environment, butonly within the context of a larger effortthat is usually joint and interagency innature.

In a counterinsurgency environment, SF opera-tions may occur within or outside the HN. When

performing a FID mission, SF teams train, advise, andsupport HN forces conducting counterinsurgencyoperations. Other SF teams may conduct DA, SR,and CT operations in the HN, either unilaterally orwith indigenous personnel. Still other SF teams mayperform any or all of their wartime missions in hostileor politically sensitive territory near the HN.

In a limited or general war, SF units may conduct FIDmissions against armed resistance organizationsopposing friendly conventional military operations.SF may also conduct FID missions to counterinsurgences in the strategic rear of the theater.

Direct Action

DA operations are short-duration strikes and othersmall-scale offensive actions by SOF to seize,destroy, or inflict damage on a specified target or todestroy, capture, or recover designated personnel ormateriel. In the conduct of these operations, SOFmay—

Employ direct assault, raid, or ambush tactics.

Emplace mines and other munitions.

Conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground,or maritime platforms.

Provide terminal guidance for precision-guidedmunitions.

Conduct independent sabotage.

SF DA operations are normally limited in scope andduration and have a planned exfiltration. They aredesigned to achieve specific, well defined, and oftentime-sensitive results of strategic or operational sig-nificance. They usually occur beyond the range (orother operational capabilities) of tactical weapons

systems and conventional maneuver forces. DAoperations typically involve the—

Attack of critical targets.Interdiction of critical LOC or other targetsystems.Capture, rescue, or recovery of designated per-sonnel or materiel.

MYTH: SF performed DA operations becausethe Army did not have any ranger units;now rangers are the primary DA force.

FACT: The roles of SF and rangers overlap inDA operations. SF DA operationsrequire unconventional tactics andtechniques, area orientation, and lan-guage qualification. Ranger DAoperations use conventional tacticsand specialized ranger techniques inplatoon or greater strength. Onoccasion, DA operations may requirea mix of SF and rangers. An SF teammay serve as an advance party for anoperation requiring ranger combatpower, or a ranger force may providesecurity for a surgical SF operation.

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SpecialReconnaissance

SR is reconnaissance and surveillance conducted bySOF to obtain or verify, by visual observation or othercollection methods, information concerning thecapabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual orpotential enemy. SOF may also use SR to securedata concerning the meteorological, hydrographic,or geographic characteristics of a particular area.SR includes target acquisition, area assessment, andpost-strike reconnaissance.

MYTH: SR is essentially the same as thetactical reconnaissance performed bycorps long-range surveillance units(LRSUs), but SF teams conduct SRdeeper and for longer periods inhostile territory.

FACT: SF may employ battlefield recon-naissance and surveillance tech-niques similar to those used byLRSUs. However, SR is frequentlymore technology-intensive. SF teamsuse their UW tactics and techniques,area orientation, and language skillsto accomplish more difficult re-connaissance tasks. They may usesophisticated clandestine collectionmethods.

SF may conduct SR in any operational environmentin peace, conflict, or war. SF teams normally con-duct SR missions beyond the sensing capabilities oftactical collection systems.

SR typically seeks to obtain specific well-defined,and time-sensitive information of strategic oroperational significance. SF may use advancedreconnaissance and surveillance techniques or moresophisticated clandestine collection methods. Duringthe critical transition from peace to war, the NCA,JCS, and unified commanders may have priority in-telligence requirements (PIR) that only SF teams cancollect. During war, SF teams deploy to named areasof interest (NAI) to collect and report information inresponse to specific PIR of the unified commanderand his subordinate operational force commanders.

In a conflict, SF teams may perform SR missionsat the strategic, operational, or tactical level. Atthe strategic level, SF teams collect and report criticalinformation for the NCA, JCS, or unifiedcommander in crisis situations and in support ofnational and theater CT forces. SF teams performoperational-level SR missions in support ofinsurgency, counterinsurgency, and contingencyoperations. SF teams may also perform tacticalreconnaissance when the nature or sensitivity ofthe mission makes the use of LRSUs inappropriate.

Counterterrorism capabilities to preclude, preempt, and resolve terror-ist incidents abroad. SOF involvement in CT islimited by HN responsibilities, Department of Justice

CT is offensive measures taken by civilian and mili- (DOJ) and Department of State (DOS) lead agencytary agencies of a government to prevent, deter, and authority, legal and political restrictions, andrespond to terrorism. The primary mission of SOF in appropriate DOD directives. When directed by thethis interagency activity is to apply specialized NCA or the appropriate unified commander,

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designated SOF units conduct or support CTmissions that include—

Hostage rescue.Recovery of sensitive material from terroristorganizations.Attack of the terrorist infrastructure.

Because of the very low profile of most terroristorganizations, identifying targets for CT missions canbe extremely difficult. While a preemptive strikeagainst terrorists may be preferred, CT missions mustoften be conducted after the terrorists have alreadyinitiated a terrorist incident.

For SF, CT is a special mission, not a generic mis-sion applicable to all SF units. SF participation in CTis limited to those specially organized, trained, andequipped SF units designated in theater contingencyplans. These designated SF units respond as directedby the NCA or unified commander to resolve specificsituations arising from a terrorist incident. As part ofthe counterterrorist enhancement program (CTEP),these designated SF units may also train selected HNforces to perform CT missions.

Many CT missions remain classified. Further dis-cussion of CT is beyond the scope of this publication.

Collateral Activities

In addition to their five primary missions, SF unitsperform collateral activities. These activities includeSA, HA antiterrorism and other security activities,countemarcotics (CN), SAR, and special activities.SF units conductor support collateral activities usingtheir inherent capabilities to perform their primarymissions. SF commanders should anticipate theircollateral requirements and ensure their unitsprepare for them.

Security Assistance

SA is a group of programs authorized by the ForeignAssistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act, orother related US statutes. The US governmentprovides defense articles and services, includingtraining, to eligible foreign countries and inter-national organizations that further US nationalsecurity objectives. The primary SF role in SA is toprovide mobile training teams (MTTs) and otherforms of mobile training assistance. Public lawprohibits personnel providing SA services (to in-clude mobile training assistance) from performingcombatant duties. (See DOD 5105-38-M, AR 12-1,and AR 12-15 for detailed discussions on SAprograms.)

Humanitarian Assistance

HA is any military actor operation of a humanitariannature. These activities include disaster relief, non-combatant evacuation, and support to and/orresettlement of displaced civilians. SF units arewell-suited to perform HA activities in remote areas,particularly in a conflict environment. Several pro-grams authorize the use of DOD resources forhumanitarian and civil assistance and for foreigndisaster relief. Combatants to include members ofcertain friendly resistance organizations, are eligiblefor assistance under some of these programs. All SFparticipation in such activities requires significantinteragency coordination.

Antiterrorism and OtherSecurity Activities

These activities ensure the physical security ofimportant persons, facilities, and events meets ac-ceptable security standards. Responding to requestsfrom the services and other government agencies, SFcan provide training and advice on how to reducevulnerability to terrorism and other hostile threats.SF teams use their UW expertise to anticipate hostileactivity and evaluate the adequacy of existing physicalsecurity systems. When directed, SF capabilities canaugment existing security for important persons andevents.

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Counternarcotics

CN activities are measures taken to disrupt, interdict,and destroy illicit drug activities. The levels ofviolence used by the drug infrastructure dictate theincreased use of military and paramilitary forces inCN activities. A 1981 amendment to the PosseComitatus Act (18 US Code 1385) authorizes specificDOD assistance in drug interdiction and drugeradication. The primary SF role in this interagencyactivity is to support US and HN CN efforts abroad.The DOS’s Bureau of International NarcoticsMatters and the DOJ’s Drug Enforcement Admin-istration (DEA) are normally the lead US operationalCN agencies within a HN. When these agencies orthe HN requests military assistance, SF teams may bedirected to provide in-country or out-of-country(offshore) training to US and HN CN forces. SFadvisors may also assist CN staffs in planning,organizing, and conducting large-scale, long-termCN operations. When authorized and subject to legaland policy constraints, SF advisors may alsoaccompany CN forces on actual operations.

Search and Rescue

SF can participate in theater SAR efforts. Theseactivities are designed to locate, recover, and restore

to friendly control selected persons or materiel thatare isolated and threatened in sensitive, denied, orcontested areas. They focus on situations that involvepolitical sensitivity and/or remote or hostileenvironments. These situations may arise from apolitical change, combat action, chance happening, ormechanical mishap. When directed, SF units performcombat search and rescue (CSAR) missions usingcollateral capabilities inherent in a DA recoverymission. SF does not employ standard CSARprocedures when executing such a mission.

Special Activities

Special activities require presidential approval andcongressional oversight. Executive Order 12333states that no agency except the Central IntelligenceAgency (CIA) may conduct any special activity inpeacetime unless the President so directs. Whendirected by the President, the DOD performs specialactivities during war declared by Congress or duringany period covered by a presidential report underthe War Powers Resolution. Whether supporting orconducting a special activity, an SF unit may per-form any of its primary wartime missions, subject tothe limitations imposed on special activities. Suchactivities are highly compartmented and centrallymanaged and controlled.

Other SO Activities

The categorization of SO activities as primary mis-sions and collateral activities focuses on what SOF do.In some cases, it is more important to focus on whySOF conduct SO. The physical result of SO may besecondary to some greater purpose. Deceptionoperations, demonstrations, and shows of force areexamples of such operations.

Deception Operations

SF can support and enhance a national or theaterdeception plan. SF deception operations distort,manipulate, or falsify facts to induce a foreigngovernment or group to react in a manner favorableto US interests. These operations also enhancefriendly operations security (OPSEC). SF may per-form deception as part of another mission or as anoperation in itself. Whenever possible, the SF

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deception role should be combined with other SO tomake the deception more credible.

Demonstrations andShows of Force

These operations are overt demonstrations ofnational intention or resolve. The NCA initiate themto influence another government or political group torespect US interests or to enforce international law.

They may involve the forward deployment of militaryforces, combined training exercises, and theintroduction or buildup of military forces in a region.Demonstrations and shows of force are not meant todeceive the target audience. These operations maymeet with a hostile response, so they must be plannedand executed to counter such a response. SF units arewell-suited for certain demonstrations and shows offorce because of their strategic capabilities.

Multiple andFollow-On Missions

Actual operational requirements often cut acrossdoctrinal mission lines. An SF team may conduct anoperation involving multiple missions. It may alsoreceive a follow-on mission after its initial mission.

Multiple missions are appropriate when opera-tional requirements demand the application of TTPsdrawn from more than one doctrinal mission. Forexample—

An SF team may acquire a target (SR mission)and then provide terminal guidance for precisionguided munitions launched against the acquiredtarget (DA mission).

An SF team may conduct an area assessment(SR mission) and then remain in the joint specialoperations area (JSOA) to develop an indigenousresistance organization (UW mission).

Follow-on missions are appropriate when the risk ofexfiltration is greater than the risk of remaining inthe operational area. They are also appropriate whenthe importance of the follow-on mission justifiesleaving the SF team in the JSOA. For example–

An SF team may conduct a DA mission against aspecified target, then link up with a resistanceorganization or a bypassed or cutoff conventionalforce to conduct a UW mission.An SF team conducting another mission may bedirected to recover a downed aircrew or otherdesignated personnel or materiel.

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SF group commanders routinely task organize companies and battalions to create mission-orientedteams and task forces. This chapter describes the formal organization of the SF group and its organicelements. Later chapters will expand on this chapter to explain how and why SF commanders taskorganize their units.

Special ForcesGroup (Airborne)

The Special Forces group (airborne) [SFG(A)] is amultipurpose and extremely flexible organization. Itsmission is to plan, conduct, and support SO in anyoperational environment in peace, conflict, and war.Figure 4-1 depicts the group’s organization.

The group’s C2 and support elements can function asthe headquarters for an Army special operations taskforce (ARSOTF) or for a joint special operations taskforce (JSOTF) when augmented by resources from

other services. The group’s C2 and support elementscan (see Chapter 5)—

Establish, operate, and support an SFOB andthree forward operational bases (FOBs).Provide three special operations command andcontrol elements (SOCCEs) to conventionalheadquarters at corps level or higher.Train and prepare SF teams for deployment.Direct, support, and sustain deployed SF teams.

The group’s SF teams infiltrate and exfiltratespecified operational areas by air, land, or sea. Theyconduct operations in remote areas and non-permissive environments for extended periods with

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minimal external direction and support. SF teams can Plan and conduct unilateral SF operations.also— Train, advise, and assist other US and allied forces

or agencies.Develop, organize, equip, train, and advise or Perform other SO as directed by the NCA or adirect indigenous military and paramilitary forces. unified commander.

Headquarters andHeadquarters Company,

SFG(A)The group headquarters and headquarters company(HHC) provides C2, staff planning, and staff super-vision of group operations and administration. Itsorganization is depicted in Figure 4-2.

Functions

The group headquarters commands and controlsassigned and attached forces. It—

Plans, coordinates, and directs SF operationsseparately or as a part of a larger force.

Trains and prepares SF teams for deployment.

Provides command and staff personnel to estab-lish and operate an SFOB.Provides advice, coordination, and staff assis-tance on the employment of SF elements to a jointSOC, JSOTF, security assistance organization(SAO), or other major headquarters.Provides cryptomaterial support to the SFOB andits deployed SF teams.

The headquarters company provides routine ad-ministrative and logistical support to the groupheadquarters. It depends on the group supportcompany for unit-level maintenance of its organicwheeled vehicles, power generation equipment, andsignal equipment. When the group establishes anSFOB, the HHC commander serves as head-quarters commandant under the direct supervision ofthe deputy group commander. As headquarters

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commandant, the HHC commander is responsiblefor the movement, internal administration (toinclude space allocation, billeting, and food service),and physical security of the group headquarters andthe SFOB operations center (OPCEN).

Command and StaffResponsibilities

The group commander exercises comnmand of thegroup and its attached elements. When the groupestablishes an SFOB, he is the SFOB commander.

The deputy commander performs those duties as-signed to him by the group commander. Heassumes commmand of the group in the com-mander’s absence. When the group establishes anSFOB, he serves as the OPCEN director. The groupcommander commands the group, but the deputycommander directs its day-to-day activities. Therelationship between the group commander and hisdeputy commander normally is such that the deputycommander can act for the commander when thecommander is absent or involved with moreimportant tasks.

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The executive officer (XO) performs duties similar tothose of a chief of staff. He directs the group staff andassigns specific responsibilities to prepare plans,orders, reports and other staff actions. When thegroup establishes an SFOB, he serves as director ofthe battle staff.

The S1 is the principal staff officer for all personnelservice support (PSS) matters and other admin-istrative matters not assigned to another coordinatingstaff officer. He may perform special staff officerduties, such as inspector general, provost marshal,public affairs officer, and special services officer.Additional duties include safety, postal operations,and the management of stragglers and hostileprisoners of war (PWs). His primary operationalconcerns are replacement operations, strength man-agement, and casualty reporting. He directlysupervises the group personnel section and exercisesstaff supervision over attached PSS and MP units.

The S2 is the principal staff officer for all matterspertaining to intelligence and counterintelligence.He plans for the collection, processing, and dis-semination of intelligence that is required for SFgroup operations. He advises the commander in theemployment of group intelligence assets. He pro-vides special security office (SSO) support to theSFOB. He provides the S3 with intelligence supportfor the OPSEC program, EW operations, and decep-tion planning. He exercises staff supervision over thegroup’s military intelligence (MI) detachment, theDS engineer terrain detachment (when attachedfrom the theater army [TA] engineer command), andattached MI units.

The S3 is the principal staff officer for all matterspertaining to the organization, training, and opera-tions of the group. He has overall staff responsibilityfor PSYOP, OPSEC, EW, CSAR, and deception.He exercises staff supervision over organic andattached aviation and PSYOP units.

The S4 is the principal staff officer for all logisticsmatters. He is the group’s primary logistical plannerand coordinator. He exercises staff supervision overthe group support company’s service detachment andattached logistical units. He coordinates closely withthe four support company commanders, who are theprincipal logistical operators of the group.

The S5 is the principal staff officer for all CA matters.He plans and coordinates the group’s civil-militaryoperations (CMO), to include foreign nation support(FNS). He advises the commander on politico-military matters and assists him in meeting his legaland moral obligations to the local populace. Heexercises staff supervision over attached CAelements.

The signal officer is the principal staff officer for allsignal matters. He plans and recommends employ-ment of SF group communications. He is also thetactical command information systems (TCIS)management officer with staff responsibility forautomation. He assists the S3 in preparing EWplans and is responsible for electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM). He supervises thegroup’s frequency manager and preparation of thegroup signal operation instructions (SOI). Hecoordinates and exercises technical supervision overtraining of organic and attached communicationspersonnel. He exercises staff supervision over theSFOB signal center (SIGCEN). He is also the groupcommunications security (COMSEC) officer andsupervises the group COMSEC custodian, whomaintains the group COMSEC account.

The budget officer is the principal staff officer for allmatters pertaining to programming, budgeting, re-ceiving, handling, safeguarding, and disbursing allprogram funds. These include special mission funds,intelligence contingency funds, foreign currencyoperations, and commercial accounts. He coor-dinates and exercises technical control over groupfinancial policies, plans, and services. If the budgetofficer is qualified and acceptable under theprovisions of AR 37-103, the supporting finance andaccounting officer may appoint him as a deputy orClass B agent officer.

The engineer is the principal advisor to the com-mander and staff on engineer matters. He exercisesstaff supervision over attached engineer units. Hecoordinates and exercises technical supervision overtraining of organic and attached engineer personnel.He plans and coordinates the group’s real estate andconstruction requirements and real property main-tenance. He establishes the group’s emergency actionfacility (EAF) and manages the group’s emergencyaction program (EAP).

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The chemical officer is the principal advisor to thecommander and staff for all matters concerningoffensive and defensive chemical operations. Heexercises technical supervision over group NBCactivities and staff supervision over attached chem-ical units.

The flight surgeon is the principal advisor to thecommander and staff for all matters affecting themental and physical health of the group, attachedelements, and its supported indigenous forces. Hedirectly supervises the group’s medical section andexercises staff supervision over attached medicalunits. He coordinates and exercises technicalcontrol over training of organic and attached medicalpersonnel.

The chaplain is the principal advisor to the com-mander and staff on moral, ethical, and religiousissues affecting the unit mission. He plans andcoordinates the activities of unit ministry teams(UMTs) to ensure comprehensive religious supportof all assigned and attached personnel and their

families. He assesses the religious attitudes ofindigenous populations to determine the impact ofthese attitudes on SF operations.

The judge advocate is the principal advisor to thecommander and his staff on legal matters. He adviseson matters involving military law, US domestic law,foreign law, status of forces agreements, intern-ational law, operational law, and ROE. He reviews allsensitive mission taskings, plans, and orders to ensurethey adequately address legal issues. He may performadditional duties as public affairs officer when nofull-time public affairs officer is attached to thegroup.

The command sergeant major (CSM) is the group’ssenior noncommissioned officer (NCO). He is theprincipal advisor to the commander and staff onmatters pertaining to enlisted personnel. He moni-tors policy implementation and standards on theperformance, training, appearance, and conduct ofenlisted personnel. He provides counsel andguidance to NCOs and other enlisted personnel.

Support Company,SFG(A)

The group support company (Spt Co) provides intel-ligence support, CSS, and signal support to the SFOBand its deployed SF teams. The company’s aviationplatoon provides general aviation support to theentire group. The company’s organization is shownin Figure 4-3. Its functions are discussed below.

The Spt Co commander commands all personneland elements assigned or attached to the company.His company headquarters provides routine adminis-trative and logistical support to the SFOB supportcenter (SPTGEN) and SIGCEN. He is the group’sprimary logistical operator. When the groupestablishes an SFOB, he serves as the SPTCENdirector. His duties require direct interface with TAlogistical support elements (see Chapter 14). In

coordination with the S3 and headquarters com-mandant, the Spt Co commander prepares the basedefense plan and supervises base defense operationscenter (BDOC) activities (see Chapter 6).

The MI detachment provides integrated all-sourceintelligence collection management, analysis, pro-duction, and dissemination in support of group-levelsituation and target development. These functionscorrespond to those performed by the tacticaloperations center (TOC) support element of aconventional MI unit. The detachment establishesand operates a tactical sensitive compartmented in-formation facility (SCIF) in the SFOB OPCEN andprovides sensitive compartmented information (SCI)communications between the SFOB and the de-ployed FOBs. It provides interrogation and CIsupport, to include CI support of the group’s OPSECand deception programs. The detachment com-mander works for the deputy group commander

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under the staff supervision of the group S2. When thedetachment is formally detached from the supportcompany, the detachment commander exercisesnormal company-level command. However, thedetachment remains dependent on the Spt Co foradministrative and logistical support.The service detachment performs unit-level supply,services, and maintenance functions for the groupHHC and Spt Co and their attached elements. Whenthe group establishes an SFOB, the service de-tachment commander coordinates and supemisesSPTCEN logistics. He works for the Spt Cocommander under the staff supervision of the S4.The signal detachment has two primary functions. Itinstalls, operates, and maintains secure SFOB radiocommunications with the FOBs and deployed SFteams. It also installs, operates, and maintainscontinuous internal SFOB communications. Thisbase communications support includes communi-cations center services, telephone communications,electronic maintenance, and photographic support.When the group establishes an SFOB, the signaldetachment commander serves as the SIGCENdirector. When the detachment is formally detachedfrom the Spt Co, the detachment commander exer-cises normal company-level command. However,

the detachment remains dependent on the Spt Cofor administrative and logistical support.

The aviation platoon provides limited general (non-tactical) aviation support to the group and its attachedelements. The platoon headquarters receives, pro-cesses, and coordinates all group general aviationsupport requirements. It also establishes andoperates the SFOB’s flight OPCEN. The aviationunit maintenance (AVUM) section maintains or-ganic aircraft and avionics equipment used by theflight section.

The medical section provides health service support(HSS) to the SFOB. This support includes unit-level medical support, medical supply (to includemaintenance of the Class VIII basic load), emergencymedical and resuscitative treatment for all classes ofpatients, emergency dental treatment, preventivemedicine support, and veterinary support.

The personnel section collocates with the supportingmilitary personnel office (MILPO). The sectionaugments the MILPO to perform personnelmanagement functions for the entire SF group.When elements of the group are supported by morethan one MILPO, members of the personnel sectionmay be attached to each supporting MILPO.

SF Battalion, SFG(A)Like the SF group, the SF battalion plans, conducts,and supports SO in any operational environment inpeace, conflict, and war. The SF battalion’s organi-zation is shown in Figure 4-4. Its functions arediscussed below.The battalion’s C2 and support elements can func-tion as the headquarters for an ARSOTF or for aJSOTF when. augmented by resources from otherservices. The C2 and support elements can—

Establish, operate, and support an FOB.Provide one SOCCE to a corps or higher head-quarters.

Train and prepare SF teams for deployment.Direct, support, and sustain deployed SF teams.

The battalion’s SF teams infiltrate and exfiltratespecified areas by air, land, or sea. They conductoperations in remote areas and hostile environmentsfor extended periods with minimal external directionand support. SF teams can also—

Develop, organize, equip, train, and advise ordirect indigenous military and paramilitary forces.Plan and conduct unilateral SF operations.Train, advise, and assist other US and allied forcesor agencies.Perform other SO as directed by higher authority.

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HeadquartersDetachment (SFOD

SF Battalion

The SFOD C, also known as C detachment, providesC2, staff planning, and staff supervision of battalionoperations and administration. The detachment’sorg