T

·DOCID: 4001113

COMINT and the PRC Intervention in the Korean W at1:S-CCO~

GUY R. VANDERPOOL

Ed.it.or'• Note: (U) Thi.a ia an e:w:panded veraion of an addreaa given by Guy R. Vanderpool at the Cryptologic Hiatory Sympoaiwn in October 1993.

"A RISK WE KNOWINGLY TOOK" (U)

(U} On 25 October 1950; four Chinese

Communist armies suddenly attacked General Douglas MacArthur's command in the approaches to North Korea's border with the PRC. The United Nations units withdrew to defensive positions.1 When MacArthu~ resumed the march a month later, the Joint Chiefs of • .. :~)'

§fi;~E~~~f!~~~ :ljb~\ _y;Er:r::· .·--~·, .... , ,~:;"::_:.~;<;··!J.~~ . <j • :·;:;· :~~* :~· .. ·:: ·: ·:L~~~~.~~·' asked MacArthur whether; to reduce .that .~·.;::,;.,;~~...ff _, . : ~.:.: .:.Jlf .. :a:;:~ danger, he could keep U.S. units away from the Douglaa MacArlbul"

PRC boundary. MacArthur immediately denounced the idea. Any such change in his operational plan would ~ "a betrayal,. of the Korean people, "appeasement of Communist aggression," and "a tribute to international lawlessness," MacArthur declared. He lectured the JCS that "t~e entry of Chinese Communists was a risk we knowingly t.ook at the time we committed o~r forces."' ·

(U) Nine PRC armies overwhelmed MacArthur's forces just two days later.3 Survivors I

of the first assaults saw .long columns 0£ Chinese troops moving past in the mountains t.o cut off retreat.' MacArth~r cabled the JCS that he was facing "an entirely new war.~

tB-8081 But Chinese Communist communications were not new to I I···· (b) ( 1 )

American crypt.ologists. •No one who received CO MINT product, including MacArthur's own G-2 in Tokyo, should have been surprised by the PRC intervention in the Korean War.

I I

I "GENUINE COMMUNISTS"? (U)

(U) The U.S. first obtained COMINT on the Chinese Communists from Japan's communications during, the Second World War. The intercepts reported Communist

I

pproved for Release by NSA on 9-26-2012 FOIA Case# 51546

I OP Sl!!!(ltr!ll' HIMl!ll

he opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) nd do not re resent the official o inion of NSA/CSS.

·DOCID · 4001113

CRYPTOLOGIC QUARTERLY

Joint Chiefs o( Staff at Pentagon, Nove111ber 1949

Mapl

I OP S!ClltET WMIUlA 2

·DOCID: 4001113

KOREAN WAR '°' 'l!Clll!f ttMlltA

mUitary operations as well e.s the position Soviet officials took when discussing the Chinese Communist Party .(CCP). For instance, Japanese ambassador Sato informed Tokyo on 4 January 1945 that Soviet foreign minister Molotov had stated during an interview:

Rusaia doea not propoae to interfere ln Chineae •ft'aira and doea not support the Chinese

ComrnunLtt.. It iii true that tbere is a eelf.atyled Communist Party and a Communist Army i.a

China, but I peraonalJy doubt whether theee penons are genuine Communists.11

(U) Soviet leaders spoke as soothingly to American diplomats. Marshal Josef Stalin remarked to Ambassador W. Averell Harriman on 10 June 1944 that members of the Chinese Party were .. margarine Communists," and Molot.ov said essentially the same to Messrs. Donald Nelson and Patrick J. Hurley on 31 August.1 Hurley, an Oklahoma land speculator and oilman, had traveled to Moscow before taking up an assignment as President Roosevelt's personal representati~e to the Nationalist government in Chongqing. After a year in China, he still believed Molotov. Hurley announced to reporters in Washington on 28 November 1945 that he had visited Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai at their headqua~rs in Y an'an and was convinced they weren't real Communists. "The only difference between Chinese Communists and Oklahoma Republicans is that the Oklahoma Republicans aren't armed," Hurley said.9

'Mao Zedon1 and Zhou Enlal I

(U) However the Soviets depicted them and Hurley perceived them, Chinese Communists did not hide :their affiliation with Moscow. General George C. Marshall remarked to British visitors in December 1950 that he had a number of conferences with Ma1> 1.edong and Zhou Enlai in China in 1946. "Pictures of Stalin and Lenin were everywhere," and Zhou had emphasized that Chinese Communists were Marxists, not mere agrarian ref'ormers. "They regarded the Russians as co-religionists. This feeling was thoroughly indoctrinated in their troops," Marshall stated.10

3 TOP SEC:AET U"'B4

·DOCID: 40.01113

I OP SECRE I t:IMIRA CRYPTOLOGIC QUARTERLY

"A STATE OF GRAVE CIVIL CONFLICT" (U)

(U) General Marshall's personal encounters with CCP leaders resulted from Washington's attempt to fashion a strong, united, and democratic Chine. following World War U. President Truman in November 1945 named Marshall as his special envoy with the job of settling differences between the Communists and Nationalists. 11

(S:CCO) General Marshall established a framework for continued negotiations between the Communists and Nationalists, secured agreement for a cease fire, arranged for representatives of both sides to monitor the truce, and tried to mediate a permanent settlement. Before leaving Washington for Chongqing, he asked the Army's Intelligence

,,lb)(1) ./!' ~b)(3)-50 USC 403

,.;."/ ~b)(3)-18 USC 798 /;<// ~p)(3)-P.L. 86-36

, , ' '

Division to provide him COMINT support. The ~~!Jt!t!e~..;-~--~: -~~If!!!!!!•~ Army Security . Agency (ASA) was already ,: / / ~ : coHecting diplomatic and Nationalist traffic :.: ./ Georgf C. Marshall \ ',

that provided commentary on China's internal situation·; and it sent: operat.ors who quickly isolated cornmunica.tions between the Communis_t:negotiators and: Yan'an. The collection\ team moved to Nanjing when the Nationalist goyernrnent and Ge~eral Marshall's ntis~ion\ transferred there in May 1946, and ASA also ~·ta~lished a new ibtercept station in seoui, ': South Korell, to cover the Communist links. 12/ / / \ ':

, ' ' ' '

E'i'SS) Intercept .. 1------~ecE!/difficult. Unt~liable eJectrical ~we~ iii:, Nanjing and poor hearability in Seoul caused ~llection gaps .• ~ndl : I

3 General Mar!lhall was impatient. n ~SA --~--~----!!"'""!"-~""!!""'-""!""!'""!""!'------officer re lated that in June 1946

We had to go up and explain to General Marshall what [ASA Headquarteni) didn't want to put

down c:m paper: I _________ ... 11•

('fBel Nevertheless ASA did produce cor.nNT that assisted General Marshall.

-------...... ---...... ---------...... --... fplaintext correspondence yielded over 800 translation~. A State Department official commented in the spring of 1947 that General Marshall had "a very great interest" in those messages.15

~The diplomatic, Nationalist, and Communist communications revealed the two sides were determined to decide the future of the country by fighting rather than by

T8P SEERfl' l:IMIAA 4

·ooc1 o: 4001113

KOREAN WAR TOP Sr!eA!'f tfMIM

negQtiating. In a circular message intercepted on 15 August 1946, the Communists specified why they refused to parley with the Nationalist (Kuomintang) government:

,...,,,;__m1..,.,.1l!Ofte4~

- - Pro.wte ....... boW'.,,.,,. • Maci0"4W <llO•f4l

• . • , ~t"e-ICW!<f CA.trlta ·_ . ...;_ . . ·---.11- · .,. ... .~

0 '

Map!

1. The Kuomintang's unwillingness to cease warfare on all fronts and its insistence I

on occupying North China ~Y force. I

2. The Kuomintang's unwillingness to carry out the decision of the Political Consultative Council and its stubborn refusal to discuss political issues affecting areas which have not been occupied by force.

3. The Kuomintang's insistence on one-party government.

4. The Kuomintang's advocacy of military dictatorship. . .

5. The Kuomintang's failure to act on its promises.18

~y late summer i946 it was thus evident from COMlNT t.hat China's doon5 were closed to American mediation. General Marshall bad became a powerless spectator o( the bitter struggle between Communists and Nationalists and a casualty of the Soviet· American Cold War. Washington policymakers increasingly interpreted the strife in China as a battlefield or worldwide conflict with Moscow in which confrontation rather

5

·DOCID: 4001113

(:b)(1) (b.)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3}P.L. 86-36

. ·.

. T8P 9E8'ET YMIRA CRYPTOLOGICQUARTERL Y

than negotiation was the prime consideration. While General Marshall attempted to bring the two sides together, Soviet military forces occupying Manchuria strengthened the Communists. At the same time, the U.S. provided material and financial aid to the Nationalista.17 The Communists hated the United States for helping the Chiang Kai-shek regime. They charged in their 15 August message that "the reckless actions in which the .Kuomintang has indulged and which have culminated in a state of grave civil conflict are a result of the mistaken policy of the Ameri_can authorities in giving aid to Chiang [Kai­shek)." In early 1947 General Marshall returned to Washington to be secretary of state, 18

the last Communist envoys departed for Yan'an,19 and the radio links that had provide.d intelligence on the Communist negotiating position puJled oft' the air. 20

MORE THAN A MILLION REGULAR TROOPS (U)

carter W.Clarke

._~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~___. The State

Department's Special Projects Staff (SPS), which was responsible for analyzing COMINT

'EQP 5i€AE'f t:IM89b\ 6

·ooCID: 4001113 /:l b) 11:

KORE.ANWAR MP9EEMl•I•.# and briefing State offici4ls Qn the re~ults, completed a study of the materiai·o~ 21 A~riV 1947. . ,' ' ' '

' ' , ' , ' , ' , ' ' '

""tSe~or the S!>S, "nearly every message" implied "control or ~~rdinatio'1. (~·ht Moscow." The. mater~l furnished "authentic ~d ooncrete proot" of,cQoperatipn .bet.~~n Moscow and Y an'an in "propaganda and organbation" and refuted ~the repeated .deni'als of organized connections between the !CCPJ and the Soviet Governfuent." Furthe·r~r~, an 16 J4arch l946 communication in which the C~P requested ~-'loan of "l.5 tq;2.~/~Uion

American dolla.rs" for postwar propaganda expenses indica~ Yan'an's "depe,bden,:~e/ .. on Moscow for financial support." .· : / ./.. /

. ~ E~rlier messagesb lboth de.monstrat~d t~·e pbinese ·Communists were Marxist- 11).rusts hnked closely lo the Soviet U nip'n a.IJd e<~ntained information that might ~ve profited Ameriean diplomacy and inteliigenefe o.Perations. Yan'an deS<:ribed attempts to. subvert Japanese- soldiers during World waJ II ~nd sought Soviet assistance in the contest with the Nationalists after the' war .. ended. On 27

' ' '

September 1945, Yan'an asked Moscow to airlift Chinese Communist trqOpsio Japanese-occupied Man4;huria, promising safe ·landing areas and "a gre~t qua11lity/or' captured gasoline. Chiang Kai-shek had already secured American h~ip in the ~ce for north China. In August and September 1945, the U.S. Army and i'ravy h~ste~ed to transfer Nationalist armies by air and by sea to accept the surrender of:J a pan's forc~s. u

· ~Viewed down long years of retrospec~ ,/. ~~g~¢sted as well that the CCP was not Moscow a puppet. The me sages mid ,I WHU 61 courteous formality. Yan'an informed Moscow of its political activities, its wan with the Nationa.IiBts, and the strength and composition of its ·army, but appeared to do'ao selecth·ely;and sparingly. The messages made clear that far from the guerrilla rem~nts that sought safety in Shaanxi province after the Long March of 1934-1935, the .Communists ~ssessed formidable military power at the end of World War II.~ ./ /

~ Other than the iJdications that Coronel.Clarke· /General Marshall, and members of the State Department's SPS saw some of th ranslations, we have no

• I :

information on the U.S. distribution. IC China:· analysts at tate and the· Department of Army had access to the riiaterial, they ignored it when calculating the strength of the Communist army. ln Apr~l 1945 Mao ZedoQg stated publicly that he ha$1900,000 regular troops. In early October ,1945,r=-=-'iintereept revealed Communist regular forces totaled 1,020,000; according t~sage, the CCP intended to reorganize the formations into sixteen armies of three divisions each. Almost a year later, in mid-1946, the G-2, Department of the Army, carried only 600,000 regular troops in the Yan' an order of battle. ln August 1947 ~ the Department of State's Chinese Affairs Division estimated Communist forces numbe~d no more than 1,000,000 troops. In contrast, Mao Zedong

I

stated on 25 December 1947 that Communist regulars totaled 2,000,000 - probably an accurate figure given th~ indication of a progression in strength between April and Oct.ober 1945.111 The American tendency to underrat.e PRC military power would persist

7 l'8P SEEAE::'f' YMIUi

·bOCID: /(b) ( 1)

4001113 / (b) (3) - 50 USC 403

f8P SEERH ti Mlllbfc CRYPTOLOGIC QUARTERL 'f

' .. ,.'

.. , ..

/ (b I I 3 I - P . L . 8 6- 36

with harmful effect through the fall and winter of 1950, when it f'ell t.o com~anders and intelligence officers to assess China's ability to intervene in the Korean War/

~ee~ But minimizing the importance of the Chinese Communists w~s not confined to COMINT cust.omers. During the endeavor to support the Marshall miesfon, ASA traffic analysts isolated what they called a "rather extensive network'" that po~sibly served the Communists in north China and Manchuria. The complex passed a gr~at deal of traffic, but ASA could intercept few messages because of' the primary' need to collect communications of the Communist negotiators. When the lin1's supporting the negotiators disappeared, ASA dropped the radio groups in north China and Manchurja because of pressure to put every possible position on Soviet targets.27

/

REDUCED RESOURCES; HIATUS IN-' ------'~XCHANGES. UM?-1949 (U) . .

f!-S8Q~Thereafter the CO;\llNT effort on the Chinese Communists suffered not only reduced collection but also cutbacks in analysis. The accompanying chart depicts combined ASA and Navy, and, beginning in November 1949, the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) people assigned to various problems. Note that Far East targets were the only ones that took significant personnel losses during this period, declining from 261 in June 1946 to 112 in December 1949. Most of the work on the Far East concentrated on Chinese Nationalist targets.~

Personnel alloca&ions..June 1946-Dec l!MB

lOP iliCAliT WMIFhfc 8

·oOCID: 4001113 __ ,,<::'/(b) (1)

.... ········· ··· ·· · ·J8p::M~= ···.· ... : .. c~:i ....... ·1 .... -··· .. ········· .. ···

"""'i 988) American anxiety over __ securft.;: :~bst;~~ted developme11-t··~;· Communist,:/ /

KOREAN WAR

milital'y communications as w_elt----t~ -~µmf'i948, the U.S. Comm":!lic~tiomi Intelligenc~ j ,.W:lllllMoM.li.W..WMM~lfCid~~il-- . ..-- .- ls'ecurity procedures were ~.lQX to trust th~ / f

ex ange Rw~ not until October 1949, and tbeh only at the urging of / ' ilh Amoric&nCOMINT. USCIB ordered ~·~ncl the Navy lo •tllieir f

that USCIB~be-ga_n_t.o ... relax the restriction, first perm~tthtg raw traffic to be releas , , and in March 1950 authorizing technical exchanges. ~r6~ the si~ Fas in a good p0sition to obtain comprehensive cover~e of Communist military commu.rii,Cations in south and central China. Coupled with--ihe lack of U.S. collection and an~ly~is, the hiaius in COMINT exchanges I !d~layed reconstruction of the milita~ ~tworks until the Korean War began:30

· (b)(1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

RENEWED EMPHASIS; PRODUCT REPORTING AND DISTRI~.YTION, 1960 (U)

'\'S:SS~ When Communist armies destroyed Nati]n1U§1; fgrce9,..in Manchuria and pushed into central and south China in 1948 and 1949 _ j\merican customers began pressing for better COMINT coverage of the Communists. In those days most U.S. intelligence officers believed the Soviet Union controlled Communist movements wherever located. The agencies estimated Moscow was preparing f'or war with the West and would be rea~y for a showdown sometime in 1950; Before then the Soviets would start local conflicts. When the People's Republic of China (PRC) was formally established on 1 October 1949, the intelligence agencies regarded the .new state ·as an eJ!:tension of Soviet power.3 l

~ In March 1950, USCl8 stressed that increasing the COMJNT effort on the PRC (b)(1 r------------------·---- was of "extraordinary importance." Because AFSA had only enough resources for a token (b)(3)-50 usc 403 -----------seUch·and:-dev.e.l~p~~nt of military communications, USCIB authorized more people, (b)(

3)-P.L.

86-36 more collection positio~:·~ii(fa-new·site-I ~all to be dedicated solely to

the PRC problem. But eJen though the resources came rapidly aft.er that, and AFSA shifted people to the PRC\ from other targets, it would not be until 1952 that traffic ·analysts could detect from military communications when PRC units entered and left Korea. I

__ ,.--_,.. .... , _____ -===-------------< _ ts SG~ Yet AFSAf ~idprodu~predictive·colllNTon·tntfPRC -irit:erveritfo'ii-----: : ::::: : ..-- ·:..--n;) ( 1 )

~~~g~18Tisc -'fga__ in the Korean War. Th~t achievement was due to uninterrupted work on _f.C?.~eign--·--(b)(3}-50 usc 403 "··-·-~ I targets and C~inese plaintext civil communications by a ~~~..lingtiists and (b)(3}-P.L. 86-36 reporters - five to six at ASA and then AFSA during the late 40~,_eighfio twelve when the

Korean War began, including Mr. Norman Wild,33 M,;r .. Robe'rt"E. Drake,'4 and.Mr. Milton Zaslow,3~who was the chief of the section_. ___ ____ _ .. ------------

(Sae09t ASA( leonec~d--Chinese civil communications all.er World War II and continued to Ao so after the Communists seized power. The messages were numerous, ranging from personal greetings and announcements of family events to official

9 l8P SEEREl YMBM

·DOCID: 4001113

Mil*onZulow Rob•rt Drake

government reports. Mr. Zaslow est.ablished a system in which the best linguists scanned the messages first, then assigned them to subject-matter tramlators and reporters. The section also obt.ained machine support for translation. The effort yielded intelligence on the PRC economy, transportation and logistics, and the positions of military units.35

(S:CC6, Reporting departed from custom. Zaslow recently recalled:

AFSA w.u colllidered to be a t.eehnical agency reaponaible for clecryptina and tranal.ating bit. of

information. Only 'profeeaional intelligence omcen' in cuatom.er organizations were auppoaed to be

qualified to evaluate the infpnnat.ion and cilecuae it witb commanderB and policymakers. 11

Notwithst.anding this conception, Zaslow and his associates knew the agencies could n~~,...(b)(1)

always diacern what was oc:Curring by.reading individual translations. On occasiog.they (b )(3)-50 use 403

th d 1 d l ! b · · b --.1 · _,.- (b )(3)-P.L. 86-36 us covere comp ex eve opments y wntmg reports 8.ttt:U on many message~,.-· · ·

ES-0e8) AFSA transmitted its product I l~l~~trically to customers in Washingt.on ~ well as overseas. 3' The standard recipients of Chinese Communist product were the St~te Department's Special Projects Staff,. CIA, Navy, the Anny G-2, Air Force, GCHQ, the British Liaison Office, and ASA Pacific HQ, located in Tokyo. The latter and the Army's G-2 distributed the reports to MacArthur's staff. The intelligence agencies republished the COMINT in their own summaries, and two groups responsible for assessing in~rnational events - the Watch Committee chaired by CIA and the Joint lntelUgence Indications Committee chaired by the Army's G-2 - gisted the

t

CO MINT product as well. Agencies relied on CO MINT and credited it with atatements such as ·"communications intelligence reported" this or "a message stated that. . .. " They frequently referred to collateral as "unconfirmed information." The agencies distn"buted both COMINT and non-COMINT ver.sions of their summaries and estimates. For example, CIA produced intelligence memoranda and National Intelligence Estimates .at the Secret

'er SEERl!f ~MIM 10

·DOCID: 4001113

KOREAN WAR f8P !!elll!Y bM&RA

level as well as a Top Secret Codeword Situation Summary that contained all-source intelligence. The Joint Intelligence lndications Committee published both codeword and noncodeword reports of its weekly deliberations. The agencies and committees distributed their publications to the president, the secretaries of state, defense, and military departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and major headquarters including General MacArthur's Far East Command in Tokyo. at

(U) Intelligence assessments on developments in the Far East of that time portended a general war with the Soviet Union: the proclamation of the PRC in October 1949, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance in February 1950, Beijing's apparent determination to attack Taiwan, and China's advancement of Viet Minh aspirations against French colonial rule in lndo-China constituted Moscow's opening moves toward a critical confrontation with the West. As a result, COMINT professionals began to notice major changes in the dispositions or PRC main force units in the spring or 1950.

CO MINT DETECTS FORCES MOVING TO KOREAN BORDER, MARCH-OCTOBER 1960 (S QQ9)

"tSerAs shown on Map 3, AFSA reported in May and June that some 70,000 PRC troops from two ~rmy groups were moving down the Yangtze River in ships toward Wuhan.40

I

~On 17 July, based on thirty-five civil messages, AFSA reported that the Fourth Field Army, which the Army ~2 at the Pentagon considered China's best combat force,"1

might be preparing for an operation against Taiwan or be moving to Manchuria. Some of the units had moved east,, but ottlers deployed northward just before the North Korean invasion on 25 June. An element of the 40th Army relocated from Guangxi in south China to north-central Manchuria between 17 April and 12 June. On 31 May, an element or another army, the 39th, -!vas addressed north of Wuhan on the rail line ·leading to Manchuria."' (Map 4)

~The Army G-2 believed AFSA's 17 July report meant the Fourth Field Army was going to invade Taiwan. The Watch Committee expressed the opinion that the "concentration of Chinese Communist troops in Manchuria might be intended for use in Korea," although "there was no indication as to when or under what circumstances they might be committed. ""8 I

~n 1 September, k.FSA published a follow-up based on forty-one more messages. I .

Beijing had continued to transfer main force units to Manchuria after the North Korean invasion. A major command HQ, the 13th Army Group, relocated from Guangzhou in the south to Dandong on the Sino-Korean border between 19 and 26 August; an element of an additional army, the 42nd, deployed to northwestern Manchuria by 24 July; and units belonging to still another army, the 38t~, were addressed north of' Wuhan on the rail line

11 TCP !l!Clt!T tSMlltA

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T8P SEEREf ijMBAI CRYPTOLOGIC QUARTERLY

Map 3 - March and April: PLA army gTOups moving

Map 4 -17 July: 4th field army operation intended in Taiwan or Manchuria

12

·DOCIO : 4001113

KOREAN WAR l'9P &EER!T ttMlltA

' -·

Map 6 -2-4, 21 October: PLA massing on border; 3rd Field Army sending units

13

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.. ----- ---· (b}fo:::::::: ....

TeP SEERR YMIAuf: CRYPTOLOOJCQUARTERL Y

to Manchuria in late June and late July." As repres(!nf.ed by the dotted lines o~ Map 5, the G-2 and CIA concluded that both the 38th and 39th Armies were en route to Manchuria when COMINT detected them at stations along the railroad . .e

~The 1 September report also stated that a new artillery division had been referenced on the same rail line north of Wuhan on 24 August. And in Manchuria, messages referred in June and August to new combat formations south and east of Shenyang- the 55th and 67th Armies, which CIA believed to be former local defense forces that the People's Liberation Army had upgraded to main force unite.'8

-teer'fhe intelligence agencies decided in September that the PRC had postponed the invasfon of Taiwan and intended to give some form of armed assistance to the North Koreans in the immediate future. On 22 September, the Watch Committee agreed that the PRC could move into Korea .. with little advance notice."47

('fSEl) During the first three weeks of October, COMIN'l' revealed that the dep\Gyments had changed. Units that ~ad deployed to central and western Manchuria or to rail centers from which they could advance quickly to Manchuria, now moved up to join the 13th Army ·Group HQ on the Sino-Korean border. As shown on Map 6, the 39th Army - last seen north of Wuhan - was referenced on 6 September at Llaoyang, about 100 miles from the ~rder. By 28 September, an element of the 42nd Army, last noted in northwest Manchuria, moved to Tonghua, within fifty miles of the frontier. Moreover, the 118th Infantry Di vision, 40th Army, had been addressed at Dandong on the 5th. On 23 October, AFSA reported the entire army might have moved to Dandong. The agencies, however, did not carry the relocation of the 40th Army until early November.41

~A massive new deployment was also under way. AFSA published a 21 October ........ ·I ~hat twenty troop trains were heading toward Manchuria from

Shangna1 m the 'third held Army's areaofresponsibility.• (b)(3)-1a·usc·7ga··. (b)(3)-50 USC"403.

(b)(3

)-P.L. 86

-36

. ·· .. . ··· ····MORE w AR .. NiN(lBEFORE THE 25 OCTOBER "'FIRST PHASE OFFENSIVE" (U) . . . : -- --. .

. ~ Othe.: 'i"JllNT ll!j,. dimensio~ ..;.d ~'f tc>~~aj!itary dee In an intercepted messageJ in Be1Jmg informed on· 25 September that, based on a ~nversation he had had with Zhou Enlai, he 1eve e PRC would intervene if the UN crossed the 38th parallel into North Korea.50 Collateral

I

confirmed Zhou Enlai had warned the Dutch and Indian envoys on 3 October that the PRC would send troops into Korea if U.S. forces entered territory above the 38th paraUeL.s' PRC civil communications.from 10 September to 15 October revealed the military had taken over railroads to the 'extent that goods could not be shipped to consumers between Shanghai and Manchuria.r.2 North Korean military communications mentioned a .. regiment that came from China" on 27 September.58 Furthermore, a 6 October message stated that a shiplaad of medical supplies had been sent to Dalian and Dandong near the Sino-Korean border. 54

TeP SEERR YMBM 14

'DOCID: 4001113 (b ) (1) (b) (3 )-5 0 USC 4 03 (b ) (3 )-5 0 USC 4 03 (b) (3 )-P.L. 8 6- 36 KOREAN WAR leP SEEREf HMBR>tt

' ,,_' ', ,

-· . . . -. -('fSe' But when the UN landed :successfully at Inchon on 15 September .and drove :the

NC>l't_h Koreans across the :38th -parallel without inter.fer.ence from the :PRC, the agencies su~~se~ that Beijing had missed the opportuni~y ;to intervene. lntellige~ce officers ba:cked-.~~~y from their ,earlier warning. They overloo'ked the new pattern of military ·deploym·~~tS to the :Sino--:Korean -frontier, :and minimized or.found a:lternati-ve explanations 'for <Other in'aica:to~s. Although CIA believed the railroad tie-ups in East China signified "considerable":nor:thward -military movement," the Jo:int I-ntelligence -Indications Committee attril)u~ed·:U:~e-congestion to a wreck far.ther up the line;~~ The agencies were

_-inc.line~ -:to ~hirik th~-,-~JlCUers 9bser:yed in __ trains 'bound ior the north were no~ from :the ~h1r-dField Army as th. "1.ad reported, but rather were Fourth Field ftJmy troops whose units had already·'.~ov.ed tO Manchuria. 56 -Moreover:, the "regiment that ·came from •China" might·have'been. N:orth Koreans .from Manchuria.57 As for :Zhou-Enlai'.s

wamings_, Zh0u -could hav:e -been usin_gl ~s conduits to ·discour.a;ge the UN 'from -entering North Kor.ea. 58 ·The -medical ;supplies m\ght not ·have ~been intended for :Chinese ·Communist troops in Manchuria, but for:the North Koreans or even the Soviets. 59 Finally, :the agencies :bickered over ithe strength o'fthe -PRC ,units, with :CIA -analysts tending to t.¥nk that a COM~NT 'reference to an army element meant the :army had moved ilitact80 and military intelligence officers beginning to do.tibt ;faat entire armies.had relocated. COMINThaa not furnished "irrefutable evidence·that all :components -oithese v.anious:army gi:ou~s are in Manchuria, 'but only portions of them are;''.the Joint -Intelligence Indications Comniittee:ai;gued.on 4 October;61 ·The .Q-2 conCluded on 4 Oct<iber

that although ~Chi'na:s entry was 0not '",w'hol~y :to be discounted;" the ,evidence :was 'insufficient :to 'indicate ·such •a development ·was ·"either h~ghly ,pr:oba:ble .or ;imminent." •On ,5 October, the Watch .Committee _ventured that even though the PRC did have a 'lar,ge force -on the :border., intervention ,'was '_';less Jikel_:y" .than :previously :because :Beijing'.s _pr~paga:nda :supporting Nor.th 1Korea hakdiminished ·and the PRC '.leader.Ship ;probabl·y-:d-id .not-wan:t :to

I 0expose:China lt~1-r.etaliatory

1

u ;S. -ait:str'ikes:·~-

'(•U:) :Pr-:es1d.e·nt Truman was .st.ill I

:concerned. :Jn :his :later :account .of .events

,px:eceding the :PRC interJentio?l, :he -wmte .that '-Zhou ;En:Iai's :threats -hiot:i:v.ated 'him >to

'meet with 'MacArthur. '"-1 -~anted ~to :get lthe

~benefit of his fir.st'ha:nd ;information .a:nd

_ju~gement;" ;Pres'iderit Tr.Jman 1exp:Ia1ned:64 _

When •he and MacArthur -don:v.ened on ·wake

Tsla-nd .on- 1~5 :Oc.~ober.,J _-:th-e .. tp.r:e:si_d.e:nit ,nepea'ted~y ·v.01ced obis ;appr:~hens1on 't:hat :the

~Chinese _m;~gh't 'i•n:terv.e·ne .. "'1 :;ha•ve .be:en ·w,or.r:ied :e!bo:ut :tha:t,"' '.he1 '-w.as ,q,uo.te.a :a•s 0s~ying:65 '''Wila:t ;ar.e :the ,chbces !for ·Chinese ...... ;in.ter:fenence?" :the ;pr:esid.e.nt :asked -MacA-tthur.. ""Vei:(Y little_;~ ·MacA:r.thur re-­;plied. -"Had ·:th~y iriter¥ened 1n the :fir-St :or iP.re sident"'l'ru:rnan

'DOCID: 4001113

CRYPI'OLOGIC QUARTERLY

second months it would have been decisive. We are no longer fearful of their intervention.,,.

(U) None of the other participants - W. Averell Harriman, the presidential adviser; Philip C. Jessup, ambassador at large; Dean Rusk, assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs; John Muccio, U.S. ambassador to South Korea; Frank Pace, secretary of the army; General Omar Bradley, chairman of the JCS; Admiral Arthur W. Radford, CINCPACFLT-apparently questioned the General's assessment.'7

·

'MJrY et after the Wake Island conference, COMINTdetected increased activity in PRC air communications and new Soviet air·patrols along the Korean border. PHOTINT showed seventy-five to one hundred fighters at Dandong airfield, and a HUM'INT source reported PRC leaders had decided to take military action in North Korea. The Watch Committee now assessed that the Chinese might indeed intervene soon, but only for a defensive purpose such as occupation of a strip of territory along the Yalu to protect bydro-electric facilities.118

THE "FIRST PHASE" ATTACKS (U)

(U) On 25 Octobe.r, the armies that AFSAI lhad .. report~!d ... moviilg .. -~ ......... Manchuria struck UN forces advancing toward the Yalu. The fJ .S: Marines consolidated their positions in eastern North Korea, and the Eighth Army pulled back to the Ch'ong'chon River in the west (see Map 7).19

MP SEERET WMIRA 16

(b) ( 1 )

·DOCID: 4001113

KOREAN WAR. t8P 9!€RH tlMIM

('"

~n 6 November, the Chinese broke oft' this First Phase Offensive and withdrew into the mountains facing the UN positions.70 During a meeting of the Joint Indications Intelligence Committee on 15 November, agency representatives puzzled over the •tack of aggre8siveness" on the part of the PRC forces.11 The intelligence officers who thought only elements of armies had deployed to Manchuria now used the same reasoning to estimate how many troops took part in the First Phase Offensive. Actually about 120,000 had attacked in four armi~s; but the Watch Committee believed the Chinese had made only "piecemeal commitments of sll\811 forces .. . from various divisions of three difJ'erent armies." The committee reasoned the PRC wanted to promote "the fiction of volunteer forces but also_ .. to create the impression of greater strength than was actually pn?Sent." Major General Charles Willoughby, MacArthur's G-2, thought only battalion-size elements had in~rvened . Asked why the Chinese had been able to destroy a U.S. regiment in late October, Willoughby said the unit had not taken precautions against a night attack.12

COMINT INDICATOR$ OF MASSIVE INTERVENTION (8e)

~ During the month between the PRC First Phase attacks on 25 October and the Second Phase Offensive that began 26 November, AFSA reported Beijing was moving three more armies to the Korean border and making extensive preparations for war. On 6 November, a North Korean message mentioned that a PRC "55th Force" had been nearby during the recent battle with U.S. elements.73 As already told, the PRC 55th Army was created from local defense forces in Manchuria during the previous summer. In addition, two more armies from central and eastern China joined the 38th, 39th, 40th, and 42nd Armies that had engaged UN forces in the First.Phase Offensive. The 50th Army was in the process of moving from Wuhan to Liaoyuan in mid-October, and the 66th Army relocated from Shanghai toiDandong by 26 November (see Map 8).74

ff8e) The troo~ I had observed heading for Manchuria on 21 October had not y~t been committed to action in Korea. In partial confirmation of the

I lmessa~e; CIA on 24 November cited collateral indicating an army group ./ headquarters.11hd two armies from the Third Field Army had arrived in Manchuria.~

(b ) ( 1

) ·i:/: · ·· · ···· ·-~F$A reported that these new deployments were attended by

· preparations for war. The Fourth Field Army and the PRC Air Force moved rear services head ti~rters to Manchuria on 28 October and 5 November res. tivel .71

(b) (1)

now the Chinese and Soviets ./received at the same time. rr

..... ~'!'-~~~~~---"'!~!'!'!"'~~ ..... ----,' / communications revealed during the first three weeks of November that Beijing was m a

/ state of emergency, with authorities sponsoring mass demonstrations demanding intervention, imposing more stringent censorship, improving air defense, and

(b) (3) - 50 USC 403 (b) (3) - 1 8 USC 798 (b) (3) - P . L . 8 6- 36

17 1'8P SEERE' YMllRA

·DOCID: 4001113

T9P 5EER!T t:IM91tA CRYPTOLOGIC QUARTERLY

Map8

1.6; l0,26 November: PLA "55th Force" in Korea; thr-ee more armies on bord·el'

commanding that any soldier or officer could volunteer to serve in Korea.78 On 22 November, the medical HQ of the Fourth Fiel'd Army urgently ordered PRC troops in Manchuria to receive immunizations for· diseases that were prevalent in North Korea -smallpox, cholera, and typhoid fever.7~

~Furthermore·, coincident with a North Korean message stating that PRC reinforcements were expected in northeast North Korea, PRC' civil communications between 9 and 22 November disclosed an organization in Shanghai sending a total of 30.,00Q· mapS-oi' Korea to citi~s· on the Sino-Korean border. The first. of the messages stated that. Shanghai was sending at Ie~st I0',000 maps to Shenyang~ The Arrny G-2 reacted to this report. with an estimate that the PRC" mi•ght all'ocate- about- l,OOO· maps to a division. The· G-2· granted that. the 10,000 maps might have been for ten divisions but thought ~t more· Hkely the maps· were intended for the: 75,000 Chinese "volunteers" Gene·ral Willoughby's· staff thought to be· in North Korea. But on. 18- November, Shanghai stated

that. 20,000· maps of" Korea· had been: sent to Shenyang. And on· the 22nd, a messa•ge· disdosed 30·,000 were. on the· way .. 8() Accor.ding. to the original G-2. cakulation,. 30,€100' maps· would be enough for· thirty

1 di·visions. On 26: November, the PRC launched the Second

Phase: Offensive· with thirty di.visions.

-teerThe. agencies now lbegan to accept t.he COMINT' evid'ence that the· Chinese wer.e preparing to. strike a heavy· blow. The, Watch Commtttee·judged on 2· November thatt the Chfoese, mrght. raise the- scale of their invoFvement, out. it stilt be'l:ie.ved1 the preparations

·ooCID : 400111 3

iU;;& Tl.1i ccrit.D Ara; Griup1sci•pW.7JD•"t -.ainit· Ellblii Ariiy, u NtsveliiBH f."6'

"1 G'G9t ooMtNT ptovided tim:elv and ilj>eclfic· inteilige-nce b'elott Ure' PRtJ DY.ervelttior1, Wfi must p~ A.F~.I ~or: eiltabtishiii'g that tl.Mi!8f.s. is· nof· the- ti~Uti~\'tt province o( cuaf.oM~J'~ .. We· mi1St tfec» aomitl:end t>)era'tfonal manager& tor feta.~

(b ) (1)

USC 403

86- 36

·DOCID: 40·01113

CRYPTOLOGIC QUARTERLY

covera·ge_9q .. __________ .. ~nd China's civil network despite pressure t.o work on ~.viet targets.

(b) (1) (b) (3) - 50 USC 403 (b) (3) - 18 USC 798 (b) (3) - P . L . 86- 36

MaplO

(8 8e6't Yet ASA should not have dropped Chinese Communist military communications in 1946. AJ a result, net reconstruction was delayed. It is of course easier to·make this observation thfin it would have been for ASA to obtain the resources for such a large effort in 1946. Ne

1vertheless, ASA's 1946 failure to continue targeting the

communications of a targ~t of such rising importance ·as the Chinese Communist movement was an ex.ample of what t.o avoid in the future.

(8 888, As for the intelligence agencies, their arialysts were too prone to transfer western political-military presuppositions into the minds of the planners h1 Beijing. Even so, they did·pay ll.ttention to COMINT and warned, however tentatively, that the Chinese would intervene.

I

(U) Why then did Ameri~an leaders sanction the advance to the Yalu?

(U) According to recently available material from the PRC, Mao Zedong was convinced MacArthur was too arroga~t and complacent to make an objective assessment of the intelligence he received. Mao reportedly thought the PRC could surprise MacArthur ·

: .

20

·ooCID: 4001113.

KOREAN WAR l8P SEaff tjMIM

because MacArthur would miscalculate Beijing's intentions. Mao allegedly also knew MacArthur had underestimated the PRC units opposing the UN. According to the recent inf'ormat.ion, Mao told the commander or the Thirt.eenth Army Group on 18 November that MacArthur believed there were only 60,000 to 70,000 PRC troops in North Korea. By then there ~ere actually 260,000. Mao is said to have commented that this misconception would help the PRC destroy .. tens of thousandsn in MacArthur's army.&

(U) MacArthur was not the only official who miscalculated. Dean Rusk would state forty yoars later that "the real failure at the Wake Island meeting was in our asseBSment of Chinese intentions and of our ability to handle Chinese forces if they actually . intervened. On this one MacArthur and the rest of us were all wrong. •JM

(8 El99) But faulty estimates of the PRC and the UN do not fully explain what occurred. For alJ Mr. Rusk's remorse, the president and his advisers had decided to use force in Korea because they perceived the war as a Soviet test of Western reeolve.81 Their mistake was not that they decided to respond militarily but that they put MacArthur in charge.

(U) Surely having in mind the COMlNT reports of armies deploying to Manchuria, they ordered him in late September to "continue to make special efforts to determine whether there i~ a Chinese Communist or Soviet threat.- But during the Second World War MacArthur had disregarded! COMINT that contradicted his plans.87 Although we lack evidence that he personally , read the reports of PRC preparations, it is clear that his headquarters in Tokyo received the information. MacArthur's zeal to pursue "betrayal," '"appeasement," and .. international lawlessness" to the Yalu probably caused him to minimize the COMINT indicators of massive PRC intervention, just as he had earlier minimized "inconvenient" COMINT reports about the Japanese. ·He thus drove his command to great defeat in Korea. Beijing's measure of the man had been terribly

. , I

accurate, Washington's terribly flawed.

Notes

1. (Ul Roy E. Appleman. Diatukr.in Korea: Tia. CltlMN Confront MacArlbr (College Station: Tela& AAM UniveraU)' Preaa, c. 1989), 19-21. I

2. (U) Army Chief of Staff J. Lawt.ori Collini to MacArthur, 24 November 1960; MacArthur to JCS. 25 November 1950, Forti«ta R•lation.r of t1N UtaiUd Sllotu: 1950, Vol. VII, Korta !Washington: U.S. Go•enuneot Printing

Office, 19761, 1222-1224and1231-~233. Cit.ad hereafteruFRUS 1960,Korea.

3. (U) Appleman, D"41tcr in Korea: 44-46, and EtUt of CllMitt: Entrapment ondBrmliout in Korea, 1950 (College Stat.ion: Texu A&M Univerait.7 Prul,c. 1987), 6~.

4. CU)Appleman,.&.lofCNJ.i11, 106.

5. <U>FRUS1950,Komi, 1237.

21 J'OR H&RiT tlMBltA

·ooc:ro: 4001113

"'TOP SttA!T WMllto CRYPTOi.OGlC'QUARTERL Y

6. <U> U.S. Aaaiatant Chief of.Stall •. G-2. War Department,."Mqic" Diplomatic Summary Nr. 1021, 10 .January

19'6, 86-86. Aecel&ion 39C CBL.135 GI l ·0306, "NSAICSS Archives.

7. (U) Herbert Feia. Tlac CIUno TG"'1k: "TM American Effort in Cliina from Pcrl Ho.rbor ta tAe Maraltall Mis1ion <Prineet.on: Princet.on univenitt 1>na.19SS>. u.o.180-t81.

8. (U) Herbert·Hoover·app0intecl Hurley, a Republican, eecretary of war. Hurley tater-1upportecl the N..., Dea\,

and Prealdent Roosevelt een't him on "trolll>l•ahooting miasiom to New Zealand ·and the Middle Eat ·u well u China. William Henry Stueck, Jr., TM Road lo Con(ron/IW)n: A"meriAlan Policy toward China o.nd Koreo.1947-1960 (Chapel Hill: The·Univ8rait.y·ofNorth-Carolina Presa,-e. 1981), 13-1'.

9. Ctn Quoted in CbarlH 8 . McLane, Souict Policy and Chinn. Commi.milti, 1·931-i.946 (New Y-orlt: Columbia Uiiivtnity Pren, 1"9!8) 3n.

10. CU)FRUS 1960, Korra, 1'369.

11. <U> General Mal"lhaJl waa not unacquaizited witb. China. •He had beita Uaigned there in the Army in tbe 1920• and participated in U.S. "policy deciaiona recardinr China aa Anny Chief of Staft' during Worli Warn. President ·Truman recalled he t.elephOned General Maraba1l "On 27 Nonmber 1946 in Leeaburc. Vi.rgiiiia. where the Marahalla were unpackinc from their move froDl Washington. "Without any preparation I &old him: 'General, I want you to fO t.o China for me.' " Maraball ·replied, "Yea, Mr. Preaident.," and rang off. He later told the praident he ended the call qu.icldy becaUM he nee:dech.o Hplain·ao Mn. MarabaU why 'he wu=ree11teriag active

coveminent eerv1ce 110 IOOil afternitintment; but within iniout.ea the radio wu broadcuting nlilft'ot't.he llanhall miliaion. General 'Marahalltold·theipreaident, "Therewu the devil to pay" whe11 Mra. liaiahall heard the report. Ha~ ·s Trilman, ·M1moin, Vol. 11, Ycrt a/Trial and Hoi>f (Garden City, NY: Do~leday and Compa11y, lnc. 1'966), 66~7.

12. &888t 1\FSA ·paper entitled "'i'he Chineia COmmuniat Product.ion Problem," dated 20 February 1961, with :11 notatibn by 'RADM J :w. Wenger; deputy-director, .AJi'SA, ·that. ihe·fiist U.S. COMIN1' -9ffort agaiaat the Chinese ·<:Jommuniata occurred in reaponae:to General Marahall'a request. ·Aci:eaaion 9l·39 C81B26 QAC, NSA ·Ar~hivea. &e ill8o ASA Pacific, "A:nnual-llej>on for FY 1·946.'' Ac:ceWon'28KCBNii2 AAP, NSAJCssArchivea.

'is .. f8t888t Undated ASA paper entitled "Stat.tis of Chineae COm1iuiiim. Problem9, ""written between iii March ·l 9441 and ·the end bf A:uguet 1941: the lifetime of the Top ·Sec:ret. "Cocleword, "CREAM, ·that. ·wae atamped on the 1pap.r. ·Acee..ion ·J.M37'CBNH66QAC, NSAJCss Archives.

I

14. (U) NSA Ce'nter"ror'CrypfOlo;tc.Hi.itorf<ecM>OralHiatory lS.82, HJuly 1982. Latera·BripilierGeneral, '€ollii11Miilrved in ·Uie Signal Co,P. {1"943-1946) and -ASA HQ 0949-1951) and Wal Chief ·'ASA.PAC, ·based fo

Tbk.yo,'froiniNoveniber 1il'6t.o :~ll'lber l94i. -H• refired in 1956.

'15. "f8i888J Mr. Kenneth ·T. Y-OUilg, Cbljjfftr ·East Sfction, "State :Department 'SpeCial 'Projecta ·&aJr (SPSJ, memol'tndurn to Mr. T . ·Acihilleil Polysciide .. -deputy. dlrilctor SPS, "Chineae Communist Me8811ge," 6 Peoruary 1947, Accea8ib'D 96'7-0X CBDB38 EAA, Ns.Vcss Archivea..

I

'16. (S ·gQ'Q') se1ee'8d •A's~ trai1al8tiom·ot t"hineaeCommlinist.·and-diplomatic: 'ln888ili'M:f'nim "iliis peiioil are on ft:idoftlm ·ree~ E-1o3;b0x '12, ~ An:'hiv111. Copin of'tbe inillllq8-Citecl'anche'leeted transialionn:te aiao ·flied ·1n'CCH'Seriea:1v ;'R;4'.2.

-f!J.. :(~'St~k./R~lO:Cdnii;;ntii'tion, '16.

~-•cm i>fi~rliilentiof.stat.e, v11tt.d:SttiR. ·Riflli1i0iw~·iihCiwrb,·wilA ·sp.cib.iRi(mna 'ta:'iu:Piriod .1Hfl,..1!Us

"(Waihiniti>n:!St&t.e·'l)ep&rlmen\UiviaiOn-Of.Public:ationa, 1-9'9>.·d -..

l9. <((f) ·!fhe~'hief'Comliiwtiiit'neil>~r .. ·Zhbu·ltiilili,:1eAN1Qitag'for¥an"an-m Noveniber1HM6. 'sweck/RocUl·IG ti:o/ifrbrUil&n. :ts.

'DOCiD: 4001113

KOREAN WAR TOP Si!Cltl!'I' HMlltA

20. •& 888) Joint. Ptoceaaing and Analysis Group (JPAG), "Report on Chinese Communist Circuits; Interim Report816aection CH-169, 12 March 1947,Acceuion '2465 Hl0-010-7, Folder 19, NSAICSSArchives.

21. f8 888~1o---------------~ewalett.en~.the~JJ)l.tf.~llf)r_dinator for Liaison of the U.S. State-Army-Navy Communicat.lona lntelli nee Board ISTANCIB> 10 June aiicfl"Au t--1946 ....... Accesaion 759 CBPB66 JAC N :::::::::::""_._,. ....... ( b ) ( 1 )

~~-=-~-~~--...... ------------'CCR Seri~~-1_\':~~.6.l;Departmenicif State, UrtiktlSto"1R~latiou U1ilh China, :r.1.

22. ~ee{ ~ewaie~~-~-~~·~:~·uty Coordinator for Liaiaon, STANCIB, 1August1946,

Acceaaion 75a CBPV66 JAC, NSAJCSS Archives.

23. t&eees Mr. Kenneth T. Yoq, memorandum to Mr. T. Acbilln Polyzoides, wSpecial Report on Relations

between the Chineae Communist Party and Comintern Headquarters in Moscow," 21 April 1947, AcceBSion 9670X CBD838 EA.A. NSAIC~ Archives. .

24. ~Yan'an, to Moacow, 21 September 1946, published 21 November 1945, CCH Series IV.MM.6.3; Feis, Clainc Tar11tu, 361-363.

25~an'an to Moscow, 3-6 October 1946, publhlhed 21 No~ember 1946, CCH Series IV .MM.6.3.

· 26. ~Yan'an to Moscow, 3~ October 1946, publiahed 21 Nonmber 1946, CCH Series IV.MM.8.3. The numbeni given by Mao Zedot1g are in 0 . Edmund Clubb, 20th Cenbuy Citino (New York: Col11111.bia Univeniity

Presa, c. UHl4>, 285. The Army'• estimate is in Department of State, U.S. Relatioru uiith CIUM, 313. State's

calculation la in Arthur R. Ringwalt. Chief Chinese Aftairt Division, to Brigadier ~~ral Marshall S. Carter. special amriatant to the secretary of state, 21 Augugt 1947, FRUS 1947, Tiit For Eaal: Cl&iJla., VoL VII, 260. Carter wu to be director, NSA, from 1June1966 to 31July1969.

,.· 27. f8 SiQ) "Special Report on Chii:ieee Communist Circuits," JPAG lnter:im Report 293 Section CH-041, 29

October 1946, AcceBBion 42466 H 10· 10-4, Folder 7, NSAJCSS Archive•; "'Summary Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1947," ASA Pacific,Acceulon l4744CBNJ13, NSAICSSArchivua.

28. '$ ccoi Resources allocated to \he various targeta are liated in JPAG mootbly statua reports filed in the I

NSAJCSS Archives under Acceuion 4266 Hl0..()100-1 through Hl0-0106-6 JAC. ·

(b) ( 1 )

30. 1&889) Folder entitled "AFSA Field Operations Far East- Chitom, Korean COMINT Problem" Acceasion

( b ) _( l ) ................ 9139 CBl826 QAC, NSAJCSS Archivia.

OGA ·-.. , .... 31~· f8'81iJ9) Jointlntelli ence Commi

CIA

rt to the Joint Chiefs

CIA of Staff, 26"Miy·I950· Situation Swn i"'"'~~!""'l"!B"ll~-------------------------,

Copies or theae documenta from the Truman Library are OD file in .. C~C~H~Se!!"'"n~-e-s~X~V~l-.C~.8-.-1.-----..--~

32. (8 8881 Folder entitled "Propoled Anny Intercept S~t-el I Feb-Mar 50," Acce11&ion 9139 CBl826; Folder entitled" AFSA Field OpeniUO:n• Far Eut- C~ic:Om, Korean COMINT Problem, Acceasion 9139 CBIB26.

' .'

33.~r. Wild graduated from Collimbia Uniyera'ity with an M.A. degree in Chinese and.Japanese in 19'3 and

apent. the war at Arlington Hall u an Ar'(Qy officer. He converted to civilian status in 1946 and translated

intercepted Chinese Nationalist andt<;on\~unist comrnunication.1 during the Marshall missil)D. In the shift of

resources from China to other tat8'!ta'in 1947, Mr. Wild wu assigned to the Soviet problem and received RW111ian language training. ASA returp~ hitn to the China eection in November 1948. A. he told representat.ivee of the

NSA Crypto-Lingulatic ~i.tion on 17 December 1987, "the Chinese cOmmunists marked up Manchuria [and]

someone decided that Chi~ waa im~rtant again." Mr. Wild tcauait.ioned i'rom ASA to AFSA and thence to NSA . . ... ~ I (b)(1) I (b)(3)-50 USC 403-(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

23 Y8P !!ERl!fttMlltA

DOCID: 4001113

I OP Sl!t!RS YHIPA. CRYPI'OLOGIC QUARTERLY

where he became a aenior technical expert in foreign languages and continued u a consultant following hi&

retirernent. An account of Mr. Wild'a remarka is on file in the CCH Otal History collection.

34. - Mr. Drake, a pilot during World War ll, received a B.A. in history and international relations from Carleton College in 1948, and entered on duty with the Navy as a CO~fINT analyst in 1949. He served as an

analyst and reporter at AFSA and NSA (1949-63), NSA representative at the Defense Department (1954), and

Operations Officer at NCEUR (1959-4i2>; attended the National War College Cl963-4i41; and, after a tour as

Deputy Chief NCR Defense in 1964-66, was aucceuively chiefB Group !1965437), deputy chi~fNCPAC l1967-

70>,chief A Group !l970-73),ADD0(1973-75), DDOC1975-78l, and DDIR 1197~0). Mr. Drake retired in 1980.

36. <U> lnterviewa of Mr. Robert E. Drake, 5 December 1985, and Mr. Milton Za.slow, 14 May 1993, OH 18-85 and

OH 17-93, CCH Oral History collection.

37. (U) Oral History Interview 17 -93, 1' May 1993, Center for Cryptologic History.

38. CUHnt.erviews of Mr. Robert E. Drake, /5 Decernber 1985, and Mr. Milton Zulow, t 4 May 1993, OH 18-85 and

OH 17 -93, CCH Oral History collection.

39, (~888t Ms. Carolyn Fo:s, AFSA, "Reports of lritelligence lndic:ationa CommitteH C~eming the Far East -.Mardi-December 1950," 3 Ja11uary J SM, CCH Seriea V.M.1.5. The document prepared by Ma. Fox was intended

to be published as an appendix or an official history of the role ofCOMINT in the Korean War. Ma.. Fox, who had

participated in writing the history of British CO MINT during World War II, eictracted from the reports of the Watch Committee and the Joint· Intelligence Indication& Committee. Washington intelligence agencies apparently were repruented o~ both committee&. Ms. Fox's extracts or committee reports are cited below by date and a1mmittee name.

40 fi ~~Q) AFSA-234134-Sal'l.~~y 19W, Accession 29749 CBSK43 JSAA, NSA/CSS Archives.

41. (8 8881 Special Resean:h Branch, G.2:~~rtme11t·of'.t)ie Army, Military Digaat(MDl 60-40, 4 Octo,;.r 1950. Thia MD and thOlll! clt.ed hereal\.er oonatit.ute Ap~ndix A of·~ ·COntJ>ila.tion by the G-Z in late 1950 or early 1951

entitled "Indications of Large-Scale Chinese Intervention in Korea betw~~-nlbe·Ou~breait of Korean War on 15 June 19150 and Launching of the Chinese Communist Offensive on 27 November 19so?fiI~HXH.~riee V .M. 7 .5.

•2. '8 8881 AFSA-234134-501Uuly-t950:· ... -........... . ..... . ..... .. ...... ··:::::::::::::::::::::::;;;;, .. ~~lgl-so USC 403 I . .

43. u; &881MD50-29, 19July 1950; Watch Commit_t:e.11. r.epori.·s·A~ 1950. (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

«. ~Ii '1'891 t.FSA-234139·50Dt&!pte~b~~-~;~o. Accession 29749 CBSK43JAA, NSAJCSS Archive&. I

45. (Ii '15il9~ IID 50-36, 6 Septem~er 1950; CIA Situation Summary for 1 September 1960. The ClA Situation

Summaries <hereafter Sit.sumal were publt.hed 9-'eekly aod are in President Truman's papers in Independence, Mimiouri. Selected copiea are in c¢tt Series XVJ.C.3.1.

I 46. {8 888) Slbiurns for 8 and 15 September. ·

47. t&e881 Watch Committee rein. 22 September; Sitaum for 29September. I

48. (E QQ91 Chinese Communiat ~nternal Analylli. Report ICCNIAR> Nr. 27, AFSA-23.,50-50/CMM, 16 October

1950, Acceuion Number 29748, IOc:atioo CBSK43 GtG-0308-1, ~AJCSS Archives; MD 50·':'· 1 November.

49. ~ 8e'1rtIACH/Cll3, 6 October 1960; MD 50.·40, 4 October, and 50·44, l November, Sitaum for 27 October.

50. <8'888JAFSA 0 -26446/50,05140ZOctober, CCH Series V.M.7.3. '

61. {U)FRUS1950,Komi,aa9,868.

52. ~) JllC report, 25 Octoblr: Sita um for 27 October.

53. (i QQQl Watch Committee spJcial report, 29 Septe~ber; Interim Siblurn, 30 September; MD 50-40, 4 Oct.ober.

. ' .

lQP SEEAET ijMBRA 24

DOCID: 4001113

(b) (1)

KOREANW!Jt T8P &li&AR UMIM

64. (8'8!8)JllC report, 11 October.

65. t~eee1 Siteum for 27 October;JlIC report, 26 October.

66. l8 88818itaum for 27 October; MD 60·44, 1 November.

67. l8 889l MD !>0·40, 4 October.

58. (i QQ9ta\Vatch Co_mmittee rep0rt, 6 October.

59. C8:888JcJllC report, 11 October.

60. Comparison of CIA numeric:e.l estimates of PRC forces in Manchuria reported in Situation Summaries for 16

September and 6 Ottober suggest CIA wu at first skeptical that complete armiea were relocat.ing to Manchuria

but changed that view by early October.

61. 18 eeeJ 1JllC report, 4 October.

62. <9"@l88l MD 50-40, 4 October.

63. ti 'ef88JWatchCommiltee report,60ctober.

64. lU)Trwnan, YMT.afTrialandHope,361-366.

65. IU> David McCullough, Truman INew York: Simon and Scbuater, 1992>, 802.

66. (U) Friu 1950, Korta. 953.

67. (U) Notea ofthe proceedinp taken by various upreaentativea from Washington are in FRUS 1950,KOl'fO, 948-962. . i

I I

68. "(9 88~ Watch Committee repo!t8, 19 and 20 October; Joint Chier. ofStaft', meM&ge to CINC Far Eaa, 21

October, transmitting an estimate that CIA had given the president on 20 October, in Anny G-2 com,ilation, "lndic:e.tiona of Large-Scale Chine11e Intervention in Korea," CCH Series V. M.7 .5.

69. ~MD50-44, l November~Appleman, Ditaauri11Kol'f4, 19-21. .

70. CU) Appleman, DiMl1"r in Koreo)2 l. . i

71. 18"@@8) llIC report, 16 Novemb~r.

' 72. 18 ijQQI Watch Committee repori, 2 November; on Willoughby's &atimate, see Appleman, EtUt of Cho.in, 4-6.

73.o(il QQQ) MD 50·46, 8 November. · ' I •

74. t8 888) MD 50""6, 15 November; Special Research Branch, G-2, Department of the Army, mesaaget.o ClNC

Far East, 26 November,in "Indicatiohs of Large-Scale Chinese lntervention in Korea,"CCH Series V.M.7.5.

76. ti ~~Ol Sitsuro ror 24 Novembe/ . I 76. 1&888JlllC report, 8 November; MD 50-44, 1 November and MD 50-46, 8 November.

I 77.&i Q'i819'ACH/Cl34, l3November;JllCreport,15November.

I 781 4i s;goi JUC re rta, 15 and 22 November: CIA Sitaum for 24 November

Acc9eaion 2003N CBQ143 MAC, NSAICSS Archives . .._____________________ I .

79, ;t&eeor.mc report, 29 November.

80: Ci ijQQJ MD 50-46, 14 November! JUC reports, 15 and 22 Nnvember; CtA Sltaum for 24 November.

81. '8 88& J'W atcb Committee repork 2 and 16 November; JllC reports, 16 an d22 November; CIA Sita11111 for 24

November.

(b) (3) - 50 USC 403 (b) (3) - P . L . ·86- 36

25 Te, SEEA&TWHllR 6

·DOCID: 4001113

118P SEEA&'J WHllll' CRYPI'OLOGIC QUARTERLY

82. t8 EU!l8) CIA Sit.um for 24 November: Appleman, Diao1kr in Korra, «-55, and Erut of Clw1in, 60-06.

83. E&888l Hao Yufaa and Zhai Zhihe.i, "China's Decision~ Enter the Korean War: Hi.story Revisited," The China Quorltrly, Number 121 (March 1990J, 112-113; Thomas J. Chri.stenaen, "Threat.a, AaaW'ances, and the

Last Chance for Peae9: The Leuona of Mao'a Korean War Telqrams," Internotionol Srcurlty, Vol XVII, Number

1<Summer192), l•t.

84. Ul 888)1)e&nRu.lt,Ad&wmNewYork:W. W.NortonandCompany, 1990),16'1.:.169. Mr.Ruakservedon

General Joeepb Stilwell'& staff' io the China-Burma-India theater during WorJ~ War II and joined the State Department. after the war. He was appoint.lid deputy undersecretary in February 1949, then aaaistant secretary

for Far Eastern .Aft'airS in March 1950. He errved aa secretary of state from 1961-1969.

85. Stueck, Road to Confronlotiori, 7-8.

861 tB 888) The order was included in the me8&8.ge authorlzing MacArthur to cross the 38th parallel into North

Koreg. It wu drllfted by the JCS, concurred by Secretary of Def'enae Ma~atl t.M S.Ctet.al"j of State Acheaon,

and approved by Preeident Truman. The JCS trall8mitted the order Co MacArthur on 27 September. FRUS 1960,

Ko~. 781, 786, 793.

87. IUJ Edward J . Drea, MacArthur'• Ultro: CoddTWalting and tJie War agaiMI Jopan, 1942-194$ <Lawrence: University of Kanau Preu, c. 1992), ha.a concluded that although MacArthw- considered CO MINT during aome operations, notably the ~lled "Jeap to Hollandia• in 19«, he "coneistentJy di.lmisled Ultra evidence that

fe.iled to accord with hie prewnceived strategic vision• (230>. When planning t.o invade the Pbilippine ialandl, be "disregarded timely and aecW"ate Ultra• nvealing the .la panese were reinforcing their prrisona (231 ). He· also "dUuniaaed Ult.ra'a a"'11'&t.e revelationa of a masaive Japanese buildup on Kyushu in July 1946" aft:er preparing the atiaclt on the Japanese home Uilaiids (234 ).

I

According tO General Bradley'a aide, the JCS concurred. with the preaident'a subsequent decision to recall

MacArthur in part *•use he resumed the march to the Yalu in November 1950 without obtaininc adequate intelligence on the opposing Ch\neae force&. McCullough, T ri£"'4n, 8'0.

(U) Mr. Vanderpool entered on duty at NSA in 1960 after military service in the Army's Counterintelligence Corps. He retired in 1996 and is currently living in Nashville, Tennessee. Mr. Vanderpool has a B.A. from Harding University and an M.A. from George Washington University. Professionalized as a Security Officer and an lntellig~nce Research Analyst, he held investigative, analytic, and managerial positions in the Office of Security and the Operations Directorate. He was a ~ember of the Intelligence Research Career Panel and a number of interagency committees. Mr. Vanderpool received the Agency's Meritorious Civilian Ser\'ice Award. He performed research for this article during an assignment i~ the Center for Cryptologic History.

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