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Liberty Theological Seminary
THE RELATIONSHIP OF DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN FREEDOM: HOW THE
FINITE HUMAN MIND CANNOT FULLY UNDERSTAND ITS CONCEPTS
A Paper
Submitted to Dr. Mark Walton
In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Course
Systematic Theology II
THEO 530-B12
By
Ryan Sebastian
October 15, 2010
i
Thesis Statement:
The purpose of this research is to dive into the conclusion that human minds are finite
and cannot fully comprehend the concept of God’s Sovereignty and how it coincides with human
free will.
ii
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………………...1
THE PREDESTINATION VIEW 1
THE FREE WILL VIEW 2
Nature of the Will 5
The Outstanding of Deliberation 5
Absence of Exterior Thought of Determination above Choices and Decisions 5
Preference and Verdict 6
Responsibility and Attempt 7
Scripture Passages That Seem to Resist Free Choice 8
The Will and Foreknowledge 9
DETERMINISTS AND LIBERTARIANS 10
Libertarian’s Arguments for the Freedom of the Will 11
The Examining of Psychological Viewpoint 11
The Moral and Religious Viewpoint 12
Arguments for Determinism 13
Physiological Data 13
Psychological Data 13
Sociological Data 14
iii
CONCLUSION 14
BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………………………… 16
INTRODUCTION
The concept of human free will and God’s sovereignty is something that theologians have
tried to solve for centuries. These two views seem to be conflicting but both appear in Scripture.
Differentiating concepts within the two views will be examined along with the Scripture
passages that support each view. The purpose is to examine the data of both points of views to
conclude that there is not adequate information that the finite human mind can fully understand
and that the debate between the two views must come to a standstill until man knows what nature
of freedom is essential for moral responsibility.1
THE PREDESTINATION VIEW
There is the viewpoint that if in order for God to be fully sovereign then He must have
predestined those who would receive salvation and likewise who would receive damnation in
hell. The predestination view states in quintessence that prior to the earth or people were
fashioned, God selected certain persons to transpire in heaven and the rest to transpire in hell.
Advocates for this view use Ephesians 1:4-5 and Romans 8:29-30 in support of predestination.
Romans 9:29-30 states: “For those God foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the
likeness of his Son, that he might be the first-born among many brothers. And those He
predestined, He also called’ those He called, he also justified; those he justified, He also
gloried.”2
1 David M. Ciocchi, “Suspending The Debate About Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 51 (2008): 590.
2 John Boykin, “The Predestination Principle: A Bible Study,” Evangelical Review of Theology 33:3 (2009): 262.
1
2
This subject came into the sharpest focal point during the Reformation. There were many
issues that faced the Reformation, but the one that was of great importance was the choosing of
reciprocally exclusive sides amid the concepts of predestination and free will. The two most
noted, outspoken followers for predestination were John Calvin and Martin Luther.3 Kenneth
Latourette condensed Luther’s view of predestination by stating, “Man, so Luther held, does not
have free will. Man’s will is like a beast of burden. It is ridden either by God or by the Devil
and does whatever the one who is in the saddle directs.”4 Calvin likewise defined predestination
as the eternal declaration of God, by which He has resolute in Himself, what He would have to
be suited of every person of humanity. Individuals are not at all created with a parallel destiny.
Some have been foreordained for eternal life and some for eternal damnation. Since every man
is created for one of these outcomes, Calvin would then state that man is predestined for life or to
death.5 The failure of many to accept the promise of Jesus Christ suggests the inclusive
antagonism of divine sovereignty and human freedom. Freedom includes resistance to God’s
will. Calvin, at a deeper intellectual level, refuses this opposition. He has noted that even
human freedom to rebuff God must be in at some degree part of God’s own will.6
THE FREE WILL VIEW
In contrast, the free will view states in quintessence that God created mankind with a free
will to construct their own choices, which results in obedience or disobedience. God does hold
3John Boykin, “The Predestination Principle: A Bible Study,” Evangelical Review of Theology 33:3 (2009): 263.
4 Kenneth Scott Latourette, A History of Christianity (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), 724.
5 Paul Evans, The Moody Handbook of Theology (Chicago: Moody Press, 1989), 481.
6 William A. Wright, “Divine Sovereignty: Absolute or Limited by Human Freedom,” Testamentum Imperium: An International Theological Journal 2 (2009): 16-17.
3
into account the choices of man, but he does not pressure humanity into choosing. Supporters of
the free will view point to passages such as John 3:16, which states: “For God so loved the
world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but
have everlasting life.” Another passage that is frequently used for support of this viewpoint is
Romans 10:13, which states: “Everyone who calls on the name of the Lord will be saved.” In
John 3:36 the author concludes in stating “Whoever believes in the Son has eternal life, but
whosever rejects the Son will not see life, for God’s wrath remains on him.”7
An early theologian in church history named Erasmus was considered the most outspoken
advocate for the free will view during the Reformation. He later became Martin Luther’s
antagonist in the field. Erasmus held to the view that “God would be unjust and immoral if He
were so to order the universe that man could not of himself fulfill the conditions which He had
ordained for salvation and then were arbitrarily to choose some to be saved and by doing so
condemn others to hell.”8 Martin Luther confessed that at one time the evident contradiction of
free will and predestination that is presented in Scripture had so driven him to the chasm of
desolation that he wished that he never had been born. Luther, like many others, stood in
admiration of the splendor and impenetrable justice of God. He maintained the belief that God is
unattainable to human reason.9 No man can guarantee the amount of control they have.
Additionally, there are some things that man cannot accomplish. Free will does not mean that
humanity can append to the standing of any given bequest outside the restrictions positioned by
nature. In addition, it does mean that man can fashion some innovative ability. Humans can 7 John Boykin, “The Predestination Principle: A Bible Study,” Evangelical Review of Theology 33:3
(2009): 262-263.
8 Ibid., 264.
9John Boykin, “The Predestination Principle: A Bible Study,” Evangelical Review of Theology 33:3 (2009): 262-263.
4
only function within the restrictions and potential of their given desires and abilities of their
environment. In reality, free will is freedom within the boundaries of a person’s unborn
capabilities and of the world in which he lives in.10 Humanity has the freedom to will under
unsure limitations. One’s will action is not subjective in the logic that it can function in devoid
of the regard for one’s tattered nature within their precedent development. The will action
represents the aptitude of humanity to construct their own world within the potential worlds
provided by man’s surroundings and capacities. In reality, humanity wills what is probable to
their own nature, and as a result man finds himself efficient to differentiating extents. Therefore,
man is further than a receptive being. Man is a responsible being. Humanity’s synthetic desires
and abilities supply the unrefined resources from which man can build their temperament and
individuality. Man cannot be liable for the raw material. In contrast, man can be blamed for the
type of configuration one can will to fashion out of them. There would be no reason in
considering man’s experience in moral responsibility if man could not will the good in which
man aspires.11 Dr. Henry C. Thiessen once stated that “God can foresee how men will act without
efficiently decreeing how they shall act. God is not limited in the carrying out of His plans,
except as He has limited Himself by the choices of man. God has set certain general bounds
within which His universe is to operate. Within these bounds He has given man freedom to
act.”12
Nature of Free Will
10 Willard F. Enteman, The Problem of Free Will (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1967), 23.
11 Ibid., 23.
12 Samuel Fisk, Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom (New Jersey: Neptune, Loizeaux Brothers, 1973), 54.
5
To understand the concept of “free will” one must first dive into its nature. The scheme
of free will is a thing of human intangible pretense. In order to investigate it beneficially, one
requires to commence by taking into consideration what the conception at issue involves and
what intelligence can be made of it.13
The Outstanding of Deliberation
There are a few requirements that free will must maintain. The first is the outstanding of
deliberation. This consists of the will being the aptitude of authority of manufacturing
premeditated choices concerning man’s actions, and in so doing guides man’s actions by way of
thought. As a result, such a will is free when it follows man’s own wishes rather than pertaining
to being controlled or manipulated. John Locke has instructively defined free will by stating:
“The idea of liberty, is the idea of power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action
according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the
other.”14
Absence of Exterior Thought of Determination Above Choices and Decisions
The second requirement is the absence of exterior thought of determination above choices
and decisions. In order to sustain that humans are outfitted with a free will is to declare that
mankind has a confident meticulous genus of an aptitude. This capacity consists of the ability to
formulate choices and decisions consisting of deliberative thought based on mankind’s own
impulse, without the outcome-determinative infringement of factors and processed whose
operations are entirely outside human individual power. The standard point of such an
13 Nicholas Rescher, Free Will: A Philosophical Reappraisal (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 15.
14 Ibid., 16.
6
arrangement is that man’s actions question human choices and decisions. Man’s choices and
decisions are industriously produced by man rather than being nonchalantly prepared for man by
a progression lying exterior of human control. Henri Bergson stated that choice is engulfed with
human sense of reality’s deputation futurity. He is also noted in stating that in making a choice,
man endeavors to convey to an awareness of one type of prospect relatively than to another.
Within the realm of genuine freedom, the subject of the incentive becomes essential. The Greek
term autexousia, which means “absolute power,” indicated the self-determination has an issue
with freedom of slavery. This was used by the early Church Fathers to situate for the type of
sovereignty characteristic of free will, which is the power of self-determination.15 Nicholas
Rescher goes on to point out that:
Just as in politics coercion and force are the prime impediments to freedom, so in personal agency external manipulation and undue influence are its prime impediments. With free will the only viable sort of constraint upon someone’s decisions and choices are those impressed by the agent’s thoughts and deliberations in the process of deciding; any sort of own constraint upon an agent’s autonomy is antithetical to free will.16
Rescher, like so many others, have strived to comprehend the complexity of the realm of free
will and the necessary components behind it.
Preference and Verdict
Another requirement for free will is preference and verdict. One may ask “how do
people resolve alternatives and make one’s choices and decisions?” This can be answered by
individual judgment or by allocation to others. Personal judgment cannot constantly be rational
since at some point snap judgment is called for because consideration computation cannot be
15 Nicholas Rescher, Free Will: A Philosophical Reappraisal (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 22.
16 Ibid., 22.
7
conceded through ad infintum, which means “to infinity.” Therefore, deliberation is to be
correlated in a relatively extensive and comprehensive manner.
Responsibility and Attempt
The fourth requirement is “responsibility and attempt.” Man’s freedom as cogent beings
is restricted by the apprehension of commonness of foreclosed portions. This is the innumerable
thing that the unyielding realities of nature deposited afar from the reach of probability for man
and experience. It is clearly given that many things are beyond humanity’s capacities. Man’s
power of mind over matter is futile. Humanity cannot choose to stay abstemious upon drinking.
In contrast, man’s control over what man can try to do is grander. Humanity’s control over what
they desire is even better. One cannot be free of will and a forestall being inundated with anger
when unreasonably offended. In reality, nothing can impede one from regretting that this is so,
desiring it were otherwise, and striving to construct it as so. The results by means of reverence
to authentic outcomes could be ahead of humanity, but results by means of reverence to endeavor
definitely are not.17 When a person is treating matters of choice and decision, one has to sustain
a peculiarity between the subjective and the objective viewpoint. There is a decisive distinction
in correlation in which an agent is free to choose and what the agent is free to do. The former
commonly affords to a great extent to a wider range.18
Scripture Passages That Seem to Resist Free Choice
17 Nicholas Rescher, Free Will: A Philosophical Reappraisal (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 24.
18 Ibid., 29.
8
Now that we have looked at free will and it has been clearly defined, Scripture on the
subject needs to be evaluated. There are several passages in Scripture that make it hard to hold
to the concept of free will. One passage is Exodus 9:12, which states: But the LORD hardened
Pharaoh's heart and he would not listen to Moses and Aaron, just as the LORD had said to
Moses;” and yet again in Exodus 9:16, which states: “But I have raised you up for this very
purpose, that I might show you my power and that my name might be proclaimed in all the
earth.” Paul also illuminates it even more, bringing forth a parallel text. The text is Exodus
33:19, which states: “And I will be gracious to whom I am gracious, and will show mercy on
whom I show mercy.” Another difficult passage is Malachi chapter one and is also expounded in
Romans chapter nine. It states, “’Was he not Jacob’s brother?’ says the Lord. ‘Yet I have loved
Jacob but I have hated Esau.’” Paul then expounds in Romans 9:11-13 that “thus they were not
yet born and had done nothing either good or evil in order that God’s purpose of election might
continue, not because of works but because of his call, she was told, loved, but Esau have I
hated.” An early church father named Jerome expounds on this passage according to the
interpretation of another church father named Origen. He stated that “God hardens when he does
not at once punish the sinner, and has mercy as soon as he invites repentance by means of
afflictions.” Another passage of note is Hosea 4:14, which states: “I will not punish your
daughters when they play the harlot.” God speaks in fury according to Psalm 89:32, which
states: “Then I will punish their transgression with the rod and their iniquity with scourges.” In
the same light Jeremiah 20:7 states: “O Lord, thou hast deceived me, and I was deceived; thou
wert stronger than I, and thou hast prevailed.” Jerome has been noted to lead astray when he does
not immediately recollect from his fault, and this is also Origen’s belief as well. He conduces to
a supplementary faultless health, just as a qualified surgeon would desire an abrasion not to scar
9
too rapidly in order that when the corrupting substance is brought out of the open injury it would
permanently heal. “And Origen notes that the Lord says: ‘But for this purpose have I raised you
up,’ not ‘For this purpose I made you.’ Otherwise, Pharaoh would not have been wicked if God
had made him like that: ‘Who saw everything that He had made, and behold, it was very good’
(Gen. 1:31).” In reality, Pharaoh was created with a will that can turn to evil or to righteousness,
but he wished to turn to evil and preferred not to obey God. Nonetheless, God turned the
malevolence of Pharaoh to His own glory and to the salvation of the Israelites that thus it might
be made plainer that men venture in futile endeavors when they defy the will of God.19
The Will and Foreknowledge
Many theologians have struggled with the thought of the will and foreknowledge. To
God, the will and foreknowledge is paralleled. Karl Barth is an example of a theologian that
sought to better understand this topic.20 In some way, it ought to be that He wills what He
foreknows as future, and that which He does not obstruct, though it is in His power to execute so.
This is what Paul means when he states “who can resist His will” in accordance to whom He
wills and hardens whom he wills (Romans 9:19). If there were a dictator who conceded into
consequence whatever he willed, and no man could oppose him, the dictator could be noted to do
whatever was pleasing to him. In parallel, the will of God seems to entail inevitability on man’s
will. In Romans 9:20 Paul does not personally unravel the question, but he rebukes the question.
19 E. Gordon Rupp and Philip S. Watson, Luther and Eramsmus: Free Will and Salvation (Louisville: Westminister John Knox Press, 1969), 64-65.
20 J. Scott Jackson, “Divine Sovereignty in Light of Christ’s Lordship:Karl Barth on the Heidelberg Catechism,” Testamentum Imperium: An International Theological Journal 2 (2009):21.
10
The passage states: “But who are you, a man, to answer back to God?”21 God maintains his
sovereignty in every aspect of creation and time.22
DETERMINIST AND LIBERTARIANS
Also, in order to have a better understanding of free will, one must examine the views of
determinist and libertarians. The minority of philosophical controversies have been waged with
a superior debate between the determinists and the libertarians. The dynamism between both
parties of the question have been espoused do not only the metaphysical magnitude of the
subject, but rather more particularly to its moral and religious implications. There are no other
philosophical concerns that are of better moral and theological instant except of those consisting
to God and the depravity of the soul. The question has been so meticulously debated that
auxiliary contemplation of it may seem ineffective. The inquiry of the freedom of the will when
it is abridged to its barest necessities is: “Are man’s acts of will unceremoniously fashioned by a
precursor of circumstances or are at least several actions free from causal determination?” The
determinists maintain that the entire events, yet the most carefully planned and premeditated, can
be explained, and that if man knew an adequate amount regarding a man’s inherited
characteristics and the situational influences which encompass the man’s shaped character. Also,
one could calculate just how the man would conduct themselves underneath any particular
situate of conditions. The libertarian or free willist asserts that there is a minimum sort of human
21 E. Gordon Rupp and Philip S. Watson, Luther and Eramsmus: Free Will and Salvation (Louisville: Westminister John Knox Press, 1969), 64-65.
22 Winfried Corduan, “Divine Sovereignty and Creation,” Testamentum Imperium: An International Theological Journal 2 (2009): 12.
11
actions of the volitional sort in which the individual by the expression of man’s will power acts
autonomously of habitual conditions.23
Libertarian’s Arguments for the Freedom of the Will
There a few arguments that need to be evaluated from the libertarian’s point of view.
Theologians on both sides have essential arguments for or against free will. The ones that will
be examined are the pensive of psychological argument and the moral and religious argument.
The Examining of Psychological Viewpoint
The majority of supporters of the free will doctrine hold true that the mind is
unswervingly conscious of its freedom in the very act of constructing a decision. Therefore,
freedom is an instantaneous reference to man’s examined consciousness. The most persuasive
and elementary of the arguments for freedom is the phrase, “I experience myself free, thus I am
free.”24 The occurrence of decision following deliberation is an unquestionable truth which
libertarians and determinists equally have to recognize. In actuality, the authentic issue is
whether this truth warrants the production which the libertarian puts upon it. The determinist
response to this argument is to urge the mind-set of freedom and that it is nothing but a sagacity
of liberation proceeding upon past indecisiveness and strain. Subsequent to indecisiveness and
divergence, the raved energies of the psyche are unconstrained and this progression is
accompanied by an interior sagacity of supremacy. Therefore, the emotion of freedom or of
intentional control over one’s actions is a sheer prejudiced misapprehension which cannot be
measured in verification for psychological indeterminacy.25 An additional introspective actuality
23 Willard F. Enteman, The Problem of Free Will (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1967), 32.
24 Ibid., 35.
25 Willard F. Enteman, The Problem of Free Will (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1967), 36.
12
cited by the free willist or libertarian is the support of doctrine that the moral agent is in thought
and certain that the libertarian may have trailed an itinerary of actions in contrast from that which
the libertarian essentially sought after. The conviction that there are indisputable alternatives of
action and that the selection among them is indeterminate, is generally stronger in outlook and in
thought than at the instance of tangible choice.26
The Moral and Religious Viewpoint
The moral argument assumes a diversity of shapes. The diversity of forms all concur in
their effort to assume volitional freedom of the moral man from some characteristic of the moral
condition. The greatest characteristic attribute of moral action is that is perceives to be bound for
the comprehension of a superlative of the execution of a commitment. The libertarian would
argue that it’s of the very temperament of an idyllic or a commitment that it shall be
unreservedly embraced. The recognition or denunciation of a moral ideal and the acceptance of
a commitment as fastening can merely be accounted for on the conjecture of man’s free choice.
The moral argument for freedom has on occasion not been affirmed from the viewpoint of the
moral man, but of the moral opponent. This opponent lays verdict on the exploit of another or
yet among the opponent’s own actions. A verdict of tribute or charge extends freedom to the
man whose deed is judged.27
Arguments for Determinism
26 Ibid., 37.
27Ibid., 38.
13
While the verification for the free will doctrine is greatly humanistic and moralistic, the
case for determinism is a petition to scientific data. The determinist finds that the discipline of
sociology, psychology, and physiology gives verification that human deeds are no exemption to
the underlying equivalence of nature.
Physiological Data
The greater a person knows about the physiological and impartial processes which go on
in the interior of the human being, the further apparent it transpires that there is not a sever in the
unremitting sequence of causation. This is even when it reacts to the greatest intricate of
incentive. Physiology has revealed a sensibly transparent depiction of the machinery of human
behavior. Behaviorists have been recruited for the cause of determinism. They have applied the
objective system of the physiologist to the human behavior. The behaviorists have described in
the slighted aspect the apparatus of reflexes and the method of their habituation. “Delayed
responses are mediated by very complex neutral processes which on their subjective side are
called conflict, indecision, and deliberation, but they are not exception to the behaviouristic
formula.”28
Psychological Data
Whereas the deterministic theory conjunctures its most apparent support from physiology
and behaviouristic psychology, introspective psychology constructs an endowment as well. An
impartial reflective assessment of preference supports the hypothesis of psychological
determinism. Now if a person’s supremacy of introspective were satisfactorily constructed, that
person could presumably follow any conclusion in discovering the precise psychological
28 Willard F. Enteman, The Problem of Free Will (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1967), 44.
14
influences which provides that meticulous verdict predictable. Beyond question for an absolute
elucidation of definite resolutions, it is essential in calculation to the cognizant experience of the
volitional performance to improve the more obscure subliminal and cataleptic influences. The
subsistence of cognitively unfathomable conscious proceedings was one of the greater
convincing reasons for the unique positing of a cataleptic or subliminal psyche. It stays accurate
that a reasonably absolute proceeding of the psychological effect of volitional choice is probable
yet lacking an alternative to a cataleptic mind.
Sociological Data
The social field of sciences succumb a copious confirmation for the deterministic view of
human conduct. The actuality that the behavior of a great collective of individuals is expressible
in conditions of an arithmetical bylaw which positively leads in that bearing, even though it is
not an irrefutable fact of individual determinism. It is intricate to resolve the likelihood of the
laws of a collective or accumulation of actions with the individual free will.29
CONCLUSION
Theologians for centuries have tried to explain the concept of human free will against
God’s sovereignty. This debate will most likely continue until the return of Christ. It is essential
as a Christian to examine all aspects of doctrine including free will. After must examination into
the debate the only conclusion that must be of note is that the finite human mind cannot fully
comprehend the concept of God’s sovereignty and human free will. As noted, both are revealed
in Scripture. How can both concepts be true? This is a question that will consume theologians
until the end of time
29 Willard F. Enteman, The Problem of Free Will (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1967), 45.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Boettner, Loraine. The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination. Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1932.
Boykin, John. “The Predestination Principle: A Bible Study.” Evangelical Review of Theology 33:3 (2009): 262-269
Ciocchi, David M. “Suspending The Debate About Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom.” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 51 (2008): 573-590
Corduan, Winfried. “Divine Sovereignty and Creation.” Testamentum Imperium: An International Theological Journal 2 (2009): 1-15.
Enteman, Willard. The Problem of Free Will. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1967.
Evans, Paul. The Moody Handbook of Theology. Chicago: Moody Press, 1989.
Fisk, Samuel. Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom. Neptune: Loizeaux Brothers, 1973.
Jackson, J. Scott. “Divine Sovereignty in Light of Christ’s Lordship:Karl Barth on the Heidelberg Catechism.” Testamentum Imperium: An International Theological Journal 2 (2009): 1-22.
Latourette, Kenneth Scott. A History of Christianity. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953
Rescher, Nicholas. Free Will: A Philosophical Reappraisal. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2009.
Rupp, Gordon, and Philip S. Watson. Luther and Eramsmus: Free Will and Salvation. Louisville: Westminister John Knox Press, 1969.
Wright,William A. “Divine Sovereignty: Absolute or Limited by Human Freedom.” Testamentum Imperium: An International Theological Journal 2 (2009): 1-17
16