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ABUEVA vs WOOD G.R. No. L-21327 January 14, 1924
JOHNSON, J
The parties:
Petitioners are members of the Independence Commission. The creation of the commission was ratified
and adopted by the Philippine Legislature on the 8th day of March, 1919. Twenty six of the petitioners
are members of the House of Representatives and four are members of the Senate of the Philippine
Islands and they all belong to the democratic party;
Respondents are Leonard Wood, the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, Manuel L. Quezon and
Manuel Roxas, Presidents of the Independence Commission. Sued as well are the Acting Auditor, the
Executive Secretary and the Secretary of the Independence Commission.
This is an original action commenced in the Supreme Court by the petitioners for the writ of mandamus
to compel the respondents to exhibit to the petitioners and to permit them to examine all the vouchers
and other documentary proofs in their possession, showing the disbursements and expenditures made
out of the funds of the Independence Commission.
FACTS:
By Act No. 2933 the Legislature of the Philippine Islands provided for a standing appropriation of one
million pesos(P1,000,000) per annum, payable out of any funds in the Insular Treasury, not otherwise
appropriated, to defray the expenses of the Independence Commission, including publicity and all other
expenses in connection with the performance of its duties; that said appropriation shall be considered
as included in the annual appropriation for the Senate and the House of Representatives, at the rate of
P500,000 for each house, although the appropriation act hereafter approved may not make any specific
appropriation for said purpose; with the proviso that no part of said sum shall be set upon the books of
the Insular Auditor until it shall be necessary to make the payment or payments authorized by said act
Petitioners averred that as members of the Independence Commission they are legally obliged to
prevent the funds from being squandered, and to prevent any investments and illicit expenses in open
contravention of the purposes of the law. Petitioners have verbally and by writing requested the
respondents to permit them to examine the vouchers and other documentary proofs relating to the
expenditures and payments made out of the funds appropriated for the use of the Independence
Commission.
Respondents have denied and continue denying to permit the petitioners from examining said vouchers
and documentary proofs.
ISSUE: Can the Court compel the respondents to address the claims of the petitioners
HELD:
1. Leonard Wood, as Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and head of the executive
department of the Philippine Government, is not subject to the control or supervision of the
courts.
2. Manuel L. Quezon and Manuel Roxas, as Chairman of the Independence Commission, are mere
agents of the Philippine Legislature and cannot be controlled or interfered with by the courts.
3. As for the auditor, the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the action because section 24 of
the Jones Law provides that: “The administrative jurisdiction of the Auditor over accounts,
whether of funds or property, and all vouchers and records pertaining thereto, shall be
exclusive”
The determination of whether the accounts of the expenses of the Commission of Independence should
be shown to the plaintiffs or not is a question of policy and administrative discretion, and is therefore
not justiciable.
The United States vs. H.N. Bull GR L-5270Jan 15, 1910
Facts:
On the 2nd of December 1908, a steamship vessel engaged in the transport of animals named Standard
commanded by H.N. Bull docked in the port of Manila, Philippines. It was found that said vessel from
Ampieng, Formosa carried 677 heads of cattle without providing appropriate shelter and proper suitable
means for securing the animals which resulted for most of the animals to get hurt and others to have
died while in transit. This cruelty to animals is said to be contrary to Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the
Philippine Constitution. It is however contended that cases cannot be filed because neither was it said
that the court sitting where the animals were disembarked would take jurisdiction, nor did it say about
ships not licensed under Philippine laws, like the ship involved.
Issue:
Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over an offense committed on board a foreign ship while
inside the territorial waters of the Philippines.
Held:
Yes. The offense, assuming that it originated in Formosa, which the Philippines would have no
jurisdiction, continued until it reached Philippine territory which is already under jurisdiction of the
Philippines. Defendant is thereby found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
No court of the Philippines has jurisdiction over any crimes committed in a foreign ship on the high seas,
but the moment it entered into territorial waters, it automatically would be subject to the jurisdiction of
the country. Every state has complete control and jurisdiction over its territorial waters. The Supreme
Court of the United States has recently said that merchant vessels of one country visiting the ports of
another for the purpose of trade would subject themselves to the laws which govern the ports they visit,
so long as they remain.
CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).
Facts
On his last day in office, President John Adams named forty-two justices of the peace and sixteen new
circuit court justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic Act. The Organic Act was an attempt
by the Federalists to take control of the federal judiciary before Thomas Jefferson took office.
The commissions were signed by President Adams and sealed by acting Secretary of State John Marshall
(who later became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and author of this opinion), but they were not
delivered before the expiration of Adams’s term as president. Thomas Jefferson refused to honor the
commissions, claiming that they were invalid because they had not been delivered by the end of
Adams’s term.
William Marbury (P) was an intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace. Marbury
applied directly to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of mandamus to compel Jefferson’s
Secretary of State, James Madison (D), to deliver the commissions. The Judiciary Act of 1789 had
granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus “…to any courts appointed,
or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.”
Issues: Does Marbury have a right to the commission?
Does the law grant Marbury a remedy?
Does the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are
unconstitutional and therefore void?
Can Congress expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in
Article III of the Constitution?
Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus?
Holding and Rule (Marshall)
Yes. Marbury has a right to the commission.
The order granting the commission takes effect when the Executive’s constitutional power of
appointment has been exercised, and the power has been exercised when the last act required from the
person possessing the power has been performed. The grant of the commission to Marbury became
effective when signed by President Adams.
Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy. The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury. One of the first
duties of government is to afford that protection.
Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that
duty, the individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the law for a remedy. The
President, by signing the commission, appointed Marbury a justice of the peace in the District of
Columbia. The seal of the United States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive
testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment. Having this legal
right to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver which is a plain
violation of that right for which the laws of the country afford him a remedy.
Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are
unconstitutional and therefore void.
It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to
particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with each other,
the Court must decide on the operation of each. If courts are to regard the Constitution, and the
Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary
act, must govern the case to which they both apply.
No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what is
specified in Article III of the Constitution.
The Constitution states that “the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other
cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.” If it had been intended to leave it in the
discretion of the Legislature to apportion the judicial power between the Supreme and inferior courts
according to the will of that body, this section is mere surplusage and is entirely without meaning. If
Congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared
their jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared it shall be
appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction made in the Constitution, is form without substance.
No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus.
To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate
jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.
It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause
already instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to
courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the same as to sustain
an original action for that paper, and is therefore a matter of original jurisdiction.
Disposition: Application for writ of mandamus denied. Marbury doesn’t get the commission.
WRIT OF MANDAMUS [Latin, We comand.] A writ or order that is issued from a court of superior
jurisdiction that commands an inferior tribunal, corporation, Municipal Corporation, or individual to
perform, or refrain from performing, a particular act, the performance or omission of which is required
by law as an obligation.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).
Facts
On his last day in office, President John Adams named forty-two justices of the peace and sixteen new
circuit court justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic Act. The Organic Act was an attempt
by the Federalists to take control of the federal judiciary before Thomas Jefferson took office.
The commissions were signed by President Adams and sealed by acting Secretary of State John Marshall
(who later became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and author of this opinion), but they were not
delivered before the expiration of Adams’s term as president. Thomas Jefferson refused to honor the
commissions, claiming that they were invalid because they had not been delivered by the end of
Adams’s term.
William Marbury (P) was an intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace. Marbury
applied directly to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of mandamus to compel Jefferson’s
Secretary of State, James Madison (D), to deliver the commissions. The Judiciary Act of 1789 had
granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus “…to any courts appointed,
or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.”
Issues
Does Marbury have a right to the commission?
Does the law grant Marbury a remedy?
Does the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are
unconstitutional and therefore void?
Can Congress expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in
Article III of the Constitution?
Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus?
Holding and Rule (Marshall)
Yes. Marbury has a right to the commission.
The order granting the commission takes effect when the Executive’s constitutional power of
appointment has been exercised, and the power has been exercised when the last act required from the
person possessing the power has been performed. The grant of the commission to Marbury became
effective when signed by President Adams.
Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy. The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury. One of the first
duties of government is to afford that protection.
Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that
duty, the individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the law for a remedy. The
President, by signing the commission, appointed Marbury a justice of the peace in the District of
Columbia. The seal of the United States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive
testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment. Having this legal
right to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver which is a plain
violation of that right for which the laws of the country afford him a remedy.
Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are
unconstitutional and therefore void.
It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to
particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with each other,
the Court must decide on the operation of each. If courts are to regard the Constitution, and the
Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary
act, must govern the case to which they both apply.
No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what is
specified in Article III of the Constitution.
The Constitution states that “the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other
cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.” If it had been intended to leave it in the
discretion of the Legislature to apportion the judicial power between the Supreme and inferior courts
according to the will of that body, this section is mere surplusage and is entirely without meaning. If
Congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared
their jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared it shall be
appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction made in the Constitution, is form without substance.
No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus.
To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate
jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.
It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause
already instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to
courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the same as to sustain
an original action for that paper, and is therefore a matter of original jurisdiction.
Disposition: Application for writ of mandamus denied. Marbury doesn’t get the commission.
WRIT OF MANDAMUS [Latin, We comand.] A writ or order that is issued from a court of superior
jurisdiction that commands an inferior tribunal, corporation, Municipal Corporation, or individual to
perform, or refrain from performing, a particular act, the performance or omission of which is required
by law as an obligation.
JOSE A. ANGARA vs THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936
LAUREL, J.:
Facts:
In the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the
National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas.
On October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of
the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of votes.
On December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a
“Motion of Protest” against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest
filed after the passage of Resolutions N0.8 confirming the election of the members of the National
Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filedo. Praying, among other-things, that said
respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or
that the election of said position be nullified
Issue:
Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative?
HELD:
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does
not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the
various departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so
far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This,
however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the
President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National
Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he
chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense
that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain
officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties.
Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established,
to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls
the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying
impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks
the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive
and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
Conclusion:
(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of separation
of power into the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often makes
difficult the delimitation of the powers granted.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the
judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised
finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and
functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of
the other two departments of the governments.
(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect, each house of
the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their
elective members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature
with respect to contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members, to the
Electoral Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and
complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and
regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.
( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent
constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object would
be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations
regarding the manner of conducting said contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making
each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and
qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to
prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the
time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the
costs and expenses of contest.
(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is not essential before
such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National
Assembly.
(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest
had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its
incidental power to prescribe the time within which protests against the election of any member of the
National Assembly should be filed.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro
Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the
National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing protests against
the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a
protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
Tanada vs Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051
After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by the
Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Tañada who belonged to the Citizen’s
Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was
contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision the SET would have to
choose its members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members comprised of the
following: 3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the
minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two SET members supposed to
come from the minority were filled in by the NP. Tañada assailed this process before the Supreme Court.
So did Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a
member of the Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his election contest. Senator Mariano
Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the issue
because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the SET is
vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Tañada and Macapagal was not to raise the issue before
judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.
HELD:
No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable question. The term
Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to
those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being asked by Tañada
to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Tañada was whether or not the
elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are valid – which is a judicial question. Note that the SET is a
separate and independent body from the Senate which does not perform legislative acts.
But how should the gridlock be resolved?
The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the minority members)
must not come from the majority party. In this case, the Chairman of the SET, apparently already
appointed members that would fill in the minority seats (even though those will come from the majority
party). This is still valid provided the majority members of the SET (referring to those legally sitting)
concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its own rules in situations like this provided such
rules comply with the Constitution.
IMMUNITIES
