Dissertation FINAL To post

F R O M T H E D E M O C R A T I C P E A C E T H E O R Y T O F O R C E D R E G I M E C H A N G E :

A P A T H R I D D L E D W I T H C O N T R A D I C T I O N S

BY GUILLAUME CHAMBELLAN

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO

LONDON METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE

DEGREE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND PEACE & CONFLICT STUDIES

GI6P01 DR. MIKE MILLS, SUPERVISOR

02/05/2014

GI6P01 Guillaume Chambellan 11063125 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction………………………………………………………………………….3

Chapter I: The Democratic Peace Theory……………………………….5

Democracy and Liberalism……………………………………………5

The Democratic Peace Theory………………………………………7

Normative and Institutional Critique……………………………8

Globalisation and Social Changes………………………………..9

The Democratic Wars…………………………………………………11

Dictatorial Peace………………………………………………………..12

Chapter II: Military Intervention and Regime Change………....14

Military Intervention………………………………………………….14

Democratisation and the Danger of War……………………17

Chapter III: Case Studies of Kosovo and Iraq……………………….20

1999 Kosovo Intervention………………………………………....20

2003 Iraq Invasion………………………………………………….....22

Conclusion………………………………………………………………………….26

Bibliography…………………………………………………………………..….28


Introduction

Writing about the democratic peace thesis and democratisation does not seem particularly

original at first. A number of scholars have investigated these topics and provided different

insights into whether liberal democracies are truly peaceful or not and whether democratisation

ought to be implemented everywhere. Yet there seems to be a need for reopening these debates,

particularly following the recent events of military interventions in Central Africa, Mali, Libya

and the failed attempt at occupation in Syria, which raise significant concerns regarding their true

nature. Generally, the way democratic powers have engaged in war since the end of the Cold War

has been under the cloak of human rights defence or the protection of liberty, but their idealist

discourses seem to hide the true nature of what all states in the end seek, hegemony. This

composition will attempt to demonstrate that democracies are not necessarily more peaceful than

other regimes but rather that their actions are the result of self-interested behaviour and not the

concern for the wellbeing of populations under authoritarian control. Can liberal democracies

truly be considered as more peaceful and their “humanitarian wars” more legitimate than the war

of rogue states? It seems that honourable concepts such as freedom, human rights and peace are

manipulated in ways to render violence, destruction and power less controversial and more

acceptable to the voting public of democratic countries.

In the first chapter a definition of liberal democracy will be provided in order for the

reader to have a clear understanding of what will be referred to throughout the development of

this composition. As a matter of fact, the concept of democracy is often argued among scholars

and of course this notion has evolved over time with different opinions about what it is or what it

should be. For the sake of clarity this paper will not attempt to redefine liberalism and democracy

or assess which states are truly democratic or not but rather will take as reference old democratic

powers such as the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK) or France which consider

themselves as exemplar cases of what democracy is in the 21st century. Then the democratic

peace thesis will be exposed and confronted to the different critical arguments from a normative

and institutional aspect on the one hand, followed by two more specific critiques looking at the

role of globalisation and analysing authoritarianism on the other. This, hopefully, will

demonstrate that the democratic peace theory lacks sufficient strength and that consequently

foreign policy based on it might be misguiding.

As a matter of fact the legitimacy given to the democratic peace theory has been a force

of justification for the spread of democracy and military intervention. As often, military

intervention is accompanied with the duty of implementing democratic and liberal values in the

“freed” country which are explained away through the notion that democratic countries are


peaceful with each other. Promoting liberal democracy will produce peace, this is what is

believed. Therefore the second chapter will focus on democratisation and in particular on military

intervention in order to assess its effects and successes on the invaded states. Further, a second

part will evaluate whether or not democratisation leads authoritarian regimes toward peace and

stability. The argument put forward in this composition is that military intervention often causes

greater losses and creates more instability than otherwise but also contradicts the fact that

democratic countries are more peaceful. As will be demonstrated, democratising states are often

more war prone than autocratic regimes therefore it could be suggested that fostering the

implementation of war-prone regimes through the use of violence undermines the claim that

democratic countries are more peaceful.

In order to give more clarity to the argument exposed in the previous chapters, two case

studies will be discussed in the third chapter to evaluate the way democratic countries proceeded

during and after intervention. These case studies presented will be the 1999 bombing campaign of

Kosovo and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. This chapter will demonstrate that the democratic

countries that participated in these two wars demonstrated a more assertive and irresponsible

attitude than a careful and restrained one. Rather than focusing on the humanitarian discourse of

the interventionist states, the argument here will demonstrate that in both cases the actions taken

clearly disregarded the international law of jus ad bellum and jus in bello and that other interests

such as the pursuit of resources, hegemony or geostrategic politics better explain the willingness

of Western power to intervene. This therefore, will further demonstrate the limited abilities of

democratic powers to be peaceful actors.

The aim of this paper is to reopen the discussion regarding the peacefulness of democratic

powers but also demonstrate that military interventions serving a humanitarian cause might in

fact be a motive for engaging with new wars of conquest for power and hegemony through

different means. Moreover, it shall be demonstrated that if democratic states truly intend to pacify

the world, they will need to rethink their foreign policy methods since most military interventions

and most forced democratisations are not producing peaceful societies but rather weak, unstable

or war-prone democracies which as a result further dwindle the strength of the democratic peace

thesis that liberals try to defend.


Chapter I

The Democratic Peace Theory

The liberal democratic peace theory has been prominent among scholars of international

relations as well as governments. A Significant number of articles, essays and books have been

written about the subject and although this chapter does not necessarily intend to raise new issues

it will nonetheless attempt to reopen the debate and more importantly attempt to demonstrate the

fragility of the theory and the importance of re-evaluating and re-examining it. A blindly assumed

approach to any political theory can have consequences and lead to misguided actions or

misinterpretations of the world.

Firstly, a definition of democracy and liberalism will be provided in order to create an equal

understanding between the reader and the author of these two notions, then the liberal peace will

be exposed and in order to demonstrate the fragility of the theory, several critiques will be put

forward.

Democracy and Liberalism

In order to fully comprehend what the democratic peace encompasses, it is essential to

browse through the historical aspects of the theory by looking more specifically at the way this

idea developed. First of all, within the terminology, two important notions must be defined,

‘liberalism’ and ‘democracy’. Very often democracy is equated on purpose, or not, with liberal

democracy or polyarchy (Barkawi & Laffey, 1999, 405). As Doyle (1986) clearly underlines

liberal states are normally representative of certain principles such as “individual rights, equality

before the law, free speech and other civil liberties, private property, and elected representation”

(Doyle, 1986 ,1151). Interestingly democracy is not mentioned in the quote cited but elected

representation is and taking into account Schumpeter’s notion of democracy, elected

representation is a key principle. To him a democratic system is one in which “its most powerful

collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in which

candidates freely compete for votes and in which all the adult population is eligible”

(Huntington, 1993, 7). Hence, a state is liberal when the norms mentioned previously are

respected and when its political elites are elected through political competition under the power

of suffrage. However, democracy can be defined in a quite different way. In fact, from a more

classical perspective, democracy finds its roots in ancient Greece where it was first practiced.

Linguistically, ‘demos’ the people and ‘kratia’ the rule simply refers to a system where “decision-

taking power lies with the people – a public, a community of fate – whom the regulation, in


question affect” (Scholte, 2005, 349). Over time, the notion of democracy has evolved and when

talking about democracy among scholars nowadays this political system is usually understood

more as elected representation than rule by the ‘demos’. Therefore, in order to understand what

the democratic peace theory is, one should firstly see democracy as what Schumpeter is referring

to rather than the classical and traditional meaning of it.

A second important element often associated with liberalism that requires discussion is

the role of private property and market in liberal states. As a matter of fact liberalism does not

focus only on the domestic practice of a set of values but also encourages interaction with the

outside, which is the international world. One of the main components of this interaction is

expressed through exchange and trade and represents a pillar of the (liberal) democratic peace.

The idea is that the increased trade and foreign investment between two states is likely to reduce

violence (Oneal & Russett, 1997, 267).Taking into account what Emeric Crucé wrote, trade

creates a common interest and increases the prosperity as well as the political power of peaceful

members of society (ibid, 268). His words were later further emphasized by the work of other

prominent figures such as Adam Smith, Francois Quesnay, Thomas Paine, etc. As a result

increased economic interdependence participates in the development of a ‘security community’

(Oneal & Russett, 1997, 270).

Another important contributor to the democratic peace theory that must be mentioned

here is Immanuel Kant who has inspired a number of theorists. Academics such as Fukuyama

and many others often portray Kant as a leader of both liberalism and democracy and more

frequently as the originator of the democratic peace thesis (Buchan, 2002, 409). Often referred to

by scholars, Kant’s Perpetual Peace written in 1759 develops the idea that peace can be created if

three ‘articles’ are accepted. The first one requires the civil constitution of the state to be

republican which to him was defined as a political society in which moral autonomy,

individualism and social order were all combined; the second article suggests that liberal

republics will then create a zone of peace amongst themselves through pacific federation or union

and finally the third article establishes a cosmopolitan law operating in association with the

pacific union which provide a foreigner the right to enter into relations – essentially commercial –

with the native inhabitant (Doyle, 1986, 1157-1158).

Summarising the different elements that have been mentioned previously, it can be

suggested that what characterises a liberal and democratic state is one which respects the values

mentioned previously, has elected representation of its political elite and have a propensity for

trade and a market oriented economy.


The Democratic Peace Theory

Now that liberalism and democracy have been defined, the democratic peace theory will

be explained and examined. The idea in itself is rather simple, it suggests that democracies might

be war-prone they do not go to war with each other and are generally more peaceful than non-

liberal states (Layne, 1994, 7-8). In order to make that assessment, one shall demonstrate what

factors participate in the peacefulness of democracies. This can be justified through a normative

and institutional perspective.

The normative approach suggests that political elites of democratic states normally act on

the basis of democratic norms, norms which are defined by the incentive to mandate nonviolent

conflict resolution and negotiation in the respect of freedom of thought and speech (Rosato, 2003,

586). If a conflict arises between two democracies they will trust and respect each other because

an important aspect of democracies is to socialise political elites on these non-violent norms

(ibid). The institutional logic asserts that the democratic institutions and processes place

politicians in a difficult position to be prone to war because they must respond to their civil

society and that undesired policies might encourage people to boot out a politician following

election. In other words, politicians are accountable to public opinion. Because foreign policy

decisions are openly debated and scrutinized by the public and Non-Governmental Organisations

(NGOs), policy makers tend to be more aware and careful in regard to the cost of their decision

particularly in regard to war (Layne, 1994, 9). Moreover mechanism enabling checks-and-

balances within democratic institutions reduce the likeliness of going to war. The executive

selection, the political competitions, and the pluralism of the foreign policy decision-making

process are three main components, which permit the checks-and-balances aimed at constraining

politicians to enjoy absolute power or absolute decision-making (ibid). Another institutional

argument is that the economic interdependence that democratic liberal states tend to have creates

interest groups that are likely to be against violence, as this would disrupt the economic

relationship between the two countries (Rosato, 2003, 587). A good example to illustrate this

point is to look at the European Coal and Steel Community, which had as its primary aim to

create economic interdependence between France and Germany and as a result strengthen their

relationship.

A last part of the theory has not been discussed yet and it concerns the behaviour of

democracies with non-democracies, in other words the dyadic perspective, and their war

proneness. One of the key elements is that democracies act in two different ways with other

democratic states and non-democratic ones. In the first environment, it is believed that they

externalize their domestic norms of cooperation and non-violence with other similar states which


as a result lead toward a zone of peace between the two. However, with non-democratic states,

democracies must adopt a different behavioural suit and abide to the norms of international

conduct of the non-democratic state in order to avoid being exploited or taken advantage of. This

can then result in democracies using violence against those who do not share their norms for

cooperation (Mac Millan, 2012, 338).

Although the democratic peace theory holds an important place in debates of international

relations and has great support from influential academics such as Doyle, Fukuyama, Russett,

Oneal and many others, the critiques that some have made reopen the debate and highlight certain

loopholes within the theory that some have, to a certain extent, failed to acknowledge. This is

what shall be exposed in the second part.

Normative and Institutional Critique

Based on Sebastian Rosato’s (2003) arguments the democratic peace actually lacks

explanatory power when it comes to proving or justifying the foundation of its claim. When

examining more closely the normative and institutional features of the democratic peace, some

contradictions start to emerge. In regard to the normative aspect, it is interesting to see that

historically democracies have often failed to respect their internal norms of non-violence in an

international context (Rosato, 2003, 588). Some argue that if liberal states go to war it is only

because their interests are threatened but it is interesting to see that according to the Correlates of

War (COW) dataset of extrasystemic wars out of 108 wars, between 1815 to 1975, 66 involved

liberal democracies and from these 66 wars, half were fought against previously independent

people and the other half were colonial waged against existing colonies (ibid). What seems

important to mention is that during the Cold War, for example, the US did support the

replacement of democratically elected government in Guatemala (1954), Brazil (1964), and Chile

(1973) which were at the time fairly democratic not to mention interventions in Iran (1953),

Indonesia (1965-66) and Nicaragua (1981); most of the democratic aspects of these nations

where rejected by the US in order to favour military and dictatorial regimes (ibid, 590-591).

Although it could be suggested that these wars were due to the Cold War and the threat of

communism, this would therefore affect the empirical validity of the democratic peace theory

because it would also suggest that the democratic peace is context-specific or history-specific and

not transhistorical which would reveal an ontological contradiction.

A second fundamental flaw according to Rosato concerns the institutional argument,

which he criticises from multiple angles; the main ones will be selected here. His first argument

focuses on the accountability of political elites and suggests that if a leader’s accountability is

determined by the likeliness to lose office for unpopular policy then an autocratic regime might


actually be at greater risk than democratic regime. As a matter of fact democratic elites suffer less

severe consequences from acting unpopularly than autocratic elites. Rosato demonstrates based

on Goemans’s (2000) dataset that losing autocrats are more likely to face severe punishment such

as imprisonment, exile, or death (ibid, 594). In comparison losing democrats are at greater risk of

being removed from office but certainly not at risk of suffering the consequences that autocrats

do, not to mention the different benefits that prime ministers or presidents still receive even after

being voted out of office. A second argument Rosato mentions involves public constraint.

According to him pro-war sentiment among people is not something inexistent. For example

during World War II the Roosevelt administration had spoken out against the disgrace of the

German firebombing of population centres and yet during the bombing of Japanese cities which

killed almost one million civilians, very little protest took place. This was explained through

well-organised propaganda, which was aimed at demonising the Japanese (ibid, 595). In other

words, public opinion can be, to some extent, manipulated and people’s mind engineered in such

a way that governments achieve public support. A last point that shall be exposed concerns

information. Supporters of the democratic peace believe that liberal institutions are more

transparent, and that information about their activity is debated openly in public but in reality it is

not that simple to know what information can be relied upon. In fact individuals faced with

overwhelming information, Rosato argues, are more likely to practice “mental shortcut”

consisting in forging their opinion on existing views of their “adversary or analogous situations in

the past to make sense of it” (ibid, 598). Rosato’s arguments demonstrate that the democratic

peace logic actually lacks any explanatory element to actually prove why democracies remain at

peace (ibid, 599) but also suggests the hypothesis that the democratic peace is in fact an imperial

peace “based on American power” rather than an intrinsic pacifying personality (ibid).

Globalisation and Social Changes

The hypothetical explanation of imperial peace suggested by Rosato finds support

through the analysis of Barkawi and Laffey (1999) and shall now be exposed. While the previous

development aimed at focusing on a classical critique of the democratic peace, Barkawi and

Laffey offer a different approach by examining globalisation and the consequent social changes

taking place. First of all the democratic peace theory is usually described as a transhistorical

phenomenon which posits that the meaning of democracy and war are fixed terms but it is

important to realise that these are contested terms which have evolved over time (Barkawi &

Laffey, 1999 , 406). As a matter of fact wars conducted in the Middle Ages were different from

those conducted during the Renaissance or Post-Modern world in terms of methods or resources.

War is defined according to COW as violent interstate conflict involving at least 1000 military

deaths. This fixed understanding renders analysis insensitive to changes in the nature of war.


Similarly democracy has evolved and adopted a fixed definition too making analysis insensitive

as well to the way it has been shaped through social change. Thus one fundamental problem with

the democratic peace is its inability to include the changing nature of the terms that define it.

There is through globalisation an evolution of the nature of the unit of analysis – in this case the

state – and the relationship between them, which must be looked upon (Barkawi & Laffey, ibid).

An important change in the political landscape has been the development of nuclear weaponry,

which has considerably altered strategic competition between core states. Interestingly during the

Cold War while nuclear power created “peace” amongst core states, the peripheral states became

centres of military operations (ibid, 410) where superpowers were highly involved. The nature of

war has changed and what can be said is that policy makers have relied on new ways to continue

the use of force as a political instrument (ibid). Since the end of World War II states have

competed indirectly through proxy in a way that even though they have not been involved

directly they have supplied, trained, advised and also directed the peripheral states in battles. Yet

COW data does not include the superpowers in such cases. The fact that democracies support war

indirectly rather than directly does not necessarily make them more peaceful. In fact the world

assists to some extent in the continuance of imperial powers in preserving their hegemony

through alternative means. Another way to look at the conduct of war is to analyse the effect of

decolonization. As a matter of fact, wars of decolonization had an important impact on the

colonizers. The movement of resistance taking place in the periphery created transformation of

the core and as a result new forms of military manipulation of the media developed particularly in

the wake of the Vietnam War (ibid, 411) but this manipulation can also be found in the invasions

of Kosovo, Iraq and Libya as well as in the Syrian crisis. The different missions carried out to

overthrow “Third World” elected governments such as Allende in Chile, Arbenz in Guatemala or

Ortega in Nicaragua does not invalidate the democratic peace theory for some scholars because

the US were not directly involved but rather relied on clients, mercenaries and cover operatives.

From a fixed understanding of war, this argument seems logical but concepts and meanings are

not static and change over time (ibid, 411-414). Wars have evolved and states can use coercive,

administrative or ideological means to protect their power over other states. For instance the

secretive actions undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency, which is an official,

constitutionally regulated government agency, could be seen as evidence of incomplete

democratic development. The existence of the CIA demonstrates that between the public

discourse of democracy and the actual strategic nature of modern capitalist states resides a

contradiction (MacMillan, 2012, 354). Therefore, it might not be so realistic to talk about

democracies as generally more peaceful, they are perhaps less direct than non-democratic states,

but surely not less driven by interest, power and hegemony (Barkawi & Laffey, 1999, 419). They

do not go to war with each other not because they are intrinsically peaceful, but rather because


through globalisation they are embedded in geostrategic and political economic relations that

reinforce the existence of a transnational state based on capitalist power. The democratic peace

theory is constrained to only see the world from a realist point of view, in other words, centred on

the notion of state and sovereignty that fails to recognise the processes of globalisation, the

changing nature of the state, of war and democracy (ibid).

After having exposed Rosato’s critique centred on the normative and institutional aspect

of the Democratic Peace and analysed it from a critical theory perspective, in addition to the

importance of global and social changes taking place and the evolution of concepts and meanings,

a third observation will now be exposed. In this section theories on the limitation of liberalism to

explain not the democratic peace but simply the democratic wars, which Brock, Geis and Muller

define as wars fought for purposes and objectives that are embodied in the universalistic

principles of democratic constitutions (Geis, B. and M., 2006, 196), shall be discussed.

Democratic Wars

Supposing that the democratic peace is a valid theory, one should nonetheless look at the

somewhat numerous wars democracies were involved in (66 out 108 between 1815 and 1975

according to COW). The reasons given by liberals to justify these wars seem to lack sufficient

explanatory elements to fully make their argument viable. In order to understand the wars led by

democratic states, it is first of all essential not to use a homogenised view which tends to

categorise democracies as even and uniform. The democratic peace theory presupposes that the

world is only made of democracies and non-democracies, however a number of differences can

be found among several democratic states. In fact some states seem to be more prone to peace

than others. Scholars and other academics should ask themselves why states like France, the UK

or the US have been involved quite frequently in military action in the last 50 years compared to

states such as Finland or Austria (Geis, B. and M., 2006, 6-7). The reality is that the democratic

peace theory has so far only focused on the pacifying effect of democracy without explaining the

wars that some states have been involved with, especially France, the UK and the US. Several

different forms of the use of force undertaken by democratic states exist. On one side there are

what can be called collective actions which are based on norm enforcement under legal process

by which an authorised body is in charge of the control of the action under the supervision of

courts; on the other are simple outright aggressions and in between lies individual or collective

self-defence, unilateral norm enforcement such as humanitarian intervention authorized by the

United Nation Security Council carried out under UN command (ibid, 7). Interestingly, these

powers often claim to act in self-defence when they attack other states like Afghanistan in 2001

and Iraq in 2003 and when they intervene in on-going conflicts their justification is often to serve


universal ends such as human rights or the protection of minorities as was the case in Kosovo or

more recently in Libya (ibid). In fact, considering the different types of war that exist it can be

demonstrated that democratic states are not more peaceful than authoritarian regimes. In Looking

at the dark side of democracy (2006) , Chojnacki demonstrates that in comparison with other

regimes democracies are engaged less often in interstate wars but nonetheless intervene militarily

more frequently than autocratic regimes (153 against 122) and also show high probability of

involvement in ongoing conflicts (ibid, 21). Another factor that Chojnacki touches upon is the

partial privatization of war through the employment of private military companies. Apart from

the fact that liberal states tend to intervene quite frequently in on-going conflicts, they also make

use of mercenaries. Since the end of the Cold War the number of private security and military

companies directly or consultatively active in conflict zones has increased. Their activities vary

from legal ones compatible with international law such as military training and logistic support of

peace missions, to illegal activities such as participation in armed conflicts on the side of warring

parties or securing the interests of an external state or corporations (ibid, 25).

The privatisation of the military sector as well as the use of modern technologies raises

new questions about the use of force and peace. As mentioned previously democratic states do

not empirically prove their peacefulness, it could rather be said that they demonstrate great

creativity in pursuing their interests by not engaging directly but instead indirectly in conflict or

in the cases where they do get involved and intervene, they tend to have either ideological or

institutionalised power to conduct their wars. In other words it is in the name of liberal principles

such as human rights or under the rule of international law that liberal democracies intervene as

“police of the world”, a world in which the latter is assumed to be rooted in liberal philosophy.

A Dictatorial Peace

A final point must be presented here in order to close this first chapter on the “flaw of

liberal peace” to make use of Rosato’s words. As mentioned previously it is essential to visualise

the world not from a Manichean way but rather through its diversity and complexity. If it is to be

assumed that differences can be found amongst democracies, it could eventually be possible to

observe differences amongst autocracies too. And to some extent moving away from a dualist

understanding, if democratic peace exists perhaps it is possible to find a “dictatorial peace” –a

zone of peace created amongst autocratic regimes. First of all it is important to differentiate the

numerous types of authoritarian regime. According to Geddes (1999) there exist three types of

autocratic regime which can be defined as follows: militarily, single-party and personalist

(Peceny, B. and S., 2002, 17). From Peceny, Beer and Sanchez-Terry’s research into these three


categories, some evidence was found showing that in the post-World War II, no personalist

dictatorship dyads went to war with one another and the same was true for military regimes.

Nonetheless single-party regime dyads are the only ones to have fought one another post-World

War II (ibid, 25). Of course the dictatorial peace theory is not as solid a theory as that of the

democratic peace theory mainly because dictatorial regimes do not experience the same level of

constraint from their institutions as liberal democracies do but they nonetheless seem to enable to

a certain degree the instauration of a separate peace amongst themselves (ibid, 20). In fact for this

observation let us suppose that there is not by nature a group of peaceful democratic regimes and

a group of dangerous autocratic ones but instead a multiplicity of regime types and political

systems which each possesses a unique set of interests and principles. Reducing the political

debate to a “good and evil” perspective appears too simplistic to be efficient.

In conclusion, this chapter aimed to bring to light the different weaknesses of the

democratic peace theory by exposing a critique based on the normative and institutional aspects

of the theory followed by a re-evaluation and investigation of certain concepts such as war and

democracy. In today’s world these concepts have evolved and suggest that perhaps the notion of

war requires a new definition in order to positively correlate with the world politics of the twenty-

first century. Another section attempted to demonstrate that although academics have tried

thoroughly to justify the democratic peace, little explanation has been provided for the different

wars that democracies have been involved in. Finally it was recommended that the readers

broaden their view and move away from a dualist understanding of the world into a more

diversified approach by visualising the numerous differences that can be found amongst

democracies and amongst authoritarian regimes. The intention behind this was to permit us to

escape from a Manichean view of world politics. The democratic peace theory cannot be claimed

as empirical, yet it has been a prominent axis of foreign policy. As a matter of fact, strong belief

in the democratic peace has given rise to support democratisation and intervention in certain parts

of the world. To some extent democratisation is a consequence of the belief political elites have

in the democratic peace process. Nonetheless, does democratisation create peace? This is what

will be exposed in the second chapter.


Chapter II

Military Intervention and Regime Change

The claim that democratic countries rarely go to war with each other has been a key

element justifying democracy-promoting foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. In 1994

Bill Clinton’s State of the Union Address justified promoting democracy around the world on the

basis of the peacefulness of democracies (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995, 5) and before him

President George H.W Bush’s administration claimed that order, peace, free trade and democracy

ought to be spread, even militarily if necessary (Geis, M. and S., 2013, 55). As a result of the US

mission to promote American values by spreading democracy, the rule of law and the market

economy are considered suitable for the rest of the world’s nations (ibid, 53). Nonetheless there

are always different ways to reach an objective and where the promotion of democracy is

concerned there seems to be a need to investigate some of the methods employed and their

implications for regime change. This chapter aims to focus on one particular aspect of democracy

implementation, military intervention and its success; however a second part will investigate

whether new fragile democracies are likely to produce peace internally and externally.

If democratisation were to be defined, it could simply be understood as the

“transformation of political system from non-democracy towards accountable and representative

government” (Grugel, 2002, 3). Democratization can emerge in different ways; it can blossom

through internal or external forces, the latter being on the focus of this chapter. According to

Merkel & Grimm there are 4 modes of external democratization: (1) enforcing democratization

by enduring post-war occupation; (2) restoring an elected government by military intervention;

(3) intervening in on-going massacres and civil war and thereby curbing the national sovereignty

of those countries; and (4) forcing democracy on rogue states by ‘democratic intervention’, in

other words, democracy through war (Merkel & Grimm, 2009, 2). The reason for concentrating

on external implementation is due to recent events of military intervention taking place in three

important states, the Afghanistan invasion in 2001, the Iraq war in 2003 and the Libyan

intervention in 2011 but more importantly because democratic intervention constitutes a great

challenge to the ‘peacefulness’ belief of democratic regimes.

Military Intervention

First of all, an important question to ask is whether or not an intervention by a foreign

power actually enhances the possibility of developing democratic institutions in the occupied

state. According to Enterline and Greig’s (2008) quantitative research which investigated

imposed democracy– defined as “democratic governments installed by a foreign power in which


the foreign power plays an important role in the establishment, promotion and maintenance of the

institutions of government” (Enterline and Greig, 2008, 323) – 63% of a sample of 43 imposed

democratic regimes failed between 1800 and 1994 and the average durability does not exceed

13.1 years. This suggests that in general imposing democracy is not an easy task and is likely to

fail (ibid, 341). Yet the costs of military intervention are generally very high and failure to

implement a successful regime can cause the elected leader to be voted out following an election

(Mesquita and Downs, 2006, 631). Thus once intervention has taken place developing a strong

democracy should become a priority for the intervening state. On the other hand and as Mesquita

pointed out, even though leaders of intervening states frequently claim that democratisation is

their primarily objective, this goal is rarely achieved (ibid, 647). Again this could be explained

due to underlying interests. It could possibly be in the interest of the intervening state to only

allow the development of superficial democratic structures. Going back to the 1980s when France

intervened in Chad in order to protect the government of Hissein Habré against the Libyan

intrusion, Habré’s declaration that democratic reform would take place failed to occur and simply

minor changes were made but Chad returned to “the more authoritarian end of the political

spectrum” after Habré was deposed by the military. It seems that French interests and investment

were more secure under an autocratic Chad than in a fully democratised regime (ibid, 633). A

similar assumption could be attributed to the US as well when they liberated Kuwait from Iraq in

1991. Only minor democratic changes took place rather than genuine ones. (ibid) From a

theoretical point of view, the people of a new democratised state might not necessarily share the

same view as the intervening state, it could be suggested that it is in the interest of the intervening

actor to only institute a symbolic aspect of democracy (ibid, 647).

Another relevant factor is the process by which the state decides to intervene because it

could be suggested that on the basis of human rights, intervention would have taken place in

South Africa and Rhodesia during the time of the apartheid or for instance in a state such as Saudi

Arabia where severe political and civil rights discrimination have never been a motive for

intervention as rightly mentioned by Merkel and Grim in War and Democratization (Merkel and

Grim, 2009, 42). Of course it is not hard to suppose that there are different rationales explaining

why the US was willing to intervene in Iraq or more recently in Syria but would not decide to

intervene in a state such as Saudi Arabia. Yet this behaviour seems to show a contradiction

between what the US values as essential and what it actually does. In fact there are two

fundamentals principles that should be respected during any democratic intervention, jus in bello

and jus post bellum. While jus in bello gives a framework on the conduct of war based on

respecting civilians, the wounded and prisoners of war, etc. it appears nonetheless quite

contradictory that the bombing of Serbia during the war in Kosovo or in Baghdad in the second


Iraq war was morally acceptable (Merkel and Grim, 2009, 46). Moreover it is difficult to imagine

that a regime change, even a democratic one, will generate public acceptance if it is enforced

through military intervention. Despite the fact that aerial bombing reduces the casualty rates of

the intervening side, it increases the number of innocent deaths on the other side (ibid). In term of

jus post bellum, it seems essential that enough help be provided to avoid volatility in the

transition from autocracy to democracy. Taking Iraq as an example, it is today still far from being

fully democratic and is experiencing severe fragmentation of its society, whether it is between

Kurds and Arabs, Shiites and Sunnis, moderates and radicals (Merkel 2009 46), the tension is

palpable and democracy does not seem to provide adequate tools to correct these divisions and

unify the population.

A question that could be asked is whether or not forced democratisation is the result of

the desire to promote “freedom” in an autocratic regime or if it is for underlying interests fostered

by Western elites. In order to offer answers, it might be useful to compare similar cases of

democratisation in which military interventions took place and enabled democratic principles to

flourish. Two states, Germany and Japan, were successfully democratised in the aftermath of the

Second World War. These two regimes were transformed from militarist regime with weak

democratic cultures into exemplar democracies (Enterline and Greig, 2008, 321). What is

important to note is that in the case of Germany, the allies were fully involved for 6 years after

the constitution was established and after having left Germany support was provided until it

becomes a stable democratic state (Hippel, 1999, 186). Another significant aspect was the fact

that Germany, and also Japan already possessed a defined nation and state in the aftermath of

Second World War (Merkel & Grimm 2009 48) which seems slightly different compared with

countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan where multiple ethnic groups inhabit with their own

distinct languages and traditions. It is needless to say that in some countries which experienced

struggles over colonialism and occupation in the past, importing democracy can be seen as a new

form of imperialism disguised under a human rights ‘cloak’. These factors should be considered

closely because in the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, it is not so surprising that the implementation

of democracy has been so difficult. As a result one should ask whether implementing democracy

in countries which are economically unstable, where the civil society is porous and has a history

of struggle with Western power will be easily achievable because if not it is likely that

intervention will create a weak form of imposed peace and generate great structural violence in

the long term.


Danger of war and democratization

Based on the insightful research of Mansfield and Snyder (1995), democratising countries

have a tendency to be more war-prone than states experiencing no regime change or those which

moved toward autocratisation (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995, 8). They demonstrate that during

transition toward democracy countries become relatively more aggressive and as a result do fight

wars with other democratic states. It is essential to expose their argument in order to understand

what causes these democratising regimes to become war-prone. A first and most important factor

is due to increased nationalism. As a matter of fact, the establishment of competitive elections in

autocratic systems often led old and new elites to use all possible resources to mobilise support

from the mass generally through nationalist appeals (ibid 7). The question is not that public

opinion is generally war-prone but rather that through imperfect institutions, elites often manage

to find ways to control the dissemination of information from the media and direct it in ways that

promote belligerent or militant sentiment within the populace (ibid 8). Secondly, the widening of

the political spectrum often creates impasse among groups, which have diverse and incompatible

interests (ibid 26). Thus multi-ethnic countries are likely to fall in this situation if the notion of

unity is not present. Finally, through democratisation, still-powerful elites are often constrained to

adopt inflexible positions, which threaten their interests and create as a result greater tension

amongst the different political groups (ibid 27-28). According to statistics, a transition from

autocracy to democracy increases the chances of any types of war by 30 to 105 percent and of

interstate war by roughly 50 to 135 percent (ibid 17). Looking at examples such as Congo-

Brazzaville, Pakistan and Russia, all faced the outbreak of civil war shortly after elections took

place. One of the explanations is that an election naturally produces a winner and a loser and can

result in conflict since the loser might not accept the result. In Congo-Brazzaville, after the

election of 1997 the defeated parties decided to bring together their supporters in order to prevent

the new elected party from taking office, which resulted in civil war (Cederman, H. and K., 2010,

382). Pakistan experienced a similar scenario after their first free election led to civil unrest

between the East and the West of the country (ibid). And finally in Russia violence quickly

erupted after Boris Yeltsin unconstitutionally decided to dissolve the parliament while the latter

declared the replacement of the president (ibid, 383). These examples demonstrate that holding

free elections does not automatically provide stability.

A principal issue which can be observed is that many democratising states establish

competitive elections although the basic institutional principles of a modern state as defined by

Weber– the rule of law and multiple institutions of civil society –are not present or too fragile

(Rose and Shin, 2001, 332-333) As Rose and Shin said “third wave democracies have started

democratization backwards” (ibid). In contrast with the first wave of democratisation, which took


place principally in the 19th century, most states already have the rule of law established. Since

seventeenth century England the notion of law has been part of society and its civil institutions

whether political or economic made their first appearances in the late 18th century. Universal

suffrage only took place from 1918 (ibid, 335). Similarly, the American constitution was

established much earlier than the universal suffrage (ibid). Although democratising countries

whether from the first, second or third wave are not necessarily more peaceful during the

transition, it seems that strong institutions, respect for the law as well as accountability are

primordial for the stability of democratising countries once free election is established. It is also

essential to realise that elections can divide and fragment a society rather than strengthen or free

it. First and foremost a state in the process of democratisation should have a complex civil society

made of different groups but more essentially groups able to engage in processes of sustained

collective action based on assuring the extension of citizenship rights throughout society. Further,

it also requires a state to be able to set national goals, deliver public goods and be capable of

mediating conflict (Grugel, 2002, 243-244) rather than using tension for political interests. In

contrast with failing democratising processes some successes have nonetheless occurred in

Southern Europe such as Spain and Portugal. This can be explained due to the greater level of

autonomy that the states had in incrementally implementing policies of taxation and redistribution

that would provide services under democracy (ibid, 245). No military intervention took place in

these countries and democracy found a way to emerge through political reform, gradually shifting

the autocratic regime toward a democratic one.

What can be said after this demonstration is that first of all military intervention seems

counter-productive and de-legitimises principles such as freedom and respect for human rights.

Although the aim here is not to reject all principles found in democracy, violence against

authoritarian regimes too often creates chaos, where a great number of the casualties wounded or

killed during interventions are civilians. Moreover the removal of an authoritarian leader often

greatly disturbs the country and therefore the communities within it. If a state wishes to help and

has genuine concerns for the wellbeing of populations in authoritarian regimes, it would probably

be more effective to actually take care of the old elites and provide ways for them to reform the

system without affecting themselves and their status. Furthermore it is essential to be conscious

of the fact that democratising states have a great tendency to go to war either internally or

externally as demonstrated in the second part of this chapter. If democratisation is implemented in

regions where stability is lacking such as in the Middle East there is a great risk that the transition

would lead toward rising nationalism, internal conflict amongst political actors as well as tension

with neighbouring states. Unfortunately to quote Clinton’s National Security Adviser Anthony

Lake “Neither we nor the international community has either the responsibility or the means to


do whatever it takes for as long as it takes to rebuild nations” (Hippel, 1999, 206). If one takes

into account how destabilising humanitarian intervention can be and how fragile the state

becomes during democratisation, it could be questioned whether or not liberal democratic

countries are more peaceful. A truly peaceful state would probably take into account the

consequences of those actions and in fact nurture a truly pacifying way to improve change within

authoritarian regime if of course the population is demanding more political freedom. In order to

enrich this composition, the final chapter will focus on two particular military interventions,

Kosovo and Iraq, and evaluate the impact that military intervention had on them and will attempt

to demonstrate that democratic states are not less eager to avoid violence and destabilisation to

achieve their ‘selfish’ interests.


Chapter III

Case Studies of Kosovo and Iraq

1999 Kosovo Intervention

On March 23rd 1999, NATO initiated a bombing campaign called Operation Allied Force

lasting 78 days (Escobar, 2008). The aim of this operation was to halt the ethnic cleansing of

Kosovar Albanian conducted by Slobodan Milosevic, the then president of the Federal Republic

of Yugoslavia. Based on moral principles of human rights, the US and NATO’s members decided

to take action and intervene to stop Milosevic. Nonetheless, as this case study will demonstrate,

there have been a number of elements suggesting that the Western engagement in the conflict was

less noble than it might have appeared. In fact the Kosovo intervention demonstrates not just the

self-interested behaviour of democratic powers but more importantly the limitations they have in

acting peacefully.

Arguably, a state acting peacefully could be regarded as one respecting international law

since the latter aims to harmonise and regulate interstate relations. Furthermore, a peaceful state

would also probably be considered more cautious and restrained in engaging in and conducting

wars. This is usually characterised by two important notions in international law, jus ad bellum

and jus in bello. Jus ad bellum refers to the rules governing the use of force when an armed

conflict is allowed and Jus in bello refers to the rules governing the actual conduct of armed

conflict, in other words, what is acceptable behaviour for nations at war (Voon, 2001, 1088). In

the case of Kosovo, it appears that the intervention was first of all illegal since the Security

Council had not given the authorization. Additionally, according to Article 5 of NATO’s charter,

the organisation is allowed to pursue an offensive only if one of its members is subjected to an

attack (Washington D.C, 1949). Yet none of the members were actually under direct threat from

the Federal Government of Yugoslavia (FRY). Although attempts to bring the conflict to an end

through the Rambouillet Negociation failed, the intervention, considered a last resort, did not

meet some of the main criteria of just war. Based on the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949

which provides specific requirements for the treatment of civilians in the course of war (Voon,

2001, 1091), the bombing campaign clearly disregarded these principles. Twenty-one specific

incidents alleged to involve NATO crimes (ibid, 1100) –amongst which are the bombing of a

civilian passenger train the 12th April 1999 after a failure to identify the target (ibid) or the

destruction of a convoy carrying Albanian refugees unfortunately identified as the Yugoslav

military causing the death of seventy-five people and one hundred injured (ibid, 1103) –

demonstrates that NATO clearly did not act cautiously. Although the attacks were aimed at


undermining Serbs offensive, some argued that many attacks had in fact mainly struck civilian

infrastructures as well as electricity supplies in order to cause civilian misery and hopefully force

Milosevic to surrender (Wise, 2013). The main issue in this whole operation is not the fact that an

intervention took place since the killing of Kosovar Albanians had to be stopped but it was

certainly wrong to believe that a bombing campaign could take place without seriously damaging

civilians from both sides of the conflict. In the course of the operation 500 confirmed civilian

found death and roughly 6,000 civilians were wounded (Voon, 2001, 1085).

Another important question to answer is whether or not NATO had other interests apart

from the unfounded claim of protecting the Kosovar Albanians. As a matter of fact, several points

can demonstrate that the Kosovo intervention as served less virtuous political interests. According

to Chossudovky, NATO had an important goal, which was to dismantle the socialist economic

system of Yugoslavia, the last one since the collapse of the Soviet Union, in order to implement a

free-market economy. Even prior to the crisis in Kosovo, a 1984 US document from the National

Security Decision Directive [NSDD] 133 called U.S. Policy Towards Yugoslavia greatly

encouraged the breaking down of the Yugoslavian system (Stone, 2005). However, an

intervention could only take place if NATO had a reason tolerable enough to both the public and

the international community. Interestingly, the austerity program imposed by the International

Monetary Funds (IMF) on Yugoslavia in the 1990s served to some extent as an important factor

in creating greater antagonism among the different ethnic groups within Yugoslavia. Needless to

say that as the majority and the ones against the dismantlement of Yugoslavia, the Serbs were

often targeted for demonization with Milosevic portrayed as the new threat to peace (Stone,

2005). It could arguably be said that there was a strong ideological interest in intervening in

Kosovo when relationships between the Serbs and the Kosovar Albanians imploded. Moreover, it

is not surprising that the peace proposal – the Rambouillet Agreement – offered by NATO had as

a guarantee according to chapter 4a article I “the establishment of a free market in the

autonomous province of Kosovo” (Hibbitts, 1999)

A second major factor often buried by political elites in war is economic interests.

According to Novak Bjelic, a mine director at the time Chris Hedge, columnist for the New York

Time wrote his article on Kosovo, “The war is about the mines, nothing else” (Hedges, 1998).

Interestingly, the country appears to contain large amounts of lead, zinc, cadmium, gold and

silver in four mines located in Trepca, Kosovo (ibid). The US and NATO’s members could have

had an interest in getting their hands on these resources or in creating a consortium between

Western companies and the autonomous government of Kosovo. There is also a more significant

motive that can lead one to believe that the intervention was motivated by self-interest. The US

established after the intervention the biggest foreign military base since the Vietnam War, this


camp, referred to as Camp Bondsteel, comprises more than 6000 US troops (Chossudovsky,

2008). It could be suggested that this military force is necessary for the protection of the civilians

since rivalry between the minority Serbs and Kosovar Albanians still occur today but what is not

mentioned so overtly by the US is that Camp Bondsteel is located close to vital oil pipelines and

energy corridors presently under construction (Stuart, 2002) protecting the Albanian-

Macedonian-Bulgarian Oil pipeline project (AMBO) aiming at channelling Caspian Sea oil from

the Bulgarian Black Sea port of Burgas to the Adriatic (Chossudovsky, 2008). Very often wars

are driven by economic motives and the arguments exposed previously seem to confirm this idea.

This argumentation asserts that any intervention should be analysed from different angles before

applying the humanitarian label.

The last and final point of this case study will look at the unconditional support NATO

and the US have given to the actual Kosovo regime and criticism of this support when considered

from different viewpoints. As a matter of fact the US and NATO have provided support both

during and after the intervention to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) which was until 1997

recognized as a terrorist organisation linked to the drug trade. During the Clinton mandate,

Robert Gelbard, a special envoy to the Balkans, had claimed the KLA to be “without any

question, a terrorist group” (ibid). Of course, a terrorist for one can be a freedom fighter for

another, nonetheless it is important to mention that the actual prime minister of Kosovo, Hashim

Thaçi founded in the 1990s the so-called “Drenica- Group”, a criminal syndicate involved in drug

trafficking and prostitution (ibid). More recently the KLA have been inculpated for human organ

trafficking which a Council of Europe report published in January 15th 2010 confirmed

(Trifkovic, 2010). Taking into account the support the US and NATO gave to the KLA; one

might in fine question the peacefulness of some democratic states. If the US and NATO’s

members are to be considered as more peaceful for being democratic, one should then explain

why such states would provide support to criminal groups in other countries. A state which does

not get directly into a war but supports regimes or group promoting violence and illegal activities

cannot be considered peaceful. Furthermore, disrespect for international law and the covering up

of ideological and economic interests seems to contradict what would be considered peaceful

actions. Interestingly similar issues can be found in other military interventions such as the Iraq

war which will be explored in the second part.

2003 Iraq Invasion

Four years after the intervention in Kosovo, a new opportunity for Western powers to

show their care and concern for world peace arose once again. This time the threat came from

Iraq; the danger was in the shape of Saddam Hussein. Portrayed as the new evil and a threat to the


US and the world in general, Hussein had to be taken down in order for its population to be freed

from a dictatorial regime and replaced with liberal democracy. This is what people were told and

this is the premise the US and the UK based their decision to invade Iraq on in 2003. Was the Iraq

invasion truly about peace and democracy? As applied to the Kosovo crisis earlier, this case study

will present elements demonstrating that ulterior motives can better explain this intervention and

their pursuit of them as being in complete contradiction to the asserted aim of protecting peace

and freedom

Similar to the Kosovo intervention, the Iraq invasion was in total discord with

international law, chapter VII of the United Nations’ Charter and a contradiction of the Security

Council’s decision to refuse the authorization of intervention. Yet it did not prevent the US from

engaging in this war of aggression with the support mainly of the UK as well as a few other

states, all democratic. The ten years following that intervention have yielded some significant

results. First of all, the accusation against Iraq of possessing weapons of mass destruction was

proved to be false and Hussein’s links to Al-Qaeda equally so (Fawcett, 2013, 325). But more

importantly the scale of violence and destruction employed to remove a single man is

questionable. Within a single day the US launched more than 380 Tomahawk missiles on Iraq,

and over a period of two weeks 30,000 bombs and 20,000 cruise missiles were deployed (Selim,

2012, 64). For comparison, only 300 missiles were fired on Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War (ibid).

It seems rather difficult to see this intervention as a “just” case. The US clearly did not show any

restraint in removing Hussein from power. However, there seems to be a contradiction between

desired goals and the means employed. The US intervention along with the later established

Coalition government caused, according to epidemiologist’s research at the Johns Hopkins

University's Bloomberg School of Public Health, the death of more than 655,000 civilians

(Brown, 2006) among which 601,000 resulted from violence and the rest indirectly through

disease and other causes. This research being conducted in 2006, it could be suggested that the

number has gone even higher since. Taking this estimation into account, it is difficult to believe

that the US intervention aimed at freeing the people of Iraq as more civilians than “insurgent”

were killed according to the 2004 Iraqi Health Ministry’s report (Russell, 2013). Interestingly

should a democratic state behaves more peacefully, restrain or respect for the insurgent would be

practiced. Yet many human rights reports from the International Committee of the Red Cross

documented mock execution, deadly form of hanging, electric shocks, rape, psychological

tortures and many others (ICRC, 2004). The shocking images of abuses reported by the media of

Abu Grahib’s prison speak for themselves, unfortunately this was not the only place where such

methods were practised (Russell, 2013).


Another essential factor to look at is whether or not the US did bring stability and peace

to the region as a result of its actions. In the short term the intervention clearly created greater

instability due to growing religious sectarianism, radical transnational movement such as the

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) but also the large-scale displacement of Iraqis

amounting roughly to two million and finally important disturbances to the balance of power in

the region (Fawcett, 2013, 332). Additionally, the US facilitated the establishment of a Shi’a

government led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in which the latter have pursued an openly

sectarian agenda and eradicated leading Sunni political figures (Van Auken, 2014). Although the

sectarian politics of Maliki were the central power, the US government also declared full support

and supplied the regime with Hellfire missiles, drones and other military equipment. Of course

the violence between Sunni and Shi’a cannot continue, but supplying such weaponry is likely to

be used to cause greater massacre than create stability (ibid) since many protests have been

disbanded through extreme violence as the April 2013 protest in Hawija demonstrated. Hundreds

of people were killed as a result of clashes with the army (Van Auken 2013). As explained in the

previous chapter, the military intervention has created a fragmented and war prone society in Iraq

and the US have a great responsibility for the tragic consequences that emerged in the country.

Interestingly, the case of Kosovo shares some similarities with what is observed in Iraq.

Clearly the US did not learn from their past mistakes but can the Iraq war be attributed to

a lack of understanding and calculation or are there other factors which better explain this

calamitous intervention? As a matter of fact, a central element of the Iraq war seems to be a key

to better understanding of the conflict, this element is oil. Hans Blix, former chief United

National weapons inspector once said “I am saddened that it is politically inconvenient to

acknowledge what everyone knows: the Iraq war is largely about oil” (Tremblay, 2013). It is a

familiar phrase to hear that the US intervened in order to get access to cheap oil, especially since

the Hussein government had excluded US and UK companies from any access to Iraqi oil

reservoir (ibid). Yet recent investigations from Greg Palast have revealed that actually the aim of

this intervention was not to get access to cheap oil but to actually prevent it from flooding onto

the global oil market and as a result reducing the price per barrel (Washington’s Blog, 2013). The

result, instead, has been to prevent the barrel from going to $13 a barrel as it was in 1998 and to

keep it at $100 per the barrel (IBID). As Palast wrote, “the invasion was not blood for oil, but

blood for no oil” (ibid). What this demonstrates is that again economic factors played for the

bigger part in this conflict and when analysing from an economic perspective, peace and freedom

found themselves put right at the bottom of US priorities in this military intervention.

These two cases have demonstrated several points that shall be summarized. Firstly,

democratic powers do not necessarily restrain themselves in interventions and do not necessarily


respect international law when important interests are at stakes. This as a result critically

undermines the idea that democratic states are generally more peaceful. Secondly the different

authors of these crimes, NATO and the US, committed in Kosovo and Iraq have never been

found guilty of war crimes. In fact it is even more surprising to know that G.W. Bush and Tony

Blair were nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2002 when they should be considered

responsible for the great instability in Iraq today. In contrast, Milosevic died in prison while

Hussein was hung up in a public place. As Rosato argues, authoritarian regimes face more severe

punishment than democratic regimes. Thirdly, both Kosovo and Iraq remain highly unstable to

this day, violent and a far cry from being democratic. As the second chapter suggested,

intervention usually leads to the establishment of weak democracies and these two cases support

this assumption. And finally, in both cases propaganda, manipulation and flawed assumptions

prevented public opinion and democratic institutions capable of stopping these unjustifiable wars

from doing so.


Conclusion

The democratic peace theory is a well-established theory in International Relations and of

course it has greatly legitimised the spread of democracy throughout the world. Nonetheless this

paper has demonstrated two fundamentals arguments. First of all, the democratic peace lacks

explanatory evidences and military intervention and forced regime change do not create a more

peaceful and stable world.

To come back to the different arguments exposed in the previous chapters, this

composition has primarily highlighted the limitations of the democratic peace. Firstly,

institutional and normative voids were found and still remain unexplained but additionally the

theory fails to take into account the changing nature of important concepts such as war and

democracy. The theory focuses on a rather classical but limited notion of the state which in the

highly globalised world of the twenty first century appears to be misleading. Furthermore little

explanation has been provided to explain the “imperialist-style” wars democratic countries have

been involved in. The problem is that a theory might be imperfect but it produces an outcome, a

consequence linked to what the theory claims. This can be seen compared to a cause and effect

link in which the effect related to the democratic peace is democratisation.

As the second chapter attempted to demonstrate, democratisation and more particularly

military intervention rarely result in the establishment of peaceful and stable regimes. The

violence employed to change a regime significantly undermines the humanist discourse that

democratic powers publicly ‘waltz’ with. Supposedly a peaceful state would surely tend to act in

the most cautious and cooperative way possible. On the contrary, implementing a weak and

unstable regime through violent means would surely not be what a peaceful state would do. In

fact this chapter also suggests, and this of course would require further research, that for the

reformation of one state the most efficient and sustainable way would be not to threaten and even

eradicate one’s authoritarian regime but rather to provide support and respect for the actual

leaders and offer them an opportunity to implement incrementally and organically policies which

they might feel more comfortable with but would at the same time establish greater freedom for

the population. Another assumption that this paper makes, referred to in the second chapter, is

that human rights and democracy are perhaps used in a way to legitimise wars, which public

opinion otherwise would object to. Through honourable discourses referring to freedom and

peace, democratic powers seem to hide a political agenda which appears more in accordance with

what classical realists support, the survival of the state and the pursuit of hegemony.


In order to demonstrate that the democratic powers are not more peaceful and thus more

cooperative and resistant to violence, the third chapter exposed the Kosovo intervention of 1999

and the Iraq invasion in 2003. From these two case studies it is possible to say that democratic

powers portrayed themselves as war prone regimes rather than peaceful rescuers since they

disrespected international law and showed no respect for civilians during the interventions as well

as supporting regimes seen to be illegitimate or oppressive by some.

The democratic peace theory seems to consider a peaceful state as one not engaging in

war with another, but this approach to peace appears too limited because since the end of the

Cold War, not only do states pursue their economic, ideological and geo-strategic interests

through direct violence, backed by human rights principles, but also indirectly through the use of

mercenaries, rebels or covert operatives. Therefore, in order to claim that democracies are more

peaceful in general it is essential to ask several questions, how do we define peace? Does

humanitarian violence result in more peace? And finally, should democracy be enforced onto

authoritarian regimes if it only leads to more violence and tension?

Interestingly the different mistakes in the past have not been used as an opportunity for

democratic powers to learn from them when it comes to intervention and democratisation and this

demonstrates two issues: either Western power lacks understanding or they are well aware of the

consequences and actually act in such a way on purpose, for the pursuit of their own interests.

Further research is needed to analyse the different wars democratic power initiated because it

seems that behind the discourse on peace is hidden an acceptation of the use violence. It could be

said that the reality of the democratic peace theory has been to legitimize democratisation in order

to cover the imperialist behaviour of some democratic powers because through the argument

developed in this composition what can be seen is that the path from the democratic peace theory

to forced regime change is riddled with contradictions.


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