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Devolution in Pakistan: an assessment of power distribution in the �azim
system 2001-2009 and the interim arrangements of 2010, through the
spatial examination of development spending patterns across Faisalabad
district
(Above) Office of the District Commissioner, Faisalabad. (23/6/2010, photograph by author)
Frédéric Hugh Carver
SOAS ID: 266496
MSc in Asian Politics
Course code: 15PPOC999
15th September 2010
10,894 words
This dissertation is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of MSc in Asian Politics of the School of Oriental and
African Studies (University of London).
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Student name: Frédéric Hugh Carver
Student ID: 266496
Name of Programme of Study: MSc in Asian Politics
___________________________________________________________________________
Declaration:
I have read and understood regulations 17.9 of the Regulations for students of the School of
Oriental and African Studies concerning plagiarism. I undertake that all material presented for
examination is my own work and has not been written for me, in whole or in part by any other
person. I also undertake that any quotation or paraphrase from the published or unpublished
work of another person has been duly acknowledged in the work which I present for
examination.
Signature: …………………………………….. Date: ……………………………
I give permission for a copy of my dissertation to be held for reference, at the School’s discretion.
Signature: …………………………………….. Date: ……………………………
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Contents:
ABSTRACT ...........................................................................................................................................- 5 -
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND THANKS .................................................................................- 6 -
THESIS ...................................................................................................................................................- 7 -
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................................. - 7 -
Why this matters .................................................................................................................................................................... - 8 -
Objective .................................................................................................................................................................................. - 9 -
Method ................................................................................................................................................................................... - 11 -
Overview .................................................................................................................................................................................... - 12 -
The decade of devolution ................................................................................................................................................... - 12 -
The history of devolution ................................................................................................................................................... - 13 -
The Nazim system ............................................................................................................................................................... - 14 -
The problems of the system ............................................................................................................................................... - 15 -
Elections and devolution .................................................................................................................................................... - 16 -
Faisalabad .............................................................................................................................................................................. - 18 -
Literature review ....................................................................................................................................................................... - 21 -
The theory of devolution. ................................................................................................................................................... - 21 -
Devolution in Pakistan ....................................................................................................................................................... - 23 -
Elections in Pakistan ........................................................................................................................................................... - 26 -
Faisalabad ................................................................................................................................................................................... - 29 -
The data ................................................................................................................................................................................. - 29 -
2001-2005 ............................................................................................................................................................................... - 30 -
2005-2008 ............................................................................................................................................................................... - 36 -
2008-2009 ............................................................................................................................................................................... - 42 -
2010 – the administrators .................................................................................................................................................... - 42 -
The wider Pakistani picture ................................................................................................................................................... - 45 -
Lahore .................................................................................................................................................................................... - 45 -
Sialkot .................................................................................................................................................................................... - 45 -
Karachi ................................................................................................................................................................................... - 45 -
Around Pakistan .................................................................................................................................................................. - 46 -
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................................................. - 48 -
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A further discussion ............................................................................................................................................................. - 51 -
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................................................. - 54 -
BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................................................................................................................. - 56 -
Interviews .............................................................................................................................................................................. - 56 -
Works consulted: ................................................................................................................................................................. - 57 -
APPENDIX 1: DATA FOR DEVELOPMENT SPENDING IN FAISALABAD 01-05 .. - 65 -
Maps, tables and graphs
Figure 1: 2001-05 total (district and provincial) development spend per Union Council (in order, the colour coding
relates to the Tehsils) ..................................................................................................................................................... - 31 -
Figure 2: Union Councils funding from the District relative to Provincial funding 2001-05 ..................................... - 32 -
Figure 3: 2001-05 average funding received by Union Councils in each MPA constituency from Province and
District ............................................................................................................................................................................. - 34 -
Figure 4: City District of Faisalabad 10 year plan ............................................................................................................... - 37 -
Figure 5: District funding of Union Councils in Faisalabad 05-08 .................................................................................. - 38 -
Figure 6: Correlation between Union Councils development spending allocations between 2001-05 and 2005-08 - 40 -
Figure 7: Election results for MPA seats in Faisalabad ...................................................................................................... - 41 -
Figure 8: Three generalised devolutions............................................................................................................................... - 52 -
Figure 9: Generalised devolutions some time later ............................................................................................................. - 53 -
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Abstract
The argument of the dissertation is that the failure of the most recent set of local government
reforms in Pakistan, the Nazim system introduced in 2001, can be understood in terms of the
rivalry between different layers of political power; and in particular of the rivalry between
political parties, which operate primarily at the provincial level, and the military dictatorship and
its elite supporters who primarily operated at higher and lower levels. This rivalry was most
evident in the tussle over development spending as it is this, and the provision of local public
goods it represents, which have traditionally provided the main method for winning elections in
Pakistan. Others have looked in detail at these rivalries spatially over smaller and larger areas
but there has not been an analysis of development spending across union councils within a
district – a curious omission as this is the level at which the two primary rival systems (provincial
and local) have direct elections.
This study attempts such an analysis, both as part of an explanation for the collapse of the
Nazim system and as part of the debate over which level is the most appropriate for the provision
of local public goods. We need to consider this not only in terms of efficiency, but in terms of
strengthening democracy. The study area is the City District of Faisalabad, placed in the wider
context of Pakistan to ensure that the analysis is representative.
The study also examines the under-studied role of administrators, and how they differ in
their approach to development spending from the elected local politicians whom they have, for
the third time in history, replaced following the end of military rule.
It concludes, with caveats, that there are advantages to development spending being
allocated by local governments, but that these findings must be tempered with a large dose of
political reality.
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Dedication
This paper is dedicated to Zaman Khan, without whom it would have been a lot shorter, and to
Anne Hudspeth, without whom it wouldn’t have been written at all.
Acknowledgement and thanks
David Taylor was a superbly knowledgeable and approachable supervisor, his contacts made this
paper possible. In particular Prof Ali Cheema and Prof Mohammed Waseem of LUMS were
invaluable in their insight and suggestions for the direction this paper should take.
Azhar Ali of the DfID and Zaman Khan of the Human Rights commission for Pakistan
went to great lengths to provide me with contacts during my time in Pakistan, all of who were
helpful, professional and candid. In addition Zaman and his colleagues Intezar and Daniel Qasar
were extraordinary generous and informative hosts and guides both in Faisalabad and Lahore.
My interest in the local Government system in Pakistan was first sparked by
conversations I had whilst travelling in the North West Frontier with Maqsood Ul Mulk and
Mufti Chitrali. Finally, Anne Hudspeth is the only reason I’m still sane.
All numbers are given to two significant figures and all errors are my own.
“Democracy can only grow from the roots, and only when people at the lowest level are
organised to discuss their problems and agree on the remedies, and only when they are given the
funds or allowed to raise them, will they begin to solve their problems.”
Ashagar Khan (2005)
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Thesis
Introduction
The story of local government in Pakistan is extraordinary. It is also very important; both to
understanding the sluggish rate of development and difficult process of deepening democracy in
one of the world’s largest and most geopolitically significant countries, and as one of the largest
test cases for how developing countries and international donors attempt to promote devolution,
which, as we shall see, many see as a solution to many of the world’s problems.
Rarely has such an ambitious scheme as the 2001 Pakistani local government reforms
ever been attempted, least of all in a developing country – indeed the only scheme regularly
mentioned as of a similar scale is that attempted in the same year in Indonesia, and some have
argued that the Pakistani scheme was further reaching even than this (DSD, 2006). Three
entirely new tiers of government were created, with far reaching responsibilities – not least over
development spending. Moreover, rarely has a devolution scheme been so heavily supported by
international donor agencies – the Asian Development Bank alone spent $1.5bn on supporting
devolution in the 2000s (Carver, 2010) and the Department for International Development
(DfID), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and others also
contributed significantly towards supporting the system.
Many commentators have, understandably, been upbeat about the prospects for the new
system. In 2006, concerning the likelihood of the clock being turned back, a comprehensive
multi-agency study on Pakistani devolution (DSD, 2006) said, “In reality, devolution is
undoubtedly a fact of life, it is not plausible to expect any substantial return to a discredited set of
institutional arrangements with a proven track record of failure”.1
Yet by 2008 the system was already unravelling: Musharraf’s party – the PML-Q – was
defeated in the general election and Musharraf resigned shortly afterwards. The new federal
1 In 2003 a working paper published by the same group had been even more direct; speaking about the previous system they pointed out, “the track record of social sector service delivery in Pakistan is so poor that it is tempting to assert that almost any reform in governance arrangements would produce better results.” (DSD, 2003)
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government announced that devolution would hitherto be a provincial affair and the four
provincial governments2 started to choke funding to the lower tiers (Carver, 2010). 2009 should
have seen the third set of local government elections but it came and went without any attempt at
holding any. “Security reasons” were cited, although this was widely perceived as an excuse and
didn’t prevent several parliamentary by-elections from being staged (Carver, 2010). In 2010,
when the constitutional protection for the new system expired, it was immediately abolished in
Balochistan whilst in the Punjab, North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Sindh the elected
representatives were removed from their posts – their term having expired – and replaced by
bureaucrats. This was supposed to be an interim measure until fresh elections are held, but 8
months later there is still no sign of elections and petitions before the provincial high courts have
only produced a promise to develop a timeframe within the next 6 months (Ashfaque, 2010). In
the meantime all three provinces are intending to fundamentally re-work arrangements and the
expectation is that all three want to wholly or largely abolish the system (Carver, 2010).
Why this matters
The failure of devolution in Pakistan however, is not just interesting as a case study in how and
why vast quantities of development funding were spent on a failed project, nor is it merely
academically interesting as a study in how a system can fail despite having so much political
capital behind it. It is also interesting because there is a growing body of evidence to suggest that
meaningful devolution could form a large part of the solution to many of Pakistan’s problems -
and indeed many of the problems developing countries face - in terms of social and economic
development, security, corruption, governance and potentially deepening democracy.
There is an overarching theme through much of Pakistan’s recent political history - the
clash between the central state and groups who wish for a different local approach, be it more
autonomy (Baluchistan), a more rapid system of justice (Swat), to be allowed to continue
2 The system only applied to the four provinces: although there was an intention to expand the system to cover Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan (ICG, 2004), this never took place whilst the Federally Administered Tribal Areas have always been Federally Administered.
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traditional feudal practices (rural Sindh) or all of the above (Waziristan). Regardless of the
reason, the writ of the state is seriously under challenge in many areas by those who feel poorly
served by it – and the main issues seem to be the speed at which the institutions of state operate,
and the state’s refusal to locally differentiate policy (Carver, 2010). Some see the solution in the
return of all powerful bureaucrat-judges, some in Sharia law, some in devolution and some in
the gradual evolution of a democratic state. Local government is key to understanding both all
these causes and all these potential solutions.
Finally, devolution and strengthening democracy, two objectives which are often
thought to go hand-in-hand, have, in Pakistan, often been set in opposition to each other. It is
therefore vitally important to those who wish Pakistan to remain a democracy that they
understand the highly ambiguous role devolution has played, and is playing, in that democracy.
Objective
This paper considers the strengths and weaknesses in the most recent local government system
and the reasons for its failure. Sinfully understudied as this area is, several works have appeared
on this subject (Cheema et al, 2010; Waseem eds, 2002; Khan et al, 2007). However, this paper
attempts to do a couple of things which, to the best of my knowledge, have not been attempted.
I am persuaded by the argument that the critical issue in this debate – and in particular
the debate with regards to devolution as a threat to democracy in Pakistan – is the competition
over who gets to provide the local public goods which are the key to winning elections in
Pakistan. Ali Cheema, Shandana Mohmand and others at the Lahore University of Management
Sciences3 have contributed valuable work towards our quantitative understanding of the battle
over local public goods and their impact on elections in Pakistan – both at the level of villages
within a union council and at the level of districts within a province (Cheema and Mohmand,
2006). However I understand no quantitative work has been undertaken on this subject at the
level of union councils within a district – this is where, to my mind, the most intense rivalry
3 At the time they conducted this work.
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between elected officials exists since this is the level which most closely relates to the
constituencies of directly elected officials.
Secondly, on three separate occasions in Pakistan’s history a civilian government has
replaced a military one and has, as one of its first acts, suspended elected local government
officials and replaced them with bureaucrats. Given the stop-start nature of devolution in
Pakistan it would be a brave scholar who bet against administrators having a future role in
Pakistan. Even if this were to be the case, administrators will remain so until another round of
local elections is called – which does not look to be for some time – if not beyond. Given
therefore, how frequently administrators are placed on the front line of local governance it is
extraordinary how understudied their attitude towards governance is. This paper looks at the
last year in Pakistan in an attempt to determine in what manner administrators govern at a local
level.
In short, we address two questions. One: how does the provision of local public goods by
elected officials at the local level i.e. Nazims differ from the provision of local public goods by
elected officials at the provincial level i.e. MPAs and ministers – and what impact does this have
on devolution reforms and the strengthening of democracy in Pakistan? Two: how does the
provision of local public goods by administrators differ from the provision of local public goods
by elected officials?
We find that district development funding exhibits several positive characteristics when
compared to provincial development funding – notably a more equitable distribution and a
closer link with electoral performance. We also find that rule by the administrators is deeply
unsatisfying for the public, primarily due to the remoteness of the rulers from the ruled, and also
presents challenges to the bureaucracy themselves and to development.
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Method
From a variety of sources, online and within Pakistan, I was able to compile budgetary
information on development spending in Faisalabad4 to which I applied a series of statistical tests
to determine which hypotheses the data could support. In addition, combined with a review of
relevant literature, I took a qualitative approach in order to determine to what extent the data
were representative and correctly ascribed cause, what reasons practitioners gave for the
characteristics of the system, and in order to further explore elements of the system the data
didn’t cover. To do this I spent three weeks in Pakistan, primarily in Faisalabad, Lahore and
Islamabad and interviewed academics, NGO and overseas governmental practitioners, senior
bureaucrats from the government of the Punjab and the city district of Faisalabad, politicians,
journalists, business leaders, judges, and other members of organisations that interfaced with the
system. This created some 14,000 words worth of short hand notes; a full list of interviewees is
included in the bibliography.
4 Faisalabad is the district for which the statistical information was most readily available. The available information is comprehensive between 2001 and 2005, between 2005 and 2008 there is some information and after 2008 there is very little information.
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Overview
The decade of devolution
Development funding is susceptible to a lack of consistency and an overemphasis on the areas
which are currently in fashion. Between 2001 and 2010 the fashion was for local government
(Carver, 2010; Zaidi, 2003), this was not without reason. Whilst there is a lively debate around
the issue, local government has many supporters. It has been said that “local Government is
arguably the most important dimension in the viability of any modern democracy” (Barnett, 1996
in Gelner and Hachhethu, 2006).5
Broadly speaking advocates of devolution fall into one of two schools. There are those
who Shandana Mohmand (in Gelner and Hachhethu, 2006) calls as the “neo-liberal” advocates of
devolution who see this as an integral part of creating a smaller state with an enhanced role for
the voluntary and private sectors. The second school sees devolution as a vital component of
deepening democracy and increasing the control of the individual over their surroundings.6
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the birth of the Washington Consensus
devolution enjoyed promotion by big NGOs and multilateral agencies – particularly the World
Bank, especially towards the latter part of the Washington Consensus era when attempts at state
building started to stall and people began to look for other ways in which democracy could be
strengthened7 (Waseem, 2002; Carver, 2010) In 1998 the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) stated that in their view “decentralisation and democratization are
integrally linked” (Wessel, 2005). By the year 2000 there was enough global growth in
devolution for it to be recognised as a trend (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2000; Wessel, 2005). The
enthusiasm would continue for the better part of the decade until the Kerry Report and Paris
5 Rondinelli and Cheema (1983) make a similar point cited in the same volume.
6 The first logic dates back to the work of Adam Smith, the second traces its origins from the work of John Stuart Mill. 7 Devolution was enacted from a neo-liberal perspective across eastern Europe and in Colombia (Litvak et al, 1998) and from a deepening democracy perspective in Kerela, West Bengal and Porta Allegre (Gelner and Hachhethu, 2006).
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Declaration led to a reappraisal of the Washington Consensus (OECD, 2005) and in particular to
a reduction in encouraging an external reengineering of the instruments of state.
In the meantime agreeably the two most ambitious devolutions of all were initiated:
Pakistan and Indonesia.
The history of devolution
Local Government in Pakistan formally dates from the 1883 reforms to the Government of India
Act. This was a continuation of the British and East India Company’s “big man” policy of ruling
through political agents and allied local leaders as well as a limited recognition of the locally
championed attempt to establish “panchayat raj”or village rule. The key feature of this system
was the establishment of the role of Deputy Commissioner, a civil servant with an extraordinary
amount of power, not only politically but crucially judicially – they exercise a range of judicial
functions themselves including the ability to pass jail sentences of up to seven years8(Rehman,
1999; Anon, 2010, Wajidi, 2000)
This is not to say that local councils were entirely irrelevant but they had very restricted
powers. These were expanded slightly, particularly in the 1920s (Dewey, 1993), but were never a
challenge to bureaucracy. This changed considerably in India at independence - far less so in
Pakistan.
General Ayub Khan introduced his “basic democracy” system in 1960. Keen to move
power away from the provinces – where it was prey to elected forces – Ayub Khan used
devolution as a way of emaciating Provincial Government by stripping it of all its most powerful
functions and handing them over to local governments. Every subsequent military dictator
followed his lead and attempted to introduce devolution and in response every civilian
government has rolled back the system and reintroduced the status quo. (Waseem, 2000; Cheema
et al, 2005; Quddus, 1981)
8 This was known as “magistracy”.
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It is wrong to say that two cohorts of politician were created: there was much overlap of
personnel and both were recruited from the same political elite (Carver, 2010). However the
statecraft of the British, the bureaucracy, the political elite and the military dictatorship had the
effect of exacerbating certain characteristics within the two systems and the politicians seem to
have adopted the characteristics of their respective system: the local politicians became associated
with dependence on the bureaucracy, loyalty to the leadership whilst party formation and
development, autonomy and democracy became seen as characteristics of the provincial
politicians.9
General Pervez Musharraf took power in 1999 in circumstances which are still unclear.
Devolution was one of his first major acts.
The Nazim system
The Nazim system was driven forward by Musharraf but the twin architects of the scheme were
a UNDP technician, Paul Loquist, and Daniyal Aziz10. The idea, once again, was for indirect,
non-party elections. The country was to be split into three tiers11 District, Tehsil (town) and
Union. It is important to understand the details of the scheme but space precludes doing so here.
Suffice to say that only the very lowest tier – the Union Nazim - is directly elected, that power is
concentrated at the very highest tier – the District Nazim – and that the Union Nazim’s main
role is to represent his area to the District Nazim through the district council.12
In a major shake-up, the chief civil servant13 was not given any judicial powers, in other
words “magistracy” came to an end. This change -which actually came not from the devolution
scheme but from a Supreme Court decision on the separation of powers – was perhaps the most
9 The idea that politicians tend to adopt the characteristics of the system they find themselves in is fairly non-contentious, having been taken as an axiom of political science since at least Marx. Gimpel (1993) makes the point with relation to different levels of devolution and Wilder (1999) discusses it in a Pakistani context. 10 A civil-servant-turned-politician whom Musharraf charged with design and implementation.
11 The country was split into 106 districts, each was split into a number (usually four or five depending on the size of
the district) of Tehsils or towns and each of these in turn was split into a number (usually around 40 or 50) of Union Councils – each Union Council covering an area of about 5-6000 homes. 12 Opinions differ as to what extent the district Nazim is dependent upon union council Nazims or whether the
opposite is the case. (DSD, 2007; Cheema et al, 2010; Zadai, 2003). 13 The District Coordination Officer (DCO)
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fundamental as it meant that, for the first time ever, the bureaucracy did not have the power to
enforce the law themselves. (Malik, 2008)
The problems of the system
Criticism came from a variety of quarters. Many advocates of democracy saw the system as a
cynical attempt to strip power away from the provinces – where the political parties and
opponents to the military regime were strongest – and divert it into a tame new tier. They
pointed to the fact that parties were not allowed to contest the elections and the fact that elections
were to be held indirectly. The devolution of large amounts of responsibility from province to
district with little to no consultation and no quid-pro-quo in terms of devolution of responsibility
from the federal to the provincial level ensured hostile provincial governments and, in the main,
hostile political parties from the outset. (Carver, 2010)
Indirect elections were also criticized for fostering patronage relationships between the
lower and higher tier elected officials. In particular, the way female, worker and minority top-up
or “reserve” councillors were indirectly elected by their peer councillors left the latter beholden
to their directly elected colleague. (Carver, 2010) and lowered their status in the eyes of their
peers. (Khan et al, 2007; Waseem, 2002)
Moreover, Shandana Mohmand (in Gelner and Hachhethu, 2008) has pointed out that
many aspects of the reform encompassed a very neo-liberal “shallow state” idea of what
devolution should look like14. Her argument was that whilst most successful devolutions have
developed around the concept of strengthening the state and democracy, this devolution scheme
suffers from fundamental weaknesses because it is so closely tied to the goal of reducing the size
of the state. The DSD study acknowledges that democratization was never an aim of devolution
in Pakistan (DSD, 2006).
Others criticized the scheme for not going far enough. One could cite the Okara Military
farms conflict where the devolved Government took the military’s side against their own people
14 One of the key drivers behind devolution was a “memorandum of understanding” with the World Bank that
devolution would be attempted (Devolution and governance reforms in Pakistan)”
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(Ali and Saqib, 2008) as proof that devolution did not alter the relationship between local groups
and powerful central actors. The district governments were still very dependent on the
provincial Government for funding as opportunities for independent revenue raising were
limited, much of the taxation that district governments did receive was collected by the
provincial governments and much more came from the provincial government directly.15
One civil servant I spoke to questioned this, “there was political interference by the
province but how much of a problem this represented was a question of relative strength. The
Nazims had all the tools, powers and support they required to take on the province and win, but
they did not do so. It was a lack of imagination and a lack of political experience on their part;
they were outwitted and allowed themselves to be taken over. The question of funding is a case-
in-point. The Nazims had the power to raise their own funds independently but they didn’t use
it - as a result they were entirely dependent upon provincial government pursestrings and lost
their power of independent action.”
Our data16 would suggest that the two systems were reasonably independent whilst the
local tier had presidential protection, but this explains why as soon as the provincial government
turned against the Nazims in 2008 the latter lost control. From my interviews it is clear that the
tactic of most opponents of local government was to leave it alone and let it fail rather than to
attempt to interfere (Carver, 2010).17
Elections and devolution
One of the reasons the issue of devolution is so contentious in Pakistan is that election results are
so closely tied to two things: the provision of local public goods and the ability to act as mediators
with the state. Elections across South-Asia are often linked to these factors but in Pakistan they
become even more important due to the prominence of the system of brokers in deciding election
15 Taking Faisalabad in 2008 as an example, out of a budget of 13 billion rupees 2.7 billion came from rollover from
previous years, 6.5 billion from the provincial government as a direct grant, 0.8 billion came from the provincial government as a tied grant, 2 billion came from the federal government or the office of the president, largely as tied grants, 0.6 billion came from taxes collected by the provinces on behalf of the district and 0.4 billion was raised by the district. 16 Particularly hypothesis 1
17 There were of course other issues regarding capacity and the wording of the ordinance (NRB, 2001).
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results18. Again, this is not a uniquely Pakistani phenomenon but it is particularly developed in
Pakistan. (Waseem, 1994; Wilder, 1999).
The result is that development funding, always a major issue in developing countries,
becomes a matter of vital importance for politicians. The Pakistani approach to this, which does
at least allow for some transparency, is a form of legalised pork-barrel politics via grants19. They
also play a key role in deciding spending priorities for the provincial government’s main
development budget (Carver, 2010). They effectively had a monopoly on the provision of local
public goods until the introduction of devolution (Zadai, 2003). Now devolution is suspended,
they have it once again. (Carver, 2010)
In addition, devolution threatened to provide another form of interface between the
public and the state, and threatened to compete with the existing system of brokers. Many felt
that devolution, by threatening the existing political parties and their elected representatives, also
threatened democracy. The argument is that as the evolution of representation in Pakistan, with
all its flaws, is something that happens at a provincial level it will either succeed or fail at a
provincial level. Thus an undermining of provincial politics and of the existing political parties is
effectively an undermining of democracy: democracy cannot be rebuilt from scratch, it must
evolve from the democracy that is. (Burki and Waseem, 2002)
The counterargument is that the weakness of Pakistani democracy is heavily intertwined
with the distance between the politicians and the masses – the fact that it is brokers, not
politicians, who provide intermediary services with the state. Devolution was seen as a way of
bridging that gap (Cheema et al, 2010). On the other hand this distance has deeper, historical
roots20. Political identities in Pakistan are inherently regional and so, for better or for worse,
multi party democracy will only develop in Pakistan at the provincial layer. (Waseem, 2006)
18 Of course in some cases the brokers and the elected officials are one and the same.
19 Each Member of the Provincial Assembly (MPA) receives eight million rupees, and each Member of the National
Assembly (MNA) 16 million, to spend on whichever development projects they see fit, 20 It comes from the fact that the Pakistani middle classes were deeply committed to the military and bureaucracy as
opposed to fulfilling what had elsewhere been their natural role of advocates for democracy. This in turn comes
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In other words whilst the democracy-that-is is imperfect, attacking the provincial
democratic cadre and promoting the local undemocratic cadre can only weaken democracy.
Again I would suggest that it is incorrect to suggest that there are two types of politician; merely
that there are two types of system and that the politicians adopt the characteristics of their
system.
Faisalabad
Faisalabad is either Pakistan’s third or fifth largest city,21 opinions differ. It is certainly one of the
fastest growing, having been little more than a trading post in colonial times. As a highly
industrial22 city it pays more tax than any city bar Karachi (Carver, 2010). Bar Karachi it is the
largest district in Pakistan, comprising 289 Union Councils in eight Tehsils23.
As one would expect Faisalabad is a city district. It is thought to be fairly representative
of Pakistani city districts24. Opinions differ as to how representative it is of other primarily urban
districts which are not administered as city districts25. Politics is to some extent an urban pursuit
in Pakistan and rural politics and rural development certainly are very different. It is thus
debatable how much relevance Faisalabad has to rural politics – although fairly substantial rural
areas are included within Faisalabad district.
Faisalabad has never solidly backed one political party or another; this trend continues to
this day and the PPP, PML-N and PML-Q all enjoy reasonable representation in the city.
Faisalabad was one of the few districts which in 2005 elected a Nazim thought to be hostile to the
from the fact that the initial ruling political elite came from the mohajir immigrant community and, as such, knew they were unlikely to thrive in direct democratic elections. 21 The population is thought to be around two to three million in the city itself with some people claiming a
population of 12 million if you count the suburbs and surrounding densely populated rural areas. The population of the city district is thought to be around 5 to 6 million. 22 The main industry is cotton, so whilst it is highly industrial, it is still in many cases a cottage industry.
23 Initially 6 Tehsils with the city itself split into an inner city tehsil and an outer “sadder” or suburban Tehsil. This
arrangement deeply disadvantaged the sadder Tehsil as the octroi tax - which is used to calculate a significant part of Tehsils’ funding - is based upon markets which are concentrated in the centre of town. As a result in 2005 the sadder and city Tehsils were reorganised, the two Tehsils merged together and then split into four quadrants. 24 There are admittedly only ten City districts in Pakistan, six of which are in the Punjab, one of which, Islamabad,
is a rather a special case as it is a capital territory. 25 On the one hand Faisalabad is a typical large Punjabi town but on the other hand non-city districts are, due to
their administrative differences, less coherent as political entities and consequentially tend to invest less political capital in local politics.
- 19 -
ruling PML-Q, however in common with all other such Nazims he rapidly made his peace with
them. (Carver, 2010)
One of the most atypical aspects of the Faisalabad situation is the disproportionate
amount of interest NGOs and governmental overseas aid organisations have paid it. Faisalabad’s
civil society, business community and political establishment have traditionally been very open to
cooperation with NGOs, successful cooperation has begat more successful cooperation. (Carver,
2010)
In particular Faisalabad has had a long and productive relationship with DfID, going
back to 1993. This led to Faisalabad being chosen as the area for DfID to pilot a Strategic Policy
Unit (SPU). This unit, initially funded and enabled by DfID but locally staffed and now entirely
locally owned, was envisaged as an appendage of the devolved local government which would
provide budgetary analysis and strategic advice.
One of the most valuable things the SPU did, particularly from our perspective, is greatly
increase the transparency of local government finances26. They performed detailed analyses,
making all financial information from Faisalabad publicly available on their website,
undertaking a series of case studies - also publicly available on their website – and conducting an
in-depth investigation into how much was spent by third parties and the provincial government
between 2001 and 2005.
One could reasonably ask whether the atypical level of attention Faisalabad has received
makes it a poor example of devolution. However, many individuals from all sides have made the
point that as the SPU’s work consisted largely of monitoring and reporting rather than
influencing what happened. Moreover, without this work it would be difficult to conduct a
meaningful study (Carver, 2010). Of course the Heisenberg principle applies even more strongly
26 Whilst there was a requirement that the devolved administrations publish budget reports on an annual basis this
requirement was only intermittently fulfilled, particularly in the early years. In later years budgets were largely only available in paper form and often on request only. Formats varied and transparency as to exactly where money was spent was variable – making spatial analysis difficult. There was also little to no record kept of the amount spent by provincial government or third parties in the respective districts. (Carver, 2010)
- 20 -
to governments than it does to atoms – people behave differently when they are being watched –
but such information as we have from elsewhere in Pakistan suggests Faisalabad is not
unrepresentative.
- 21 -
Literature review
The theory of devolution.
The advocates of deepening democracy primarily base their argument on the democratic benefit
of the way it increases opportunities for, and quality of, representation. Devolution allows the
citizen a reasonable degree of control over their neighbourhood. (Gaventa, 2002). Moreover,
increasing the number of lower level elected posts increases the number of opportunities for the
individual citizen to stand for election themselves. It then becomes a training ground for higher
level elected officials27. It also roots the political class in the grassroots, and so in the long run
reduces the risk of elite capture. This is what Geddes calls “insulation” (Geddes, 1994 in
MacIntyre and McLeod, 2007) from “the net” (BRAC, 1983 in MacIntyre and McLeod, 2007). In
the short term the effect of devolution on elite capture is less clear, as we shall see.
Neo-liberals28 tend to concentrate on efficiency benefits. Micro-management by the
centre is avoided, cutting down on the number of decisions which create inefficiency by going
against conditions as they exist on the ground. Even more importantly devolution can
revolutionise the efficiency of resource allocation– in no small part due to the ability to vary
service delivery according to local need, in other words to pick “horses for courses” (Estache and
Sinha, 1995). It is also the case that policy that varies by locality is more likely to be locally
acceptable.29
There are also thought to be benefits from “horizontal competition” (Litvak et al, 1998);
in other words efficiency is driven up by having the lower sub-units of the state compete with
27 : Roger Myerson (2009) has argued that “decentralization can increase the national supply of individuals who have
good reputations for using public resources responsibly”. 28 When talking about democratic benefits from either perspective, but particularly the neo-liberal one, we must
have consider the debate between Whaites (1996) and his neo-conservative critics over whether statebuilding can be externally engineered or whether it must be an internal process. This does not negate the argument of course as we are discussing both internally and externally generated devolution. 29 As Stigler (1957) says, “(1) the closer a representative government is to the people, the better it works, and (2)
people should be able to vote for the kind and amount of public services they want”. The point is also made in Habibi (2003), Adam Smith (1776), Tendler (1997) Bengali (1999), Antlöv (2003) and World Bank (1995).
- 22 -
each other for resources and acclaim. All these elements mean the institutions of state should
deliver outcomes more quickly under devolution.30
Structural benefits are claimed by advocates of both schools. Capacity is freed up in the
higher echelons of government which can be concentrated on the higher functions of
government (Hayek, 1944), something which was welcomed by several of my interviewees.
Strong devolved local government can also act as a check on the executive in the centre.
Decision making is thought to improve in a variety of ways from bringing it closer to the
people it affects31 (Faguet, 2002; Azfar et al, 2001). Devolution provides better access to the state
for the citizen by increasing the number-of, and reducing the distance-to, access points. This is
both a benefit in its own right but also provides knock on benefits, an easily accessible state is
more dynamic in responding to the populace’s needs. There are also a number of studies to
suggest devolution prevents corruption32 and increases accountability
33 although Manor suggests
that this is not guaranteed (Crook and Manor, 1998).
Socially, devolution allows for greater regional autonomy and can form a major part of
attempts to reconcile separatist groups, cultural minorities and anybody else who feels excluded
from the centre (Manor, 1999). It can form a major part of efforts to calm volatile security
situations – a feeling of isolation being a major driver behind terrorism, sectarian violence and
indeed most crime. Within South Asia there is an argument that meaningful devolution would
have prevented ethnic conflict in northern Sri Lanka and the Chittagong hill tracts and that it
did in fact end the conflict in the Bodo areas of Assam (Gelner and Hachhethu, 2008).
Critics of devolution point to the fact that local government, by being smaller and more
embedded in the community, is more open to capture by local elites, and threatens to fracture the
state and thus potentially weaken the writ of the centre. (antlov 2003), Other concerns regard the
30 See also Inman and Rubinfield (1996), World bank (1997), Breton et al (1998), Martinez-Vasquez (1997),
Prud’homme (1995), Huther and shah (1998), Besley and Coate (2003), Beasley and Case (1995), World Bank (1995), Bolton and Roland (1997, Azfar et al (2001) Faguet (2004). 31 Moreover there are time-and-motion savings from physically moving the architecture of government closer to the
governed. 32 Amongst others: Prud’homme (1995), Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006), Chattopadhayay and Duflo (2003).
33 Amongst others: Tiebout (1956), Oates (1999), Bardhan (2002), Ezzamel (2004), Lankina et al (2008).
- 23 -
issue of capacity and whether devolved administrations are competent to deal with the level of
responsibility given to them.
Drawing upon all the above, Bardhan and Mookerjee (2001) have established a highly
persuasive model for the actual effects of devolution in developing countries. They posit that the
lower the level to which power is devolved, the more responsive and equitable service delivery is.
However, if the system of governance is captured by the elite all these positive effects can be
negated; and, crucially, the risk of elite capture is also related to the level to which power is
devolved: the lower the level, the greater the risk of elite capture. So devolution becomes a trade-
off, the more you devolve the more equitable service delivery becomes if it is not captured by elite
forces but the greater the risk that it will be.34
Devolution in Pakistan
Considering the importance of the issue and the amount of resource invested in it, it is
extraordinary how little has been written about devolution in Pakistan, particularly recently.
Nevertheless, we are fortunate that this research is of an exceptionally high calibre. A number of
academics, notably Ali Cheema, Shandana Mohmand and Mohammed Waseem have written
extensively on the subject. We have covered aspects of this debate already but it is worth looking
into some further elements here.
There was initially a consensus that the non-political nature of elections to local bodies
was a facade as political parties clearly made their endorsements of particular candidates openly
known and publicly campaigned for “slates” of candidates (Kennedy, 2001; Pattan, 2005; ICG,
2004).
A couple of recent works and my own observations suggest this is an oversimplification
(Cheema and Mohmand, 2006; Khan et al, 2007). For a start it is far from straightforward
determining which parties endorse which Nazims. Alliances between Nazims and parties seem
34 This is a point to which I wish to return in my conclusion.
- 24 -
to be temporary and negotiated on an ad-hoc basis35. (Carver, 2010) Had devolution continued
longer an analysis of the winners and losers of successive elections might have started to produce
statistical evidence for slates – two elections is simply too few to start to do this: as we will see.36
Parties seem to be only interested in the higher echelons of the local government system
and tend to ignore the direct elections stage – concentrating on recruiting the winners rather
than running a slate. Often that approach was taken even further and, rather than campaigning
at all, parties would just try to recruit the winning Nazim37. For all these reasons Nazims held
little sway internally within political parties (Carver, 2010).
Here again we can see a repetition of the historical pattern: local politicians are seen as
being separate from, and holding no sway within, the world of the politicians that rule the
country, who operate at a provincial level – this holds true even when there is a significant
overlap of individuals, and even when there are thought to be links between Nazims and parties.
The effect devolution has had on development is contested. The National Reconstruction
Bureau is predictably upbeat in a 2005 assessment (NRB, 2005) whilst Zadai (1999) has argued
that the shallow state Pakistan are developing does not allow for politics to have much of a role
in development decision making. Ali Cheema and Shandana Mohmand (2006) have suggested
that at the village level devolution has brought enormous benefits for previously underprovided
areas and households but that in many areas benefits were dependent upon having a decent
patron-client relationship with the local elite.38
Ali Cheema and Shandana Mohmand are also working on another paper (Carver, 2010)
on the effects at a district level. Their interim findings are that re-election as a District Nazim
35 Some might say that this is also a fair criticism of the selection of MNAs and MPAs – particularly in a deeply
factional party like the PML-Q. However party ties are clearly stronger here, and as parties are not prohibited at these levels there is at least a degree of transparency in the process. The draconian powers of the 18
th constitutional
amendment further discourage isle swapping in mid-term for MNAs and MPAs. 36 See in particular the failure of my hypothesis 4.
37 Indeed after the 2005 elections the PML-Q used the fact that they held power at the provincial and federal levels
(and such Nazims needed to work with them) to successfully recruit every single Nazim who had been elected – including those that had been elected allegedly on an opposition platform. Moreover even by the very low standards of king’s parties in Pakistan the PML-Q was deeply factionalised, thus in many areas the most contentious battles for power at the local level were not between parties but between PML-Q factions. 38 In other words in classic Bardhan and Mookerjheean fashion devolution has brought both more equal outcomes
and a greater risk of elite capture.
- 25 -
seems to be determined by their ability to attract development funding – and so this system of
elections has resulted in a greater prioritization of development. Moreover elected politicians
appear to have different spending priorities to civil servants – at least at this level39.
Perhaps predictably politicians tend to prioritise overt, demonstrative development
projects such as road building and sanitation over items like health and education where the
infrastructure is less visible and the return less immediate. Less obviously politicians seem to
prefer starting new projects to finishing ongoing ones.40
Of course when talking about devolution and development we must have some
consideration for benchmarks and how well (or badly) Pakistan was doing in terms of
development before devolution. The DSD report was scathing (2003). Arguably Pakistan hasn’t
dealt that badly with poverty in absolute terms41 but they have done very poorly with regard to
“capabilities” (Sen, 1979). Kerala has shown that development of capabilities is one area where
devolution can be really helpful (Gelner and Hachhethu, 2008).
The role of the bureaucracy is integral to determining how much has actually changed.
Despite the traditional control the bureaucracy had in this area there was enough in the local
government ordinance about empowering politicians to deeply worry the bureaucracy (ICG,
2004) - Kennedy characterised the ordinance as “war on the bureaucracy”(2001). That said, the
bureaucracy was widely believed to have eventually triumphed and kept a fairly tight hold over
the levers of power (Carver, 2010). One of the key things that made the reforms so unpopular
amongst the bureaucrats was the loss of magistracy; this may explain how easy the incoming
provincial governments found it to dismantle it.
39 Other studies also express an expectation that politicians will behave in this way (Ali and Saqib, 2008).
40 Whilst hardly unusual on the subcontinent this is perhaps surprising as one would expect that the moment at
which a development project yields a political win to the politician is the moment the project is completed rather than the moment it starts. It may be a result of the indirect system of elections – whilst direct elections require projects to be finished to impress the electorate, indirect elections merely require that the lower level politicians be promised a project in their area – which of course happens when the project starts.(Carver, 2010) 41 World Bank estimates for poverty hover around the 30% mark (DSD, 2006): worse than, but comparable with,
India.
- 26 -
Elections in Pakistan
It is fairly extraordinary, given how globally important Pakistani democracy is perceived to be
there are only three sources of any real note on the subject of elections in Pakistan – one of which
is now over 40 years old42. We are indeed fortunate that the sources in question are so
comprehensive, thorough and insightful. Nevertheless, the lack of alternative views is worrying.
Mohammed Waseem’s (1994) study of the 1993 elections describes the Pakistani electoral
landscape primarily in terms of “big men” or brokers who operate large banks of “hundreds or
thousands” of votes. In the crudest examples they gain control over this number of voters
through bribes, murders and intimidation. More sophisticatedly they can gain control as a quid-
pro-quo for providing services of access-to, and mediation-with, the state. They trade these vote
banks with the political parties in exchange for, in some instances, money and more generally
local public goods which further enhance their reputation and access.
Waseem updated his study with regards to the 2002 elections (2006) in which he delved
more deeply into issues of mobilization and seduction of individual voters based upon horizontal
groupings43. He still concludes that all the major parties operated as grand patronage networks –
albeit devolution has now introduced a second patronage network in competition with the first.
Wilder (1999) also bases his analysis primarily on the 1993 elections. He concentrates his
research on what influences individual choice. He concludes that party identification is the
strongest determining factor – largely trumping the will of biraderi other horizontal groupings.
Party identification is partly and increasingly based on ideology and service delivery44 but the
main driver is patronage, which in turn is linked to development spending. So whilst coming at
42 This is particularly surprising given how much attention has been paid to elections in neighbouring India.
43 For example biraderi, class, ethnicity, family and party ideology.
44 Some studies have suggested that the advent of satellite television (Shaikh, 2007) and the new found independence
of private television networks (Ali, 2009) mean that there is now a greater political awareness amongst the poor majority, particularly the previously isolated rural poor, and so ideological considerations could potentially play a greater part in future elections. Regrettably there has been no detailed study into this (Waseem, 2002).
- 27 -
the question from different angles, Waseem and Wilder conclude in agreement – a conclusion
shared by such other studies as there are (Yusufzai, 1999)45.
It is this approach that leads to the attitude MNAs and MPAs have towards their role.46
(Yusufzai, 1999) Thus we see the provincial cohort of politicians seeing themselves as separate-
from and rivals-to the local cohort and attempting to co-opt what would traditionally be seen as
functions which would fit more comfortably with local governments because they see them as a
threat.
The third detailed study is Philip Jones’ (200347) study of the PPP in the 1970 election.
Whilst an old work it is still of import given the extent to which this campaign is still regarded
by many (primarily PPP supporters) in Pakistan as the epitome of electioneering. The popular
myth is that Bhutto campaigned and won on the issues (bread, clothing and housing) by building
a party out of the masses (Ali, 2009). Having spoken to some of the people who ran the campaign
I have my doubts: it appearing that, at least in Faisalabad, the campaign was won more by
picking the leaders of particular class-groups as candidates more intelligently than their
opponents (Carver, 2010).
Jones gives some weight to the PPP’s interpretation, stating that “never before had the
rural peasant or urban worker so broken with his customary leadership, the rural landlord and
the urban union godfather, to assert his independent political rights as he did in 1970”. He
characterises the PPP in 1970 as a transitory party, somewhere between the elite, patronage-
based parties of the past and the mass parties which might have appeared in the future had the
military not intervened in 1976. The PPP did use ideology to motivate horizontal sections of
society to vote for them (as opposed to vertical sections which are more indicative of patronage
45 When parties are eliminated, of course biraderi and other concerns do become more prominent (journal emailed).
46 Wilder (1999 also quoted in DSD, 2006) quotes interviewees saying “People now think that the job of an MNA
and MPA is to fix their gutters, get their children enrolled in school, arrange for job transfers...[These tasks]consume your whole day….” (p. 196); “Look, we get elected because we are ba asr log [effective people] in our area. People vote for me because they perceive me as someone who can help them...Somebody’s son is a matric fail and I get him a job as a teacher or a government servant. . .”(p. 204). 47 The manuscript was originally written in the early 1970s but only recently published.
- 28 -
relationships). However as a political party they were certainly not mass participatory, a factor
Jones feels was key to Bhutto’s downfall.
There is of course a school of thought that states that Pakistan is not a democracy due to
widespread rigging of polls. Most would argue that whilst democracy in Pakistan has its flaws, it
is a democracy nevertheless (FAFEN, 2009; Pattan, 2005).48
48 Rigging undeniably takes place (NDI, 1990) and from my own experience the Election Commission of Pakistan
are toothless and inept (Carver, 2010). However most of the claims that vote-rigging takes place on a scale that would influence the overall result come from partisan sources (PDA, 1991).
- 29 -
Faisalabad
The data
The data on Faisalabad are the most comprehensive of any Pakistani district – even so there are
gaps. Consequently we are going to have to approach different sections of the last ten years
differently. Moreover, the boundaries of the unions and the constituencies are not clearly defined
nor are they couched in the same terms. Realising this issue, the government of Faisalabad have
put considerable effort into defining their boundaries (City District Government of Faisalabad,
2008 (a)) – however none of the other statutory bodies have taken their lead and so delimitation
remains a challenge.49
We also have an issue of benchmarking, William Lovett’s (1980) work is one of the few
sources available on development in the Punjab before 2000 but it does not cover Faisalabad in
any but the broadest sense. The provincial and local governments both claim to have lost what
little data they had (this form of analysis having never been a priority) in the chaos of
devolution50. (Carver, 2010)
Between 2001 and 2005 the data were fairly comprehensive and we have exact details of
every project commissioned per union council: we can categorise these projects into those where
funding came from the district and from the provincial government51. This gives us quite a good
picture of the first five years of devolution and of the Nazims’ entire first term.
Between 2005 and 2008 the district government conducted their own investigation into
spatial development patterns – coming to their own conclusions but also providing52 data from
which we can draw ours. Unfortunately this approach replaced the previous comprehensive
survey of exactly what was spent per Union Council. Moreover there is no information on
49 Determining, for example, which Union Council is in which MPAs constituency requires approximation based
upon overlaying maps on photoshop, reference to a paper map and frequent interrogation of the Electoral Commission gazette. 50 One civil servant described the establishment of devolution as being “like civil war, with people running in and
grabbing files willy nilly resulting in the loss of a lot of data”. 51 Compiling this data is not without its challenges: it is in several different places part of it is in Urdu and one or
two villages are missing but it is reasonably comprehensive. 52 Admittedly this data is summarised and banded.
- 30 -
spending during this period by the provinces53. We can attempt to draw some tentative
conclusions by extrapolating from 2002-05 when the same MPAs were in place.
For the 2008-09 financial year and the first half of 2009-10 all development priorities
were set by the provinces; information regarding this time was not made available54. Similarly it
had been my intention to study the role of administrators based upon the 2009-10 budgets but
these have not been published. Consequently, I shall adopt a qualitative approach here.
2001-2005
Over this period over 2 billion rupees worth of development funding were spent, 1,840 million
by the district administration and 340 million by the provincial government. We have detailed
information about this spending so we can test a number of hypotheses. My aim is to determine
to what extent provincial and district generated projects exhibit different characteristics and
what those characteristics are.
To give an idea of the kind of spread in resource allocation we are dealing with, the
following is a graphical representation of how much funding each area has had in total over the
last four years (overleaf):
53 I had hoped to be sent this information, however I was not which is understandable as the provincial government
is currently preoccupied by the floods 54 Again the flooding may have had a part to play in this.
- 31 -
Figure 1: 2001-05 total (district and provincial) development spend per Union Council (in order,
the colour coding relates to the Tehsils)
Hypothesis 1: There is a correlation between Union Councils which have a high degree of
development spend from the Districts and those that have a high degree from the Provinces.
Test: Pearson’s correlation coefficient.
Result: broadly discarded. We get a coefficient of 0.10 indicating a very slight positive correlation
in which we can have some confidence (p value 0.01755). However in 184 of the 283 Union
Councils the Provincial Government gave no money at all – potentially warping the analysis. If
we ignore these councils we get a correlation coefficient of 0. 023 – an exceedingly slight positive
correlation in which we can have no confidence (p value 0.74).
Analysis: This argues slightly against both systems being captured by the elite – or at least being
in the control of the same elite. It is difficult to prove or disprove patronage at this level, Cheema
and Mohmand’s (2006) study is better suited to answering this question. It does argue strongly
against the systems being complementary: in other words the province does not leap in when it
55 The p value is the probability that this distribution could have been created by random chance, so there is a 1.7%
chance that this distribution could be replicated randomly. Most statisticians set a 5% threshold for statistical significance (a p value less than 0.05). Whilst we are not dealing with exact science here that number is worth bearing in mind as a benchmark.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Millions
Chak Jumirah
Iqbal
Jaranwala
Jinnah
Lyallapur
Madina
Samundar
Tandilawalah
- 32 -
sees a lack by the district or vice versa. This constitutes a fairly powerful indicator that the
systems are indeed separate and serve different masters. This supports our historical model.
It is already clear that the province prefers to target its resources on fewer, larger schemes
– not giving any money at all to 65% of union councils. Of course what we cannot know is how
each of these groups would behave if the other did not exist.
Figure 2: Union Councils funding from the District relative to Provincial funding 2001-05
Hypothesis 2: Tehsil has a significant impact on variation in funding received by union councils
Test: analysis of variance56
Result: discarded. A p value of 0.85.
Hypothesis 3: whether an area is urban or rural has a significant impact on variation in funding
received by Union Councils
Test: analysis of variance
Result: discarded. Whist rural areas do on average receive half a million rupees each fewer over
the five years in development funding there is a p value for this distribution of 0.73
56 Analysis of variance (Anova) tests to see if the variation between groups is statistically significant by comparing
variation between the suggested groups with variation within the group.
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0 5 10 15
Pro
vin
cial
fundin
gM
illions
Districtfunding
MillionsUnion Councils
- 33 -
Hypothesis 4: areas where the Union councillors are thought to be sympathetic to the PML-Q
receive significantly more development funding from the district
Test: analysis of variance
Result: discarded. Union Councils within the “Q” areas received on average about 370,000 rupees
more District funding, the p value is 0.77
Analysis: this is not surprising given what we have been told about the fluid and feeble nature of
political affiliation at the Union Nazim level.57
Hypothesis 5: areas where the Union Councillors are thought to be sympathetic to the PML-Q
receive significantly more development funding from the province
Test: analysis of variance
Result: debateable, the PML-Q areas, insofar as they can be identified, receive on average about
900,000 rupees more in development funding from the provinces. The p value is 0.054
Analysis: I think this is better understood as a knock-on effect. Not surprisingly there is some
overlap between PML-Q MPA constituencies and ostensibly PML-Q union council areas and the
correlation with the MPA constituencies is much stronger.
Hypothesis 6: Development spending from the Districts is a) more evenly distributed and b)
varies less year-on-year than development spending from the Province
Test: Gini58 coefficient
Result: accepted. The Gini coefficient for District spend between Union Councils over the 4
years is 0.58, for provincial spend 0.86. District spend varied year on year with an average Gini
coefficient of 0.39, provincial spend averaged 0.68. This is even more obvious in the urban areas
(0.66 and 0.92).
57 It is in any case difficult to determine which the PML-Q sympathetic areas are. Of course one could argue that this
is because where party affiliations are weak they have to be constantly maintained with infusions of funds. 58 I chose to use the relative mean difference (RMD) as a measure of the equitability of distribution instead of
standard deviation (SD) as RMD, unlike SD, is not defined in terms of a specific measure of central tendency – and the central tendency for development spending in the Punjab has not been determined. I then chose to use the Gini Coefficient as it is a scaled version of RMD (RMD=Ginix2) and so occupies a more pleasing 0 to 1 scale and will be more familiar to political scientists as a measure of inequality. Whilst direct comparison with the Gini coefficients of the wealth of nations is to be avoided – they are not directly comparable – it will give readers an idea as to what constitutes a high or low coefficient.
- 34 -
Analysis: it would seem that this is caused by provincial politicians preference for a few large
schemes over the districts more diffuse approach. Here we can see the ability for devolution to
provide services more closely tailored to local need (Estache and Sinha, 1995). From interviews
we know that the bureaucracy has a distaste for this kind of diffuse approach (Carver, 2010) so
this data also argues against the bureaucracy having control of the district. In the cities, schemes
which benefit people from many Union Councils are only accounted as a benefit to the one in
which they are located which may explain the urban to rural disparity.
Hypothesis 7: the MPA constituency to which a Union Council belongs has a significant impact
on variation in funding received a) from the District and b) from the Province.
Test: analysis of variance.
Result: a) possible, b) accepted. The p value for the district is 0.060, for the province 0.000010.
Analysis: a) is perhaps surprising– suggesting potentially that in this initial phase MPAs did have
some influence in development funding even if the Province per-se did not. b) is very
interesting: further dissected below.
Figure 3: 2001-05 average funding received by Union Councils in each MPA constituency from
Province and District
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Fundin
g fro
m the
dis
tric
t
Millions
Funding from the Province Millions
PML-N
PMLQ
PPP
- 35 -
The chart above omits PP55, a constituency which received roughly 10 million from each source
– and so would not fit on this graph whilst keeping the scale useable. PP55 is also a PML-Q
constituency. Colouring – as we have above – the political parties of the MPAs it seems that there
is a clear preference for funnelling provincial funding to PML-Q constituencies, whereas there is
a less obvious party link to district funding.
Hypothesis 8: PML-Q constituencies get more a) provincial and b) District funding
Test: analysis of variance
Result: a) accepted, Union Councils within PML-Q constituencies receive on average 1.6 million
rupees more funding with a p value of 0.00012. b) discarded, the link with political parties in any
sense being debateable. Union councils within PPP constituencies on average receive 1.3 million
rupees more funding than PML-Q and 4.3 million more than PML-N – this relationship has a p-
value of 0.069.
Hypothesis 9: re-election as a Nazim is dependent upon the ability to attract funding from the
District.
Test: analysis of variance
Result: accepted with caveats. It has proven remarkably difficult to find accurate data regarding
the 2001 and 2005 elections59, analysing the data for the union councils for which I do have
accurate information shows that on average Nazims who successfully stood for re-election
attracted 10 million rupees more funding per union council than those which were not returned
– a robust finding with a p value of 0.021. However this is based on a sample of only the 9.2% of
union councils for which we have accurate election data. Given the seemingly random nature of
the sample this is large enough for us to have some confidence in this finding60 but it would be
beneficial to conduct further investigations to confirm this relationship. It does however make
59 It seems to be very difficult to find any data at all regarding the 2001 elections in Faisalabad; in 2005 it did not
seem to be common practice to record who else stood and lost, or the number of votes cast, but simply the winner. 60 The sample size is 26, using a sample size calculator we calculate that we can have a 99% confidence in this
finding with a margin for error of 12%. Putting this another way we can say with a p value of 0.031 that across Faisalbad winning Nazims attracted somewhere between 12,150,000 and 7,850,000 more development funding from the district than losing Nazims.
- 36 -
sense, given the importance Waseem and Wilder place upon the provision on development in
winning elections.
Unfortunately the non-party nature of these elections makes it difficult to undertake
further analysis. It appears however that other factors did not have a significant effect.
2005-2008
Following the local elections of 2005 the bureaucracy of the City District Government decided
that spatial planning of development needed to become more strategic. They were critical of
“un-even and un-planned spending of limited financial resources” (2008(a)) which they blamed
on a lack of consolidated information. They identified areas of duplication, areas where there
was a total lack of investment and areas where synergies were not exploited. They also unveiled a
strategic plan for how development in Faisalabad should be targeted over the next ten years to
satisfy immediate housing need and take advantage of the opportunities provided by the new
motorway (overleaf):
- 37 -
Figure 4: City District of Faisalabad 10 year plan (picture from City District Government of
Faisalabad (2008 (a)).
Their solution to all this was the Faisalabad Integrated Geographic Information System (FIGIS)
– an ambitious plan to map and audit all development in the City District. The first phase was a
survey of spending in Union Councils, the raw data from which made the first part of my
analysis possible. Between 2005 and 2008 they did their own analysis – the hope was that in the
future this would be used to ensure deprived Union Councils were targeted for development
funding61.
61 It was thought that (in 2008) it would take 4 or 5 more years before FIGIS was running well enough to allow this.
- 38 -
They concluded that the act of mapping and auditing development spending in this way
had alerted some Union Nazims to the fact that their areas had been underinvested in: this led to
more effective lobbying by them and a more equitable distribution of development funding62.
The rest of the report is uncritical, discussing how the fieldwork identified a lack of
education resources and prompted union Nazims to give education a higher priority and think
more strategically. Unfortunately it does not distinguish between funding from the Provinces
and funding from the Districts – except in passing to say that the increase in education funding
was as a result of the efforts of the latter not the former. Nor do they provide their raw data.
However they do detail within broad brackets how much funding each Union Council received
from the District in total between 2005 and 2008, also doing so graphically in this map:
Figure 5: District funding of Union Councils in Faisalabad 2005-08, (picture from City District
Government of Faisalabad (2008 (b)).
62 This conclusion is supported by my data – the Gini coefficient for development funding amongst Union Councils
dropping sharply from 0.82 in 2001- admittedly a chaotic year – to 0.67 in 2002 and then dropping gradually year-on-year to its 2005 rate of 0.62
- 39 -
If we attempt a comparison with our previous data by translating it into this form we can test
some hypotheses.
Hypothesis 10: Development spending patterns between 2005 and 2008 are similar to those
between 2001 and 2005
Test: Pearsons correlation coefficient
Result: accepted. A reasonably strong positive correlation with a coefficient of 0.24 in which we
can have confidence given a p value of less than 0.00010.
Analysis: We can assume many of the same features apply: therefore there must be to a certain
extent the same winners and losers but it is not entirely clear who these are. It may be that this
has been lost in the lack of detail provided by the banding of the data. It is possible that those
who were returned were better at navigating the system than those who were not – newly
elected Nazims on average managed to get their union council to rise 0.35 of a category whilst
second term Nazims enjoyed a 1.8 category rise. This distribution has a p value of 0.036 although
again this is based upon only the union councils for which we have accurate election data63. Rural
Nazims gained slightly more than urban Nazims, (on average rising 0.2 of a category more than
urban Nazims) but with a p value of 0.36 we cannot have much confidence in this finding. There
was no most favoured Tehsil or most improved MPA seat.
The banding hides a lot of the detail concerning whether development is being more
evenly distributed; the Gini coefficient of the bands has shrunk slightly from 0.29 to 0.28.
63 The sample size calculator would suggest then that for the whole of Faisalabad second term Nazims did
somewhere between 1.6 and 1.1 of a category better than newly elected Nazims and that the p value for this distribution is 0.046
Figure 6: Correlation between Union C
05 and 2005-08
2008 also saw the provincial and federal election. Unfortunately the data for provincial
government spend in Faisalabad between
tentative testing of hypotheses by extrapol
must be careful in doing so.
Of the 22 seats in Faisalabad
PML-Q virtually wiped out, the PML
national election, Faisalabad bucked the trend
Less than 1 million
1 to 2 million
2 to 4 million
Conto
urs
indic
ate
num
ber
of unio
n c
ounci
ls, ea
ch c
onto
ur
repre
senting a
2 U
nio
n C
ounci
l "h
eight"
ris
e
- 40 -
: Correlation between Union Councils development spending allocation
provincial and federal election. Unfortunately the data for provincial
government spend in Faisalabad between 2005 and 2008 was not available. We can
tentative testing of hypotheses by extrapolating from the data we do have, although of course we
Of the 22 seats in Faisalabad, 12 changed hands. In an election which
Q virtually wiped out, the PML-N come to power in the Punjab and the PPP win the
Faisalabad bucked the trend (overleaf):
Less than 1 million
1 to 2 million
2 to 4 million
4 to 8 million
8 to 16 million
16 to 32 million
32 million+
2 to 4 million
4 to 8 million
8 to 16 million
16 to 32 million
32 million+
05-08 spend
ouncils development spending allocations between 2001-
provincial and federal election. Unfortunately the data for provincial
. We can conduct some
although of course we
elsewhere saw the
N come to power in the Punjab and the PPP win the
Less than 1 million
1 to 2 million
2 to 4 million
4 to 8 million
8 to 16 million
16 to 32 million
32 million+
01-0
5 sp
end
- 41 -
Figure 7: Election results for MPA seats in Faisalabad
Now
PPP
Now
PML-N
Now
PML-Q
Now
IND
Was PPP 3 5 1 1
Was PML –N 0 3 0 0
Was PML –Q 3 2 4 0
Hypothesis 11: re-election as an MPA is highly dependent upon the ability to attract funding
from the Province.
Test: analysis of variance
Result: discarded, those that were successfully returned only had on average only 1.4 million
more rupees per constituency spent on development funding – giving a p value of 0.88
Analysis: this is fascinating, particularly when contrasted with hypothesis 9. It is possible that
these results were due to development spending activities in the latter rather than the former
part of the term, and this result is an anomaly thrown up by only having part of the data and by
provincial elections being about much more than development spending64. Nevertheless this does
indicate strongly that there is no correlation.
At first glance this would appear to contradict Waseem (1994) and Wilder’s (1999)
theories as to how elections are won. However, if politicians are serving brokers rather than the
public then it is possible for a politician’s electoral future to be closely linked to the provision of
development without there being a clear link between performance and election results. It would
however suggest one of two things: Either the brokers were not able to deliver the promised
votes and that the other factors Jones (2003) and Wilder (1999) discuss were influencing voters’
choice, or that brokers are purchased in a manner which our data does not capture.
64 2008 could be called a change election, given the anti PML-Q landslide.
- 42 -
We know from hypothesis 8 that PML-Q constituencies tended to attract more
development funding than others but it does not seem that this overly influenced the result65.
2008-2009
Sadly the 2010 floods have prevented me from obtaining any detailed information from the
provincial government for 2008-2009.66 Without access to detailed data it is impossible to say
whether, as one might logically expect, the result was that development funding took on more of
the characteristics of provincial funding outlined above – and fewer of those of district funding.
Again, we cannot know if and how the province behaves differently if there is no development
by the district.
2010 – the administrators
My intention was to analyse the role of the administrators, empirically using the kind of
statistical analysis I have attempted above. As the data for the last financial year are not yet
available67 I will instead adopt a more qualitative approach to appraise the administrators using
the interviews I held in the Punjab in June 2010.
One thing everyone, even the administrators themselves, agree upon is that the
reintroduction of administrators has made local government more distant. This is literally true:
whereas previously there was a Union Councillor in virtually every village and a Union Nazim
within 2 or 3 miles of every village now one must go to the municipal offices in central
Faisalabad (a distance of some 50 miles from some parts of Faisalabad district) or find a
telephone or email, which for many rural Punjabis is an even greater challenge. It is also
metaphorically true: by the DCO’s own admission, he does not have the time or the resources
65 The seats the PML-Q kept did have on average 11 million rupees more pumped into them than the seats they lost
but given the large amounts of money going into Q seats and the small sample size this only produces a p-value of 0.59. Again we are basing this analysis on an incomplete set of data. 66 The information I do have shows that whilst the MPAs were quick to shut down the District’s development plans
this did not mean they were not generous towards Faisalabad. 6.4 billion rupees were allocated to Faisalabad in 2008-9 and this was due to rise to 8.2- billion in 2009-10 (Government of the Punjab, 2010). 67 This is understandable given both the high state of flux surrounding local government in Pakistan and the
moment and the crisis in all sectors brought about by the terrible flooding means that publishing the annual accounts may has become a lower priority. The accounts were presented to the Provincial Assembly, but I understand that they are not yet publicly available
- 43 -
and does not consider it his role to make himself available for discussion with the public – far less
to go out and talk to people on their doorsteps. Interface with the state is now a matter of
knowing people in high places: in other words of the system of brokerage (Carver, 2010).
As would be expected, opinions differ as to what the effect has been on development
funding. Some, including the DCO, (Carver, 2010) say that administrators only follow the will of
their political masters. With the Nazims gone they regard the MPAs and MNAs as their political
masters and follow their direction. They say that they tend to be keener on bigger schemes than
the Nazims - in other words, as our analysis of 2001-05 shows, MPAs prefer a few big projects in
one place to many small projects with a more even coverage. Others (Carver, 2010) point out that
District Co-ordination Committees (DCCs: committees of all the MNAs, MPAs and senators
within a district whose job it is to advise the administrators now the Nazims have gone) have yet
to be set up in many areas and in many other areas have only just been established or meet very
rarely, leaving the administrators in sole charge.
Some in the Civil Service see this as an opportunity to “be more strategic” than the
Nazims were and spend money on areas they feel the Nazims overlooked, particularly
education. This was twice described to me as “redressing the balance” (Carver, 2010). Others
within the Civil Service have suggested to me that this limbo has left the system open to easy
corruption (Anon, 2010) and that large amounts of development funding are now going to
schemes of dubious merit or “bridges to nowhere”.
The DCO and senior civil servants consider that they lack the tools to do the job properly
– they feel they require greater control over the other agencies of state, in particular the police,
and unsurprisingly they would like magistracy back to enforce their decisions. They also make
the reasonable point that replacing an assembly of 280 with one person in one stroke has resulted
in a system being inherited which is not suited for the set-up they now find themselves under
(Carver, 2010). To take the most glaring example the DCO now finds himself line-managing 63
- 44 -
different departments68. Clearly something has to give: either scrutiny becomes minimal and
strategic thinking reduces or the number of areas receiving attention falls – or both.
68 That means even if he were to do this and nothing else a department would only get about one hour’s worth of
attention every two weeks. Similarly, even if there were to be only one development project in each union council in a given year that would require the DCO to approve nearly one scheme a day – on top of running the district
- 45 -
The wider Pakistani picture
It is not the intention of this project to appraise local government across the rest of Pakistan in
any detail. This overview (of necessity rather cursory) serves to confirm that my findings from
Faisalabad do not seem atypical of the situation elsewhere in Pakistan, with the caveat that
Faisalabad is a City District.
Lahore
Whilst in Lahore I was fortunate to see a manuscript which analyses the spending of the City
District of Lahore (Anon, 2010). It suggests that the Nazim system was rife with corruption, that
once the system was suspended it was even more so, and that under the administrators it is the
worst of all. It suggests a higher level of direct involvement in decision making under devolution
by MPAs and MNAs than I observed in Faisalabad.
Sialkot
In some ways Sialkot is very similar to Faisalabad: they are both rapidly expanding, newly rich
industrial towns in the Northern Punjab. However, members of the Faisalabad business
community were keen to tell me that the comparisons end there (Carver, 2010). Local
government never really got off the ground in Sialkot: this is partly because Sialkot was not
designated as a City District when arguably it should have been. It is also partly because Sialkot,
with a predominantly export based economy,69 needed better infrastructure more quickly than
government of any sort was able to provide and so took matters into its own hands. As a result
the Sialkot Chamber of Commerce took on a lot of the role that is normally that of government –
albeit they only served the business community. They even went so far as to levy their own
business rates and remarkably build their own airport.
Karachi
Karachi attracts extreme emotions: it is regarded by many as an example of extraordinary
development in a short period of time and criticized by others as a corrupt and undemocratic
69 It is largely a sports industry based economy.
- 46 -
personal fiefdom of the MQM70. Clearly the truth lies somewhere between these two extremes.
Karachi certainly has been transformed out of all recognition over the last 10 years (City District
Government of Karachi, 2008); how much credit for this can go to the Nazim is a matter of
opinion.
Satisfaction surveys show that people are much more satisfied by local government in
Karachi than anywhere else (SPDC, 2008; PSLM, 2006).71 As a result of the support the MQM
Nazim undoubtedly enjoys in Karachi, the Karachi local government system has proven more
resilient than any other. At very least one can say there is a significant portion of Karachi’s
population, possibly a majority, who like the system and the results it has brought (Ashfaque,
2010).
Around Pakistan
Devolution never really took off in Balochistan and was never attempted in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) or northern areas. Myerson (2009) and Rashid (2008) have
argued that this is a large part of the reason behind the insurgencies in these areas, arguing for a
strong causal link between the lack of effective local representation and the rise of extremism.
This can also be seen in the Swat valley where the Taliban came to power in large part due to a
frustration with the speed at which the local institutions of state, in particular the judiciary,
operated (MA shah). Indeed the solution was found to be a re-working of the local government
arrangements.
It was my conversations in 2009 with people in the NWFP about the Nazim system
which first led me to want to pursue this line of research.72. The indirect elections led to local
elites too easily capturing the system – as all they needed to do was win the Union Council
elections – again we can see the enactment of Bardhan and Mookerjee’s theory. In a huge
70 The MQM had a vested interest in devolution as due to their largely mohajir powerbase, they held power in the
main cities of Karachi and Hyderabad but could not hope to challenge the PPP across Sindh. 71 However given the JI dominated the 2001 elections and the PPP run provincial government having increasingly
interfered from 2008 onwards one could dispute how much this is actually down to the MQM city administration 72 These conversations were not rigorous pieces of fieldwork but the complaints raised will be familiar.
- 47 -
dispersed district like Chitral it was felt each union Nazim was just looking to privilege their
own village when what was needed were infrastructural projects to tie the district closer together
– such as improving the road to Dir.
An ADB report on Rajanpur (ADB, 2008) gives some insight into how the rest of the
Punjab has fared under local government. Service delivery through devolution is very low,
particularly with regard to health and education, vertical schemes from the provinces providing
much of the progress. However the ADB sees a local development strategy which prioritizes
closing the gender gap in literacy as a solution – and does not find the system to be
fundamentally flawed.
Anan Quadir (2010) has undertaken some valuable statistical work on development
spending by Tehsils in Sindh. It paints a very mixed picture from which some of the themes we
have encountered elsewhere emerge: varying degrees of implementation, a prioritisation of
sewerage and water schemes.
- 48 -
Conclusion
Clearly there were many flaws with the Nazim system; that is well covered in the literature. In
addition my statistical analysis is not without some flaws of its own, some data are missing or
otherwise unavailable; this kind of investigation can never be an exact science. Moreover there is
more to elections than the ability to attract funds for development and so this approach to
analysing performance is not without its limitations. There is also an argument that development
is best when targeted and lumped into quantities where it can do good: even spending of
development funds, it could be argued, constitutes spreading the jam so thinly it can no longer be
tasted.
With those caveats in mind, my analysis did draw out some very strong correlations.
Whilst provincial and district politicians are recruited from the same group,73 they do appear to
behave differently insofar as their behaviour can be determined from the distribution of funds
under their control74. Provincial development projects seem to be disproportionately channelled
towards the seats of MPAs of the ruling party – yet whilst this seems to be the benchmark by
which MPAs are measured, elections seem to be poorly linked to performance as couched in
these terms. The election of Nazims does seem to have a closer link with performance.
A paper on the 2005 elections backs up this conclusion, suggesting that voters’ choices are
mostly based on their personal experiences of being helped or receiving gratification via service
provision (Akramov et al, 2007) and so devolution has increased the link between voting and
performance.75
Development funding by the district also appears to be more reliable year-on-year, an
important consideration for sustainable development, and appears to be more equitable. I was
73 It has been suggested to me that attempts to bring new faces into politics via the Nazim system were a failure
(notes). 74 My interviews suggest that whilst the bureaucracy does have a major role in defining what is possible and
controlling the flow of funds, the setting of priorities for funding was genuinely the domain of elected politicians at both provincial and district level. We will talk in a moment about the risk of bureaucratic capture. 75 Other studies suggest that depending upon the extent of elite capture devolution has made government more
accountable in some instances and less in others (Keefer et al, 2006; Mahmood, 2007). We will return to this point momentarily.
- 49 -
struck by the Union Nazim who told me that before the 2001 devolution there had been no
development in his area for 60 years: if you were overlooked in the previous system you
remained overlooked. The fact that every small area had a champion of sorts was certainly a
positive development – particularly as prior to the Nazim system there was a significant problem
with underspend (Carver, 2010). If every district in Pakistan had the FIGIS system of mapping
development spending it might be possible to identify areas of need without Nazims, but even in
Faisalabad this is a long way off. Nazims performed a valuable system of warning if an area had
been overlooked – a role which is now missing.
In contrast the same function would seem to be less appropriate when enacted by MPAs
– as Ali Cheema said, “why would we want to elect an MPA based upon their ability to pork-
barrel?” (Carver, 2010). Of course one could fairly level that same criticism of Nazims: in
developing countries there is a fine line between pork-barrel politics and the legitimate role of an
elected official in championing one’s underdeveloped area. Whilst this is a problem without an
easy solution it would seem that only one level of the system needs to concern itself with this
allocatory responsibility: the one that rewards performance electorally and provides for more
equitable service delivery.
Our data also suggests that MPAs re-election does not seem to be closely tied to provision
of development. Therefore it is possible that a further uncoupling of these roles would leave
further space for other factors such as ideology to take on a greater significance, to the
betterment of democracy.
There will always be debate about whether elected officials spend development funding
correctly: whether they are suitably strategic, whether there are too parochial and whether
“giving the public what they want” is justification enough. I feel that the “overemphasis on
visible improvements” argument is overstated: there genuinely is a pressing need for sanitation
- 50 -
and water projects across Pakistan (Carver, 2010).76 Moreover if one is in favour of democracy in
Pakistan then one must be in favour of elected representatives controlling one of the most
important aspects of government: development spending.
Perhaps the most valuable role Nazims played was in interfacing with the state –
forming a link between local people and the bureaucracy which did not necessarily require
brokers or “big men”77. This is a hard thing to quantify but a UNDP social audit report (2010),
and the testimonies of people I met (Carver, 2010), attest to its validity78.
All these positive aspects of the system should not, however, distract us from the political
reality. This is that however flawed the current crop of political parties are as vessels for the
aspirations of the people of Pakistan, democracy in Pakistan will only grow and deepen if it does
so through the existing political parties (Waseem, 2000). Moreover the political parties remain
deeply wedded to government through the provinces. Any attempt to uproot, destroy and start
again on the flawed democracy that is can only damage the democracy that will be – as
Pakistan’s repeated military interregnums have shown us. (Waseem, 2002)
Political parties can be forgiven for not wanting to play a game they could not win, and
so bringing down the Nazim system. However they could benefit from looking at the positive
attributes of devolution and developing a system of elected local government on their own terms
- for political parties are as poorly served as everyone else by the lack of engagement at the grass
roots. Insofar as there are two rival cohorts of politician in Pakistan the differences are artificial
and a product of statecraft – they could also be bridged by statecraft.
76 The issue of the undervaluing of education is problematic but it is not unique to devolution. It has been suggested
to me (Carver, 2010) that public education projects in Pakistan are unpopular because whilst everyone pays only the very few fortunate enough to live close enough to one of the very few schools benefit. I think there’s a certain merit to that argument although I feel it underestimates the level of educational coverage in Pakistan – except in very poor rural areas. If this is a case then it is a problem which will fade as coverage increases. 77 Of course in many cases it still did, this is why the issue of to what extent the Nazim system was captured by the
elite is so important. We will discuss it shortly. 78 Of course it could have gone further still, the lowest rung of the system – Union Councils – were largely forgotten
(Carver, 2010) and the planned scheme of direct involvement of the public – Citizen Community Boards - barely got off the ground (Takashi, 2006). Also as Shandana Mohmand (in Gelner and Hachhethu, 2008) said, the purpose of this scheme was a neo-liberal rolling back of the state, whereas what was needed was for the state to extend in such a way as to facilitate the citizens in their accessing of it. This combined with an imperfectly thought through mechanism for service delivery means that devolution has not closed the gap between the state and the public as much as was hoped: as Mohammed Waseem (2000) predicted.
- 51 -
The roots of Pakistani democracy are shallow, and whilst the reasons may be historical
part of the solution is surely for political parties to become more local, to interact directly with
the public, avoiding brokers and similar patronage networks: as Myerson, Khan and Cheema
(2010)79, and others (Kitschelt and Palmer, 2009) say.
Another part of the solution would be a healthier internal democracy within political
parties, something which must surely be linked to local government to create a meritocratic
professional political cadre from which future politicians can emerge. Moreover, even in 1996
before the Nazim system, it was realised by some that councils are where real power will always
lie (Jamil, 1996; Carver, 2010). Local government is also very popular with the Pakistani public as
is shown in SPDC satisfaction surveys. Opinion polls suggest 64% want directly elected system of
Local Government whilst 79% oppose a return to the 1979 system (FAFEN, 2009).
A further discussion
Let us now think about this in terms of the relationships between the level to which
power is devolved and captured by the elite. In Pakistan I feel capture by the bureaucracy can be
conceived in similar terms as capture by the elite as to a certain extent both are dependent upon
how robust the political alternative is. Understanding this issue is clearly vital as the argument I
make above is negated if the effect of devolution is to hand development priority setting over to
the elite. Mohammed Waseem (2006) argues that the Nazim system was largely captured by
elites and I find his statistic that 20% of the winners of Union Nazim seats were rich whilst only
1% of the losers were particularly compelling. Khan et al (2007) paints a more mixed picture but
with similarly pessimistic conclusions about many areas.
I shall simplify Bardhan and Mookerjee’s (2001) work as follows: various factors linked
to the size of the administration mean that the smaller the area, the greater the power of elite
79 “The structure of political parties has been affected by their disjunction from democratic local government.
Political parties in Pakistan are highly centralized, and their national and provincial leadership retains considerable control with regard to the nominations of legislative candidates and strategic decision making. Their organizational structure does not reach broadly down to the local grass-roots level.”
groups and the smaller the area the lesser the power of the mass group. Let us now consider
three general acts of devolution: A to a, B to b and C to c
Figure 8: Three generalised devolutions
As we can see in all cases devolution
and increased the power of elites (line Y), making the capture of the system by the elites more
likely. In other words in my simplification X=nS and Y=
factors outlined in Bardhan and Mookerjee’s work
However Bardhan and Mookerjee also say that the lower the level to which power is
devolved, the more responsive and equitable service delivery is
earlier. But Bardhan and Mookerjee
the power of the mass group is based upon
model). Waseem’s (2006) analysis of Bardhan and Mookerjees work (his formula 1) suggests that
expected service delivery is one of the main factors in determining the outcome of elections
80 These may be thought of as acts of devolution in different countries where the values f
and mass power are different or they may be considered three potential devolutions to different sizes of administration within one country – they are entirely general.
- 52 -
groups and the smaller the area the lesser the power of the mass group. Let us now consider
three general acts of devolution: A to a, B to b and C to c80:
generalised devolutions.
in all cases devolution (the red lines) has reduced the power of the masses (line X)
and increased the power of elites (line Y), making the capture of the system by the elites more
. In other words in my simplification X=nS and Y=-mS where n and m ar
factors outlined in Bardhan and Mookerjee’s work.
However Bardhan and Mookerjee also say that the lower the level to which power is
devolved, the more responsive and equitable service delivery is – hence the trade off alluded to
Bardhan and Mookerjee (2001) also contend that under a system of local democracy
the power of the mass group is based upon their ability to win elections (formula 8 in their
analysis of Bardhan and Mookerjees work (his formula 1) suggests that
expected service delivery is one of the main factors in determining the outcome of elections
These may be thought of as acts of devolution in different countries where the values for the levels of elite power
and mass power are different or they may be considered three potential devolutions to different sizes of they are entirely general.
groups and the smaller the area the lesser the power of the mass group. Let us now consider
has reduced the power of the masses (line X)
and increased the power of elites (line Y), making the capture of the system by the elites more
mS where n and m are functions of the
However Bardhan and Mookerjee also say that the lower the level to which power is
hence the trade off alluded to
that under a system of local democracy
their ability to win elections (formula 8 in their
analysis of Bardhan and Mookerjees work (his formula 1) suggests that
expected service delivery is one of the main factors in determining the outcome of elections. We
or the levels of elite power and mass power are different or they may be considered three potential devolutions to different sizes of
- 53 -
also know that the lower the level to which power is devolved the more responsive and equitable
service delivery is for the mass group.
This is not a contradiction, it just means that whilst X=nS (the smaller the
administration, the lesser the power of the mass) one of the factors that makes up the function
“n” is how much devolution there is81. Of course this is a simplification as n is made up of many
other factors too.
So let us revisit our generalised three devolutions after some considerable time has
passed. I would argue that in case a (the most devolved) the fact that service delivery is more
equitable and responsive has increased the masses ability to win elections and so there is a new n
- let’s call it n(1) – in the formula X=nS and this new n(1) is a much stronger function. There are
also new ns – call them n()2 and n(3) for cases b and c.
Figure 9: Generalised devolutions some time later
81 This is equivalent to Geddes’ (1994) “insulation.”
- 54 -
Thus I would suggest that as well as the short term effects of devolution (red) described by
Bardhan and Mookerjee, their model also implicitly suggests a long-term effect (green). The
overall effect (orange) is not always necessarily positive. Whether or not it is positive or negative
depends upon the other factors: these are generalised cases, these lines could be at any height and
could have any gradient, depending upon the specifics of the case and a host of other factors.
However my argument is that, contrary to popular interpretation, in Badhan and Mookerjee’s
own work is implicit the suggestion that the effect is not necessarily negative.
If devolution does not necessarily lead to elite capture it still might specifically. That is a
difficult judgement call upon which Mohammed Waseem and others have written far more
knowledgably than I. Clearly there are many aspects of the Nazim system which could be altered
to reduce the risk of elite capture (Khan et al, 2007).
Conclusion
There is a feeling that local politicians and provincial politicians are very different. They are not,
but their respective systems have caused them to act very differently. Supporters of democracy in
Pakistan have been right to consider local government as a threat in the past because it always
has been. However, in the main these problems have been due to specific problems in the system
– they are not necessarily insurmountable.82Indeed not only is devolution not necessarily
antidemocratic but it may form a significant part of bridging the historical gap between
Pakistanis and their politicians.
Whilst we must be aware of the limitations of my study, my evidence points towards
development spending being determined by lowest tier having several positive characteristics
when compared with development spending being determined by the province83. This is true
even in the least promising of circumstances. Whilst we must be aware both of the underlying
82 The only way one could suggest that they were would be if we were to consider capture by the bureaucracy as a
specific form of elite capture and if we were to use the logic of Bardhan and Mookerjee to say that devolution increases the risk of elite capture. Even then we have shown the situation is not this straightforward. 83 This presumes of course that union councillors are the most significant voice in determining spend by the districts
and that provincial politicians are the most significant voice in determining spend by the provinces. There is no consensus about either of these points (Carver, 2010) but that is the best judgment we can make.
- 55 -
political reality and the risk of elite capture, this argues strongly in favour of attempting to
devolve decisions regarding development to a sub-provincial democratic tier.
- 56 -
Bibliography
Interviews
Many of the people I spoke to were happy to be quoted but some spoke to me in confidence.
Others were happy to talk to me but might feel embarrassed to find they have been cited. To
avoid causing problems I have referenced all interviews as “Carver, 2010” and only given the
name of the individual when it adds significantly to the value of what is said.
Full list of those interviewed (in chronological order):
Asif M Shah - Public finance specialist, Local Government, Asian Development bank
Ali Azhar – Governance advisor, DfID
Dr M Yasim - Thesil Nazim, Saddar Town, 2001-2005
Syed Sadar Bukhari - Vice President, District Bar Association
Anonymous police officer
Dr Hamir Raza – journalist and publisher of the Daily Gulf
Malik Mohammed Aslan - President, Faisalabad Press Club
Mr Siddiqui - resident editor Daily Mussavat
Sheikh Quaram – President of Faisalabad Centre of Commerce
Zaman Khan – Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
Chaudhry Talib Hosseini - former basic democrat, MPA, MNA and minister
Saema Syed – Assistant Financial Secretary, Social Services, Government of the Punjab
Mohammed Mahmood Rai and his deputy – Assistant Financial Secretary, local government,
Government of the Punjab
Faisal Rashid – Assistant Secretary, Finances, Government of the Punjab
Sheryar Sultan – Assistant Secretary, Local Government, Government of the Punjab
Ail Cheema – LUMS
Mohammed Arshad – Assistant Financial Secretary, budget director, Government of the Punjab
Iftekhar – Sustainable development for Pakistan (NGO)
- 57 -
Abdul Sattar and his son – Union Nazim UC 160
Farzana Choudhry – Union Nazim UC 207
Miah Taharayyub – Union Nazim UC 206
Saeed Wahla – DCO Faisalabad
Zia Ul Haq – Deputy Commissioner (local Government), City District Government of
Faisalabad
Dr Tariq Sattar – Director development finance for Faisalabad, Jhang, Chiniot and Toba Tek
Singh. Former director SPU
Abdul Mohamadin – Assistant election commissioner, Election Commission of Pakistan
Mohammed Waseem – LUMS
Mr Rehman – Chair, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
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Appendix 1: data for development spending in Faisalabad 01-05
UC Re-elected
Thesil MPA seat
2001-2 2002-3 2003-4 2004-5
District Province District Province District Province District Province
1 Chak Jumirah
PP51 0 0 490,387
1,110,054 1,490,217 575,247 747,845 3,427,000
2 Chak Jumirah
PP52 0 0 0 0 1,278,000 0 196,000 0
3 Chak Jumirah
PP52 0 0 3,248,000 0 865,000 185,800 2,779,000 5,273,000
4 Chak Jumirah
PP52 0 0 115,000 0 4,269,285 1,500,000 400,000 0
5 Chak Jumirah
PP52 0 0 3,445,000 0 1,016,300 0 1,609,100 0
6 Chak Jumirah
PP52 0 0 0 0 120,000 0 956,382 720,000
7 Chak Jumirah
PP51 100,000 0 250,971 0 458,546 0 2,488,000 3,624,000
8 Chak Jumirah
PP51 4,135,000 0 1,108,000 0 1,931,000 0 4,337,000 0
9 Chak Jumirah
PP51 0 0 1,481,000 0 2,135,656 357,000 1,902,000 0
10 Chak Jumirah
PP51 13,085 0 889,807 0 1,592,349 0 1,871,800 0
11 Chak Jumirah
PP51 7,600,000 0 300,000 0 5,516,581 0 2,041,000 3,497,000
12 Chak Jumirah
PP51 1,306,000 0 2,613,500 0 1,947,000 0 3,525,000 0
13 Chak Jumirah
PP51 283,877 0 1,181,435 0 680,961 0 417,104 0
14 Chak Jumirah
PP51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 Chak Jumirah
PP51 7,900,000 0 7,160,000 0 7,770,000 3,400,000 6,225,000 1,240,000
16 Jaranwalah Town
PP52 1,692,000
2,400,000 3,721,979
3,200,000 5,001,449 4,400,000 239,169 0
17 Jaranwalah Town
PP52 800,000 0 2,674,728 0 4,804,973 500,000 1,850,316 500,000
18 Jaranwalah Town
PP52 2,053,832 0
16,935,500 200,000 2,641,000 0 990,000 500,000
19 n Jaranwalah Town
PP52 500,000 0 641,493 0 1,813,770 0 542,300 0
20 Jaranwalah Town
PP55 0 0 215,861 0 529,710 0 488,818 200,000
21 Jaranwalah Town
PP55 2,262,590 0 760,417 0 431,935 0 1,305,766 0
22 Jaranwalah Town
PP55 2,500,000 0 2,100,000 800,000 2,230,000 0 450,000
29,720,000
23 y Jaranwalah Town
PP55 0 0 7,300,000 0 1,284,600 300,000 1,900,000 0
24 Jaranwalah Town
PP55 2,071,000 0 2,515,629
1,600,000 2,068,499
26,250,000 2,042,950 8,278,000
25 Jaranwalah Town
PP55 2,613,789 0 5,306,179 0 3,572,088 0 378,912 0
26 Jaranwalah Town
PP52 0 0 1,786,457 0 2,469,294 1,800,000 597,191 500,000
27 Jaranwalah Town
PP52 0 0 5,305,593 500,000 6,914,803 4,050,000 271,014 0
28 Jaranwalah Town
PP52 0 0 803,083 0 2,078,573 500,000 772,000 200,000
29 Jaranwalah Town
PP55 142,900 0 1,108,906 0 1,108,906 0 688,600 200,000
30 Jaranwalah Town
PP53 8,298,195 0 827,115 450,000 1,861,474 0 4,547,000 378,000
31 y Jaranwalah Town
PP54 902,551 0 830,664 200,000 1,659,413 900,000 754,468 800,000
32 Jaranwalah Town
PP55 800,000 0 1,688,700 0 2,097,000 1,500,000 2,375,681 5,700,000
33 Jaranwalah Town
PP55 400,000 0 4,574,000 400,000
31,042,838 1,250,000 3,608,545 400,000
34 Jaranwalah Town
PP55 970,200 0 2,946,200 800,000 5,900,000
13,974,023 381,838 0
- 66 -
35 Jaranwalah Town
PP55 5,110,468 0 950,847 0 2,066,600 1,940,000 3,488,818 950,000
36 Jaranwalah Town
PP56 640,000 0 1,131,100 0 877,350 4,800,000 620,000 1,000,000
37 Jaranwalah Town
PP55 1,591,893 0 2,400,220 0 2,310,154 0 3,150,000 1,250,000
38 Jaranwalah Town
PP54 168,134 0 1,896,812 0 3,132,971 0 1,546,770 2,900,000
39 Jaranwalah Town
PP54 1,729,571 0 2,579,326 0 2,351,650 0 297,501 0
40 Jaranwalah Town
PP54 5,000,000 0 604,300 0 1,500,000 0 1,500,000 0
41 Jaranwalah Town
PP54 1,353,721 0 1,755,470 0 1,248,534 0 710,726 0
42 Jaranwalah Town
PP54 330,367 0 434,332 0 419,168 0 0 0
43 Jaranwalah Town
PP54 298,715 0 273,318 0 51,689 0 124,446 0
44 Jaranwalah Town
PP53 206,640 0 2,283,972 0 2,509,578 9,800,000 2,558,433 0
45 Jaranwalah Town
PP53 500,000 0 529,450 0 8,349,100 1,800,000 2,506,378 0
46 n Jaranwalah Town
PP53 577,026 0 279,760 0 70,820 0 835,016 0
47 Jaranwalah Town
PP53 229,228 0 561,631 0 429,650 0 377,265 0
48 Jaranwalah Town
PP53 159,000 0 939,900 0 1,242,200 0 351,836 0
49 Jaranwalah Town
PP53 38,000 0 1,608,286 300,000 2,582,265 1,800,000 1,682,513 500,000
50 n Jaranwalah Town
PP53 310,460 0 339,550 0 38,991 280,000 0 1,000,000
51 Jaranwalah Town
PP53 111,783 0 1,560,000 0 1,423,759 0 354,640 200,000
52 Jaranwalah Town
PP54 76,457 0 660,817 0 256,664 0 195,306 0
53 Jaranwalah Town
PP54 262,468 0 314,979 0 20,000 0 361,401 0
54 Jaranwalah Town
PP54 547,000 0 500,000 0 510,000 0 0 0
55 Jaranwalah Town
PP56 2,112,088 0 2,354,186 0 3,662,566 0 1,544,908 0
56 Jaranwalah Town
PP56 311,032 0 471,201 0 424,747 0 228,206 0
57 Jaranwalah Town
PP54 1,056,314 0 1,595,661 0 1,019,052 0 2,410,372 0
58 Jaranwalah Town
PP56 169,000 0 175,000 0 175,000 0 175,000 0
59 Jaranwalah Town
PP56 384,500 0 234,349 0 654,949 0 463,010 0
60 Jaranwalah Town
PP56 115,961 0 500,485 0 268,390 0 257,400 0
61 Jaranwalah Town
PP56 382,400 0 135,235 0 194,125 0 50,470 0
62 Jaranwalah Town
PP56 788,300 0 1,564,050 0 2,603,025 0 990,500 0
63 Jaranwalah Town
PP56 0 0 3,185,198 300,000 2,066,069 0 537,165 0
64 Jaranwalah Town
PP56 207,883 0 556,214 0 237,500 0 452,072 0
65 y Jaranwalah Town
PP56 510,076 0 500,000 0 445,296 0 376,500 0
66 Jaranwalah Town
PP56 0 0 1,935,032 0 2,734,657 900,000 5,449,352 0
67 Jaranwalah Town
PP56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
68 Jaranwalah Town
PP56 1,750,000 0 5,917,264 0 2,288,000 2,900,000 4,100,000 0
69 Jaranwalah Town
PP56 50,000 0 1,348,890 300,000 3,214,380 440,000 5,188,693 450,000
70 Jaranwalah Town
PP56 1,411,900 0 1,891,500 0 3,129,980 0 1,506,990 0
71 Jaranwalah Town
PP56 831,460 0 1,567,391 0 500,000 350,000 2,341,041 0
72 Jaranwalah PP56 1,440,000 0 1,997,458 0 1,578,695 0 2,542,820 0
- 67 -
Town
73 Tandlianwala
PP57 0 0 981,800 0 1,816,000 1,800,000 1,937,000 2,000,000
74 Tandlianwala
PP57 1,138,000 0 1,897,247 100,000 2,585,600 380,000 1,695,400 1,000,000
75 Tandlianwala
PP57 237,500 0 1,178,600 0 1,641,800 300,000 177,000 0
76 Tandlianwala
PP57 258,000 0 1,132,624 350,000 2,138,894 0 5,868,000 0
77 Tandlianwala
PP57 516,473 0 1,435,462 100,000 454,772 400,000 1,782,700 0
78 Tandlianwala
PP57 790,000 0 1,070,000 0 1,240,000 150,000 2,810,000 0
79 n Tandlianwala
PP57 340,000 0 490,000 0 540,000 0 0 0
80 Tandlianwala
PP57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
81 Tandlianwala
PP57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
82 Tandlianwala
PP57 4,265,200 0 1,835,400 0 3,864,800 300,000 335,300 0
83 Tandlianwala
PP57 1,143,648 0 1,703,000 0 2,650,800 0 6,329,000 0
84 Tandlianwala
PP57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
85 Tandlianwala
PP57 246,000 0 1,518,600 0 2,237,600 200,000 3,213,000 0
86 Tandlianwala
PP57 188,100 0 288,000 0 380,625 0 163,310 0
87 Tandlianwala
PP57 583,000 0 460,000 0 350,000 0 155,000 0
88 Tandlianwala
PP57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
89 Tandlianwala
PP57 66,250 0 54,667 0 2,588,060 1,500,000 99,000 0
90 Tandlianwala
PP58 2,012,000 0 2,724,700 0 7,210,000 5,650,000 1,426,000 0
91 Tandlianwala
PP58 940,000 0 1,077,000 0 3,460,000 2,600,000 177,000 0
92 Tandlianwala
PP58 147,773 0 1,484,004 0 2,117,350 0 862,744 0
93 Tandlianwala
PP58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
94 Tandlianwala
PP58 810,000 0 1,288,870 0 631,300 1,600,000 734,940 0
95 Tandlianwala
PP58 926,170 0 1,490,000 0 235,440 220,000 397,000 0
96 Tandlianwala
PP58 1,260,000 0 6,017,063 0 365,000 1,300,000 941,693 0
97 Tandlianwala
PP58 788,826 0 310,872 0 1,584,891 0 401,528 0
98 Tandlianwala
PP58 1,199,049 0 2,439,000
2,500,000 1,409,000 2,400,000 1,389,500 880,000
99 Tandlianwala
PP58 1,347,060 0 1,347,060 0 1,319,620 1,950,000 808,550 0
100 Tandlianwala
PP58 675,230 0 1,133,921 0 1,512,235 0 2,607,000 1,000,000
101 Samundari PP59 1,101,470 0 1,347,688 421,000 2,158,294 500,000 1,453,901 2,000,000
102 Samundari PP59 289,676 500,000 612,952 650,000 559,275 0 1,779,006 0
103 Samundari PP59 0 0 468,155 0 190,000 0 3,300,000 200,000
104 Samundari PP59 1,321,800 0 1,330,000 0 3,065,115 0 1,032,000 635,000
105 Samundari PP59 17,000 0 687,510 0 1,421,050 500,000 2,191,000 0
106 Samundari PP59 0 0 1,207,568 0 1,858,150 0 1,831,000 1,000,000
107 Samundari PP59 0 0 1,145,567 0 2,340,350 0 818,105 0
108 Samundari PP59 800,000 0 1,656,430 0 1,349,040 600,000 3,307,100 100,000
109 Samundari PP59 915,577 0 664,813 200,000 1,872,410 0 757,430 0
110 Samundari PP59 341,400 0 1,316,885 0 8,609,869 3,000,000 5,640,637 0
- 68 -
111 Samundari PP59 73,880 0 1,336,545 200,000 2,809,645 1,283,000 2,408,335 0
112 Samundari PP59 346,980 0 628,498 0 1,272,195 200,000 911,165 400,000
113 Samundari PP59 329,439 0 2,424,391 0 1,583,995 3,200,000 815,100 250,000
114 Samundari PP60 1,336,556 0 4,706,026 0 2,343,323 2,700,000 7,219,700
10,700,000
115 Samundari PP60 535,000 0 1,823,600 0 947,745 200,000 0 0
116 Samundari PP60 80,000 0 2,160,786 0 4,767,490 2,400,000 3,248,000 0
117 Samundari PP60 102,500 0 1,367,833 400,000 1,829,500 0 3,400,500 500,000
118 Samundari PP60 992,426 0 337,282 200,000 1,054,168 0
15,033,900 0
119 Samundari PP60 74,000 0 129,946 0 403,420 0 495,169 0
120 Samundari PP60 381,000 0 308,392 0 457,490 0 142,568 0
121 Samundari PP60 47,320 0 1,260,978 0 191,754 0 0 0
122 Samundari PP60 17,280 0 476,370 200,000 2,689,227 100,000 2,681,800 0
123 Samundari PP59 97,993 0 1,796,374 0 2,749,359 1,300,000 459,000 0
124 Samundari PP60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
125 Samundari PP60 110,476 0 218,810 0 108,200 0 55,309 0
126 Samundari PP60 337,500 0 1,419,500 0 4,840,000 0 888,200 4,470,000
127 Samundari PP60 74,450 0 2,550,000 0 173,100 2,100,000 938,493 0
128 Samundari PP60 0 0 352,009 0 111,335 0 611,971 0
129 Madina PP62 98,600 0 737,074 0 564,650 0 273,000 2,290,000
130 n Iqbal PP61 177,500 0 1,302,000 0 975,000 298,000 1,095,000 200,000
131 n Iqbal PP61 15,990 0 731,974 0 7,680,100 0 3,739,613 0
132 n Iqbal PP61 186,856 0 899,455 0 1,366,794 600,000 2,496,401 200,000
133 Iqbal PP61 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
134 n Iqbal PP61 186,565 0 495,487 0 1,146,420 700,000 985,213 0
135 y Iqbal PP61 1,248,662 350,000 2,812,000 250,000 6,900,000 3,850,000 5,043,900 0
136 n Iqbal PP61 0 0 840,202 0 1,397,686 0 300,980 0
137 n Iqbal PP61 190,000 0 1,790,700 300,000 1,739,000 0 8,162,000 0
138 n Iqbal PP61 1,233,600 0 2,555,470 0 3,484,000 0 299,540 0
139 n Iqbal PP61 29,525 0 1,459,500 0 1,754,400 0 600,000 0
140 n Madina PP61 500,000 0 482,144 0 1,595,000 0 87,000 0
141 Madina PP61 0 0 2,309,634 490,000 0 0 0 0
142 n Madina PP62 0 0 541,830 0 1,474,002 0 683,551 0
143 Madina PP62 0 0 1,300,000 200,000 1,900,000 0 528,000 0
144 Madina PP62 120,076 0 2,657,950 0 1,993,985 110,000 627,000 70,000
145 Madina PP62 1,000,000 0 1,569,742 0 2,628,127 0 788,295 0
146 Madina PP62 0 0 884,789 0 1,723,730 0 4,249,000 300,000
147 n Iqbal PP62 800,000 0 3,223,000 0 2,050,000 0 300,000 0
148 n Iqbal PP62 20,000 0 1,410,000 200,000 1,140,000 700,000 2,095,000 0
149 y Iqbal PP62 987,620 0 7,312,467 0 1,159,318 0 6,577,741 0
150 n Iqbal PP61 1,575,000 0 998,441 0 966,623 0 1,942,686 0
151 y Iqbal PP61 33,862 0 502,880 0 2,795,501 0 1,880,000 0
152 Jinnah PP63 115,800 0 1,796,593 0 2,823,436 170,000 2,759,130 1,940,000
153
154 Jinnah PP63 0 0 1,600,000 0 2,630,000 0 3,692,000 0
- 69 -
155 Jinnah PP63 70,230 0 1,735,526 0 3,190,927 0 378,750 0
156 y Jinnah PP63 1,028,722 0 1,039,389 0
10,700,000 0
35,000,000 0
157 Jinnah PP63 45,100 0 1,244,480 0 1,805,994 0 1,893,341 0
158 Jinnah PP63 2,200,000 0 518,359 0 728,068 400,000 1,110,475 0
159 Jinnah PP63 0 0 3,250,000 0 5,066,000 500,000 2,850,000 0
160 Jinnah PP63 700,000 0 3,192,110 0 4,471,960 0 347,675 0
161 Lyallapur PP64 0 0 1,384,000 0 921,000 0 2,323,500 0
162 Lyallapur PP64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
163 Lyallapur PP64 209,850
1,050,000 830,679 0 484,190 1,050,000 1,987,858 0
164 Lyallapur PP64 112,000 0 3,365,200 0 1,679,358 0 1,899,000 0
165 Lyallapur PP64 1,463,952 0 377,400 0 2,259,534 0 1,900,000 0
166 y Lyallapur PP64 671,000 0 2,703,000 0 1,698,000 0 0 0
167 Lyallapur PP64 700,000 0 1,644,894 0 2,543,364 0 94,794 0
168 Lyallapur PP64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
169 Lyallapur PP64 800,000 0 1,308,300 0 620,000 0 2,582,862 0
170 Lyallapur PP64 31,400 0 1,200,000 0
10,920,000 0 128,300 0
171 Lyallapur PP64 0 0 850,000 0 100,000 0 707,893 0
172 Lyallapur PP64 733,000 0 1,934,600 0 1,765,600 0 3,144,000 0
173 Lyallapur PP51 1,217,000 65,000 1,162,648 0 3,515,484 500,000 900,000
20,200,000
174 Lyallapur PP64 0 0 11,990 0 800,000 0 2,428,822 0
175 Lyallapur PP51 24,244 0 595,027 0 393,710 1,400 239,700 0
176 Lyallapur PP51 1,022,420 0 3,875,000 0 800,000 0 585,760 0
177 Madina PP51 0 0 3,298,000 0 1,414,405 0 658,792 0
178 Madina PP51 700,000 0 850,000 0 1,241,093 0 743,200 0
179 Lyallapur PP51 200,000 0 300,000 0 4,700,000 0 300,000 0
180 Jinnah PP51 0 0 1,156,000 0 3,250,000 250,000 2,800,000 2,600,000
181
182 Iqbal PP70 0 0 57,642 0 895,500 0 340,506 0
183 Lyallpur PP65 0 0 936,807 0 1,333,604 0 2,175,923 0
184 Lyallpur pp72 0 0 380,534 0 321,757 0 353,900 0
185 Lyallpur PP65 166,149 0 2,151,016 0 4,067,288 550,000 4,843,919 0
186
187 Jinnah PP71 19,400 0 598,400 0 346,700 0 256,470 0
188 Lyallpur PP65 0 0
10,582,485 0 794,916 0 1,300,000 0
189 Lyallpur pp72 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
190 Lyallpur pp72 100,000 0 800,000 0 700,000 0 100,000 0
191 Lyallpur PP65 600,000 0 1,900,000 0 1,400,000 0 1,096,141 0
192 Lyallpur PP65 0 0 122,025 0 231,972 0 696,466 0
193 Lyallpur PP65 0 0 8,768,000 0
11,569,395 0 3,350,780 0
194 Lyallpur pp66 900 0 459,006 0 149,688 0 178,366 0
195 Lyallpur pp66 50,540 0 424,966 0 276,895 0 426,025 0
196 Lyallpur PP65 0 0 0 0 298,208 0 214,427 0
197 Madina pp65 0 0 68,954 0 395,893 0 373,632 0
- 70 -
198 Madina pp65 1,850,000 920,000 1,469,158 0 1,500,000 700,000 1,435,000 100,000
199 Madina pp65 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,501,960 0
200 Madina pp65 0 0 56,200 0 3,624,631 0 686,900 0
201 Madina pp67 0 0 0 0 1,181,000 0 296,000 0
202 Madina pp67 0 0 147,233 0 608,144 0 506,726 0
203 Madina pp67 1,300,000 0
61,870,000 0
20,131,500 0 423,500 0
204 Madina pp67 1,200,000 0 1,800,000 0 1,400,000 0 900,000 0
205 Madina pp66 1,569,000 0
43,813,900 0 1,725,582 0
12,504,586 0
206 Madina pp66 0 0 273,626 0 400,646 0 589,400 0
207 Madina pp66 0 0 543,949 0 277,707 0 250,918 0
208 Lyallpur pp66 99,774 0 310,750 0 464,156 0 351,062 0
209 Lyallpur pp72 0 0 4,455,000 0 5,700,000 0 5,600,000 0
210 Lyallpur pp72 149,561 0 157,671 0 560,000 0 356,750 0
211 Lyallpur pp66 1,700,000 0 1,918,963 0 1,353,542 0 2,447,772 0
212 Lyallpur pp66 141,204 0 592,789
2,100,000
70,962,853 0 1,755,129 0
213 Madina pp66 1,800,000 0 1,680,300 0 4,604,304 0 2,200,888 0
214 Madina pp66 0 0 440,522 0 658,620 0 464,100 0
215 Madina pp66 0 0 402,905 0 499,382 0 252,450 0
216 Madina pp67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
217 Madina pp67 760,000 0 692,763 0 28,148 0 347,086 0
218 Madina pp68 0 0 0 0 550,826 0 708,021 0
219 Madina pp68 0 0 0 0 544,183 0 39,154 0
220 Madina pp68 0 0 311,693 0 605,258 0 248,470 0
221 Madina pp68 52,700 0 67,215 0 566,000 0 228,687 0
222 Madina pp68 0 0 0 0 300,054 0 244,393 0
223 Madina pp68 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
224 Madina pp68 0 0 3,800,000 0
11,900,000 0 4,200,000 0
225 Madina pp68 3,459,726 0 6,372,507 0 1,061,285 0 6,517,886 300,000
226 Madina pp68 0 0 405,916 0 59,940 0 447,263 0
227 Madina pp68 2,600,000 0 170,000 0 75,000 0 0 0
228 Madina pp68 180,000
7,000,000 1,100,000 0 700,000 1,200,000 0 2,100,000
229 Madina pp68 500,000 700,000 500,000 700,000 500,000 700,000 500,000 700,000
230 Madina pp68 0 0 0 0 548,765 0 496,320 0
231 Lyallpur pp66 0 0 433,500 0
45,372,700 3,200,000 203,200 0
232 Lyallpur pp66 0 0 69,927 0 476,188 0 331,077 0
233 Lyallpur pp66 0 0 0 0 867,361 0 627,382 0
234 Iqbal PP68 0 0 229,881 0 544,717 0 279,747 0
235 Iqbal PP68 0 0 0 0 427,700 0 1,008,531 0
236 Iqbal PP68 1,321,433 0 4,343,257 0 533,932 0 674,479 0
237 Iqbal PP68 10,768,542 0 3,189,819 0 3,600,191 0 970,239 0
238 Madina pp68 0 0 376,382 0 556,617 0 405,769 0
239 Iqbal PP68 0 0 0 0 440,000 0 0 0
240 Iqbal PP68 133,400 0 382,477 0 250,366 0 383,258 0
- 71 -
241 Iqbal PP68 0 0 0 0 469,406 0 640,836 0
242 Iqbal PP68 0 0 296,273 0 347,619 0 248,611 0
243 Iqbal PP68 0 0 29,540 0 388,992 0 243,255 0
244 Iqbal PP68 0 0 0 0 394,490 0 722,814 0
245 Iqbal PP68 1,579,969 0 6,275,942 20,000 3,096,289 0 0 0
246 Iqbal PP68 0 0 0 0 859,820 0 859,820 0
247 Iqbal PP68 1,039,350 0 2,670,000 500,000 289,541 0 3,776,000 0
248 Iqbal PP69 211,339
2,800,000 2,768,877 0 2,821,974 7,500,000 149,267 0
249 Madina pp68 320,000 0 4,343,600 0 880,000 0 3,011,900 0
250 Iqbal PP69 60,000,000 0 6,000,000
1,400,000 7,700,000 0 2,200,000 300,000
251 Iqbal PP69 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
252 Iqbal PP69 0 0 1,704,872 0 5,584,000 0 3,779,000 0
253 Iqbal PP69 0 0 440,840 0 463,213 0 245,432 0
254 Iqbal PP69 3,816,000 0 8,361,600 0
10,542,035 0 538,538 0
255 Iqbal PP69 721,588 0 1,016,199 0 1,091,562 0 347,169 0
256 Iqbal PP69 0 0 183,784 0 673,653 0 582,973 0
257 Iqbal PP69 12,915 0 0 0 286,703 0 745,747 0
258 Iqbal PP69 1,950,000 0 900,000 0 4,999,549 0 2,262,185 0
259 Iqbal PP70 0 0 0
1,300,000 586,535 0 295,440 1,200,000
260 Iqbal PP70 0 0 0 0 95,440 0 756,084 0
261 Iqbal PP70 0 0 49,500 0 4,500 0 0 0
262 Iqbal PP70 0 0 0 0 442,685 0 886,164 0
263
264 Jinnah PP70 500,000 0 700,000 0 0 0 2,180,000 0
265 Jinnah PP70 0 0 80,964 0 0 0 0 0
266 Jinnah PP70 0 0 389,000 0 616,000 0 1,991,700 0
267 Jinnah PP70 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
268 Jinnah PP70 0 0 397,966 0 241,555 0 315,375 0
269 Jinnah PP70 930,000 0 150,335 0 4,399,596 0 376,804 0
270 Jinnah PP70 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
271 Jinnah PP70 0 0 129,046 0 584,745 0 750,400 0
272 Jinnah PP70 7,850,000 0 900,000 0 7,050,000 5,200,000 3,334,007 0
273 Jinnah PP71 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
274 Jinnah PP71 134,958 0 279,456 0 412,170 0 389,500 0
275 Jinnah PP71 0 0 1,121,175 0 35,088 0 1,107,002 0
276 Jinnah PP71 0 0 1,538,350 0 602,735 0 218,693 0
277 Jinnah PP71 0 0 345,272 0 288,857 0 402,345 0
278 Jinnah PP71 846,672 0 2,372,281 0 3,943,210 0 2,248,524 0
279 Jinnah PP71 0 0 170,674 0 853,628 0 287,950 0
280 Jinnah PP71 187,940 0 241,896 0 238,150 0 256,018 0
281 Jinnah PP71 0 0 241,474 0 649,197 0 514,401 0
282 Jinnah PP71 3,467,031 0 1,675,144 0 861,200 0 278,000 0
283 Jinnah PP71 8,799,270 0 132,658 0 118,912 0 1,439,809 0
284 Jinnah PP72 50,000 0 2,842,692 0 3,206,901 0 2,109,787 2,300,000
- 72 -
285 Jinnah PP72 3,309,000 0 233,422 0 4,103,787 0 2,910,523 0
286 Jinnah PP72 78,100 0 608,600 0 267,300 0 479,800 0
287 Jinnah PP72 79,140 0 49,994 0 58,650 0 338,385 0
288 Jinnah PP72 0 0 405,000 0 495,000 0 262,500 0
289 Jinnah PP72 0 0 247,394 0 670,786 0 231,298 0
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