Dissecting a Mexican Cartel Bombing in Monterrey

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Created Oct 27 2011 - 03:51

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By Scott Stewart

Early Oct. 20, a small sedan apparently filled with cartel gunmen rapidly pulled in front of amilitary vehicle, drawing the military patrol into a car chase in downtown Monterrey, Mexico. Aftera brief pursuit, the vehicle carrying the cartel gunmen turned at an intersection. As the militaryvehicle slowed to negotiate the turn, an improvised explosive device (IED) concealed in a parkedcar at the intersection detonated. The incident appears to have been intended to lure the militarypatrol into a designated attack zone. While the ambush did not kill any soldiers, it did cause themto break off their chase.

Though this IED ambush is interesting in itself for a number of reasons, we would like to use it asa lens to explore a deeper topic, namely, how STRATFOR analyzes a tactical incident like this.

cting a Mexican Cartel Bombing in Monterrey http://www.stratfor.com/prin

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Why We Look at an Incident

Hundreds of violent incidents take place every day worldwide, from fuel depot explosions in Sirte,Libya, to shootings in southern Thailand to grenade attacks in Nairobi, Kenya just a few of thethings that happened on a single day this week. Indeed, a typical day sees dozens of incidents inMexico alone, from shootings and beheadings to kidnappings and cargo theft. Unless one has amethod to triage such incidents, they quickly can overwhelm an analyst, dragging him or her

down into the weeds struggling to understand the tactical details of every one. This can result ininformation overload. The details of so many incidents simply overwhelm the analysts ability tounderstand them and place them in a context that allows them to be compared to, and perhapslinked with, other incidents.

STRATFORs methodology for placing items in context begins with our interrelated array of netassessments and forecasts. Net assessments are high-level overviews of the significant issuesdriving the current behavior of nations, regions and other significant international actors.Forecasts can be drawn from these baseline assessments to predict how these actors willbehave, and how that behavior will impact regional dynamics. In this way, net assessments andforecasts provide a strategic framework of understanding that can be used to help create

assessments and forecasts for tactical-level items.

In the case of Mexico, we have long considered the countrys criminal cartels significanttactical-level actors, and we have established an analytical framework for understanding them.We publish this framework in the form of our annual cartel report. The higher-level frameworkgenerally shapes such tactical-level analyses, but at times the analyses can also contradict andchallenge the higher-level assessments. We also maintain a regular flow of tactical analysessuch as the weekly Mexico Security Memo, which serves to explain how events in Mexico fit intoour analytical framework. The items we select as bullets for the second section of the MexicoSecurity Memo are significant and further the analytical narrative of what is happening in Mexicobut do not require deeper analysis. This helps our readers cut through the clutter of the reporting

from Mexico by focusing on what we find important. We also strive to eliminate the bias soprevalent in todays media landscape. Our readers frequently tell us they find this analyticalwinnowing process quite valuable.

Based upon this tactical framework, we then establish intelligence guidance. This lays outtripwire events that our analysts, regional open-source monitoring team and even our on-the-ground sources are to watch for that either support or refute our forecast. (In STRATFORscorporate culture, challenging an assessment or forecast is one of the most important things anemployee can do. This ensures we stay intellectually honest and on target. There is nothingmore analytically damaging than an analyst who falls in love with his own assessment, or a teamof analysts who buy into groupthink.)

When an event, or a combination of events, occurs that does not fit the analytical framework, theframework must undergo a rigorous review to ensure it remains valid. If the framework is found tobe flawed, we determine if it needs to be adjusted or scrapped. Due to the rapid shifts we haveseen on the ground in Mexico in the past two years in terms of arrests and deaths of major cartelleaders and the emergence of factional infighting and even new cartel groups, we have found itnecessary to adjust our framework cartel report more than just annually. In 2011, for example, wehave felt compelled to update the framework quarterly.

And this brings us back to our IED attack in Monterrey. When we learn of such an event, we


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immediately apply our analytical framework to it in an effort to determine if and how it fits. In thiscase, we have certainly seen previous IED attacks in Mexico and even grenade attacks inMonterrey, but not an IED attack in Monterrey, so this is clearly a geographic anomaly. While wedont really have a new capability, or a new actor Los Zetas were implicated in a command-detonated IED attack in January in Tula, Hidalgo state we do have a new location inMonterrey. We also have a new tactic in using a vehicle chase to lure a military vehicle into anIED ambush. Past IED ambushes in Juarez and Tula have involved leaving a cadaver in avehicle and reporting it to the authorities.

Some early reports of the Monterrey incident also indicated that the attack involved avehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED). If true, this would contradict our assessmentthat the Mexican cartels have refrained from employing large IEDs in their attacks.

Also, according to our analytical framework and the intelligence guidance we have established,Monterrey is a critical Zeta stronghold. We already have asked our tactical analysts to keep aclose eye on activity there and the patterns and trends represented by that activity for indicationsthat Los Zetas might be losing control of the city or that other cartels are establishing controlthere.

Because of all these factors, the Monterrey attack clearly demanded close examination.

How We Look at an Incident

Once we decide to dig into an incident and rip it apart analytically, we task our analysts andregional open-source monitors to find everything they can about the incident. At the same time,we reach out to our network of contacts to see what they can tell us. If we have employees in thecity or region we will rely heavily on them, but when we do not, we contact all the relevantsources we have in an area. Depending on the location, we will also talk to our contacts inrelevant foreign governments with an interest in the incident. Of course, like open-source reports,

information we receive from contacts must be carefully vetted for bias and factual accuracy.

As information begins to flow in following an incident, there are almost always conflicting reportsthat must be reconciled. In the Monterrey case, we had reports from sources such as theMexican newspaper El Universal saying the IED had been hidden in a vehicle parked beside theroad, while The Associated Press ran a story noting that the car being pursued exploded. Insome cases, news stories can even seemingly contradict themselves. In the above-mentionedAP story, the author noted that the vehicle containing the IED almost completely disintegrated,but then added that the bombing caused no other damage. It is rare that an IED large enough todisintegrate a car would cause no other damage. We have found that most journalists do nothave much experience dealing with explosives or IEDs, as their reporting often reflects.


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Photo courtesy of El UniversalScene of the Oct. 20 improvised explosive deviceambush in Monterrey

Such conflicting accounts highlight the importance of photographs and video when analyzing anattack. Photos and videos are no substitute for investigating the scene firsthand, but traveling toa crime scene takes time and money. Moreover, gaining the kind of crime scene accessSTRATFOR employees enjoyed when they worked for a government is tough. That said, anincredible amount of information can be gleaned from some decent photos and videos of a crimescene.

In the Monterrey attack, the first thing the photos and video showed us is that the vehiclecontaining the explosive device had not completely disintegrated. In fact, the chassis of thevehicle was mostly intact. It also appeared that the fire that followed the explosion rather than theexplosion itself caused much of the damage to the vehicle. The explosive damage done to the

vehicle indicated that the main charge of the IED was relatively small, most likely less than 5pounds of military-grade high explosive. Some media reports said a fragmentation grenadethrown from the vehicle being pursued caused the explosion, but the damage to the carappeared quite a bit greater than would be expected from a hand grenade. Also, no apparentfragmentation pattern consistent with what a grenade would cause was visible in the metal of thecar or on the smooth, painted walls of the auto repair shop the car had been parked near.

The lack of fragmentation damage also made it apparent that the bombmaker had not addedshrapnel such as ball bearings, nails or nuts and bolts to enhance the devices destructiveness.Also, while the repair shops garage door did have a hole punched through it, the hole appears tohave resulted from part of the car having been propelled through it. The door does not display

any significant damage or disfiguration from the blast effect. The painted walls do not either,though they do show some signs from the high heat of the explosion and resulting vehicle fire.This is another indication that the blast was fairly small. Finally, that the bulk of the significantdamage to the car is in the rear end of the vehicle makes it appear that the small IED had beenplaced either in the vehicles trunk or perhaps on the vehicles backseat.

After analyzing such photos and video, our tactical analysts contact other experienced blastinvestigators and bomb technicians to get their impressions and ensure that their analysis is notoff track. Like doctors, investigators frequently chat with other knowledgeable investigators toconfirm their diagnoses.


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Of course, the process described above is how things happen in an ideal situation. Frequently,reality intrudes on the ideal and the process can get quite messy especially in the middle of alarge ongoing situation like the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Taming the chaos that tends to reignduring such a situation is difficult, and we sometimes have to skip or repeat steps of the processdepending on the circumstances. We run a postmortem critique after each of these crisis eventsto determine what we did well and what we need to do better as we strive for excellence.

Piecing It All TogetherWhen we looked at all the pieces of the Monterrey incident, we were able to determine that dueto the location and execution of the incident, Los Zetas most likely were behind the attack. It wasalso clear that the device was a well-constructed, command-detonated IED and that the Mexicantroops were drawn into a carefully executed ambush. From the size and construction of thedevice, however, it would appear the operational planner of the ambush did not intend to kill thesoldiers. Had that been the objective, more explosives would have been used in the IED.(Commercial explosives are cheap and plentiful in Mexico.) Alternatively, the same smallerquantity of explosives could have been fashioned into an improvised claymore mine-type deviceintended to hurl shrapnel at the military patrol something likely well within the skill set of a

bombmaker capable of building and employing an effective command-detonated IED.

The small explosive charge and lack of fragmentation, then, indicates the ambush was intendedmore to send a message than to cause a massacre. The Mexican cartels have a history ofkidnapping, torturing, and murdering Mexican military personnel, so they normally are notsqueamish about killing them. This brings us back to our analysis regarding the cartels use ofIEDs, and our conclusion that the Mexican cartels have intentionally chosen to limit the size ofexplosive devices they employ in Mexico.

This incident may also be consistent with our analysis that Los Zetas are feeling pressured bythe increased military presence in Mexicos northeast. The message this incident may have been

intended to convey is that the military needs to back off. At the very least, at the very lowesttactical level, it will certainly give the Mexican military second thoughts the next time theyconsider pursuing apparent cartel vehicles in Zeta territory.

Drug Trafficking Terrorism/Security Scott Stewart Mexico USMC - Featured AnalysisSecurity Weekly

Source URL: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20111026-dissecting-mexican-cartel-bombing-monterrey

Links:

[1] http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/burton_and_stewart_on_security

[2] javascript:launchPlayer('s5qnahzi', 'http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bo9-xYktCMg', 640, 360)

[3] http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20111026-mexico-security-memo-restrained-ied-attacks-necessary-tactic-drug-cartels

[4] http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/net_assessment_united_states

[5] http://www.stratfor.com/forecast/20111007-fourth-quarter-forecast-2011

[6] http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20101218-mexican-drug-wars-bloodiest-year-date

[7] http://www.stratfor.com/theme/tracking_mexicos_drug_cartels

[8] http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20111024-mexican-drug-war-update-polarization-continues

[9] http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110413-perceived-car-bomb-threat-mexico

[10] http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20081013_mexico_security_memo_oct_13_2008

[11] http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110817-buffer-between-mexican-cartels-and-us-government


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Dissecting a Mexican Cartel Bombing in Monterrey