Brian Lund 11/01/2015

Contract Services for Smallholders.  

A rethink of the SRI narrative through a business lens

Discussion paper

 

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 Contents

Purpose ......................................................................................................................................................... 1

The rice value chain ..................................................................................................................................... 2

Quantifying this unrealized value ........................................................................................................... 3

Potential contribution to the household income .............................................................................. 3

Potential contribution to GNP .............................................................................................................. 4

SRI as a triple bottom line ........................................................................................................................ 4

The need for a new way to present this opportunity to farmers .............................................................. 5

SRI - slow growth in Cambodia ................................................................................................................ 5

Reliance on farmer-facing extension services ...................................................................................... 5

Moving to a market-based solution ............................................................................................................ 6

Building technically competent teams .............................................................................................. 6

Marketing directed toward smallholders ........................................................................................... 7

Market testing .......................................................................................................................................... 7

Options to strengthen the model ................................................................................................................ 8

Service guarantees .............................................................................................................................. 8

Options to broaden the model ..................................................................................................................... 8

The production/value chain ................................................................................................................ 8

Risk analysis ............................................................................................................................................... 10

Oxfam’s role ................................................................................................................................................ 11

Evaluation of the FLAIR program ....................................................................................................... 11

Links to the Cambodian OCS .............................................................................................................. 12

Experience of Oxfam and partners .................................................................................................... 12

Resource Development ...................................................................................................................... 12

Purpose This paper argues that there is significant unrealized value in the rice value chain that could be developed for the smallholder client and that this would be best realized in Cambodia by opting for a market-based approach to agricultural services rather than the extension-based approaches we see more commonly applied in the rural sector in developing economies. This opens smallholder to a different perspective as to how to address opportunities and challenges in agriculture and potentially a very different set of market relationships, some of which will be broached here. The paper’s initial focus for discussion is the husbandry package known as the System of Rice Intensification (SRI). It is discussed as key amongst several entry points presenting the smallholder potential economic gains in the rice value chain. Finally the paper begins to lay out how Oxfam might engage with a view toward a new approach to our rural development program.

 

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The rice value chain The simplest description of the rice value chain in Cambodia can be summed up as 1) the farmer; typically a smallholder with landholdings averaging 1 hectare, 2) the middleman who buys the harvest at farm gate price for resale for milling, further aggregation or informal export markets, 3) the miller who may store and further aggregate, 4) the wholesaler/retailer who may export. Using the Average yield for the National crop at 2.6t/ha as reported by the Cambodian government1 and a farm gate price of $200/t the current value chain is portrayed in the table2 and schematic.

Schematic representation of the Rice Value Chain (red) and the potential increase (black)

This modeling suggests that the greatest potential gain lies with the farmer but that all agents stand to make substantial gains. Middle men and millers stand to gain where farmers produce increased quality and consistency of grain but also through aspects such as improved mill-ability and sale-ability. AThe exporter/retailer is most likely to gain from premium and niche market opportunities3.

                                                                                                                         1  National  statistics,  Ministry  of  Agriculture  Forestry  and  Fisheries  2015  report  2  Need  to  do  more  work  on  verifying  these  figures.  May  be  able  to  adapt  the  results  of  the  study  in  the  Philippines  conducted  by  MicroSave  3  This  is  based  on  the  performance  of  SRI  as  a  crop  husbandry  package  for  smallholders  as  detailed  in  text.  

Stage value  as  %  of  retail  price

KH  (USD)/ha KH  (USD)/ha

wholesaler/retailer.  Value  aded  through  market  distribution  and  retailing

9% 104$                       estimate  10%  increase  for  premium  markets 114$                    

miller.  Value  added  through  grading,  milling,  storage,  wholesaling  

40% 485$                       estimate  10%  increase  for  millability  and  storage 534$                    

local  trader.  Value  added  through  aggregation,  grading,  storage  and  timing  of  sales

9% 104$                       estimate  10%  increase  for  grain  quality,  storage  and  handling 114$                    

farmer.  Value  added  to  the  farm  gate 43% 520$                      estimate  54%    increase  based  on  SRI  husbandry  before  gains  from  improved  input  quality,  storage  and  markets

800$                    

100% 1,213$               1,563$              

Potential  Increase  to  value  chainCurrent  value  chainTable  showing  indicative  profile  of  the  Rice  Value  Chain

. .1600 1600

1500 1500

1400 1400

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1200 1200

1100 1100

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600 600

500 500

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USD  /  h

ecatre  of  rice  g

rown

Farm

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Middlem

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Miller

Retaile

r/  Export

Farm

er  

Middlem

an

Miller

Retaile

r/  Export

 

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While there has been growth in all parts of the value chain in recent years, growth at the Farmer level has remained relatively slow – and what growth there is can be largely attributable to increasing commercialization and less so smallholder farming. This can be seen in the following graph that show the average yields (t/ha) for each province over the last 10 years. The majority of provinces (reliant on conventionally grown un-irrigated rice farming practices) are currently producing 2.8t/ha which is well below demonstrated potentials. Also the trend line suggests that at current rates it would take another 20 seasons for the national crop average to approach 4t/ha

The paper argues that this amounts to unrealized value, a large part of which could flow to the smallholder farmer.

Quantifying this unrealized value Looking primarily at potential gains from good husbandry it is possible to make an estimate of the unrealized value. To this end crop performance under SRI is considered. The basic crop husbandry described in SRI leads to consistent crop production improvements. This is rarely disputed4. Since its introduction to Cambodia reported levels of productivity improvement from SRI varied considerably. In response, in 2006 AusAID (now AusTrade) and GTZ (now GIZ) conducted what was considered at the time to be a watershed study of SRI projects in Cambodia5. They determined that where SRI was practiced properly, farmers achieved an average increase in crop production of 1.45t/ha without increase in input costs, this was a 60% gain from the reported national crop average of 2.4t/ha6 at the time.

Potential contribution to the household income Using these established production parameters it is possible to provide a crude estimate of the potential contribution of SRI to the livelihood of the farmer with a small landholding. On average farmers in Cambodia cultivate 1 ha of arable land. At the same time, the government is reporting an                                                                                                                          4  What  is  disputed  around  SRI  is  1)  the  precise  list  of  husbandry  practices  and  whether  or  not  application  of  a  subset  of  the  practices  constitutes  SRI  adoption,  2)  an  interpretation  of  input  costs  –  especially  labor  costs-­‐-­‐that  suggests  that  revenue  gains  may  be  negated  by  higher  costs,  resulting  in  negligible  net  income  increases,  3)  conceptualization  of  SRI  as  a  set  of  principles  applicable  to  whole-­‐farm  ecology.  5  Vannaro  P  &  Seth  S  (2006)  Survey  of  SRI  and  other  rice  management  practices  on  acid  soils  in  Prey  Veng  Province  of  Cambodia  2006.  Technical  report  funded  by  the  Australian  Embassy,  Cambodia  and  GTZ.    

3.539 3.619 3.622 3.66 3.812 3.709 3.761 3.827 3.6701 0.103055 0.010622.75 2.5 2.75 2.43 2.915 2.738 2.575 2.712 2.6732 0.141534 0.0200322.334 2.697 2.654 2.86 2.957 2.902 2.835 2.579 2.6946 0.194552 0.037852.471 2.359 2.456 2.54 2.755 2.736 2.748 2.815 2.5355 0.22796 0.0519662.085 2.341 2.501 2.61 2.681 2.738 2.788 2.791 2.534 0.231683 0.0536773.044 3.079 2.96 3.11 3.34 3.328 3.398 3.447 3.1317 0.253723 0.0643753.4 3.195 3.502 3.53 3.68 3.572 3.553 3.599 3.3937 0.267113 0.07135

3.288 3.427 3.553 3.66 3.868 3.885 3.896 3.76 3.5641 0.295426 0.0872772.566 2.767 2.975 3.03 3.106 3.121 3.137 3.084 2.8614 0.297312 0.0883942.858 2.561 2.588 2.95 3.189 3.31 3.307 3.236 2.9326 0.308055 0.0948982.121 2.542 2.523 2.8 2.891 2.658 2.875 2.743 2.5443 0.308341 0.0950742.401 2 2.521 2.6 2.686 2.726 2.87 2.812 2.4755 0.326089 0.1063341.915 1.826 2.101 2.14 2.62 2.286 2.481 2.379 2.1141 0.329717 0.1087131.6 2.072 2.105 2.51 2.604 2.283 2.542 2.104 2.1491 0.339885 0.115522

2.441 2.336 2.462 2.69 3.11 3.015 3.074 2.852 2.6514 0.340574 0.115992.627 3.473 3.303 2.92 2.882 2.906 2.933 2.881 3.1067 0.3424 0.117238

3 3.276 3.725 3.48 3.597 3.466 3.453 2.988 3.319 0.265966 0.0707381.72 1.862 2 2.5 2.6 2.391 2.203 2.448 2.0993 0.380924 0.1451031.74 2.5 2.667 2.65 2.758 3.126 2.95 2.83 2.6221 0.398434 0.1587492.252 2.388 2.476 2.56 2.751 2.788 2.888 2.905 2.4487 0.430793 0.1855822.439 2.807 2.866 3 3.295 3.223 3.313 3.253 2.8663 0.43147 0.1861661.823 2.121 2.467 2.67 2.944 2.814 2.842 2.735 2.4033 0.468296 0.2193011.75 2.611 2.961 3.1 3.199 3.196 3.215 3.257 2.8112 0.500252 0.2502525.514 2.645 2.643 2.78 3.183 3.43 3.405 3.231 3.1233 0.953549 0.909255

3.449 3.449

3.23.43.63.84

1 3 5 7 9

Kandal

Kandal

Linear(Kandal)

R²  =  0.0874

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Average  Yield  (t/ha)  fo

r  each  province

Sketch  showing  trend  in  Rice  yields  (t/ha)  across  all  provinces  .Data  from  MAFF  2005-­‐2004  extrapolation  to  2034  

KandalStueng  TrengBatambangK.ThomKoh  KongPrey  VengK.ChamTakeoKampotKratieB.  MeancheyPreah  VihearMondolkiriOtadar  Mean  CheyK.SpeuPhnom  PenhPailinRatanakiriPreahsihanoukSvay  RiengK.ChhnangSiemReapKep2005    06          07      08        09        10        11        12        13      14        15          16          17      18        19        20        21        22        23        24      25      2 6     27        28        29        30        31        32        33  2034

Trendline

season

 

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increase in the national crop to 2.6t/ha with the majority crop being conventionally grown un-irrigated rice. The SRI assessment in 2006 indicated a minimum of 1.45t/ha additional yield which at a farm gate value of $200/t/ha is equivalent to an increase by 56% from $520/ha to $810/ha for the farmer.

Potential contribution to GNP Using national parameters it is possible to provide a crude estimate of the potential contribution of SRI to the Cambodian GNP. Given the national crop encompasses 2.6million hectares and the potential of SRI to increase yield by 1.45t/ha the increase in the national crop would be 3.8million ton. Applying a more conservative extrapolation; if farmers applied SRI to only half this crop area and their yield results where only half as good as the benchmarked increase, the SRI contribution to the national crop would be 0.95million ton. Assuming an export value of USD$200/t (check WB report) this would equate to USD$190 million pa7. By comparison, in neighboring Vietnam where the government has chosen to actively invest in SRI extension authorities are now reporting 1.8million smallholder participants each realizing an additional 250-USD650 at the farm gate each year. Using the lower figure in this range, this equates to a minimum annual addition to the rural economy of USD$450,000,000.

SRI as a triple bottom line While there is rightly, continuing debate around the limitations and portrayal of SRI beit as a recipe or as a menu for the hand-planted rice crop, there is much less debate about each of the components of crop husbandry described as component parts of SRI having the potential to contribute to a stronger crop for the smallholder: The soil, seed and seeding preparation is reflective of best practice in practically any crop, while the weed and water management is much more reflective of local circumstances and therefore variable. Importantly, smallholders are quick to recognize and adapt the components best suited to them regardless of the debate. But despite many smallholders having demonstrated gains over the 30 years that SRI has been described, dissemination and adoption of SRI is still limited. The concern must be that relying on current dissemination/extension strategies risks the passing of another 30 years after which majority of poor farmers would still have been without the opportunity to try SRI for themselves8. In layman’s terms SRI is simply a compilation of recognized good husbandry practices relevant to hand-planted rice crops. It offers a triple bottom line: 1. In social terms, because the component parts of the compilation are easy to understand and

can be applied separately, it provides an exceptional space for poor and risk averse farmers to gain experience in adaptation and risk-taking. It also factors in improvement to much of the crop management traditionally delegated to women, and builds a culture of sharing and learning from each other.

2. In environmental terms, SRI requires less agricultural inputs; fosters a stronger stewardship of resources like seed, water and soil; encourages organic produce and seed production; and reduces methane gas emissions from rice production.

3. In economic terms it offers significantly greater crop production and farm-gate returns while potentially incurring less input costs.

This paper focuses only on the later point, arguing from the perspective of the economic advantage.

                                                                                                                         7  Lund  (2010)  Investing  in  quality  agricultural  extension  -­‐  The  right  blend  for  Cambodia.  An  internal  paper  for  Oxfam  America.  Figures  need  updating  as  farm  gate  price  in  2015  is  nearer  $200/t  8  A  second  concern  must  be  –  what  happens  to  the  next  bottom-­‐up  innovation  –  will  it  also  take  30  years  to  reach  this  far?      

 

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The need for a new way to present this opportunity to farmers SRI - slow growth in Cambodia Given the unrealized economic value alone it is striking that SRI has seen quite slow dissemination and take-up in Cambodia. Reports place current take-up at just 150,000 of Cambodia’s 4 million farmers increasing at approximately 5,000 farmers per year9. While there is ongoing debate as to the contributing factors, this paper argues that two factors in particular are at play; 1. A reliance on farmer-facing extension services so that after 30 years the vast majority of

smallholder farmers still have never had the opportunity to see and assess SRI. 2. Where smallholders are exposed to SRI there has been insufficient support in addressing the

risk-averseness responses that they choose - or are compelled to choose - that result in them not adopting SRI.

3. Even where farmers are inclined to adopt SRI, they are then compelled to recruit family or community members to do the same. This requires them to invest additional effort in persuading family and community to ‘try something new’ this is not always easy particularly where rural communities are experiencing an increasing outward migration of the able-bodied labor needed to make SRI work.

Reliance on farmer-facing extension services The majority of improvements in agriculture in Cambodia are introduced via extension services working with smallholder farmers. Unfortunately the quality and scale of extension services continues to be quite variable – particularly services offered to poor smallholders. These extension services can be categorized as follows; 1. Extension actors – the public sector. This is largely government department officers, trained

and mandated to deliver extension services to Cambodia’s farming community. While they are well trained and often reasonably resourced (via development agency projects), their effectiveness is curtailed by the patronage system that pervades Cambodia’s public sector. As a consequence the extension officers low salaries compels them to rent-seek from farmers rather than empower them to act independently. Government officers are also increasingly inclined to work with larger land holders because the extension is easier and the rent seeking prospects are greater.

2. Extension actors – the development agencies. This category includes INGOs, LNGOs and academic institutions. Generally speaking they make up the weight of effective extension services currently active in Cambodia. They encompass a wide range of competencies, sometimes effective, sometimes not so effective. There is a general lack of coordination leading to overlap, inefficiencies There is also tendency toward short term objectives (given they are very often bound by short term project funding). This has the effect of compromising longer term strategic thinking need to encourage services at scale.

3. Extension actors – private sector. To date the private sector has not engaged in farmer extension in a systematic manner. The agri-business paradigm is often based on the one-off transaction. The concept of mutual gain leading to repeat business with an established client base is not particularly evident despite many small businesses being based in the farming communities. The US INGO iDE has been addressing this with some success through a program called Farm Business Advisors (FBAs) who are trained as quality input sellers able to provide good advice. However, there are still very many communities without this support. Bigger private sector investors are much more inclined to seek land concentration so they themselves can move to a mechanized system and realize the productivity potentials on offer.

                                                                                                                         9  Personal  Communication,  Mr  Luy  PiseyRith,  Program  Coordinator,  Oxfam  US  

 

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Regardless the quality of extension the fundamental approach is generally farmer-facing. As illustrated in the sketch above the extension service is directed toward the smallholder after which the smallholder is left to only a “take-it-or-leave-it” response to the improvement on offer. Essentially at this point, farmers who are inherently risk averse are asked to shoulder new risk.

Moving to a market-based solution While there are numerous market-based models operating in the agricultural sector this paper focuses of one model that recognizes the smallholder as the client for agricultural services. Essentially this requires the design to view the smallholder as a client able to purchase services rather than as a student of new approaches in agriculture. As indicated by the red text in the sketch below this requires a shift in approach whereby 1) small teams are trained and supported in service delivery, 2) marketing is directed toward the smallholder so she is informed, and ultimately 3) she has more options available if she chooses to pursue improvements.

Building technically competent teams With SRI as the entry point, intensive extension training would be directed toward selected community members (not necessarily farmers but also landless, land-poor, women and youth with experience in farming), who have an interest in forming into small business teams able to provide on-farm services. The first objective would be to ensure they achieved a high degree of competence in the good husbandry techniques promoted in SRI. The second objective would be to provide training including finance10, small business, and entrepreneurial skills11. Teams would then

                                                                                                                         10  Savings  for  Change    

 

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be formed and supported with resourcing, marketing and coordination services until they established a viable client base of smallholder farmers who have retained secure land tenure and thereby can become more financially independent and sustainable.

Marketing directed toward smallholders At the same time a marketing strategy would be implemented so that smallholders are aware of the service available to them, how to access it and what to expect. This approach would;

1) Take away some of the risk that the individual farmer confronts when trying a new practice for the first time. Where previously the farmer had to build experience in each new technique, here the teams are trained and less likely to make mistakes.

2) Amplify the reach of extension investments as the service teams would benefit from being their own advocates, (also other NGOs working with communities could recruit these services),

3) Eliminate barriers to implementation such as labor supply. As the teams would ideally operate throughout the growing season and thereby eliminate reliance on the availability of incidental labor from family and community members.

At the same time the approach would help 1) Realize the economic potential of the crop by bringing up yields. 2) Keep money and job opportunity in the local economy – most service team members are

likely to be locals selected by their community. 3) Open opportunity for additional services and small business opportunity. These could

include deep-ripping as a climate change mitigation measure, local laser leveling to improve water control, ploughing and field preparation, nursery management, weeding, accurately timed fertilizer services, local seed improvement harvest, post-harvest drying and storage, etc.

Market testing In keeping with Oxfam’s partnership approach the thinking developed in this paper emerges from close cooperation with local partner organizations. In particular two local NGOs, Rachana and Srer Khmer who helped in the formative stages of this thinking then took up the challenge to begin market testing by establishing Service Teams during the 2016 cropping season and undertaking some marketing. Their prelimary results are presented here. Rachana; • Service team with 22 women members. IDPoor112 (2), IDPoor 2 (6), People living with HIV (2), other poor (12) • 22.9 ha of paddy land served: SRI direct rice seed plant (19.42 ha) and weeding use the Rice Dragon13 (3.5

ha) • They charge 450,000 riels/ha about $112.5/ha. Total they earned 10,316,000 riels ($2,579) With the money they earned, the team dicided to distribute to each member and 21 members used those money to buy materials for their children to school. One of the women used her money to buy vegetable seed and fertilizer Srer Khmer; System of Rice Intensification Service Provider Group (SRI-SPG)

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       11  The  International  Labor  Organization  (ILO)  is  currently  promoting  a  community-­‐based  entrepreneurial  package  (C-­‐BED)  in  Cambodia  that  would  be  ideal  in  this  instance  12  IDPoor  is  a  national  system  for  identifying  the  extent  of  poverty  that  people  are  contending  with.  It  allows  identification  of  the  absolute  poorest  for  support.  13  The  Rice  Dragon  is  a  weeding  tool  that  is  operated  by  hand  (see  cover  page).  Good  weed  control  has  the  potential  to  increase  crop  productivity  by  1tonne/ha.  

 

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• Service group of 20 members, including women (17) • 1.2 ha of paddy land (testing service) Sareing village, Srer Sdock commune, Kandeing district Pursat

province • They charged 360000riels/ha= $90/ha Srer Khmer also began testing additional services, provide in-depth capacity for the Service Teams on SRI, broadcasting techniques, using a drum seeder, direct rice seed planting and use trans-planting machines. Their Initial marketing included distribution of 15,000 Public leaflets on SRI-SPG information At the time of writing the crop is still to be harvested so the gains for the farmer have yet to be fully determined. Nonetheless both organizations have already seen encouraging success in both the supply side (people’s interest in joining teams) and the demand side (both organizations were unable to keep up with the level of initial interest for their services).

Options to strengthen the model Service guarantees Even with the increased options available via this approach it is recognized that smallholders are still likely to remain risk averse and slow to adopt. The proportion of farmers prepared to take this risk is typically low. Roger’s Adoption Curve14 is particularly useful in conveying this characteristic; typically only innovators and early adopters are inclined to take on new risk. While the majorities of the population wait for increasing confidence and assurance before they will act – without attention to real risks and risk aversion the prospect of improvements are adopted at scale is lessened. One option to address this would be guarantees whereby smallholders that use the service of endorsed service providers will be guaranteed yield outcomes equivalent to the provincial average plus 1 tonne/ha. Pending questions of who funds the risk, cash flow management, field verification etc an approach like this would also allow farmers to gain the firsthand experience and trust in Service teams. Arguably it would also serve as an introduction to insurance concepts that may come into the market at a future point.

Options to broaden the model The production/value chain Aside from the guarantee, once the teams begin gaining credibility as service providers their repertoire of services could be expanded so as to introduce other services beyond SRI planting15. It is to be expected that Oxfam’s partner organizations and the Service teams will be able to build out a diverse repertoire as they build experience but some to the initial options for investigations include; 1. Nursery management ensuring even and healthy seedlings – ideally using improved or locally

selected varieties.

                                                                                                                         14  Rogers,  E.  (1962)  Diffusion  of  innovations.  Free  Press,  London,  

15  Both  Rachana  and  Srer  Khmer  are  addressing  this  from  the  perspective  of  additional  services  and  also  the  continuity  of  work  for  the  service  teams  

 

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• Hand planted crops require that farmers set up a small nursery in order to germinate and ready seedlings for transplanting. There are several photo-sanitary techniques known to improve the vigor of nursery stock but these techniques are not used. Also individual farmers are often caught with over-grown seedlings when their planning is upset by late rains.

• Benefit to smallholder: reduced risk of low quality seedlings, assures of 7-10 day old seedlings are produced under optimal conditions.

2. Field preparation • Field preparation (cultivation) is frequently outsourced already. In this instance the

service could become part of an entire package making it convenient for farmers16. • Benefit to smallholder: yield improvement of 1.45t/ha. Lessened risk of crop loss due to

uncertain rainfall patterns. 3. SRI planting

• While SRI planting is main focus of this paper there are numerous refinements that could be introduced via the Service Teams. Over time the teams will gain experience in recognizing optimal plant densities for each soil type across entire districts17.

• The teams may opt for night planting, allowing them optimize the window of time available for planting and/or allowing them to avoid the heat of the day.

• Benefit to smallholder: yield improvement of 1.45t/ha. Lessened risk of crop loss due to uncertain rainfall patterns.

4. Weeding of crops • Oxfam has been working to introduce a weeding tool (the rice dragon) as a means of

improving crop productivity while reducing labor inputs. In its first season the project achieved brand recognition from marketing, exceeding 50%. As recognition and market experience grows smallholders are seek Rice Dragon teams to weed their crops. The teams are well placed to offer weeding as a service in their repertoire.

• Benefit to smallholder: shown to increase productivity by up to 1t/ha 5. Duck-Rice systems

• There are several systems whereby ducks are either herded or fenced in the rice crop in order to control insects and broadleaf weeds. Business models vary from ‘farmers renting the flock’ to duck growers ‘renting the field’.

• Not a common approach in Cambodia despite substantial flocks in key provinces such as Kampong Speu and Kampong Cham.

• Benefit to smallholder: Thailand smallholders have reported up to 15% increase in crop productivity due to pest control and duck manure.

6. Local seed improvement – by preselecting seed from better preforming areas of crop prior to harvest.

• There are several simple techniques available to smallholders whereby they can improve the quality of their own seed reserves (for subsequent planting). These techniques are not often applied.

• Benefit to smallholder: shown to increase productivity of subsequent crop up to 20%                                                                                                                          

16  Could  be  option  to  introduce  equipment  to  overcome  the  drudgery  of  planting  in  the  heat  of  the  day;  by  provide  shade  in  the  field  and/or  lighting  for  night  work.  

 17  Could  be  option  to  introduce  equipment  to  overcome  the  drudgery  of  planting  in  the  heat  of  the  day;  by  provide  shade  in  the  field  and/or  lighting  for  night  work.  

 

 

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7. Harvesting • While this is generally a family and community collective activity, the migration of labor

from rural areas is affecting labor availability. While the service teams could engage here, there is also the prospect of contracting combine harvest machinery.

• Benefit to smallholder: Minimize damaged and dirty grain which otherwise reduces price at the mill.

8. Bagging for storage using hermetically sealed bags • Up to 30% of the harvest can suffer insect damage if stored incorrectly18. Hermetically

sealed (air-tight) bags offer a proven solution but they require an ability to assure grain moisture contents of 11 to 12%. The equipment and know-how to do this is available but is rarely used by smallholders because it does require a good knowledge of how to manage seed moisture content. Good storage also offers opportunities to smooth supply and develop specialized markets.

• Benefit to smallholder: Eliminate post-harvest insect damage. Opens new marketing options.

9. Harvest aggregation and marketing • Several examples of specialized marketing have emerged: in Cambodia (Ibis Rice) has

targeted European markets and Sano rice has begun scoping for the Netherlands and global markets, in Vietnam (Lotus Rice) has targeted USA markets. All of these markets function on the basis of ‘environmental friendliness’.

• Benefit to smallholders: Market able to attract a premium. 10. Introducing innovation

• The teams are particularly well placed as a focus for introducing new techniques and technologies. They can be skill-up and supported in field testing innovations that could then translate into addition services in the repertoire. Examples include seeding and transplanting machinery appropriate for smallholder farming; crop rotations; cover cropping

• This would require organizations like Royal University of Agriculture, Srer Khmer and Rachana increasingly working with the teams as their primary client for new technologies, business models, marketing and extension approaches.

• Benefit to smallholders: Able to take advantage of new innovations without being exposed to the risks and barriers to adoption that they would otherwise encounter when working alone.

Risk analysis Risks of primary concern for this program include the following:

• Risk of reliance on external service providers. Rather than the smallholder having the expertise and the option of acting as she sees fit she would be reliant on the service teams knowing their job and being able available at the right times19.

• Smallholders are familiar with negotiating short-term cash flow deficient when they recruit labor for harvest but are only able to make payment when they’ve received payment for the crop. Other services earlier in the crop cycle will extend this deficit period – and risk.

                                                                                                                         18  Reference  from  Thailand  report.  Need  details  19  Personal  communication  University  California,  Davis  Extension  Team  Apr  2015  

 

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• Guarantees and related products like microfinance are relatively unknown to the farming community. It will take time to build trust in these products.

• Women are increasingly the decision makers in farm management. Introduction of a new service could see a shift toward men taking control where that was not the case before.

• The model requires being able to recruit and maintain service teams. In turn this requires being able to build a critical mass of clients in order to keep teams employed.

• Farmers may learn enough from the teams to decide to undertake some tasks by themselves thereby not needed the full teams for labor, the demand for the teams could gradually decline as the knowledge transfer is successful.

• The work is seasonal. Team members are likely to migrate in the ‘off season’ necessitating a team rebuilding process each year.

• Monitoring of team and crop performance plus smallholder client feedback will be critical to the success of this approach if at scale. The monitoring tools are not yet designed.

Oxfam’s role The experience of Oxfam as an exponent of SRI provides an extraordinary platform for pursuing this new approach. For Oxfam’s part the statistics indicate that our partners reached over 58,000 people and that they gained over $10 million at the farm gate. Oxfam’s investment over this time totaled $3.7M over the 10 years with an average return of $3 for every $1 invested by Oxfam

Evaluation of the FLAIR program Nonetheless, the most recent program design incorporating SRI was FLAIR. This program was orientated toward farmer-facing extension with the objectives extending beyond extension for technology transfer to women’s empowerment. In implementation the program was successful in;

• Encouraging good quality extension services • Engaging government agencies and influencing national policy and strategy development • Good work achieved by development sector actors.

It was less effective in; • express objectives around women’s empowerment

YearOUS  

Investment

SRI  program  directly  

supported  by  OA

SRI  program  across  

Cambodia

SRI  program  directly  

supported  by  OA

SRI  program  across  

Cambodia$(USD)/t

SRI  program  directly  

supported  by  OA

SRI  program  across  

Cambodia

2005  $            125,000    field  trials  

2006  $            209,436                                      1,634   60,000                                                                409   16,386                     1.31  $                240    $                    128,432    $          5,151,758  2007  $            482,466                                      2,712   82,386                                                                814   47,039                     1.29  $                240    $                    251,891    $      14,563,274  2008 526,500$                                              3,835                    104,750                                      1,342   58,291                     1.3  $                240    $                    418,782    $      18,186,792  2009  $            420,722                                      3,609                    110,530                                      1,112   59,785                     1.66  $                259    $                    477,930    $      25,703,963  2010  $            517,620                                      6,188                    124,820                                      1,270                          61,291   1.53  $                258    $                    501,320    $      24,194,009  2011  $            528,061                                      9,058                    149,185                                      3,996                          94,681   1.35  $                239    $            1,287,350    $      30,506,218  2012  $            333,133                                  13,097                    149,657                                      6,189                    100,720   1.43  $                254    $            2,247,838    $      36,583,518  2013  $            294,967                                      9,818    na                                  11,328   na 1.40  $                250    $            3,964,709    na  

2014  $            325,654                                      8,868    na                                      6,877   na 0.92  $                250    $            1,581,641    na  

Total 3,763,559$     58,819                             781,328                 33,335                             438,193                  $        10,859,893    $154,889,534  Source:    MAFF  reports,  grant  reports

Estimated  value  to  rural  economy  (USD)

SRI  in  CambodiaNo.  farmers  adopting  SRI  

(HH)Area  of  SRI  (ha) Increase  in  

yield  above  national  average  (t/ha)

 

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• Encouraging public sector investment of budget resources • Encouraging private sector engagement

The experience and learning from these outcomes underpins this new approach.

Links to the Cambodian OCS The Cambodian OCS very specifically prioritizes resilience of smallholders and opts for a way-of-working based around evidence based influencing of public and private policy and practices plus positioning partner organizations to take on implementation at scale. The Service Team approach is entirely consistent with the OCS and it opens additional opportunities for the OCS given the emphasis on markets, women and landlessness.

Experience of Oxfam and partners • Experience in agricultural extension pertaining to SRI research, promotion, training and

monitoring. • Experience in targeted marketing directed toward rural communities • Experience in micro-insurances • Potential for partners to offer service using a social enterprise model • A sound program design • Identifying people to participate in SRI training; service team candidates and smallholders • Marketing to smallholders • Setting up the crop guarantee system (including IT4D – crop tracking) • Lobby, campaign and advocacy at policy level • Coordinating role • Bridge between institution and extension service providers

Resource Development • Able to access conventional development resources. While resource development sector

bilateral and multilateral donors is becoming increasingly competitive, Oxfam is well placed to coordinate collective bids for partner organizations. Also specific thematics such as food security, women in agriculture, youth in rural economies, privates sector engagement remain prominent.

• Increasingly positioned to encourage private sector investment. Give the extent of unrealized wealth described in this paper, the prospect that private sector investment to capture some of that wealth must be considered.

• Increasingly versed in new investment instruments like Development Impact Bonds with the potential to take a rollout of any initiative to genuine scale.

//End