DISARMAMENT, DÉTENTE, DEVELOPMENT Papers from the IPRA Disarmament Study Group || TOWARDS A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

TOWARDS A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCEAuthor(s): Raimo VäyrynenSource: Instant Research on Peace and Violence, Vol. 6, No. 1/2, DISARMAMENT, DÉTENTE,DEVELOPMENT Papers from the IPRA Disarmament Study Group (1976), pp. 81-88Published by: Tampere Peace Research Institute, University of TampereStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40724798 .

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Raimo Väyrynen Tampere Peace Research Institute

TOWARDS A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

The present fora for arms control and disarmament talks can be classified in several ways by considering, for example, their par- ticipant composition or the weapon systems on which the talks are focusing. SALT is an example of great-power bilateralism, while the Vienna talks on the mutual re- duction of armed forces and armaments give an example of bloc-based negotiations. The CCD might serve, in turn, as an example of the forum in which the bloc considerations have been connected with the idea of representativeness of the participants. The plans and proposals for the holding of a World Disarmament Conference (WDC) start from the very idea that the countries participating in disarmament negotiations should be as representative as possible. In the case of a WDC, nor in any other official connection, the idea of representativeness is extended, however, to non-governmental actors, but the arms-control talks have been strictly a governmental affair. In the connection of a WDC the idea of the NGO participation has been, however, taken up: in particular in the recammendations of the Bradford conference of various peace organizations (held at the very beginning of September 1974). As to a WDC it is stated in these re- commendations that 'provisions should be made for the participation of not less than 30 representatives of non-governmental organizations with full rights of participation

(except voting rights) at all preparatory sta- ges of the conference and at the conference itself and 'all non-governmental organizations in consultative status with ECOSOC should be given the normal observer status'.

In particular the non-aligned group of countries has been for a long time in favor of holding a world-wide disarmament conference. As early as in 1965 in the 20th Session of the General Assembly of the UN a resolution - 2030 (XX) - was adopted by a vote of 112-0-1 (France). This resolution confirmed in fact the proposal made by the Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in 1964 in Cairo. In the pro- gramme for peace and international cooperation adopted by this conference it was stated that »the conference is convinced that the convening of a world disarmament conference under the auspices of the United Nations, to which all countries would be invited, would provide powerful support to the efforts which are being made to set in motion the process of disarmament and for securing the further and steady development of this process». The question was discussed already in the declaration of the meeting of the Heads of State and/or Go- vernment of Non-Aligned Countries held in Belgrade in 1961.

The General Assembly declaration of 1965 also urged »that the necessary consultations be conducted with all countries for the



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purpose of establishing a widely representative preparatory committee which will take appropriate steps for the convening of a world disarmament conference not later than 1967 (sic!). Shortly thereafter the preparatory steps came, however, to a complete standstill. In spite of that all the major powers retained their basically positive attitude to the convocation of a WDC, the practical results were meager. Also China supported the idea, and emphasized that the conference should strive for a complete prohibi- tion of the nuclear weapons and, as a first step, to agree to the non-use of nuclear weapons. Western powers maintained, in turn, that the conference should be prepared in a detailed and careful manner, while non- aligned and socialist countries preferred a more rapid procedure.

For one reason or another the willingness to promote the WDC idea declined consi- derably after the mid 1960's. The WDC idea appeared in the world arena again in 1971 when the Soviet Union expressed in the UN General Assembly her positive attitude towards a WDC. During the same session China turned, partly due to the compelling logic of Sino-Soviet relations, to resist and criticize the WDC plan as put forward by the Soviet Union. Since then the Soviet Union has been the most ardent proponent of a WDC, gaining also continued support from the Third World and smaller Western countries. For instance the declaration adopted by the non-aligned countries in their Algiers conference in 1973 states that »the conference demands that an international conference on disarmament, with the participation of all states, shall be convened as soon as possible». On the -other hand there has been also resistance to this idea, especially on the part of China and major Western powers, most notably the United States.

The United States does not completely reject the idea of having a WDC, but she has adobted a strategy which is apparently aim- ed at delaying the convocation of the conference. This strategy is performed by saying that the setting of a specific date of the es- tablishment of a specific machinery for the preparations is inappropriate and unneces-

sary at the present stage. This point of view can be illustrated by the statement made by Mr. Martin, the U.S. repressenta- tive in the First Committee of the UN Ge- neral Assembly, during its 29th session in 1974:

The views of the United States on this subject are unchanged. We recognize that a world disarmament conference could serve a useful function at an appropriate time, but we do not believe that such a conference now or in the near future would produce useful results, It is not the lack of suitable forum but the lack of political agreement that prevents us from taking more far-reacing steps towards disarmament. World conference could not in the foreseeable future solve this problems and thus would merely dissappoint the hopes of its proponents.

Furthermore, the United States has de- manded that the conference must be care- fully prepared (something which was said already in 1965) if it is to fulfill its functions. The United States' resistance has been fairly invisible in the United Nations, while China has adopted a more active and visible role in opposing the WDC idea. The Chinese view on WDC was laid down, for example, in the First Committee of the General As- sembly in 1972 when the Chinese delegate put forward the preconditions for her participation in the conference:

All nuclear countries, particularly the Soviet Union and the United States which possesses the largest amount of nuclear weapons, should undertake the obliga- tion: 1. not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any cir- cumstances; 2. withdraw from abroad all armed forces and dismantle all military bases including bases set up on foreign soil.

China has set several other preconditions for her participation, but those quoted above are the most important ones (and they have been, in addition, prevalent items in the Chinese vocabulary of foreign policy other- wise, too). Another aspect strongly emphasized by China is that the blame for the arms race cannot be put equally on all countries, but those responsible are mainly the two great powers, viz. the United States and the Soviet Union. The Chinese delegate to the U.N. has stated that if these preconditions



are fulfilled his government is ready to participate in and work for a WDC, but »the world disarmament conference should in no way be convened under the nuclear threat of the superpowers». In general China has voted, however, for the resolutions which aim at the preparation of a WDC.

Although a UN report states that »a large group of states strongly urges that a world disarmament conference be convened as soon as possible after due preparation', the attitude adopted by the United States, China and some other countries makes that no rapid advance can hardly be expected. Thus the question has not been of rapid advance of the WDC idea, but more of efforts to keep it alive. The WDC plan is now in a stalemate in which all depends on every- thing and the major powers are maneuver- ing among a jungle of anticipations and preconditions. Homer Jack has put this situation in the following manner:

It is understood that China continues to refuse to participate, that the United States and the United Kingdom refused to participate with only the Soviet Union, and that the Soviet Union refused to coun- tenance the appointment of the entire sommittee from non-nuclear states (see below).

To keep the WDC idea alive the UN Ge- neral Arrembly adopted in 1972 a resolution - 2930 (XXVII) - in which the governments of all states were invited to make their best in promoting conditions for the convening of a WDC. The President of the General Assembly appointed a Special Com- mittee consisting of 35 states to examine the

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views related to the world disarmament conference. In fact the committee consisted of 31 members only, because the nuclear powers - with the exception of the Soviet Union - did not assume membership in the committee; the remaining four seats were however, reserved for these nuclear-weapon powers.

The Special Committee failed, however, to carry out even the modest task assigned to it, largely because of the boycott from the part of the four nuclear powers. The committee did not produce even a formal report. The hope was, however, still alive in the 28th session of the General Assembly which decided to establish an Ad Hoc Committee consisting of 40 member states to consider a WDC. This time all the members were non-nuclear powers, and the nuclear powers were only invited to cooperate or maintain contact with the committee. This solution can be seen as an attempt to avoid the politically difficult situation which prevailed in the Special Committee: viz. that only one nuclear power - the Soviet Union - was present there. In the Ad Hoc Committee all the nuclear powers were in the same position, outside the committee but cooperating with it. According to the report of the Ad Hoc Committee prepared for the 29th session of the UN General Assembly it was understood that the nuclear powers would enjoy the same rights as the appointed members of the Committee.

The composition of the Special and Ad Hoc Committee and their differences can be illustrated by the following table:

Table 1. The composition of the UN committees for the preparation of a WDC, per cent

Ad Hoc Special Committee Committee Differences (in 1973) (in 1972)

NATO countries 15.0 19.6 -4.6 Neutral European countries 7.5 6.4 1.1 Socialist countries 15.0 22.6 - 7.6 Third World 62.5 51.4 11.1

Total 100.0 (N=40) 100.0 (N = 31)



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The information provided by the table shows that the share of socialist countries as well as that of the NATO countries has decreased in these committees over time at the expense of an increase in the share of the Third World countries, mainly members of the group of non-aligned countries. The number of European neutrals has also in- creased by one country, viz. Austria which is a member of the Ad Hoc together with Sweden and Yugoslavia. These shifts are logical in the sense that the share of those countries which are an essential part of the present stalemate has been reduced - deli- berately or not - to make the advance in the WDC process at the committee level easier than before. The increase in the share of non-aligned countries is in turn understandable for the reason that they have made attempts in the UN, by engaging in extensive and complicated discussion, to change the preminantly negative attitudes of China and the United States towards a WDC. The intensity of these activities can be highlight- ed by the fact that the Working Group of the Ad Hoc Committee - consisting of Burundi, Egypt, Hungary, India, Iran, Italy Mexico, Peru. Poland and Spain - held altogether 37 meetings between 27 June and 6 September 1974.

The point made above can be further illustrated by figures on a WDC in the Ple- nary or in the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly during the period 1971 - 73:

Table 2. Number of statements on a WDC in the General Assembly, 1971-73

Hungary 10 Ukranian SSR 7 Mexico 10 Byelorussian SSR 6 China 9 Finland 6 Czechoslovakia 8 France 6 Italy 8 India 6 Poland 8 Nepal 6 Ghana 7 USA 6 Indonesia 7 USSR 6 Mongolia 7 Yugoslavia 6 Sambia 7

This list which includes all the delega- tions which have given .more than six statements during the period concerned provides a good illustration of the prevailing situation. The most active speakers on a

WDC as well its most ardent proponents in general have been socialist and Third-World countries; in addition to them the list includes only two NATO members and two neutral European countries. In fact all the countries in the list except China and the United States have worked for the WDC idea.

During the fall of 1974 essentially the same situation continued as before. The UN Ge- neral Assembly adopted a resolution - 3260 (XXIX) - stating that »it does not yet seem possible to reach a final conclusion with regard to the convening of a world disarmament conference». Consequently, and concordant with the theory of keeping the WDC idea alive, the Assembly invited »all States to communicate to the Secretary- General, before 31 March 1975, their comments on the main objectives of a world disarmament conference». This sugestión in fact implied the continua- tion of the information-gathering activities pursued during the year of 1974 (see below). Furthermore, the General Assembly decided that the Ad Hoc Committee should resume its work on 1 April 1975 - after the member states have submitted their comments - and give priority to the following functions:

1. »To prepare and to submit to the Ge- neral Assembly at its thirtieth session, on the basic of consensus, an analytical report, including any conclusions and recommenda- tions it may deem pertinent, concerning the comments received».

2. »To maintain close contact with the representatives of the States possessing nuclear weapons in order to keep currently in- formed of any change in their respective positions».

Taking into account these views, it is reasonable to conclude that no conspicous change occurred during the 29th session of the General Assembly.

The work of the Ad Hoc Committee start- ed, as envisaged, on 1 April 1975 and it held 12 meetings by 27 August 1975. The pri- mary focus in the work of the Committee was on reviewing the comments submitted by some member states on the main objectives of a WDC. The Committee submitted, pursuant the decision of the 29th session of the General Assembly, its report (A/ 10028) to the 30th session. Nothing parti-



cularly new happened in the General Assem- bly in which the matter was discussed. The mandate of the Ad Hoc was continued; this decision was reached fairly unanimously which is understandable for the reason that no new initiatives were made and hence the question was more of a routine matter. In the First Committee of the Assembly the resolution concerning a WDC - 3460/XXX - was approved by consensus and in the Assembly without a vote.

The Ad Hoc Committee held its first meeting at the beginning of March 1976. In this meeting a working group, following the practice adopted in earlier years, was es- tablished and the responsibility to draft a report for the 1976 session of the Gener- al Assembly was given to this group. The Soviet Union proposed, according to the available information, that a lengthy meeting of the Committee should be held in July 1976 and this idea gained some support. It was, however, notable that the non-aligned countries were exceptionally silent when a WDC was dealt with. The only explanation to this of affairs which comes to my mind is that the non-aligned are waiting for the decision to be made in the Colombo summit meating of the movement. It is to be expected that this meeting will recommend the arrangement of a special session of the U.N. General Assembly to deal with disarmament issues. This sort of idea was already mentioned in the final declaration of the Lima meeting of non-aligned countries in August 1975, and it is quite probable that this idea will be further developed in Colombo.

In practice there probably are very few differences between a separate WDC under the auspices of the United Nations and a special session of the General Assembly. As far as I can see the outcome will be more or less the same, i.e. the law of equifinality operates here. There are, however, some political differences, partly for prestige reasons, because the socialist countries seem to be in favor of a separate WDC, while non-aligned countries have found the practice of organizing special sessions of the General Assembly profitable from their point of view. It is, however, quite improbable that any deeper conflicts will develop between socialist and non-aligned countries in this issue.

Thus far most of the energy devoted to

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a World Disarmament Conference has been in the diplomatic meaneuvering within the United Nations, and consequently very few practical proposals have been made on the substance and timing of the conference. Some insights can be gained, however, by analyzing the replies of governments to a note verbale which the Secretary-General of the United Nations delivered to all the member states on February 21, 1974. In this note the Secretary-General asked the member states to communicate their views on a WDC. Only 12 countries - viz. Byelo- russian Soviet Socialistic Republic, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Federal Republic of Germa- ny, Finland, Guatemala, India, Kenya, New Zealand, Oman, Spain and United Arab Emirates - responded to this note by the official deadline which was 15 April 1974.

Most governments replying to the Secre- tary-General's note verbale were of the opinion that a WDC should be basically a forum for exchange of opinion and for a general review of pertinent problems (the Federal Republic of Germany) and for drafting a solemn declaration to accept and put into practice »specific and properly programmed and supervised disarmament measures» (Spain). The preferable content of a WDC was put forward with great clarity by the Polish government which stated in its note verbale that:

A world disarmament conference should be guided by two principal objectives - first to ensure that all aspects of disarmament which are of interest to all States, both in the nuclear and conventional field, on a global and regional scale, are discus- ed and - second to ensure constructive and equal participation of all States in the discussion of disarmament problems . . . The conference could not be called upon to pursue negotiations of specific agree- ments nor seek to replace the existing or- gans and forms of disarmament negotiations.

In this connection one may also refer to the Soviet view on the form and content of a WDC, as it was specified in the response to the Secretary-General in 1975:

A world disarmament conference must be a forum at which all the countries of the world, on a basis of equality, will be able to express and com- pare their views on disarmament questions in all their aspects, both with regard



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to weapons of mass destruction and with regard to conventional weapons and armed forces. A comprehensive exchange of views at the conference would make it possible not only to make clearer the positions of all states on the various aspects of the problem of disarmament but also to join forces in determining the most effective ways and means for its solution . . . The Soviet Union believes that the conference should devote special attention to the problem of general and complete disarmament . . . The conference might also consider - and the Soviet Union would be prepared to join in considering - any specific questions whose favourable solution would help to attenuate the armaments race, to induce States to act with restraint in the increase of existing types of weapons and the development of new types and to persuade them to refrain from the use of scientific advances for the further development of means of destruction.

These expressions of standpoints by proponents of a WDC indicate that the scope of the conference should be preferably comprehensive, and deal with all the aspects of disarmament which are deemed relevant, but at the same time it should not aim at binding and concrete decisions to be imple- mented, but at declarations which should lay down the principles of world-wide disarmament. It is hardly no exaggeration to say that this conclusion is an interpretation of standpoints mainly held by the socialist countries. They also strongly support the view that the developing process of détente provides one of the basic conditions for the successful convening of a WDC.

A great majority of governments responding to the note verbale state that the participation of all nuclear-weapon states in a WDC must be assured, and that they should show readiness to promote disarmament in cooperation with small powers. This view is held especially strongly by many Third- World governments. Most of the respon- dents also emphasize that the participation in the conference must be universal and that all states should be assurred of equal participation in the conference. The right of equal participation is extended in some responses also to the decisions and control over their implementation. These points are mostly raised by those governments advocating the convocation of the conference. Somewhat different impressions can

be gained from the statements of the United States and China. For China the WDC plan is only a trick of »imperialist and social- imperialist superpowers» to avoid real disarmament, while the United States doubts the effectiveness of this type of conference: »A large, unwidely conference would not provide the sort of atmosphere conductive to real progress - it could indeed be harm- ful to institutions that have already achieved a record of proved accomplishment and that are currently conducting ongoing negotiations».

The comments - which are published in U.N. document A/10028, submitted in 1975 to the Secretary-General - on views concerning a WDC do not essentially differ from those given a year earlier. I have got, however, an impression that ideas concerning a WDC have proliferated in a way; more and more functions have been suggested to this conference. One of these ideas relate to the aim of making a WDC a forum in which the expansion strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament can be considered. Furher- more, the need to assess in a WDC the results already achieved in disarmament questions is emphasized. Both of these points originate mainly from the non-aligned countries which have taken up similar ideas in other connections, too. Basically no progress was achieved, however during the 30th session of the General Assembly, although one can note with satisfaction increasing willingness by which the nuclear powers have cooperated with the Ad Hoc Committee.

On the other side one cannot avoid the impression that the WDC process has become more routinized over time. This tendency is indicated by the relatively great number of comments by member states - totally 13 or almost 30 per cent of the countries responding - in which a reference is only made to the comment provided in 1974 (the average length of these answers is only some 4 - 5 lines). The countries which have re- sorted to this practice include USA, Canada, Denmark, France, India and Federal Repub- lic of Germany. It is also possible to dis- cern a cumulative tendency in the activities concerning a WDC; of the 19 most active countries listed in Table 2, 16 have responded to the Secretary-General in 1975 (only



Ghana, Nepal and Zambia have declined to do so). Three of these 16 countries, viz. India, France and the United States, have provided the sort of routinized answer de- scribed above). This means that the remaining ten »routinized» countries do not belong to the most active WDC-countries in terms of debate propensity in the General Assembly. In other words a significant corre- lation, indicating the cumulative tendency in the WDC activity, emerges.

The situation in the WDC debate is quite similar with that prevailing in other nego- tiation fora, viz. Third-World countries are supporting the views of socialist countries on disarmament policies, but insist at the same time that more far-reaching decision must be achieved. These demands start in most cases from the idea that nuclear disarmament is the most important issue. Con- sequently these demands are directed to the nuclear powers which may expect a frontal attack against their policies in a WDC if it is to be held. The Kenyan government, for instance, has stated that the central objective of a WDC should be »to get an assurance from the nuclear weapon powers that they will work towards the cessation of the arms race and the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and the limitation of strategic weapons systems» as well as pre- vention of the militarization of oceans. Furthermore, the peaceful uses of the nuclear energy and the channelling of the funds, hitherto used for the building up of nuclear weapons, to the advancement of the economy of developing nations were emphasized in the Kenyan reply to the note verbale by the U.N. Secretary General.

Non-governmental organizations have pre- sented a more extensive agenda for a WDC than most governments in their replies to the Secretary-General. The declaration of the Bradford conference, mentioned above, sing- les out four group of factors which should be considered in a WDC, viz. nuclear weapons, international security, human survival and educational aspects. In the case of nuclear weapons the declaration demands the outlawing of the use of nuclear weapons, the application of automatic sanctions against any actor using or threatening to use these weapons as well as the dismant- ling of existing nuclear warheads and their means of delivery. As to international se-

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curity the declaration makes, inter alia, the points that all sales and transfers of arms and ammunition must be licensed and controlled, and all military alliances should be dissolved.

One might claim that the criticism put forward by non-aligned countries means in fact the adoption of the Chinese line in the disarmament issues. This is not, however, the case, but it rather illustrates a more general pattern. This pattern could be easily observed, for examble, in the work- of the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment in which most developing nations, including India, strongly attacked the industrialized countries and rightly said that they are in the main responsible for the increasing pollution. The case of a WDC would probably be quite the same; only the concrete issue would be different. No doubt the Soviet Union would get a fair share of the criticism in a would-be WDC, but still the main criticism would be directed to the United States as it is the strong- est military power in the world and the »pioneering» and leading country in the field of nuclear arms race. From this pers- pective it is understandable that the United States does not feel interest in the conven- tion of a WDC, because it would result in the public condemnation of her armament policies by the majority of nations in the world.

The situation illustrates also a more general problem in the work of the United Nations. The planning and practical measures of disarmament belong to the Secu- rity Council, while the General Assembly can consider general principles, including principles related to disarmament and arms control. This makes that there is a certain conflict of interest between General Assem- bly and the Security Council as to their jurisdiction and powers to act. This conflict has become manifest in the pressure to change the content of the UN Charter. As a WDC would probably get its mandate from the General Assembly, it hardly can do anything else that to concentrate its work on the principles promoting disarmament (which is exactly the line adopted by the socialist countries). This is an addition- al reason why the United States has been less willing to support the WDC idea. The



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29th session of the General Assembly indicates that the United States is strongly cri- tical of the policy carried out by the majority of the UN Assembly, and it is not going to tolerate the terror by the majority, as

stated the former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, John Scali. The U.S. attitude to the WDC plan is probably only a reflection of this wider political constella- tion.



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DISARMAMENT, DÉTENTE, DEVELOPMENT Papers from the IPRA Disarmament Study Group || TOWARDS A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE