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Disarmament and International Security London International Model United Nations 18th Session | 2017

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Table of Contents

Introduction letters………………………………………………………..3

Introduction to the committee……………………………………………6

Topic A……………………………………………………………………..7

Topic B……………………………………………………………………..19

Conference Information…………………………………………………..30

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Introduction Letters

Jackson Webster: Director

My name's Jackson Webster, I'm originally from Manhattan Beach, California,

and have spent the last 3 years living and studying in Europe. My bachelors

was in the King's College London Department of War Studies in the United

Kingdom, where I participated in KCL's United Nations Association. I am

currently reading for a masters in International Security in the École des

affaires internationales at Sciences Po Paris. My degree is focused on risk

analysis and Russian studies, particularly the effects of Russia's domestic

politics on the formation of her foreign policy. As such, I look forward to

hearing DISEC's delegates debate some of today's most pressing security

issues. I've been participating in MUN for 7 years now, both in the states in

high school and in Europe during my degrees. Last year, I had the privilege of

serving the KCL UNA as its President, and as Secretary General of our annual

conference held at KCL's Strand Campus: ULMUN. This will be my 4th year

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at LIMUN, and my second time chairing here, and with such an excellent dais I

look forward to making it my best LIMUN yet!

Mélanie Villar: Assistant Director

My name is Mélanie Villar, and I will be one of the Deputy Directors of

DISEC at LIMUN 2017. I am doing a second Master’s in International

Relations, specialty International security and defense at Jean Moulin Lyon 3

University (France). I've been studying intergovernmental organisations and

NGOs last year, and Law and Political science during my BA.

I have participated in about 13 conferences as a delegate (mostly Model United

Nations), then 3 as a member of the Press Team (London MUN 15, Leeds

MUN 15 and Lyon MUN 15), and I am currently the Secretary General of

Lyon Model United Nations 2017. As you can see, I am fond of that kind of

simulations that are fundamental for learning about International Relations and

their institutions, and especially the United Nations. I am very excited to come

back to London for this amazing conference, and to experience chairing there. I

was a delegate last year at the Security Council, and once again I obviously

loved it. Thank you so much to the LIMUN team for organising such a

conference.

Somaan Tariq: Assistant Director

I’m Soman Tariq, originally from Pakistan but living in Germany for more

than a year now. I’m 20, and currently pursuing a BSc in Industrial

Engineering and International Economics at Jacobs University Bremen. I’ve

been an avid public speaker and MUN-ner throughout the course of the past

few years. From someone who could barely speak out a word on his first high

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school conference to participating in over 13 conferences and finally chairing

LIMUN. Yes, I’ll be serving as the Co-Director of DISEC at LIMUN 2017.

I’m also the Secretary-General for Bremen International Model UN 2017, the

President of BRIMUN Society, and along with that I’ve chaired Hamburg

MUN twice, so rest assured you’re in good hands! On a less formal note, I’m

into rowing, lifting weights and House of Cards. Dress like Frank Underwood,

and you’ll surely take the award with you. I’m more than delighted to come

back to my favorite city in the world to chair Europe’s largest conference. I

wish the best of luck to all, and I am very much looking forward being in

London!

Committee email: disec@limun.org.uk

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General Assembly: First

Committee

The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) was the first

committee established by the United Nations General Assembly, tasked with

the UN’s founding purpose: preventing another world war. DISEC has, over

the 71 years of the existence of the General Assembly, discussed topics

concerning the prevention of the proliferation of arms, the resolution of

regional conflicts, the settlement of border disputes, and much more.

Because of the sensitive nature of DISEC’s purview, it is often considered both

the most influential and the most contentious committee of the General

Assembly.

DISEC is as relevant today as it ever has been. Multiple states are on the verge

of becoming new nuclear powers, and the international norms and statutes

preventing the usage of weapons of mass destruction are being stressed, tested,

and questioned.

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Topic A: The Proliferation of Weapons

of Mass Destruction in South Asia

Introduction

Throughout the course of the history the issue of Weapons of Mass Destruction

(WMDs)s including Nuclear and Chemical Weapons in South Asia has been a

very significant one. India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974, which was

the first test of its sort in South Asia. The strong arms race between India and

Pakistan led to Pakistan developing its nuclear weapons and thus conducting

its first nuclear test in 1998.

Initially India also possessed a certain amount of Chemical Weapons but in

1992, after signing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), India started a

dismantling program for its chemical weapons stockpile.

India has also ratified the Biological Weapons Convention and pledges to

abide by its obligations. In 1974, Pakistan also ratified the Biological Weapons

Convention. Therefore the issue of Biological Weapons remains of a lesser

significance.

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However, India and Pakistan have not signed the NPT, which enhances the

issue of nuclear proliferation even more in the region. All other states within

the geographical boundaries of South Asia have signed the NPT.

Both India and Pakistan have frequently been through severe tensions since

1947 including three wars. Furthermore the issue of Kashmir and the disputed

territories between both the countries increase the problem even more. At

various instances in the history both of the countries have been at the verge of

a nuclear war.

Both of the countries possess Second Strike capabilities and maintain huge

stockpiles of different types of nuclear weapons. India has declared a ‘no first-

use policy’ whereas Pakistan maintains a ‘no first-attack policy’ which is even

more problematic in this case.

Pakistan refuses to adopt a "no-first-use" doctrine, indicating that it would

launch nuclear weapons even if the other side did not use such weapons first.

Indian officials also say that the main threat to national security comes from

China, not only from Pakistan. Thus, the Pakistani ballistic missile called

Ghauri (1998) was never introduced by India as a significant nuclear power of

its neighbour, even though it was adequate to reach New Delhi for example. It

is clear that diminishing the importance of the nuclear power of Pakistan, India

wants to position itself as the rival power of China. Also, Pakistan and China

maintain close diplomatic ties for a long time.1 Indeed, during the 1962 Sino-

Indian border conflict, China expressed its support for a referendum in

Kashmir, like Pakistan and contrary to what India wanted. Hence, India

continues to be concerned about the emergence of a Chinese threat,

1 http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/06/17/commentary/world-commentary/china-india-battle-nuclear-playing-field/#.WCIa_TdF0qY

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considering the strong military and diplomatic bonds between China and

Pakistan.

Adding the issue, the non-state actors within the region also pose a security

threat. The presence of terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeeda, Taliban and

Harkat-Ul-Mujahideen within the region pose a risk to the security of the

nuclear weapons.

History of the Problem

The history of WMDs in South Asia dates back to 1967, when India started its

nuclear program. It was the very first time any state in South Asia had access

to a WMD program which is why India did not sign the Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. In 1974, India tested its first nuclear

device, which was code-named as “Smiling Buddha”. India called it a

“Peaceful nuclear explosion” stating that it was testing its nuclear program for

the purpose of deterrence. India's pursuit of nuclear weapons was first spurred

by a 1962 border clash with China and by Beijing's 1964 nuclear test.

Pakistan's nuclear weapons development was in response to the loss of East

Pakistan in 1971's Bangladesh Liberation War. In 1972, under Prime Minister

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan started its nuclear program. Munir Ahmed Khan,

Ex-President of the Nuclear Reactor division at IAEA Vienna was appointed as

the Chief of Pakistan’s nuclear program, with the initial goal of completing the

bomb by the end of 1976.

In the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, Pakistan suffered a very heavy defeat from

India, losing an area of 56,000 sq. miles (Formerly known as East Pakistan.

Now knowns as Bangladesh) This defeat and such huge loss of territory led to

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Pakistan eventually starting its nuclear program enabling it to compete in a

nuclear arms race with its rival India.

Throughout the course of the decade, various Pakistani scientists from all over

the world, particularly from International Research Centre for Physics in Italy

joined the program. The program was highly secretive throughout the time.

In 1998, India conducted its second nuclear test. Around 2 weeks later,

Pakistan successfully conducted its first nuclear test. The map above shows the

Nuclear Test sites throughout South Asia. Pakistan conducted its nuclear test in

Ras Koh hills near its border with Iran. Whereas India conducted its first

nuclear test in Pokhran near its border with Pakistan.

In 1999, Kargil War occurred between both the countries. It was feared that a

nuclear-war may breakaway, as Pakistan had recently conducted its first

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nuclear test. Furthermore, Pakistan doesn’t maintain a “no-first-use” policy,

which increased the threat of a nuclear war even more. During the period,

Pakistan Foreign Secretary, Shamshad Ahmad made a statement saying that

Pakistan could use any weapon in its arsenal during the war. The situation

worsened when CIA received reports that Pakistan was moving its warheads

closer to the border with India. At that time, the US President Bill Clinton tried

persuading Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif against any such actions.

The disputed territory of Kashmir has now and then been the cause of hostility

between Pakistan and India. It has also been the reason behind the wars of

1947, 1965 and the Kargil War of 1999. India has maintained control over the

Jammu and Kashmir area, whereas Pakistan maintains control over the Azad

Kashmir region. Thousands of people have died in the Kashmir Conflict, but

no solution was ever reached. The UNSC called for a referendum to be held in

Kashmir, but until the date, it has not been held.

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The Line of Control (LOC) separates the Pakistani administered Kashmir from

the Indian administered Kashmir. Although no official statistics are available

regarding the matter, but it is rumoured that both Pakistan and India maintain

120-130 nuclear warheads each.

Within the region, several non-state organisations are very active, including the

terrorist organisation, Lashkar-e-Taiba, which operates several training camps

for militants all over Kashmir. With the existence of such organisations in such

a hostile region, the threat of security risks increases even more. The security

of the Nuclear Programs of India and Pakistan are also at risk.While Dr. Abdul

Qadeer Khan claimed that Pakistan’s nuclear program is the most secure in the

world, there is always a threat of these non-state actors gaining access to these

weapons.

Statement of the Problem

Proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of the most important issue and is at

the very heart of the international political agenda. At the present time and

despite prevention and control arrangements, two regions require debating: the

Middle East and Asia. The United Nations Security Council and IAEA

concerns are numerous: Iranian nuclear weapons development, North Korean

nuclear tests and its consequences in the Sea of Japan, the growing power of

China, and other tensions such as the ones just mentioned between Pakistan

and India. In Asia, theories of deterrence and proliferation effect political

realities: we can call it the “security dilemma”. 2 Indeed, once a country

develops its nuclear arsenal, its neighbour increases its own nuclear capacity as

well: China’s nuclear arsenal is real and is seen by India as a threat, so India

2 http://thediplomat.com/2013/05/solving-the-northeast-asia-security-dilemma/

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acquired nuclear weapons.34 As a consequence, Pakistan developed its nuclear

capabilities. Also, DPRK declared possessing nuclear weapons in 2005.

Even if the nuclear build-up by Pakistan and India is a classic nuclear

dissuasion, the international community feels concerned about this region’s

stability. However, some believe that proliferation in Asia is due to the will of

these countries to strike a better balance of power.5 Therefore, the Chinese,

Indian and Pakistani increasing nuclear arsenal can be seen as stabilising factor

in a region where 40 per cent of the global population live. India and Pakistan

have created a group of experts that meets regularly for the harmonization of

New Delhi and Islamabad positions. Even if this situation is not ideal

especially because they have not signed the NPT, it ensures a certain strategic

stabilization.

Areas of tension are multiple: Pakistan and India had a common history (until

the partition in 1947), the border is close to Pakistani vital centers, and there

are recurring boundary disputes (Kashmir for example).6

The P5 members of the Security Council have attempted to ensure that Article

1 of the NPT will be respected respected, and especially within these Asian

countries. The first article of the Non-Proliferation Treaty states that “each

nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any

recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or

control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not

in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to

3 https://asialyst.com/fr/2016/08/02/inde-le-programme-nucleaire-cible-contre-la-chine-pas-contre-le-pakistan/ 4 http://nationalinterest.org/feature/indias-mighty-nuclear-weapons-program-aimed-china-pakistan-11956 5 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-co/hotcontent/index.html?section=world/asia/eastasia/northkorea 6 http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/dossiers/inde-pakistan/cachemire.shtml

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manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive

devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.”7 However, India

and Pakistan did not sign the treaty, so these countries are under no legal

obligation.

After the 1998 nuclear tests by India, both India and Pakistan rejected the idea

of signing the NPT. Thus, these countries went against the UNSC resolution

taken the same year about international security, demanding in Article 3 of the

resolution to India and Pakistan to “refrain from further nuclear tests and in

this context calls upon all States not to carry out any nuclear weapon test

explosion or any other nuclear explosion in accordance with the provisions of

the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty”.8

The international community feels concerned not only about the fact that India

and Pakistan possess an important nuclear arsenal, but also the security

measures of these materials are not sufficient enough, nor satisfactory. Indeed,

even if the NTI index 2016 (Nuclear Threat Initiative index) shows that

improvements have been noticed especially by India, the country still lacks an

independent regulatory agency.9 Even if the IAEA Additional Protocol has

been set up in India, many efforts needs to be done. Also, the unstable

Pakistani political environment is a major regional concern, even if efforts

have been undertaken, particularly to prevent the theft of nuclear materials.

Moreover, Pakistan has not implemented the Additional Protocol of IAEA.

The situation is still more worrying because of the tensions between Pakistan

and India. The NTI index attests that South Asia is the most likely region for

7 http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/text%20of%20the%20treaty.pdf 8 https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/158/60/PDF/N9815860.pdf?OpenElement 9 http://www.ntiindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/NTI_2016-Index_FINAL.pdf

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“the first Post-Second world war use of nuclear weapons”, especially because

of the border conflicts in Kashmir. As History has shown, these two countries

have already gone to war with each other four times (1947, 1965, 1971 and

1999).

Current Situation

While five countries with nuclear weapons are trying to reduce or maintain

their nuclear arsenal, three others continue to increase theirs. Indeed in one of

its reports, the International Peace Research Institute Stockholm (SIPRI)

explained that China has now 250 nuclear warheads whereas they had 240 in

2012, Pakistan 100 to 120 against 90 to 110 and India increased the number of

its warheads by 20%.10

Institutes such as SIPRI judge the peace in South Asia as fragile, and this arms

race is worrying the international community, mainly because of the growing

tensions that persist between India and Pakistan, the two Koreas, or even China

and Japan.11 The signatories of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)

like Russia and the United States of America have reduced their arsenals.

France, the United Kingdom and Israel remain at the same level. However,

these are estimations. These statements are more or less reliable depending on

the country. For example, China is now such a total opacity and Russia are

showing less and less transparency.

Also, the reduction of the stockpile of nuclear weapons arms does not mean

reducing the nuclear threat. Shanon Kile, the coordinator of the nuclear

research at SIPRI, explained that "The long-term modernization programs in

10 http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2013/06/03/chine-inde-et-pakistan-continuent-d-accroitre-leur-arsenal-nucleaire_3422592_3210.html 11 https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2016/global-nuclear-weapons-downsizing-modernizing

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ongoing in these states suggest that nuclear weapons are still a sign of the

international status, and show that nuclear weapons are power".12

Pakistan increases its military capabilities depending on what India does, India

increases its military capabilities depending on what China does, China

increases its military capabilities depending on what the United States does,

and the US according to its allies (including South Korea). That is what Greg

Thielmann and David Logan (two researchers at the University of Princetown)

call « arms race vortex », a dangerous chain reaction.

Bloc Positions

Both, Pakistan and India, face continuous pressure from the International

community regarding the issue of Nuclear Proliferation, as both of them are

non-signatories to the NPT. Furthermore, it was believed that Pakistan secretly

assisted North Korea for developing its own nuclear program.

China has always been a supportive ally for Pakistan’s Nuclear and Military

Programs. It can also be explained by China’s rivalry with India and the

territorial disputes between both of the countries. Beijing’s nuclear test was

also one of the reason why India developed a nuclear program in the first

place. Recently, China has also started investing in the nuclear energy

production program in Pakistan.

Russia has also been supportive of India’s nuclear program. There has always

been a historical military and nuclear cooperation between India and Russia. In

2009, another nuclear deal was signed between both of the countries to set up

two more nuclear power plants in India for which Russia provided technical

and financial assistance. Recently in 2016, Russia also conducted a joint

12 http://www.obsarm.org/spip.php?article276

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Military exercise with Pakistan, making it the first time any such cooperation

had occurred between Pakistan and Russia.

However, The US has always been a promoter of non-proliferation. The issue

always been a very controversial topic between both of the countries. In fact, in

1999 after Pakistan’s first nuclear test, the relations between Pakistan and US

were heavily strained.

In 2005, US and India signed a Civil Nuclear Cooperation deal to separate

India’s military and civil nuclear programs and to place its civil nuclear

program under IAEA safeguards, whereas in return the US agreed to cooperate

for the further development of the civil nuclear program.

In 2008, France also signed a civil nuclear cooperation deal with India for the

development of nuclear energy in India. France provided technical and

financial assistance, according to the deal. In 2009, France signed a deal with

Pakistan known as the France-Pakistan Atomic Energy Framework under

which France promised to provide more security to Pakistan’s nuclear energy

program. Pakistan and France also agreed upon mutual collaboration for

nuclear safety and security. Critics have compared this deal to India-US Civil

Nuclear Cooperation deal. France has also been one of Pakistan’s biggest

military contractor despite its good relations with India.

Questions A Resolution Must Address

• What role can DISEC play in addressing the issue of Nuclear Proliferation

in South Asia?

• How can Pakistan and India ensure the safety and integrity of their

individual nuclear programs from the hands of non-state actors and

organisations within the region?

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• What role should the international community play in addressing the

Kashmir Conflict?

• How can China play a key role in ensuring stability in the South Asian

region?

• What new mechanisms and agreements need to be formulated to promote

nuclear disarmament in South Asia?

Sources

Asialyst, “Le programme nucléaire cible contre la Chine pas contre le

Pakistan”, August 2016, Asialyst

H. PANT Harsh, “China and India battle on nuclear playing field”, June 2017,

The Japan Times

JIMIN Chen, “Solving the Northeast Asia security dilemma”, May 2013, The

Diplomat

Le Monde, “La Chine, l’Inde et le Pakistan continuent d’accroître leur arsenal

nucléaire”, June 2013, Le Monde

SIPRI, “Global nuclear weapons downsizing modernizing”, June 2016, SIPRI

The Washington Post, “North Korea declares itself as a nuclear power”,

February 2005, The Washington Post

NTI 2016 Index, Building a framework for Assurance, Accountability and

Action, January 2016, Nuclear Security Index

Non Proliferation Treaty, July 1968

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Topic B: Combating the Threat of

Islamic State Sleeper Cells

Introduction

Over the past three years, the world has faced an immense security threat from

the Islamic State (IS). Numerous countries in the West and the Middle East

have been significantly affected by this threat.

One of the reasons why the threat is so grave is because of the unique way ISIS

operates. The organisation commands a sizable amount of sleeper cells all over

the world. These sleeper cells are used to carry out attacks far beyond the reach

of IS’s conventionally-held territory. Reports suggest that in Continental

Europe alone, IS operates more than 20 individual sleeper cells comprising of

more than 120 members each.13

During the last years, these sleeper cells have been used to carry out attacks in

Paris, Brussels and other places in the world. The nature of these sleeper cells

makes it very hard for security organisations to cater to this threat. Most of

these cells are only activated a few days prior to the attacks. These sleeper cells

13 http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/16/europe/europe-terrorism-threat/

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only execute the instructions of the masterminds of the attacks. Sleeper cells

have extended to South Asia and Southeast Asia as well. IS has claimed

responsibility for various attacks in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh. In

order to respond to this threat, continuing multilateral security cooperation and

intelligence and is needed.

During the past years, security organisations throughout the world have

focused on defeating IS at its core, which includes destroying its strongholds in

Syria and Iraq, however the issue of sleeper cells is now of increasing

importance.

In Europe, the ongoing refugee crisis has eased the spread of IS sleeper cells

throughout the continent. It has been reported that numerous IS trained fighters

disguised as refugees had been sent to Germany, France, and other European

member-states.14 With such a large influx of refugees to the Continent, it has

become increasingly difficult to screen individuals for potential links with ISIS

and other terrorist organisations. Various IS sleeper cell members crossed

through Turkey into the Balkans and then further into mainland Europe.

Furthermore, the potential visa-free travel deal between Turkey and Brussels

may render controlling the Schengen Zone’s borders a nearly insurmountable

task.

History of the Problem

The so-called Islamic State (IS) was established by ex-members of al-Qaeda in

Iraq (AQI) in 2013 upon the declaration of a new caliphate by self-declared

caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The group’s ideology draws on theological

writings of Salafist-Islamist writers across the Muslim world --mainly Egypt,

Saudi Arabia, and from within the al-Qaeda network-- however it also

14 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-security-idUSKCN0VE0XL

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represents a new stage in the evolution of jihadist discourse. While al-Qaeda

had never attempted territorial control, IS explicitly sought to establish a Sunni

Salafist caliphate which was territorially contiguous, “remaining and

expanding” to incorporate new ‘Emirates’ across the Greater Middle East. IS

thus differs from other religious extremist organisations in that it has overt

territorial ambitions, and thus more closely resembles a quasi-state. This

assertion is supported by the IS leadership’s actions within their captured

territory: establishing a pseudo-governmental bureaucracy in Raqqa in Syria,

minting a currency, levying taxes, etc.

Attacks perpetrated by IS sympathisers have thus far impacted almost every

continent on Earth. In the United States, two attacks by individuals pledging

allegiance to IS have occurred. The first was a shooting at an office complex in

San Bernardino, California in December 2015, which killed 14 individuals and

wounded a number of others. The attack was carried out by a radicalised

husband and wife, who had pledged allegiance to IS on social media before the

shooting. The husband was an American-born citizen and his wife was a lawful

permanent resident of Pakistani origin. The second attack occurred in June

2016 in Orlando, Florida, when a radicalised American citizen, Omar Mateen,

attacked a gay nightclub of which he had frequently been a patron. Prior to the

attack, Mateen declared himself a “fighter of the Islamic State” on social

media.

Europe has seen the three most striking examples of successful IS attacks

outside of conflict zones. Two attacks occurred in Paris, the first on the offices

of satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo and the second on a series of cafes and

concert halls in Paris’s young and diverse 11th district. In both cases, the

French GIGN (armed police) killed the individuals involved, all of whom were

French citizens, both natural-born and naturalised. In Belgium in March 2016,

bombers attacked the capital’s international airport, killing dozens and

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themselves in the process. The country has made serious changes to its internal

security architecture since, as both the attackers in Brussels and Paris used the

western Bruxelloise suburb of Molenbeek as a staging area for their cells.

Since the attacks, residents of Molenbeek have become some of Europe’s

strongest voices against both harsh anti-immigrant sentiment and religious

radicalisation. In Germany, multiple isolated ‘lone-wolf’ attacks have occurred

over the past year, some of which were perpetrated by German citizens and

some by refugees and migrants. Though some attacks have been linked to

sleeper cells, most were isolated incidents more closely associated with mental

illness.

In Africa, IS-associated groups in Mali and Nigeria have been the deadliest

islamist groups outside the Syrian conflict. Though these militants cannot be

accurately described as “sleeper cells”, their existence nonetheless exemplifies

the spread of Salafist ideology across the globe.

In the Middle East, attacks committed by radicalised Syrian refugees and

Kurdish militants associated with multiple groups, including IS, have hit

various locations in Turkey. The most notable incident took place in Ankara in

October 2015, where two IS militants detonated explosive belts in the middle

of a crowd of demonstrators, killing well over 100 Turkish citizens. In a

separate incident, an IS fighter detonated a bomb in Istanbul near the Blue

Mosque, deliberately targeting foreign nationals and killing 13 German

tourists.

In Asia, a pair of IS militants attacked a bakery in the Bangladeshi capital of

Dhaka, in an attack inspired by the attacks on a Jewish supermarket in Paris

which occurred in tandem with the Charlie Hebdo killings of 2015. When

Bangladeshi security forces retook the building, 20 hostages and 8 bystanders

had been killed. In Quetta, Pakistan in August and October 2016, IS militants

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attacked a hospital full of lawyers and a police academy, respectively. The

attacks together killed over 100 Pakistanis and wounded 100 more. In the tribal

areas of Pakistan’s northern provinces, the threat posed by IS cells is often

exacerbated by the ongoing conflict between central authorities in Islamabad

and the Pakistani Taliban.

Statement of the Problem

IS sleeper cells are a unique evolution of the threat posed by religious

extremism for two reasons: its unique organisational structure and its recruiting

methods.

Unlike al-Qaeda, IS operates with an incredibly decentralised network

structure. Al-Qaeda commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan had tight control

over their cells around the world. Conversely, IS-central in Raqqa has only

varying degrees of spotty contact with its cells in other parts of the world. The

organisation operates more like a franchise enterprise than a typical militant

organisation, thus complicating the tasks of internal security agencies more

accustomed to combatting opponents such as the IRA, Tamil Tigers, leftist

militants, or the PLO. In many cases, fighters are not part of any formal

network and may not even be in contact with IS itself. In such cases, ‘lone

wolf’ fighters plan and execute simple attacks, only linking themselves to IS

and its ideology on social media or in suicide notes as part of their

justifications or manifestos. Often these individuals have little-to-no training,

are typically poorly educated on Islam and takfiri ideology, and more than

likely have non-theological motivations. Such was the case in the 2016

Orlando attack, where the gunman was most likely motivated by a combination

of social isolation, marital troubles, and mental illness, and was never an

extraordinarily or demonstrably religious individual according to his associates

interviewed by authorities. In fact, IS fighters, both in and outside the Syrian

theatre, have shown remarkably low levels of familiarity with the Islamic

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religion in general when compared with the leadership of other organisations

such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda, many of whom were educated in theological

discourse to degree-level.

The result of these two loosely-constructed frameworks --ideology and control-

- mean that almost any violent act committed around the globe is open to ties

to the Islamic State, a link drawn either before the attack by its perpetrators or

ex post facto by IS media outlets. Many attacks by members of militant groups

not officially affiliated with the Islamic State, such as the Pakistani Taliban,

have been appropriated after the fact by opportunistic IS propagandists. The

effect of this strategy is a sense of relentless panic and despair instilled in

target publics, a sort of apocalyptic feeling that IS’s enemies are under siege

while in reality most attacks have very little to do with central authorities

within the Caliphate’s territory. IS is able to capitalise on domestic criminal

activity in otherwise secure nations for its own branding and narrative

purposes. IS leadership’s repeated open calls for Muslims living in the West to

attack any and all civilian targets thus comes as no surprise, as it gives

terrifying significance to any act of violence of any magnitude committed by

any Muslim citizen of any Western country, adding to the IS narrative of

civilisational conflict between Islam and the West.

Islamic State’s decentralised system of sleeper cells creates an organisation

which is hard to track and defeat, and which is extremely adept at taking

advantage of unrelated attacks for propaganda purposes. Even the world’s most

experienced security agencies --DGSÉ, FSB, CIA, MI5, BND- have struggled

to keep up with the dizzying rate at which IS can contact potential

sympathisers through social media, far from its online operators in Iraq and

Syria. In fact, IS itself has internal security organisations both involved in

recruitment abroad and in control of its foreign-born fighters. Most of the

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members of these intelligence-related organs are former members of the

mukhabarat, Saddam Hussein’s internal security service, and thus were trained

by Warsaw Pact agencies such as the KGB and the Stasi. When confronting the

threat of IS sleeper cells, the international community must adopt an approach

which draws upon methods from the fields of counterinsurgency,

counterterrorism, and counterintelligence.

Current Situation

Reports from IS defectors interviewed by European and American media and

academics over the past year reveal the new evolution of IS strategy, one

which is aware of the group’s likely conventional military defeat by Iraqi and

Kurdish security forces (ISF, KRG). Immediately before the ‘13 novembre’

attacks in Paris in 2015, IS leadership began turning away European recruits,

telling them to leave Syria and instead return to Europe and await instructions

to attack European civilians. A number of recruits, thinking they had come to

Iraq and Syria to fight in the Syrian Civil War, were disturbed by this, and

began to speak with media such as the New York Times, Der Spiegel, and Le

Monde, as well as by academic institutions such as King’s College London’s

International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR). These ex-recruits

described a network of IS fighters, deliberately interspersed amongst refugees

transiting over land through Turkey and the Balkans, told to return to Europe

and begin organising attacks. Raqqa likely does not have direct control over

the details of attacks carried out by these cells, instead opting to spread their

assets as thin as possible, hoping that a least a few of the IS cells will succeed,

slip past security agencies, and be able to carry out attacks.

Outside of Europe, IS still relies on its franchise network for global influence.

IS franchises are faring differently from region-to-region. While the Libyan

franchise in Sirte is still the group’s wing largest outside of Syria, its Nigerian

and Afghan affiliates are still in fighting form as well. This state of affairs will,

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however, not last, given recent Nigerian military victories, American drone

strikes in Afghanistan, and the slow formation of alliances amongst Libyan

tribes against their IS-affiliated counterpart.

Bloc Positions

Combined Joint Task Force/Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR):

Beyond geographic blocs, it is worth noting the allegiance of certain states to

the coalition currently fighting IS forces in Iraq and Syria, as these states are

more directly invested in the conflict. By engaging the Islamic State militarily,

these states are also more likely to be targeted for attacks by IS fighters. The

OIR member-states kinetically engaged with IS are as follows: Australia,

Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,

Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Kurdistan Regional Government, Latvia, New

Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,

Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, UAE, United Kingdom, United States.

Europe: European states are particularly vulnerable to infiltration by sleeper

cells for a number of political, geographic, and socioeconomic reasons.

Equally, the large Muslim minorities present in many European states are

particularly vulnerable to radicalisation, especially in states where these

minorities are socioeconomically marginalised. European states currently face

a dual security threat both from the violence of IS sleeper cells and nationalist

hate crimes in response to high numbers of migrants. These problems are

further complicated by Continental European states’ open borders. The EU has

thus focused on common border security agencies --lead by Italy-- and

intelligence sharing mechanisms --lead by France and Belgium--.

Middle Eastern States: By proximity, these states are the most vulnerable to

IS sleeper cell formation, and man states such as Libya and Afghanistan have

seen organisations which started as small cells metastasize into fully-fledged

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‘emirates’. These states pursued highly varied approaches to the crisis,

depending largely on domestic factors such as the level of authoritarianism in

government, the religious sect of the state, the state’s religious plurality, the

number of refugees accepted, and the sympathies of the given state’s

population for Salafist ideology. Middle Eastern states, even those within the

Arab League, do not form a contiguous bloc on such issues relating to the

Syrian Civil War. Notable divisions exist particularly in the power struggle

between Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

Russia and Central Asian States: Moscow and the Central Asian republics

which rely on her for military assistance are highly concerned by infiltration

from sleeper cells given their large Muslim populations and histories of inter-

religious violence in the region. These states have taken hardline stances on

internal security in an attempt to combat ‘homegrown terrorism’ since the First

Chechen War of the 1990s.

East Asia: Only China has become truly concerned by the prospect of

domestic terrorism resulting from allegiances to global jihadist movements,

and with good reason, given Beijing’s complicated relationship with its

western provinces. China has relied upon a combination of a security

crackdown in western provinces and an informational campaign to create a

Han Chinese ethnic identity which transcends the country’s diverse religious

composition.

South Asia: All three major South Asian states --India, Bangladesh, and

Pakistan, are gravely threatened by IS sleeper cells. All three states have strong

nationalist, separatist, and irredentist political factions, which when combined

with allegiances to a terrorist organisation such as IS could prove threatening.

Bangladesh was the victim of an IS-aligned terrorist attack in 2016 in its

capital which specifically targeted foreign nationals.

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Questions A Resolution Must Address

• What role can the General Assembly play in international coordination on

counterterrorism writ large?

• How will the international community address the diffusion of ISIS be

affected by the impending defeat of the group’s bases of operations in Syria

and Iraq? Will the nature of the group change moving forward?

• How do the solutions to combating radicalisation differ from region-to-

region?

• How should states treat citizens who travelled to fight for the Islamic State?

Sources

Aubenas, Florence. “Attentats de Paris : la bande de Molenbeek”. Le Monde

(Bruxelles). 4 May 2016.

Callimachi, Rukmini. “How a Secretive Branch of ISIS Built a Global

Network of Killers”. New York Times (New York). 3 August 2016.

Cronin, Audrey. “The Islamic State is Not a Terrorist Group”. Foreign Affairs

(New York), March 2015.

Damgé, Mathilde. “Origine, puissance, financement : les clefs pour

comprendre l’Etat islamique”. Le Monde (Paris), November 2015.

Filiu, Jean-Pierre. Un si proche orient (blog, various entries), Le Monde (Paris).

Filiu, Jean-Pierre. “L’Amérique en déni de l’État islamique”, Le Monde

(Paris). 25 January 2016.

Laumonier, Alexandre. “Molenbeek-Saint-Jean n’est pas un ghetto”. Le Monde

(Bruxelles). 23 November 2015.

Lebovich, Andrew. “How ‘religious’ are ISIS fighters? The relationship

between religious literacy and religious motivation”. Brookings Institute

(Washington). 13 April 2016.

Sèbe, Berny. “Sousse shows the deadly potential of the Isis franchise”. The

Guardian (London). 28 June 2015.

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Shavit, Uriya. “Al-Qaeda's Saudi Origins”. Middle East Quarterly. Fall 2006.

Pg. 3-13.

Weiss, Michael. “How ISIS Picks its Suicide Bombers”. The Daily Beast (New

York). 16 November 2015.

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Conference Information

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Agenda & Rules of Procedure

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