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This article was downloaded by: [Colorado College]On: 30 October 2014, At: 17:17Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Sport, Ethics and PhilosophyPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rsep20
Disability or ExtraordinaryTalent—Francesco Lentini (Three Legs)Versus Oscar Pistorius (No Legs)Ivo van Hilvoorde & Laurens LandeweerdPublished online: 18 Jul 2008.
To cite this article: Ivo van Hilvoorde & Laurens Landeweerd (2008) Disability or ExtraordinaryTalent—Francesco Lentini (Three Legs) Versus Oscar Pistorius (No Legs), Sport, Ethics andPhilosophy, 2:2, 97-111, DOI: 10.1080/17511320802221778
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17511320802221778
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DISABILITY OR EXTRAORDINARY TALENT—
FRANCESCO LENTINI (THREE LEGS) VERSUS
OSCAR PISTORIUS (NO LEGS)
Ivo van Hilvoorde and Laurens Landeweerd
It seems fairly straightforward to describe what should and should not count as a disability into
two separate and opposing categories. In this paper we will challenge this assumption and
critically reflect on the narrow relations between the concepts of ‘talent’ and ‘disability’. We further
relate such matters of terminology and classification to issues of justice in what is conceived of as
disability sport. Do current systems of classification do justice to the performances of disabled
athletes? Is the organisation of a just and fair competition similar for abled as it is for disabled
sport? Two cases (of Francesco Lentini and Oscar Pistorius) will be explored to further illustrate the
complexities of these questions, in particular when related to notions of normality and
extraordinary performances.
Resumen
Parece un asunto bastante simple el describir lo que deberıa y no deberıa contar como discapacidad
en dos categorıas distintas y opuestas. En este artıculo desafiaremos esta suposicion y reflejaremos
crıticamente sobre las estrechas relaciones que hay entre los conceptos de ‘talento’ y ‘incapacidad.’
Ademas conectamos tales asuntos de terminologıa y clasificacion con asuntos de justicia en lo que se
entiende como deporte discapacitado. ¿Hacen justicia estas maneras actuales de clasificacion a las
actuaciones de los atletas minusvalidos? ¿Es la organizacion de una competicion justa parecida para
el deporte con y sin discapacidad? Dos casos (el de Francesco Lentini y el de Oscar Pistorius) seran
explorados para ilustrar mejor las complejidades de estas cuestiones, en particular cuando se las
relaciona con nociones de normalidad y actuaciones extraordinarias.
Zusammenfassung
Die Unterteilung von Behinderung und Nicht-Behinderung in zwei getrennte gegensatzliche
Kategorien erscheint etwas zu vereinfachend zu sein. In unserem Artikel wollen wir diese
Unterteilung infrage stellen und kritische Reflexionen zur engen Verbindung der Begriffe ,Talent’
und ,Behinderung’ anbringen. Des Weiteren wollen wir derartige terminologische Aspekte sowie
Probleme der Klassifikation mit Fragen nach Gerechtigkeit im sogenannten Behindertensport in
Verbindung bringen. Ist die gegenwartige Leitungsklassen-Einteilung behinderter Athleten
gerecht? Ist die Organisation gerechter und fairer Wettkampfe Nicht-Behinderter mit derjenigen
Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, Vol. 2, No. 2, August 2008
ISSN 1751-1321 print/1751-133X online/08/020097–15
ª 2008 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/17511320802221778
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fur Behinderte vergleichbar? Zur Veranschaulichung der Komplexitat dieser Fragen werden zwei
Fallbeispiele (Francesco Lentini und Oscar Pistorius) herangezogen, insbesondere in Bezug auf
Begriffe wie Normalitat und besondere Leistung.
KEYWORDS disability; super-ability; definition and ethics of (disability) sports; naturalness;
artificiality; enhancement; prostheses; Lentini; Pistorius
Introduction
The highly talented and the disabled person seem, at first sight, to be living in
completely different worlds. Gifted persons will be celebrated because of their culturally
valued talents and may enjoy a lifetime of social advantages as a result. But instead of
being praised for their deviation, a disabled person may need to adapt to a world that is
primarily built around standards of normality and even experience a lifetime characterised
by stigmatising and discrimination. Therefore, there seems to be a sharp contrast between
the athlete as a cultural hero and icon and the disabled person that needs extra attention
or care; the one incorporating the peak of normality, human functioning at its best, the
other often representing the opposite. The concepts of ‘talent’ and ‘handicap’, however,
bear certain family resemblances. Both concepts of dis-ability and super-ability are based
upon deviations from standards of normality.
Disabilities are seen as a dysfunctional deviations from normality. The division
between the dysfunctional and the healthy is often built from a bio-statistical notion of
normal functioning. Though a dysfunction can also be the result of an accident, these
deviations are in many cases the result of genetic inheritance and mutations. In the
literature there is an extended discussion on how to distinguish between impairment,
disability and handicap, a classical categorisation (cf. Sherill 2004a; Ustun 2004). The
semantic jungle that followed from this discussion still obstructs clear debates on disability
rights and public duties. We will try to avoid touching upon this jungle by merely using
the term disability as a generic term.
Athletes with a disability are classified within the following disability categories (cf.
Tweedy 2002; IPC 2006; Kioumourtzoglou and Politis 2004; Klenck and Gebke 2007;
DePauw and Gavron 2005):
. Wheelchair athletes;
. Athletes with cerebral palsy;
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. Amputees;
. Athletes with total or partial loss of sight;
. Athletes with intellectual disability and learning difficulties; and
. ‘Les autres’ disabilities (a complex ‘all the rest category’)
Both the concept of ‘sport’ and ‘disability’ have their own specific distinctions and internal
differentiations, such that a combination of both gives rise to all sorts of complexities and
new issues, in particular regarding definition and fairness. The distinction between
different disabilities listed above is only relevant for disability sports. There is no medical
categorisation of disabilities that fits smoothly and logically into the context of sport. What
is considered a disability in ‘regular life’ may even become an advantage in the context of
elite sports. In basketball, extreme height is considered to be an advantage rather than a
disability, while possibly posing a disability, albeit slight, in daily life. A huge sumo wrestler
may have problems travelling on a bus, but at the same time be celebrated as a Japanese
sport hero. A genetic mutation that corresponds to extreme muscle growth can be
classified in one case as a high-risk potential for disablement and in another as a
precondition of being exceptionally talented. It appears that in many ways the scales on
which one ranks human traits are not value-neutral, or are at least established from a very
specific (albeit hidden) perspective. This poses the question whether one can neutrally or
objectively define what should count as a disability (or impairment), what as a trait within
a normal variance and what as a super-ability.
Several authors have shed light on the philosophical dimensions of classification,
categorisation, merit and justice related to disability sports (cf. Bowen 2002; Wheeler 2004;
Pickering 2005; Jones and Howe 2005). Categorisation and classification are ongoing
processes and discussions need to be continued, not least because our views on disabilities
change and evolve, as does the technology to compensate for certain disabilities. From an
egalitarian perspective one can strive for the neutralisation of luck and reward specific
talents (cf. Bailey 2007). On the other hand, specific distinctions between (severity of)
disabilities can be drawn in such a way that extreme efforts are awarded in order to
compensate for a lack of talent. Categorisations within disability sports appear to be the site
of an ‘ongoing struggle’ to find the right balance between a good competition based on
differences in talent on the one hand and the demonstration of excellence within a group
with relevant similar skills on the other. We will try to show that this tension eventually also
bears relevance for the distinction between elite sports and disability sports.
Defining Disability: Normative or Neutral
The concept of disease and disability was heavily debated in the 1970s and 1980s by
Christopher Boorse (1975, 1976, 1977) and H. Tristam Engelhardt and S.F. Spicker (1974).
Boorse looked upon the difference between health and diseases as a natural given, basing
his stance on a statistically derived definition of normal and abnormal function. Health was
therefore defined as ‘the ability to perform all typical physiological functions with at least
typical efficiency level’ (Boorse 1977, 542). Correspondingly, disease is any state that
interferes with this normal functioning. In Boorse’s words:
An organism is healthy at any moment in proportion as it is not diseased; and a disease is
a type of internal state of the organism which (i) interferes with the performance of some
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natural function—i.e., some species-typical contribution to survival and reproduction—
characteristic of the organism’s age; and (ii) is not simply in the nature of the species, i.e.,
is either atypical of the species or, if typical, mainly due to environmental causes. (Boorse
1976, 62)
This means that Boorse’s account of the concepts of health and disease is heavily
dependent of an objective image of ‘nature’, ‘natural’ or ‘normal functioning’.
Among others, Tristam Engelhardt criticises this naturalist approach to the
conceptualisation of diseases. In his opinion, one cannot analyse concepts of health and
disease solely on the basis of the biological nature of the organism and its functioning. The
social context needs to be taken into account as well. In this normative approach diseases
are normative constructions with a specific socio-cultural background, rather than natural
givens within a bio-statistical framework. In the words of Toulmin, supporting Engelhardt’s
view,
The nature of health is, at one and the same time, a matter for empirical discovery and a
matter of evaluative decision. We refine our sense of how the human body ought to
work, and ought to be helped to work, in the course of and in the light of our empirical
studies of how it does in fact work. (Toulmin 1975, 51)
So, according to the normativists, what counts as a disability and what not is as much
dependent on socio-cultural values and decisions as on medical standards. Essentially, within
this perspective, the latter are even to be seen as a subcategory of the former. The discussion
between the bio-statistical and the normative or contextual definition of diseases and
disabilities has continued up to now. As has been put forward by Moser (2006, 374), ‘Being
disabled is not something one is by definition, but something one becomes in relation to
specific environments. Disability is enacted and ordered in situated and quite specific ways.’
People can become disabled by the environment or by specific (lack of) technologies. A
person with an average intellectual ability may ‘become’ disabled in an environment with just
highly gifted people. An elite athlete who chooses not to use performance-enhancing
substances may become dis-abled in a context in which the use of doping is ‘normalised’. In
these cases (and in many similar cases) one can argue that one is free to choose the ‘right’
environment in which specific qualities can be shown and compared to ‘relevant others’. The
person that one wants to be cannot be detached from the financial rewards that are attached
to specific practices, as well as the status and meanings that are intrinsically related to the
community of superior athletic performances. The valuation of human performances cannot
be effected irrespective of a social-cultural hierarchy, ranking specific talents and making
differences between highly valued talents (e.g. the ability to throw a ball in a basket) and less
valued talents (e.g. running on prostheses).
New technologies such as prostheses apparently help to turn disabled people into
‘normal’ subjects. This may explain the urgent wish of Oscar Pistorius, an athlete who
usually competes in races for disabled athletes, to become part of the ‘normal Olympic
Games’. What may be considered ‘normalisation’ in the context of daily life is at least
ambivalent in the context of elite sport. Running on prostheses may be defined as crucial
for the specific talent that is tested in a competition against ‘relevant others’: athletes who
have the ability to show a similar talent. The wish of a disabled person to become part of
‘normal’ elite sport may be framed as a way of ‘inclusion’ or ‘integration’, but this at the
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same time reproduces new inequalities and asymmetries between performances of able
and dis-abled bodied.
If one is to enhance the traits needed to function optimally in society, one takes that
society as a universal standard against which the functioning of people is measured, while
one could also say that within a just society people should not be made to follow the
dictations of a larger ideal. When one defines what counts as a disability in a normative
rather than a descriptive fashion the notion of a disability also becomes political. In
contemporary (Western) democracies, each citizen is presupposed to be self-reliant within
a competitive capitalist environment. Therefore, society is set up to deal primarily with an
idealised version of the ‘average person’ (Taylor and Mykitiuk 2001, 1). Anything that falls
below this picture of the ideal citizen is treated as abnormal. In many respects, however,
the ideal of the elite sportsman has all characteristics of abnormality as well. But in
contrast to the disabled, the elite sportsman is not considered a political and medical
burden. So on the one hand society invests quite willingly in the ‘abnormal’ super-abilities
of the elite sportsman, while on the other it does this only reluctantly, and from a ethics of
inclusion, with respect to the disabled. In the case of disabilities, one wants to eradicate
abnormalities by equalising on the basis of ‘sameness’ (Taylor and Mykitiuk 2001, 1), while
in the case of super-abilities we support abnormalities. This ‘selective investment in the
abnormal’ and the admiration for the ‘genetically superior’ could be seen as a token of a
society that cannot meet up with the criteria for justice (cf. Tannsjo 2000). On the other
hand, sport is a competitive practice, whose internal logic consists of the display of an
unequal distribution of abilities. These internal goods are considered worth striving for, for
their own sake (cf. MacIntyre 1985; Brown 1990; McNamee 1995). Sport consists of an
internal logic that may conflict with more societal ideals (for example concerning justice or
equality). These internal goods cannot be brought in agreement with the ideal, for
example, to create as many sport categories as possible with the aim of producing as
many sport stars as possible. It may be that everyone has certain abilities and disabilities;
we cannot however freely choose the practice in which our own specific abilities are
admired by people around the world.
Rawls and a Just Distribution of Disabilities
In the 1970s, Rawls, among others, gave rise to a revival of liberal political
philosophy. Next to his general influence on political and ethical philosophy, Rawls also
had an extensive influence on bioethics and sport ethics. Rawls most important
contribution to juridical and political philosophy was his publication in 1971 of a Theory
of Justice. In a Theory of Justice, John Rawls set out to find a more rational basis for the
contractualist tradition in political and ethical theory. He tried to find general principles of
justice that would function as basic rules for justice in society. These principles would, as is
typical for contractualism, be supported by a social agreement. However, Rawls combined
this with a stronger notion of justice which he derived from Kantian philosophy, and with
the utilitarian notion of costs and benefit calculus to find the best overall balance for
individual and collective well-being or happiness. Rational agreement was to be the basis
of this philosophical system. For Rawls, principles of justice
are the principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests
would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their
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association. These principles are to regulate all further agreements; they specify the kinds
of social cooperation that can be entered into and the forms of government that can be
established. (Rawls 1971, 11)
So, in Rawlsian philosophy, the basic principles of justice should balance individual
liberty with an equal distribution of liberty. This should be combined with a provision
of the greatest benefit for the least advantaged. People should come to this
agreement through rational reflection, unaware of their specific individual place, talents
or background in society. This is what Rawls called ‘original position’. Rawls’s
conception of an ‘original position’ forms the rationale behind these basic principles
of justice. It stems from the contractarian tradition in political theory. The original
position was usually posed as the beginning position from which the social contract
was formulated, from within a ‘state of nature’. In Rawls’s work, this construction of an
original position should be regarded as a hypothetical position rather than a true
historical occurrence. It functions as a maxim rule; it is the basic position one
should take to come to the principles for a just society. In Rawls’s original position,
one is supposed to wear a ‘veil of ignorance’. With this construction, Rawls tried to
find a tool that can balance freedom or liberty and equality and leave out any
prejudices stemming from one’s class or one’s ethnic, linguistic, religious or cultural
background.
In Rawls’s vision, those who are at the same level of talent and ability, and have
the same willingness to use them, should have the same prospects of success
regardless of their initial place in the social system. Social class, gender or any other
contingency should have no influence on the liberty individuals are to enjoy in the
pursuance of his or her goals in life. Moreover, social and economic inequalities
should be distributed in such a way that they can reasonably be expected to be
advantageous to all those who are the worst off in the first place. Rawls aimed
at a distributive justice to compensate for the differences in fortune that we come
across. Justice is seen as being independent of luck and favouring more equal
distribution.
This position, although dominant in our current theoretical framework of justice, is
on a par with the notions of both talent and disability. Our world is primarily designed
for the average human being. People with a disability cannot partake in it as fully as
they should according to the principles of distributive justice. By redesigning the world
around us, however, we can make this world more accessible for the disabled. The
question remains what obstacles can and should be taken away in order for the disabled
to become part of other spheres of life. Making a building accessible is not the same
thing as trying to become (a successful) part of one of the most competitive practices
on earth. Following Rawls, we should adjust the person rather than the environment.
Therefore, a defence of plurality is often not the outcome of a Rawlsian approach to
justice. Our dominant understanding of elite sport cannot be brought in agreement with
the right to become an elite athlete, similar to the right for example to receive good
education. It may be difficult to justify the difference in admiration for the elite athlete
and the disabled athlete just based upon concepts as ‘talent’ or ‘effort’. Some talents are
more valued in a society than others in spite of a (changing) terminology, one that
sometimes even seems to suggest that being disabled is the norm for each human
being.
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Adaptation of terminology
The inclusion of people with disabilities within regular sport and physical education
has become daily practice in many countries (cf. Doll-Tepper et al. 2001; Vanlandewijck
and Chappel 1996; Block and Obrusnikova 2007). The aims of participation and inclusion
have also influenced debates about terminology and disability sports. This issue of
terminology and language is important when it comes to matters of categorisation, and
also with regard to the distinction between elite sport and disability sport. How does this
categorisation, between sport for the ‘normal’ and sport for the disabled, in itself
contribute to our understanding of what is and what should be considered ‘ab-normal’?
What equalities and what inequalities are considered justified in our society and in what
way does the internal logic of sports challenges the understanding of justice in relation to
matters of inclusion and exclusion? In able to deal with these questions we will have to go
back to some of the debates on terminology and classification.
In 1980, the World Health Organisation introduced the International Classification of
Impairments, Disabilities and Handicaps (ICIDH). It was followed by years of dispute about
the medical and social model of disabilities. This dispute finally resulted in the
presentation of the International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF)
in 2001. Within this new model, disability is not regarded a characteristic (that is present all
the time) but a state that may be present in certain environments or resulting from specific
interactions with other people (cf. Ustun 2004). Following this new terminological
proposal all people possess a multitude of abilities and disabilities. Sherill (2004b, 9)
optimistically writes about this change of terminology: ‘The worldwide trend is on
appreciating, embracing and celebrating individual differences as opposed to glorifying
the norm, the normal, and normalisation as was done in the 1900s.’ Since everyone has
disabilities and abilities, there is no need to make a rigid distinction between abled and
dis-abled bodies. ‘Being disabled is the norm for humanity’ (Ustun 2004, 1). In this sense,
the Paralympics is understood as ‘parallel Olympics’, not special nor separate or inferior.
The change of terminology can not hide the huge difference in status attached to
winning a medal as an able-bodied or a disabled athlete. This difference very clearly
explains the ultimate wish for a disabled athlete to become part of the competition for
elite athletes. With two cases we ask if certain limits to normalisation and inclusion may
conflict with ‘a distribution of resources’. Having three legs or no legs does not, in and of
itself, necessarily entail being disabled. In relation to sport it does however raise questions
regarding which inequalities are ‘relevant inequalities’ based upon the internal logic of
sport. It also presents us with an example of the reproduction of normality through sports.
Although sport and the circus have very similar historical roots, elite sport in the twentieth
century has differentiated from the early ‘freak shows’. Nowadays it celebrates the
ultimate, but at the same time normalised, two-legged human abilities and performances.
Even in elite sport ‘more’ is not necessarily ‘better’, as can be illustrated by the story of
Franceso Lentini, the ‘three legged football player’.
Lentini: Super- or Dis-abled?
Francesco Lentini (1889–1966) was born in Sicily in Italy with three legs, and a
rudimentary foot growing on one of his legs. As a child he was brought to a home for
disabled children. Initially, Lentini experienced his impairment as a disability (mainly
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because his third leg was six inches shorter than the two other legs). After being brought
into this home of disabled children (with children who were deaf, blind or mute) he found
out for himself that he was not disabled at all. Lentini writes about his childhood
‘transformation’:
I could appreciate the fact that I was possessed of all my faculties and senses. I could
hear, talk, understand, appreciate and enjoy the beauties of life. I could read and they
couldn’t. I could talk to my friends, but some of them couldn’t because they were dumb. I
could hear and enjoy beautiful music, while some of them couldn’t because they were
deaf. I had my mental faculties and began to look forward to my education, and some of
them couldn’t because they were idiots. (Nickell 2005, 131–2)
Lentini learned to use his ‘disability’ as an advantage. He entered the circus in the USA as a
young child. One of his acts was playing soccer on a stage, which explains his show name:
the ‘Three-Legged Football Player’. How fair it would have been if Lentini would have
entered a regular soccer competition is purely hypothetical, since he was only acting in the
circus, and his third leg would have given him a disadvantage over his opponents rather
than an advantage. More interesting in this respect would be the case of swimming.
Lentini talks about this advantage:
No, my limb does not bother me in the least. I can get about just as well and with the
same ease as any normal person—walk, run, jump; ride a bicycle, horse; ice and roller
skate; and drive my own car. I can swim—one advantage I have over the other fellow
when I swim is that I use the extra limb as a rudder.1
There is a clear difference between a performance in the circus and elite sport, and
between the performances of able (two-legged) and disabled (three-legged) athletes. This
difference can however not be inferred from a definition of ‘the normal’. Modern elite
sport celebrates abnormalities in many shapes and appearances, varying from extreme-
sized sumo wrestlers to extremely undersized gymnasts. What is considered a sport
performance or a circus performance has to be primarily understood from the historical
and cultural context. Yet comparing them does raise some interesting issues regarding the
definition of being disabled, the ‘boundaries of normality’ and the manner in which
modern, competitive sports may challenge some of the accepted categories and
definitions. Having three legs may become a disability in a world where two legs presents
the dominant norm, similar to Lentini’s observation: ‘If you lived in a world where
everyone had one arm, how would you cope with two?’
In the case of Lentini, uniqueness is not a reason for admiration, just because of the
deviation from the standard (as is the case in elite sport). Admiration and heroism is
afforded on the basis of a multitude of factors including training, discipline, showing and
mastering certain skills. Differences between elite sport as a global entertainment industry
and the circus are related to conceptual differences between ‘admiration’ and
‘amazement’. One can be amazed by looking at ‘physical abnormalities’, but this
amazement may turn into admiration when an ‘extraordinary feature’ is mastered and
turns out to be an extraordinary sport talent.
Without the prospect for the kind of heroism that is attached to modern elite sport,
large deviations from the standards of being ‘normal’ may still end up in a circus. It is
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interesting to see that, although many acts in the circus are the result of years of hard and
vigorous training, these performances are still very much associated with the historical
roots of the freak show, or any other public place for the ‘unlucky mutants’ exposing or
trading upon their abnormalities. Elite sport and the circus have similar roots, based upon
the celebration of extraordinary talent. European countries share a similar history in the
knowledge and popularisation of physical culture, thanks to the circuses, the acrobats, the
pioneering bodybuilders and other body artists who travelled through Europe. In the late
eighteenth century, people already watched strongmen and other athletes performing at
fairs, festivals and in all kinds of theatres. Long before the idea of training and building
muscle mass became a ‘normalised’ kind of behaviour, people saw extraordinarily strong
men (and children) primarily as ‘miracles of nature’. Until around 1850, it is hard to draw
clear distinctions between sport, acrobatics and circus-like activities.
Thanks to the globalisation of modern sport, many ‘mutants’ are nowadays cheered
for their achievements. They set a norm for human performance and virtuosity to be
strived for also by elite athletes in disability sports. The classical distinction between elite
sports and the disabled athlete is blurring, as well as the distinction between the athlete as
hero, excelling on the basis of what counts as ‘normal’, and a (former) ‘patient combating
his limitations’, falling outside this normal variance. In this respect, modern disability sports
have made much progress in terms of admiration and respect. Nowadays, some so-called
‘disabled’ performances sometimes even come close to those of elite athletes. It raises the
question of what counts as normal in order to become part of the competition for able-
bodied athletes. How much of a disablement can and should be compensated for in order
to be (re)defined as a ‘normal athlete’?
Oscar Pistorius: Super- or Disabled?
South African Oscar Pistorius is known as ‘the fastest man on no legs’. He runs with
artificial limbs and is world record holder in the 100, 200 and 400 metres. He runs that fast
thanks partly to his carbon-fibre legs. He can even compete with elite athletes on ‘natural
legs’. In fact, he did so in July 2007, when he ran a 400-metre race at the British Grand Prix.
His participation in a regular competition is, however, surrounded by controversy. His
artificial limbs (also called ‘cheetahs’) may give him extra advantages which, as some
argue, makes the running competition unfair.
Pistorius is not the first disabled person competing in an able-bodied event. In most
historical cases there was no reason for concern about the justification of the participation
of disabled athletes. In the 1904 St Louis Olympics, George Eyser won three gold medals in
gymnastics while competing on a wooden leg. Neroli Fairhall, a paraplegic, competed in
archery in the 1984 Olympics, and in 2000 blind runner Marla Runyan raced against able-
bodied runners in the 1,500 metres athletics competition. Ajibola Adeoye (Nigeria) is an
arm amputee who holds the Paralympic record in the men’s 100 metres (10.72 seconds). If
his time would allow it, there is little reason why he couldn’t compete in the regular
Olympics. The loss of one of his arms does affect his ability to run, but not in such a way
that it causes concern about the fairness of the competition. These examples illustrate that
unless their disadvantage is a certain disability people can still compete in regular
competition. In these cases, no use is made of any prosthetic that influences the athletic
performance, at least not in such a way that it raises concern about the fairness of the
competition.
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The case of Pistorius is rather special, because his disability may, with the help of his
prostheses, turn out to be an unfair advantage. This is why the IAAF amended its
competition rules in 2007, banning the use of ‘any technical device that incorporates
springs, wheels or any other element that provides a user with an advantage over another
athlete not using such a device’ (IAAF Rule 144.2). IAAF spokesman Nick Davies
commented after the British Grand Prix, ‘We all wish him [Pistorius] well. The point here is
what’s going to happen in ten years? What happens if it continues to evolve?’
In November 2007 the IAAF asked the Institute of Biomechanics and Orthopaedics
(German Sport University, Cologne) for an independent biomechanical and physiological
study. Early in 2008 the results were presented. Some of the main results, as presented on
the IAAF site2 were that:
. running with prosthetics needs less additional energy (up to 25 per cent) than running
with natural limbs;
. the amount of energy return of the prosthetic blade has never been reported for a
human muscle-driven ankle joint in sprint running;
. the returned energy from the prosthetic blade is close to three times higher than with
the human ankle joint in maximum sprinting.
Based on these findings, the study concluded that an athlete running with prosthetic
blades has a clear mechanical advantage (more than 30 per cent) when compared to
‘someone’ not using the blades. According to Pistorius, however, other experts
contradicted these findings. Not all of the relevant variables were taken into consideration.
Pistorius and his coach responded to some of these arguments by claiming that his
prosthetics confront him with other disadvantages, such as rain (which reduces his
traction), crosswinds (which can blow the device sideways), and that some of his energy is
more easily dispensed at the start of the race than the energy of other runners.
The discussion and main arguments in this case were primarily focused on the
empirical question of what is considered an athletic advantage. This debate cannot,
however, be detached from the more conceptual question on the definition of running,
and what could still be considered a norm for (human) running. The main question
preceding any empirical research is of course: with whom is Pistorius compared, and based
upon what arguments? Compared to the world record holder, any runner may be defined
as ‘disadvantaged’. The fact that running with prosthetics needs less additional energy (up
to 25 per cent) than running with natural limbs is in itself insufficient to keep Pistorius from
competing in the Olympics. Based on the same arguments, sport authorities could have
forbidden the introduction of klapskates in speed skating or the even the Fosbury flop in
high jumping (cf. van Hilvoorde et al. 2007). There seems to be a fear that running on
prosthetics might become faster that ‘normal’ running. It may conflict with our
understanding of elite sport. Does it show the conservatism of sport and the public
that wants to hold on to the familiar distinction between elite sport and disability sport?
Enhancement and ‘Boosting’ in Disabled Sport
In discussing the ethical issues that Paralympic sports are confronted with, Wheeler
(2004) states that most ethical issues may be classified as ‘boosting’. Well-known in
disability sports are physiological, pharmacological and intellectual boosting. In the
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context of this paper the discussion on technical boosting is of great relevance. Similar to
sport in general, there is an ongoing discussion on unfairness as a result of inequalities in
(financing) new technology. Differences in the availability of new products (wheelchairs
that are made of lighter material for example) and increasing inequalities between
developing and industrialised countries highly affect the fairness of disability sports
worldwide. Wheeler also mentions ‘osseointegrated prostheses’, a new technology that
improves (enhances) the integration of the prostheses with the human part of the leg. This
is a positive development for people who are hindered by their current prostheses, but it
also creates new inequalities in the context of elite disabled sport.
Special concern is also raised by the issue of ‘classification boosting’, which is unique
to disability sports. Instances have been described where athletes misrepresent their
functional abilities during the process of classification (Wheeler 2004, 4). The matter of
defining dysfunctions is both complex and contentious, being susceptible to deceptive
manipulation and fraud. Think for example of the misrepresentation or misclassification of
persons with average or above average intellectual abilities as intellectually disabled. Not
much is known about this phenomenon, but it raises reasons for concern about the
(future) credibility of disability sports—not least because there do not seem to be easy
measures to prevent this type of athletic fraud. The ‘pre-game process’ of classification
influences possible outcomes of a contest to a considerable degree. Wheeler’s pledge for a
code of ethics for disability sport could be a first step, but needs to be followed by
measures of administrators to formalise observational criteria and investigate possibilities
of manipulation.
At the same time it raises the question of how objective the presentation of
functional abilities can be. Every boundary that is drawn between certain types of disability
creates some injustice (cf. Jones and Howe 2005). In every category there are the ‘lucky’ and
‘unlucky’ ones. In one category one could qualify as highly talented (Pistorius in the
Paralympics for example), in the other just as an average athlete (Pistorius in the regular
Olympics). This injustice is in many ways similar to the kind of injustice that is intrinsic to
sport in general (cf. Loland 2002). Sport intrinsically differentiates between (in some respect
arbitrary) differences in genetic makeup. Dysfunctions need to be recognised as similar/
dissimilar and, to an acceptable degree, responsible for the outcome of the sport. Athletic
competitions are ideally set up in such a way that obvious differences in biological makeup
do not determine the outcome at forehand. On the other hand, some people will always be
naturally faster or stronger in ways that no training regimen can correct for.
While recognising that Paralympics do not imply inferior performances, based upon
a static and absolute distinction between able and disabled bodies, one can expect that
these games are increasingly confronted with discussions about classification, credibility
and also about unfair methods of ‘enhancement’. The optimist could say that the increase
in sport-ethical concerns in the Paralympics (whether because of fraud or illegal
enhancement) is a good sign, because it shows that the Paralympics are taken more
and more seriously by both competitors and the audience. The more status is attached to
winning medals, the more attention there is for possible fraud (such as classification
boosting). This might, however, appear to be too optimistic. The struggle, for example,
within professional cycling as a result of doping scandals is grounded in the fear of losing
credibility within a sport that already enjoys a worldwide popularity. Disability sports start
with a lack of popularity (and credibility) and have, in this sense, not much to lose. The
Paralympics are not considered to be ‘truly’ interesting by the larger portion of the general
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public since disabled sportsmen (defined as an impaired deviance of normality) are not the
best athletes in the world from the perspective of ‘normal sports’. In this respect, the
urgent wish of Pistorius to compete within the 2008 Olympic Games paradoxically
underlines the differences and reproduces the current order and hierarchy between able
and disabled bodies. It would be as if Pistorius, being the best disabled runner, is
promoted from an inferior division to the premier league of international sport. For most
disabled athletes there is no reason (and no possibility) to aim for this kind of ranking and
‘promotion’. Pistorius’s ‘promotion’ may even contribute to a loss of credibility and
appreciation of the performances of disability athletes.
Some argue that athletic enhancement by means of an increase in the quality of
prosthetics is similar to the use of doping. In terms of enhancement there is, however, more
at stake within disability sport, more than just trying to become the best athlete within a
specific category. Disability sports are about showing performances within categories of
similar disabilities, without making those disabilities the central element of athletic
prowess. Elite sport is about excellence within the boundaries of ‘self-chosen’ limitations;
disability sports originated from limitations through fate. Elite sport symbolises the athlete
as hero; it reproduces elitist ideals about the body (‘athletic’ and ‘beautiful’), about good
sportsmanship and national pride. For many people in disability sport, the athlete is still a
‘patient combating their limitations’, instead of an elite athlete with specific talents or
virtuosity.
It is, however, a different matter if disabled elite athletes may in some cases be
eligible to compete with able athletes. Arguments against the inclusion of three legs or
prosthetic limbs may be focused too much and selective on visible differences between
athletes. Take for example Floyd Landis, who injured his hip in 2003 and received a hip
prosthesis in 2006. Why is Floyd Landis’s hip not regarded as an advantage or an (‘artificial
hip’) enhancement, while his usage of testosterone was? What’s the difference between
the internal prosthesis of Landis and the external ones of Pistorius? The advantages of a
prosthesis in this case bear upon the relevant inequalities of the sport. Some actually claim
this is also the case for running competitions between Ethiopians and Caucasians, and that
therefore they should compete in separate categories. The question is whether Pistorius is
playing the same game as his opponents. We argue that he is not because he is showing
another and extra skill, namely handling his prosthesis in an extremely talented way.
Prostheses may have a considerable influence on the outcome of the game. This, however
is not an argument in itself that this competition should be excluded from the regular
Olympic Games.
Conclusion
Problems with classification and categorisation in sport for the disabled confront us
with the intrinsic inequalities and unfairness of any competitive practice that depends
upon the classification of people based upon both equalities and (‘relevant’) inequalities. A
three legged swimmer or a sprinter with prostheses who might become faster than the
elite sprinters can be excluded from regular competition, not because of their inferiority
but instead because a disability may appear to be a superior advantage. It is easy to point
at the conservative elements within traditional sport, in order to explain the exclusion of
Pistorius from the Olympic Games. There is, however, more at stake, from the perspective
of the internal goods of the sport. In sport there is no purely rational logic in the definition
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of rules, neither in classification nor categorisations, in order to make the competition as
‘fair’ as possible. Rules are always a combination and compromise of tradition and a sport-
ethical ideal of ‘equality’ (the ‘level playing field’). People with three legs would allow for a
separate competition when the third leg has a considerate influence on the outcome of
the game.
When discussing relations and remarkable differences in admiration between elite
sport and disability sport, the traditional sport world is confronted with matters of
inclusion and a fair distribution of resources and rewards for the achievements of all
athletes. As we have seen in the case of Rawls’s philosophy of justice, however, these
mechanisms of inclusion and fair distribution are often based upon a very narrow image of
the average person, therefore again excluding the possibility of a pluralistic society. Sport
is a social practice with an internal logic that does not always conform to these general
principles of justice, specifically as we have come to embrace them now. It therefore
proves to be a good case for further analyses of the distinction society draws between
normal and disabled, between natural and dysfunctional.
Sports are a well-defined form of cultivation of specific abnormalities, and what is
traditionally understood as professional sportsmanship has socio-cultural roots in history.
Abnormality is the common denominator for both. The direction of excellence can be
framed socio-culturally, and from that perspective, there is not that much of a difference
between Paralympics and Olympics. The genetically fortunate and unfortunate share the
exceptional position on the scale of normality. And sometimes they meet, at the circus or
in a sports arena. Many biological exceptions are the result of certain genetic mutations
that may result in either a talent or disability. Depending on the time and context in which
a ‘mutant’ is being nurtured, one could either end up in a freak show, at the circus or in a
modern sport arena.
NOTES
1. See http://www.sideshowworld.com/blowoff-RFlentini.html, accessed 10 March 2008.
2. Available at http://www.iaaf.org/news/Kind¼512/newsId¼42896.html, accessed 10 March
2008.
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