July 29, 1959G.R. No. L-12902CEFERINO MARCELO,plaintiff-appellant,vs.NAZARIO DE LEON,defendant-appellee.

Facts:On February 4, 1957, Ceferino Marcelo, filed in the justice of the peace court of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, a complaint to recover possession of a lot of 2,000 square meters belonging to Severino P. Marcelo (who had given him a full power-of-attorney) which was held by defendant "on the understanding that one-half of all the products raised in the occupied area, would be given" to the landowner.The complaint alleged that after plaintiff had assumed the administration of Severino Marcelo's properties, defendant delivered the products corresponding to the owner; but when in September 1956, plaintiff notified defendant that in addition to giving half of the produce, he would have to pay a rental of two pesos per month, the latter refused, and continued refusing to pay such additional charges. Wherefore, complainant prayed for judgment ordering defendant to leave the premises and to pay damages and costs.The defendant questioned the court's jurisdiction, arguing that the matter involved tenancy relations falling within the authority of the Agrarian Court; he also challenged the capacity of plaintiff to sue. He lost in the justice of the peace court; however, on appeal to the court of first instance, he raised the same issues on a motion to dismiss, and then his views prevailed.Issue: W/N the case should be dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest.Ruling:The plaintiff in this case is a mereapoderadoof the owner, Severino P. Marcelo.[[1]]The rule is that every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, (sec 2, Rule 3).

However, plaintiff quotes that part of sec. 1 of Rule 72, permitting "the legal representative" of any landlord to bring an action of ejectment, and insists in his right now to litigate. Supposing that "legal representative" as used in sec. 1, includes attorneys-in-fact, we find that plaintiff's power attached to the complaint, authorizes him to sue for and in the name of Severino Marcelo, to "pursue any and all kinds of suits and actions for me and in my name in the courts of the land". This action is not in the name of plaintiff's principal.For all the foregoing, the appealed order is affirmed with costs chargeable against appellant.G.R. No. L-31061 August 17, 1976SULO NG BAYAN INC.,plaintiff-appellant,vs.GREGORIO ARANETA, INC., PARADISE FARMS, INC., NATIONAL WATERWORKS & SEWERAGE AUTHORITY, HACIENDA CARETAS, INC, and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN,defendants-appellees.Facts:On April 26, 1966, plaintiff-appellant Sulo ng Bayan, Inc. filed anaccion de revindicacionwith the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Fifth Judicial District, Valenzuela, Bulacan, against defendants-appellees to recover the ownership and possession of a large tract of land in San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, containing an area of 27,982,250 square meters, more or less, registered under the Torrens System in the name of defendants-appellees' predecessors-in-interest.The members of the plaintiff corporation, through themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, had pioneered in the clearing of the fore-mentioned tract of land, cultivated the same since the Spanish regime and continuously possessed the said property openly and public under concept of ownership adverse against the whole world; that defendant-appellee Gregorio Araneta, Inc., sometime in the year 1958, through force and intimidation, ejected the members of the plaintiff corporation fro their possession of the aforementioned vast tract of land; that upon investigation conducted by the members and officers of plaintiff corporation, they found out for the first time in the year 1961 that the land in question "had been either fraudelently or erroneously included, by direct or constructive fraud, in Original Certificate of Title No. 466 of the Land of Records of the province of Bulacan", issued on May 11, 1916, which title is fictitious, non-existent and devoid of legal efficacy due to the fact that "no original survey nor plan whatsoever" appears to have been submitted as a basis thereof and that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan which issued the decree of registration did not acquire jurisdiction over the land registration case because no notice of such proceeding was given to the members of the plaintiff corporation who were then in actual possession of said properties.Plaintiff-appellant consequently prayed (1) that Original Certificate of Title No. 466, as well as all transfer certificates of title issued and derived therefrom, be nullified; (2) that "plaintiff's members" be declared as absolute owners in common of said property and that the corresponding certificate of title be issued to plaintiff; and (3) that defendant-appellee Gregorio Araneta, Inc. be ordered to pay to plaintiff the damages therein specified.Issue:1. Whether or not plaintiff corporation (non- stock may institute an action in behalf of its individual members.2. W/N the complaint may be treated as a class suitRuling:It is a doctrine well-established and obtains both at law and in equity that a corporation is a distinct legal entity to be considered as separate and apart from the individual stockholders or members who compose it, and is not affected by the personal rights, obligations and transactions of its stockholders or members.The property of the corporation is its property and not that of the stockholders, as owners, although they have equities in it. Properties registered in the name of the corporation are owned by it as an entity separate and distinct from its members.5Conversely, a corporation ordinarily has no interest in the individual property of its stockholders unless transferred to the corporation, "even in the case of a one-man corporation.The mere fact that one is president of a corporation does not render the property which he owns or possesses the property of the corporation, since the president, as individual, and the corporation are separate similarities.7Similarly, stockholders in a corporation engaged in buying and dealing in real estate whose certificates of stock entitled the holder thereof to an allotment in the distribution of the land of the corporation upon surrender of their stock certificates were considered not to have such legal or equitable title or interest in the land, as would support a suit for title, especially against parties other than the corporation.It has not been claimed that the members have assigned or transferred whatever rights they may have on the land in question to the plaintiff corporation. Absent any showing of interest, therefore, a corporation, like plaintiff-appellant herein, has no personality to bring an action for and in behalf of its stockholders or members for the purpose of recovering property which belongs to said stockholders or members in their personal capacities.Class suitIn order that a class suit may prosper, the following requisites must be present: (1) that the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; and (2) that the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.20Under the first requisite, the person who sues must have an interest in the controversy, common with those for whom he sues, and there must be that unity of interest between him and all such other persons which would entitle them to maintain the action if suit was brought by them jointly.Here, there is only one party plaintiff, and the plaintiff corporation does not even have an interest in the subject matter of the controversy, and cannot, therefore, represent its members or stockholders who claim to own in their individual capacities ownership of the said property. Moreover, as correctly stated by the appellees, a class suit does not lie in actions for the recovery of property where several persons claim Partnership of their respective portions of the property, as each one could alleged and prove his respective right in a different way for each portion of the land, so that they cannot all be held to have Identical title through acquisition prescription.Having shown that no cause of action in favor of the plaintiff exists and that the action in the lower court cannot be considered as a class suit, it would be unnecessary and an Idle exercise for this Court to resolve the remaining issue of whether or not the plaintiffs action for reconveyance of real property based upon constructive or implied trust had already prescribed.ACCORDINGLY, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED with costs against the plaintiff-appellant.

June 30, 1954G.R. No. L-7020ALICIA GO, ET AL.,plaintiffs-appellees,vs.ALBERTO GO, ET AL.,defendants-appellants.Facts:On December 18, 1951, plaintiffs brought an action in the Municipal Court of Manila to recover from defendants the possession of a house situated at 921 Dagupan St., Manila, and the sum of P2,000 as damages and P200.00 as attorney's fees.Defendants in their answer set up several special defenses and a counterclaim. The counterclaim was divided into three causes of action as follows: the first is for P2,000 representing the value of certain furniture and equipment belonging to defendants and which are claimed to have been taken away by plaintiffs from the house in litigation the second is for P1,000 representing expenses incurred by defendants arising from the falsity of the facts alleged in the complaint; and the third is for P500 as attorneys fees arising from the institution of the present action.The court found for the plaintiffs, after due hearing, ordering defendants to vacate the house in litigation and to pay costs, but denied the claim for damages both of plaintiffs and defendants on the ground that their amounts are beyond its jurisdiction. The defendants, in due time, perfected their appeal to the Court of First Instance, and after the latter had filed their answer as required by the rules, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint wherein they reiterated their original allegations with some slight modifications. To his amended complaint, defendants filed an amended answer reiterating the counterclaim they had alleged in their original answer which, as previously stated, has been divided into three causes of action involving an aggregate amount of P3,500.Claiming that the amount involved in the counterclaim is beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court and, therefore, the Court of First Instance cannot act on it in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 8, section 1 (a), of the Rules of Court. This motion was resisted by defendants, but the court, in its order issued on March 30, 1953, overruled the opposition and granted the motion to dismiss. Hence, this appeal.Issue:1. Whether the jurisdiction of the municipal court is governed by the amount of each claim or by the aggregate sum of all the claims when there are several plaintiffs suing jointly but have independent causes of action.2. Whether or not the ruling in A. Soriano and Co. vs. Gonzalo M. Jose, et al., can be applied when there is only one plaintiff or one defendant, or several plaintiffs or defendants but with a common claim, divided into several causes of action involving transactions different one from the other?Ruling:1. In A. Soriano and Co. vs. Gonzalo M. Jose, et al. , we held that "where several claimants have separate and distinct demands against a defendant or defendants, which may be properly joined in a single suit, the claims cannot be added together to make up the required jurisdictional amount; each separate claim furnishes the jurisdictional test." The purpose of the rule permitting the joining of parties is to save unnecessary work, trouble, and expense, consistent with the liberal spirit of the new rules. This ruling, no doubt, applies with equal force to a counter claim in view of the similarity of rules applicable to both complaint and counterclaim.2. In discussing the test to be considered in determining the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace, laid down the following rule: "When a separate debt is due, it is demandable in a separate action. Therefore, neither a debtor nor a third party may plead lack of jurisdiction because the sum of two separate debts exceeds the amount for which action may be brought in a court of a justice of the peace. On the other hand, if a debt is single a creditor may not divide it for the purpose of bringing the case within the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace." This case is authority for the statement that if a claim is composed of several accounts each distinct from the other or arising from different transactions they may be joined in a single action even if the total exceeds the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace. Each account furnishes the test. But if the claim is composed of several accounts which arise out of the same transaction and cannot be divided, the same should be stated in one cause of action and cannot be divided for the purpose of bringing the case within the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace.In the last analysis, therefore, the question to be determined is whether the three causes of action into which the counterclaim of the defendants has been divided refer to transactions which should be stated separately, or transactions which have a common origin and should be joined in one cause of action for jurisdictional purposes. An analysis of the facts reveals that the three causes of action of the counterclaim are different one from the other, or at least the first is completely different arises from a set of facts different from those which gave rise to the other two. The first refers to the recovery of the amount of P2,000 arising from the alleged unlawful taking by the plaintiffs of certain furniture and equipment belonging to the defendants; while the second and third causes of action arose, not from the illegal taking of property, but from the alleged unlawful institution by the plaintiffs of the action of ejectment in the Municipal Court. From this it can be seen that the first cause of action cannot be joined with the other two in one single claim because they arise from different sets of facts.Another consideration that should be borne in mind is whether the counterclaim is compulsory or not. If it is, such as if it arises from, or is necessarily connected with, the facts alleged in the complaint, then that counterclaim should be set upregardless of its amount.Failure to do so would render it barred under the rules. In this particular case, while the first cause of action cannot be considered compulsory because it refers to a transaction completely unrelated with the main claim, the second and the third belong to this class because they necessarily arise from the institution of the main action. Viewed in this light, it can be said that the counterclaim of the defendants should be deemed as coming within the jurisdiction of the municipal court, because the respective amounts, considered separately, do not exceed its jurisdiction. From all angles we view the order appealed from it would appear that it is unwarranted and has no legal basis.Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby set aside, without pronouncement as to costs.G.R. No. L-22909 January 28, 1925VICTORIANO BORLASA, ET AL.,plaintiffs-appellants,vs.VICENTE POLISTICO, ET AL.,defendants-appellees.Facts:This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Laguna on July 25, 1917, by Victoriano Borlasa and others against Vicente Polistico and others, chiefly for the purpose of securing the dissolution of a voluntary association namedTuruhan Polistico & Co., and to compel the defendants to account for and surrender the money and property of the association in order that its affairs may be liquidated and its assets applied according to law.In the month of April, 1911, the plaintiffs and defendants, together with several hundred other persons, formed an association under the name ofTuruhan Polistico & Co.Vicente Polistico, the principal defendant herein, was elected president and treasurer of the association, and his house in Lilio, Laguna, was made its principal place of business. The life of the association was fixed at fifteen years, and under the by-laws each member obligated himself to pay to Vicente Polistico, as president-treasurer, before 3 o'clock in the afternoon of every Sunday the sum of 50 centavos, except that on every fifth Sunday the amount was P1, if the president elected to call this amount, as he always did. It is alleged that from April, 1911, until April, 1917, the sums of money mentioned above were paid weekly by all of the members of the society with few irregularities. The inducement to these weekly contributions was found in provisions of the by-laws to the effect that a lottery should be conducted weekly among the members of the association and that the successful member should be paid the amount collected each week, from which, however, the president-treasurer of the society was to receive the sum of P200, to be held by him as funds of the society.It is further alleged that by virtue of these weekly lotteries Vicente Polistico, as president-treasurer of the association, received sums of money amounting to P74,000, more or less, in the period stated, which he still retains in his power or has applied to the purchase of real property largely in his own name and partly in the names of others. The defendants in the complaint are the members of the board of directors of the association, including Vicente Polistico, as president-treasurer, Alfonso Noble, secretary, Felix Garcia and Vivencio Zulaybar, as promoter(propagandistas), and Afroniano de la Pea and Tomas Orencia, as members (vocales) of the board.Issue: W/N the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that it showed on its face a lack of necessary parties.Ruling:The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires, of course, the joinder of all necessary parties wherever possible, and the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, the presence of those latter being asine qua nonof the exercise of judicial power. The class suit contemplates an exceptional situation where there are numerous persons all in the same plight and all together constituting a constituency whose presence in the litigation is absolutely indispensable to the administration of justice. Here the strict application of the rule as to indispensable parties would require that each and every individual in the class should be present. But at this point the practice is so far relaxed as to permit the suit to proceed, when the class is sufficient represented to enable the court to deal properly and justly with that interest and with all other interest involved in the suit. In the class suit, then, representation of a class interest which will be affected by the judgment is indispensable; but it is not indispensable to make each member of the class an actual party.The addition of some hundreds of persons to the number of the plaintiffs, made in the amendment to the complaint of December 13, 1922, was unnecessary, and as the presence of so many parties is bound to prove embarrassing to the litigation from death or removal, it is suggested that upon the return of this record to the lower court for further proceedings, the plaintiff shall again amend their complaint by dismissing as to unnecessary parties plaintiffs, but retaining a sufficient number of responsible persons to secure liability for costs and fairly to present all the members of the association.There is another feature of the complaint which makes a slight amendment desirable, which is, that the complaint should be made to show on its face that the action is intended to be litigated as a class suit. We accordingly recommend that the plaintiffs further amend by adding after the names of the parties plaintiffs the words, "in their own behalf and in behalf of other members ofTuruhan Polistico & Co."The order appealed from is reversed, the demurrer of the defendants based upon supposed lack of parties is overruled, and the defendants are required to answer to the amended complaint within the time allowed by law and the rules of the court. The costs of this appeal will be paid by the defendants. So ordered.G.R. No. L-20844 August 14, 1965ANGELITA F. RIVERA,plaintiff-appellant,vs.LORETO LUCIANO,defendant-appellee.Facts:On May 16, 1962 Angelita F. Rivera instituted Civil Case No. 50408 against Loreto Luciano in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the collection of the sum of P5,862.60. However, on June 9, 1962, upon motion of defendant, the case was dismissed on the ground that her husband was not joined as defendant. Plaintiff did not appeal from the order of dismissal.On August 14, 1962 Angelita F. Rivera filed another action against the same defendant Loreto Luciano, in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the recovery of the sum of P5,897.60. The case in as docketed as Civil Case No. 51262. It involved the same subject matter, the same cause of action and the same parties as in Civil Case No. 50408. Again, Loreto Luciano's husband was not joined as defendant, but the complaint alleged as reason for this that defendant was engaged in business. Before filing an answer defendant moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the same was barred by the dismissal of the previous Civil Case No. 50408. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case.Plaintiff appealed to this Court.Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of Civil Case No. 50408 for non-joinder of a party was an adjudication on the merits which would bar the institution of Civil Case No. 51262.Ruling:Section 4 of Rule 30 of the old Rules of Court, applicable herein, states:SEC. 4.Effect of dismissal on other grounds. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.Accordingly, the dismissal of an action in the Court of First Instance on grounds not provided for in Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Rule 30 is, unless otherwise ordered, an adjudication on the merits, except, of course, dismissal for lack of jurisdiction which is always without prejudice.1In the instant case the dismissal of Civil Case No. 50408 was not in pursuance of Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Rule 30. Neither was it for lack of jurisdiction. And, inasmuch as the court did not order the dismissal to bewithout prejudice, it follows that it was an adjudication on the merits. Having become final it bars the filing of another action on the same cause of action.WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs. So ordered.