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JULIANA P. YAP, Petitioner

Vs.

MATIN PARAS AND ALFREDO D. BARCELONA, SR .,

According to Yap, Paras sold IN 1971 to her his share in the intestate estate for P300.00. The sale was evidenced by a private

document. Nineteen years later, (in 1990), Paras sold the same property to Santiago Saya-ang for P5,000.00. This wasevidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale.

When Yap learned of the second sale, she filed a complaint for es tafa against Paras and Saya-ang with the Office of the

Provincial Prosecutor of General Santos City. On the same date, she filed a complaint for the nullification of the said sale with

the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City.

After investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor instituted a criminal complaint for estafa against Paras with the Municipal Circuit

Trial Court of Glan-Malapatan, South Cotabato, presided by Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr., who dismissed the criminal case on

the ground that the issue in the civil case is prejudicial to the criminal case for estafa.

Issue: Is the Judge correct in motu proprio dismissing the criminal case?

Ruling: The judge is wrong. First, he should not have dismissed the criminal case but only suspended it. Second, it was wrong

for him to dismiss the criminal case outright, since it requires a motion first from the proper party.

The rule provides: Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for suspension of the criminal action

based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the fiscal or the court

conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall

be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests. Third, there is actually no prejudicial question

here.

Anent the issue of prejudicial question, the rule provides that:

Section 5, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended provides:

Sec. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action

involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue

determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue

involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be det erminative of

the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a

question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or

innocence of the accused.

It was held that "for a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the criminal

action pending the determination of the civil action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon

which the criminal prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in said civil action would be necessarily

determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused".

Indeed, the civil case at bar does not involve the same facts upon which the criminal action is based. There was no motion for

suspension in the case at bar; and no less importantly, the respondent judge had not been informed of the defense Paras was

raising in the civil action. Judge Barcelona could not have ascertained then if the issue raised in the civil act

determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.


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Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001

Power of Sandiganbayan to suspend members of Congress vis-a-vis Congress' prerogative to discipline its own members: the

former is not punitive, the latter is

FACTS:

A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) filed a complaint for violation of Anti-Graft and

Corrupt Practices Act against then CID Commissioner Miriam Defensor-Santiago. It was alleged that petitioner, with evident

bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, approved the application for legalization of the stay of

several disqualified aliens. The Sandiganbayan then issued an order for her suspension effective for 90 days.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has authority to decree a 90-day preventive suspension against a Senator of the Republic of

the Philippines

RULING:

The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official charged with violation

of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. xxx

It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the validity

of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to

issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be no ifs and buts about it. Explaining the nature of

the preventive suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan observed:

x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned

shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension.

In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an unequivocal mandate of

the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayans authority to decree the

suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.

Power of Sandiganbayan to Decree Preventive Suspension vis-- vis Congress Prerogative to Discipline its Members

The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information fil ed against petitioner, behooved Sandiganbayan to discharge

its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension.

The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks

under the Constitution which provides that each-

x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, w

of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shal

days.

The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed u

by the Senate or the house of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.

xxx

Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, th

not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
http://scire-licet.blogspot.com/2010/01/santiago-vs-sandiganbayan.htmlhttp://scire-licet.blogspot.com/2010/01/santiago-vs-sandiganbayan.html


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MARBELLA-BOBIS v. BOBIS

MARBELLA-BOBIS v. BOBISJuly 31, 2000 (G.R. No. 138509)PARTIES:Petitioner: IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBISRespondent: ISAGANI D. BOBIS

FACTS: October 21, 1985, first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Not annulled, nullified or terminated

January 25, 1996, second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis Third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez February 25, 1998, Imelda Bobis filed bigamy Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first

marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license

Petitioner argues that respondent should have first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriagebefore entering into the second marriage*after petitioner sued for bigamy, its just when the respondent filed adeclaration of absolute nullity.

ISSUE:Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes aprejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy

HELD:A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein.

It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the

guilt or innocence of the accused. Its two essential elements are:7(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimatelyrelated to the issue raised in the criminal action; and(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminalaction may proceed.

In Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first

marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. In the current jurisprudence, a marriage though

void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be

void. The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case

at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second

marriage with petitioner.

Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the

subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It

is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.

*Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority.

Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second

marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy (Landicho v. Relova)


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Beltran vs. People

FACTS:In 1973, Beltran and Charmaine Felix married each other. Theyve had 4 children since then but after 24 years of

marriage Beltran filed an action for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage due to Felixs PI. Felix countered that Beltran

left the conjugal home to cohabit with a certain Milagros and that she filed a case of concubinage against Beltran. In 1997, the

lower court found probable cause against Beltran and Milagros. In order to forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest against

him, Beltran raised the issue that the civil case he filed is a prejudicial question to the criminal case filed by Milagros. He said

that the courts hearing the cases may issue conflicting rulings if the criminal case will not be suspended until the civil case gets

resolved. The lower court denied Beltrans petition and so did Judge Tuazon of the RTC upon appeal. Beltran then elevated the

case to the SC.

ISSUE:Whether or not the absolute nullity of a previous marriage be in voked as a prejudicial question in the case at bar.

HELD:The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential

elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the

resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The pendency of the case for declaration

of nullity of Beltrans marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial

to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not

only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the

resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be

determined.

Article 40 of the Family Code provides:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment

declaring such previous marriage void.

The SC ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring

a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of

other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable.

In a case for concubinage, the accused (Beltran) need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can

adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other th an proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage

void.

With regard to Beltrans argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared

null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a

defense.


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Philippine Agila Satellite vs Trinidad Lichauco 489 scra 22 FACTS

Petitioner Philippine Agila Satellite Inc. is a duly organized corporation, whose President and Chief Executive Officer is co-

petitioner Michael C.U. De Guzman. PASI was established by a consortium of private telecommunications carriers which in

1994 had entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the DOTC, through its then Secretary Jesus Garcia, concerning

the planned launch of a Philippine-owned satellite into outer space. The Philippine government, through the DOTC, was tasked

under the MOU to secure from the International Telecommunication Union the required orbital slots and frequency

assignments for the Philippine satellite.

The government, together with PASI, coordinated through the International Telecommunication Union two orbital slots,

designated as 161o East Longitude and 153o East Longitude, for Philippine satellites. PASI wrote then DOTC Secretary Amado S.

Lagdameo, Jr., seeking for official Philippine government confirmation on the assignment of the two aforementioned Philippine

orbital slots to PASI for its satellites. Secretary Lagdameo, Jr. replied in a letter confirming the Philippine Governments

assignment of Philippine orbital slots 161E and 153E to PASI for its satellites.

PASI averred that after having secured the confirmation from the Philippine government, it proceeded with preparations for

the launching, operation and management of its satellites, including the availment of loans, the increase in its capital.

However, respondent Lichauco, then DOTC Undersecretary for Communications, allegedly embarked on a crusade to malign

the name of Michael de Guzman and s abotage the business of PASI.

Aggrieved by Lichaucos actions, PASI and De Guzman instituted a civil complaint against Lichauco, by then the Acting Secretary

of the DOTC. The complaint, alleging three causes of action, was for injunction, declaration of nullity of award, and damages.

The third cause of action, for damages, imputed several acts to Lichauco as part of her alleged crusade to malign the name of

plaintiff De Guzman and sabotage the business of PASI.

ISSUE

Is the suit one against the state?

RULING

The hornbook rule is that a suit for acts done in the performance of official functions against an officer of the government by a

private citizen that would result in a charge against or financial liability to the government must be regarded as a suit against

the State itself, although the latter has not been formally impleaded. However, government immunity from suit will not shield

the public official being sued if the government no longer has an interest to protect in the outcome of a suit; or if the liability of

the officer is personal because it arises from a tortious act in the performance of his duties.

As earlier noted, the complaint alleges three causes of action against Lichauco: one for injunction against her performing any

act in relation to orbital slot 153o East Longitude; one for declaration of nullity of award, seeking to nullify the alleged award of

orbital slot 153o East Longitude; and one for damages against Lichauco herself.

As stated earlier, it is when the acts done in the performance of official functions by an officer of the government will result in

a charge against or financial liability to the government that the complaint must be regarded as a suit against the State itself.

However, the distinction must also be raised between where the government official concerned performs an act in his/her

official and jurisdictional capacity and where he performs an act that constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack

of jurisdiction. In the latter case, the Constitution itself assures the availability of judicial review, and it is th

who should be impleaded as the proper party- defendant or respondent.

As to the first two causes of action, the Court ruled that the defense of state immunity from suit do not app

of action cannot be properly considered as suits against the State in constitutional contemplation. These ca

not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the State, but merely the nullification of state actio

attached to these two causes of action are for the revocation of the Notice of Bid and the nullification of th

nothing more. Had it been so that petitioner additionally sought damages in relation to said causes of actio

have been considered as one against the State. Had the petitioner impleaded the DOTC itself, an unincorpo

agency, and not Lichauco herself, the suit would have been considered as one against the State. But neithe

obtains in this case.

The doctrine, as summarized in Shauf v. Court of Appeals states: While the doctrine appears to prohibit on

state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts alleged

them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the st

perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the

against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally implead

noted, however, that the rule is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances.

It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary t

to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommu

Aligaen, etc., et al.: Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of go

or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have

violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immun

from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or

State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the persona

rights or the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not

is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its

rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetra


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FRANCISCO MAGESTRADO, Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ELENA M. LIBROJO Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the (1) Resolution[1] dated 5 March 2001 of the Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. SP No. 63293 entitled, Francisco Magestrado v. Hon. Estrella T. Estrada, in her capacity as the Presiding JudgeofRegional Trial Court, Branch 83 of Quezon City, People of the Philippines and Elena M. Librojo, which dismissed petitioner

Francisco Magestrados Petition for Certiorari for being the wrong remedy; and (2) Resolution[2] dated 3 May 2001 of the

same Court denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Private respondent Elena M. Librojo filed a criminal complaint[3] for perjury against petitioner with the Office of the City

Prosecutor of Quezon City, which was docketed as I.S. No. 98-3900.

After the filing of petitioners counter-affidavit and the appended pleadings, the Office of the City Prosecutor recommended

the filing of an information for perjury against petitioner. Thus, Assistant City Prosecutor Josephine Z. Fernandez filed an

information for perjury against petitioner with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City. Pertinent portions of the

information are hereby quoted as follows:

That on or about the 27th day of December, 1997, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there

willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and knowingly make an untruthful statement under oath upon a material matter before a

competent officer authorized to receive and administer oath and which the law so require, to wit: the said accused subscribe

and swore to an Affidavit of Loss before Notary Public Erlinda B. Espejo of Quezon City, per Doc. No. 168, Page No. 35, Book

No. CLXXIV of her notarial registry, falsely alleging that he lost Owners Duplicate Certificate of TC T No. N-173163, which

document was used in support of a Petition For Issuance of New Owners Duplicate Copy of Certificate of Title and filed withthe Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as LRC# Q-10052 (98) on January 28, 1998 and assigned to Branch 99 of the

said court, to which said Francisco M. Mag[e]strado signed and swore on its verification, per Doc. 413 Page 84 Book No. CLXXV

Series of 1998 of Notary Public Erlinda B. Espejo of Quezon City; the said accused knowing fully well that the allegations in the

said affidavit and petition are false, the truth of the matter being that the property subject of Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-

173163 was mortgaged to complainant Elena M. Librojo as collateral for a loan in the amount of P 758,134.42 and as

a consequence of which said title to the property was surrendered by him to the said complainant by virtue of said loan, thus,

making untruthful and deliberate assertions of falsehoods, to the damage and prejudice of the said Elena M. Librojo.[4]

The case was raffled to the MeTC of Quezon City, Branch 43, where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 90721 entitled,

People of the Philippines v. Francisco Magestrado.

On 30 June 1999, petitioner filed a motion[5] for suspension of proceedings based on a prejudicial question. Petitioner

alleged that Civil Case No. Q-98-34349, a case for recovery of a sum of money pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of

Quezon City, Branch 84, and Civil Case No. Q-98- 34308, a case for Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery of Title and Damages,

pending before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 77, must be resolved first before Criminal Case No. 90721 may proceed since

the issues in the said civil cases are similar or intimately related to the issues raised in the criminal action.

On 14 July 1999, MeTC-Branch 43 issued an Order*6+ denying petitioners motion for suspension of pr

Acting on the Motion for Suspension of Proceedings filed by the *herein petitioner Magestrado], thru cou

Comment and Opposition thereto, the Court after an evaluation of the same, finds the aforesaid motion w

is hereby DENIED, it appearing that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil actions is not determinativ

innocence of the accused.

Hence, the trial of this case shall proceed as previously scheduled on July 19 and August 2, 1993 at 8:30 in t

On 17 August 1999, a motion[7] for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but was denied by the MeTC in a

19 October 1999.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari[9] under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, with a pra

a Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 83, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-

ground that MeTC Judge Billy J. Apalit committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

denying his motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90721.

On 14 March 2000, RTC-Branch 83 dismissed the petition and denied the prayer for the issuance of a writ o

injunction, reasoning thus:

Scrutinizing the complaints and answers in the civil cases abovementioned, in relation to the criminal action

Court opines and so holds that there is no prejudicial question involved as to warrant the suspension of the

await the outcome of the civil cases. The civil cases are principally for determination whether or not a loan

petitioner and whether or not he executed the deed of real estate mortgage involving the property covered

173163, whereas the criminal case is for perjury which imputes upon petitioner the wrongful execution of a

support his petition for issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 173163. Whether or not he co

the issue in the criminal case which may be resolved independently of the civil cases. Note that the affidaviexecuted in support of the petition for issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163 whic

raffled to Branch 99 of the RTC. x x x.[10]

Again, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[11] but this was denied by RTC- Branch 83 in an Order[

December 2000.

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari[13] under Rule 65 of the Revi

which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 63293. Petitioner alleged that RTC Judge Estrella T. Estrada committ

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q

effect sustaining the denial by MeTC-Branch 43 of petitioners motion to suspend the proceedings in Crimin

as well as his subsequent motion for reconsideration thereof.

On 5 March 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed[14] the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 63293 on the ground th

remedy should have been an appeal from the dismissal by RTC-Branch 83 of his Petition for Certiorari in Q-

Court of Appeals ruled that:


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Is this instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 the correct and appropriate remedy?

We rule negatively.

The resolution or dismissal in special civil actions, as in the instant petition, may be appealed x x x under Section 10, Rule 44 of

the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and not by petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the same rules. Thus, the said rule

provides:

Section 10. Time for filing memoranda on special cases. In certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus

cases, the parties shall file in lieu of briefs, their respective memoranda within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from

receipt of the notice issued by the clerk that all the evidence, oral and documentary, is already attached to the record x x x.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of

Civil Procedure is hereby DISMISSED.[15]

The Court of Appeals denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration*16+ in a Resolution*17+ dated 3 May 2001.

Hence, petitioner comes before us via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court

raising the following issues:

1. Whether or not the Orders of Judge Estrella T. Estrada dated March 14, 2000 denying petitioners Petition for Certiorari

under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and her subsequent Order dated December 21, 2000, denying the Motion for

Reconsideration thereafter filed can only be reviewed by the Court of Appeals thru appeal under Section 10, Rule 44 of the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

2. Whether or not Judge Estrella T. Estrada of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Quezon City, had committed grave abuse

of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of her jurisdiction in denying the Petition for Certiorari and petitioners subsequent

motion for reconsideration on the ground of a prejudicial question pursuant to the Rules on Criminal Procedure and theprevailing jurisprudence.

After consideration of the procedural and substantive issues raised by petitioner, we find the instant petition to be without

merit.

The procedural issue herein basically hinges on the proper remedy which petitioner should have availed himself of before the

Court of Appeals: an ordinary appeal or a petition for certiorari. Petitioner claims that he correctly questioned RTC-Branch 83s

Order of dismissal of his Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358 through a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of

Appeals. Private respondent and public respondent People of the Philippines insist that an ordinary appeal was the proper

remedy.

We agree with respondents. We hold that the appellate court did not err in dismissing petitioners Petition for Certiorari,

pursuant to Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court (and not under Rule 44, Section 10, invoked by the Court of

Appeals in its Resolution dated 5 March 2001).

The correct procedural recourse for petitioner was appeal, not only because RTC-Branch 83 did not comm

of discretion in dismissing petitioners Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358 but also because

Order of dismissal was a final order from which petitioners should have appealed in accordance with Sectio

Revised Rules of Court.

An order or a judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of a pending action, so that nothing more ca

the trial court. In other words, the order or judgment ends the litigation in the lower court. Au contraire, a

order does not dispose of the case completely, but leaves something to be done as regards the merits of th

Branch 83s Order dated 14 March 2001 dismissing petitioners Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99

disposes of the said case and RTC-Branch 83 can do nothing more with the case.

Under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely

case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by the Revised Rules of Court to be appealable. The m

an RTC judgment or final order is also provided in Rule 41 as follows:

Section 2. Modes of appeal.

(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial C

of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgm

appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required e

proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In su

on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.

Certiorari generally lies only when there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy or adequate remedy avail

petitioners. Here, appeal was available. It was adequate to deal with any question whether of fact or of law

of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion or error of judgment which the trial court might have committed

instead filed a special civil action for certiorari.

We have time and again reminded members of the bench and bar that a special civil action for certiorari un

Revised Rules of Court lies only when there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ord

law.*19+ Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availa

remedy,[20] certiorari not being a substitute for lost appeal.[21]

As certiorari is not a substitute for lost appeal, we have repeatedly emphasized that the perfection of appe

and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and that the failure to perf

renders the decision of the trial court final and executory. This rule is founded upon the principle that the r

part of due process of law but is a mere statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in accord

provisions of the law. Neither can petitioner invoke the doctrine that rules of technicality must yield to the

substantial justice. While every litigant must be given the amplest opportunity for the proper and just dete

cause, free from constraints of technicalities, the failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementary perio

technicality. It raises a jurisdictional problem as it deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction over the appe


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The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.[23] A party cannot substitute

the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the remedy of appeal. The existence and availability

of the right of appeal are antithetical to the availability of the special civil action for certiorari.[24] As this Court held in Fajardo

v. Bautista[25]:

Generally, an order of dismissal, whether right or wrong, is a final order, and hence a proper subject of appeal, not

certiorari. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. Accordingly,

although the special civil action of certiorari is not proper when an ordinary appeal is available, it may be granted where it is

shown that the appeal would be inadequate, slow, insufficient, and will not promptly relieve a party from the injurious effects

of the order complained of, or where appeal is inadequate and ineffectual. Nevertheless, certiorari cannot be a substitute forthe lost or lapsed remedy of appeal, where such loss is occasioned by the petitioners own neglect or error in the choice of

remedies.

On 21 December 2000, petitioner received a copy of the Order of the RTC-Branch 83 denying his motion for reconsideration of

the dismissal of his Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358; hence, he had until 18 January 2001 within which to file

an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner on 19 February 2001 with the Court of

Appeals cannot be a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. As petitioner failed to file a timely appeal, RTC-Branch 83s

dismissal of his Petition for Certiorari had long become final and executory.

For this procedural lapse, the Court of Appeals correctly denied outright the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner before it.

Moreover, there are even more cogent reasons for denying the instant Petition on the merits.

In the Petition at bar, petitioner raises several substantive issues. Petitioner harps on the need for the suspension of the

proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90721 for perjury pending before MeTC-Branch 43 based on a prejudicial question still to be

resolved in Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 (for cancellation of mortgage) and Civil Case No. Q-98-34349 (for collection of a sum of

money) which are pending before other trial courts.

For clarity, we shall first discuss the allegations of petitioner in his complaint in Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 (for cancellation of

mortgage) and that of private respondent in her complaint in Civil Case No. Q-98-34349 (for collection of a sum of money).

Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 is a complaint for Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery of Title and Damages filed on 8 May 1988 by

petitioner against private respondent with RTC-Branch 77. Petitioner alleges that he purchased a parcel of land covered by

Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-173163 thru private respondent, a real estate broker. In the process of negotiation,

petitioner was pressured to sign a Deed of Sale prepared by private respondent. Upon signing the Deed of Sale, he noticed

that the Deed was already signed by a certain Cristina Gonzales as attorney-in-fact of vendor Spouses Guillermo and Amparo

Galvez. Petitioner demanded from private respondent a special power of attorney and authority to sell, but the latter failed to

present one. Petitioner averred that private respondent refused to deliver the certificate of title of the land despite execution

and signing of the Deed of Sale and payment of the consideration. Petitioner was thus compelled to engage the services of one

Modesto Gazmin, Jr. who agreed, for P100,000.00 to facilitate the filing of cases against private respondent; to deliver to

petitioner the certificate of title of the land; and/or to cancel the certificate of title in possession of private

respondent. However, Mr. Gazmin, Jr., did nothing upon receipt of the amount of P100,000.00 from petitioner. In fact,

petitioner was even charged with perjury before the Office of the City Prosecutor, all because of Mr. Gazmin, Jr.s

wrongdoing. Petitioner further alleged that he discovered the existence of a spurious Real Estate Mortgag

signed in favor of private respondent. Petitioner categorically denied signing the mortgage document and

respondent who falsified the same in order to justify her unlawful withholding of TCT No. N-173163 from p

petitioner prayed for:

1. The cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage dated August 2, 1997 as null and void;

2. As well as to order *herein private respondent+ to DELIVER the Owners Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certif

173163 to [herein petitioner];

3. Condemning [private respondent] to pay [petitioner] the sums of

a) P100,000.00 as MORAL DAMAGES;

b) P50, 000.00 as EXEMPLARY DAMAGES;

c) P50,000.00 as Attorneys fees and

d) Cost of suit.

4. A general relief is likewise prayed for (sic) just and equitable under the premises.

Civil Case No. Q-98-34349,[26] on the other hand, is a complaint for a sum of money with a motion for

attachment filed by private respondent against petitioner on 14 May 1988 before RTC-Branch 84. Private r

that petitioner obtained a loan from her in the amount of P758,134.42 with a promise to pay on or before

security for payment of the loan, petitioner executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage covering a parcel of la

under TCT No. N-173163. Petitioner pleaded for additional time to pay the said obligation, to which responprivate respondent discovered sometime in February 1998 that petitioner executed an affidavit of loss alleg

owners duplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163, and succeeded in annotating said affidavit on the original cop

173163 on file with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. Private respondent further alleges that she also d

petitioner filed a petition for issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163 with the RTC o

Branch 98, docketed as LRC Case No. Q-10052. Private respondent demanded that petitioner pay his obliga

refused to do so. Resultantly, private respondent prayed for the following:

A. That upon filing of this Complaint as well as the Affidavit of attachment and a preliminary heari

as bond filed, a writ of preliminary attachment is (sic) by the Honorable Court ordering the Sheriff to levy [h

property sufficient to answer *herein private respondents+ claim in this action;

B. That after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered in *private respondents+ favor as agai

ordering the latter to pay the former the sum of P758,134.42 plus interest thereon at 5% per month from S

to the date of actual payment; actual damages in the sums of P70,000.00 each under paragraphs 11 and 12

P200,000.00 as moral damages; P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; twenty (20%) of the principal claim as

P2,500.00 per appearance honorarium; and P60,000.00 as litigation expense before this Honorable Court.


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[Petitioner] prays for such further relief in law, justice and equity.

As to whether it is proper to suspend Criminal Case No. 90721 for perjury pending final outcome of Civil Case No. Q-98-34349

and Civil Case No. Q-98-34308, we take into consideration Sections 6 and 7, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, which read:

Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the

pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the

preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in thesame criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.

Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action

involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (b) the resolution of

such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting

decisions.[27]

A prejudial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved

therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case

before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a

question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or

innocence of the accused.[28]

For a prejudicial question in a civil case to suspend criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts

intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue orissues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.

Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings

until the final resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately

related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in t he

civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question

must be lodged in another tribunal.[29]

If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will n ot determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal

action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal

case, therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question.*30+ Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and

the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.[31]

However, the court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and upon proper application for a

stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance to abide by the outcome of another case pending in another court, especially

where the parties and the issues are the same, for there is power inherent in every court to control the disposition of cases on

its dockets with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights of par

action cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in the first action are settled, the second a

stayed.[32]

The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition

dockets, considering its time and effort, those of counsel and the litigants. But if proceedings must be stay

in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious litigations, conflicting judgments, confusion bet

courts. It bears stressing that whether or not the trial court would suspend the proceedings in the criminal

submitted to its sound discretion.[33]

Indeed, a judicial order issued pursuant to the courts discretionary authority is not subject to reversal on re

constitutes an abuse of discretion. As the United States Supreme Court aptly declared in Landis v. North Am

burden of making out the justice and wisdom from the departure from the beaten truck lay heavily on the p

unwilling litigant is compelled to wait upon the outcome of a controversy to which he is a stranger. It is, th

in rare circumstances will a litigant in one case is compelled to stand aside, while a litigant in another, settli

that will define the rights of both is, after all, the parties before the court are entitled to a just, speedy and

of their case undetermined by the pendency of the proceedings in another case. After all, procedure was c

and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice.*34+

As stated, the determination of whether the proceedings may be suspended on the basis of a prejudicial qu

whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the civil cases are so related with the issues raised in

such that the resolution of the issues in the civil cases would also determine the judgment in the criminal c

A perusal of the allegations in the complaints show that Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 pending before RTC-Bra

Case No. Q-98-34349, pending before RTC-Branch 84, are principally for the determination of whether a loa

petitioner from private respondent and whether petitioner executed a real estate mortgage involving the p

TCT No. N-173163. On the other hand, Criminal Case No. 90721 before MeTC-Branch 43, involves the dete

whether petitioner committed perjury in executing an affidavit of loss to support his request for issuance oduplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163.

It is evident that the civil cases and the criminal case can proceed independently of each other. Regardless

the two civil cases, it will not establish the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the criminal case for perju

petitioner of the land or his execution of a real estate mortgage will have no bearing whatsoever on wheth

knowingly and fraudulently executed a false affidavit of loss of TCT No. N-173163.

MeTC-Branch 43, therefore, did not err in ruling that the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 for cancel

before the RTC-Branch 77; and Civil Case No. Q-98-34349 for collection of a sum of money before RTC-Bran

prejudicial question in the determination of whether petitioner is guilty of perjury in Criminal Case No. 907

likewise, did not err in ruling that MeTC-Branch 43 did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying pet

suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90721.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions dated 5 March 2001 and 3 May 2001of the Co

G.R. SP No. 63293 are hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. According

Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 43, is hereby directed to proceed with the hearing and trial on the merits


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No. 90721, and to expedite proceedings therein, without prejudice to the right of the accused to due process. Costs against

petitioner.

SO ORDERED.


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COCA-COLA BOTTLERS (PHILS.) INC. and ERIC MONTINOLA, Petitioners, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION and DR. DEAN

CLIMACO, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

REYES, R.T., J.:

WE are confronted with triple remedial issues on prejudicial question, forum shopping, and li tis pendentia.

We review on certiorari the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) upholding the order of the Social Security Commission

(SSC),[2] denying petitioners motion to dismiss respondent Climacos petition for compulsory coverage with the Social Security

System (SSS).

The Facts

Petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers (Phils.), Inc. is a corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of softdrink beverages.[3] Co-

petitioner Eric Montinola was the general manager of its plant in Bacolod City.[4] Respondent Dr. Dean Climaco was a former

retainer physician at the companys plant in Bacolod City.*5+

In 1988, petitioner company and Dr. Climaco entered into a Retainer Agreement[6] for one year, with a monthly compensation

of P3,800.00,*7+ where he may charge professional fees for hospital services rendered in line with his specialization.*8+ The

agreement further provided that either party may terminate the contract upon giving thirty (30)-day written notice to the

other.*9+ In consideration of the retainers fee, Dr. Climaco agrees to perform the duties and obligations*10+ enumerated in

the Comprehensive Medical Plan,[11] which was attached and made an integral part of the agreement.

Explicit in the contract, however, is the provision that no employee-employer relationship shall exist between the company and

Dr. Climaco while the contract is in effect.[12] In case of its termination, Dr. Climaco shall be entitled only to such retainer fee

as may be due him at the time of termination.*13+

Dr. Climaco continuously served as the company physician, performing all the duties s tipulated in the Retainer

Agreement and the Comprehensive Medical Plan. By 1992, his salary was increased to P7,500.00 per month.[14]

Meantime, Dr. Climaco inquired with the Department of Labor and Employment and the SSS whether he was an employee of

the company. Both agencies replied in the affirmative.[15] As a result, Dr. Climaco filed a complaint[16] before the National

Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Bacolod City. In his complaint, he sought recognition as a regular employee of the

company and demanded payment of his 13th month pay, cost of living allowance, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay,

Christmas bonus and all other benefits.[17]

During the pendency of the complaint, the company terminated its Retainer Agreement with Dr. Climaco. Thus, Dr. Climaco

filed another complaint[18] for illegal dismissal against the company before the NLRC Bacolod City. He asked that he be

reinstated to his former position as company physician of its Bacolod Plant, without loss of seniority rights,

backwages, other unpaid benefits, and for payment of damages.[19]

The Labor Arbiter, in each of the complaints, ruled in favor of petitioner company.[20] The first complaint w

Labor Arbiter Jesus N. Rodriguez, Jr. found that the company did not have the power of control over Dr. Clim

of his duties and responsibilities. The validity of the Retainer Agreement was also recognized. Labor Arbite

likewise dismissed the second complaint in view of the dismissal of the first complaint.

On appeal, the NLRC, Fourth Division, Cebu City, affirmed the Arbiter disposition.[21] On petition for review

NLRC ruling was reversed.[22] The appellate court ruled that using the four-fold test, an employer-employexisted between the company and Dr. Climaco. Petitioners elevated the case through a petition for review

before this Court.

Meantime, on November 9, 1994, while the NLRC cases were pending, Dr. Climaco filed with the SSC in Bac

petition[24] praying, among others, that petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers (Phils.), Inc. be ordered to report him

social security coverage.

On April 12, 1995, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdict

that there is no employer-employee relationship between the company and Dr. Climaco; and that his servic

virtue of a Retainer Agreement.[25]

Dr. Climaco opposed the motion.[26] According to Dr. Climaco, *t+he fact that the petitioner [i.e., respond

does not enjoy the other benefits of the company is a question that is being raised by the petitioner in his c

National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Bacolod City, against the respondent *i.e., petitioner compan

On July 24, 1995, the SSC issued an order stating among others, that the resolution of petitioner companys

is held in abeyance pending reception of evidence of the parties.*28+

In view of the statements of Dr. Climaco in his opposition to the companys motion to dismiss, petitioners a

1996, moved for the dismissal of Dr. Climacos complaint, this time on the g rounds of forum shopping and l

SSC and CA Dispositions

On January 17, 1997, the SSC denied petitioners motion to dismiss, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the respondents Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied for lack of mer

Accordingly, let this case be remanded to SSS Bacolod Branch Office for reception of evidence of the parties

Order dated July 24, 1995.

SO ORDERED.[30]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration*31+ received the same fate.*32+


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On April 29, 1997, the company filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. On March 15, 2002, the CA dismissed the petition,

with a fallo reading:

WHEREFORE, under the premises, the Court holds that public respondent Social Security Commission did no t act with grave

abuse of discretion in issuing the disputed orders, and the herein petition is therefore DISMISSED for want of merit.

SO ORDERED.[33]

Hence, the present recourse.

Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues for Our consideration:

WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RENDERING THE ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS, HAVING

DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS

HONORABLE COURT, CONSIDERING THAT:

I.

THE PREVIOUS COMPLAINT FOR REGULARIZATION AND/OR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL, WHICH IS NOW PENDING RESOLUTION

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, POSES A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION TO THE SUBJECT OF THE PRESENT CASE.

II.

GIVEN THE ATTENDANT CIRCUMSTANCES, RESPONDENT CLIMACO IS GUILTY OF FORUM SHOPPING, WHICH THEREBY CALLED

FOR THE OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL OF HIS PETITION BEFORE THE SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION.

III.THE PETITION SHOULD HAVE ALSO BEEN DISMISSED OUTRIGHT ON THE GROUND OF LITIS PENDENTIA, AS THERE ARE OTHER

ACTIONS PENDING BETWEEN THE SAME PARTIES FOR THE SAME CAUSE OF ACTION.[34] (Underscoring supplied)

Our Ruling

The petition fails.

The Court notes that petitioners, in their petition, averred that the appeal from the NLRC and CA dispositions on the illegal

dismissal of respondent Climaco is still pending with this Court. Upon verification, however, it was unveiled that the said case

had already been decided by this Courts First Division on February 5, 2007.

While we deplore the failure of petitioners and counsel in updating the Court on the resolution of the said related case,

We hasten to state that it did not operate to moot the issues pending before Us. We take this opportunity to address the

questions on prejudicial question, forum shopping, and litis pendentia.

No prejudicial question exists.

Petitioners allege that Dr. Climaco previously filed separate complaints before the NLRC seeking recognitio

employee. Necessarily then, a just resolution of these cases hinge on a determination of whether or not Dr

employee of the company.[35] The issue of whether Dr. Climaco is entitled to employee benefits, as praye

cases, is closely intertwined with the issue of whether Dr. Climaco is an employee of the company who is su

coverage under the SSS Law. Hence, they argue, said regularization/illegal dismissal case is a prejudicial qu

The argument is untenable.

Our concept of prejudicial question was lifted from Spain, where civil cases are tried exclusively by civil cou

cases are tried exclusively in criminal courts. Each kind of court is jurisdictionally distinct from and indepen

other. In the Philippines, however, courts are invariably tribunals of general jurisdiction. This means that c

jurisdiction over both civil and criminal cases. Thus, it is not impossible that the criminal case, as well as th

a prejudicial question may rise, may be both pending in the same court. For this reason, the elements of pr

have been modified in such a way that the phrase pendency of the civil case in a different tribunal has be

The rule is that there is prejudicial question when (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue

related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determine

the criminal action may proceed.[37] It comes into play generally in a situation where a civil action and a c

pend and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal actio

proceed. This is so because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinativ

the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.[38]

Here, no prejudicial question exists because there is no pending criminal case.[39] The consolidated NLRC

considered as previously instituted civil action. In Berbari v. Concepcion,[40] it was held that a prejudicia

understood in law to be that which must precede the criminal action, that which requires a decision with w

closely related.

Neither can the doctrine of prejudicial question be applied by analogy. The issue in the case filed by Dr. Cli

involves the question of whether or not he is an employee of Coca-Cola Bottlers (Phils.), Inc. and subject to

coverage of the Social Security System. On the contrary, the cases filed by Dr. Climaco before the NLRC inv

issues. In his first complaint,[41] Dr. Climaco sought recognition as a regular employee of the company and

payment of his 13th month pay, cost of living allowance, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, Christmas

benefits.[42] The second complaint[43] was for illegal dismissal, with prayer for reinstatement to his forme

company physician of the companys Bacolod Plant, without loss of seniority rights, with full payment of ba

unpaid benefits, and for payment of damages.[44] Thus, the issues in the NLRC cases are not determinativ

the SSC should proceed. It is settled that the question claimed to be prejudicial in nature must be determin

before the court.[45]

There is no forum shopping.

Anent the second issue, petitioners p osit that since the issues before the NLRC and the SSC are the same, th

a ruling on the issue presented before it without necessarily having a direct effect on the issue before the N


14/31

patently erroneous, if not malicious, for Dr. Climaco to invoke the jurisdiction of the SSC through a separate petition.[46] Thus,

petitioners contend, Dr. Climaco was guilty of forum shopping.

Again, We turn down the contention.

Forum shopping is a prohibited malpractice and condemned as trifling with the courts and their processes.[47] It is proscribed

because it unnecessarily burdens the courts with heavy caseloads. It also unduly taxes the manpower and financial resources

of the judiciary. It mocks the judicial processes, thus, affecting the efficient administration of justice.[48]

The grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by two (2) competent tribunals of two(2) separate and contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous litigants, taking advantage of a variety of competent tribunals, may

repeatedly try their luck in several different fora until a favorable result is reached.[49]

It is well to note that forum shopping traces its origin in private international law on choice of venues, which later developed to

a choice of remedies. In First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals,[50] the Court had occasion to outline the origin

of the rule on forum shopping. Said the Court:

x x x forum shopping originated as a concept in private international law, where non-resident litigants are given the option to

choose the forum or place wherein to bring their suit for various reasons or excuses, including to secure procedural

advantages, to annoy and harass the defendant, to avoid overcrowded dockets, or to select a more friendly venue. To combat

these less than honorable excuses, the principle of forum non conveniens was developed whereby a court, in conflicts of law

cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most convenient or available forum and the parties are

not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.

x x x x

In the Philippines, forum shopping has acquired a connotation encompassing not only a choice of venues, as it was originally

understood in conflicts of laws, but also to a choice of remedies. As to the first (choice of venues), the Rules of Court, forexample, allow a plaintiff to commence personal actions where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be

found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff (Rule 4, Sec. 2*b+). As to remedies,

aggrieved parties, for example, are given a choice of pursuing civil liabilities independently of the criminal, arising from the

same set of facts. A passenger of a public utility vehicle in volved in a vehicular accident may sue on culpa contractual, culpa

aquiliana or culpa criminaleach remedy being available independently of the othersalthough he cannot recover more than

once.

In either of these situations (choice of venue or choice of remedy), the litigant actually shops for a forum of his action. This

was the original concept of the term forum shopping.

Eventually, however, instead of actually making a choice of the forum of their actions, litigants, through the encouragement

of their lawyers, file their actions in all available courts, or invoke all relevant remedies simultaneously. This practice had not

only resulted to (sic) conflicting adjudications among different courts and consequent confusion enimical (sic) to an orderly

administration of justice. It had created extreme inconvenience to some of the parties to the action.

Thus, forum-shopping had acquired a different concept which is unethical professional legal pra

necessitated or had given rise to the formulation of rules and canons discouraging or altogether prohibiting

What therefore started both in conflicts of laws and in our domestic law as a legitimate device for solving p

abused and misused to assure scheming litigants of dubious reliefs.[51]

Thus, in order to prevent forum shopping, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure now provide:

SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping.The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the

initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneous(a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any co

quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b

other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should ther

same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days the

wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.[52]

Forum shopping is not only strictly prohibited but also condemned. So much so that *f+ailure to comply w

requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the

case without prejudice. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertak

constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal a

of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be groun

dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt as well as a cause for administrative sanctions

There is forum shopping when one party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, s

successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumsta

substantially the same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely, by some other court.[54] In

shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case wiljudicata in the other.[55]

There is res judicata when (1) there is a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it has jurisdiction

matter and the parties; (3) the judgment or order is on the merits; and (4) there is between the two cases id

subject matter and causes of action.[56]

Measured by the foregoing yardstick, Dr. Climaco is not guilty of forum shopping. While it is true that the p

in the NLRC and in the SSC, the reliefs sought and the causes of action are different.

Admittedly, Dr. Climacosbasis in filing the cases before the NLRC and the SSC is his Retainer Agreement wi

company. This does not mean, however, that his causes of action are the same:

x x x Some authorities declare the distinction between demands or rights of action which are single and en

are several and distinct to be that the former arise out of one and the same act or contract and the latter o

or contracts. This rule has been declared to be unsound, however, and as evidence of its unsoundness, ref

made to the fact that several promissory notes may, and often do, grow out of one and the same transactio


15/31

not constitute an entire demand. The better rule is that the bare fact that different demands spring out of the same or

contract does not ipso facto render a judgment on one a bar to a suit on another, however distinct. It is clear that the right of a

plaintiff to maintain separate actions cannot be determined by the fact that the claims might have been prosecuted in a single

action. A plaintiff having separate demands against a defendant may, at his election, join them in the same action, or he may

prosecute them separately, subject of the power of the court to order their consolidation. There may be only one cause of

action although the plaintiff is entitled to several forms and kinds of relief, provided there is not more than one primary right

sought to be enforced or one subject of controversy presented for adjudication.[57] (Underscoring supplied)

As the SSC and the CA correctly observed, different laws are applicable to the cases before the two tribunals. The Labor Code

and pertinent social legislations would govern the cases before the NLRC, while the Social Security Law would govern the casebefore the SSC. Clearly, as the issues pending before the NLRC and the SSC are diverse, a ruling on the NLRC cases would not

amount to res judicata in the case before the SSC.

The elements of litis pendentia are absent.

Lastly, petitioners contend that the petition of Dr. Climaco before the SSC is defective because there were pending actions

between the same parties and involving the same issues in different fora.[58]

For litis pendentia to exist, there must be (1) identity of the parties or at least such as representing the same interests in both

actions; (2) identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief founded on the same facts; and (3) identity of the

two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.[59]

In the case under review, there is no litis pendentia to speak of. As previously explained, although the parties in the cases

before the NLRC and the SSC are similar, the nature of the cases fil ed, the rights asserted, and reliefs prayed for in each

tribunal, are different.

As a last attempt, however, petitioners invoke Rule 16, Section 1(e) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioners contend

that the petition Dr. Climaco lodged with the SSC is another action prohibited by the Rule.*60+

In Solancio v. Ramos,[61] the issue centered on whether the pending administrative case before the Bureau of L ands is

another action, which would justify the dismissal of the complaint of plaintiff against defendants before the then Court of

First Instance (now RTC) of Cagayan. Ruling in the negative, the Court noted that both parties as well as the trial court have

missed the extent or meaning of the ground of the motion to dismiss as co ntemplated under the Rules of Court.*62+ Mr.

Justice Regala, who wrote the opinion of the Court, explained the phrase another action in this wise:

This is not what is contemplated under the law because under Section 1(d), Rule 16 (formerly Rule 8) of the Rules of Court,

*now Rule 1, Section 16(e) of the Rules of Court, supra+ one of the grounds for the dismissal of an action is that there is

another action pending between the same parties for the same cause. Note that the Rule uses the phrase another

action. This phrase should be construed in line with Section 1 of Rule 2, which defines the word action, thus

Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection

of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Every other remedy is a special proceeding.*63+

Evidently, there is no another action pending between petitioners and Dr. Climaco at the time when the l

before the SSC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appealed decision AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.


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JESSE Y. YAP versus HON. MONICO G. CABALES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,

Branch 35, General Santos City; MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 1, General Santos City;

COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOVITA DIMALANTA and MERGYL

MIRABUENO,

Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance of a writ of

preliminary injunction and/or issuance of status quo order seeking to annul and set aside the Resolution[1] of the Court of

Appeals (CA) dated July 17, 2003 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the Decision[2] dated April 30, 2003 in CA-

G.R. SP No. 68250.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Jesse Y. Yap and his spouse Bessie Yap are engaged in the real estate business through their company

Primetown Property Group.

Sometime in 1996, petitioner purchased several real properties from a certain Evelyn Te (Evelyn). In consideration of said

purchases, petitioner issued several Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) postdated checks to Evelyn. Thereafter, spouses

Orlando and Mergyl Mirabueno and spouses Charlie and Jovita Dimalanta, rediscounted the checks from Evelyn.

In the beginning, the first few checks were honored by the bank, but in the early part of 1997, when the remaining checkswere deposited with the drawee bank, they were dishonored for the reason that the Account is Closed. Demands were made

by Spouses Mirabueno and Spouses Dimalanta to the petitioner to make good the checks. Despite this, however, the latter

failed to pay the amounts represented by the said checks.

On December 8, 1997, Spouses Mirabueno filed a civil action for collection of sum of money, damages and attorney's fee

with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of

General Santos City, docketed as Civil Case No. 6231.[3] On December 15, 1997, Spouses Dimalanta followed suit and

instituted a similar action, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 6238.[4]

Subsequently, on various dates, the Office of the City Prosecutor of General Santos City filed several informations for

violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 22 against the petitioner with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), General

Santos City. The criminal complaints were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 34873, 34874, 34862 to 34869, and Criminal Case

No. 35522-I.[5]

In the criminal cases, petitioner filed separate motions to suspend proceedings on account of the existence of a prejudicial

question and motion to exclude the private prosecutor from participating in the proceedings.[6] Petitioner prayed that the

proceedings in the criminal cases be suspended until the civil cases pending before the RTC were finally resolved.

The MTCC, in its Orders[7] dated June 21, 2000 and July 4, 2000, denied the motions for lack of merit.

Partial Motion for Reconsideration[8] relative to Criminal Case Nos. 34873, 34874, 34862 to 34869 and a M

Reconsideration of the Part of the Order Denying the Motion to Suspend Proceedings on Account of the Ex

Prejudicial Question relative to Criminal Case No. 35522-I.[9] The subsequent motions were denied in the O

October 18, 2000.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with a Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Prelimina

before the RTC, docketed as SPL. Civil Case No. 539, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the M

2, 2001, the RTC issued an Order[12] denying the petition.

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[13] which was denied in an Order dated October 1

Thereafter, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari Prohibition and Mandamus with Urgen

Issuance of Status Quo Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction,[15] docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68250.

On April 30, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision[16] dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The CA op

Nos. 6231 and 6238 did not pose a prejudicial question to the prosecution of the petitioner for violation of

The CA ruled:

In the instant case, a careful perusal of Civil Cases Nos. 6231 and 6238 reveals that the issue involved

validity of the sale as incorrectly pointed out by the petitioner, but it is, whether or not the complainants th

collect from the petitioner the sum or the value of the checks which they have rediscounted from Evelyn Te

Court to state that the sale and the rediscounting of the checks are two transactions, separate and distinct

so happened that in the subject civil cases it is not the sale that is in question, but rather the rediscounting

Therefore, petitioner's contention that the main issue involved in said civil cases is the validity of the sale st

ground. Furthermore, if it is indeed the validity of the sale that is contested in the subject civil cases, then, W

why the petitioner never contested such sale by filing an action for the annulment thereof or at least invokeanswer that the sale be declared null and void. Accordingly, even if Civil Cases Nos. 6231 and 6238 are tried

of the issues therein is had, it cannot be deduced therefrom that the petitioner cannot be held liable anymo

violation of B.P. Blg. 22.[17]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[18] which was denied in the Order[19] dated July 17, 20

Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:

1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE IS NO PREJUDICIAL QUEST

CASES (FOR COLLECTION OF SUMS OF MONEY INSTITUTED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OVER CHECKS ISSUED

PETITIONER, CIVIL CASE NOS. 6238 AND 6231) THAT WOULD WARRANT SUSPENSION OF THE CRIMINAL CA

35522-1, FOR VIOLATION OF B.P. 22, SUBJECT OF WHICH ARE THE VERY SAME CHECKS).

2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANC

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR STATUS QUO ORDER.[20]

The main contention of the petitioner is that a prejudicial question, as defined by law and jurispruden

present case. It is the petitioner's assertion that Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 for collection of sum of mon

were filed ahead of the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. He further alleged that, in the pending c

as to whether private respondents are entitled to collect from the petitioner despite the lack of considerat


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is a logical antecedent to the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. For if the court rules that there is no valid

consideration for the check's issuance, as petitioner contends, then it necessarily follows that he could not also be held liable

for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

Petitioner further avers that B.P. Blg. 22 specifically requires, among other elements, that the check should have been

issued for account or for value. There must be a valid consideration; otherwise, no violation of the said law could be rightfully

pursued. Petitioner said that the reason for the dishonor of the checks was his order to the drawee bank to stop payment and

to close his account in order to avoid necessary penalty from the bank. He made this order due to the failure of Evelyn to

deliver to him the titles to the purchased properties to him.

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that there is no prejudicial question in Civil CaseNos. 6231 and 6238 which would warrant the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22

against the petitioner. The issue in the civil cases is not the validity of the sale between the petitioner and Evelyn, but whether

the complainants therein are entitled to damages arising from the checks. These checks were issued by the petitioner in favor

of Evelyn, who, thereafter, negotiated the same checks to private complainants. The checks were subsequently dishonored

due to insufficiency of funds. The OSG maintains that the resolution of such issue has absolutely no bearing on the issue of

whether petitioner may be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.[21]

The present case hinges on the determination of whether there exists a prejudicial question that necessitates the

suspension of the proceedings in the MTCC.

We find that there is none and, thus, we resolve to deny the petition.

A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there

exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue

raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the

criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential

elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the

resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.[22]

If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised in theother, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not

only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the

resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If

the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action

based on the same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case, the

civil case does not involve a prejudicial question.[23] Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action

can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.[24]

The issue in the criminal cases is whether the petitioner is guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22, while in the civil case, it is

whether the private respondents are entitled to collect f rom the petitioner the sum or the value of the checks that they have

rediscounted from Evelyn.

The resolution of the issue raised in the civil action is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the

criminal cases against him, and there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal cases.

In the aforementioned civil actions, even if petitioner is declared not liable for the payment of the value of the checks and

damages, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The mere issuance of worthless checks

with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in itself an offense.[25]

In Jose v. Suarez,[26] the prejudicial question under determination was whether the daily interest rate

such that the checks issued by respondents to cover said interest were likewise void for being contra bonos

the cases for B.P. Blg. 22 will no longer prosper. In resolving the issue, We ruled that whether or not the in

by petitioners is eventually declared void for being contra bonos mores will not affect the outcome of the B

because what will ultimately be penalized is the mere issuance of bouncing checks. In fact, the primordial q

before the court hearing the B.P. Blg. 22 cases is whether the law has been breached; that is, if a bouncin

issued.

Further, We held in Ricaforte v. Jurado,[27] that:

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless chethat is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. In Lozano v. Martinez, we have declared that it is not

of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his d

the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless checks. Becaus

effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offen

but an offense against public order. In People v. Nitafan, we said that a check issued as an evidence of debt

intended to be presented for payment - has the same effect as an ordinary check and would fall within the

22.

x x x x

x x x The mere act of issuing a worthless check - whether as a deposit, as a guarantee or even as evidence o

is malum prohibitum.

To determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, w

faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring a

and in banking communities. So what the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the pur

was issued or the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is prohibitum.[28]

Moreover, petitioner's reliance on Ras v. Rasul[29] is misplaced. The case of Ras involves a complaint f

deed of sale on the ground of an alleged double sale. While the civil case was pending, an information for e

against Ras (the defendant in the civil case) arising from the same alleged double sale, subject matter of the

The Court ruled that there was a prejudicial question considering that the defense in the civil case was base

facts that would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the estafa case.

The instant case is different from Ras, inasmuch as the determination of whether the petitioner is lia

private respondents the value of the checks and damages, will not affect the guilt or innocence of the petiti

material question in the criminal cases is whether petitioner had issued bad checks, regardless of the purpo

its issuance.

Guided by the following legal precepts, it is clear that the determination of the issues involved in Civil

6238 for collection of sum of money and damages is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the petitioner in

for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.


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In addition, petitioner's claim of lack of consideration may be raised as a defense during the trial of the criminal cases

against him. The validity and merits of a partys defense and accusation,as well as the admissibility and weight of testimonies

and evidence brought before the court, are better ventilated during trial proper.

Precisely, the reason why a state has courts of law is to ascertain the respective rights of the parties, to examine and to

put to test all their respective allegations and evidence through a well desi gned machinery termed trial. Thus, all the

defenses available to the accused should be invoked in the trial of the criminal cases. This court is not the proper forum that

should ascertain the facts and decide the case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 filed against the petitioner.

In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in affirming the decision of the RTC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated April 30, 2003 and the Resolution dated July 17, 2003 of the Court

of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68250 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.


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DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC., Petitioner, vs.CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and HON. ARTHUR A. FAMINI, Respondents.D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, Inc. seeks the reversal of the August 26, 2008 Decision1 in SCA No. 08-0005 of the

Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 253 in Las Pias City. The Decision affirmed the Orders dated October 16, 20072 and March

12, 20083 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 79 in Las Pias City.

The FactsOn October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and Vice-President for Finance and Marketing,

Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit dated October 5, 20044 for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22)

against private

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