Difficult Environments 5.3 Rethinking adaptation, or adapting development 5.4 Political will The way forward: key tasks References Difficult Environments: Bridging Paper 4 2012 3 Boxes

Bridging Paper 4 4

DifficultEnvironments

Bridging Concepts and Practice for Low CarbonClimate Resilient DevelopmentMohamed Hamza, Dan Smith and Janani Vivekananda

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2The IDS–DFID Learning Hub aims to improveknowledge and information flows between DFIDpractitioners and experts in the field of low carbonclimate resilient development. It is a new approachthat combines practitioner learning networks,knowledge management capacity and reflectivelearning processes with bespoke research and analysis.The Hub has four interconnected ‘learning cycles’(Approaches to planning for climate change; tacklingpoverty in a changing climate; low carbon energy anddevelopment; and difficult environments). Each cyclehosts a learning event which are safe, supportedspaces for DFID staff who work on climate change anddevelopment to share individual learning and skills;engage experts in dialogue; develop new ways ofthinking and working together; identify where there areknowledge and learning gaps and contribute to the co-creation of a common knowledge base around ‘lowcarbon climate resilient development’. All the learningcycles are linked through various inputs and outputsthat create an ongoing flow of knowledge and will leadto the development of theories of change for LowCarbon Climate Resilient Development.

This is the fourth Bridging Paper from the Hub’s fourthlearning cycle; difficult environments.

Author’s affiliations:Mohamed Hamza is a Disaster Risk Management Consultant affiliated to the Global ClimateAdaptation Partnership (GCAP),Oxford Brookes University, UK andLund University, Sweden.

Dan Smith is Secretary General andJanani Vivekananda is Climate Change and Conflict Adviser atInternational Alert.

Acknowledgements:Thanks go to all DFID staff whoparticipated in the Learning Hub eventin London in November 2011: JohnCarstensen, Jane Clark, Sean Doolan,Gustya Indriani, Simon Lucas, JoanneManda, Chris Murgatroyd, Radio Save,Virinder Sharma, Sabita Thapa andKhemraj Upadhyaya, and to DonaldLunan of HTSPE and Nigel Thornton ofAgulhas: Applied Knowledge. Thanksalso go to the IDS Learning Hub staffteam, Thomas Tanner, Fran Seballos,and Patricia Curmi and to eventfacilitator Carl Jackson (WKG) for theirsupport, feedback and organisationthroughout the Learning Cycle.

Edited by: Dee Scholey

Designed by: The Ethical GraphicDesign Company Ltd

© 2012 Learning Hub, Brighton: IDS

The Learning Hub

This material has been funded by UKAid from theDepartment for International Development, howeverthe views expressed do not officially reflect thedepartment’s policies.

ContentsTowards a climate resilient state 5.1 Linking development and peace-building goals to climate responses5.2 Achieving a peace-positive balance between conflicting priorities5.3 Rethinking adaptation, or adapting development5.4 Political will

The way forward: key tasks

References

Difficult Environments: Bridging Paper 4 2012

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BoxesBox 1 Waiting for the ants is not enough in MozambiqueBox 2 Cooperative management of climate stress in MaliBox 3 Balancing community resilience with political interestsBox 4 Climate insensitive adaptation in Nigeria

FiguresFigure 1 The relationship between climate stress, human dynamics andsocietal impactsFigure 2 Frameworks depicting two interpretations of vulnerability toclimate changeFigure 3 The complexity of the evolving climate finance architecture

Introduction

Setting the scene: unpacking narratives of fragility and adaptation

Climate change impact in difficult and fragile environments

The LCCRD agenda in difficult and fragile environments 4.1 Identifying the overall development goal4.2 Finding the international LCCRDagenda its national pace and shape4.3 Key issues4.4 Donors’ dilemmas

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4AF Adaptation FundASEAN Association of Southeast Asian NationsCTF Clean Technology FundDAC Donor Assistance CommitteeDFID Department for International DevelopmentFAO Food and Agriculture OrganizationFIP Forest Investment ProgramFSF Fast Start FinanceGCAP Global Climate Adaptation PartnershipGEF Global Environment FacilityGSM Global Circulation ModelsHMG Her Majesty’s GovernmentIGO Inter-governmental organisationINGO International non-governmental organisationIPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate ChangeLCCRD Low carbon climate resilient developmentLCD Low carbon developmentLDCF Least Developed Countries FundMDB Multilateral Development BankNAPA National Adaptation Programme of ActionNGO Non-governmental organisationNRB Niger River BasinODA Official Development AssistancePCDMB Post-Conflict and Disaster Management Branch PPCR Pilot Programme for Climate ResilienceREDD Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest DegradationSCCF Special Climate Change FundSCF Strategic Climate FundSREP Scaling-up Renewable Energy ProgrammeUNEP United Nations Environment ProgrammeWB-CIF World Bank Climate Investment FundWFP World Food ProgrammeWKG Westhill Knowledge Group

Acronyms

5IntroductionThe fourth cycle of the Learning Hub aimed tobring together theory and practice on climateadaptation and development in difficultenvironments and fragile states. Approaches toworking in difficult environments areincreasingly on the agenda of donor agenciesand development organisations. Experiencesfrom countries such as Sudan, Nepal, Somalia,Afghanistan and several others point to theneed for a better understanding of the specificcontext difficult environments present.

There is a growing literature on fragile and failedstates, the focus of which is still on security andpeace issues. Literature, which addressesdevelopment problems, is still characterised bythe drive to find a ‘one size fits all’ solution forcountries and situations that – if seen from anglesother than ‘instability‘– are radically different.However, despite the growth in literature,analytical frameworks, policy and strategydocuments, adaptation and development indifficult environments are still relatively new.

Difficult environments include a broad set ofcontexts: conflict and post-conflict, post-disasterrehabilitation and rebuilding, and states withweak governance and low levels of political will.The fourth cycle of the Learning Hub undertooka review of current approaches, tools andnarratives, and captured experience and lessonsfrom tackling climate change in difficultenvironments. It examined the inter-relationships between climate change,development, conflict/peace-building andspecifically the nexus in which all three overlap.This paper sets out the critical dimensions ofadaptation and development programming andpolicy engagement that emerged through thedialogue between DFID practitioners, advisersand the authors.

This paper bridges the concepts and review ofthe state-of-play set out in the background paperprepared for the learning event with the learningoutcomes from the fourth cycle. In the nextsection the paper unpacks narratives of difficultenvironments, going beyond definitions orconditions of fragility to deepen ourunderstanding of the specific context withinwhich policies and strategies need to be set. Thepaper then progresses, in sections three to six,to explore how a climate resilient state can beachieved in an unstable and difficultenvironment. It asks:

n What are the impacts of climate change indifficult environments beyond whatclimate science modelling says?

n What are the challenges in planning anddelivering low carbon resilientdevelopment in difficult environments andhow should an LCCRD agenda be set?

n How can climate change adaptationcontribute as a vehicle to building apeaceful state, and what institutionalcapacities need to be in place to reach thegoal of becoming a peaceful resilient state?

n How does that translate into tangible keytasks for all stakeholders involved?

The paper concludes by stressing theimportance of ‘contextualisation’ in difficultenvironments, of allowing ‘home grown’approaches and methods to evolve and of theneed for ‘experimenting’ where conditions areuncertain and situations are in a constant state of flux.

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Difficult and fragile environments are generallycharacterised by vulnerability to humanitariancrises (including slow and rapid onset disastersresulting from natural hazards);underdevelopment; political instability; lack ofsecurity; lack of legitimacy and authority; lack ofpolitical commitment of a government toperform its duties; lack of capacity to deliverbasic services; and in some cases but notnecessarily a condition, conflict and post-conflict environments (Faria 2011). Insummary, whether on a national or sub-nationalscale, this particular context can becharacterised by three dimensions: authority,service and legitimacy failure.

While the discourse on fragility has beencriticised on various grounds – from being areductionist term to failing to acknowledge thedifferences between social and politicalorganisation that differ from theWestern/Weberian model of state – itnevertheless has become mainstreamterminology (see Faria 2011; Woodward 2004).

However, when climate change impact becamean issue and cause for concern in difficultenvironments the ensuing narrative was largelydriven by a security agenda, rather than ‘processaccelerator’ or ‘threat multiplier’ concepts. What

appears in the media, and some politicaldiscourses, as a direct link between climatechange and conflict, or indeed state fragility hasno substantiated empirical evidence. Even whenpresented in an analytical way much of theliterature is speculative and based on eitheranecdotal evidence or possible future scenariosthat are difficult to prove or test.1 Direct causallinks largely originated from the ‘securitisation’of climate change impact – for example, thepopular and common belief that climate changewill lead to ‘water wars’.

The post-Cold War era’s new political landscapedemanded a broader and a wider approach tothe term security. A 1994 report by the UNDevelopment Programme articulated the term‘human security’, shifting the emphasis towardsa focus on securing individual people. Thiscreated the space to incorporate non-traditionalthreats, such as environmental degradation(slow-onset disasters), extreme events (rapid-onset disasters), and health and human rights,into the security agenda, alongsidelongstanding issues of defence and stateinterests (Schoch 2011; Woodward 2004).Reports from the EU, the US, the UK andGermany were aimed at mobilising more policyattention to climate change, and an April 2007UN Security Council session was entirely

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Setting the scene:unpacking narratives offragility and adaptation

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devoted to climate change, peace and security,further emphasising such security linkages.

Securitising climate change in difficult andfragile environments in a way that didn’texplicitly acknowledge and investigate addedpressures caused by climate change, focusedthe world’s attention on ‘responding to a threat’rather than ‘dealing with and mitigating againstexisting complex factors that exacerbate suchthreat’. In other words, a narrative that follows a‘threat specific analysis’ based on climatechange causing conflict doesn’t connect to apolicy agenda that is broader than a threatspecific security response. It fails toacknowledge that whatever impact climateexerts on natural environments, such impact isalways mediated through existing socio-politicalpower dynamics and institutional factors. It alsofails to recognise that the configuration andcombination of problem issues (climate impactinteracting with power structures, resourcedistribution, etc.) in each context is singular andspecific to that context. These failures ignore theimportance of contextualising not justapproaches and policies, but analysis andproblem identification in the first place.‘Context-specific approaches’ are a main focusof this paper and will be further elaborated later.

Furthermore, there is still evidence to suggestthat even where resource scarcity is the mainissue, appropriate mediation and resourcemanagement mechanisms can be key to conflictresolution and even conflict prevention. The NileBasin Initiative is one example, albeit notwithout its problems and challenges.2 Anotherexample is the Israeli-Jordanian initiative dubbed‘Picnic Table Talks’ where in times of activeconflict, water managers acted as the mediatorsacross lines of a highly volatile environment(Dabelko 2008). UNEP’s Post-Conflict andDisaster Management Branch (PCDMB) isundertaking what it calls ‘environmental

diplomacy’. Such approaches emerged fromslow, local and appropriate learning processesthat guided an incremental pathway tomediation – a pathway that wasn’t dictated ordriven by a pre-determined and rigid outcome.

Framing climate change as a ‘threat’ rather thanfocusing on opportunities and adaptive capacity,while engaging only a limited pool of securityspecialists, runs the risk of missing crucialissues such as disaster or conflict mitigation,development, poverty reduction, economicgrowth, equity, justice and resilience – none ofwhich figure on the priorities of the securityagenda (Schoch 2011).

Whilst climate change does presentnew challenges for development; power and influence remainenduring considerations.Newsham et al. (2011: 23).

Experience from engaging with DFIDstaff in the learning hub eventindicates that open but ‘safe’ forumsfor creative thinking areessential...this thinking needs toinvolve interaction with actorsbeyond the ‘adaptation’ and‘mitigation’ experts who can bringvery different perspectives to thetable; without them, there is a realrisk that critical and practicalinsights may be missed.Hedger et al. (2011: 32).

1 Where a link between climate change and conflict in IPCC reports ismentioned, it is weakly substantiated with evidence. The SternReview’s references to how conflict ‘may’ occur as a result of climatechange are mostly based on second hand sources of the same natureas those used by the IPCC. Some recent econometric work on therelationship between internal conflict and rainfall changes (as a proxyfor economic instability) is also cited, but the implications of thiswork are not discussed at any length (Gleditsch et al. 2007).

2 Many of the Nile Basin countries are characterised by high levels ofinstability and even civil conflict. The nine basin states – Burundi, theDemocratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya,Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda – have developed an initiativethat centres around eight ‘Shared Vision’ projects including: RegionalPower Trade, Water Resources Management, and Efficient Water Usefor Agriculture projects.

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It is one thing to look into the physical orecological impact of climate change. It’s anotherto look into the social impact. Coupled socio-ecological impact is a recognised and agreedterm for climate change impact. No more this isthe case than in difficult and fragileenvironments. The impacts of climate changeand environmental degradation cannot be seenin isolation of or outside the context of state-society relationships. It is, for example, naïve toattribute the conflict in Darfur to mereenvironmental factors. We can discern five majorsocial effects of climate change that mediate thephysical impact and affect adaptive capacity. It isprecisely these effects and factors that needattention and commitment if we are to work onthe root causes rather than the symptoms.

First, economic problems, reduced stateincome, health and mortality, along withrecurring disasters may hinder the state’sability to provide basic goods and services,further reducing the state’s politicallegitimacy and inviting opposition andchallengers (Homer-Dixon 1999). In stableand viable democracies, challenge andopposition take the form of coming up withsolutions and alternatives in a peacefulmanner. In less than stable conditions, theoutcome could be radically different.

Second, increasing resource competitionbetween groups and when ethnic,national, or religious fault lines are alignedwith such competition whetherdomestically or across borders, couldintensify social cleavages, heighten ethnicidentity and increase the risk ofradicalisation and conflict (Kahl 2006). Asnoted earlier, resource scarcity orcompetition can also be a catalyst toconflict prevention and resolution with theright tools and mechanisms.

Third, increasing unemployment, loss oflivelihoods and economic activities wouldreduce state income and its ability toprovide services (Ohlsson 2003; Homer-Dixon 1999). A focus on sustainablelivelihoods will be key in this context.

Fourth, efforts to address effects of climatechange and deteriorating environmentthrough, for example, large-scaleadaptation and mitigation measures(dams, or forced population displacement),austerity measures and cuttingexpenditure on basic services because ofinvestment in climate adaptation couldalso inadvertently stimulate tension(Buhaug et al. 2008). Top-down vs. bottom-

Climate change impactin difficult and fragileenvironments

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up adaptation or state directed vs.autonomous adaptation are major issuesthat will need to be carefully addressed indifficult environments.

And finally, where environmentaldegradation could have an impact onpopulation movement (Reuveny 2007;Warner et al. 2009); monitoring, earlywarning and supporting sustainable eco-system services and addressing resiliencerather than simply migration issues will bekey and requires proactive action.

What is more or less common and important toacknowledge is that in situations of fragility, thepolitical and economic elite are often organisedin such a way as to give themselves privilegedaccess and control over resources andopportunities. Climate change impacts couldcompel elite groups to further tighten their gripon resources and/or manipulate climate changefunding to their own benefit (patronage andclientelism where contracts provide both licitand illicit money-making opportunities).

HumanDevelopment

HumanSecurity

EcosystemInteraction

EconomicActivity

FinancingWater

&Food

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Figure 1 The relationship between climate stress, humandynamics and societal impacts

Source: Adapted from Scheffran and Battaglini (2010).

Temperature variation

Precipitation

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Extreme events

Soil erosion

Desertification

Sea level rise

Weak institutions

Lack of legitimacy

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Crime, urban violence

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Climate Change Impacts Human Dynamics Possible Societal Impacts

There is a danger of specific interestscapturing the adaptation agenda – tothe detriment of poor people.Agriculture for example…poorerfarmers have been pushed off landby members of the agri-businesssector which, at the same time, isoften positioning itself to receiveclimate finance.Newsham et al. (2011: 23).

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And this is where climate impact assessmentin difficult and fragile environments needs toadopt a different approach from the one that’sentirely or exclusively scenario based on GlobalCirculation Models (GSM) for example. Thishigh resolution level of analysis (let aloneprediction) fails to capture micro-levelvulnerabilities, social and political dynamics,state-society relations, power structures, andeverything else that’s not necessarily unique toconditions of fragility, but highly determinesultimate impacts of climate change. In otherwords, what Smith and Vivekananda (2007)label ‘the consequence of the consequences’.

The history of climate impacts assessment isrooted in ‘what if’ and ‘so what’ approachesthat follow a fairly linear progression, from aclimate scenario, to an impact receptor, to a setof consequences. This vector serves well innarrowly defined model-based studies but doesvery little to aid the understanding of climateimpact in difficult environments, let aloneinforming policy on adaptation. A shift hasalready occurred in the adaptation-policy worldto a framing based on real-world pathways.Often this is under a rubric of Act-Learn-then-Act again, or similar concepts of social learningand actor-institutional change. This poses a

great challenge in difficult environments andfragile states where the conditions are notconducive to an ‘act-learn-act’ pathway, as thecurrent overall development approaches do nottake into account the complex politicaleconomy of such fragile contexts.

Beyond evaluating current vulnerability, whatdoes future vulnerability look like? This iscritical in fragile situations characterised byfluidity and a constant state of flux. Socialvulnerability is embedded in relations amongpeople and is multi-scalar – the links betweenpeople jump across space – therefore, as bothsocial relations and spatial configurationschange, the reference system forunderstanding vulnerability also changes overtime. It is absolutely essential that such issuesare recognised and addressed. They are notonly relevant to fragile situations, but evenmore so because of the timescales of climateadaptation in general.

There is also the complexity of outcome vs.contextual vulnerabilities (Füssel 2010).Climate impact assessments tend to focus onthe former, while difficult and fragileenvironments require a greater depth ofunderstanding of the latter.3

Figure 2 Frameworks depicting two interpretations of vulnerabilityto climate change

Source: Adapted from O’Brien et al. (2007) cited in Füssel (2010).

Outcome Vulnerability Contextual Vulnerability

Climate change

Institutional

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ClimateVariability

and Change

Economic andSocial Structures

and Changes

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OutcomeVulnerability Responses

Contextual Conditions

ContextualVulnerability

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Given the trans-disciplinary, multi-sectoralnature of adaptation and the characteristicuncertainty of climate science and predictivescenarios, adaptation in such a complex area asdifficult and fragile environments needs to beprimarily shaped around the specific needs,challenges and existing capacities of the contextin question, and situated in the demands oforganisations and state-society relations.

Early climate change studies tended to rely on acouple of climate scenarios for, say, the 2050sand 2080s and then seek to reduce theprojected (as modelled) impacts through someadaptation actions. This notion of our ability topredict the complex evolution of vulnerabilityimpacts through decades into the future ismisplaced and there is a need to progressbeyond Predict-and-Provide approaches. Yetthey persist – note the seemingly unendingstream of global studies of the cost of somehypothetical state of adaptation. This falls aparteven more drastically in fragile states.

Two progressions are in play. The first is tofocus more adequately on current vulnerability –the interplay of social dynamics, environmental-economic baselines and current climate events.The second progression is to adaptivemanagement, or more generally resilience(although that is a less focused field). While thisis the foundation of much practical work, it isnot fully developed in the climate adaptationworld as yet.

Actors are central to adaptation strategies andmeasures. But so many strategies start withidealised systems or generic lists of actionswithout any understanding of the actor-networks that define decision spaces. This is aripe field in social and political sciences. Actor-network theory with a practical focus on thenature of decision-making, the stakeholder-knowledge networks that govern the scope ofaction and processes of social learning is morerelevant and appropriate to fragile situations.

In difficult and fragile environments, unlessadaptation strategies consider the additionalelement of not just conflict sensitivity, but‘context sensitivity’, adaptation efforts couldunintentionally contribute to further instability.Therefore adaptation needs to be framed,conceptualised and planned in not just a top-down fashion since it will largely alienate localcommunities where the impact of climatechange is most severely felt. Top-down planningfails to grasp micro-level vulnerabilities, theintricacies of community relations and tensionsand focuses more on national interests. Top-down adaptation will also come across to localcommunities as an external impositionespecially when there is a history and legacy ofheavy-handed government intervention. The realdanger is when different strands of policy startundermining each other and when policies andstrategies for development, peace-building andclimate change adaptation are disconnected ordivergent (Smith and Vivekananda 2007).

The belief that society can projectfuture conditions with some level ofcertainty has underpinnedapproaches to managing risk acrosssociety. New generations ofcomputers are not removing theuncertainties associated with climatechange where there are manyunknowns, some that we are awareof and others yet to emerge.Hedger et al. (2011: 10).

3 Contextual vulnerability – rooted in political economy is determinedexclusively by internal characteristics of the vulnerable system thatdetermine its propensity to harm for a wide range of hazards.Outcome vulnerability – also known as end-point interpretation orintegrated cross-scale vulnerability – represents an integratedvulnerability concept that combines information on potential climateimpacts and on the socio-economic capacity to cope and adapt.

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4.1 identifying the overalldevelopment goal One of the challenges of working in difficultenvironments is the need to maintain a balancebetween development, state-building, peace-building, and climate policy, human rights andgender equity. Too often, these have beenunderstood as a set of separate, albeitconnected, goals and priorities. Because theyare different, and because appreciation of theimportance of each has arisen at different timesin the evolution of international developmentassistance over the past six decades, they areoften seen as potentially competing goals.Tradeoffs and prioritisation between goals easilyenters the discourse. Where an outright choicebetween these goals is not openly envisaged,the discussion often shifts to the question of theappropriate sequence for addressing them. TheLearning Hub shared concerns about thetendency witnessed by participants to‘sequence-iate’ climate change to the end of thequeue. This reflects the concern that sequencingis sometimes polite code for de-prioritising.

It is part of the thinking that underlies thispaper, that making choices between thesepriorities is unnecessary, counter-productiveand artificial. This is both a normative stance –an argument about what is right – and, asevidenced through experiences shared at theLearning Hub event, a position in evidence-based policy. Seen from this perspective, thechallenge of maintaining a balance betweendisparate policies is actually a challenge to keepall the different components of policy in sight.Nonetheless, sequencing may be necessary but,seen in this light, the policy objective that comeslater is not lesser; rather, the one that is taken firstmay be seen as a means to an end.

The LCCRD agenda indifficult and fragileenvironments

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There are imperatives to reducepoverty and carbon emissionsquickly, and discrete projects candeliver significant results. However,ultimately the low carbondevelopment agenda is about puttingthe whole economy on a differentgrowth path, and this transformationrequires major political and policychanges. A balance must be struckbetween these objectives, levels ofambition and timescales.Lockwood and Cameron (2012: 5).


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In looking at the low carbon climate resilientdevelopment agenda in difficult environments,the first task is to take the specific context as thestarting point and identify the overall goal ofdevelopment in the specific country and region.In general terms the goal of development policyis that people make progress in terms of theirgeneral level of prosperity, their access to thecountry’s birth right from nature and to goodssuch as education and health care, and theirparticipation in the benefits of internationallyagreed standards of human rights. Development,in short, is not only about economic growth, orenvironmental sustainability, or the quality of life,or political freedoms. It is about all of them. Putthe other way round, they are it.

But from one developing country to another,needs and priorities are different. To generaliseacross a range of diverse environments linkedby their instability and propensity to conflictescalation but differing in many other aspects isnecessarily to deal in an abstraction. Butresearch in recent years provides a basis inevidence for this abstraction and tethers it firmlyto policy and practice. Based on the analysis inthe World Development Report (2011), whichreflects, supports with evidence and strengthenssuccessive DFID and HMG policy positionsover the years,4 the key development goal indifficult environments is to build a peacefulstate with a web of institutional (formal andinformal) links to society at large.

One way of understanding this abstract goal isto come directly to the question of policy onclimate change. As the discussion of impacts inthe previous section indicates, this is an area ofconsiderable complexity. It is hard to see how itis possible to get policy traction on these issueswithout the existence of a state that is bothcommitted to and capable of taking action toprotect and improve the condition of thecountry’s citizens in the face of the challenge ofclimate change. To do this, there must beinformation input to the government, which it isable to digest, and information throughput tocitizens, which they are also able to digest, discussand absorb with confidence. This in turn can onlybe available if information can be questionedwithout risk and if questions receive answersthat will be regarded as honest. This requires

exactly that web of institutional links betweenstate and society, some formalised throughaccountable departments of state and lines ofcommunication between different levels ofgovernment from national structures to localcouncils, some informal in the shape of socialnetworks and information media. Forwardmotion in this broader context makes it possibleto get traction on climate issues – and others.Failure to get forward motion in this broadercontext condemns development, adaptation and much else to stasis or worse.

This implies that the first key task in order tooperationalise the LCCRD agenda in difficultenvironments is a mapping of the institutionalenvironment, re-expressed in section 4.3 belowas an assessment of legitimacy. Before gettingto that point, however, we need to look moredeeply into the relationship between the broaderinternational agenda on LCCRD and thesituation in countries we are calling difficultenvironments.

4.2 Finding theinternational LCCRDagenda its national paceand shapeThe LCCRD agenda knits together the prosperityand sustainability components of development– sustainability as understood through the lensof climate change, and the need to de-carboniseeconomic output – into a long-term strategy.There are, however, countries – primarily, fragileand conflict-affected – in which an LCCRDagenda for their own economic output is ofmarginal relevance to both their own economicdevelopment and to the global level of carbonemission, and in these countries, moreover, thecapacity to design and implement such astrategy – often, any long-term economicdevelopment strategy – is signally lacking.

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14It is in this context that the primary goal fordevelopment is to develop much neededinstitutions – see above. However, as the web ofinstitutional links between state and societybeds in and begins to work and to enlarge, it isalso necessary to work to prevent climatechange from destabilising the situation andundermining prospects of progress.

To see what this means in practice, consider theArab Spring of 2011 and the situation in Egypt.Some commentators cite evidence that climate-affected deficiencies in food security helped sparkthe original revolt early in the year (Werz andConley 2012). As the country now tries to makeprogress on economic, life quality and humanrights issues simultaneously, the impact ofclimate change on water levels, the flow of theNile and rainfall could all affect food prices andfood security. Were this to happen and deprivationincrease as a result, there could be a repeat of theoriginal uprising, but with the Egyptian militarymore committed to the new order under itsleadership than it was to the old under Mubarak.This in turn may push large numbers, especiallyin the major cities, not only towards moredesperate actions but also towards more radicalpolitics. And a further consequence of this isincreased risk of a new authoritarianism.

In other words, the LCCRD agenda in difficultenvironments is primarily directed at defensiveactions to prevent climate change consequencesfrom unfolding in a way that destabilisespolitics, hinders economic advancement andthreatens human rights. This directs attention atadaptation and addresses problems generated byrich countries’ efforts to reduce their CO2

emissions. Both of these can be demandingpolicy goals for fragile states to handle.

The interaction of different causal factors in theclimate/insecurity relationship has to be bornefirmly in mind when identifying adaptationmeasures. For example, migration – vacating anarea where the human habitat is no longer sohabitable – is a means of adaptation that mayimpose a burden on those communities towhich migrants move. Equally, sand used fromriverbanks for improved construction of housesto make them more robust in the event ofstorms and flooding weakens the riverbanks andincreases the risks of flooding. These are bothexamples of potential mal-adaptation, and thepoint of these and other illustrative examples isreally quite simple – not only does climatechange have consequences, but there are alsoconsequences of adapting to thoseconsequences.

The same is true about mitigation of carbonemissions in rich countries. In an inter-connected world, the knock-on effects ofpolicies need to be interrogated with great care.The classic example of this is the shift by the EUin 2007–8 towards greater emphasis onbiofuels, resulting in land being taken out offood production into profitable biofuel crops;and out of common and customary ownershipinto profit-seeking private hands. Studiessuggested that the push for biofuels negativelyaffected land access for ordinary people in largeareas of Africa, Latin America, Asia and thePacific region, knocked about 30 million peopleinto poverty and threatened the livelihoods ofalmost 100 million, and was responsible forabout one-third of the food price rises thattriggered violence in over 30 countries in 2008(Mitchell 2008; Gallagher 2008).5

Identifying this kind of knock-on consequence ofboth adaptation and the mitigation of carbonemissions and getting preventive measures inplace will impose heavy demands on weak stateinstitutional capacity. Governing groups thathave credibility and legitimacy may find theyhave to expend considerable political capitalboth with national populations and withinternational actors, including companies andrich governments, ending up being caught inthe middle between conflicting demands theycannot meet. The burden of making progress onmore forward-looking LCCRD goals such as

In some settings, low carbondevelopment will be difficult not somuch because of factors that arespecific to mitigating carbonemissions, but because basicinstitutions, policies and practicesare so weak that any kind ofdevelopment is difficult.Lockwood and Cameron (2012: 14).


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progress on de-carbonising the country’seconomic output may simply put too muchstrain on available state institutional capacityand on other aspects of governance. Only ifforward momentum is registered and the statebegins to make some progress in buildingpeaceful and stable relations can the moredemanding policy goals be taken on. This is anexample of sequencing, within an overall LCCRDagenda, in which the defensive measures onadaptation and rich country mitigation aremeans to the more ambitious end of low carbondevelopment.

4.3 Key issuesA number of key issues need carefulconsideration when working out how toactivate as much as possible of the LCCRDagenda. We briefly outline six key issues here,which are also threaded into the discussion onbuilding a resilient state in section 5. We alsolook at four dilemmas that are specific tointernational donors.

In principle, all partners – international,regional, national and local actors alike – shouldjoin together in exploring the key issues and thedonor dilemmas. But a complicating factor indifficult environments is that partnerships maynot be straightforward and the motives of localand national actors may often be mixed at bestand covert. Without being naïve it can beproductive to take stated interests andobjectives on trust, at least to test out the depthof commitment of local actors, bringing theminto the process of analysing options, makingpolicy and implementing it. But it is also truethat in all aspects of work in difficultenvironments, a good partner analysis is anessential part of context analysis, of knowingwho you are working with and against, and whatyou are working towards.

4.3.1 State-society relations and state legitimacy At its heart, state legitimacy is the acceptance insociety that the organisations that make up thestate have the right to rule. Legitimacy, in otherwords, is an attribute of the relationshipbetween state and citizens and it can ebb andflow. Sources and definitions of legitimacy varyfrom one context to another and change overtime. The intricacies and complexities of state-society relations and state legitimacy have to be highly contextualised in any attempts toaddress climate change impact.

State-society relations are mediated – or, putanother way, legitimacy is won and lost –through the country’s political processes.Against the background of recognising thatstrengthening the web of institutionalrelationships linking state and society is acrucial element of climate policy in difficultenvironments, this means that climate actions –adaptation and guarding against the effects ofmal-mitigations in rich countries – cannot bethought of as essentially technical andmanagerial and, thus, largely apolitical, howeverheavy their technical content may be. Further, itwould be the height of naivety to fail torecognise that for many actors, adaptation is ofinterest because of the huge sums of moneyattached to the term in international policydiscussions. These are two reasons why a newpolitical economy of climate change anddevelopment is apposite (Tanner and Allouche2011). Without an in-depth understanding ofthe political economy, balance of power andlocal politics, international climate finance couldeasily produce highly undesirable outcomes.Care must be taken to avoid promoting andempowering a narrow elite at the expense of thecommon interest.

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4.3.2 Expectations Donor intervention invariably affects socialexpectations of the state, because it eitherchannels resources through the state or, insome extreme circumstances such as statecollapse and massive humanitarian emergency,channels resources right round the state. Thefirst eventuality raises expectations of the state,sometimes to impossible heights, while thesecond dumps expectations down in the depths,from which they may not ever recover. At itsmost benign and productive, the influence ofODA on expectations is to foster demandswithin society that put positive social pressureon the state to improve responsiveness andaccountability. This can go so far that thefundamental view of what the state is about andfor is altered.6 This can be a key component ofdevelopment but donors must exercise careabout how explicitly they come out in favour of amodel of the state that replicates their ownexperience and preference. Overloadedexpectations of democracy, for example, whenthe machinery and the political culture for anelectoral democracy either do not exist or onlybarely can be deeply destabilising; whiledemocracy is proven to be a more peaceableform of government than autocracy, the processof democratisation has proven to be fraughtwith danger.7 The particular negativecontribution that donors can make to thepotentially explosive brew of democratisation,despite best intentions, is to supportexpectations that destabilise and delegitimizeone set of institutional relationships withoutthere being a viable alternative ready to supplantthem (North et al. 2009).

4.3.3 State and non-state actorsThe understanding of the politics of legitimacyadvanced above and the caution that donorsmust show in relation to expectations leads to anuanced view about the role of non-state actors.They are crucial for state-building; it is noexaggeration to say state-building is impossiblewithout non-state actors, not only as agents ofchange but also because of their role inenlarging the civil society space. However, toequate civil society with the sum total of non-state actors or those voluntary organisationsknown as NGOs is mistaken. Civil society is notthe actors as such but the space in which theyoperate, but not they alone; it is the sphere inwhich politics happens. Donors can payattention not only to which NGOs they offergrants to as well as the funding they provide forthe government, but also to the question of howthat civil space is protected, whether it isenlarging, how free political exchange is, andwhether the news media are genuinely free.

But while non-state actors are crucial, so is thedevelopment of the institutions of the state assuch. Concentrating only on civil society is asmisleading for development as concentratingeverything on the state. Aid systems have showna tendency to work around state structures insome difficult environments, underlining themby over-focusing on the non-state sector. InAfghanistan, for example, a few years after theTaliban had been ousted, approximately 28,000civil servants worked in government earning $50a month on average pay, about 50,000 Afghansworked for the UN, other IGOs and NGOsearning up to $1,000 per month (Ghani et al.2005). The result was to undermine the statestructure that the international community wasattempting to support and develop. There weremany sources of error behind this ill-judgedapproach, of which one of the most benign mayhave been focusing on the quality of delivery ofprojects, which today might be called the resultsagenda, at the expense of attempting tostrengthen state-society relations and statelegitimacy, which is a much bigger but tougherresult to aim for.

Political economy encompasses notonly actors and interests (includingmaterial and political interests) butalso the ideas or ideologies thatlegitimise actions and policies (Tannerand Allouche 2011). It also involvesthinking about how coalitions can beformed to produce change, and howthe political settlement within acountry’s elite will affect the likelihoodof pro-poor outcomes.Lockwood and Cameron (2012: 21).


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4.3.4 Response to external shocksOne of the defining characteristics of fragilityand difficult environments is the state’s inabilityto manage external shocks. With potentialincreases in the magnitude and frequency ofnatural hazards linked to climate change puttinggreater stress on already weak institutions, oneof the most serious consequences will be thestate’s ability to recover after a disaster, and itsability to manage changing risks in agro-ecological and hydrological resources in thelong term. This calls for creating closer linksbetween the governance of climate changeadaptation and the governance of disaster riskreduction. The place in which to develop theselinks is, again, in the institutional linkages and

networks that combine to make up the state-society relationship.

4.3.5 Information and education A key characteristic of a resilient society is itscapacity to handle information – to contribute toinformation flows, to receive, evaluate, digest,disseminate and act upon. People must bothunderstand and trust the climate informationthey receive if they are to respond in anadequate manner. The case study of the antsand the floods in 2000 in the Limpopo riverbasin are an object lesson (see Box 1). The issuehere was simple: which source of informationwould people trust if their lives depended on it –the government, or insects?

With climate change, traditional knowledge isincreasingly not enough because our pastexperience does not necessarily apply to presentand future risks. There is no point in generatingadvanced climate models without alsodeveloping ways to communicate this newknowledge in ways that are sensitive to thecontext and that can be understood and trusted– especially among marginalised communitieswhere trust of the local government may be low.

4.3.6 Cross-border and regional relationsThere has long been concern that environmentalpressure on river systems such as the Niger

Basin, the Ganges-Brahmaputra, the Blue andWhite Niles, and the Tigris and Euphratesamong others could be the source of violentconflict not just between communities but alsobetween governments. A major study of 1,831instances of interactions over internationalfreshwater resources between 1948 and 1999found that 67 per cent of these werecooperative, 28 per cent were conflictive, andthe remaining 5 per cent were neutral orinsignificant; there were no formal declarationsof war over water during this period (Barnaby2009). While this reveals a strong record ofcooperation predominating and conflicts being

Box 1 Waiting for the ants is not enough in Mozambique

In 2000, the Limpopo River Basin in southern Africa experienced a very substantial rainfall formany days as a result of unusual cyclone activity. Experts knew that it would result in seriousflooding – of a magnitude never experienced before by rural communities in Mozambique. Yetvery few villages were informed about it.

Most communities had no electricity or radio, yet people were usually able to successfullypredict floods by observing ants. Ants build their homes underground; when groundwater rises,they leave their nests – and people know that the water is rising. On this occasion, the floodcame so rapidly there was no time for the groundwater to rise, or for ants to react before theriver overflowed. When someone who had heard the experts’ prediction drove to a certain villageto tell them to evacuate, the local chief asked him, ‘Who are you and why should I do what yousay? Since the times of my ancestors, floods have only occurred after ants leave their homes.Now the ants are not moving and you come and ask me to leave?’ As in most of the LimpopoValley, many people did not evacuate. About 700 people drowned.

Source: Smith and Vivekananda 2009.

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peacefully settled, the reservation must ofcourse be entered that the study covers aperiod before the impact of climate change.There has, nonetheless, been considerableclimate variability and there are good reasonsfor believing that cooperation is the more likely outcome.

The issues can, however, be extremely tangled.The Semliki River that forms the borderbetween the DRC and Uganda has facedincreased flooding in recent years and haschanged course, which has effectively takenland from each country and given it to theother. On balance, Uganda is currently theloser. Farmers who used to tend the same landas their grandparents now have to rent thatland in a foreign country. Raising the stakes,there is oil, which has been discovered on theeastern bank of Lake Albert; there isprospecting on both the Congolese andUgandan sides of the Semliki where it flowsinto the lake. And raising the stakes yet furtherare unresolved tensions left by Uganda’smilitary involvement in eastern Congo aroundthe turn of the millennium. Climate change isnot the only or even the major cause of theSemliki’s flooding but it is part of the storybecause it is fed from the RuwenzoriMountains where the glaciers are melting(Randerson 2010).

In this and similar contexts, implementing thenecessary defensive measures of adaptation toclimate change not only require state-societyrelations to be in good order on both sides ofthe Semliki border, they also require good state-to-state relations across the border.Cooperation through a regional body such as,in the case of the Niger, the Niger BasinAuthority (NBA), could be the best way tosupport cooperative resolution of such issues(Goulden et al. 2009). With respect totransboundary relations between ripariancountries sharing the Niger increasingdevelopment and abstraction of river water,both at a large and small scale, could interactwith climate variability to exacerbate existinglatent tensions between countries. The extent towhich this tension develops depends in part onthe effectiveness of the cooperation betweencountries, in particular through the NBA.

4.4 Donors’ dilemmas International ODA donors have some specificchallenges to face in assessing how to supportLCCRD in difficult environments, organisedhere under the rubric of four dilemmas:

4.4.1 Ownership and alignment Ownership is a vague term with littleagreement on what it actually means or entails,and when we can ascertain that true ownershiphas taken place, let alone how we achieve it. Itis helpful to think about the difference betweenownership as control over policies, on the onehand, and ownership as commitment topolicies regardless of who chooses and shapes(Whitfield 2009). The problem – familiarthroughout the international donor communitybut not always welcome – is the nature of theowner at national and local levels with whom itis donor orthodoxy now to align. Where theseactors are seeking the best interests ofcommunities they represent and lead, there islittle problem; where they represent their ownbest interests against those of communitiesthey lead, problems are rife. While donors maydiscuss ownership as a form of commitment,the most rapacious of national and localpartners will routinely seek ownership in theform of control and further seek donoralignment with their control. That makes itquite possible that donors will fund actions inthe name of adaptation that either have little todo with it or actively undermine the goal.

The way climate funding is structured throughits various mechanisms (GEF, SCCF, LDCF andAF) is highly complex as Figure 3 (see over)illustrates. How donors and governmentsnegotiate climate funding and work out themodalities will determine the form and degreeof ownership. State ownership of the agenda,policies and outcomes of climate adaptation is a core issue in current climate finance andno more so than in fragile contexts. Donorshave to navigate and negotiate their wayaround a number of rocks on which adaptationcan founder.


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4.4.2 Strategic dilemmas These are usually manifest in the difficultydonors face trying to juggle and reconcile theirgovernment’s strategic objectives, be they geo-political, trade, or low carbon development andemissions reduction (for example, biofuels) withstate-building and development objectives ofthe recipient country. When these objectivesclash or become diametrically opposing thelikelihood of aid doing harm becomes higher.Understanding these dilemmas is crucial toassessing aid effectiveness in any country.

The nature of these dilemmas often relates toshort or long-term priorities. Adaptation is seenas being urgent. Yet building resilience and thecapacity to adapt is not something that can beachieved quickly. Its components include

education, good governance, jobs, householdasset accumulation and protection, genderequality and the qualities of trust and self-esteem that grow from these. These takedecades to build. Providing precautionaryemergency help could mean doing the job forthe local communities, which would get in theway of their long-term resilience. The dilemmais between the two contrary risks of treatingadaptation as an emergency issue andundermining what resilience is already presentin local communities there, and on the otherhand taking a long-term purist approach andfailing to provide enough immediate help whenthat is what is needed.

Figure 3 The complexity of the evolving climate financearchitecture

Source: Adapted from Nakhooda et al. (2011).

GREEN CLIMATE FUND?

Donor Countries

Australia

UNDP

UN

DP

UNEP

FAO

UN Agencies AF GEF WB-CIFs Other MDBs

IFCI

AusAID

Canada

CIDA

EU

EU REDDF

RECP

GCCA

France

FFEM

MIES

AFD

Germany

ICI

BMZ

GIZ

KfW

Japan

FSF

MOFA

JBIC

JICA

Norway

ICFI

NORAD

ODIN

UK

ICF

CCPO

DFID

US

Ex-Im

OPIC

USAID

Dedicated Bilateral Initiaties

Bilateral Institutions

Multilateral Institutions

LDCF CTF ADB Brazil Amazon Fund

NATIONALINTERNATIONAL

Yasuni ITT

AfDB CBFF

EBRD

EIB GEEREF

IDB

WB FCPF

FIP

SCCF SCF

SREP

PPCR

Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund

Indonesia Climate Change Trust Fund

Guyana REDD Investment Fund

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The only way to resolve this dilemma is throughworking in an inclusive way at the level wherethe problem resides. And this, we suggest, isthe key to a much broader approach to thestrategic dilemmas with which donors grapple –to identify, through as cooperative a process aspossible, the appropriate level at which to actand the appropriate actors at that level. Localcommunities can often find practical answers tolocal problems when they have the chance to;provincial authorities are required both tohandle a profusion of localised problems and tomediate between local communities andnational government, which must itselfincreasingly have the capacity to set theframework within which actions are undertakenlocally and at provincial or city level. Regionalorganisations can support, coordinate andfocus on cross-border issues, while from theinternational and global level, there is a need fortechnical expertise, international frameworks oflaw and cooperation, and financial support.

4.4.3 FundingThe way aid is delivered in general can have aprofound effect on state functioning and state-building. The global climate finance architectureis structured in a way to interface with mainlystate structures. The effects of finance foradaptation will depend on the situation at theend of the pipeline; where aid is being deliveredthrough public agencies and/or voluntarybodies, much depends on their effectivenessand their legitimacy. These reflections indicatethat how the money is spent on adaptation andother LCCRD agenda items is quite asimportant as how much is spent.

If arguments so far have indicated howadaptation finance could go wrong if deliveredto rapacious partners, it must be added thateven without that element, it can go badlywrong. The uncoordinated approach and lack ofharmonisation in aid flows has led over time toincreased demands on recipient countries – aidas burden: Tanzania, for example, has toprepare 1,200 reports a year on the ODA itreceives (Ghani et al. 2005). Harmonisation isechoed in declarations by the Donor AssistanceCommittee (DAC) of the OECD in Rome andParis, but actual practice is still lagging behind.Climate change adaptation finance may simplyadd yet another layer of complexity of projectdesign, funding applications, reports andevaluation. The value for money of all thisbecomes increasingly difficult to grasp.

One thing that may help is to focus a little onpredictability of funding flows. While mostcountries have been receiving aid for severaldecades, the allocation and transfer cycle is stilla yearly one for most donors and aid flows tofragile states have been twice as volatile as toother low-income countries. Moreover, theurgency to dispense funds quickly, coupled withthe need to experiment and learn makes fragilestates a high risk for Fast Start Finance (FSF)and deprives them from such a vitalmechanism. Unpredictability is also damagingin fragile states where results take longer tomaterialise.

4.4.4 Programmatic directionsIn difficult environments, adaptation is a majorpriority in the LCCRD agenda. However, thediscourse of adaptation is by now indeliblyassociated with very large amounts of money.Considerable effort in international conferencesgoes into fixing the sum and pillorying richwestern countries for not coming up with themoney. This reflects a shift in the discourse oflikely beneficiary countries some years back oftreating adaptation finance as compensationrather than as aid, a vocabulary that also suitsthe agendas of the NGO development lobby,keen to protect what they see as basicdevelopment finance who have willingly arguedthat adaptation finance should be additional toODA and given under different rules.

In order for poor people to be resilientin the face of climate change impactsthey need infrastructure, services andlocal governance processes thatprevent natural hazards becomingdisasters; access to adequately paidclimate-insensitive or resilientemployment opportunities;institutions that respond quickly inemergencies, and so on.Newsham et al. (2011: 25).


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The compensation discourse is understandablebut it is blurring an important issue – which isthat unless development is adapted, it is hard tosee what adaptation would mean. It may becompensation for past and present injury but itis nonetheless needed in support of thedevelopment strategy of recipient countries.

The compensation discourse is also profoundlyunappealing to public opinion in donorcountries where taxpayers are hard-pressed andfacing the prospect of prolonged wage freezes,restricted government spending and stagnanteconomies. Giving away money is hard to justifyin those circumstances, however just it mightbe. Contributing to a climate-resilientdevelopment strategy can be understood as acontribution to global security and wellbeing but providing ‘free’ money will not workpolitically among the donors.

Donors are therefore caught between uncertainpublic opinion at home and beneficiaries whowant finance without conditions, while seekingin the middle of this conundrum to support astrategic contribution to LCCRD via adaptationand prevention of negative consequences frommal-mitigation. As above, we suggest that aprocess of working out issues and problems withpotential partners at levels that are appropriateto the actions envisaged, is the best and likely tobe the only way to handle the dilemmas.

Climate change exacerbates existingdevelopment challenges. Adaptationactions at all levels from autonomousto planned have consequences fordevelopment strategies andpathways, and vice versa. Climatechange closes some developmentoptions, but may open others.Hedger et al. (2011: 15).

4 See DFID approach to Defining Disaster Resilience,www.dfid.gov.uk/What-we-do/Publications/publications1/Defining-Disaster-Resilliance---A-DFID-approach-paper/

5 See Oxfam (2008). 6 See OECD (2010). 7 See Sida (2003).

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Conflict-sensitive responses to climate changeare approaches based on peace-building (Smithand Vivekananda 2009). Such responses requirethe engagement of communities in socialprocesses to work out how to manage changebrought about by efforts to adapt to or mitigateclimate change and how to handle conflicts asthey arise in order to avert the risk of conflictturning violent. The approach brings togetherthe science of climate change and localknowledge, capitalising on communities’autonomous adaptation while providing moreinformation and resources to strengthen anddevelop resilience. To contribute to building apeaceful state, the key points of conflict- and‘context’ sensitive responses to climate changeare as follows:

n Adaptation to climate change needs to beconflict sensitive where all interventionsmust respond to people’s needs in aninclusive and consultative way takingaccount of power structures and socialorder. Bridging top-down and state-ledpriorities to satisfy national developmentinterests with bottom-up and autonomousadaptation to address communityresilience is key.

n Peace-building needs to be climate proofwhere this is reflected in post-conflict andpost-disaster reconstruction for example,taking into account the limited water andland resources available for construction,

the detrimental implications of timber andconcrete production on communityresilience, and the reintegration of ex-combatants must take account of thelong-term viability of the land and naturalresources available for lives and jobs.

n Mitigation and shifting to low carboneconomies must also be conflict sensitive andsupportive of development and peace. Thepush by developed countries towards lowemissions fuelled the rapid move tobiofuels, exacerbated the food crisis anddrove millions off their land, where thereis already instability.

n Support is required for poor countries’ socialcapacity to understand and manage climateand conflict risks.

n A greater effort is needed to understand, planfor, and cope peacefully with climate anddisaster-related migration. Research so farshows that the majority of movement isinternal and domestic within nationalborders.8 This still requires support andadequate policies.

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5.1 Linkingdevelopment andpeace-building goals toclimate responsesAccordingly, the need to build resilience andadaptability requires that adaptation is notsimply seen as a set of techniques and tasks, butrather as a set of inter-linked problems, whichrequire linked solutions. As outlined in section 3,the interaction of climate change impacts withother profound challenges, risks overwhelmingcountries with weak governance systems, to thedetriment of fragile peace- and state-buildingprocesses and posing a high risk of politicalinstability. This adds to the political, economicand social burdens faced by vulnerablecommunities, and makes it harder for them toadapt to climate change. The flip side of theseconflict risks is that responding to the rootcauses of vulnerability to climate change impactsin a context-sensitive way can yield great conflictprevention and peace-building dividends.

A productive approach to both understanding theproblems and advancing effective strategies is tofocus on the linkages between development,peace and climate resilience. Whilst the rhetoric ofcoherence in development practice is not new,practical measures so far undertaken to addressthe linked goals of development, peace-buildingand climate change adaptation have been limitedin quality, scale and effect.

Most efforts on climate change adaptationfocus on responding to the direct environmentalimpacts of climate change, for example byswitching to drought-resistant crops, buildingflood defences or constructing storm-proofhomes. Important as it is to address the directimpacts, it is the resulting social consequences– such as conflicts between displaced floodvictims and host communities, loss oflivelihoods and disputes over access toincreasingly scarce resources – that ultimatelyrequire more attention and resources. Theseknock-on consequences will be the mostpervasive, yet remain the least understood.

Mitigation tends to be less of a priority indifficult environments given that a stableinvestment environment and effective politicalinstitutions – which tend to be lacking inconflict-affected contexts – are a prerequisite toimplementing technical frameworks forsupporting low carbon development. However,mitigation and adaptation initiatives are notmutually exclusive. Many small-scale efforts toexpand energy access to the poor and promotelow carbon energy sources, such as throughdomestic rooftop photovoltaic kits or cleancookstoves simultaneously reduce carbonemissions, and provide households withgreater resilience by reducing their reliance onwood fuel.

However, both small and larger scale low carbonenergy initiatives require conflict sensitivity andtailoring to do no harm in the face of thepolitical and economic mutability of conflict-affected contexts. Low carbon policies can onlybe pursued where there is a deep understandingof the political economy in any given context,including an awareness of the major powerholders and the vested interests involved. Forexample, as illustrated in Box 5 (p 22) ofBridging Paper 3, on the political economy oflow carbon development in Indonesia, efforts toreduce deforestation are frequently stymiedbecause access to rainforest is used as a form ofpatronage by the political elites. The lack of clearland tenure and the inability to implementcentralised protection efforts throughIndonesia’s decentralised forest licensingsystem means that any REDD efforts that do notsimultaneously address governance issues andlink the grassroots with the centre will fail.

Be it through adaptation or mitigation efforts,LCCRD needs to be tailored to address theknock-on consequences of climate change in


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It is critical then, to ensure thatclimate change interventionscontribute to reinforcing thepathways of poverty reduction, andto helping people get out of or avoidpathways of poverty reproduction.Newsham et al. (2011: 5).

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fragile contexts in order to respond sustainablyto development challenges in a peacefulmanner, in spite of the uncertainty andvariability presented by climate change (seeBox 2).

5.2 Achieving a peace-positive balancebetween conflictingprioritiesAs set out in Bridging Paper 3 from theLearning Hub, a low carbon developmentagenda entails striking some kind of balancebetween two, often conflicting objectives:poverty reduction and carbon abatement.Notable examples of conflicts between carbon

abatement and poverty reduction which havelead to violence include the shift from growingfood crops to biofuels and investment in large-scale hydro-electric schemes.

Whilst adaptation at first sight seems muchmore compatible with poverty reduction, wherean adaptation response is not appropriate tothe specific context in which it is beingimplemented there is considerable scope formal-adaptation. This is a risk where donorsand practitioners seek to scale up goodpractice in one context by replicating it inothers as a blueprint. There are also risks ofconflicting interests where the adaptationpriorities might challenge development andpeace-building policies.

For example, the imperative for decent work is apriority for all developing countries, andespecially so in post-conflict contexts with ahigh proportion of unemployed youth. Manypost-conflict communities are largelydependent on highly climate-sensitiveagriculture or livestock-based livelihoods. Bestpractice in socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants accepts that youth in difficultenvironments don’t necessarily want tocontinue with agrarian livelihoods but oftenprefer skilled work or to set up their ownbusinesses (Watson 2009). New jobs for youngpeople in these contexts, as well as thecontinued promotion of traditional employmentissues such as job security, occupational safetyand health, child labour, wages, gender equality,etc., need to be compatible with adaptation andmitigation efforts, as well as supportive of anew low carbon development trajectory.

Box 2 Cooperativemanagement of climatestress in MaliStresses compounded by climate changeneed not necessarily lead to conflict. Theneed to cope with a common threat canalso lead to cooperative coping strategiesbetween conflicting parties. In Selingue,Mali for example, the local government,with foreign assistance, initiated a schemewith local villagers to mark agreed cattleroutes to reduce the incidences of conflictbetween farmers and pastoralists in thearea. Increased variability in rainfall wasincreasing grievances between sedentaryfarmers and nomadic pastoralists overaccess to scarce water sources. But thecooperative scheme, in which both groupsand local villagers were involved indeciding a route for cattle in which farmerswould not plant crops and in marking andenforcing this route created space forcommunication and building trust betweenthe two hostile groups.

Source: Goulden and Few (2011).

One example given in the LearningHub LCD event was investments incity-level projects that combinedrecycling with energy-from-waste.Such projects may remove thelivelihoods of people scavenging onwaste sites, so it is important toprovide new and better alternatives,such as secure employment sortingrecyclables.Lockwood and Cameron (2012: 16).


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An example of a conflict of interest would bepromotion of new eco-friendly technology, whichmay be less labour intensive, which necessitatespremature laying-off of workers. Anotherexample would be re-training ex-combatants inagricultural skills whilst climate change trendspredict that agricultural production will becomeincreasingly unviable in the next five to ten years– thus inadvertently creating increased pressureon existing land and water resources, and in thelong run, a trained group of unemployed ex-combatants who have raised expectations butno livelihood options.

Conflicting priorities need to be identified andresolved in such a way that promotes win-wins.This requires thinking through the socio-economicimplications of climate change responses andlinking up with other sectoral approaches torecognise and promote potential co-benefits.

There are also potential win-win opportunitieswhere low carbon energy interventions in ruralareas can provide cheap energy whereconventional grid access is costly. Solar irrigationpumps, domestic solar PV, clean cookstoves andbio waste, for example, all serve the dual purposeof reducing emissions and increasing resilience.However, these examples are small scale andefforts to scale up have been slow, lead by socialenterprises and lacking wholesale politicalsupport (see section 2.2 in Bridging Paper 3).

Larger scale low carbon energy access efforts will bemore costly than high carbon options. However,whilst the short-term financial costs will be higher,expensive abatement initiatives make long-termsocial sense as they avoid locking the economy into ahigh carbon path. Unless these costs are subsidisedeither by climate financing or by private sectorinvestment, such a transition will be unpopular withthe public, as the costs will be passed on to themthrough higher taxation or higher end-user costs.This issue also underlies the political challenges,which impede the removal of fuel subsidies (seesections 2.3 and 2.4 in Bridging Paper 3).

Private sector engagement, however, requirespolitical buy-in, appropriate policy incentives toencourage private financing, and stronggovernance to ensure stability for private sectorinvestments. Given the short-term nature of

Box 4 Climate-insensitiveadaptation in NigeriaIn the river port of Lokoja, Nigeria, disaster riskreduction initiatives to build flood-proof housingalong the flood plains of the Niger River useconcrete breezeblocks instead of traditionalmaterials as concrete homes are less likely to beswept away in a flood. Yet the concrete blocksused are a product of the unregulated sandextraction along the riverbanks, which thesevulnerable households inhabit. The increaseddemand for concrete linked to increasedconstruction is responsible for riverbankerosion, and flood surges, increasing the floodrisk faced by riverside communities.

Source: Goulden and Few (2011).

Box 3 Balancing communityresilience with politicalinterests

In the mid-hills of Nepal, the World FoodProgramme has been implementing a Foodfor Work programme where famine affectedcommunities are given rice in return forwork. Years of this programming havecreated a culture of rice dependency inregions where rice was not, and could notbe, the traditional staple due to waterscarcity. However, communities which oncerelied on various less water intensive crops,such as buckwheat and root vegetables havenow come to expect and demand rice. Withthe WFP scaling down their operations thisyear, this expectation now falls on the localgovernance providers. Since rice is a highlypolitical issue in Nepal, and indeed acrossSouth Asia, political responses seek topromote rice cultivation despite the costand unsustainability of irrigation in themountains, rather than to educate andsensitise communities to return to the moresustainable crops, which they used to grow.

Source: Vivekananda (2010).

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political terms of office, corruption, and the realityin difficult environments that governments,anxious to maintain power and stability, arereluctant to make social changes that could bepolitically unpopular, private sector engagementin supporting large-scale energy efficiency andlow carbon energy initiatives are limited.

5.3 Rethinkingadaptation, or adaptingdevelopment Delivering on the first key points of the conflict-sensitive approach presented earlier –‘adaptation and mitigation need to be conflictsensitive’ and ‘peace-building needs to beclimate-proof’ – would entail fundamentaloperational shifts at three different levels whichare explored further in the following sections.

5.3.1 Addressing inter-linkages: bridgingtop-down and bottom-up responsesLCCRD in difficult environments needs to beplanned in ways other than purely top-down, whileacknowledging that bottom-up approaches alonewill also not suffice. As previously noted, top-downplanning fails to grasp micro-level vulnerabilities, theintricacies of community relations and tensions, andfocuses more on national interests. Further, incommunities where there is deep mistrust forcentral government – for example, in Sri Lankawhere actors in the current administration were partyto the recent conflict – and when there is a historyand legacy of government marginalisation ofparticular identity groups, top-down government-managed adaptation assistance might come acrossto local communities as an unwanted and potentiallyharmful imposition. In such contexts, it is importantthat climate responses might get past relying on thegovernments and promote community engagementthrough education and information access servicessuch as community radio.

Exploring the role of the private sector as anagent for peace and development is alsoimportant here. The peace-building potential oflocal businesses has been well documentedwithin the peace-building community and afterten years of piloting, the profit benefits of

adopting conflict-sensitive business practices(compared with the costs of conflict-insensitivebusiness-as-usual and the subsequently hugecosts of private security provision for staff,refineries and mines, etc.) are being embraced bymajor extractive industries (Henisz et al. 2011).

Community-based adaptation is stronglypromoted by many development actors as aneffective means of ensuring context-specificactions. This is an attractive approach but itneeds to be nuanced. On the one hand, localcommunities in conflict-prone or conflict-affected contexts often lack the confidence andthe capacity to take on the responsibility forproviding basic needs and services forthemselves, and, on the other hand, even if theycould do so, such action by the communitywould risk usurping the legitimate role of thestate. There is a strong correlation between theperception that a state isn’t upholding its side ofthe bargain – that is, spending taxes on provisionof basic needs and services such as security androads – and the incidence of political instability.It follows then that, if communities take overroles, which ought to be done by the governmentin return for the tax revenue they receive fromcitizens, the social contract is further weakenedand efforts to build resilience actually underminegovernance and political stability.

There are arguments to be made for top-downapproaches, and for bottom-up approaches, butthere is also a need for work to address the middleground to connect the top with the bottom.Certainly, LCCRD should be locally informedthrough bottom-up processes, but some level oftop-down leadership is also required. Dogmaticpursuit of one at the expense of the other could beproblematic. What is needed is to find a way to getthe two levels to work together.

It sometimes seems there is adichotomy between these [autonomousadaptive responses] and the ‘exogenous’programmes, policies and projects of astate or development partners (usuallycalled planned or national adaptation).However, the two are interlinked andboth are always present.Hedger et al. (2011: 15).


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5.3.2 Revising current donor normsDevelopment, peace-building and state-buildingstrategies need to adapt to meet the combinedchallenge of climate change, conflict risk andstate fragility. It is wrong to imply thathenceforth there will be old-style developmentwith adaptation on top. Likewise, traditionalapproaches to sequencing in post-conflictcontexts (to over-simplify, first comesdisarmament, demobilisation and reintegration,then look at reforming the security sector, thenshift focus to development and climate changeadaptation) cannot be sustained. It may be thatthere will be a continuum from developmentactivities that are not affected by climate changeto development activities whose entire purposeis adaptation (McGray et al. 2008), but overallpolicy and strategy will present a new form ofdevelopment. That means all external assistancewill need to adapt too.

This will entail ensuring that state-building andpeace-building processes are climate adapted.Bolstering citizen-state relationships is a keycomponent of state-building, and will becharacterised by responsibility and responsiveness.A state’s ability to take responsibility for andrespond to communities’ changing needs andservice provision requirements in the face of eitherslow onset or sudden climate change poses anopportunity to build trust and cooperation.However, it also creates very visible politicalexpectations (for example, in the case of foodscarcity or flood responses), which if not givensufficient attention, could severely undermineprogress on state-building writ large.

Initiatives to support physical infrastructureprojects, particularly in post-conflict and post-disaster situations must also be climate-sensitiveby ensuring that construction is both climate proofin that it can withstand future climate changeimpacts, and also that it does not inadvertentlyundermine community resilience, for example, byusing timber felled from woods vital to preventsoil erosion and landslides, or gravel extractedfrom riverbeds causing downstream river siltationand water scarcity. These kinds of issues are notjust relevant to construction, but also to privatesector development and livelihoods initiatives to avoid lock-in to inadvertently high carboneconomy structures.

In addition, aid effectiveness lessons from directbudgetary support and the involvement ofmulti-donor trust funds in fragile states need tobe applied to efforts to route climate finance.This will help to safeguard against climatefinancing creating perverse incentives forcorrupt regimes to engage in climate changeinitiatives as a means to access moreinternational aid. Already, much disbursementof climate financing is supply-driven rather thandemand-led (see section 5 of Bridging Paper 3).

Further challenges arise where absorptivecapacity of national governments and civilsociety is weak and as such, regional banks ormulti-donor trust funds take ownership ofclimate funds. As was the case in Bangladesh,this is generally met by hostility at a perceivedtechnocratic approach, which excludes localownership. In a fragile context, suchcontroversies can be detrimental to peaceprocesses where the same internationalinstitutions are instrumental in peace-buildingand state-building processes. Regional orbilateral flows are perhaps better suited todifficult environments, but here too, efforts mustbe made to ensure that ‘national ownership’ isnot simplistically interpreted as ‘nationalgovernment’ ownership should the state not beadequately representing the needs of its people.Provisions for local civil society access tobilateral funds may help here, as would riders forINGOs to act as intermediary checkingmechanisms on local implementing agencies.

5.3.3 Institutional reformInstitutions responsible for climate changeadaptation – whether under the UN climatechange framework, international financial

Finance is sometimes channelledinto infrastructure projects which arenot thought through with low-carbonor climate impact criteria taken intoaccount. The risk is of contributing tolocking countries into carbon-intensive development pathwayswhich would be expensive andinefficient to retro-fit.”Newsham et al. (2011: 23).

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institutions, development agencies or peace-building organisations – need to ensure thattheir internal systems and structures promoteadaptation even where there is state fragility orconflict risk. In these complex and delicatesituations, adaptation must do no harm, andideally help the goal of peace along its way. Forthis to be possible, institutions mustrestructure in such a way as to maximise theparticipation of ordinary people and buildaccountable and transparent public institutions.

Design of the instruments under the newclimate change architecture needs to ensurethat an understanding of the social issues andthe political economy of conflict-affectedcontexts is embedded in all policy and practice.It must also minimise the institutionalconstraints that impede flexibility or it will beimpossible to respond to changingcircumstances. And, reflecting the importanceof outcomes such as perceptions of security,trust and social cohesion, they should promotequalitative indicators rather than simply relyingon assessing quantitative outputs (or, evenworse, quantitative inputs such as moneyspent). Institutions, such as the World Bankand the UN system, which will undoubtedlyplay a major role in disbursing climate changefunds and implementing climate changeadaptation projects, urgently need to evolve tobetter cope with the complexity, uncertaintyand variability posed by climate change acrossall sectors, not just those which explicitly dealwith climate change. This requires a moveaway from inflexible structures grounded insectoral ‘silos’, counterproductive incentivesystems which advance large-scale and rapidfund disbursement, patchy knowledge basesand inadequate consideration of governance in

any meaningful sense (Bell 2008). This isnecessary not just within departments, but alsoin aid financing structures.

5.4 Political willNational governments in difficult environmentsaffected by climate change object to the apparentuse of the ‘climate security’ narrative by Westerndonors to place the responsibility for climateimpacts from the industrialised states (whopolluted in the first place), to the overwhelmedstate which, due to weak governance or legacy ofconflict, is unable to safeguard its populace. Inthis understanding, climate conflict risks areviewed suspiciously, as a way for Annex 1donors9 to shirk their responsibility to supportadaptation and mitigation efforts and shift theblame to the fragile state. This suspicion is also aparticular challenge when promoting low carbonand emission reduction initiatives.

One way to address the suspicion anddefensiveness triggered by a perceived‘securitisation’ of climate change is to redefinethe definition of conflict at the heart of theinquiry. The understanding of conflict should notbe too state-focused. Preliminary evidence onclimate pressures points to local level conflicts,which have the potential to be politicised. It istherefore necessary to move beyond thetraditional frameworks of analysis based on statelevel conflicts to understand the dimensions ofcommunity grievances and potential forescalation. It is also about redefining responsesto climate change such that they are seen as anintegral part of the state-building and peace-building process, rather than an add-on, whichcomes later. Building resilience to climatechange – through conflict-sensitive energysecurity, climate proof employment, growth, riskreduction, etc., would then be rightly understoodas a cost effective, positive and necessarydimension of conflict prevention.

Poverty reduction is included as one ofthe criteria for the selection of priorityactions in NAPAs...A recent review ofthree NAPAs (Sudan, Mozambiqueand Uganda) concluded that they didnot adequately demonstrate howadaptation interventions will eitherreach or benefit poor people...Crane 2010 in Hedger et al. (2011: 22).

8 Two main research projects in this area are:• EACH-FOR: www.each-for.eu/index.php?module=main andwww.each-for.eu/index.php?module=ef_media.• Foresight: www.bis.gov.uk/foresight/our-work/projects/current-projects/global-migration.

9 Annex I Parties include the industrialised countries that weremembers of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment) in 1992, plus countries with economies in transition(the EIT Parties), including the Russian Federation, the Baltic States,and several Central and Eastern European States.

The way forward: key tasksThis paper sets out the challenges of respondingto climate change in difficult environments. Ithighlights emerging principles from the fields ofconflict sensitivity, vulnerability studies anddisaster risk reduction on how climate changeand development policymakers and practitionerscan promote peace-positive climate changeadaptation actions which can yield the doubledividend of building resilience to climate changeand conflict.

Incorporating a conflict-sensitive approachwhen planning and implementing climatechange adaptation actions is thus an imperativein order to promote increased socio-economicdevelopment, food security, equity and betterresource governance as well as to promotepeace and stability. This requires increasedknowledge and understanding of the linkagesbetween climate change, development, state-building and peace-building in order tocapitalise on shared goals and avoid pittingconflicting goals against each other. This alsorequires changes in behaviour, systems andpractice of institutions charged with managingand delivering aid in order to strengthen theirrole in supporting peace, development andprosperity in difficult environments.

Climate-related financing, policies, andprogrammes that have not adequatelyconsidered local conflict dynamics and the socialand governance context could produce seriousunintended negative consequences. The otherside of this coin is that approaching LCCRD as aset of inextricably and often beneficially linkedgoals, which duly balance economic, social, equity,gender and environmental priorities in a mannerrelevant to the particular country context, can yieldsignificant climate change, development and peace-building dividends. To move down this ‘yellowbrick road’, overcoming obstacles such aspolitical economy, vested interests, governance,information and communications, six key issuesneed to be understood. Each issue comes withcorresponding tasks for donors such as DFIDand practitioners to take on board.

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1. Recognise and respond to the politicalnature of LCCRD from the outset Efforts to promote low carbon climate resilientdevelopment in difficult environments willinvariably centre on water, land, energy andfood. All of these issues are not only highlyaffected by climate change and variability but arealso highly political, and come with their owncomplex political economy. Donors must thusequip themselves to respond better to thecomplex tensions that arise in difficultenvironments between multiple politicaldemands so that they can work in partnershipwith government and elites which may only havepartial political legitimacy; support actions thatimprove stability and security; and proactivelyfoster the emergence of a relationship betweencitizen and state that is characterised byresponsibility and responsiveness.

This is not a question of another toolkit, butrather of promoting understanding amongrelevant policymakers of existing conflict-sensitive approaches. Such approaches ensurethat the context is the starting point for allinterventions, and include participatorycommunity peace and conflict analysis,political economy analysis and dialogue linkingpolicymakers and communities.

From discussions in Learning Cycle 4 it isapparent that DFID is actively working toincorporate political economy analysis intoadaptation planning. But at the front line, thereis still a demand for simple principles toapproach these complex issues.

Tasks

There must be an understanding andacceptance of the political dimensions ofresponses to climate change among allactors working on LCCRD. This requiresawareness raising – especially withintechnical teams, and training in conflictsensitivity where the capacity to grasp theknock-on consequences of both climatechange and of climate changeinterventions is lacking.

Donors need to equip themselves torespond better to the complex tensions

that arise in difficult environmentsbetween multiple political demands. Asimple actor mapping and contextanalysis built into the planning,monitoring and evaluation phases ofclimate change interventions would be agood first step. A commitment to a fullconsultation process as part of decision-making would be the obvious follow-up.

Specific attention must be paid tomanaging the necessary but challengingrequirement of working in partnershipwith governments and elites, which mayonly have partial political legitimacy. Athorough understanding of powerdynamics and competing politicalinterests will help manage such difficultrelationships with conflict sensitivity.Staff need to be assigned to shepherdstrategies and major projects.

2. Agree strategic priorities that reflectthe local context and a locally-specificapproach to peace-building Climate financing must be adapted to ensurethat it does not contribute to the disconnectbetween institutional plans and local peace anddevelopment priorities. Project financingarrangements, narrow results agendas andsiloed programmatic funding which separatesclimate change spends from development andpeace-building spends, among other externalfactors, can have a detrimental effect on thedegree to which local context and local voicesshape the direction of international support.

Tasks

Conflicting priorities need to be identifiedand resolved in a way that promotes win-wins. This requires thinking through thesocio-economic implications of climatechange responses and linking up withother sectoral approaches to recogniseand promote potential co-benefits. At thestrategic and planning level, this calls forincreased knowledge, understanding andlines of communication between relevantstaff on the linkages between climatechange, development, state-building andpeace-building in order to capitalise on

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shared goals and avoid pitting conflictinggoals against each other.

Financing modalities must also be shapedto ensure that they do not contribute tothe disconnect between institutional plansand local peace and development needsand opportunities. This requires a moveaway from narrow results agendas, projectfinancing agreements and siloedprogrammatic funding which separatesclimate change spends from developmentand peace-building spends.

Given the complicated balance ofpriorities and different interests in difficultenvironments, a useful approach toprogramming is to prioritise activities,which improve community security andproactively foster better relations betweencitizens and the state, characterised byresponsibility and responsiveness.

3. Enable flexible and innovativeleadership within institutionsFlexibility, innovation and risk taking are vital inensuring that institutions designed in the lastmillennium are able to cope with the challengesof the present millennium. Mechanisms toinstitutionalise emerging expertise are also vitalto ensure that climate and conflict-sensitiveexpertise – which often happens in technical orsectoral projects – are brought into themainstream. And to encourage and instil aculture of working differently, change must beincentivised through appropriate performanceindicators for staff. Staff at every level of donoragencies, relevant national governmentinstitutions and operational agencies – fromdirector to administrative support – need to beaccountable for and capacitated to adoptconflict-sensitive and climate-sensitiveapproaches. This holds true for all sectors, not just those that explicitly deal with climate change.

Tasks

Organisational structure needs to bereviewed from the perspective of theagenda of LCCRD in difficult environmentsand adjusted as necessary to meet criteria

of flexibility, innovation and rewardingsuccessful risk taking.

Long-term, programmatic funding shouldbe promoted over short-term, outputbased funding, in order to encourageinnovation and innovative leadership.

To encourage and instil a culture ofworking differently, change must beincentivised through appropriate internalsystems or performance indicators forstaff. Mechanisms to institutionaliseemerging expertise are also vital to ensurethat climate and conflict knowledge gainedin technical or sectoral projects arebrought into the mainstream and can beshared across sectors.

4. Tackle funding issues Funding for climate change needs to be long-term, predictable, coordinated and aligned withrecipients’ absorptive capacity. At present, mostclimate financing is structured to be channelledmainly through state structures. DFID iscurrently locked into this even while many DFIDstaff recognise that, in reality, most adaptationis happening autonomously with non-stateactors. However, climate-financing mechanismsdo not have adequate channels for disbursinglarge tranches of funding directly to non-stateactors. Funding arrangements need to ensure abalance between recognising what institutionscan do and what the constraints are. This holdstrue for both state and civil societies’ absorptivecapacity and adherence to good governance anddonor fiduciary requirements. Appropriate stepsmust also be taken to ensure that climatefinancing is not used by corrupt regimes toreinforce systems of patronage and clientelism.

Tasks

Based on a thorough understanding of keystakeholders and the political economy ofthe context, donors need to develop anappropriate and aligned balance betweenoff and on-budget support for publicgoods and service provision.

Poor absorptive capacity and theconsequent temptation for donors to work

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‘around’ the state requires urgent attention.Donors need to commit to address andwork through appropriate measures ofstrengthening capacity and matching aid toincreasing state capacity to handle funds,especially in climate adaptation. Suchcapacity building and governance activitiesshould be viewed as legitimate ends forclimate financing to support.

The role of the private sector and non-state actors such as social enterprisesneeds to feature more prominently inclimate financing mechanisms where statestructures have a low capacity to deliver.

5. Push forward with internationalinstitutional reformInternational institutions responsible forclimate change adaptation – be they under theUN climate change framework, internationalfinancial institutions, development agencies orpeace-building organisations – need to ensurethat their internal systems and structurespromote adaptation even where there is statefragility and conflict risk. In these complex anddelicate situations, adaptation must do noharm, and ideally help the goal of peace alongits way. For this to be possible, institutionsmust restructure in such a way as to maximisethe participation of ordinary people and buildaccountable and transparent publicinstitutions. Institutional reform is thus a‘must have’ goal rather than a ‘nice to have’.

Tasks

Design of the instruments under the newclimate change architecture needs toensure that an understanding of thesocial issues and the political economy ofconflict-affected contexts is embedded inall policy and practice. In addition,particularly where institutional structuresare already in place, cross-sectoralthinking and programming must beactively incentivised through training,staff objectives and assessments.

As much as possible, internationalinstitutions should follow the logicoutlined above about organisation review

and staff incentives and rewards. DFID is aleading international voice with severalparts of the international institutionalarchitecture and has a key role to play here.

Reflecting the importance of outcomessuch as perceptions of security, trust andsocial cohesion, donor priorities andreporting structures must promotequalitative indicators rather thanemphasising quantitative outputs (or,even worse, quantitative inputs such asmoney spent).

6. Promote national and regionalinstitutional reformAt the national level, if states fulfil theirgovernance mandate to their people, they will bewell positioned to adapt their responses toclimate change to strengthen capacities forresilience to cope with climate related changeand variability across all sectors – from trade, tohealth, to development. The tasks that need tobe taken on are complex and challenging butwell run states can ensure that line ministriesresponsible for development and thoseresponsible for climate and environmentalissues have a coordinated and synergisticapproach.

Regional institutions also have a strategic roleto play in promoting regional approaches foraddressing climate and security throughestablishing platforms for exchange, sharingand concerted action. For example, regionalinitiatives such as the ASEAN multi-sectoralframework on climate change provide a usefulplatform to address agriculture, forestry andfood security. However, to date, regionalinitiatives have been patchy, often lackingleadership and sustained donor support. Sinceregional processes tend to be slow andcumbersome, there is an urgent need forsustained support (through funding or externalfacilitation from international donors whererelevant) and political will from member states.

Tasks

National governments and nationalinstitutions need to improvecommunication to ensure information

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flow to citizens and key sectoralstakeholders. An improvement in sharingand learning across sectors and lineministries will improve not just efficiency,but also the conflict sensitivity of climatechange response policies andprogrammes.

Given the trans-boundary nature ofclimate change and the mutual gains fromsharing knowledge available on the issueto enable understanding and response,opportunities for regional cooperation anddialogue should be created and exploitedwherever possible.

Civil society actors at the national andregional level also have three crucial rolesto play here: i) representing the concernsand insights of specific interest groups; ii)monitoring the implementation ofadaptation policies from a conflict-sensitivity perspective, flagging problemsand the need for adaptation approacheswhere necessary; and iii) strengtheningsocial capacity at the community level tounderstand and manage climate andconflict risks.

Flexibility, innovation, risk taking, andcontextualisation at the local level, supportingcommunity-based adaptation, and combiningtop-down and bottom-up adaptation planning allneed to feature a lot more in the way aid is giveninstead of applying universal blueprints, recipesand prescriptions of the same modalities,programmes and projects. Understanding thepolitical environment in each country, beingsensitive to power bases and power balance, andshaping priorities and strategies jointly withnational governments not only strengthens thestate’s negotiating position, it also produces farmore appropriate results.

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Difficult Environments 5.3 Rethinking adaptation, or adapting development 5.4 Political will The way forward: key tasks References Difficult Environments: Bridging Paper 4 2012 3 Boxes