Upload
trinhduong
View
224
Download
3
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
DiF Series — Air Campaign Module REVISED
Poland 1939This is the first time that C3i Magazine
has published a new treatment of an
already existing Down in Flames Series
campaign. You may ask, how does this
campaign differ from its counterpart in
Rise of the Luftwaffe? One important
difference is that it's "denser", reflecting
the current state of the art of DiF
campaign designs (it has multiple phases
and the resources are more campaign-
specific). Another is that it allows the
Polish player the opportunity to undertake
a few offensive missions by providing him
with bombers as well as fighters. Finally,
creating this version allowed us to delete
the Junkers Ju88 aircraft, which appeared
in RotL despite the fact that it was not
introduced until just after the 1939 Polish
campaign had ended.
Stuka AngriffEarly in the morning of 1 September
1939, a formation of three Junkers Ju87B
Stukas belonging to the 34 Gruppe of
Stukageschwader 1 took off from the
airfield at Elbing in Germany and quickly
crossed the border into Poland. Com-
manding the unit was Oberleutnant Bruno
Dilley, the other machines being flown by
Leutnant Horst Schiller and Unteroffizier
Gerhard Grenzel. Dilley's bordfunker
(radioman/gunner) was Obelfeldwebel
Ernst Kather. Their target was a block-
house at the railroad station in Tczew
(Dirschau) next to a bridge on the river
Vistula (Weichsel). The Poles, fearful of an
invasion from Germany and aware that the
Germans would need the bridge to
communicate with their detached province
of East Prussia, had wired it with explo-
sives and placed the detonator in the
building. The bomber crews' task was to
destroy the structure without damaging the
bridge. The three aircraft rarely climbed
above fifty meters — they were going to
glide-bomb, not dive-bomb, that day — as
they gingerly made their way east through
patchy fog in rolling country. Fortunately,
Dilley and his companions knew the
terrain fairly well. Earlier in the week,
dressed in civilian clothes, they had visited
the station, where they had reconnoitered
the bridge and surrounding area.
The first bomb fell at 4:34 am. Eleven
minutes later, Germans ground forces
crossed the border into Poland. The
Second World War had begun.
by Roger Horky
Dilley and his companions succeeded in
their mission, severing the cables between
the blockhouse and the bridge. But when
the soldiers who were to secure the bridge
arrived later in the morning, they
discovered it had been destroyed. Their
train had been delayed. Despite another
attack against the railyard about an hour
after Dilley's visit (this time by Dornier
Dol7s), the Poles had managed to
reconnect the ignition wires and blow up
the bridge at 6:30 am.
The Historical Campaign
The invasion of Poland is an excellent
subject for a DiF campaign (which is one
of the reasons it was included in RotL). It
was one of the earliest demonstrations of
blitzkrieg, the German army's doctrine for
the conduct of offensive operations during
World War Two. The word literally means
"lightning war," a fitting name for a
concept emphasizing speed and mobility.
Airpower, fast and flexible, is a vital
component of blitzkrieg. However, there
is a widespread belief that an air force
involved in a blitzkrieg campaign is
completely subordinated to the needs of
the ground war, serving as little more than
glorified artillery. This perception,
common though it is, is wrong. There are
fewer restrictions on the use of airpower in
blitzkrieg than is usually supposed.
Airpower's primary (in both senses of
the word, "first" and "most important")
contribution to a successful blitzkrieg
campaign is the establishment of air
superiority. Surface forces enjoy a greater
freedom of action when they are protected
from aerial observation and attack by a
strong air arm, which can then, once it has
suppressed the enemy air force, be applied
to direct and indirect support of the
surface forces. Air strikes against hostile
forces can open up gaps in the front lines
to be exploited by friendly tanks and
infantry, while airplanes operating in the
enemy's rearareascanattack his communi-
cations, supply, and morale, weakening
both his ability and his will to fight. Fall
Weiss ("Case White," the German plan for
the invasion of Poland) was explicit about
the role of airpower in the upcoming
campaign. The Luftwaffe (the German air
force) was instructed "to prevent the Polish
air arm from effective participation in
operations...to carry out concentrated air
strikes on the...rear of the fighting Polish
armies [and] to provide close support for
ground troops... [and to conduct] massive
air strikes on military installations,
government establishments, and armament
industries..."
The need to achieve air superiority
dominated the Luftwaffe's mission
assignments on the first day of the
campaign. Most bomber squadrons were
assigned to attack airfields and aircraft
factories, while fighter units were expected
to seek out and destroy the Polish air force
in the air. The Germans destroyed almost
180 Polish aircraft on the ground on 1
September and accounted for an additional
29 in aerial combat. The next day, the
official German war communique
proclaimed that "all existing enemy aircraft
in hangars or in the open were set on fire.
From this it can be assumed that the Polish
air arm has received a mortal blow. The
German Luftwaffe has won undisputed
mastery over the whole of Poland."
The announcement was premature. The
aircraft that had been destroyed on the
ground were commercial and private
airplanes, trainers, and obsolescent military
types — and many outright decoys. The
Poles' front-line fighters and bombers had
been no where near the targeted airfields.
As tensions rose in the late summer, the
Poles, aware that a German invasion would
probably begin with an attack against
airbases, began dispersing their fighter and
bomber units to smaller airstrips (all in the
western part of the country, the Poles
deliberately leaving their eastern frontier
Poland 1939 Air Campaign — Down in Flames Module
unprotected). The task was completed on
31 August, the day before hostilities began.
Thus the Poles were able to continue air
operations through most of the campaign.
Polish airmen fought valiantly, but were
simply outnumbered and outclassed. The
Luftwaffe had committed 1200 medium
bombers, 360 dive bombers, 40 attack
aircraft, 1180 fighters (both single and
twin-engined), 890 reconnaissance aircraft,
and 550 transports to the campaign. Most
of these aircraft were among the most
advanced in their class in the world. The
Lotnictwo Wojskowe ("military aviation," a
part of the army) had just 420 aircraft:
170 fighters, 120 light bombardment/
reconnaissance aircraft, 35 medium
bombers, and 95 army cooperation
(observation/light transport) aircraft. Of
these, only the medium bombers could be
considered modern designs.
The Poles may have had tenacity and
spirit, but they lacked many of the material
resources necessary for sustaining an air
campaign. Their dispersal airfields were
well supplied but were often deficient in
other respects. Many had poorly-drained
runways, forcing any bombers operating
from them to carry reduced bombloads to
avoid getting mired. The absence of repair
facilities compelled the Poles to abandon
many airplanes that had suffered only
minor damage. Additionally, most of the
dispersal airfields lacked adequate fuel
storage. The one thing these airfields did
provide was concealment. The Germans
located only one of them, the base at
Hutniki, during the campaign. They
immediately dispatched bombers to attack
it, destroying seventeen of Poland's
irreplaceable P.23Bs and P.37s in two
quick raids.
The Lotnictwo Wojskowe's organization
further handicapped the defenders. Polish
aviation was firmly subordinated to the
army, each regional ground commander
having his own fighters and light bomber/
observation aircraft, which made coordi-
nating units from various regions difficult,
especially after the Germans began
disrupting the Polish communications
network. A fighter brigade, independent of
any particular army group, was created for
the defense of Warsaw, but it lacked an
early-warning system and thus had to rely
upon wasteful standing patrols to effect
interceptions. The independent bomber
brigade was too small to have a significant
impact. It also suffered from the Polish
high command's indecisiveness regarding
what to do with it, its forces slowly
squandered in small raids against German
ground forces (additionally, the British
and French pressured the Poles to refrain
from bombing targets in German
territory). On 10 September, the Poles
ordered all surviving air units to fall back
behind the Vistula, where they were
supposed to be consolidated. By that
time, though, the Lotnictwo Wojskowe was
so badly disorganized that little changed.
A second withdrawal to the east of the
Bug added to the chaos and confusion.
The Luftwaffewas not the only hazard
Polish airmen faced. Polish ground troops
saw so few friendly aircraft that they
assumed that anything in the air was
hostile (civilians, too, felt abandoned by
the Lotnictwo Wojskowe). At least thirty
Polish aircraft were lost to friendly fire
during the September campaign. Ace
fighter pilot Stanisaw Skalski wrote in his
memoirs that "Everyone was shooting at
us: Germans and Poles alike — the Poles
often more accurately."
Even nature seemed to favor the
Germans. September in Poland is usually
wet and dreary, but in 1939 the skies
remained clear. Dry roads facilitated the
Wehrmacht'sdash across the countryside;
sunny skies permitted the Luftwaffe to
maintain a constant presence over the
battlefield. Dispirited Poles spoke of
pogoda Hitlera (Hitler's weather).
The Poles never gave up fighting
despite the hardships they faced.
Nonetheless, by 5 September the German
high command believed the Polish air
force to have been weakened sufficiently
for the Luftwaffe to begin directing its
efforts towards the destruction of the
Polish army. Of course, the Germans had
been conducting air operations against
ground targets since the first day of the
campaign, but these were on a relatively
small scale. As the Wehrmacht (the
German army) advanced through Poland,
its need for air support grew ever greater.
The Poles, unprepared for the speed
and fury of blitzkrieg, could do little to
slow the German assault. They attempted
to pull back from the borders and
regroup, but constant Luftwaffe attacks
denied them any opportunity to restore
themselves to order (Stuka units flew as
many as ten sorties a day). In blitzkrieg,
aircraft are rarely used against ground
forces in contact with friendly units, as
distinguishing one set of soldiers from
another is too difficult amongst the
smoke, dust, and confusion. It is much
easier to target men, trucks, and tanks
traveling down roads, being carried by
trains, ormarshaling inrearareas (tooeasy,
perhaps: German fighter pilots assigned to
strafe troops late in thecampaign said they
would prefer "a nice clean dogfight").
Airpower also serves the ground war by
sowing confusion and despair among the
enemy by striking at his lines of communi-
cation and supply. The rapidity of the
German troops' advance was in no small
part due to the support they received from
the Luftwaffe.Wehrmachtunits reached the
outskirts of Warsaw just over a week after
the invasion.
However, the Luftwaffe did not engage
in tactical operations exclusively. It also
conducted a strategic bombing campaign.
German bombers made a number of
attacksagainst factories, arsenals, and other
targets associated with the Polish war
economy at the beginning of the cam-
paign. By 6 September, however, the raids
were ordered stopped. The Germans had
advanced more rapidly than they expected
and realized that they should leave
Poland's industry intact so that they could
use it afterwards. A short time later, the
Luftwaffe began withdrawing medium
bomber units from the theatre. Those that
remained were not idle, however.
The air strikes against factories and
other economic targets were just one part
of the Luftwaffe's strategic bombing
campaign. Another component was raids
against non-military targets intended to
undermine civilian morale. Throughout
the 1930s, advocates of airpower main-
tained that a bomb that fell into a
residential area was as valuable as one that
hit an industrial target, because a nation's
will to fight is just as important as its
ability to fight. The Luftwaffe embraced
this notion, in part because precision
bombing was more difficult to accomplish
than originally thought. The Germans
conducted "terror raids" against Polish
cities, towns, and villages, the most
notorious of which were the attacks on
Wielu on 1 September, Frampol twelve
days later, and Warsaw on the 25th.
Some of these attacks may have been
misinterpreted, however. The dive bomber
strike on Wielu can be explained as having
had a military objective. The Germans
have long claimed that that there was
Polish cavalry in the town. It was the first
day of the campaign and Wielu is near the
border; it is entirely plausible that Polish
ground forces may have been present (and
whether they actually were or not is
unimportant; the reason for the attack was
DiF Poland 1939 Campaign — Revisedthe perception that troops were there —
consider Monte Cassino in Italy). Much
depends on the timing of the raid. Polish
accounts aver that the town wasattacked at
daybreak, before the invasion began, while
the Germans say just after noon. Given
that ground fog covered much of western
Poland that morning, it seems unlikely
that the Stukas would have attempted a
dawn strike, although it is possible.
Other so-called terror raids may have
been attacks against factories, radio
stations, railyards, and other strategic
targets that went astray (the majority of
bombs dropped on Frampol appear to have
been aimed at the village center, a point
where five roads met). As was mentioned
earlier, pinpoint bombing was beyond the
capability of the Luftwaffe. However, the
Germans probably did not care that much
whether their bombs hit their intended
targets or flattened nearby residences.Both, they might argue, would contributeto the defeat of Poland.
It is also possible that the Luftwaffedid
strafe refugee columns. German aircraft
may indeed have bombed villages just to
practice, as the Poles claim. And the raids
on Polish cities and towns may have been
conducted solely to terrify civilians.
Contemporary accounts and the post-war
literature are so full of accusations and
exonerations that it is difficult now to
ascertain the actual purposes of the raids.
However, it is almost impossible to
explain the attack on Warsaw on 25
September as anything but a terror raid.
The operation was the culmination of a
week and a half of German land and air
operations intended to compel the city's
surrender. German troops reached Warsaw
on 8 September but the siege of the city
did not begin in earnest until the 13th.
On that day, the Germans conducted a
large-scale attack against military targets
and public utilities in Warsaw. Smoke and
flame rising from the city caused many
aircrews to miss their targets, resulting in
considerable damage to residential areas,
particularly the Jewish quarter. Several
similar raids, with similar outcomes, took
place over the next week. When not
carrying bombs, German medium bombers
dropped leaflets urging the city's defenders
to surrender.
The Poles held out, and the Germans
decided to punish the city for its resistance.
Having withdrawn most of its medium
bomber units, including all of its He 1 11
squadrons, the Luftwaffeassigned every still
available aircraft to the raid — Dornier
Do17 medium bombers, Henschel Hs123
attack aircraft, Stuka dive bombers, and
Junkers Ju52 transports —some 400 aircraft
in all. The Ju87s were used as level
bombers, greatly reducing their accuracy.
The Ju52s had neither bombsights nor
bomb racks, but accurate aim was not
needed for the incendiary bombs they
carried. Their crews just shoveled the
explosives out of the aircraft's cargo doors.
There was no attempt to disguise the raid
as anything but a terror bombing.
This attack is not included in the DiF
Campaign's target matrix, as it was
unopposed. The Lotnictwo Wojskowe no
longer existed on 25 September.
A week earlier (17 September) the
Soviet Union, in keeping with the Nazi-
Soviet Pact, also invaded Poland. Polish
airmen were then instructed to take
whatever aircraft were still flying to
Rumania. About 150 of all types were
saved, most to be impressed into the
Fortele Aeriene Regale ale Romaniei
(Royal Romanian Air Force). A handful of
diehards refused to evacuate, but one or
two airplanes could do little to save Poland
from its Nazi-Soviet invaders. Warsaw fell
on 27 September. The last holdouts — the
fortress at Modlin, troops on the Hel
peninsula, and the Polesie army group —
fought a little while longer. The land
campaign ended on 6 October 1939.
A Note About Place Names
The plains of northeastern Europe lie
on the blurry and porous frontier between
the German and Slavic speaking peoples,
and as a result, most cities, towns, and
rivers in Poland have multiple names. The
centuries-long struggle for control of the
area — Austria-Hungary, Russia, Prussia,
USSR, and Nazi Germany have all
conquered large parts of Poland — has
"prevented any particular set of names from
entering English as the standard accepted
version. It has also given one's choice of
names an unfortunate political component.
Poles and Germans remain sensitive to
whether a writer refers to Danzig,
Tschenstochau, and Warschau or Gdansk,
Czestochowa, and Warsaw. Another effect
of this situation is that it forces readers
trying to find locations on a map of Poland
to be aware of its age and nation of origin
(the language problem is not just limited to
German and Polish: what were Brzesc,
Gabin, uck, and Wilno in Poland in 1939
are now Brest in Belarus, Gusev in Russia,
Lutsk in the Ukraine, and Vilnius in
Lithuania respectively).
In this DiF Campaign and its accompa-
nying article, most place names are
rendered in their Polish forms because
most of the works referred to used them.
There are some exceptions, generally
because older English-language sources
favored the German names. The writer has
no particular preferences.
IMPORTANT NOTE
DiF Components Needed for C3i ModuleLike the Air Umbrella Over Dunkirk
Campaign Module in C3i Nr17, the
Poland 1939 DiF Campaign does not
require the ownership of either of GMT
Games' European Theatre of Operations
games: The Rise of the Luftwaffe (DiF
Vol I) and 8th Air Force (DiF Vol II).
What players will need is a copy of
Zero! (DiF Vol III), Corsairs & Hellcats
(DiF Vol IV), and the C3i Magazine AirUmbrella Over Dunkirk Campaign Module
in Nr17. A limited number of back issues
of C3i Nr17 containing the Air Umbrella
DiF Campaign Module are still available.
Campaign Rules
The Polish campaign is played
according to the DiF rules as presented in
Zero! and Corsairs & Hellcats, with the
following additions. There are new
resources and several new Target
Systems as well.
RevisedMissionSelectionProcedure
When determining the mission to be
flown, refer not only to the type of the
random Action Card drawn but to whether
its index number (located on the left of the
card immediately above the "Attack"
portion of the card) is even or odd as well.
Multiple aircraft elements: If two
elements an aircraft type are listed as part
of a resource andthat type isalsoamission
aircraft, the player receives one element of
the listed type instead.
Patrol Mission aircraft: Victory Points for
mission aircraft on a Patrol Mission are
scored using the Patrol Aircraft column of
the Victory Point Award Table, regardless
of what type the aircraft actually are.
Variable mission aircraft: Several of the
missions onthe targetmatrices listMission
aircraft by generic type (i.e., Polish
Bomber). Use the following charts to
determine the actual aircraft involved.
Poland 1939 Air Campaign - Down in Flames Module
Special (Future) Missions: Special (Future) Missions featureaircraft that are not yet represented in the DiF series, but may bein future DiF games, modules, or Squadron Packs. They occurwhen entry 19 is drawn on the Mission Targets table. Special(Future) Missions are formatted like regular missions and are listedon the table below.
The Special (Future) Missions table is divided into threesections, one for each phase of the campaign. Each phase has twoentries, a "future" mission featuring an airplane not yet in DiF anda "default" mission featuring an aircraft currently available in DiF.If the aircraft featured in the "future" mission for the current
phase is not available, play the default mission for the phase.However, if that aircraft is available, flip the allied/axis turnmarker to determine which mission to play. Axis-side-up indicatesthe future mission.
Special (Future) Missions are played like regular missions.Both players select Resources for Special (Future) Missions.
1. Penalty for bombing naval targets does not apply to Small Watercraft target, ifdrawn.
2. Target is fortified. See 27.9.
3. Cargo Capacity: three
Substitute Aircraft: Several resources in this campaign call for aplayer to replace one element of his aircraft with a different modelof the same plane. Space limitations precluded us from includingthese aircraft. Instead, the countersheet in this issue of themagazine contains counters for each type. When a substitution iscalled for place the appropriate Leader and Wingman counters onthe cards that are being changed. Each Leader counter shows thesubstitute model's Performance (P), Horsepower (H) and Burst(B) ratings. Each Wingman counter shows the substitute's Offense(0) and Defense (D) ratings. The Bombing, Damage and Gunnerratings of the "parent" card are used in all cases. (Note that one ormore of the ratings on the counter may be the same as the parentas well.) If an aircraft card with a substitute counter on it is flippedto its Damaged side, flip the counter as well.
Skilled/Green Pilots and Crews: Before the beginning of eachmission players draw for Skilled or Green Pilots and Crews usingthe procedure in Rule 19.0 of Corsairs & Hellcats and the tablebelow. When selecting the specific Skilled Pilot/Crew for aSubstitute Aircraft use the designation on the parent card.
New Resources
Bf-109D: Has no effect if your opponent has no MesserschmittBf-109E fighters this mission. Your opponent must designate oneelement of Messerschmitt Bf-109Es as Messerschmitt Bf-109Ds.Mark the Leader and Wingman with Bf-109D counters.
Blundering Recon Aircraft: If mission aircraft are PZL P.23B,place one PZL P.37B at Low altitude. Otherwise place one PZLP.23B Leader starting at Very Low altitude. This aircraft is inaddition to any mission aircraft and resource aircraft. The aircraftis not affected by the "Recognition Error" resource and is treatedas a patrol aircraft for VP calculation.
Dispersal Airfield Deficiencies: May not be selected for lastmission of phase. If mission aircraft are PZL P.37B, their bombratings are reduced by one (1). If mission aircraft are PZL P.23B,draw one card and refer to its color:
If mission aircraft are any other type or if mission is a Dogfight:if any Polish fighter (Leader or Wingman) ends this mission inDamaged condition, the Polish player must remove a Wingmanfrom one element the next time he receives any Polish fighters.
Dispersal Airfield Discovered: May not be selected for lastmission of phase. Disregard the mission selected and play Mission3 (German Bomber v Airfield) instead. Add one turn to both theTargetbound and Homebound phases. Effects vary by the successlevel of this mission.
DiF Poland 1939 Campaign — Revised
Freie Jagd: Targetbound phase increased by two (2) turns.Mission aircraft do not appear until turn three of theTargetbound phase.
German Fighter: Draw one random action card and referto its color:
Nervous Ground Troops: Increase the number of Target Flakcards drawn against strafing aircraft — friendly or hostile — by one.This resource has no effect on Area Flak or Dogfight missions. Inaddition, if the Mission aircraft are Polish draw one card for all
aircraft at Low and Very Low altitude at the end of each turn andrefer to the card's strafing section. If the result is Hit that aircraftreceives one point of Damage.
No fighters, German or Polish, may "break away" during theOver the Target phase of the mission.
Overwhelmed Defenses: Draw one random Action card.
PZL P.7: Has no effect if your opponent has no PZL P.11cfighters this mission. Your opponent must designate one 1/w PZLP.11c as l/w PZL P.7. Mark the Leader and Wingman with P.7counters.
Ramming Attack: Fighters and Light Bombers may declare theuse of "Out of the Sun" cards to make Ramming Attacks. Whenused to Ram, ignore the Burst cost of the Action card. If success-ful, both aircraft are destroyed. When ramming is successful, theenemy receives no victory points for your aircraft, and you receivedouble for his.
Recognition Error: May not be selected if mission aircraft arefighter types (if this is the last mission of the phase, and missionaircraft are fighter types, this resource has no effect).
Disregard mission drawn and draw a random Action card todetermine mission. Refer to its Index number.
The mission begins with a pair or element of the MisidentifiedAircraft in play, controlled of the player identified inparentheses.
Play mission as normal but draw a random Action card at thebeginning of second and all subsequent turns. If blue-bordered,the mission aircraft pair is replaced by an element or pair of theActual Aircraft. Control of the new mission aircraft istransferred to player originally on defensive. All surviving missionaircraft immediately become neutral to all other aircraft in game.Their altitude does not change. All damage inflicted on and bymission aircraft remains unchanged.
If aircraft element does not change during mission, draw onerandom action card at end of game. If white-bordered, theMisidentified Aircraft changes to the Actual Aircraft and is givento former defensive player.
VPs for damage to Target awarded to player who finishedmission in possession of mission aircraft, whether Actual orMisidentified. VPs for damage to mission aircraft awarded toplayer who did not have possession of mission aircraft at end ofmission, whether Actual or Misidentified.
Scramble: Has no effect if the mission aircraft belong to oppo-nent. After deciding altitude for your aircraft, but before revealingit, your opponent draws one random action card for each of hisaircraft elements and refers to its color.
Treetop altitude is one level lower than Very Low altitude. Anaircraft may climb out of Treetop level but no aircraft may divedown into Treetop level. An enemy airplane at Treetop altitudemay be attacked by expending Red action cards from the hand ofany one aircraft at Very Low altitude. There is no limit to thenumber of cards that may be played. In My Sights and Out OfThe Sun cards do the amount of damage indicated on the card.
Poland 1939 Air Campaign - Down in Flames Module
Each Half Loop and Maneuvering card played does one point ofdamage if the Strafing results section indicates a Hit. The targetedaircraft may not respond to these cards.
Standing Patrol: Your leaders receive three bonus action cards atthe start of the mission.
Your opponent declares the starting altitude of his aircraftbefore you decide yours. Draw a random action card and referto its color:
Tight/Loose Formations: If Mission aircraft are friendly, allfriendly Formation aircraft draw one additional card when underattack. If Mission aircraft belong to opponent, enemy Formationaircraft draw one card less than normal when under attack. Doesnot apply to aircraft — friendly or hostile — that are out offormation due to being damaged.
Trained Bomber Crews: Treat all non-skilled medium bombercrews as having the "B" skill.
Vacant Airfield: Has no effect if target is not airfield. Halve(round down) all VP awards for Damage to the target.
Variant Aircraft: If mission aircraft are Polish and themission is not a Dogfight, do not draw for aircraft type.Receive one element of PZL P.23B Karas. Mark the Leaderand Wingman with P.43 counters.
If the mission aircraft are German, or if mission is a Dogfight,receive one element of PZL P.11c and skilled pilot Szczesnycounter. Mark the Leader and Wingman with P.11g counters (ifthe players have Down in Flames Squadron Pack 1 they may usethe PZL P.24F cards in the pack to represent the PZL P.11ginstead of the counters).