eclining levels of legitimacy, good governance, and socioeco-nomic performance all point in the direction of a disturbing trend: the quality of democracy in Paraguay is extremely low.

The absence of collective actors has given rise to parties that are clien-telistic, rather than issue-based, in nature. For almost twenty years, these neopopulist parties have dominated Paraguayan politics, implementing

particularistic, pork-barrel, and volatile poli-cies that have, in turn, engendered economic stagnation, high levels of poverty, and pro-found disenchantment. Between the “rock” of low-quality democracy and the “hard place” of neopopulism stands Bishop Fernando Lugo, a likely frontrunner in Paraguay’s 2008 presi-dential election. Fears that he may be the next Hugo Chávez are misguided. A Lugo presi-

dency could spur much-needed reform in Paraguay.

“D

” —Diego Abente-Brun, June 7, 2007

Between a Rock and a Hard Place:Between a Rock and a Hard Place:Dilemmas of Democracy in Dilemmas of Democracy in

ParaguayParaguay

bybyDiego Abente-BrunDiego Abente-Brun

Reagan-Fascell Democracy FellowReagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow

June 7, 2007June 7, 2007National Endowment for DemocracyNational Endowment for Democracy

Please note that the views expressed in this presentation represent the Please note that the views expressed in this presentation represent the opinions and analysis of the speaker and do not necessarily reflect opinions and analysis of the speaker and do not necessarily reflect

those of the National Endowment of Democracy.those of the National Endowment of Democracy.

The Third Wave of Democracy (1978- )The Third Wave of Democracy (1978- )and its Challengesand its Challenges

Electoral democracies, illiberal regimes.Electoral democracies, illiberal regimes. Low quality democraciesLow quality democracies

The Emerging Literature on Quality of The Emerging Literature on Quality of DemocracyDemocracy

O’Donnell, Vargas Cullel, Iazetta, O’Donnell, Vargas Cullel, Iazetta, The The Quality of Democracy, 2004Quality of Democracy, 2004

Diamond & Morlino, Diamond & Morlino, Assessing the Quality Assessing the Quality of Democracy, 2005of Democracy, 2005

EmphasisEmphasis on: on: Conceptual craftsmanshipConceptual craftsmanship Studies of comparative dyadsStudies of comparative dyads

Missing:Missing: A systematic inquiry into the causesA systematic inquiry into the causes

Defining Quality of DemocracyDefining Quality of Democracy

The question to be addressed…The question to be addressed…

Distinguishes between Distinguishes between naturenature and and qualityquality of democracy of democracy ……NOT how democratic a democracy is, or a NOT how democratic a democracy is, or a polyarchypolyarchy is … (Rule is … (Rule

of law, participation, competition, Accountability, Freedom, Political of law, participation, competition, Accountability, Freedom, Political Equality, Responsiveness)Equality, Responsiveness)

……but what is the quality of regimes that qualify as democratic (or but what is the quality of regimes that qualify as democratic (or polyarchic) in terms of their ability to address key issues.polyarchic) in terms of their ability to address key issues.

Three variables taken into account:Three variables taken into account:1.1. LegitimacyLegitimacy (Ability to generate support) (Ability to generate support)2.2. EffectivenessEffectiveness (Ability to govern well/governance) (Ability to govern well/governance)3.3. EfficacyEfficacy (Ability to deliver) (Ability to deliver)

Quality of Democracy in South America:Quality of Democracy in South America:1) LEGITIMACY1) LEGITIMACY

OVERALL INDEXOVERALL INDEX DEMOCRACYDEMOCRACY

2000–20042000–2004 1995–20051995–2005SUPPORTSUPPORT

FORFORSATISFACTIONSATISFACTION

WITHWITH

ParaguayParaguay 3838 3434 3232 1717

EcuadorEcuador 3838 3434 4343 1414

BoliviaBolivia 4040 3939 4040 1313

PeruPeru 4141 3939 4949 2424

ColombiaColombia 4141 4141 4646 2929

BrazilBrazil 4747 4343 3737 2222

VenezuelaVenezuela 5353 5656 7676 5656

ChileChile 5353 5656 5959 4343

ArgentinaArgentina 5959 5757 6565 3434

UruguayUruguay 6666 6868 7777 6363

Sources: Frances Hagopian, 2005 (Support & Satisfaction with Democracy, Importance of voting, Valid votes/VAP, Trust in Gov’t, Democracy is the Best System), Latinobarómetro 2005.

Quality of Democracy in South America:Quality of Democracy in South America:2) GOVERNANCE2) GOVERNANCE

COUNTRYCOUNTRY AVERAGEAVERAGEPoliticalPoliticalStabilityStability

GovernmentGovernmentEffectivenessEffectiveness

RegulatoryRegulatoryQualityQuality

Control ofControl ofCorruptionCorruption

VenezuelaVenezuela -0.88-0.88 -1.00-1.00 -0.92-0.92 -0.68-0.68 -0.91-0.91

ParaguayParaguay -0.83-0.83 -0.76-0.76 -1.06-1.06 -0.44-0.44 -1.08-1.08

EcuadorEcuador -0.77-0.77 -0.89-0.89 -0.92-0.92 -0.39-0.39 -0.87-0.87

ColombiaColombia -0.58-0.58 -1.87-1.87 -0.13-0.13 0.110.11 -0.45-0.45

BoliviaBolivia -0.38-0.38 -0.50-0.50 -0.45-0.45 0.200.20 -0.76-0.76

PerúPerú -0.28-0.28 -0.85-0.85 -0.32-0.32 0.340.34 -0.28-0.28

ArgentinaArgentina -0.17-0.17 -0.14-0.14 0.010.01 -0.13-0.13 -0.43-0.43

BrazilBrazil -0.03-0.03 -0.16-0.16 -0.07-0.07 0.180.18 -0.07-0.07

UruguayUruguay 0.610.61 0.640.64 0.560.56 0.590.59 0.640.64

ChileChile 1.171.17 0.710.71 1.271.27 1.361.36 1.361.36

Source: World Bank, Kauffman, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, “Governance Matters.” Data averaged for the period 1996–2005.

Quality of Democracy in South America:Quality of Democracy in South America:

3) SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE3) SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCECOUNTRYCOUNTRY POVERTY GAPPOVERTY GAP POVERTYPOVERTY GDP GROWTH PCGDP GROWTH PC

BoliviaBolivia 34.4034.40 62.4062.40 0.900.90

ParaguayParaguay 30.3030.30 61.0061.00 -1.10-1.10

ColombiaColombia 24.1024.10 50.6050.60 0.300.30

VenezuelaVenezuela 22.1022.10 48.6048.60 0.900.90

EcuadorEcuador 20.8020.80 49.0049.00 1.101.10

PerúPerú 20.6020.60 54.7054.70 1.601.60

BrazilBrazil 17.8017.80 38.7038.70 0.700.70

ArgentinaArgentina 12.2012.20 29.4029.40 1.401.40

ChileChile 6.306.30 18.7018.70 3.003.00

UruguayUruguay 4.504.50 15.4015.40 1.001.00

Source: CEPAL. Data from most recent year available (ranges from 2001 to 2004).

The Quest for an ExplanationThe Quest for an Explanation

Three hypotheses:Three hypotheses:

1.1. STRUCTURALSTRUCTURAL Socioeconomic matrixSocioeconomic matrix Stakeholders and nature of the political gameStakeholders and nature of the political game

2.2. INSTITUTIONALINSTITUTIONAL Nature of the party systemNature of the party system Rules of the political game, constitutional and legalRules of the political game, constitutional and legal

3.3. SOCIO-CULTURALSOCIO-CULTURAL ““Social capital” of the populationSocial capital” of the population Associational predispositions; horizontal relationsAssociational predispositions; horizontal relations

1) 1) STRUCTURALSTRUCTURAL: Socioeconomic Matrix: Socioeconomic Matrix

COUNTRYCOUNTRY

NON-NON-AGRICULTURAL AGRICULTURAL

WORKFORCEWORKFORCEPERCENTAGE OF EMPLOYEES PERCENTAGE OF EMPLOYEES

WITH SOCIAL SECURITYWITH SOCIAL SECURITY

UrbanUrbanAgric.Agric.

WorkforceWorkforce InformalInformal FormalFormal InformalInformal FormalFormal OverallOverall

BoliviaBolivia 39.0%39.0% 32.3%32.3% 66.7%66.7% 33.8%33.8% 6.5%6.5% 46.3%46.3% 31.3%31.3%

EcuadorEcuador 48.0%48.0% 30.3%30.3% 57.6%57.6% 42.4%42.4% 14.2%14.2% 63.4%63.4% 47.1%47.1%

ParaguayParaguay 49.6%49.6% 31.3%31.3% 62.9%62.9% 37.1%37.1% 4.4%4.4% 45.3%45.3% 26.5%26.5%

PeruPeru 55.2%55.2% 37.5%37.5% 58.0%58.0% 42.0%42.0% 14.9%14.9% 63.9%63.9% 48.3%48.3%

BrazilBrazil 58.4%58.4% 19.6%19.6% 44.6%44.6% 55.4%55.4% 34.2%34.2% 83.8%83.8% 69.2%69.2%

ColombiaColombia 59.2%59.2% 20.9%20.9% 59.9%59.9% 40.1%40.1% 27.5%27.5% 83.9%83.9% 65.2%65.2%

VenezuelaVenezuela 71.5%71.5% 9.7%9.7% 52.2%52.2% 47.8%47.8% 16.9%16.9% 72.2%72.2% 57.0%57.0%

ChileChile 72.1%72.1% 13.3%13.3% 35.8%35.8% 61.2%61.2% 48.9%48.9% 83.3%83.3% 76.4%76.4%

UruguayUruguay 74.3%74.3% 4.6%4.6% 37.7%37.7% 62.3%62.3% 32.9%32.9% 87.0%87.0% 73.1%73.1%

ArgentinaArgentina 74.9%74.9% 1.1%1.1% 44.3%44.3% 55.7%55.7% 17.5%17.5% 66.8%66.8% 51.5%51.5%

Sources: CEPAL, Int’l Labor Organization. Data from most recent available (2002–2004).

1) STRUCTURAL 1) STRUCTURAL (continued)(continued)::Effects of Invertebrate SocietyEffects of Invertebrate Society

Invertebrate societyInvertebrate society: Lack of collective actors with : Lack of collective actors with collective interests that can structure the political collective interests that can structure the political game along issue-based linesgame along issue-based lines

This lack of social articulation favors the emergence This lack of social articulation favors the emergence of clientelistic politicsof clientelistic politics

Prevents the development of horizontal ties and Prevents the development of horizontal ties and furthers vertical, hierarchical, and in essence, furthers vertical, hierarchical, and in essence, exploitative relationships. exploitative relationships.

Incorporates popular sectors Incorporates popular sectors as clientsas clients, but excludes , but excludes them them asas citizens.citizens.

2) INSTITUTIONAL:2) INSTITUTIONAL:Clientelistic vs. Issue-Based PartiesClientelistic vs. Issue-Based Parties

Typesof Parties

Correlates

SSocial Base ocial Base of of

SupportSupport

Policy BiasPolicy Bias Identity Identity profileprofile

Issue-Issue-BasedBasedPartiesParties

Constituencies Constituencies CollectivesCollectives

Re-Re-distributivedistributive

UniversalisticUniversalistic

ProgressiveProgressivepro-labor; or pro-labor; or conservative, conservative, pro-businesspro-business

ClientelistiClientelistic Partiesc Parties

Constituents Constituents IndividualsIndividuals

Distributive Distributive ParticularisticParticularistic

Populist, Populist, conservative, conservative, personalisticpersonalistic

Effects of Clientelistic Parties Effects of Clientelistic Parties on Quality of Democracyon Quality of Democracy

1.1. Favors particularistic policies that privilege Favors particularistic policies that privilege individual party supporters.individual party supporters.

2.2. Breeds dependence on small but organized Breeds dependence on small but organized groups—mainly public employees—that groups—mainly public employees—that interact not with each other but with state.interact not with each other but with state.

3.3. Reinforces rent-seeking behavior of powerful Reinforces rent-seeking behavior of powerful socioeconomic actors.socioeconomic actors.

4.4. Increases both the Increases both the weakness weakness andand centrality centrality of of the state.the state.

Types of parties

Qualityof policies

Socioeconomic matrix

Effects of Low Quality of DemocracyEffects of Low Quality of Democracy GDP per-capita GDP per-capita

1980: $1,4411980: $1,441 1989: $1,4421989: $1,442 2004: $1,3822004: $1,382

30% of population is rural and has no access to land30% of population is rural and has no access to land 10% of overall population owns 66% of the available land10% of overall population owns 66% of the available land Remaining 60% of population share 6% of the surfaceRemaining 60% of population share 6% of the surface

1980–19881980–1988 1989–19991989–1999 2000–20052000–2005

Tax burdenTax burden 7.7%7.7% 10.5%10.5% 10.9%10.9%

Bureaucratic Bureaucratic BurdenBurden

42.4%42.4% 61.3%61.3% 75.9%75.9%

Growth in Public-Sector EmployeesGrowth in Public-Sector Employees

Total de cargos de la Administración Central (1989 - 1999)

0

50,000

100,000

150,000

200,000

250,000

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2004

Growth in Public-Sector SalariesGrowth in Public-Sector Salaries

The Trap of ClientelismThe Trap of Clientelism

On the one hand….On the one hand…. 80% of voters belong to one of two 80% of voters belong to one of two

traditional partiestraditional parties

On the other hand…On the other hand… 75% of the population considers 75% of the population considers

political parties the least-trustworthy political parties the least-trustworthy institutioninstitution

3) SOCIO-CULTURAL FACTORS:3) SOCIO-CULTURAL FACTORS:Associational PredispositionsAssociational Predispositions

Inspired by work of TocquevilleInspired by work of Tocqueville Interpersonal trust and associational behavior Interpersonal trust and associational behavior

key to quality of democracykey to quality of democracy Interpersonal trust in Paraguay very low Interpersonal trust in Paraguay very low

between 1996 and 2004 (Latinobarómetro)between 1996 and 2004 (Latinobarómetro) In 2001, 56.9% of population didn’t belong to In 2001, 56.9% of population didn’t belong to

any intermediate organization; in 2005, 70.3%any intermediate organization; in 2005, 70.3% Are these Are these causescauses or or consequencesconsequences of low of low

quality of democracy?quality of democracy?

The Rock and Hard-Place DilemmaThe Rock and Hard-Place Dilemma

Low quality democracy vs. the neo-populist alternative Low quality democracy vs. the neo-populist alternative Neo-populism: Neo-populism:

No longer tied to specific social constituencies or No longer tied to specific social constituencies or economic policies (e.g. Peron, Vargas), but instead…economic policies (e.g. Peron, Vargas), but instead…

……tied to a pattern of personalistic and anti-institutionalist tied to a pattern of personalistic and anti-institutionalist politics rooted in the appeal and mobilization of politics rooted in the appeal and mobilization of marginalized masses by a charismatic, often authoritarian marginalized masses by a charismatic, often authoritarian leaderleader

1996–2003: the neo-populist temptation; 1996–2003: the neo-populist temptation; authoritarian formulas, Gen. Lino Oviedo.authoritarian formulas, Gen. Lino Oviedo.

The UnexpectedThe Unexpected Social-science explanations can never rule Social-science explanations can never rule

out the unexpectedout the unexpected The unexpected came in March 2006 with The unexpected came in March 2006 with

a citizens’ demonstration led by Monsignor a citizens’ demonstration led by Monsignor Fernando LugoFernando Lugo

This confirms the old adage, “There is no This confirms the old adage, “There is no ill that lasts 100 years nor a Paraguayan ill that lasts 100 years nor a Paraguayan willing to put up with it.”willing to put up with it.”

Hope Beyond HopeHope Beyond Hope

The chiliastic upsurge of former Bishop The chiliastic upsurge of former Bishop Fernando LugoFernando Lugo

Lugo, Chavez, MoralesLugo, Chavez, Morales Lugo not a military leader, but a pastor who grew Lugo not a military leader, but a pastor who grew

up in a tradition of horizontality, collective up in a tradition of horizontality, collective leadership, and anti-authoritarianism.leadership, and anti-authoritarianism.

Lugo not a Marxist or a neo-populist but an Lugo not a Marxist or a neo-populist but an exponent of Catholic social progressism.exponent of Catholic social progressism.

Lugo not a leader of an ethnically divided society.Lugo not a leader of an ethnically divided society. Lugo is a catalyst who gathers support from a Lugo is a catalyst who gathers support from a

wide range of wide range of parties,parties, from right to left. from right to left. Lugo identifies himself as a centrist Lugo identifies himself as a centrist (“mbytetepe, (“mbytetepe,

poncho juruicha”);poncho juruicha”); sees ‘left’ as a movement for sees ‘left’ as a movement for change rather than as an ideological platform.change rather than as an ideological platform.

ImplicationsImplicationsEcuadorEcuador Similar socioeconomic matrix, similar clientelistic Similar socioeconomic matrix, similar clientelistic

parties (but not deeply rooted)parties (but not deeply rooted) Instability, development of a new politics of identity Instability, development of a new politics of identity

(Pachacutik) (Pachacutik) Emergence of populist-authoritarian alternativesEmergence of populist-authoritarian alternatives Lucio Gutiérrez and Rafael CorreaLucio Gutiérrez and Rafael Correa

BoliviaBolivia Similar socioeconomic matrix, similar clientelistic Similar socioeconomic matrix, similar clientelistic

parties (but not deeply rooted save MNR) parties (but not deeply rooted save MNR) Development of new politics of identity Development of new politics of identity Emergence of radical alternativesEmergence of radical alternatives Evo MoralesEvo Morales

CorollariesCorollariesBoliviaBolivia: : If established political elites do not make reform If established political elites do not make reform

possible, possible, they make revolutions inevitable.they make revolutions inevitable. Evo Morales.Evo Morales.

EcuadorEcuador: : If established political elites do not make reform If established political elites do not make reform

possible, possible, they make instability inevitable.they make instability inevitable. Mahuad, Gutiérrez, Palacios, Correa … Mahuad, Gutiérrez, Palacios, Correa …

ParaguayParaguay If opposition political elites do not make reforms If opposition political elites do not make reforms

possible, possible, they make one-party rule inevitable.they make one-party rule inevitable. Lugo?Lugo?

Between a Rock and a Hard Place:Between a Rock and a Hard Place:Dilemmas of Democracy in ParaguayDilemmas of Democracy in Paraguay

Diego Abente-BrunDiego Abente-BrunReagan-Fascell Democracy FellowReagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow

THE ENDTHE END