Dialogul de La Shanghai

8/12/2019 Dialogul de La Shanghai

1/97

The International Institute for Strategic Studies

The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Arundel House, 13-15 Arundel Street, Temple Place, London WC2R 3DX, UnitedKingdom. www.iiss.org. Incorporated in England with limited liability under number 615259. UK registered charity 206504.


This content may be used for research and private study purposes. All rights reserved. Any substantial or systematicreproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is

expressly forbidden.

Full terms and conditions of use: hp://www.iiss.org/terms-and-conditions

SCROLL DOWN FOR DOWNLOADED CONTENT
http://www.iiss.org/terms-and-conditionshttp://www.iiss.org/terms-and-conditions


2/97

The 8th IISS Asia Security Summit2931 May 2009, Singapore

THE SHANGRI-LADIALOGUE



3/97

The International Institute for Strategic StudiesArundel House | 1315 Arundel Street | Temple Place | London | 2 3| UK

www.iiss.org

THE SHANGRI-LA DIALOGUE

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted

or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic,

mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented,

including photocopying and recording, or in any information

storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from

the institute.

The International Institute for Strategic Studiesis an independent centre for research, information and debate on

the problems of conict, however caused, that have, or potentially have, an important military content. The Council

and Sta of the Institute are international and its membership is drawn from over 90 countries. The Institute is

independent and it alone decides what activities to conduct. It owes no allegiance to any government, any group

of governments or any political or other organisation. The IISS stresses rigorous research with a forward-looking

policy orientation and places particular emphasis on bringing new perspectives to the strategic debate.

2009 The International Institute for Strategic Studies

Director-General and Chief ExecutiveDr John Chipman

EditorAlexander Nicoll

ContributorsJames Hackett, Dr Tim Huxley,

Nigel Inkster, Dr Andrew Parasiliti,

Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, Hilary Synnott, Adam Ward

Manager for Editorial ServicesDr Ayse Abdullah

Assistant EditorsDr Jeffrey Mazo, Katharine Fletcher,

Carolyn WestEditorial Research Kay Floyd, James Howarth

Production and DesignJohn Buck

Printed and bound in Great Britain by

Hastings Printing Co. Ltd, East Sussex.


4/97

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter 1

Keynote address and opening dinner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter 2

Plenary session

Americas security role in the Asia-Pacific. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter 3

Plenary session

The major powers and Asian security: cooperation or conflict? . .

Chapter 4

Plenary session

Building a security community in the Asia-Pacific. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter 5

Break-out groups

Break-out group 1

New military technologies: how useful? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Break-out group 2

Towards a Northeast Asia security dialogue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Break-out group 3

Enhancing maritime cooperation and confidence-building . . . . . . . .

Break-out group 4Contributing to peace-support operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Break-out group 5

Modernising armed forces in lean times . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Break-out group 6

Enhancing energy and food security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter 6

Reception. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter 7

Plenary session

Military transparency and defence cooperation

in the Asia-Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter 8

Plenary session

Winning counter-insurgency campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter 9

Plenary session

Strengthening defence diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific. . . . . . . . . . . .

Appendices

I. Press coverage of the Shangri-La Dialogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I I . S e l e c t e d I I S S p u b l i c a t i o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Contents


5/97


6/97

5Foreword

The International Institute for Strategic

Studies (IISS) is pleased to present this

summary of the proceedings of the Eighth

IISS Asia Security Summit: The Shangri-La

Dialogue.

The IISS inaugurated the Shangri-La

Dialogue in 2002 and it was held for the eighthtime in Singapore from 2931 May 2009. The

Dialogue yet again provided a superlative

opportunity for participating states defence

establishments, represented in most cases by

their ministers, permanent heads of minis-

tries and military chiefs, to exchange views

on current and emerging security challenges.

As well as the public plenary sessions and

the closed-door break-out groups open to all

delegates, government delegations also held

many private meetings. This report summa-

rises the discussions that were open to all

summit participants in the plenary sessions

and break-out groups.

In 2009, no fewer than 27 governments sent

delegations to the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue.

This eighth summit in the series saw several

signicant developments. An outstanding

feature was the presence of Prime Minister

Kevin Rudd of Australia, who was the rst

leader from a country other than Singapore

to address the Shangri-La Dialogues open-

ing dinner. Vietnam was represented by its

Minister of National Defence and a high-

ranking ocer represented the Russian

Federations Ministry of Defence. Ocial

Foreword

delegations held more private bilateral meet-

ings than ever before, and for the rst time,

the Dialogue enabled a trilateral ministerial

meeting involving Japan, the Republic of

Korea and the United States.

The IISS thanks the government of

Singapore for its generous support andlogistic assistance. Under a new agreement

reached earlier in 2009, Singapores support

will allow the Shangri-La Dialogue to be

staged in the city state until at least 2014. We

also express gratitude to these commercial,

institutional and government benefactors

for additional vital nancial support: The

Asahi Shimbun, BAE Systems, Boeing, DCNS,

EADS, the Keppel Corporation, The John D.

and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the

Mitsubishi Corporation, the S. Rajaratnam

School of International Studies, Raytheon,

Singapore Technologies Engineering, Thales

and the Australian Department of Defence.

The IISS looks forward to developing these

valuable partnerships in the service of

advancing pan-regional security dialogue

and cooperation.

Dr John Chipman

IISS Director-General and Chief Executive

Dr Tim Huxley

Executive Director, IISSAsia


7/97

6 The Shangri-La Dialogue


8/97

7Introduction

Initiated in 2002 in response to the clear need

for a forum where the Asia-Pacics defence

ministers could engage in dialogue aimed at

building condence and fostering practical

security cooperation, the IISS Asia Security

Summit, or Shangri-La Dialogue as it has

come to be known, has established itself asa key element of the emerging regional secu-

rity architecture. It is the most important

regular gathering of defence professionals

in the region and has become a vital annual

xture in the diaries of Asia-Pacic defence

ministers and their civilian and military

chiefs of sta. By catering to their specic

interests and needs, and by facilitating easy

communication and fruitful contact among

them, the Shangri-La Dialogue has helped to

engender a sense of community among the

most important policymakers in the defence

and security establishments of regional states

and of major powers with signicant stakes

in Asia-Pacic security.

The Dialogues format, agenda and cohort

of delegates have evolved incrementally. The

IISS soon modied the Dialogues structure

originally based simply on plenary sessions

to permit several simultaneous break-out

groups during one half-day of the summit,

allowing in-depth discussion of a greater

variety of critical regional security topics.

Because the states of the Asia-Pacic, an

extraordinarily large and diverse region

encompassing the majority of the worlds

population, face an extremely wide range of

defence and security challenges, and their

responses to these challenges have been

varied, the IISS has intentionally formulated

a wide-ranging agenda for the Shangri-La

Dialogue each year. But we have also ensured

that each year the Dialogues agenda has

recognised emerging as well as established

regional security concerns.After the 2006 summit, the IISS set itself

the target of ensuring participation at the

highest level from the very few regional

states that had not hitherto sent ministerial-

level delegates. The IISS, together with

participant states, particularly felt Chinas

under-representation needed to be rectied.

In 2007, long-standing IISS eorts to encour-

age appropriate Chinese participation bore

fruit when the Deputy Chief of the General

Sta of the Peoples Liberation Army (with

vice-ministerial status) led Beijings delega-

tion for the rst time. In 2008, both Vietnam

and Myanmar elevated their representation

to deputy-minister level.

Increasingly open debate at the Shangri-La

Dialogue has advanced substantive coopera-

tion on important security issues. Moreover,

ministers have used the Dialogue as a plat-

form from which to propose initiatives on

regional security. In the maritime-security

sphere, for example, discussions at the

Dialogue led to a consensus on common

principles relating to the roles of lioral states

and concerned non-Southeast Asian powers

in relation to the Malacca Strait. At the 2006

Dialogue, Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister

Dato Sri Mohd Najib Tun Razak proposed

Introduction


9/97


establishing a regionally based humanitarian-

relief coordination centre. Subsequently,

in 2008, just such a regional coordinating

mechanism played a key role in facilitating

international assistance to Myanmar after

Cyclone Nargis. At the 2008 Dialogue, French

Minister of Defence Herv Morins call for

condence-building measures in relation

to the regional proliferation of submarines

stimulated thinking among interested par-

ties about appropriate mechanisms for such

measures.

Over time, ocial delegations have made

increasingly intensive and eective use of

the Dialogue as a venue for meetings with

security partners. The precise content of

these private meetings, which year by year

have become more numerous, has usually

remained condential, but they have some-

times resulted in publicised understandings

on defence and security cooperation.

Though the Shangri-La Dialogue is,

above all, a Track One inter-governmental

meeting, the participation of non-ocial

delegates has from the beginning served to

animate and enrich the summits proceed-

ings. By replenishing each year the cohort of

legislators, academic experts, distinguished

journalists and business delegates invited

to the Dialogue, the IISS has continually

expanded awareness of the institution in the

wider public community concerned with

defence and security maers.

The Dialogue

The eighth Shangri-La Dialogue, held in late

May 2009, brought together ocial delega-

tions from all 27 countries that were invited.

An innovation was the rst address to the

opening dinner by a leader from a country

other than Singapore: Kevin Rudd, Australias

Prime Minister. He said: In only seven years,the Shangri-La Dialogue has cemented itself

as the pre-eminent defence and security dia-

logue in the Asia-Pacic region.

Ministers of defence (or, in two cases, for-

eign aairs), or their deputies, led the majority

of ocial delegations at the Dialogue in 2009.

Most participating states sent their military

chiefs of sta. Vietnam was represented at

full ministerial level for the rst time, with

General Phung Quang Thanh, Minister of

National Defence, leading its delegation

and speaking in a plenary session. Another

rst was the participation of a senior ocer

from the Russian Federations Ministry of

Defence. Lieutenant-General Ma Xiaotian,

Deputy Chief of the General Sta (with

vice-ministerial status), again led a strong

delegation from Chinas Peoples Liberation

Army. Robert Gates, US Defense Secretary,

took part in the Dialogue for the third time

after President Obama retained him in post.

On the Dialogues rst day, three plenary

sessions allowed Gates, Admiral Sureesh

Mehta (Chairman of Indias Chiefs of Sta

Commiee), Japans Minister of Defense

Yasukazu Hamada, and Chinas Ma to out-

line their countries major global and regional

security concerns, and enabled a discussion

Dr Robert M. Gates, US

Secretary of Defense;

and Lee Hsien Loong,

Prime Minister,

Singapore


10/97

9Introduction

of the prospects for a regional security com-

munity led by the Indonesian, South Korean

and New Zealand defence ministers. On the

following day, the fourth plenary examined

the links between military transparency and

defence cooperation, with perspectives fromSingapores deputy prime minister (who

is also defence minister) and the United

Kingdoms minister for international defence

and security. In the fth plenary, Sri Lankas

minister of foreign aairs, the Philippines

undersecretary for defence aairs, Pakistans

secretary of defence and Myanmars deputy

minister of defence spoke about the counter-

insurgency campaigns in their countries. Inthe nal plenary, the defence ministers of

Australia, Cambodia and Vietnam exam-

ined the prospects for strengthening defence

diplomacy in the Asia-Pacic.

On the Dialogues Saturday afternoon,

diverse and distinguished speakers includ-

ing ministers, chiefs of defence sta, civilian

heads of defence ministries and, in several

cases, academic analysts and former senior

ocials led discussions in break-out groups

on the topics New military technologies: how

useful?, Towards a Northeast Asia security

dialogue, Enhancing maritime coopera-

tion and condence-building, Contributing

to peace-support operations, Modernising

armed forces in lean times and Enhancing

energy and food security. IISS directing and

senior sta chaired these sessions.

The challenge of North Korea

Four days before the 2009 Dialogue, North

Korea conducted underground testing of a

nuclear device more powerful than the one it

detonated in 2006; it also carried out a series

of missile tests. Delegates used the Dialogue

to discuss Pyongyangs motivations, the

level of threat its actions posed, and how

they should respond. The crisis prompted

the Shangri-La Dialogues rst-ever trilat-

eral meeting between participating states

defence principals, in which Gates met his

Japanese and South Korean counterparts; all

three declared their solidarity on the issue.

In the rst plenary session, Gates clearly

stated Americas position: We will not

accept North Korea as a nuclear-weapons

state. Washingtons goal remained the denu-

clearisation of the Korean peninsula, and

Pyongyang would be held responsible for

the consequences of any nuclear materials

transferred elsewhere. At the end of the day,

said Gates, the choice to continue as a des-

titute international pariah is North Koreas

alone to make.

Kevin Rudd saw the nuclear test as a

provocative act by a reckless regime and

a threat to the peace and stability of our

region. Strong measures were necessary:

nancial sanctions should be reimposed and

hardened.

North Korea became the focus of the break-

out group entitled Towards a Northeast

Asia Security Dialogue. While discussion

in the group started from the premise that it

was desirable to develop a dialogue mecha-

Joel Fitzgibbon,

Minister for Defence,

Australia; and Lee

Kuan Yew, Minister

Mentor, Singapore


11/97


nism in a region still facing the legacies of

past wars, the harm that North Koreas latest

nuclear test had inicted on the Six-Party

Talks process did lile to inspire condence

that this embryonic dialogue could develop

a wider purview. The groups discussion

focused instead on how the US, South Korea,

Japan, China and Russia should coordi-

nate their responses to North Koreas latest

provocations. There was, however, disagree-

ment in the group regarding the immediacy

of North Korean progress towards develop-

ing a deliverable nuclear weapon, and also

over the wisdom of taking punitive action

that might undermine the Norths stability.

There was nevertheless consensus that North

Korea should not be formally recognised as a

nuclear power.

Insurgency and domestic challenges

North Korea was not the only regional hotspot

to capture delegates aention. In the fth

plenary session, Rohitha Bogollagama, Sri

Lankas Minister of Foreign Aairs, gave an

account of the recent end to the war between

government forces and the Liberation Tigers

of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

Bogollagama said that succumbing to

international pressure for a ceasere would

no doubt have prolonged the conict and

provided a lifeline to the terrorists. Among

the top priorities now, he said, was reset-

tling nearly 280,000 displaced people andreuniting families. A political selement

acceptable to all was a necessity. The foreign

minister responded to a suggestion that the

government should establish an independent

commission to inquire into alleged human-

rights abuses by saying that Sri Lankas

judicial process and constitution were able to

deal with such allegations.

Against the background of the Obamaadministrations new policy for both

Afghanistan and Pakistan, involving a troop

surge in the former and pressure on the laer

to hit back at Islamic militants, Pakistans

Secretary of Defence, Lieutenant-General

(Retd) Syed Athar Ali, argued that his coun-

try had played a leading role in the global

campaign against terror, but Coalition forces

failure to stabilise Afghanistan had impeded

eorts to control unrest in Pakistans frontier

region.

Antonio C. Santos, Jr, the Philippines

Undersecretary for Defence Aairs, empha-

sised that while the state needed to enforce

its authority by using force if necessary, it

must also enter into dialogue if its opponents

show willingness to negotiate a political

selement.

Major-General Aye Myint, Myanmars

Deputy Defence Minister, focused on the

ceasere agreements that his government

had reached with most of the countrys

ethnic-minority rebel groups. However, he

also raised the issue of Aung San Suu Kyi, the

opposition leader held under house arrest

for most of the time since her party won elec-

tions in 1990. While he claimed that legal

proceedings against her were justied, in the

Kevin Rudd, Prime

Minister of Australia;

and Lieutenant-

General Ma Xiaotian,

Deputy Chief of

General Staff, Peoples

Republic of China


12/97

11Introduction

previous plenary Baroness Ann Taylor, the

United Kingdoms Minister for International

Defence and Security, had called for Aung

San Suu Kyis release as a rst step towards

democracy.

Enhancing multilateral cooperation

The great range of security threats and ten-

sions in the Asia-Pacic underlines the

need for closer regional security coop-

eration. Continuing a lively debate from

previous Shangri-La Dialogues, speakers

proposed various forms of regional security

architecture.

Kevin Rudd outlined steps he had takensince becoming prime minister to advance his

idea of an Asia-Pacic Community encom-

passing economic and security collaboration.

He said that such a community could help

to nurture a culture of cooperation and col-

laboration on security, including a culture

of military transparency, helping to build

condence, and could advance cooperation

on transnational security issues. Rudd men-

tioned his concern about long-term strategic

drift or, even worse, strategic polarisation

in the absence of such an institution, and

announced he would convene a one-and-a-

half track conference to explore the proposal

further.

Other government speakers had their

own views on the most desirable security

structure for the region. Indonesias Minister

of Defence, Juwono Sudarsono, said a com-

munity of the type proposed by Rudd should

be based on the clustering of regional coop-

eration in Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia

and the South Pacic. He also appealed for

closer connections to be built up between

younger military ocers in the Asia-Pacic.

Lee Sang Hee, South Koreas National

Defense Minister, saw a model for Asia in the

Organisation for Security and Cooperation

in Europe. He proposed strengthening

existing regional multilateral security insti-

tutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum

(ARF) and the Shangri-La Dialogue, and

additionally developing linked multilateral

consultative bodies at sub-regional level as

precursors to a pan-regional security com-

munity. Japanese Defense Minister Hamada

said there needed to be three levels of

regional engagement: increased dialogues

and exchanges; cooperation on meeting

threats, particularly in the nuclear sphere;

and capacity-building, particularly through

the ARF. Wayne Mapp, New Zealands

Defence Minister, agreed that the best way

forward would be to build on existing insti-

tutions, particularly the ARF.

Robert Gates said that the United States,

while maintaining bilateral ties, would like

to see regional security enhanced through

greater multilateral cooperation among its

allies and security partners. Chinas General

Ma oered a ve-part proposal for closer

regional security cooperation: existing

structures should be strengthened; bilateral

military alliances should not be expanded;

norms such as mutual respect and trust should

Fleur de Villiers,

Chairman of the IISS

Trustees; Dr John

Chipman, Director-

General and Chief

Executive, IISS;

and Major-General

Karl Mllner, Head,

MilitaryPolitical

Section, Ministry of

Defence, Germany


13/97


be established; joint exercises and other prag-

matic cooperation should be stepped up; and

countries should engage more actively in

military diplomacy. General Phung Quang

Thanh, Vietnams National Defence Minister,

also advocated defence diplomacy as a means

of enhancing cooperation.

Dr Tim Huxley,

Executive Director,

IISSAsia and Colonel

Don Freeman,

Australian army

In the plenary session on military trans-

parency and defence diplomacy, Singapores

Teo Chee Hean said that transparency could

play a crucial role in avoiding misunderstand-

ings and in increasing trust and condence:

States need to articulate their securityconcerns and strategic intent in clear and

convincing ways that can reassure others.

Active defence cooperation was one way of

achieving military transparency, as was hap-

pening through a web of arrangements in the

region. Australias Joel Figibbon noted that

defence diplomacy required bluntness and

honesty.

Concluding the Dialogue, Dr JohnChipman thanked the government of

Singapore and the commercial and philan-

thropic sponsors. Real defence diplomacy of

immediate, strategic consequence has taken

place here, he said. Moreover, key policy

ideas had been launched. He announced that

the next Dialogue would take place from 4 to

6 June 2010.


14/97

Friday 29 May 2009, 8.00 pm

SPEAKER

Kevin Rudd

Prime Minister of Australia

Chapter

Keynote address andopening dinner


15/97


Kevin Rudd, Prime

Minister of Australia

The Keynote Address to the opening dinner

of the Shangri-La Dialogue was delivered

by Kevin Rudd, Prime Minister of Australia.

The rst non-Singaporean leader to give the

address, Rudd noted that: In only seven

years, the Shangri-La Dialogue has cemented

itself as the pre-eminent defence and securitydialogue in the Asia-Pacic region.

Rudd began by discussing the interna-

tional response to the global economic crisis,

which in 2009 was producing the rst contrac-

tion in the world economy since the Second

World War. The eect on Asia was severe,

with the Asian Development Bank predicting

that an additional 62 million people would

be forced into poverty. The response of the

Keynote address and opening dinner

G20, with large-scale stimulus packages and

funding for international nancial institu-

tions, had been swift and coordinated in

marked contrast to the situation during the

Great Depression of the 1930s.

The Asia-Pacic region was strongly

represented among G20 members, whichat the London Summit in April had shown

a remarkable degree of collective determi-

nation to work together for the collective

good. Such cooperation had long been

seen in the region, especially in the form of

the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN), which over many years had played

an important role in building a stable strate-

gic foundation for Southeast Asia. Using the


16/97

15Keynote address and opening dinner

example of ASEAN, Rudd argued that the

wider region now faced a long-term choice.

This, he said, was whether to seek actively

to shape the future of our wider region, the

Asia-Pacic region, by building the regional

architecture we need for the future if we are

together to shape a common regional future;

or whether instead we will adopt a passive

approach, where we simply wait to see what

evolves, whether that enhances or in fact

undermines stability.

The region, Rudd said, could not assume

that peace and prosperity were inevita-

ble outcomes of human progress. Will we

seek a framework of shaping the institu-

tions of common security for our region or

will we allow traditional inter-state tensions

to evolve and, in some cases, escalate? he

asked. Cooperation would foster strategic

stability as well as economic growth. But it

required eort, because the natural default

position tends to be suspicion, rather than

cooperation.

The region faced many complex security

challenges. It therefore needed robust mech-

Kevin Rudd, Prime

Minister of Australia;

and Dr John Chipman,

Director-General and

Chief Executive, IISS

anisms to foster active collaboration to deal

with strategic shocks, as well as new habits

of dialogue to help minimise friction. Rudd

said: We need a body that brings together the

leaders of the key nations in the Asia-Pacic

region, including Indonesia, India, China,

Japan, the US and other nations, with a

mandate to engage across the breadth of the

security, economic and political challenges

we will face in the future. Absent such a

body, I am concerned in the long term about

the possibility of strategic drift within our

region or, even worse, strategic polarisation,

polarisation which I believe serves nobodys

interest.

Rudd had in 2008 proposed the creation of

an Asia-Pacic Community (APC) that would

help in the process of regional, economic and

nancial integration as well as nurturing a

culture of security cooperation and military

transparency. An APC, the prime minister

said, could provide a vehicle for discussion

of a range of challenges with transnational

reach, such as climate change, resource and

food security, bio-security and terrorism.


17/97


forces, the risk of miscalculation is reduced.

In that spirit, the Australian government had

recently published a Defence White Paper

a frank document which describes how we

see the world and how we are shaping our

military forces to respond to possible chal-lenges ahead. Australias close alliance with

the United States would remain the bedrock

upon which the countrys national security

was built, Rudd said. The country believed

that strategic stability in the region was best

underpinned by the continued presence

of the US through its network of alliance

and security partnerships, including with

Japan, South Korea and Australia, and by itsmilitary presence in the Western Pacic. Aus-

tralia would continue to strengthen defence

and strategic ties, such as with Japan and

South Korea. It aimed to expand its security

dialogue with China, and to strengthen its

defence relationship with India. Alongside

New Zealand, it would maintain a special

relationship with the Pacic Island countries.

In addition, Australias defence policy was

based on the need to ensure that the country

could act in self-defence against a wide range

of threats, and so it must control its air and

sea approaches.

Rudd said it was vital for Asia to shape

new sets of strategic realities as they

emerge. He concluded: I am an unapolo-

getic optimist about our regions future, just

as I am an unapologetic realist about the

choices we will need to make for our regions

future together.

Questions and answers

Dr Tim Huxley, Executive Director, IISS

Asia, noted that the Defence White Paper

outlined plans for major changes in the

armed forces, including a major naval build-

up and the addition of land-aack cruise

missiles. He asked whether there was any

Rudd had appointed a special envoy,

Richard Woolco, a former diplomat, to

discuss the APC concept in regional capi-

tals. Woolco had found that there had been

broad agreement on the value of a discus-

sion about a regional architecture and thatviews were far from uniform. This was

good, since the whole point of this ini-

tiative is to begin the conversation about

where we need to go. Secondly, there was

widespread recognition that current struc-

tures did not provide a single forum for all

relevant leaders to discuss the full range of

political, economic and security challenges.

Thirdly, it was clear that no one wants moremeetings. There is no appetite for additional

institutions. It is dicult enough for leaders

to make it to the range of meetings that we

already have.

Australia had no prescriptive view about

future structures, Rudd said, and he intended

to continue the discussions. He would con-

vene a one-and-a-half track conference to

explore the APC idea. Disagreements were to

be expected, but Australia was commied to

making a positive contribution to the debate

on the regions future. I do not believe we

can aord to sit idly by while the region

simply evolves without any sense of strategic

purpose; in fact, I believe this is potentially

dangerous. Australia was not oering misty-

eyed idealism about some pan-regional

utopia, but instead took a deeply realist

approach. The realism of the international

relations of the twenty-rst century neces-

sarily involves a high degree of structured

regional and global engagement to be eec-

tive in our highly globalised world.

Australia, the prime minister said,

strongly believed that military coopera-

tion and transparency aided long-term

security. If sovereign states are clear about

their strategic perceptions and their military


18/97

17Keynote address and opening dinner

contradiction between assessments of the

strategic challenges facing Australia and its

thinking about the potential for a regional

community. Rudd said planners needed to

proceed on both tracks. Australia was a coun-

try of 21m people with a very long coastline,

and it must make prudent preparations for

national defence. But the second track must

always be around how we shape the institu-

tions, cultures and habits of security policy,

transparency and cooperation. This was

why institutional changes were needed. We

need to lift this to a broader regional focus,

so that the pre-existing tensions that exist in

our part of the world, in part arising from

unresolved territorial disputes that go back

decades, if not centuries, as well as the new

threats to security, can be properly openly

discussed and maximally harmonised within

an environment of common regional security

community.

Kishore Mahbubani, Dean of the Lee

Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National

University of Singapore, asked what could

be done to ensure that the current stable

and positive relationship between the US

and China continued. Rudd said it was clear

that President Obama intended to keep it so.

The development of the G20 was positive in

this regard: at the recent London Summit,

there had been a high degree of collegial-

ity between China and the US. The bilateral

strategic and economic dialogues between

Washington and Beijing were important and

should be developed further. He believed

both sides wanted to do this.

(lr): Dr Tim Huxley,

IISSAsia; and Kishore

Mahbubani, Lee

Kuan Yew School

of Public Policy,

National University of

Singapore

(lr): Ambassador

Robert D. Blackwill,

RAND Corporation;

and Stanley Roth, TheBoeing Company


19/97


Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill, Senior

Fellow, RAND Corporation, asked whether

there was anything about the region that

kept the prime minister awake at night

other than North Koreas nuclear activities.

Rudd mentioned the challenges presentedby Afghanistan and Pakistan, and by Irans

nuclear programme, as well as the uncer-

tainties surrounding North Koreas nuclear

activities and leadership. In addition, the

threat of global pandemics should seize all

of our national policy establishments about

how we best plan eectively to deal with

this.

Stanley Roth, Vice-President, Inter-national Government Relations, Asia and

Middle East, The Boeing Company, asked

about North Korea. Was there anything that

could be done to compel it to give up its

nuclear capability? Rudd commended Chi-

nas eorts to facilitate the Six-Party Talks, in

which the only constant factor had been the

consistently non-cooperative approach ofthe DPRK regime. The most recent setback

had been acute. It was necessary for the UN

Security Council to reach a unanimous reso-

lution with a uniform set of strong measures.

Rudd said the aention of the government

in Pyongyang would be seized by a harsh

range of nancial measures of a type that had

previously been imposed. The regime would

only respond to a unied demonstrationof strength on the part of the international

community.


20/97

Plenary session 1

Saturday 30 May 2009, 9.00 am

SPEAKER

Dr Robert M. GatesSecretary of Defense, United States

Chapter

Americas security role inthe AsiaPacific


21/97



Secretary of Defense

The opening plenary session featured an

address by US Secretary of Defense Robert

M. Gates. He began by saying that as with all

IISS forums I aend whether in Manama or

here in Singapore the opportunity to speak

about global issues in seings like these is

unparalleled. Coming just ve days afterNorth Koreas second nuclear test, Gates said

that the US will not accept North Korea as

a nuclear weapons state and rearmed the

US commitment to the defence of our allies

in the region.

Speaking rst of the strategic reality of

Asia and Americas role in this order, Gates

observed that in recent years, the nations

of Asia have, for the most part, achieved

Plenary session

Americas security role in the AsiaPacific

unprecedented wealth and stature as they

have forged more mature political, economic,

and military institutions. The strategic land-

scape of Asia had evolved to include new

and re-emerging centres of power in China,

Russia, India and Indonesia; the advance of

civil society and democratic reform; contin-ued steps toward military modernisation

among both rising powers and smaller states;

and the emergence of multiple transnational

challenges, both old and new, calling for

greater cooperation among the states of the

region. America had welcomed Asias rise

over the last few decades; in fact, its contin-

ued presence had been essential in enabling

that rise. The US commitment to the region


22/97

21Plenary session

was as strong, if not stronger, today as it had

ever been. There had been a very real shift

in thinking in US defence strategy, placing

greater emphasis on building the capac-

ity of partners to beer defend themselves,

shifting away from conventional military

deterrence toward a seamlessly integrated

mixture of hard and soft power.

Gates pointed out that long-standing US

relationships with Japan and South Korea

remained cornerstones of our foreign

policy. Both nations had become economic

powerhouses with modern, well-trained and

equipped armed forces. The US was there-

fore making adjustments in each country to

maintain a posture that is more appropriate

to that of a partner, as opposed to a patron.

He noted that, in 2012, the US would tran-

sition wartime operational control to the

Republic of Korea, so that Korea would take

the lead role in its defence. The US would

maintain its rm commitment to security on

the peninsula, he added, even as it sought to

broaden the alliance to address other secu-


Secretary of Defense;

and Dr John Chipman,

Director-General and

Chief Executive, IISS

rity challenges in the region and beyond.

With regard to Japan, the Diets ratication

of the Guam International Agreement was a

signicant step in strengthening the alliance,

modernising US posture and maintaining

engagement in Asia over the long term. The

US was increasing its military presence in the

central and western Pacic, with new assets

based in Guam and elsewhere prepared to

respond to a number of natural or man-made

contingencies. Gates also cited develop-

ments in Australia, Thailand, the Philippines,

Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam,

Cambodia and Laos as contributing to the

new strategic reality.

The Secretary said USIndia relations

had seen cooperation that would have

been unthinkable in the recent past; in the

coming years, the US looked to India to be

a partner and net provider of security in the

Indian Ocean and beyond. There were also

common challenges in USChina relations

economic maers, regional areas of tension,

counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, energy


23/97


had been a regular focus of discussions at the

Shangri-La and Manama Dialogues.

Gates spoke of trying to overcome the

conventions and habits of the Cold War,

when Asias security architecture mostly

reected a hub and spokes model with the

United States as the hub and the spokes rep-

resenting a series of bilateral alliances with

other countries that did not necessarily coop-

erate much with each other. ASEAN, the

Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation forum,

and ad hoc arrangements to combat piracy

and illegal tracking were examples of

important regional multilateral institutions.

He stressed that this new approach did not

mean any weakening of our bilateral ties, but

rather enhancing security by adding to them

multilateral cooperation.

Afghanistan was important to Asian

security: failure in a place like Afghanistan

would have international reverberations

and, undoubtedly, many of them would be

felt in this part of the world. Gates thanked

Australia, Japan, India, New Zealand

security, piracy and disaster relief. The two

countries needed to cooperate wherever pos-

sible; they required a defence relationship

marked by consistent and open channels of

communication and contact.

Asia, like the rest of the world, faced

traditional dilemmas posed by rising, resur-

gent, or rogue nation states coexisting with

a range of diverse, unconventional threats

that transcend national borders. Some, such

as piracy, ethnic strife and poverty, were

ancient; more recent challenges included the

mix of terrorism and technologies, weapons

proliferation, environmental degradation,

drug and human tracking, cyber secu-

rity, climate change, economic turmoil and

deadly and contagious diseases. These chal-

lenges required multiple nations acting with

uncommon unity. Gates singled out maritime

security and combating piracy and prolifera-

tion as areas where the US Pacic Command

was cooperating closely with Indonesia,

Malaysia, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Sri

Lanka and other nations. Maritime security


Secretary of Defense


24/97


25/97


talks. Gates called for a sequenced approach

to the reduction of nuclear arms, beginning

rst with the US and Russia, which have the

preponderance of nuclear weapons in the

world.

In response to a question from Professor

Han Sung-Joo, Chairman, Asan Institute

for Policy Studies, and former Minister of

Foreign Aairs, South Korea, on whether

North Koreas nuclear and missile capabili-

ties represented a direct military threat to

the United States, Gates said they did not,

but that the combination of the two was a

harbinger of a dark future. He added that

the progress they have made gives urgency

to the eort to try and bring enough pressure

on the North Koreans so that they change

their path. There were perhaps other ways

than trying to buy our way back to the status

quo ante to get the North Koreans to change

their approach.

Manish Tewari, National Spokesperson,

Indian National Congress, asked the Secretary

to elaborate on his remarks about Indias role

as a net provider of security in the Indian

Ocean. Gates cited the example of Indias

participation in the counter-piracy operations

in the waters around Somalia. What we see

in India is a great power that has tremendous

potential to be a major player in bringing inter-

national security and stability in a lot of places,

as a part of the international community.

In response to a question from Kishore

Mahbubani, Dean, Lee Kuan Yew School

of Public Policy, National University

of Singapore, about what two or three

(lr): Kishore

Mahbubani, National

University of

Singapore; and DrJohn Hillen, Global

Strategies Group

(North America) Inc.

(lr): Professor Han

Sung-Joo, Asan

Institute for Policy

Studies, Korea; and

Manish Tewari, Indian

National Congress


26/97

25Plenary session

condence-building measures could improve

the already positive and stable USChinarelationship, Gates said he had discussed

this in a bilateral meeting with Lieutenant-

General Ma Xiaotian,Deputy Chief of the

General Sta, Peoples Republic of China,

that morning. Speaking for himself, Gates

said he supported the opening of a defence-

based strategic dialogue. A similar dialogue

on the diplomatic side already existed. In

response to a later question, Gates also said

that the US would welcome Chinas help

in Afghanistan, whether it is a contribution

to the security fund, or in a number of these

civilian areas of expertise.

Dr John Hillen, Chief Executive

Ocer, Global Strategies Group (North

America), asked about the relative contri-

butions of Asian and European countries in

Afghanistan. Gates replied that if he had been

tougher on the Europeans in this respect

than on a number of countries in Asia it was

because three successive NATO summits had

declared a success in Afghanistan to be the

Alliances highest priority. There had been a

gap between the rhetorical emphasis on the

importance of success in Afghanistan, and

the capabilities many allies were prepared

to put forward. It was important to acceler-

ate expansion in the size and capability of the

Afghan National Army and National Police,

and the US would put billions of dollars intothis eort over the course of the next several

years. Gates called on more nations to con-

tribute to the Afghan National Security Force

trust fund under NATO auspices, and recog-

nised the commitments that had been made

to the fund by Japan and South Korea.

In response to a question from Barry

Desker, Dean, S. Rajaratnam School of Inter-

national Studies, Nanyang Technological

University, Singapore, Gates called the pros-

pect of Japan developing a nuclear capability

in response to North Korea as remote but

added that we also have to worry about the

consequences of North Koreas behaviour

creating instability in the region and pro-

voking its neighbours into taking defensive

actions.

Admiral (Retd) Arun Prakash, former

Chairman, Chiefs of Sta Commiee, and

former Chief of Naval Sta, India, asked

how India could assure Pakistan that it did

not pose a threat. Gates recognised India for

conducting itself with great sophistication

and care over a period of considerable turbu-

lence, including Pakistans political crisis last

year, and in response to the terrorist aacks

in Mumbai. He added that the willingness

of the Pakistani government and military to

(lr): Admiral (Retd)

Arun Prakash, former

Chairman, Chiefs

of Staff Committee,

India; and Barry

Desker, Nanyang

Technological

University, Singapore


27/97


take action in the western part of the country

was a recognition that what was happeningthere was more of an immediate threat than

the situation with India.

Responding to a question from Farooq

Sobhan, President, Bangladesh Enterprise

Institute, on whether Irans nuclear pro-

gramme or its role in contributing to stability

in Afghanistan and Iraq was more important,

Gates said Iran was playing both sides of

the street, in both Afghanistan and Iraq; it,

on the one hand, tries to cultivate positive

diplomatic and political relationships with

the two governments, it tries to expand eco-

nomic relationships, but at the same time it

is supplying weapons and training to those

trying to overthrow those governments ... In

terms of Irans role in Afghanistan, I wouldsay that it is obviously a concern, but at this

point at least it pales by comparison with our

concern over their nuclear programme.

Peter Qiu, Commentator, Phoenix TV,

asked about the next steps the US might take

with regard to North Korea. Gates said that

one of the great virtues of the Six-Party Talks

is the involvement of Russia and China in

discussing these security issues relating to

North Korea, and so there is very lile inter-

est in walking away from the Six-Party Talks,

but we need to talk about how they can be

more eective, and how we can reach a beer

outcome than we have reached so far.

(lr): Farooq Sobhan,

Bangladesh Enterprise

Institute; and Peter

Qiu, Commentator,

Phoenix TV


28/97

Plenary session 2


SPEAKERS

Yasukazu HamadaMinister of Defense, Japan

Admiral Sureesh Mehta

Chairman, Chiefs of Sta

Commiee and Chief of Naval

Sta, India

Lieutenant-General Ma Xiaotian

Deputy Chief of the General Sta,

Peoples Republic of China

Chapter

The major powers andAsian security: cooperation

or conflict?


29/97


Yasukazu Hamada,

Minister of Defense,

Japan

The second plenary session featured repre-

sentatives of the three major Asian powers

China, India and Japan who all recog-

nised increased security dependencies in

the Asia-Pacic region as well as traditional

and new, non-traditional security challenges.

They called for building regional capaci-ties to meet some of these challenges and

made specic proposals tointensify defence

cooperation.

Japanese Minister of Defense Yasukazu

Hamada stated that North Koreas second

nuclear test, conducted less than a week

before, was totally unacceptable as it con-

stituted a grave threat to Northeast Asian

security and the international community

with the enhancement of its ballistic-missile

capability. He urged North Korea to aban-

don its weapons of mass destruction and

ballistic-missile programmes, and expected

the UN Security Council to adopt a strong

new resolution in this regard.He said major powers had three main

responsibilities. The rst was to expand and

deepen defence dialogues and exchanges,

and increase transparency on arms transfers

and defence spending, to reduce the risk of

an arms race. The second was to cooperate on

global security challenges including nuclear

disarmament and non-proliferation, terror-

Plenary session

The major powers and Asiansecurity: cooperation or conflict?


30/97

29Plenary session

ism, piracy, disasters, infectious diseases and

climate change. Following the US declaration

to pursue a world free of nuclear weapons,

he urged China and other nuclear powers to

undertake nuclear-disarmament measures to

ensure that nuclear tests are no longer con-

ducted. Finally, the third responsibility was

to build regional capacity for disaster relief,

maritime security, and peacekeeping or

peace-building.

Noting that the Shangri-La Dialogue had

unparalleled signicance as the only mul-

tilateral defence ministerial dialogue in the

region, he proposed an intergovernmental

multilateral dialogue, in addition to Track

II, at a defence-ministerial level in which all

countries across the region take part.

Admiral Sureesh Mehta, Chairman of

the Chiefs of Sta Commiee, and Chief of

Naval Sta, India, noted the ominous rise

of the malevolent non-state actor as well as

that of the state-sponsored non-state actor,

the laer responsible for the terror aack

in Mumbai in November 2008. He queried

Admiral Sureesh

Mehta, Chairman,

Chiefs of Staff

Committee, and Chief

of Naval Staff, India

whether Indias preventive, curative and

punitive security eorts [should] be directed

principally towards the state sponsor or the

non-state entity. Whereas no cooperative,

consultative or constructive endeavour could

succeed in the face of opposition from major

state powers, no meaningful conict could be

waged against malignant non-state powers

without state powers joining hands in a

cooperative endeavour.

He noted that the safety of sea lines of

communication remained a priority for India

for the foreseeable future, emphasised that

the Indian navy was a signicant stabilis-

ing force in the Indian Ocean region, and

expressed hope and expectation for regional

constructs such as the Western Pacic Naval

Symposium and the Indian Ocean Naval

Symposium.

He stated that Indias capability-

enhancement and capacity-building initia-

tives with Sri Lanka, Seychelles, Maldives

and Mauritius had enabled them to deal with

many of their security concerns on their own.


31/97


eration mechanisms, including the ASEAN

Regional Forum and Shanghai Cooperation

Organisation (SCO), for regional peace

and stability. The second was the further

enhancement of the concept of cooperative

security; China opposed the enlargement

of existing bilateral military alliances in the

Asia-Pacic left over from the Cold War.

Thirdly, fair and rational norms for mutual

relations should be created to give proper

consideration to each others interests and

concerns, and honour the vital interests

and signicant security interests of each

country. Fourthly, pragmatic international

security cooperation should be strength-

ened, including joint military manoeuvres

and drills, exchange of intelligence and

information, and personnel-training pro-

grammes to cope with cross-border threats

and challenges such as terrorism, interna-

tional crime, natural disasters and piracy.

Finally, military diplomacy should be

actively conducted to reinforce mutual

understanding and trust.

He added that, increasingly, India would

take upon itself the role of further equipping

its neighbours in ways that would not only

enhance their own security but contribute

positively to regional stability as well.

Lieutenant-General Ma Xiaotian, Deputy

Chief of the General Sta, Peoples Republic

of China, noted that Chinas peaceful devel-

opment was a correct strategic decision

on the part of the government and a major

opportunity for the Asia-Pacic region and

the world. China had rmly pursued a

national defence policy that was defensive

in nature, and a military strategy of active

defence to safeguard its national sovereignty

and territorial integrity. Chinese warships

were sent to the Gulf of Aden o Somalia in

December 2008, demonstrating Chinas com-

mitment to its international obligations as a

responsible major country.

To further regional security cooperation,

he made ve recommendations. The rst

was the consolidation and strengthening

of multilateral security dialogue and coop-

Lieutenant-General

Ma Xiaotian, Deputy

Chief of the General

Staff, Peoples

Republic of China


32/97

31Plenary session

Questions and Answers

Gareth Evans, President and Chief Executive

Ocer, International Crisis Group, asked

Hamada whether, in terms of maintaining

the credibility and momentum of Japans

strong historical and continuing commitment

to a world free of nuclear weapons, it was not

time for Japan, along with other US allies,

to make clear that the US nuclear umbrella

is available only for nuclear threats, and that

for non-nuclear threats chemical, biological

and all the rest the US deterrent capability

is and should be conventional in character,

not nuclear. Lieutenant-General Dr Mohd

Aminul Karim, former Commandant,

National Defence College, Bangladesh, que-

ried whether, in view of Japans huge military

modernisation, it had security concerns other

than North Korea. Hamada responded that in

terms of threats there were discussions about

North Korea, and then there were discus-

sions about everything else. Japan would not

use military force for the resolution of mili-

tary disputes internationally, and whether it

was ballistic-missile defence or conventional

weapons, Japanese capabilities were purely

defensive. Japan would naturally think only

about its defence and would steadily pre-

pare to defend itself in the future. Japan, as

the only country that had suered nuclear

bombings, believed it was truly important to

work to eliminate nuclear weapons and not

permit nuclear proliferation.

Professor Simon Chesterman, Director

of the New York University School of Law

Singapore Programme, National University

(lr): Gareth Evans,

International Crisis

Group, Australia; and

Lieutenant-General Dr

Mohd Aminul Karim,

former Commandant,

National Defence

College, Bangladesh

(lr): Professor

Simon Chesterman,

National University of

Singapore; and MarkFitzpatrick, IISS


33/97


of Singapore, asked the panellists what poten-

tial developments most worried them in the

near term. Mark Fipatrick, IISS Senior

Fellow for Non-proliferation, asked Mehta

to expand upon the linkage between state

sponsors and non-state actors in the aack

in Mumbai. Mehta responded that the rise

in the asymmetric threat of non-state actors

bothered India most of all. The Mumbai

aacks had involved professionalism, preci-

sion and planning. This made India believe

there was covert state support. States from

whose territory such acts emanated had a

moral obligation to ensure such acts were not

permied from their territories and needed

to take action.

Professor Chikako Kawakatsu Ueki,

Graduate School of Asia-Pacic Studies,

Waseda University, Japan, asked what

reassurances China had received through

defence diplomacy and condence-building

measures, which concerns were alleviated,

and whether they impacted on defence poli-

cies or their structures. Oksana Antonenko,

IISS Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia,

asked how China was going to contrib-

ute more to stabilisation in Afghanistan, in

particular what SCO mechanisms could be

utilised for that purpose, and to what extent

the improvement in the strategic dialogue

between the US and China could encour-

age the SCO to be more open to engaging

with the US for the purpose of improving

the capacity of regional actors to stabilise

Afghanistan. Dr Chung Min Lee, Dean and

Professor of International Relations, Yonsei

(lr): Professor Chikako

Kawakatsu Ueki,

Waseda University,

Japan; and Oksana

Antonenko, IISS

(lr): Dr Chung Min

Lee, Yonsei University,

Republic of Korea; and

Ralph A. Cossa, Centerfor Strategic and

International Studies,

United States


34/97

33Plenary session

University, and IISS Adjunct Senior Fellow,

asked whether China felt threatened byNorth Koreas nuclear test and, if so, to what

extent. Why was China resolutely against

missile defence in South Korea and Japan,

even though North Korea had more than 900

ballistic missiles targeted against both these

countries? Ralph A. Cossa, President, Pacic

Forum, Center for Strategic and International

Studies, United States, asked at what point

the strategic-arms talks between the US and

Russia needed to become multilateral. When

did China believe it was prepared to enter

into the dialogue? There was a great deal

of concern in the region that China might

exploit the decision by the US and Russia

to reduce forces by trying to increase num-

bers to obtain parity. Cossa sought assurance

from China that this would not be the case,

and that China would stick to its minimum

deterrence philosophy. Professor Han Sung-

Joo, Chairman, Asan Institute for Policy

Studies and former Minister of Foreign

Aairs, Republic of Korea, asked whether

China could give an example or two of the

shifting of domestic troubles to others and

what it could do about it, as well as examples

of Cold War mentality in the area. Dr Fu-kuo

Liu, Research Fellow and Chairman, The First

Research Division, Institute of International

Relations, National Chengchi University,

Taiwan, asked whether China would be will-ing to carry out military condence-building

measures with Taiwan.

In response, Ma stated that security

mechanisms and security dialogues did not

include Taiwan as they were international

issues. Taiwan was part of the Peoples

Republic of China and thus an internal

issue of the Chinese people. Nonetheless,

the establishment of a security mechanism

in Taiwan for military security and mutual

trust between the two sides of the Taiwan

Strait would be benecial for easing mili-

tary security concerns of the mainland and

Taiwan. It would also be useful for stabilis-

ing the security situation and facilitating the

peaceful development of relations across the

strait. Following the speech of Hu Jintao,

General Secretary of the Communist Party

of China, to establish contact and exchange

on military issues in good time and to dis-

cuss the establishment of military security, a

convenient time for the two parties to come

together would be determined by the parties

themselves.

On USRussian talks on reduction of

nuclear arsenals, China had only a small

fraction of the worlds nuclear weapons and

was not entitled to participate in such dia-

(lr): Professor Han

Sung-Joo, Asan

Institute for Policy

Studies, Republic of

Korea; and Dr Fu-kuo

Liu, National Chengchi

University, Taiwan


35/97


logues. China had declared that it would not

be the rst country to use nuclear weapons

and would not use or threaten to use nuclear

weapons against non-nuclear countries and

regions. The US and Russia should take the

rst step in this respect.The expansion of military exchange and

security mechanisms was mutually bene-

cial. The quality of the military relationship

between countries reected the strength of

the national relationship. China paid great

aention to military exchanges, including

with the US. Of course, there were dierences

between them. However, China believed

that by following the principle of mutual

respect, mutual trust, equality and mutual

benet, they could gradually eliminate these

dierences.

China understood the worries and con-

cerns of Japan and South Korea over NorthKoreas nuclear test. Being a neighbour of

North Korea, China also had great concern

about its second nuclear test. China was

strongly against it and had always been

against nuclear proliferation. China hoped

for denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.

All relevant parties were expected to handle

this issue soberly and properly.


36/97

Plenary session 3


SPEAKERS

Juwono SudarsonoMinister of Defence, Indonesia

Lee Sang Hee

Minister of National Defense,

Republic of Korea

Dr Wayne Mapp

Minister of Defence, New Zealand

Chapter

Building a securitycommunity in the

Asia-Pacific


37/97


Juwono Sudarsono,

Minister of Defence,

Indonesia

The topic of the third plenary session,

Building a Security Community in the Asia-

Pacic, was of particular relevance given

the many developing bodies in this area as

well as proposals for yet more institutions.

The changing power balances in the region,

and the economic recession aecting manyregional countries, made it more pressing.

Juwono Sudarsono, Minister of Defence,

Indonesia, responded to the suggestion of an

AsiaPacic Community by Australian Prime

Minister Kevin Rudd by proposing that coop-

eration should be based on clustering in

Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and the South

Pacic. This, he said, would be similar to the

concept dened in 1951 by US Secretary of

State Dean Acheson, under which the strate-

gic perimeter of the United States constituted

a spectrum of alliances from Northeast

Asia and Southeast Asia to the Australia,

New Zealand, United States Security Treaty

(ANZUS) in the south. Following the rise of

regional economic powers, the question nowwas the balance within the clusters of extra-

regional and intra-regional powers the US

having played a crucial role for the past 60

years. ASEANs experience showed how

cooperation between members had enhanced

security in a wider sense, political and eco-

nomic as well as military.

Sudarsono had a further suggestion

to enhance cooperation. Younger people

Plenary session

Building a security communityin the Asia-Pacific


38/97

37Plenary session

aending the Shangri-La Dialogue, includ-

ing military ocers, were from a generation

after the Korean and Vietnam wars. He pro-

posed that there should be more cooperation

through institutions like the IISS and ocer-

training establishments so that younger

ocers from all services could engage with

each other on Asia-Pacic security. There

should be more cooperation between mili-

tary ocers, diplomats, academics, as well

as people from business and across genera-

tions. There must be connections between

hard power, soft power and smart power.

The boardroom, the classroom and the war

room must connect together to provide plan-

ning ahead for what constitutes security

throughout the Pacic region.

Lee Sang Hee, Minister of National

Defense, Republic of Korea, believed the

concept of security had expanded beyond

politicalmilitary aairs to embrace eco-

nomic, social and environmental aspects.

There were also a series of new dangers,

such as terrorism, piracy, infectious dis-

Lee Sang Hee, Minister

of National Defense,

Republic of Korea

eases and cyber threats. Building a regional

security community was essential, and the

Organisation for Security and Cooperation

in Europe could be a model. The fact that

various multilateral bodies had developed in

the Asia-Pacic region showed that regional

countries were keenly aware of the need to

establish a security community.

No institution had yet developed su-

ciently to be called an Asia-Pacic security

community, partly because the conicting

interests of relevant countries restricted the

ability to resolve problems through multilat-

eral dialogue. In addition, the region was very

diverse, and historical legacies and overlap-

ping interests complicated the building of a

community. Lee proposed a phased strategy.

Firstly, existing regional multilateral secu-

rity consultative bodies such as the ASEAN

Regional Forum and the Shangri-La Dialogue

should be strengthened. Cooperation should

rst be stepped up in areas where it was easier,

such as disaster relief, and then extended.

Secondly, existing consultative bodies at the


39/97


crime, terrorism, disaster relief, pandemics,

environmental issues and broader resource

issues. New Zealand believed that the path

to progress lay in developing existing insti-

tutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum,

which should have a secretariat headed by a

secretary-general.

Questions and answers

Professor Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Deputy

Chairman, Indonesian Institute of Sciences,

noted the dierences between the speak-

ers approaches to a security architecture,

with Sudarsono speaking about sub-regional

clusters but the others seing out a step-by-

step approach to an over-arching structure.

Admiral (Retd) Arun Prakash, former

Chairman, Chiefs of Sta Commiee, and

former Chief of Naval Sta, India, asked

whether Rudds proposal was too all-encom-

passing and ambitious. Would it be beer to

stick to sub-regional and regional groupings?

Nick Bisley, Associate Professor at

Australias La Trobe University, asked where

leadership would come from, since important

sub-regional level should be built up and

linked. As a precursor to an Asia-Pacic secu-

rity community that encompasses the entire

region, we can strengthen security coop-

eration at the sub-regional level, such as in

Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia.

Dr Wayne Mapp, Minister of Defence, New

Zealand, said his country wanted the various

existing institutions to move to the next stage

of their evolution. There were four criteria

that should direct this evolution. The rst was

a consensus on the need for a community, and

the second was eectiveness, without which

no arrangement would be durable. An eec-

tive regional community will have a central

role in moderating intra-regional disputes and

will have a lead role in promoting regional

stability, Mapp said. The third criterion was

that any regional security construct must be

comprehensive: ASEAN was the premier

example of a regional architecture developed

on the principle of inclusion. The fourth was

the communitys purpose: ensuring stability

was the most important goal, but the modern

denition of security embraced transnational

Dr Wayne Mapp,

Minister of Defence,

New Zealand


40/97

39Plenary session

developments in international security coop-

eration had been driven by specic states or

strong institutions. Manish Tewari, National

Spokesperson, Indian National Congress,

noted that conversations on security struc-

tures had been taking place for several yearsand asked whether it was now time to move

beyond this stage.

Katsuhisa Furukawa, Senior Fellow,

Center for Safety and Security Research,

Research Institute of Science and Technology

for Society, Japan Science and Technology

Agency, said cooperation in areas such as

disaster relief required engagement with

law-enforcement authorities, scientic com-munities and public-health authorities. In

most countries these had a very domestic focus

and were not accustomed to foreign or secu-

rity aairs. How should they be engaged?

Kishore Mahbubani, Dean, Lee Kuan Yew

School of Public Policy, National University of

Singapore, picking up Sudarsonos remarks

about generations, asked how the younger

generation in ASEAN could be made more

aware of the importance of ASEAN to the

future of Southeast Asia.

Barry Desker, Dean, S. Rajaratnam School of

International Studies, Nanyang Technological

University, Singapore, suggested the time had

come for meetings of defence ministers to com-

plement foreign ministers meetings within the

ASEAN Regional Forum.

Several points were raised about the impli-

cations for security cooperation of the threat

from North Korea. Vice Admiral (Retd)

Hideaki Kaneda, Senior Research Advisor

on National Security, Mitsubishi Research

Institute, asked Lee, in light of the mili-

tary challenge from North Korea, whether

South Korea would favour more substantial

military cooperation with Japan in order to

counter the threat. Mark Fipatrick, Senior

Fellow for Non-proliferation, IISS, noted that

North Korea had repeatedly escalated the

confrontation over its nuclear programme.

He asked Lee how South Korean defence

forces would respond if the North red on

shing vessels, took hostages, or took other

provocative steps.Dr Jonathan D. Pollack, Professor, Asian

and Pacic Studies, US Naval War College,

said the speakers had highlighted the di-

culty of pursuing a security community in

the face of non-universality in membership.

The most acute case of this was North Korea,

where for the time being the international

community had lile option but to pursue a

containment strategy. The issues, however,were less to do with North Koreas security

goals than with the countrys internal struc-

ture and system. Pollack asked whether it was

possible to imagine a change of the sort that

would be required to induce North Koreas

participation, involvement and inclusion, in

the absence of a change in the nature of the

regime.

James Hacke, Editor,The Military Balance,

IISS, asked about the forthcoming defence

review in New Zealand. What capability

requirements were likely to feature in it?

Sudarsono reiterated his belief that

building on a sub-regional structure was

beer than aempting to create a com-

prehensive structure from scratch. While

Singapore, a compact country relying on hi-

tech and services, could more easily be built

into a global and regional architecture, it

was less easy for Indonesia, which would be

required to make too sudden a leap. Rather,

it was necessary to have regional clusters

leading towards a comprehensive solution.

In this sense, sub-regional arrangements

could complement the macro structures

envisioned by the US and Australia. The

minister said that it was practical to keep

the ASEAN Regional Forum in the hands of


41/97


foreign ministries, even if defence ministers

aended its meetings.

Lee said new threats included non-

military and transnational dangers, and there

were many areas for cooperation, including

in police and maritime aairs, as well as sci-

ence. On military cooperation between Japan

and South Korea, the factors limiting this

were political and diplomatic. Lee noted that

when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Sta, he could not have discussions with his

Japanese counterpart for political reasons.

Mapp, on the issue of sub-regional versus

comprehensive approaches to security archi-

tecture, said the two approaches were basically

the same because they were evolutionary. A

focus on moving the ASEAN Regional Forum

from dialogue to action would enable more

eective handling of problems such as disaster

relief, humanitarian assistance and transna-

tional crime issues that all could agree on.

It was imperative to have defence-ministers

meetings. Leadership to develop a secretariat

would have to come from an agreement of

both foreign and defence ministers. Going

beyond this to the ambition set out by Rudd

would take time and would challenge a lot

of nations. On New Zealands review, Mapp

said it was being approached in concentric

circles: rst, the South Pacic, which was

the primary area of interest, then Southeast

Asia and further aeld, such as Afghanistan.

Clearly our ability to reach out is much more

limited, and it is done through either bilateral

or multilateral organisations, and we make

niche contributions.

(lr): Professor Dr

Dewi Fortuna Anwar,

Indonesian Institute

of Sciences; and

Nick Bisley, La Trobe

University, Australia

(lr): Katsuhisa

Furukawa, Japan

Science and

Technology Agency;and Vice Admiral

(Retd) Hideaki Kaneda,

Mitsubishi Research

Institute


42/97

Saturday 30 May 2009

Group 1

New military technologies: how

useful?

Group 2Towards a Northeast Asia security

dialogue

Group 3

Enhancing maritime cooperation

and condence-building

Group 4

Contributing to peace-support

operations

Group 5

Modernising armed forces in lean

times

Group 6

Enhancing energy and food

security

Chapter

Break-out groups


43/97


The group heard that the revolution in

military aairs (RMA), which envisaged

the networking of sensors and repower,

reached its apogee with the US-led invasion

of Iraq in 2003. Over-optimistic expecta-

tions of the eectiveness of networked forces

had allowed technology in eect to shapedoctrine, severely undermining the eec-

tiveness of the campaign in Iraq beyond

the initial invasion. Nevertheless, what

might be called RMA-type capabilities

remained highly relevant to contemporary

warfare in an era of counter-insurgency.

Despite some commentators emphasis on

the need for boots on the ground in con-

temporary counter-insurgency operations,

advanced technologies had become vital

tools for military commanders in Iraq and

Afghanistan. Warfare is a constant strug-

gle to maintain an asymmetric advantage,

and new and emerging technologies with

military applications help the armed forces

of developed countries to reduce casualties

from insurgents tactical innovations (such

as roadside improvised explosive devices)

while operating with smaller forces than

would have been thought possible in the

past. In contemporary operations, persistent

Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition

and Reconnaissance allows Coalition armed

forces to bring repower to bear within ever

more tightly compressed timescales. In the

future, it was claimed, new technologies

could oer the prospect of reducing civilian

casualties and providing greater protection

Break-out group

New military technologies: how useful?Saturday May , . pm

CHAIR

Dr Tim Huxley

Executive Director, IISSAsia

OPENING REMARKS

Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup

Chief of the Defence Sta, UnitedKingdom

General Tan Sri Dato Sri Abdul Aziz bin

Haji Zainal

Chief of Defence Forces, Malaysia

Dr Chung Min Lee

Dean and Professor of International

Relations, Yonsei University; Adjunct

Senior Fellow for Asian Security Aairs,

IISS

Dr John Hillen

Chief Executive Ocer, Global Strategies

Group (North America) Inc.; former

Assistant Secretary of State for Political

Military Aairs, US Department of State


44/97

43Break-out group

for friendly forces. In the Asia-Pacic, new

technologies were key to regional states

eorts to improve their Maritime Domain

Awareness, and to integrating the capa-

bilities of diverse agencies and states, thus

improving their capacity to manage low-

(lr): Air Chief Marshal

Sir Jock Stirrup, Chief

of the Defence Staff,

United Kingdom;

and General Tan Sri

Dato Sri Abdul Aziz

bin Haji Zainal, Chief

of Defence Forces,Malaysia

intensity challenges such as piracy in the

Malacca Strait. At the same time, networked

forces were also central to regional states

military-modernisation plans (for example,

those of South Korea) aimed at countering

conventional military challenges.

(lr): Dr Chung

Min Lee, Dean

and Professor

of InternationalRelations, Yonsei

University; and Dr

John Hillen, Chief

Executive Officer,

Global Strategies

Group (North

America) Inc.


45/97


The discussion started from the premise that

it was generally desirable to elaborate some

manner of Northeast Asian dialogue mecha-

nism to respond to the panoply of challenges

confronting a region that in strategic terms so

visibly still labours under the burdensome,

unresolved legacies of the Second WorldWar, the Chinese Civil War, the Korean

War and the Cold War. With the exception

of India, the region is home to all the great

powers of the Asia-Pacic, among whom

the balance of power is shifting and mutual

suspicion is often conspicuous. Inter-state

antagonisms, territorial disputes, nuclear

and ballistic-missile proliferation and high

levels of defence spending are all prevalent

and represent staple concerns for policy-

makers. While the demand for a mitigating

mechanism is clear, the manner in which it

should be supplied is not. What institutional

form would it assume? What would its com-

petences be? How could broad consultations

be operationalised into policy and action?

Could such a body be reconciled with the

continuance of the exclusive bilateral alli-

ances that the United States has fashioned

with South Korea and Japan?

These maers received aention in the

group. But the harm inicted on the Six-

Party Talks process by North Koreas second

nuclear test which took place just before the

Shangri-La meeting opened inevitably did

lile to inspire condence that that embry-

onic dialogue, not yet marked by notable

successes, would develop into a body with a

Break-out group

Towards a Northeast Asia security dialogueSaturday May , . pm

CHAIR

Adam Ward

Director of Studies, IISS

OPENING REMARKS

James B. Steinberg

US Deputy Secretary of State

Mitoji Yabunaka

Vice-Minister for Foreign Aairs, Japan

Lieutenant-General Yevgeny Buzhinskiy

Head of the International Military

Cooperation Department, Ministry of

Defence, Russian Federation

Professor Han Sung-Joo

Chairman of the Asan Institute for Policy

Studies; former Minister of Foreign

Aairs, Republic of Korea


46/97

45Break-out group

wider purview. Discussion instead focused

on the maers at hand how the US, South

Korea, Jap

Documents

Dialogul de La Shanghai