DFID’s land portfolio and programmes · 2019-11-11 · management Our analysis of three investment facilities flags several areas where DFID can improve its current practices on

February 2016

• DFIDfundsaround25programmesthatworkonland,almostallofwhichhaveachievedoroutperformedtheirobjectivesandhavehelpedstrengthentenuresecurityfortheirbeneficiaries.DFIDfundinghasledtoimpressiveresultsindeliveringlargelandregistrationprogrammesandstrengtheninglandrightsforwomen.

• Successfullandprogrammesarenotuniformintheirapproach,buthaveallbeengroundedinstrongunderstandingoflocalpracticesandnorms.Thepoliticalsensitivitieslandprogrammesencountercallsforpolitically-smartdesign,flexibilityandlong-termcommitment.

• Programmesthatcarryoutlandregistrationmustinparallelinvesttoensurelandadministrationservicesarefitforpurpose.Bothregistrationactivitiesandadministrationservicesshouldbedesignedtosuittheneedsofwomenandvulnerablegroups,includingthepoorest.

• Insupportinginvestmentfacilities,DFIDputsconsiderableresourcesintoprojectswithland-relatedrisks.BetterinformationmanagementsystemsareneededtokeepDFIDinformedoftheserisks,andwhattheentitiesmakinginvestmentsaredoingtoaddressthem.

Key messages

LEGEND Report

DFID’s land portfolio and programmesAn overviewGiles Henley and Harriet Hoffler

Contents

Acknowledgements 6

Abbreviations 6

Executive summary 7

Main findings 7

Recommendations for the design of land programmes 7

Recommendations for DFID risk management 8

1. Introduction 9

1.1 Background to DFID’s work on land 9

1.2 Contents of this portfolio review 10

2. The DFID land portfolio at a glance 12

2.1 Programmes covered in this portfolio review 12

2.2 Status of programmes in the portfolio 12

2.3 Portfolio value 12

2.4 Programme approaches 15

2.5 Geographic distribution of programmes 17

2.6 Types of land covered 18

2.7 Delivery partners 18

2.8 DFID-supported investment facilities 18

3. Programme designs 20

3.1 What issues are included in programme design? 20

3.2 Risks faced and mitigation approaches 23

3.3 Use of evidence during programme design and implementation 25

4. Programme results: impact and ongoing performance 27

4.1 Performance of completed and ongoing programmes 27

2 LEGEND Report

4.2 What works for women’s land rights 29

5. Findings from three investment facilities 32

5.1 Overview 32

5.2 How do programmes view and manage risks related to land? 32

6. Gaps and opportunities for learning 35

6.1 Outstanding questions 35

6.2 Challenges in accessing information 36

6.3 Suggestions for improving availability of information 36

6.4 Reflections for future portfolio overviews 37

7. Conclusions 38

7.1 Recommendations for the design of land programmes 38

7.2 Recommendations for DFID risk management 39

7.3 Recommendations for LEGEND and for future portfolio reviews 39

References 40

Annex 1: Methodology for this study 43

Defining the scope of the review 43

Annex 2: Further information on programmes 50

Detailed findings from completed programmes 50

DFID’s land portfolio and programmes: an overview 3

List of tables, figures and boxes

Tables

Table 1: Programmes included in this portfolio review 13

Table 2: Questions unanswered in this portfolio review 35

Table 3: Programme documents available and consulted for this review 41

Table A1: Main questions for the portfolio overview 45

Table A2: Programmes for which reports provided insufficient detail on land 47

Table A3: Not-included DFID programmes working on land (confirmed and potential) 48

Table A4: Overview of land components in logframes of non-core land programmes 53

Table A5: Beneficiaries that programmes aim to serve 55

Table A6: Programme scores for ongoing and complete programmes 56

Figures

Figure 1: Review methodology: defining the analytical framework and selecting programmes 11

Figure 2: Implementation status of different programmes in the portfolio 14

Figure 3: Value of DFID’s core land programmes 14

Figure 4: Value of other programmes in the portfolio 15

Figure 5: Geographic distribution of programmes by country 17

Figure 6: Programmes categorised by different types of land 17

Figure 7: Five PIDG subsidiaries: investments in land-intensive sectors 19

Figure A1: Improvements in collection of property rights in the MPUSP programme 50

4 LEGEND Report


Boxes

Box 1: DFID’s work on land policy in recent decades 10

Box 2: DFID’s prioritisation of land issues for women and girls 21

Box 3: Are links between land programmes and higher level country and sector strategies clear and well-articulated? 22

Box 4: Identifying the state of gender awareness in programme interventions: MOLA’s approach 30

Box 5: Findings from Namati on land components of their Legal Empowerment Programme 31

Box 6: Land issues arising through PIDG’s gender study 33

Box 7: IFC Performance Standards 34

AcknowledgementsManythankstothefollowingpeoplefortheirthoughtfulinputsthathelpedshapedtheframingofthestudyanditsfinalcontents:AnnaLocke,JulianQuan,IanScoonesandIrisKrebber.ThankstootoDFIDstaffforsupplyingadditionalinformationonprogrammes.WewouldalsoliketothankJennySpruellatDFIDforhersupportinassistingusaccessprogrammedocuments,ClaireBracegirdlefor

assistancewithanalysisandHelenHynesforsupportoneditingandproduction.Theresponsibilityforanyerrorsandomissionsrestssolelywiththeauthors.

ThisreportwasproducedbytheKnowledgeManagementteamundertheDFID-fundedLand:EnhancingGovernanceforEconomicDevelopmentprogramme(LEGEND).

AbbreviationsCLUF Mozambique Community Land Use Fund

COPE Creating Opportunities for the Poor and Excluded in Bangladesh

DLM Degraded Land Mapping for Kalimantan and Papua provinces

FGMC Forest Governance, Markets and Climate Programme

FLAG Forest Land Use and Governance in Indonesia

GEMS3 Growth and Employment in States Programme Component 3

GLEI Global Legal Empowerment Initiative

ICF Investment Climate Facility for Africa

KUSP West Bengal: Kolkata Urban Services for the Poor

LEGEND Land: Enhancing Governance for Economic Development

LIFT Ethiopia Land Investment for Transformation - Wealth Creation Programme

LTRSP Rwanda Land Tenure Regularisation Programme

LTSP Tanzania Land Programme

LULUCF Improving governance of Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry in Indonesia

MOLA Mozambique Land Action Programme

MPUIIP Madhya Pradesh Urban Infrastructure Investment Project

MPUSP Madhya Pradesh Urban Services for the Poor

MSFP Nepal Multi-Stakeholder Forestry Programme

SNPUPR Support to National Policies for Urban Poverty Reduction

SPUR Support Programme for Urban Reforms in Bihar

ULM Urban Land Reform- Urban LandMark programme in South Africa

6 LEGEND Report


ThisportfolioreviewexploresDFID’sprogrammesthatfocusonimprovinglandgovernance,andthosethatworkonlandtoachieveabroadersetofobjectives.Drawingonselectiveprogrammedocumentationitdescribeshowprogrammesaredesignedanddiscussestheirperformance.ItalsodiscussesseparatelyhowthreeinvestmentfacilitiesthatreceivesubstantialfundingfromDFIDdealwithlandissuesintheirinvestmentsincommercialagriculturalandinfrastructure.

Main findings

• Programmeshavesubstantiallydifferentrationalesandapproachestostrengtheningrightsoflandholdersandimprovinglandgovernance.Theportfolioincludesprogrammesthataimtosecure land rightsinordertoreduce poverty in rural and urban areas,butalsoprogrammesthataimtoprovidebetterconditionsforinvestment,empowermarginalisedgroups,reducedeforestationandencouragebetterlanduse.Agrowingnumberofprogrammesaimtoimprovelandrightsandrelatedopportunitiesforwomen.

• Programmeshaveadoptedawiderangeofdesignsandpracticestoimprovelandrightsandreducepovertyamongtargetgroups.Whilemanyfocusonregisteringland,othersadoptotherapproachessuchaslegalempowerment,makingland administration more user-friendlyorattemptingtochangethewayauthoritiesrecogniserightstooccupyandholdland.

• Theprogrammesreviewedhavelargely performedwell against expectations,althoughdeliveryhasoftennotproceededatthepaceexpected,duetochangesinpoliticalcontextandtheneedtodevelopeffectivecontext-specificworkingmethods.

• TheprogrammesreviewedaddresstopicsonwhichDFID has been challenged to do more;notably,therearepositive examples of work to strengthen women’srights to land.However,itisnot clearhowfarlandprogrammesincorporaterecommendationsforDFIDtodomoretotackleissuesofcorruption and climatechange:moreanalysisandreflectionisneededonhowlandprogrammescancontributeintheseareas.

• Severalareasofprogrammeperformanceareidentifiedforwhichdetailedinformationisnotreadilyavailablefrompublicly-availableprogrammedocuments.ThesegapswouldbenefitfromfurtherattentioninfutureLEGENDportfolioreviewsorthroughotherassessments.Areastoexploreincludethe use of theoriesof change,howprogrammesareaddressingclimatechange, and corruption.Futureportfolioreviewscouldalsousefullyinvestigateothercategoriesof

DFIDprogrammes(e.g.urbanorclimateprogrammes)toprovidearicherunderstandingofthewaystheseprogrammesareaddressinglandissues.

• Thereisalsoanongoingneedformoresystematiclesson learningfromrecentandongoingprogrammesthathavefocusedonsecuringlandrightsandstrengtheninglandadministrationtoinformthedesignoffuturelandprogramming.

Recommendations for the design of land programmes

• Thepoliticsoflandexposesprogrammestointerference,obstructionandsporadicprogress.Thiscallsforprogrammestafftobe perceptive to local politics,willingtoinvestinmediumto long-term programmesandtoleranttoshort-termdelays.Programmesshouldrecognisethehigh incidence of corruption in land,aimtoreduceitinlandadministrationandpreventitinprogrammeactivities.DFIDshouldconsiderdevelopingfurther internal guidancetohelpstaffdesignandimplementprogrammesthatworkinapolitically-smartwayandhelptacklecorruption.

• DFID’smainrationaleforpromotingbetterlandgovernanceisthatstrongerlandtenureimproveseconomicgrowthandreducesincomepoverty,includingforpoorerandmoremarginalisedgroups.Manyprogrammesreflectthisrationaleintheirresultsframeworks,whichfocusonthelinksbetweeninterventions,risingproductivityandreducingincomepoverty.Whilethisfocusonincomepovertyiskey,programmesshould avoid missing broader impacts onsocial and economic empowerment,evenifthesearehardertomeasure.

• Programmestaffshoulddevelopresultsframeworksfromathoroughunderstandingof local norms andpractices,andwithrealisticexpectationsofthepotentialcontributionofstrongertenuretohigherincomes,avoiding leaps of faith in theories of changeormisguidedassumptionsthatasuccessfulinterventioninonecountrywillreplicateelsewhere.

• Theportfolioalsoincludesprogrammesthatrelyondifferentapproachestostrengthenlandtenuretailoredtocertaincontextsorgroups,suchasformarginalisedwomen.Someoftheseapproacheshavebeensuccessfulandmayprovidelessonsfornewprogrammes.However,thedesignofnewprogrammesshould also be based onlocally-grounded researchandexperimentation.

Executive summary

• Programmesthatcarryoutlandregistrationmustmakecommensurate improvements in land administrationtomanagetheforeseeablesurgeinformaltransactions.Programmesmustnotletlandadministrationlagbehind,jeopardisinggainsachievedthroughlandregistration.

Recommendations for DFID risk management OuranalysisofthreeinvestmentfacilitiesflagsseveralareaswhereDFIDcanimprove its current practicesonmonitoringlandrelatedrisks:

• Manyprojectsfundedbyinvestmentfacilitiesareland-intensiveandoperateinland-sensitiveareas.Thisincludesinvestmentsthataimtoraisefarmproductionthroughlargenucleusandoutgrowerfarmingschemesbutalsothosethatbuildinfrastructureinruralandurbanareas(e.g.irrigationorhousing).Whenland

disputesgounacknowledged,theycandelay project plans and raise costs.Beforemakingsubstantialcommitmentstothesefacilities,DFIDshouldassureitselfthatdue diligence procedures are sound,andtakefullaccountoflandissuesandrisks.

• WhileDFIDstaffrecognisetheserisks,therisktoolsDFIDusestomonitorprogrammesdo not captureenough information on land-related risks.Land-relatedrisksarenotprominentinriskregistries,andannualreviewexercisesdonotregularlyreportonlandissuesunlessthesehavesurfaced.

• Moreover,unlessDFIDcanverifyindependentlythatinvestmentfacilitieshaveestablishedrobustriskmanagementsystems,assurancesthatfacilitiesuseIFCperformancestandardsareunconfirmed:thesearenotreportedonthroughDFID’snormalmonitoringprocesses.DFIDshouldthereforeconsiderhowtoimprove its monitoring of investments made through theinvestment facilities it funds.

8 LEGEND Report


1.1 Background to DFID’s work on landDFID’sinterestin–andcommitmentto–landgovernancehasseenarevivalinrecentyears,astheUKGovernmenthasemphasiseditsimportanceindeliveringonthegovernment’sprioritiesfordevelopment(SeeBox1andreferencesformoreinformationonDFID’sworkonlandpolicyinrecentdecades).StrongerpropertyrightsareoneofthemainstrandsoftheGoldenThread–PrimeMinisterDavidCameron’stheoryofdevelopmentthatviewscertainconditions,includingtheruleoflawandclearly-definedpropertyrights,asessentialtodevelopment.InthespeechesofseniorUKGovernmentofficials,strongpropertyrightsandgoodlandgovernancehavefeaturedfrequentlyasambitionsoftheUK’sgeneralapproachtodevelopment,aswellasimportantpillarsforpartnershipswithspecificdevelopingcountries.Atthe2013SummitofOpenGovernmentPartnership,thePrimeMinistercalledforG8countriesincludingtheUKto“workwithdevelopingnationstostrengthentheirlandpoliciesandinstitutions”sothat“peoplehaveclearrightstothelandtheylive,farmandworkon”.Thecurrentgovernment’snewUKAidStrategy(November2015)reaffirmsitscommitmenttostrengtheningpropertyrightsaspartofitscontinuedpromotionoftheGoldenThread.

Inlinewiththisframing,DFID’sworkonlandgovernanceisprimarilycarriedoutthroughitsworkstreamoneconomicdevelopment.Workonlandgovernanceispositionedtocontributetofouroffivepillars1ofthisworkstream,namely:

• improvinginternationalrulesforsharedprosperity, • supportingtheenablingenvironmentforprivatesectorgrowth,

• engagingwithbusinessestohelptheirinvestmentscontributetodevelopment,

• ensuringgrowthisinclusive,benefitinggirlsandwomen(DFID,2015).

However,beyondtheeconomicdevelopmentagenda,goodlandgovernanceunderliestheotherpolicyprioritiesDFIDsupports,includingreducinghungerandmalnutrition,improvingtransparencyandaccountability,supportinginternationalactiononclimatechangeandpreventingconflictinfragileandconflict-affectedstates.Forexample,throughitspositionasholderoftheG8Presidencyin2013,theUKGovernmentpushedforactiononlandaspartofitsinitiativeontransparency.The2013G8Communiqueconfirmedthecommitmentofmember

governmentstotheprinciplethat‘Landtransactionsshouldbetransparent,respectingthepropertyrightsoflocalcommunities.’TheInternationalDevelopmentCommittee’s(2013)reportonGlobalFoodSecuritysuggeststhatinordertoimprovefoodsecurity,DFIDshouldfundmorelandregistrationprocesses.ThenewUKAidStrategy(DFID2015a)alsoprioritisesequalaccesstolandaspartofeffortstoprioritisetherightsofwomenandgirls.

Alongsideothergovernments,theUKsupportstheimplementationofthe2012VoluntaryGuidelinesontheResponsibleGovernanceofTenure,asetofglobally-negotiatedprinciplesthatapplyacrossthelandsectorandwereagreedthroughtheintergovernmentalCommitteeonWorldFoodSecurity(CFS),withsupportfromcivilsocietyandtheprivatesector.HavingreaffirmeditscommitmenttoimplementtheVoluntaryGuidelinesduringthe2013G8summit,theUKgovernment,throughDFID,isdirectlysupportingtheUN’sFoodandAgricultureOrganizationtohelpsteerimplementationoftheseinseveralcountries,andsupportingarangeofotherpartnerstoworkonspecificthematicareas.

Aspartofitsrenewedengagementonland,DFIDhasstartedanewprogrammeofactivitiesundertheLEGENDprogramme.Thisaimsto:

• helpstrengthenknowledgeandevidenceonhowtoprotectlandrightsandimprovelandgovernanceatglobalandnationallevels,

• developguidancefortheprivatesectortoimproveinvestmentpracticesinland,

• supportcountryofficesaccessexpertiseinordertodesignlandprogrammesandimprovepropertyrights.Thegoalistostartnewlandprogrammesinsixnewcountriesby2018.

Inthecontextofthisre-engagementonlandandambitiontolaunchmoreland-relatedprogrammesandactivities,thereisalsoaneedtounderstandmoreaboutDFID’spreviousandongoingprogrammes.Thisportfolioreview,thefirstoffourandcommissionedthroughthefive-yearLEGENDprogramme,intendstoprovidedetailsofDFID’sportfolioofrecentandongoinglandprogrammes.Aswellasprovidinganoverviewofwhatisbeingdone,italsoaimstoidentifyareasforfurtherinvestigation.Untilrecently,landhasnot‘belonged’toanyspecificpolicyarea,andlandprogrammeshavebeenneitherdesigned,managedoranalysedtogether.Hence,thisreviewaimstotakeahigh-levelviewofboththoseprogrammesthat

1 Thecurrentframeworkdoesnotseeworkonlandgovernancecontributingtothelastpillar:catalysingcapitalflowsandtradeinfrontiermarkets.

1. Introduction

focusonlandandthosethatincludeasubstantiallandcomponentanddrawoutsomeofthemainsimilarities,differencesandkeylessonsfromthem.

1.2 Contents of this portfolio review

Methodology summary (expanded version presented in Annex 1)Figure1summarisesthemainstepswetooktoidentifytheanalyticalframework(right-handside)andidentifyprogrammestoanalyse(left-handside).

Analytical frameworkToestablishcriteriaforassessingperformance,wedrewonreportsfromUKparliamentarycommitteeswithamandateandtrackrecordofassessingDFID’sperformanceindifferentareas.TheseincludedreportsproducedbytheInternationalDevelopmentCommittee(IDC),IndependentCommissionforAidImpact(ICAI)andNationalAuditOffice(seeAnnex1forafulllistofthereportsconsulted).

Fromthesereports,weextractedfindingsandrecommendationsspecifictoDFID’sworkonlandandcategorisedtheseintoareasrelatedtocoverage,approachandcoherence,whichweusedtoanalyseprogrammes.Inaddition,wealsonotedrecommendationstargetedatotherareas(privatesectordevelopment,impactandcorruption)thatwerealsopotentiallyrelevanttolandprogrammes.Forexample,ICAI’s(2014d)reportonprivatesector

developmentincludesrelevantrecommendationsonhowprogrammesshouldlinkexplicitlytoDFIDcountryofficestrategiesandobjectives.TableA1inAnnex1presentsextractsfromthesereportsandnoteshowthesearerelevantforestablishingcriteriapertinenttoassessingprogrammes’coverage,approachesandcoherence.

Programme selectionDFIDlistsitslandprogrammesontheLandGovernanceProgrammemap–adatabasesetupbytheGlobalDonorWorkingGrouponLand(GDPRD2015).Thelistofprogrammesisupdatedtwiceperyear,mostrecentlyinApril2015.Programmesonthelistproducedforthelastupdatewereselectedforanalysis,althoughsomewereexcludedbecauseeitherrelevantprogrammereportswerenotavailableor,ifavailable,theydidnotdescribetheprogramme’sworkonlandinsufficientdetailtoprovideaclearunderstandingofwhatitwasdoing.TableA2inAnnex1presentsthelistofprogrammesthatwereexcludedduetoalackofinformation.2Forthoseprogrammeswithsufficientinformation,weconsultedthebusinesscases,logframes,annualreviewsandanycommissionedimpactevaluationsandresearchreportsthatprovidedinformationonprogrammeperformance.

Alongsideitsinvestmentsthroughcountryprogrammesthatexplicitlytargetedimprovementsinthelandsector,DFIDdirectssubstantialresourcesthroughinvestmentfacilitiesestablishedtodevelopinfrastructureandcommercialagriculture.Becauseoftheseprogrammes’

2 Forafewprogrammes,relevantdocumentationwasnotavailableforsearchesonDFID’sDevTrackerorQuestdatabases.ADFIDmemberofstaffkindlyassistedwithsearchesonQuestwhenwecouldnotlocatedocumentationonDevTracker.

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Box 1: DFID’s work on land policy in recent decades

AspartofDFID’sprioritisationofrurallivelihoodissuesunderthe1997government,thedepartmentestablishedaRuralLivelihoodsAdvisoryGroupthatincludedaspecificadvisorygrouponLandTenureandPolicy.Thisgroupconvenedaseriesofworkshopsandconferencesonland,providingadvisorysupporttotheRuralLivelihoodsDivisionandDFIDcountryoffices.ItalsoworkedtoinfluencepolicyandprogrammingonlandbytheWorldBankandEU,asthemajormultilateraldonorstakingforwardworkonland.Thisworkculminatedinthe2002publicationofadraftLandPolicyPaperforconsultation,whichsetoutkeyfindingsfromexperiencesoflandreformandmaderecommendationsonwhatDFIDcoulddo(DFID2002).

After2003,DFIDscaledbackitsworkonland.Thiswasbecauseitwasthoughtthedepartmentdidnothavetheinternalcapacitytoengagebeyondacoordinatingroleandbecauseitsexperienceatthetimesuggestedthatinordertopursuepropertyrightsprogrammes,thereneededtobepoliticalconsensusforreformfromgovernmentsinitspartnercountries,whooftenhad‘strongviewsonlandtenure’(IDC2006).Apolicypaperwaseventuallypublishedin2007–BetterAccessandSecureRightsforPoorPeople–whichreaffirmedDFIDsupportfortheEUlandpolicyguidelinesithadpreviouslyhelpedtoshape,highlightedhowimprovingpoorpeople’saccesstolandwasoneofDFID’sprioritiesandsetoutitssupporttocountry-ledapproachesinthecountryprogrammesitsupported.However,itdidnotdefineanyotherambitionsortargetsinthisarea.DFIDcontinuedtoacknowledgetheimportanceofland,butthiswasmainlyexpressedthroughitspolicyon,andsupportto,agriculture(Craeynest,2009).WhileDFIDdidnotscaleupengagementonlandthroughcountryprogrammes,itcontinuedtoprovidesupportthroughmulti-lateralagencies,includingtheWorldBankandIFC,andmorelimitedsupportthroughcivilsocietyorganisations.Foradiscussionofsomeothercontextualfactors,bothwithinandoutsideDFID,thatcontributedtoashiftinfocusawayfromland,alongwithadescriptionofDFIDsupporttolandthroughtheearly2000s,seeCraeynest(2009).


sizesandtheirpotentialtoreconfigurerurallanduseintheareastheyoperate,theyinvariablyneedtoconsidertheirimpactonlandtenure.Forthisportfoliooverview,weanalysedthreeofthelargestrecipientsofDFIDfunding:GAFSP,AgDevCoandPIDG.

Thisselectionprocessproducedalistof24programmes,whichweanalysedusingalistof26questions(seeAnnex2).Forthethreeinvestmentfacilities,welookedexclusivelyathowtheydealtwithlandintheirinvestmentapproaches.

Limitations of this reportTheaimofthisreportistolookacrossawiderangeofprogrammesratherthanexploreanyofthemindepth.AsweagreedwithDFIDtorestricttheprogrammedocumentstothethoseDFIDusestoapproveandmanageprogrammesanddidnottalktoanyprogrammestaff,wedidnotgainadeepinsightintotherangeofissuesanyparticularprogrammeworkson,orhowwelltheyperformed.Discussionofperformanceisbasedonthefindingsofannualreviewsandevaluationreports,andhencethisreportdoesnotevaluate,score,ormakespecificrecommendationsforindividualprogrammes.

Infutureyears,weaimtobuildonthisgroundworkandreviewspecificgroupsofprogrammesandissuesinmoredepth.Wealsohopetoprovideamoredetaileddiscussionofprogrammeperformance,somethingthisreviewhastouched

upononlylightly.Section6.4discussesideasforfuturereviewsinmoredepth.

Report structureTherestofthereportisstructuredasfollows:

• Thefollowingsectionprovidesadescriptionoftheprogrammeswelookedatandintroducestheircoreaimsandapproaches.

• Section3presentsdetailedfindingsfromouranalysisofhowprogrammesaredesignedandhowtheyareperforming,aswellastheriskscommonlyfacedbyprogrammesworkingonlandandhowtheydealwiththem.

• Section4looksatthemainresultsofouranalysisofhowwellprogrammesareperformingandwhatfindingsemergefrombothcompleteandongoingprogrammes.Thisincludesadiscussionaboutwhatprogrammeshavefoundworkswellforpromotingandsecuringwomen’slandrights.

• Section5discussesfindingsfromouranalysisonhowthreeinvestmentfacilitiesapproachlandissues.

• Section6discussesgapsinourfindingsresultingfromacombinationofthelimitationsoftheapproachtakeninthisportfoliooverviewanddifficultiesinfindinginformationonprogrammes.

• ConclusionsarepresentedinSection7.

Figure 1: Review methodology: defining the analytical framework and selecting programmes

Thissectionprovidesasnapshotoftheprogrammesanalysedinthisportfolioreview3.ItincludesDFID’sprogrammesknowntotarget,orwhichhaveamajorcomponenton,strengtheninglandrightsand/orimprovinglandgovernanceorlanduse.Itintroducessomeofthemaincharacteristicsoftheportfolioincludingthenumber,variationanddistributionofprogrammes.Italsocategorisesprogrammesbytheirapproach.

2.1 Programmes covered in this portfolio reviewTheportfoliocanbesplitintotwobroadcategoriesofprogrammes:thosethathavelandgovernanceasamainfocus–‘corelandprogrammes’4–andthosewithadifferentorbroaderonethatincludesasubstantiallandcomponent,eitheronstrengtheninglandtenureorimprovinglandgovernance.

Table1listsall24programmesusingthiscategorisation,alongwiththethreeinvestmentfacilitiesincludedinthisreview.FurtherdetailsoftheseprogrammesanddescriptionsofwhattheyaimtoachievearepresentedbelowandinAnnex2.ThetableexcludessomeofprogrammesontheoriginallistprovidedbyDFID.Thereasonsfortheirexclusionarediscussedattheendofthissection.

2.2 Status of programmes in the portfolioOfthe24programmesconsideredinthisreview,18areongoingandsixhaveclosed.AsFigure2shows,therehasbeenasteadyriseofprogrammessince2008,withseveralnewonesstartingeachyear.Theexpansioninthenumberofprogrammesworkingonlandappearstoresultfromacombinationofongoinginterestinlandissuesintheforestsector,andgrowingattentiontotheinterfacebetweenrurallandgovernanceandagriculturalgrowth.Themedianprogrammelengthforprogrammesisfouryearsandthreemonths.Thelongest-runningprogrammesaretheIndia

KUSPprogrammeandglobalFGMCprogramme(both11+years),theMozambiqueCLUFprogramme(8+years)andtheNigeriaGEMS3programme(8+years).AllbutthreeofthecurrentprogrammeswillhavecompletedbyMarch2019.However,moreprogrammesareexpectedtostartbeforethen,inlinewithDFID’sintentiontoscaleupitsworkonland:sixhavestartedsince2014.

2.3 Portfolio value

Core land programmesTheoverallvalueoftheeightongoingprogrammesthattargetthelandsectorisaround£142million.5ThelargestprogrammeintheportfolioistheEthiopiaLIFTprogramme(withabudgetof£66.7millionoversixyearsandninemonths).ThenextlargestistheongoingRwandaLTRSPprogramme(withabudgetof£26.5million,ofwhich90%hasbeenspent),followedbythenewcentrally-managedumbrellaLEGENDprogramme(c.£20million).Fundingforthenewly-startedMozambiqueMOLAprogrammeis£15.5million,whichexpandstheended£7millionCLUFprogramme;theotherthreecorelandprogrammeshaveavalueofbetween£3.7millionand£5.3million.

Other programmes

Informationonfundinggoingtolandcomponentsandactivitiesisnotavailableforthemajorityofotherprogrammes.ThethreeexceptionswherethevalueofthelandcomponentareknownaretheGEMSComponent3(£14.6million),COPE(£1.74million)andICFprogrammes(£1.6million).6Althoughitisknownthatallotherprogrammeshaveasubstantiallandcomponent,ithasnotbeenpossibletoestimatethevalueofthisforeachcase.However,informationonprogrammeoutputsandoutcomessuggeststhiscouldbeconsiderableforsomeprogrammes.Forexample,landtenurereformisoneoffourmainoutcomesofthe£160millionForest

3 Asdiscussedintheintroduction,althoughthisreviewcapturesalargesampleofthoseprogrammesthatworkonland,thereareothersthatarenotincludedhere.Thislistwillbeextendedasmoreinformationiscapturedonotherprogrammes.

4 ProgrammesarenotformallycategorisedaslandprogrammesbyDFID.Wehaveincludedinthiscategorythoseprogrammeswithoutcomestatementsintheirlogframethatspecificallytargetbetterlandgovernance.

5 DFIDfundingtotherecentlyclosedCLUFprogrammewas£7million.Thisisnotincludedinthe£142millionfigureabove.

6 TheGEMS3AnnualReviewpresentsspendingonlandseparately.ThisinformationonthelandcomponentsintheCOPEandICFprogrammeswascollectedthroughinternalDFIDrequestsinMarch2015.

12 LEGEND Report

2. The DFID land portfolio at a glance


Governance, Markets and Climateprogramme,andtheprogrammededicatessubstantialresourcestoworkonlandgovernance.7Figure4presentsbudgetinformationforotherprogrammes.

7 Theindicativebudgetinthe2015addendumfortheFGMCPindicatedthatforGhanaalone,£1.5millionwasearmarkedforsupportonlandtenuregovernancefortheperiod2015-2018.

Table 1: Programmes included in this portfolio review

Project/Activity name Country/Region

Core land programmes

1 Community Land Use Fund (ended 2014) Mozambique

2 Improving governance of Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry in Indonesia (ended 2015) Indonesia

3 Land Investment for Transformation (LIFT) – Wealth Creation Programme (ongoing) Ethiopia

4 Land: Enhancing Governance for Economic Development (LEGEND) (ongoing) Global and multi-country

5 Mozambique Land Action (MOLA) (ongoing) Mozambique

6 Rwanda Land Tenure Regularisation Programme (ongoing) Rwanda

7 Support for the Implementation of the Voluntary Guidelines on Land Tenure (ongoing) Global and multi-country

8 Tanzania Land Programme (ongoing) Tanzania

9 Urban Land Reform – Urban LandMark (ended 2012) South Africa

Programmes with a substantial land component

10 Creating Opportunities for the Poor and Excluded in Bangladesh (COPE) (ongoing) Bangladesh

11 Degraded Land Mapping for Kalimantan and Papua provinces (ended 2015) Indonesia

12 Forest Governance, Markets and Climate Programme 15 countries; DFID leads in Ghana, Guyana, Indonesia and Liberia

13 Forestry Land Use and Governance in Indonesia (ongoing) Indonesia

14 Global Legal Empowerment Initiative (ended 2014) Uganda, Liberia and Mozambique

15 Growth and Employment in States Programme (GEMS) Component 3 (ongoing) Nigeria

16 Investment Climate Facility for Africa (ongoing) Africa

17 Madhya Pradesh Urban Infrastructure Investment Project (MPUIIP) (ongoing) India

18 Madhya Pradesh Urban Services for the Poor (MPUSP) (ended 2013) India

19 Multi-Stakeholder Forestry Programme – Nepal (ongoing) Nepal

20 Sport Relief 2012 – UK Aid Match – Slums (ongoing) Africa

21 Support Programme for Urban Reforms in Bihar (ongoing) India

22 Support to National Policies for Urban Poverty Reduction (SNPUPR) (ongoing) India

23 West Bengal: Kolkata Urban Services for the Poor (KUSP) (ongoing) India

24 Improving the livelihood of 6000 women in the DRC DR Congo

Investment facilities

25 Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme (GAFSP) Global (multiple countries)

26 AgDevCo Africa (multiple countries)

27 Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG) Global (multiple countries)

Figure 3: Value of DFID’s core land programmes

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70

Urban Land Reform- Urban Land Mark

Support for the Implementation of the Voluntary Guidelines onLand Tenure (VGGT)

Tanzania Land Programme

Community Land Use Fund

MOLA (Mozambique Land Action)

Land: Enhancing Governance for Economic Development(LEGEND)

Rwanda Land Tenure Regularisation Programme

Land Investment for Transformation (LIFT)- Wealth CreationProgramme

£ (Millions)

Source: The figures presented are taken from DFID’s DevTracker website.

NB: The values presented in the chart are DFID’s contributions as reported on DevTracker and not the overall value of the programmes, some

of which also receive funding from other development partners.

14 LEGEND Report

Figure 2: Implementation status of different programmes in the portfolio

Jan 2004

Aug 2004

Feb 2005

Sep 2005

Mar 2006

Oct 2006

May 2007

Nov 2007

Jun 2008

Dec 2008

Jul 2009

Jan 2010

Aug 2010

Mar 2011

Sep 2011

Apr 2012

Oct 2012

May 2013

Nov 2013

Jun 2014

Dec 2014

Jul 2015

Feb 2016

Aug 2016

Mar 2017

Sep 2017

Apr 2018

Oct 2018

May 2019

Dec 2019

Jun 2020

Jan 2021

West Bengal: Kolkata Urban Services for the Poor (KUSP)

Urban Land Mark

Community Land Use Fund

Madhya Pradesh Urban Services for the Poor (MPUSP)

Growth and Employment in States Programme (GEMS) Component 3

Support to National Policies for Urban Poverty Reduction (SNPUPR)

Support Programme for Urban Reforms in Bihar


Forest Governance, Markets and Climate Programme

Mullti-Stakeholders Forestry Programme

Global Legal Empowerment Initiative

Improving governance of Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry in Indonesia

Degraded Land Mapping for Kalimantan and Papua provinces

Madhya Pradesh Urban Infrastructure Investment Project (MPUIIP)

Improving livelihoods for 6,000 marginalised women in DRC

Creating Opportunities for the Poor and Excluded in Bangladesh (COPE)

Support for the Implementation of the Voluntary Guidelines on Land Tenure

Land Investment for Transformation Programme (LIFT)

Tanzania Land Programme (LTSP)

Land: Enhancing Governance for Economic Development (LEGEND)

Investments in Forests and Sustainable Land Use

Forest Land Use and Governance in Indonesia

Mozambique Land Action (MOLA)

Source: The start and end dates presented are taken from DFID’s DevTracker website.

NB: Grey bars show programmes that are complete as of December 2015 (marked with a red line). See Annex 3 for a full-size reproduction of

this graph


2.4 Programme approachesTheprogrammesintheportfoliocanbelooselycategorisedintogroupsaccordingtotheirrationalefortargetinglandandthemaincharacteristicsoftheirapproach.

1. Land titling and land administration strengthening programmesTheseprogrammestargetimprovementsinlandgovernanceacrossaregionorcountrythroughprocessesofregularisationandformalregistrationoftenure(generallyinvolvingmappingandadjudicationoflandrights,andissuingofdocumentation)andstrengtheningofnationallandadministrationinstitutions.Becausetheyoperateacrossregionsorcountries,theseprogrammesfocusmostlyonrurallandandbeneficiaries,althoughsomealsoincludeurbansettlements(e.g.RwandaLTRSP).Themaincounterpartsoftheseprogrammesarecentralgovernmentagencies.However,localcivilsocietyandprivatesectormayplayimportantrolesaspartnersinprogrammedelivery.Theprogrammesthatfallintothiscategoryinclude:

• TheEthiopiaLIFTprogramme,whichprovidesfundingthroughaserviceprovidertocarryoutadjudicationandtitlingoflandinthehighlandsregionsofEthiopia.

• TheRwandaLTRSPprogramme.Thefirstphaseofthisprogrammeprovidedfundsthroughanexternalservice

providertocarryoutsystematiclandadjudicationandtitlingacrossthewholeofRwandaandstrengthenthenationallandadministration.AnextensiontotheprogrammeprovidedadditionalfundstotheGovernmentofRwandatostrengthenthecapacityofnationallandadministrationinstitutionsanddeliveryservices,especiallyatthedistrictlevel.

• TheMozambiqueCLUFand,now,MOLAprogrammes.TheCLUFprogrammeworkedwithcommunitiestodelimitcommunitylandboundaries,setupnaturalresourcecommitteestobetterstewardresources,andreduceconflict.Theprogrammealsoaimedtoincentiviseprivateinvestmentsbybothlocalsandoutsideinvestors,whowouldpartnerwithlocalcommunities.

• TheTanzaniaLTSPprogramme,whichaimstoimprovetransparencyinTanzania’slandsectorbycarryingoutlandtenureregularisationintwodistrictsandestablishingamulti-stakeholderforumtoimproveinformation-sharingandconsultationaroundpressingissues,includinglarge-scalelandacquisitions.

• TheNigeriaGEMSprogramme(Component3),whichfundsaworkstreamonsystematiclandtitlingandregistration,aspartofabroaderagendatomakeimprovementsinthebusinessenvironment.

Figure 4: Value of other programmes in the portfolio

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160


Investment Climate Facility for Africa

Multi-Stakeholder Forestry Programme - Nepal

Sport Relief 2012 - UK Aid Match - Slums



Comic Relief Programme Partnership Arrangement




Investments in Forests and Sustainable Land Use



£ (Millions)Whole programme budget Land component (confirmed)

Source: The figures presented are taken from DFID’s DevTracker website.

NB: There is no OECD DAC category for spending on land-related activities. Therefore, disaggregating programme spending on land would

require separate in-depth analysis of each programme’s budget, which would be difficult and time-consuming.

Theprogrammesaboveareallimplementedthroughmulti-year,in-countryprogrammesmanagedbyDFIDcountryoffices,ofteninpartnershipwithotherdonors.DFIDalsofundstwomultilateralagenciestoimplementprogrammesthatsharethebroaderaimsofimprovingnationallandgovernance.Unliketheprogrammesabove,theyworkacrossmultiplecountriesandtheirengagementisshorterinlengthandmorefocusedinscope.ThesearetheFAO-implementedSupport for the Implementation of the Voluntary Guidelines on Land Tenure,and–undertheLEGENDumbrellaprogramme–theWorldBank’sworkonimprovinglandgovernance.8Thisprogrammeproducescountry-leddiagnosesoflandgovernance,usingtheLandGovernanceAssessmentFramework(LGAF)tool,andalsodevelopsdatasourcesandnationalcapacitiesformonitoringlandgovernance.

2. Forest programmes that include a focus on landtenure issuesThiscategoryincludesforestprogrammesthatworkonlandtenureissuesaspartofastrategytoreducedeforestationandcarbonemissions,alongsidepromotingeconomicdevelopment.

• ThelargestprogrammeinthiscategoryistheForestGovernance, Markets and Climateprogramme,whichworksinmultipledevelopingcountriesandaimstoreducedeforestationthroughmarketandgovernancereformsthatalsobenefitthepoor.Itfundsgranteesandserviceprovidersineachcountry,whoworktogetherwiththecivilsocietyandgovernmenttoimproveforestgovernance.Oneofthemainprogrammeoutcomesistoadvanceadoptionandimplementationofpro-poorlandtenurereformsatnationallevel,especiallyforLiberia,Ghana,RepublicofCongo,CameroonandIndonesia.

• ThreeprogrammesinIndonesiaaddresslanduseandtenureissuesonforestland.9The(now-ended)DegradedLand Mapping for Kalimantan and Papua provincesprogrammeaimedtodirectinvestmentsinoilpalmontodegradedlandandfostersocially-equitableproduction.Itexploredgovernancequestionsaroundhowtograntaccesstosuitablelands,andthefeasibilityofcarryingout‘landswaps’ofHighConservationValueforestsforareasofdegradedland.TheImproving Governanceof Land UseprogrammeinIndonesiaaimstoworkinapolitically-informedwaytoimproverecognitionofcommunitylandrightsandtheruleoflawonlanduseinfourprovinces.TheForest Land Use and Governanceprogrammeworkswithgovernmenttoimprovespatialplanning,withcivilsocietytoimprovegovernance,andwithbusinessestodrivetheadoptionofsustainableand

responsiblebusinesspracticesandreducesocialconflictsassociatedwithlanddisputes.

• TheNepalMulti-stakeholder Forestry Programmesetsupandstrengthensforestusergroups,whichhelpspoorandvulnerablehouseholdsgainaccesstovaluableforestland.Itbroadlyaimstomaketheforestrysectorcontributetoeconomicgrowth,povertyreductionandtacklingclimatechange.

3. Programmes that target land as part of broaderreforms to improve the business climate

Theseprogrammesaimtotackleaspectsoflandgovernanceandadministrationprimarilybecausetheyinhibitanenablinginvestmentenvironment.TheNigeriaGEMS3programmeaimstoreducethoseconstraintsthatespeciallyaffectthepoor,whichincludeland,taxandinvestment.ItsupportstheLandReformProgrammeoftheNigerianGovernmentinprovidinglandtitlesecurityandeconomicempowermentforthemajorityofNigerians.ThissupportseekstoincreasethenumberofregisteredlandtitlesinNigeria.Italsoaimstosimplifytheprocessoflandadministrationandmakeitmoretransparentbyreducingthenumberofdiscretionaryprocesses.Theapproachinvolves,inter alia,developmentofasystematiclandregistrationtoolkittosupportstandardisedlandtitlingandregistration.TheICFAfricaprogrammeaimstoimprovethebusinessenvironmenttothebenefitofallbusinesses.Asignificantportionofitsportfoliohasbeendevotedtoinvestmentstoimprovepropertyrights,whichinvolvereducingthetimebusinessesneedtoregisterland.

4. Urban programmes that work with localgovernment to improve services and lives in slumsTheseprogrammes–whichareclusteredinSouthAsia–workwithlocalgovernmenttoprovidebetteraccesstobasicservicesforslum-dwellers.Almostallaimtoimproveaccesstowaterandsanitationandtrytostrengthentenuresecurityasameanstoachievethis;somealsoaimtoimprovetenuresecurityintheirownright.Programmesinthiscategoryinclude:

• ThenationalSNPUPRprogramme • TheSPURprogrammeinBihar • TheKUSPprogrammeinKolkata • TheMPUIIPprogrammeinMadhyaPradesh • TheMPUSPprogrammeinMadhyaPradesh

Twoadditionalprogrammesintheportfoliotargeturbanlandbut,becausetheirapproachesaredissimilartoothers,thesefitintotheirowncategories:

8 Thisprogrammeofactivitiesissupportedthroughtheprogramme‘Improvinglandgovernancethroughgreatertransparencyandaccountability’.DFIDfundsthisprogrammethroughaWorldBankmulti-donortrustfundcalled‘LandPoliciesforGrowthandPovertyReduction’

9 Someoftheseprogrammesalsoworkonagriculturalissuese.g.treecropsonagriculturalland.

16 LEGEND Report


• Urban LandMark (South Africa).LikeseveraloftheprogrammesinIndia,the(completed)Urban LandMarkprogrammeinSouthAfricaaimedtoimprovesecureaccesstowell-locatedlandfortheurbanpoor.Italsoworkedwithgovernmentauthorities,butactedmoreinaresearchandfacilitationroleanddidnotimplementactivitiesdirectly.Throughtargetedinterventionsaimedatbuildingcapacityinmunicipalitiesandimprovingpoliciesatthecityandnationallevel,itaimedtomakeurbanhousingmarketsworkbetterforthepoor.

• The Sports Relief Urban Slum Initiative.ThisprogrammeisfundedthroughpartnershipsbetweenUKandlocalNGOsinslumsinSouthAfrica,SierraLeone,LiberiaandUgandatoimproveaccesstobasicservicesandstrengthensecurityoftenure.Theinitiativehas17multi-yeargrantsincludingthreeinCapeTown,fourinLusaka,fiveinFreetownandfiveinKampala.

5. Programmes targeting support at the poorest andvulnerable groups

• The Global Legal Empowerment Programme(GLEP)aimedtostrengthenlandtenurethroughalegalempowermentapproach.Itsetupanetworkofparalegalsandprovidedtrainingforparalegalstoempowerlocalcommunitiestodefendtheirlandrights,alongsideotherentitlements.

• TheCOPEprogrammeinBangladeshtargetedthepoorestandmostvulnerablegroups,aimingtoimprovebothaccesstobasicservicesandstrongerpoliticalrepresentation.Itaimedtoensurethatgovernmentlandthatwasearmarkedfordistributionstothepoorwasactuallyallocatedandtransferredtothem.WhileitsapproachtotargetingthepoorestandmostvulnerablewassimilartotheGLEPprogramme,itdifferedbyusingwell-establishedlocalNGOstoimplementitsactivities.

• The improving livelihoods for 6000 women in the DRCprogrammeaimstoprovide6,000socially-excludedwomeninSouthKivu,DRCwithaholistictrainingprogrammethatwillenablethemtounderstandtheirrights,gainagriculturalskills,accesslandandcredit,andincreaseincomes.Itwillcontributetocreatinganenablingenvironmentforwomenbytraining1,500maleleadersonwomen’srightsandstrategiestofacilitatetheserights,andbyplacingwomen’srighttoaccesslandonDRC’sdevelopmentagendaviaresearchandadvocacy.

Inadditiontotheseprogrammes,theLEGENDprogrammecomprisesanumberofsub-programmesandactivitiesthatsupportbothglobalandbilateralworkon

improvinglandgovernanceandlayingthegroundworkforresponsibleinvestmentinland.

2.5 Geographic distribution of programmesThedistributionofprogrammesintersectspositivelywithcountries’DFIDpriorities;apartfromIndonesia,allprogrammesare,orwereinDFID’sprioritycountries(Figure5).DFIDisalsoplanningprogrammesformoreofitsprioritycountries,includingtheOccupiedPalestinianTerritoriesandSierraLeone.

Figure 5: Geographic distribution of programmes by country

0123456789

Figure 6: Programmes categorised by different types of land

Urban26%

Rural26%Forest

18%

Unspecified30%

2.6 Types of land coveredTheportfolioincludesprogrammesthatworkspecificallyonrural,forestandurbanland(Figure6).Thereisacleargeographicalsplitintypesoflandprogramme,withmostprogrammesfocusedonrurallandinAfricancountries,urbanlandusemainlyinIndia,10andforestlandinIndonesia.11

2.7 Delivery partners Themostcommonimplementingpartnersacrossalltypesoflandprogrammesarenationalgovernmentsandlocalgovernments/authorities;onlyasmallnumberofprogrammes,suchasCOPE,GLEIandLULUCF,workthroughnationalCBOsorNGOs.Reasonsforthisincludetheneedtoequiplocalgovernmentsandinstitutionswiththecapacityandabilitytomaintainprogrammeoutputsaftertheprogrammehascometoanend.Forurbanprogrammes,allmainimplementingpartnersaregovernmentsandlocalmunicipalities(e.g.programmesinIndiaandUrban LandMarkinSouthAfrica).

2.8 DFID-supported investment facilities

AGDEVCO

AgDevCoinvestsin57agriculturalenterprisesinfivecountriesinsub-SaharanAfrica.Establishedasadevelopmentcompanyin2009,itisinvolvedinearlystagedevelopmentofagriculturalenterprises,fromwhichitaimstoexitoncecompaniesareestablished.Theaimsofitsinvestmentsaretocreatejobsinthebeneficiaryenterprisesandraiseproductionoftheiroutgrowers,eitherbybringinginnewfarmersorbyraisingproductionofthosealreadyworkingwiththecompany.Acrossitsinvestees,AgDevCoaimstoexpandthetotalirrigatedareasby34,370hectares.Theseplansdonotnecessarilyrequireconsolidationoflandholdingsortransfersoflandoutofthehandsofexistingoccupiers.However,bystimulatingchangesinproductionthatwilllikelyraisetheuseandvalueofland,theactivitiesoftheseprojectsareexpectedtointroducenewpressuresonland.12OneofAgDevCo’slargestinvesteesistheGhanaGreenfieldsprojectthatinvestsintwoirrigationschemesinBabatorandtheTonoDaminNorthernGhana.

PIDG

ThePrivateInfrastructureDevelopmentGroup(PIDG)isagroupofcompaniesthatinvestininfrastructureprogrammesindevelopingcountries.Ithaseightsubsidiarymembers:GuarantCo,InfracoAsia,InfraCoAfrica,InfraCo,DevCo,theEmergingAfricaInfrastructureFund(EAIF),theInfrastructureCrisisFacility–DebtPoolandAfricaGreenPower.ItalsohasaTechnicalAssistanceFacilitythatbothpoolsfundsandprovidestechnicaladvicetocompaniestodevelopandimplementriskmitigationandotheractivitiesthatenablethemtoraisemoneyfromcapitalmarkets.ThemaintoolstheTechnicalAdvisoryFacilityusestodothisaresecondingofadvisors,carryingouttrainingandlonger-termtechnicalassistance.

FivePIDGsubsidiarieshaverecentlymadeinvestmentsinprogrammesthatworkinsectorswherelandissuesareprominent,includingagri-infrastructure,urbandevelopmentandhousing.Figure7presents18identifiedprojectsworkinginthesesectors,rankedbysize.

In2013,around4.5%ofthefundsheldbyPIDGwereintheagri-infrastructuresector.Ofthis:

• EAIFinvestmentsinagri-infrastructureamountedto$31.3million.ThiswentintotheAddaxBioenergy’sirrigatedsugarcaneprojectinSierraLeone.

• InfraCoAsiainvestmentsinagri-investmentsare$4.4millionacrosstwoprojectsinIndia($2.0million)andCambodia($2.2million)(PIDG2015).

• InfraCoAfricainvestmentsincludetwoirrigationprojectsinZambia.

• ICF-DPcumulativeinvestmentsinagri-investmentsamounttoUS$27.7M(PIDG2015).ThisfundingwentintotheAddaxBioenergyprojectinSierraLeone.

PIDGcompaniesalsoinvestintheurbandevelopmentandhousingsector.Theseinvestmentsarealsolikelytofaceissuesoflandgovernanceonaregularbasis.ImportantprojectsintheportfolioincludetheICF-DPandGuarantCofundingoftheAckrutiCitySlumRedevelopmentinIndia($30millionand$20millionrespectively),GuarrantCo’sfundingoftheKumarUrbanDevelopmentSlumRedevelopmentProject($15million)andDevCo’sfundingoftheOdishaAffordableHousinginBerhampurcityinIndia($480,000).

10 WiththeexceptionofUrbanLandMarkinSouthAfrica

11 WiththeexceptionoftheMulti Stakeholder Forestry ProgrammeinNepal12 Forfinancialreasons,someofAgDevCo’sinvesteesmayonlybeabletoworkwithfarmersthathavelandholdingsaboveacertainthresholdthattheycan

planttocommercialcrops.Forexample,the2015AnnualReviewofAgDevConotesthatTanzanianinvesteeRACwillstarttochangeitspolicytoacceptonlynewavocadooutgrowerswithfivehectaresofland.Thismayplacepressureonhopefulparticipantstoattempttogainaccesstomorelandfromwithinthecommunity.

18 LEGEND Report


GAFSPTheGlobalAgricultureandFoodSecurityProgramme(GAFSP)isaWorldBank-managedmulti-donortrustfund.AsofNovember2015,DFIDhascommittedtocontribute£136million,representingaround17%ofthetotalprogrammevalue.Theprogrammeissplitbetweenapublicandprivatesectorwindow;DFID’sfirsttrancheof£12.5millionwenttothepublicsectorwindowin2012/13,andithassincedisbursed£63.5milliontotheprivatesectorwindow.Thepublicsectorwindowcurrentlyprovides$913millionto32projectsin25countries.

TheIFCsupervisestheprivatesectorwindow,whichprovidesconcessionalfinancetotalling$72.7millionto16investmentsinagribusinesscompaniesoperatingin12

countries.TheIFCalsoprovidesloansandguaranteesatcommercialrates,aswellasadvisorysupporttoprojects.

GAFSPhasadedicatedindicatoronlandrightsunderoutput4ofthelogframe,whichistoimprovemanagementofrisksandincreaseresiliencetoshocksthataffectfoodsecurity.13Twopublicsectorwindowprogrammescontributetothisoutput:theLivestockandAgricultureMarketingProgrammeinMongoliaandtheSmallholderCommercialisationPrograminSierraLeone.

Fewofthe19investmentsmadethroughtheprivatesectorwindowappeartohavedirectlinkstotheproductionstage.ExceptionsincludeinvesteesinvolvedintheproductionoffruitcropsinMalawi,BhutanandEthiopia:mostotherinvestmentsfocusonimprovinglendingthroughbanks,andimprovingstorageandprocessing.

13 Theindicatorinthequestionis“Numberoftargetpopulationwithuseorownershiprightsrecorded(disaggregatedbygender)inamannerrecognizedbynationalorcustomarylaw.”Thetwootherindicatorsonthisoutputaremonitorcashtransfersandnutrition.

Figure 7: Five PIDG subsidiaries: investments in land-intensive sectorsEA

IF Addax Bioenergy (SL) Ltd (Addax), Sierra Leone

ICF-

DP Ackruti City Ltd Slum Redevelopment, India

ICF-

DP

Addax Bioenergy (SL) Limited (“Addax”), Sierra Leone

G.C

o

Fatima Fertilizer Company Ltd, Pakistan

G.C

o Ackruti City Ltd Slum Redevelopment, India

G.C

o Kumar Urban Development Ltd (KUDL) Slum Redevelopment, India

Infra

CoA

f

Chiansi Irrigation, Zambia

G.C

o Housing Finance Guarantee Africa (HFGA), SSA

Infra

Co

As Cambodia Salt Farm Development, Cambodia

Infra

Co

As

Kota Mechanised Grain Market Infrastructure Development Project, Rajasthan, India

Infra

Co

Af

Chanyanya Pilot Irrigation Project, Zambia

De

vC o Rajasthan Street Lighting, India

Dev

Co

Odisha Affordable Housing – Berhampur city, India

Infra

Co

As

Bikaner Mechanised Grain Market Infrastructure Development Project, Rajasthan,

India

Dev

Co Punjab Silos, India

Infra

Co

Af

Antara Cold Storage Project, Vietnam

De

vC o Bhubaneswar PSL – Street lighting, India

De

vC o Odisha Street Lighting Program, India

USD Millions

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35

Thissectionprovidesasummaryofourreviewofhowprogrammesaredesigned,including:

• whatgroupsprogrammestarget, • howtheyaddressissueshighlightedintheIDCandICAIreports,

• whatriskstheyidentifyandwhatmitigationstrategiestheypropose,

• howtheyusedevidence.

3.1 What issues are included in programme design?

Poverty reduction: what groups do programmes target? Almostallprogrammeswithintheportfoliohaveanexplicitobjectiveofcontributingtoreducingpoverty.Thislinkisclearestforprogrammesthathaveindicatorsattheimpactandoutcomeleveltargetingpovertyreduction,eitheracrosstheregionsinwhichtheyworkoramongspecificgroupsofbeneficiaries.Mostprogrammestargetthepoorasacategoryandaimtocontributetohigherincomes(SeeTableA4inAnnex3).Atleast14programmesalsospecificallytargetwomenintheiractivitiesandaimtomeasureimpactsonthesethroughtheirmonitoringindicators.Forexample,theNigeriaGEMS3programme–primarilyaprogrammeaimedatimprovingthebusinessclimate–aimstocontributetomorejobsandhigherincomesforwomenthroughtheirbusinessandhouseholdactivitiesaspartofeffortscreatelastingopportunitiesforthepoor.

Atleasteightprogrammesexplicitlytargetvulnerableordisadvantagedgroups.TheBangladeshCOPEprogrammeisalone14infocusingallitsactivitiesonspecificmarginalisedgroups,includingmigrantworkers,childbrides,victimsofviolenceandchildreninhazardouswork.However,otherprogrammesalsoincludemarginalisedgroupsalongsidetheincomepoor.15Forexample,theBiharSPURprogrammetargetswomeninminorityreligioncommunities,whiletheNepalMFSPtargetsabroadrangeofdisadvantagedhouseholds,includingethnicandreligiousminoritiesandclimatevulnerablehouseholds,aswellaspoorhouseholdswithlessthansixmonthsoffoodself-sufficiency.

Forasmallsubsetoftwoprogrammes,thelinkstopovertyreductionarelessclear.WhiletheInvestment Climate Facility for Africaprogrammehasa‘supergoal’ofreducingpoverty,thereisnospecificindicatorthatlinksDFID’scontributionwithpovertyreductionwithincountriesoramonggroups.Similarly,fortheDegraded Land Mappingprogramme,thelinkstopovertyreductionarenotexplicit.16

What approaches do programmes use to benefit the poor?Mostlandprogrammesaimtoraiseincomesofpoorhouseholdsthroughstrengtheningtheirlandtenuresecurity.Thisisalsotrueforanumberofurbanprogrammeswhoseimpactoroutcomestatementsincludeimprovingthesecurityoftenure(e.g.theIndiaKUSPandSPURprogrammes).LargerrurallandprogrammessuchasEthiopiaLIFTandNigeriaGEMS3plancomplementaryactivitiestoimprovefunctioningofruralmarkets,therebyensuringhouseholdshavebetteraccesstoinputandoutputmarkets.Theseandotherruralprogrammesalsostrengthencommunitylandrights,alongsideprovidingtrainingandsupporttomakecommunitymanagementofresourcesasourceofsustainableincomeforcommunitymembers.Anumberofurbanprogrammes(e.g.SportsReliefandMPUIIP)alsoaimtostrengthenlandrightsaspartofapackageofinterventionsthatimprovehouseholds’accesstobasicservicesincludinghousing,waterandsanitation.Severalprogrammesinbothurbanandruralareasaimtoimproveaccesstolandalongsideaccesstocredit:theIndiaMPUIIPprogrammeaimstoprovidegreaterfinancialsecurityfromlandforpoorpeople,whiletheRwandaLTRSPprogrammealsoexpectedthatstrongerlandrightsforpoorbeneficiarieswouldhelpthemaccesscreditmoreeasily.Twoprogrammesarereliantonotherpathwaystoimproveconditionsforthepoor:theIndonesiaFLAGprogrammeaimstoreducethenumberofland-basedconflictsandtheBangladeshCOPEprogrammeaimstostrengthencommunities’abilitiestoacquirelandthegovernmenthassetasideforredistributiontothepoorbutisyettodistribute.Thesmallnumberofprogrammesthatworkwithbusinesses(e.g.DLM)aimtogetthemtoadoptresponsiblebusinesspractices.

14 Otherprogrammesmayalsotargetatthislevelofspecificitybutdonotmakethisexplicitintheirlogframe

15 COPEdocumentationexplicitlystatesthattheprogrammeswill“directly target the most poor and marginalised people [which include the poor, women, Dalits, religious and ethnic minorities, working children and people with disabilities] in Bangladesh, aiming to equip them with access to basic services and social safety nets, and access to khas land”.

16 AnexplanationforthelackofalinktopovertyreductionisthatDFID’sIndonesiaprogrammeisfocusedentirelyonclimatechangeanddoesnotoperateapovertyportfolio(Indonesiacountrystaffpers.comm.).

20 LEGEND Report

3. Programme designs


How does the portfolio address women’s land rights?

Inrecentyears,DFIDhasincreaseditsfocusonpositiveoutcomesforwomenandgirlsandhasmadeimprovingaccesstolandaprioritywithinthis(SeeBox2).Inaddition,theIDC’s2015reportonJobsandLivelihoodsrecommendsthatDFID“stresstheimportanceofsupportingwomeninbusinessandgivingthemthesameaccesstolandrightsasmen”(IDC,2015).

Most,butnotall,programmesintheportfoliohaveclearcommitmentstoimprovingthepositionofwomen.TheDRC Improving livelihoods for 6000 womenprogrammeistheonlyonewhollytargetedatstrengtheningwomen’slandrightsandusesdifferentapproachesforwomenindifferentsocialcircumstances,e.g.marriedwomen,widowsandfemale-headedhouseholds.Amongotherprogrammes,thosethathavestartedmorerecentlytendtobemoreexplicitinhowtheyaddresswomen’slandrights:forexample,FLAGandMOLAexplicitlyrefertotheInternationalDevelopment(GenderEquality)Act2014intheirbusinessplansandhaveprioritisedgenderequalityintheirprogrammeapproaches.

Severallandprogrammesalsoincludeastrongfocusonstrengtheningwomen’slandrightsaspartofruralorurbantitlingactivities.Securingwomen’saccesstolandwascentraltotheRwandaLTRSPprogramme,whilethelandregularisation(LTR)processitselfwasmanyordinaryRwandans’firstexposuretotherealitiesofthecountry’sprogressiveequalityagenda.Underthelaw,marriedcoupleshaveequalrightstothelandandshareownership50:50.AttheendofLTR,thepercentageoflandclaimedbymarriedcoupleswas83%,with10%ownedbyasinglefemaleand5%ownedbyasinglemale.Rwanda’sGenderMonitoringofficeconcludedthat‘Thelandregistrationprocessisa

positivemechanismtoimprovegenderequality’,althoughitnotestherearestillchallenges,includingsomecouplesnotbeingawareofhowimportantthecertificatesareandissuesarisingwithco-habitationoutsideofmarriage.Programmedocumentationalsocautionsthatstrengtheningwomen’srightstolandwilltaketime,statingthat‘[to]properlytrackthegenderimplicationsoftheregistrationprocessandtheimpactofsubsequenttransfer,itwillbeseveralyearsbeforethisindicatorisimpactedbytransfers’.17

Someotherearlierprogrammeshavenotgivensufficientattentiontogenderissuesandhavehistoricallyfailedtodisaggregatedataandimpactsonthestatusofwomen.18However,thishasbeennotedinsubsequentreviewssuggestingcorrectiveaction.Reviewsofseveralforestprogrammes,includingMFSPandLULUCF,indicatethatalthoughtheprogrammeshaveimprovedrepresentationofwomen,theyneedtomakespecialprovisionstohelpthemengagemoremeaningfullyatdecision-makinglevels.Forexample,genderguidelineswerepreparedbytheIndependentReviewTeamfornewgrantsundertheFCGPprogrammeand,subsequently,grantholdershavebeenencouragedtofocusandreportongender.WhereasthefirstphaseoftheLULUCFprogrammedidnotdisaggregatereportingaccordingtogender,thiswasintroducedintothesecondphase.AnexampleofstepsaprogrammehastakentoensuregenderissuesarelocallyrelevantisgivenbytheFGMCprogramme,whichundertookresearchtobetterunderstandthehumanrightsimplicationsofcustomarylawforwomenrelatingtolandtenureineachofitscountries.This,inturn,ledtocapacitybuildingspecificallyaimedatrespondingtotheneedsofwomen,dialogueandadvocacythroughlegalchannelstoaddressgenderdiscrimination,andapromotionofequityincustomarylaw.

17 DFID(2015)AnnualreviewforRwanda.

18 Forexample,theNepalMFSP2013annualreviewnotesthat,bynotreportingonsuccessfulgenderoutcomes,theprogrammedoesa“disservicetotheextensiveworkthatisbeingundertakenatthegrass-rootslevelinbuildingvoicetoholdotherstoaccount”.

Box 2: DFID’s prioritisation of land issues for women and girls

The UK’s International Development (Gender Equality) Act of 2014requiresDFIDtoconsiderifalldevelopmentandhumanitarianassistancewillreducepovertyinawaythatcontributestoreducinggenderinequality.DFIDimplementstheActbyrequiringallbusinesscasesfornewfundingtodemonstrateeitherhowtheprogrammewillcontributetoreducinggenderinequalityorthatgenderisnotrelevanttotheprogrammeifitdoesnot.

DFID’s Strategic Vision (2011) outlinedthecriticalimportanceofcreatingan‘enablingenvironment’toensurethatgirlsandwomengaindirectaccessto,andcontrolover,economicassets.Withinalandgovernancecontext,thisincludes:

• Programmes supporting land reform and inheritance rights to secure women’s rights to own and use property. • Supporting initiatives to give women and girls the skills, confidence and networks that will help them to keep

hold of their economic assets and make productive use of them.

CommitmenttothesegoalswasreiteratedintheDFID’smostrecentAnnualReport2014/2015(DFID2015c),whichmentionstheneedtoscaleupprogrammesthatimprovethesecurityoflandtenurerightsindevelopingcountries,particularlyforwomenandgirls.

How do programmes fit within country priorities and with other country programmes? SeveralrecentindependentreportsstressthatDFIDprogrammesshouldbeclearlylinkedtoDFID’scountryprioritiesanditsothercountryprogrammes.ItisnotedinICAI’s(2015a)reportonDFID’sapproachtodeliveringimpactthatDFIDstrugglestobuildcoherentportfoliosatacountrylevel,whilethereisaneedforcloselinkagesbetweencentrally-managedandcountryprogrammeswheretheseoperateinthesameareas.ThisisalsoarecommendationfromICAI’sreportonBusinessinDevelopment(ICAI2015b).Finally,ICAI’s(2014a)reportonthePrivateSectorDevelopmentWorknotestheneedforclearlinkagesbetweenprogrammes19andDFID’soverallcountryobjectives.

DescriptionsinbusinesscasessuggestthatintendedimpactsareinlinewithbothDFIDcountryobjectivesandsectorstrategicpriorities(wheretheseexist).Thisismostevidentinnewerprogrammesandpartlyattributabletothenewbusinesscaseformatthatrequiresmoreexplicitstatementsoflinkagesbetweenprogrammeandhigherorderobjectives.However,linksarealsoclearinolderprogrammes.Forexample,oneofDFIDIndia’sstrategicobjectivesistoharnesstheprivatesectorfordevelopmentinIndia’spooreststatesandimprovethelivesofpoorwomenandgirlsinparticular.Thefiveurbanprogrammesservebothaims,meetingspecificcommitmentsinDFIDIndia’sOperationalPlan(2011-2015).Theyaimtoincreasethenumberofpoorpeoplewithcleandrinkingwaterandsanitation,promotepublic-privatepartnershipinpro-poorurbaninfrastructure,raisemorecityrevenues(e.g.propertytax),andhelppoorpeopleobtainsecurityoftenure,betterlivingconditionsandabetterdealfromkeypublicservices.

How do programmes approach climate change? ICAI’s(2014b)reportontheICFcommendstheapproachoftheEthiopiaLIFTprogrammeoflinkingworkonclimate

changetoitslandprogramme,andmorebroadlycallsforcloserlinkagesbetweenclimateworkandbilateralprogrammes.

Forestprogrammesintheportfoliohavetheclearestlinktomitigatingclimatechangethroughavoideddeforestationand,inseveralcases,helpingcommunitiesadaptbyimprovingtheireconomicreturnsfromforestry.Forexample,FLAGrecogniseshowtheprogrammewill‘alsocontributetopovertyreductioninanumberofways:forest-dependentcommunitiesdirectlyaffectedbylanduseandforestrywillbenefitfrombetterrecognitionoftheirrightsandmoreequitablebenefit-sharingarrangements;thepoorthroughoutIndonesiawillbenefitfrombettergovernanceandmoresustainabledevelopment;andthepoorthroughouttheworldwillbenefitfromreducedemissionsastheeffectsofclimatechangewillbemitigated’(c2012businesscase).TheNepalMSFPbusinesscasearguesthatifprogrammesseektobringaboutbetterforestmanagementpractices,thiscanleadtoreducedclimatechangeimpactsonmicro-climatesandwatersheds,whilethelivelihoodopportunitiesreducecommunities’relianceonsubsistenceagriculturewhichwillbecomeincreasinglyvulnerableunderclimatechange.

OnlytwoprogrammesintheportfoliohaveclimatecomponentsthatwillreceivefundingfromICF:FLAGandMOLA(discussedbelow),withtheTanzaniaLTSPprogrammealsoinvestigatingaccessingICFfundsforfuturework.Otherwise,thereislittlementionofhowtheICFisinvolvedinprogrammedesign,monitoringorfuturework.DLMwasevaluatedagainsttheICFindicatorswithinthemonitoringandevaluationreview.Thisnotedthat:

‘There is no embedding in the programme document with regards to climate change plan/ strategy. However, there are partial specific measures to address climate change identified in the programme and climate risk evaluation and reduction measures are integrated into planning’ (DLM2014AnnualReview).

19 Atpresent,mostPSDprogrammesarecentrally-managed.

22 LEGEND Report

Box 3: Are links between land programmes and higher level country and sector strategies clear and well-articulated?

Linksbetweenprogrammesandcountryandsectorstrategiesarewell-articulatedinmostprogrammebusinesscases,especiallyrecentprogrammes,whichfollowthenewbusinesscaseformat.New(post-2014)programmesrefertohowtheywillsupportimplementationofDFID’sfourpartnershipprinciplesandallfivepillarsofDFID’snewEconomicDevelopmentStrategicFramework.Certainprogrammesrefertoothercurrentpriorities;forexample,theMOLAbusinesscasereferstotheG8transparencycommitmentandtheFLAGbusinesscasediscussestheprogramme’slinktothe‘GoldenThread’.Inaddition,newerprogrammesexplicitlyrefertotheInternationalDevelopment(GenderEquality)Act2014andtheneedtosafeguardwomen’srightsinthecontextoflandpolicyandlegislation,aspartoftheDFIDVisionforWomenandGirls.OlderprogrammesrefermorefrequentlytoUKcommitmentsontheMDGs.ClimatefocusedprogrammesclearlystatehowtheirinterventionswillalsohelpdeliverUKgovernment’sInternationalClimateFinance(ICF)commitmentand‘FutureFit’”.ItisthereforepossibletomakelinksbetweenprogrammesandthehigherlevelprioritiesofDFIDatthetimetheprogrammesweredesigned.Ithasnotbeenpossiblewithinthescopeofthisreviewtoassessifprogrammeshavechangedhowtheyworkoradaptedtheirmonitoringwhennewprioritiesemerge.


Severalofthecorelandprogrammeshaveactivitiesthataddressclimatechangemitigationoradaptationmoredirectly.TheTanzaniaLTSPprogrammeseekstoincludeclimatechangeandresilienceinnationalandlocallanduseplanningproceduresandpolicies.MozambiqueCLUFandthefollow-onMOLAprogrammeseeterritorialandlanduseplanningasameanstoreducevulnerabilitytoclimatechangeandseektolinkimprovedlandmanagementpracticestoaccesstoclimatefunds.TheprogrammewillreceivefundingfromtheICFtocarryoutadaptationplansinmunicipalitiesanddistricts.Asdiscussedabove,theEthiopiaLIFTprogrammehassetoutclearlinkswithclimatechangemitigationandundertakesitsownstudiesonhowtoensureprogrammeactivitiescontributetoadaptation.Italsocollaborateswithotherinitiativesworkinginthisarea.Otherlandprogrammes(RwandaLTRSPandNigeriaGEMS3),alongwithurbanprogrammes,approachclimatechangemainlyintermsofarisktoprogrammedelivery,ratherthandiscussinghowprogrammeactivitiesactivelyaddressclimatechangemitigationoradaptation.

3.2 Risks faced and mitigation approaches Howwellprogrammesidentifyrelevantrisksandmitigatethemisimportantfortheirsuccess.ICAI’s(2015a)reportonDFID’sapproachtodeliveringimpactnotesthatcountryprogrammesshouldcontinuouslymonitorrelevantrisksandreportontheseinannualreviews.Italsorecommendsthatprogrammesshouldbeupfrontaboutanypoliticalriskstheyfacethatmayaffecttheirabilitytodeliveroverthelongterm.AsimilarrecommendationismadeinICAI’s(2014a)reportonprivatesectordevelopment,whichnotestheneedforprogrammestorecognisedifferencesinpoliticalsettingsacrosscountriesthatmayaffectdelivery.

Overall,theportfolioprogrammeshaveanaverageriskratingof‘medium’.Therearethreeprogrammesratedashighrisk:NepalMSFP,EthiopiaLIFTandMOLA,thelattertwoofwhichbeganin2015.Ingeneral,programmeshavedescribedrisksusingcleardefinitionsandsetoutriskmitigationstrategiesthatappearappropriate.TheEthiopiaLIFTbusinesscaseprovidesanexcellentexampleofariskmatrixthatenumeratesalargenumber(36)ofdifferentrisksindifferentcategoriesandclearlysetsouthowitproposestomitigatetheserisks.Aswellasmitigationmeasures,theNigeriaGEMS3programmealsohasawell-developedriskmatrixinplace,whichincludesalistofcontingencyoptions.Theriskmatricesofotherprogrammesarelesssophisticatedbutappearadequate,asauthorsofannualreviewshavemadechangestotheseinonlyafewinstances.

Inonlyasmallnumberofprogrammes,isitobviousthatkeyriskshavebeenmissed.AlthoughtheDLMprogrammeidentified(ultimatelycorrectly)thattheprivatesectormaynotbuyintotheconceptofalandswap,itdidnotincludeacorrespondingriskforlackofinterest

fromthegovernment.Poorunderstandingofprogrammeobjectivesbybothprojectpartnersand,insomecases,alsoprogrammestaffiscommontoseveralprogrammes:theannualreviewoftheNepalMFSPprogrammenotedthatalackoftheoreticalunderstandingofwhattheprogrammeisdoingbyprogrammepartnersledtoactionsbeingdisconnectedandpoortrackingofresults.Otherprogrammeshaveidentifiedrisksrelatedtopoorunderstandingandperformanceinadvanceandaimedtoovercomethesebychoosingspecificpartnerstoworkwith(e.g.LULUCFandMOLA)orbyretainingsomeinfluenceoverstaffing(e.g.SPUR).

Thefollowingparagraphsdiscusscommonrisksthatprogrammesrecogniseandincludeintheirriskmatricesunderdifferentcategoryheadings.

Political RiskThedocumentationreviewedsuggeststhatmostlandprogrammesarehighlysensitivetopoliticalchanges.Allprogrammesincludepoliticalriskintheirriskmatrices.Commonpoliticalrisksinclude:

• programmedelaysduetoelectionsorpoliticalinstability, • changeingovernmentalstructureand/orinstitutions, • highturnoverofpolicymakers,and • alackofbuy-infromgovernments,orlimitedengagementandresistancefromlocalleaders.

Themostcommonoverallriskscitedarepoliticalinstabilityandobstruction.Forexample,intheCOPEprogramme,politicalunrestinBangladeshatthestartof2015limitedtheabilitytoworkcloselywithgovernmentofficials,especiallyonlandissues.ThedeterioratingpoliticalsituationinNepal(MSFP),causedbytheconstitutionalcrisis,alsoforcedtheprogrammetochangeitsworkplan.TheRwandaLTRSPprogrammeanticipatedpoliticalobstructionfrommayorswhofearedlandregularisationwouldgetinthewayofdevelopmentinitiatives.

Documentationforseveralprogrammesalsorecognisestherisktoprogrammetimelinesthatelectionscause,whicheitherdelaysorundoprogressmadethroughreformprogrammes.Forexample,workonreforminglandlawsinGuyanaundertheFGCMprogrammewasseverelydelayedduringaprotractednationalelection.InIndonesia,forestprogrammesanticipatedanewgovernmentwouldbelesscommittedtoreducingdeforestationandlessenpoliticalsupportfortheobjectivesoftheFLAGprogramme.Conflictinprogrammesitesandtargetareashasalsobeenidentified,specifically,acrossforestlandprogrammesasariskfactorforprogrammeresults.DocumentationfortheFGMCprogrammedescribesthesituationinIndonesiaasonewhere‘landandresourceconflictsarebecomingamajorsourceoflethalviolenceandtherearenogoodmechanismsforresolvingthem’.TheEthiopiaLIFTbusinesscasehighlightstheriskofpoliticalcaptureoftheprogramme,

inthiscaseofpartycadreshijackingthelandregistrationprogrammeanddistributinglandtorewardpartymembers.

Theapproachesprogrammesusetomitigatepoliticalriskincludeseekingpoliticalbuy-infromacrosspoliticalconstituencies(especiallybeforeelections),carryingoutpublicawarenessraisingcampaignstoreducetheriskofprogrammesbeingcancelledandcarryingoutinstitutionalmappingbeforeprogrammeactivitiesstart.TheNigeriaGEMS3programmeoffersanexampleofamitigationapproachtoanticipateddisruptionstoprogrammeactivitiesduringelections.Whencreatingtheprogramme,staffrecognisedtherisksofprojectdelaysanddesignedtheworkplansothattheleastsensitiveactivitieswouldtakeplaceduringthesetimes.Also,acknowledgingthatitwouldnotbepossibletoobtaintheapprovalsneededfromhigh-levelofficialstostartprogrammeactivitiesduringtheelections,theprogrammemadesuresignaturemachinescouldbeusedasaninterimsolution.

Social RisksThesocialrisksthatprogrammesidentifyandseektomitigateincludefurthermarginalisingvulnerablegroups,excludingthesegroupsfrombenefitsandexacerbatingtensionsoverland.Programmesthatworkinforestareasrecognisetheriskthatprogrammesfacilitatinglandacquisitionscouldleadtolossoflandrightsforindigenousgroups.ProgrammesthatidentifythepotentialnegativeimpactsoftheiractivitiesincludetheAfricaregionICFprogrammeandtwourbanprogrammesinIndia(MPUIPandSPUR).Thecorelandprogrammesrecognisethatlandadjudicationanddemarcationcanposeriskstotherightsofvulnerablegroups,andtheyincludemeasurestomitigatetheseriskswhendesigningtheirprogrammes.

Fewotherprogrammesincludeontheirriskregistersthedangerofhouseholdslosinglandasaresultofprogrammeactivities.OnecasedemonstratingthatthisriskisrelevantisanannualreviewfortheNepalMSFPprogramme,whichnotesthat–inthecontextofprogrammeeffortstoreclaimforestlandthroughtheproceduresformanagementofpublicland–secondandthirdgenerationresidentshavebeentermed‘encroachers’andendedupbeingresettledwithnosafeguardsorrightofappealinplace.Thismeansthattheprogrammerisksbeingcomplicitinremovinglegitimatelandholdersfromforestareas.

Optionstomitigatesocialrisksincludecarryingoutsocialriskassessmentsbeforeprogrammeactivitiesstarttoensurethattheprogrammeactionsdonotcontributetoexclusionofcertaingroups.Insomecases,suchastheKUSPprogramme,thisincludesseekingassurancesfromgovernmentcounterpartsthatlargeurbanisationprogrammeswillactivelyseektoincludeallgroupsinprogrammeactivities.Italsomeansconfirmingthat,intheeventofanyresettlement,thegovernmentwillguaranteelivingstandardsareatleastasgoodasthosethathouseholdspreviouslyenjoyed.Allofthelandprogrammeshavehiredindividualsorteamstoexclusivelymonitor

socialrisksthatprogrammesmaycause.Forexample,theRwandaLTRSP,NigeriaGEMS3andEthiopiaLIFTprogrammeshaddedicatedteamswithintheprogrammemanagementwhoadvisedonsocialrisksandcollectedmonitoringdatatoassessimpactsofinterventionsonvulnerablegroups.ThisapproachisalsobeingadoptedintheMOLAandTanzaniaLTSPprogrammes.

Climate and Environment risksAnumberofprogrammesidentifyclimateandenvironmentrisksanddetailtheseintheirriskmatrix,alongsidemitigatingactions.TheMozambiqueMOLAprogrammeprovidesagoodexampleofhowclimateeventsmaydirectlyandindirectlycompromisetheprogramme.Directrisksincluderestrictedaccesstofieldsitesduetofloods,whichmayalsomaskboundariesanddisplacefarmers.Inaddition,droughtsmayexacerbateexistingtensionsoverlandandassociatedresources,compromisingworkunderwaytodefinebordersofcommunityland.Morebroadly,adverseclimaticconditionsmayleadthegovernmenttodivertfundsthatstaffintendedfortheprogrammetodealwithshorttermclimate-relateddisasters.TheMOLAprogrammeaimstoreducetheimpactofclimateandenvironmentalthreatsthroughterritorialplanning,landuseplanningandraisingawarenessofenvironmentalrisksinbeneficiarycommunities.IndianprogrammesKUSPandSPURimplementlanduseplanningandregulationtominimiserisksfromsevereclimaticevents.Anumberofprogrammeshavebeenaffectedbyclimaticeventsandotherdisastersduringimplementationthatwerenotforeseenattheprogrammedesignstage.Several,suchasthoseinBangladesh,DRCandMozambique,arelocatedinflood-pronecountriesandfloodingisarelativelycommoncauseofdelaystoprogrammeactivities.Innoneoftheprogrammesreviewedhaveeventsfatallyimpededprogrammedelivery;inmostcases,theimpacthasbeenrelativelyminorandprogrammeshavebeenabletoadjusttheiractivitiestoensurethattheimpactoftheshockontheprogrammeisminimal.Forexample,intheDRC Improving livelihoods for 6000 womenprogramme,floodspostponedtrainingactivities;however,itwasabletoadjustitstrainingprogrammeonlandrightsandincludedthisaspartofitstraininginformationonhowtoreducevulnerability.

Risks of fraud and corruption ICAI’sreportonDFID’sapproachtoanti-corruptionanditsimpactonthepoor(ICAI2014c)notesthatmanyprogrammesarenotupfrontaboutaddressingcorruption,whichaffectsboththeenvironmentstheyoperateinandtheprogrammesthemselves.Thisincludesaddressingformsofeverydaycorruptionexperiencedbythepoor,suchasinlandadministrationservices.

Bothlandandnon-landprogrammesrecognisethatcorruptionisariskfactorandincludethiswithintheirbusinesscaseandriskmatrix.Ingeneral,however,the

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focusoncorruptionismuchmoreembeddedinforestprogrammesthanitisforcorelandprogrammesorthosefocusingonurbanareas.SeveraloftheforestprogrammesinIndonesiahaveincludedastronganti-corruptioncomponentincorporatingsafeguardsintohowprogrammesaremanaged.Theriskofcorruptioninthesectorishighbecauseoflong-standingtiesbetweencompaniesandelites,alongwithlocalgovernmentauthorities’abuseofpowerbyissuinglicensesandpermitstoconvertforestareastoplantations,loggingorminingconcessions.Measurestominimisecorruptionincluderegularmonitoring,spotchecksandworkingtransparently;forexample,theIndonesiaFLAGprogrammemonitorsthereportingofcrimesrelatedtoforestuse,includingcorruption-relatedoffensesandsupportingnationalactiontotacklecorruption.

Thereislessfocusonlandcorruptioninurbanandcorelandprogrammes.However,thereareexceptions;the(urban)BangladeshCOPEprogrammebothacknowledgesandaimstoaddresscorruptioninadministrationandserviceprovision.Itdoessobyenablingcitizenstoholdserviceproviderstoaccount,buildingonexperiencesshowinghow,ifhouseholdschallengepettycorruption,thisreducestheneedtopaybribesforbasicservices.Meanwhile,theprogrammeriskmatrixforEthiopiaLIFTincludestwocorruption-relatedrisksandhasfivemitigationmeasurestolimitcorruption.Theseincludesimplifyingproceduresforlandregistrationandadministrationtoreduceopportunitiesforcorruptionandmanipulationbyindividuals.Likeothernewerprogrammes,italsocollectsdataoncorruptionaspartoftheprojectmonitoringprocess;inthiscase,theprogrammeestablishedacomplaintsproceduretoencouragewhistleblowingandchecksoncitizens’concernsregardingcorruptionaspartoftheM&Esystem.MOLA’sapproachofdeliveringequipmentandsupporttolocalgovernmentviathirdpartiesinaChallengeFundarrangementreducestherisksofcorruption,aslocalauthoritieshavetodemonstrateperformanceimprovementsinordertoaccessfurtherfunds.Inthisway,landprogrammescanmakeimportantcontributionstotransparencyandgenerateinformationthatcitizenscanusetoholdgovernmentstoaccount.

3.3 Use of evidence during programme design and implementationThereviewprocessconsideredwhattypesofevidencebusinesscasesuseandhowtheyuseit.Whilerecognisingthatbusinesscasesneedtopresentaclearly-arguedrationaleforpursuingtheselectedoptionandcannot

extensivelydiscussthestrengthoftheevidenceunderpinningtheintervention,thereisalsoaneedtoensuretheexpectationfortheprogramme’ssuccessareinlinewithexistingevidence.

Theuseoftheevidencetounderpinbusinesscaseshasbeenimprovedinrecentyears.Thisisinlinewiththehigheremphasisplacedonevidencebythenewbusinesscaseformat.However,acrossprogrammes,theuseandusageofevidenceisfairlymixed.Somebusinesscasesincludemultiplereferencestofindingsfromacademicstudiesandusethesetosubstantiatetheirmainassertionsortoprovideassuranceonthemainassumptionsoftheircost-benefitanalysesorotherformsofrationale.Inothercases,theuseofevidenceissparser.

Presumablybecauseofalackofevidencecomingfromthejurisdictionwhereprogrammesplantowork,businesscasesoftenciteevidencefromothercountriesorsettings.Giventheimportantdifferencesinthecontextandinthecontentsof‘interventions’indifferentcountries,itisquestionablewhetherevidencefromonecountry(especiallyifinadifferentregion)canbeusedtosubstantiateexpectationsofsimilarbenefitsinanother,withoutconsiderablecaution.Forexample,severalbusinesscasescitepositiveevidencefromtitlinginEthiopiaasevidenceofhowstrengtheningpropertyrightsmaybringaboutimprovementsinotherAfricancountries.AsEthiopianfindingsappeartobestrongerthanforothercountries,20itmaybeoverambitioustoexpectprogrammeselsewheretoexperienceeffectsofthesamemagnitudeasinEthiopia.

Newprogrammesthatareextensionsofearlierprogrammesdowellindrawingonfindingsfromthelatter.Forexample,theMOLAbusinesscasedrawsonlessonsfromtheindependentevaluationoftheearlierMozambiqueCLUFprogrammetoinformitsoveralldesignandexpectationsaboutrisks,ashastheextensionoftheRwandaLTRSPprogramme.Apotentialshortcomingofthisapproachisifthedesignphasedoesnotadequatelyconsiderevidencefromelsewhereandreflectthisinalternativeoptionstoproposefortheprogramme–theMOLAbusinesscasereferstolittleevidencebeyondfindingsonthepreviousintervention,whichraisesthequestionofwhetherlessonsfromelsewherewereconsideredduringprogrammedesign.

20 TheDFID-fundedsystematicreview(Lawryetal.2014)onthelinkagesbetweenlandpropertyinterventionsandagriculturalproductivitysuggeststhismaybeduetothefacttheEthiopianprogrammesofthe1990sweredesignedspecificallytoquelldisputesarisingfrompreviousstate-ledlandredistributionprogrammesandalsobenefitedfromsubstantialinvestmentsfromcentralgovernment;thesesameconditionsdonotalwaysexistinothercountries.

Inrecentyears,DFIDhascommissionedseveralpiecesofresearchthataggregateandsynthesisefindingsacrosstheevidencethatexistsonlandtenurerightsanddevelopmentoutcomes.Thisincludesasystematicreview,anevidencepaper,atopicguideandanumberofrapidevidenceappraisals(Lawryetal.(2014),DFID(2014)LockeandHenley(2014)).Itissuggestedthatwhere

country-specificfindingsarenotavailable,authorsofbusinesscasesshouldrefertoDFID’sTopicGuideonLandandotherthematically-focusedstudies(e.g.,onlandandgender)whendesigningprogrammes.Thiswouldensureexpectationsandrisksarewellunderstoodbyallinvolvedinprogrammeapproval,oversightanddelivery.

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4.1 Performance of completed and ongoing programmes Thissectionreviewshowwellprogrammesperform.Asdiscussedinsection2,six21programmeshavebeencompletedandthereforehavedocumentstodescribewhethertheywereabletomeettheirtargets;forotherprogrammes,annualreviewsgiveasenseoftheirprogress.

Overall progress of programmes against their workplansReviewssuggestthatprogrammesaregenerallyperformingwellagainsttheirplans.ThemostrecentscoresforprogrammesarepresentedinTableA6,andshowthatmostprogrammeshavescoresof‘A’oraboveontheirlandcomponents,meaningprogrammeperformanceisinlinewithorbetterthanexpectations.

However,annualreviewsoftendescribeperformanceovertimeasirregular:programmesfrequentlystruggletoachieveresultsintheearlyyearsbecauselayingthegroundworkofchangingrulesandpracticesandgatheringbuy-incantakemoretimethananticipated.Forlandregistrationactivities,rolloutofregistrationcantakeplacemorequicklyoncethebasicprocessesareinplace.Forexample,theNigeriaGEMS3programmedidnotdelivertotargetinitsfirstfewyearsandwasputonaperformanceimprovementplan.Sincethen,ithasmadeimpressiveprogressinitslandactivitiesandsurpassedalmostallitstargets(GEMS32014AnnualReview).Similarly,theMozambiqueCLUFprogrammetooklongertogetstarted,withathirdofthelanddemarcationsandhalftheplanneddelimitationstakingplaceduringtheextensionphase.However,bytheendoftheprogrammetimeline,ithadexceededitslanddemarcationtargets(EDG,2014).Inasmallnumberofcases,theoppositehasoccurredandearlyprogresshasnotbeensustained:althoughtheCOPEprogrammeinBangladeshhassucceededingettingsomepubliclanddistributedtopoorhouseholds—andexceededearlierannualtargets—alackofprogressinthelastyearmeantitmetonly60%ofitstarget,withthelatestannual

review(2015)suggestingitscalebackitsambitionbecauseitwasunlikelytomeetitstargets.

Changesinthepoliticalcontextpresentaleadingreasonfordelayandthisissomethingallprogrammesworkingonlandarehighlysensitiveto.Inseveralcases,programmeswithalandcomponenthavenotbeenabletomakeprogressonalandagendabecauseofalackofpoliticaltraction.Forexample,fortheIndiaMPUIIPprogramme,thetargetoflandtenuresecurityfortheurbanpoorcouldnotbeachievedduetofailureonthepartoftheGovernmenttoimplementanactofparliament.22OtherurbanprogrammesinIndia(e.g.SNPURB)havealsofaceddifficultyinmovingforward,duetoalackofcoordinationbetweenthetwokeyministries.Thishasweakenedthescopeforinclusivedevelopmentatthelocallevelandreducedthelocalcapacitiesforpoverty-focusedreformanddevelopment.Thisexamplereinforcestheneedforprogrammestoconsidertheimpactsofpoliticalchangesonprogrammedeliveryandcontemplatemitigationstrategies,asdiscussedinSection3.2.

Theslowprogressoflandactivitiespotentiallycreatesachallengeforprogrammespursuingbroaderobjectives,whichmayrevisetheirambitionsandresourcesonlandprogrammesandfocusonbetterperformingareas.Severaloftheurbanprogrammeshavestruggledtostrengthenthelandrightsofthefullnumberofbeneficiariesoriginallyanticipated.Forexample,theIndiaMPUIIPprogrammeoriginallymeanttoincreasethenumberofwomenwithaccesstofixedassetssuchashousingandlandtenurethroughpolicyreformsandcommunitylevelengagements.However,progressagainstthisindicatorwassignificantlybelowexpectation.Theannualreviewoftheprogrammesubsequentlycalledforittobedropped,withabriefexplanationthat‘ensuringpropertyrightsisdifficultandcallsforlong-termengagement’(MPUIIPAnnualReview2013).

Similarly,attemptstoreformlandlawsthroughtheglobalForestGovernanceMarketsandClimateprogrammehavebeensignificantlydelayedinmostofitstargetcountries.The

21 TheseareMozambiqueCLUF,SouthAfricaULM;IndonesiaDLM,GlobalGLEI,IndiaMPUSPandRwandaLTRSP.SummariesfromeachcompletedprogrammearepresentedinAnnex2.

22 TheactinquestionistheMadyaPradeshPattaAct.

4. Programme results: impact and ongoing performance

latestannualreview(2014)foundthatoutofeightcountriesanalysed,Liberiawastheonlyonewhereprogresshadbeenmade,withthenewLandLawexpectedtobringsignificantchangestolandallocation,givingcommunitiesformalpropertyrightsoverforestedlandandprogramme-supportedpartnerssucceedinginsecuringfundingfromtheMinistryofFinanceforacommunitybenefittrust.Inothercountries,progressonlandreformremainssloworisbeingdevelopedbehindcloseddoors.Toreinvigoratetheseprocessesandencouragegreatertransparency,programmepartnersinGhana,RepublicofCongo,CameroonandIndonesiaareconveninganddraftingpositionpaperstoprogressdialogueontenurereform.Thissuggeststhat,whileitmaybemorepoliticallypalatabletobundleacomponentonimprovinglandgovernancetogetherwithabroaderprogramme,itneedstoberecognisedthattheemphasisthisreceivesmaydiminishovertimeandtheremaybepressuretomoveresourcesandfocusawayfromlandcomponentstowardsbetterperformingprogrammeactivities.

Successes and challenges in registering land and improving land administrationWhereprogrammeshavebeensuccessfulinregisteringland,theyhavealsobeenabletodoitinaninclusivewaythathasstrengthenedlandrightsattheindividualorcommunitylevel.TheRwandaLTRSPprogrammehasbeenwidelypraisedinrecentyearsforitsachievementofcarryingoutacountrywidelandregistrationexercise.Theexperiencedemonstratedthatitispossibletodeliveralargeandsocially-inclusivesystematictitlingexercisewithoutincurringhighcostsorlongdelays.Thiswaspossibleinpartbecauseoftheprogramme’scarefuldesignandhighdegreeofflexibilityonceimplementationhadbegun.ThisenabledtheserviceprovidertochangetheprogrammeinresponsetorequestsfromthegovernmentofRwanda.Thehighdegreeofflexibilityalsomadeitpossibletoincorporatefeedbackfromtheprogramme’sperformanceintoongoingimplementation.InthecaseoftheMozambiqueCLUFprogramme,theapproachofcombiningdemarcationofcommunitylandwitheffortstoimprovesustainableuseofforestsandothernaturalresourceshasprovedtobeasuccessfulmeansofdemonstratingthebenefitsofstrengtheninglandrights.Theprogrammeevaluationfoundthatthiscombinationofinterventionswassuccessfulbecause,byestablishingnaturalresourcemanagementcommittees,communitymembersbetterunderstoodthevalueofregisteringtheirlandinordertodefendtheirrightsandbargainoveraccess.Thiscombinationofactivitiesprovided‘notonlyagreatersenseofsecurityandconfidence[forcommunitymembers]’,butalsoenabledthemto‘manageandnegotiatenaturalresourcesmoresensibly,induetime’(EDG2014).

However,landprogrammescontinuetofacechallengesinimprovinglandadministrationandneedtoconsiderlong-termsustainabilityoflandadministrationfromtheoutset.WhiletheRwandaLTRSPprogramme’sprogress

ontitlinglandwasimpressive,itsworkonstrengtheningthelandadministrationincurredsignificantdelaysandunderperformedagainsttargetsthroughouttheprogramme’slifetime,asthiscomponentdidnotreceiveadequateattentionattheoutset(LTRSPAnnualReview2015).Themodernisationandexpansionofthelandadministration–necessaryformeetingthehigherlevelofdemandassociatedwithmoredocument-basedtransactions–hasnotoccurredonthescaleneeded.Thisgapthreatenstojeopardisetheimpressivegainsmadebytheregistrationcomponentoftheprogramme.Effortstoimprovelandadministrationhavesufferedfromalackofattentiontocollectingdataandusingmanagementapproaches,aswellasreluctancewithinthelandadministrationservicestoreformexistinginstitutionalstructuresandpractices(LTRSPAnnualReview2015).Theannualreviewof2014foundthat:‘Thelackoftakeupofregisteringtransferisthesinglegreatestrisktothewholeprogramme,andrecordedtransfersareatleastanorderofmagnitudebelowwhattheyshouldbe.’Toovercomethesechallengesandencouragehouseholdstoregistertransactions,theprogrammesoughttoreducefeesowedbyruralhouseholdsforcompletingtransactions.However,furtherimprovementstotheadministrationareneeded,whichthenewprogrammeseekstoimplement.Similarly,whileprogressonlanddemarcationanddatacollectiononparcelshasbeenimpressiveintheNigeriaGEMS3programme,progressinimprovingadministrationhasbeenslowerandpresentsachallenge.The2014annualreviewfindsthat

‘while the project has succeeded in supporting demarcation of 21,787 parcels of land and record gathering for 13,946 parcels… … no certificates of occupancy have yet been signed off by State authorities. So while GEMS 3 is exceeding its output targets, [the link between] Systematic Land Titling & Registration and greater security of land tenure rights and improved business opportunities remains unproven’ (Nigeria GEMS 3 Annual Review, 2014)

Thesefindingssuggestthatitiscriticalforthosedesigningprogrammestoensurelong-termsustainabilityoflandadministrationisbuiltintoprogrammedesign.If,duringimplementationactivitiestoimprovelandadministration,theseprogrammeschronicallyunderperform,managersshouldtakecorrectiveactionratherthanwaituntillandregistrationisatanadvancedstage.

Someoftheurbanprogrammeshavemadeimprovementsinservicedeliveryaroundlandregistrationandmayholdlessonsforadministrationreformselsewhere.TheMPUSPprogrammewashighlysuccessfulinitseffortstodevelopcitizen-centricgovernance,whichledtolargereductionsinthewaitingtimesforkeydocuments,includingbuildingpermitsandlandrecords.Morebroadly,urbanprogrammesinIndiahavestrengthenedlandrightsbyprovidingtitles,leadingtodevelopmentalbenefitstotheurbanpoorinthe

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areastheyworkin.Theyhavecreatednewinstitutionstoattractinvestmentsandstrengthenedcapacityofurbanadministrationdepartmentsandurbanlocalbodies.Theyhavealsosupportedreformsoflandandplanninglawstostrengthenlong-termsecurityoftenureforpoorergroups.Forexample,theKUSPprogrammesupportedamendingtheTenancyActinKolkataandlobbiedforthedelistingofcertainareasasslums,whichenablednearly28,000slumdwellerstoconstructtheirownhouses.Whilethesesuccessfulprogrammeapproachesareprobablymosttransferrabletourbanlandprogrammes,theirapproachestostrengtheninginstitutionalprocessesandservicedeliverymayalsoholdbroaderlessonsforlandadministrationreforms.

Effectiveness of approachesA handful of the completed programmes have earned recognition because their innovative designs have worked well. TheevaluationsoftheSouthAfricaULMandtheglobalGLEIprogrammesareparticularlypositive,commendingprogrammesforboththesuccessoftheinnovativeapproachestakenandthequalityoftheoutputs.Bothprogrammeshighlightthescopeforprogrammestobenefitbytakingmeasuredrisksonnewapproaches.ThemajorachievementoftheSouthAfricaULMprogrammewasitsabilitytoinfluencetheapproachesthatnationallandinstitutionsandlocalurbanmunicipalitiesusedtoimprovelandmarketsandhousinginpoorinformalsettlements.FollowingULM’spilotingofthe‘incrementaltenuresecurityimprovement’methodologyinthreesettlements,themethodologywasappliedthroughNationalUpgradingProgrammein49municipalitiesacrossSouthAfrica.GLEI’sprogrammeofpromotinglegalempowermentthroughparalegalsasanapproachtostrengthentherightstolandofpoorandvulnerablepeoplewasseentobehighlysuccessful.Thiswasduetobothitsapplicabilityacrossarangeofcountriesandsuccessesinimprovingrightsofwomenparticularly.

Althoughtherearefewdocumentedexamplesofprogrammesthathavetakenunsuccessfulapproaches,thereisoneimportantlessonthatemergesfromtheIndonesiaDLMprogrammeforthoseaimingtochangebehaviourofbusinessestoachievebetterlandgovernance:aspartofwhattheprogrammecompletionreportdescribesasanapproachtooreliantontechnicalfeasibility,23theprogrammebuiltsomesupportforitsproposedideaoflandswaps,butdidnotbuildacasethatcouldconvinceandsecurebuy-infromtopcompanyexecutives.Thisisapotentiallyimportantexample,givenDFID’songoingworkonfosteringbetterbusinesspracticesaroundresponsibleland

Other important lessons relevant for all programmesTheRwandaLTRSPandCLUFprogrammesoffercriticallessonsinareasthatarecentraltoDFID’sexistingand

futurelandprogrammes.Thisisespeciallythecaseforambitioustitlingandadministrationreformprogrammesbecause,aswellasimprovingcommunity-levelgovernanceoverruralland,itenablesthemtoattractandnegotiateoutsideinvestment.

Ensuringcoherenceexistsonpriorities,strategiesandapproachesbetweenlocalandnationalpartnersandinstitutionsinvolvedinadministeringtheprogrammeiscritical.Severalprogrammescitetheneedtoworkcloselyatalllevels,becausemanyofthereformstheyseektoimplementcannotbeachievedbyworkingatthedistrictlevelswhereactivitiesarelocated;thereisthereforeaneedtobringonboarddecision-makersattheprovincialornationallevels.ThisisthecaseforalloftheforestprogrammesworkingtoimprovelandgovernanceinIndonesia.Similarly,theGLEPprogrammehasobservedbenefitsfromgainingprovinciallevelbuy-intotheconceptoflegalempowerment,assupportatthislevelcancatalysebroaderadoptionoftheapproach.

Reviewsofseveraloftheprogrammesconfirmthatstrengtheninglandrightscontributestobroaderempowermentofpoorerpeople,whichisnotalwayscapturedinprogrammeresultschains.Specificlandregistrationprogrammessupportthelocalcommunitiestohaveasayinlandissuesthataffectthem.Forexample,FGMCsupportslocalpeopletohaveasayondecisionsaboutforestallocationandworksalongsidebeneficiariestodevelopclearlegalavenuesfordisputeresolution,whilealsoindirectlyaddressingpowerimbalances.Similarly,whiletheNepalMSFPprogrammemainlytracksempowermentintermsofjobcreationformarginalisedgroups,thereviewhasnotedthatwomen-onlyforestmanagementareasappeartobeincreasingempowermentandstatus,throughareductioningender-basedviolence(althoughmoreevidenceonthisisneeded).Whilecapturingimprovementsinempowermentarenotcommonlyusedaslogframeindicators—andmaybeseenastoocomplicatedforsomeprogrammes—itisworthnotingthatsomeempowermentdoestendtooccurintheprocessofestablishingstrongerlandrights.

Programme reviews have found several other conditions that were critical to success.Theseincludestrongownershipofthereformsinitiativebythegovernmentpartner,reformsofthebehaviourandpracticesofinstitutionsworkingonlandandpeer-to-peerlearningbetweenprogrammebeneficiaries,whichisoftensuccessfulincatalysingadoptionofnewpractices.

4.2 What works for women’s land rightsThefollowingfindingshaveemergedfromongoingandcompletedprogrammes:

23 ThetechnicaloutputsoftheprogrammeareassessedasgoodinthePCR,whichalsocommendstheweb-basedtoolstheprogrammedeveloped.

• Attemptstostrengthenwomen’slandrightsthroughlandregistrationandchangestothelawwillonlybesuccessfulifaccompaniedbychangingattitudesandpracticesonthegroundthroughawarenessraisingactivities.ThisfindingemergedfromseveralprogrammesincludingMozambiqueCLUF,RwandaLTRSP,andBangladeshCOPE.AreviewoftheMozambiqueCLUFprogrammehassuggestedthat,inmostruralareaswheretheprogrammeoperated,‘theformallegalsystem[was]weakand/orremote……[so]afocusonchangingattitudesandknowledgeonwomen’srightsandroles–ratherthansimplyonDUATs(landtitles)forwomen–ismoreimportant’.Unlessthisisrecognised,legalentitlementsmayleadtolittlechange.

• Raisinggenderissuesatcommunitylevelislikelytobemoresuccessfulifprogrammepartnersarealsoawareofgenderdiscriminationandmotivatedtoaddressthisthroughtheirdecisionsandactivities.Forexample,theMozambiqueCLUFprogrammegavegendercascadetrainingtoserviceprovidersandcivilsocietyorganisationsinvolvedinthelanddemarcation,adjudicationandregistrationprocess,whichwassuccessfulinstrengtheningtheircapacitytoaddressgenderanddiversityissuesintheirwork.Provincialmonitoringreportsandfollow-upvisitsfoundevidenceofimprovedparticipationofwomenandattentiontogenderanddiversityissueswithincommunities,attestingtothebenefitsoftakingsuchanapproach.Programmeshavealsoattemptedtoimprovegenderoutcomebyprovidinggendertrainingtootherswhosedecisionshaveanimportantinfluenceonwomen’slandrights.Forexample,theFGMCandFLAGprogrammesalsoprovidedgendertrainingtocommunityleadersandjudges.

• Ithelpstoraisecommunityawarenessofanystructuralgenderinequalityandvulnerabilityissuesearlyonandfindappropriatewaystoaddressthesebeforeproceedingwithanylandregistration.Forexample,

theRwandaLTRSPprogrammeheldpublicmeetingsonlandrightsandinheritancelaw,whichincludedchallengingsomeofthediscriminatorypracticesinplacethatmadewomen,particularlysecondwives,vulnerable.Duringthesemeetings,communitymembersandtheprogrammeteamagreedwaysthatthelandregistrationprocesscouldstrengthenclaimsofsecondwivestoland,suchasbylistingthesecondwifeonthelease.Asaresultoftheseinitiatives,bothhusbandsandwives’nameswereincludedontheclaimant’sregister,alongwiththenamesoftheirchildren.Theissueofwidows’rightswasapproachedinasimilarwaytoensurethisgroupretainedthesamerightsasmarriedwomen.Theevaluationreportstatesthepercentageoflandclaimedbymarriedcoupleswas83%,with10%beingownedbyasinglefemaleand5%beingownedbyasinglemale.

• Ensuringagenderbalanceinstaffinvolvedinallaspectsofprogrammedeliveryisimportantforgeneratingpositiveoutcomesforwomen.ThefactthathalfoftheRwandaLTRSPstaffwerewomenencouragedparticipationoffemalebeneficiariesinprogrammeactivities.NigeriaGEMS3reportsfeedbackfrombeneficiarieswhosaythatifwomenmakeuppartofthevisitingfieldteamundertakingLTRinterviews,womenaremuchmoreinclinedtoparticipateininterviews.TheDRC Improving livelihoods for 6000 womenprogrammeseekstoachievesystematicanddirectparticipationbywomen’srepresentativesinallthepolicyandlegaladvocacyworkunderpinningitsapproach.Whilechallengingtoachieveeverywhere,someprogrammessuchasMozambiqueCLUFhavealsobeensuccessfulinachievingbettergenderbalancesincommunitydecision-makingbodiesforlanduseplanningandnaturalresourcesmanagement.

• Aswellaspromotingwomen’srightstolandandmoregenderequalityacrossallprogrammeactivities,someprogrammeshavedesignedspecificcomponentsand

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Box 4: Identifying the state of gender awareness in programme interventions: MOLA’s approach

MOLAhasidentifiedawaytoexplicitlyassesswhethertheapproachespartnersusearegendersensitive.Thisapproachgroupspartners’perspectivesinthefollowingcategories,withillustrativeexamples,tohelpidentifyhowtoaddressthem:

• Gender Blind: Partnerscareaboutwomen’sissues,butintheirwork(especiallyresearchorpolicyadvocacyforopennessofinformation),theyfeelthatthereisnoconnectionwithgenderissues.

• Gender Neutral:Thepartnersgenerallyviewthatenvironmentaldamagethroughpoorforestmanagementhasthesameimpactonwomenandmen,andgirlsandboys.

• Gender Biased: anassumptionthatwomenwillautomaticallyenjoythebenefitsifthepolicyadvocacysucceedsorthatcertaintypesofworkaretoodangerousforwomen,sotheyshouldnotbeinvolved.

• Have Limited Gender Sensitivity: Somepartnersmayperpetuatestereotypesofwomen’sfemininityorgivetoolittleconsiderationtothetraditionalrolesofwomen,whichimpedestheirparticipation.

Source: MOLA (2015) Business Case


activitiestoimprovewomen’slegalandeconomicempowerment.Forexample,NigeriaGEMS3usesWomen’sEconomicEmpowerment(WEE)initiativestoincreasewomen’sawarenessoflandreformprogrammes.TheNepalMSFPprogrammehassupported‘women-only’forestareas;forexample,smallleaseholdareaswithincommunityforestsandpreliminaryfindingsshowthatthesegivewomenachanneltochallengeprocessesthatignoretheirneedsandincreasewomen’sstandingwithinhouseholdsandinthecommunity.However,theprogrammeevaluationnotesthismodelhasnotbeenwellresearchedanddeservesmoreattention.

• Wherediscriminatorycustomarypracticesseeminsurmountableintheshortterm,supportingwomen’saccesstolandthroughtheleastdiscriminatorycustomarychannelsmayprovideimprovementsonthe

statusquo.Forexample,anearlyfindingfromtheDRC Improving livelihoods for 6000 womenprogrammefoundthatstrengtheningwomen’saccesstocustomarytenuresystems(therebygrantingmorelongtermaccesstotheirhusband’sland)orthroughrentalmarketscanyieldmodestbenefitsforwomen’spositionsandlivelihoods.ThecontextofthisprogrammeistheEasternDRC,wherelocaltenuresystemsconferlandonlytomen,andwherethereisminimalcapacitytoimplementnationallawsthatpromotemorerightstowomen’sownershipofland.Thissameprogrammealsofoundthatsensitisingmenongenderissueshadtheunintendedpositiveoutcomeofmen’sgroupsbeginningtodiscussissuesaroundwomen’slandrights,violationsandabuseandtherebyplayingaroleinmediatingthese.CommunityserviceprovidersintheMozambiqueCLUFprogrammefoundsimilarresultsinsomecommunities.

Box 5: Findings from Namati on land components of their Legal Empowerment ProgrammeUndertheGLEIProgramme,Namatiproducedanevidencereviewonprotectingcommunitylandsandoutlined

thefollowingkeyfindingsonimprovingwomen’slandrights:

• Ifwell-facilitated,theprocessofdraftingandrevisingcommunityrulesforlandandnaturalresourcesmanagementmayopenupanauthenticspaceforwomenandothervulnerablegroupstoquestioncustomarynormsandpracticesthatdisadvantagethem.This,inturn,mayalsohelpthemadvocateforrulesthatstrengthentheirlandrightsandtenuresecurity.

• Legalandtechnicalfacilitatorsmayneedtotakespecialactionstoensurewomen’sactiveparticipationinprojectactivities,including:

• Carryingoutagenderanalysisandcraftingstrategiestoproactivelyaddressgenderinequitiesthatmaynegativelyimpactcommunitylanddocumentationexercises.

• Holdingcommunitylanddocumentationmeetingsattimesandlocationsthataccommodatewomen’sschedules(i.e.afterwomenhavecompletedtheirhouseandfarmwork).

• Conveningspecialwomen-onlymeetingstoidentifyissuesthataffectwomen’srightsandparticipation,empoweringwomentoaddresstheseissuesduringcommunitylanddocumentationefforts.

• Theactiveinvolvementofwomenandothervulnerablegroupsthroughoutthebylaws/constitution-draftingdebatesappearstohavestrengthenedwomen’sproceduralandsubstantiverightsintheircommunities.Communitieshaveimprovedsubstantiverightsbyadoptingprovisionstostrengthenandprotectwomen’slandrightsandmakingchangestoensurethatcommunityrulesdonotcontravenenationallaw.

• ThedatafromMozambiqueillustratestheimportanceofdraftingcommunityby-laws/constitutions.Areviewofexistingcustomarynormsandpracticeshasfoundthatmanycommunitiescurrentlyhaverulesthatundermineandcontravenewomen’sconstitutionalrights.YetbecauseMozambique’scurrentcommunitylanddelimitationprocessdoesnotmandateareviewofintra-communitygovernance,communitiesdonotrevisetheircustomstoconformtonationallaw.Suchfindingsleadtotheconclusionthatsomeprocessofcataloguing,discussingandamendingcommunityrulesiscentraltoeffortstoprotectwomen’slandclaims.

• Awell-facilitatedprocessofreviewingandamendingcustomstoalignwithnationallawshasopenedaspaceofdialogueinwhichitispossibletostrengthenwomen’sexistinglandrightswithincustomarylegalconstructs.Customaryleadersmaybeimportantalliesintheenforcementofwomen’slandrights,asthedataindicatethatcommunitiesconsidertheseleadersprimarilyresponsiblefortheprotectionofwomen’sandwidows’landrights.Customaryleadershaveindicatedthattheyareopentoshiftinglocalpracticestoalignwithnationallaws.

• Tofortifythegainsmade,communitywomenmustactivelyflextheirnewproceduralrightsandcontinuetoparticipateincommunitymeetingsconcerninglandandnaturalresources.Furtherlegalandtechnicalsupportwillalsobenecessarytoensurecontinuedenforcementofwomen’sproceduralandsubstantiverights.

5.1 Overview ThissectiondescribeshowthreeinvestmentfacilitiesthatDFIDsupportsapproachemerginglandissuesintheirinvestmentprojects.Aswiththelandprogrammes,ouranalysisoftheseprogrammesismainlybasedonthepublicly-availableDFIDprogrammedocumentation;however,wehavealsoconsultedsupplementaryinformationavailableonthewebsitesofeachentity.BecauseDFIDmonitorshowtheseentitiesperformataveryhighlevel,discussionoflandissuesreceiveslittleattentionineitherthebusinesscasesortheannualreviews.Thismeansouranalysisofhowinvestmentfacilitymanagersviewandtreatlandissuesisbasedonlimitedinformationandlikelymissessomeofwhatthesefacilitiesaredoing.Thefollowingpointsnonethelessemerge:

• Landissueshavecauseddelaystotimeframesandraisedcostsforseveralinvestments,highlightingtheneedforthoroughduediligenceonlandissuesbeforemakingsubstantialcommitments.

• AllentitieshaveoptedtousethePrinciplesandCriteriaoftheInternationalFinanceCorporation(IFC)asminimumstandardsfortheirinvestmentprojects.Thisistoguideinitialduediligenceandongoingriskmanagement.ForAgDevCo,theseapplytoallinvestmentswithavalueofover$1million.24AspartofgreaterscrutinyoftheESGduediligence,possiblyasaresultofprominentlandissueswithintheirportfolio,someentitieshavepaidcloserattentiontoland.ThisisparticularlyapparentforthePIDGmemberEIAFandforAgDevCo.

• AllprogrammesproposetouseIFCstandardstoguidetheirapproachestoenvironmental,socialandgovernanceissuespriortoinvestment.However,availabledocumentationdoesnotprovidedetailsonthestatusofanymanagementsystemsinvesteecompanieshaveinplacethatwoulddemonstratetheircompliancewiththesestandards.

5.2 How do programmes view and manage risks related to land?

Land issues investments have encountered

AGDEVCO

EarlierannualreviewssuggestlandissueswerebecomingincreasinglyprominentamongsomeofAgDevCo’sinvestments.The2013AnnualReviewofAgDevConotesthatlandtenureissuesconstituteamainriskforthesuccessofaninvestor’s(Illovo’s)workwithoutgrowers.InitscurrentriskregisterforprogrammesinMozambique,AgDevCoacknowledgesthat‘theMozambicanGovernment’scontestedbutlawfulrighttoacquirelandwithoutpayingadequatecompensationorproperlyresettlingaffectedcommunities’riskscreatingnegativerelationshipsbetweenitsinvesteecompaniesandhostcommunities.Tomitigatetheserisks,itproposestocarryoutearlyandongoingconsultationwithinvesteestoensurelocalregulationsonresettlementandcompensationarecompliedwithanddisputesresolved.

InGhana,AgDevCo’sBabatorirrigationinvestmentranintoissuesaroundalanddisputethatdelayedtheprojectforsixmonths,asitwasnecessaryforAgDevCotoundertakeafurtherhistoricalstudytodetermineequitableclaimstoland.ThisneededtobecompletedbeforetheEnvironmentalandSocialImpactAssessmentcouldstart.Securingtheleaserequired‘closeengagementwiththelocalcommunity,youthgroups,communityelders,subandparamountchiefs,traditionalcouncils,localandregionalgovernmentandthecentralgovernmentLandsCommission’(AgDevCoAnnualReview2014).

PIDGNoneoftheDFIDdocumentationwerevieweddiscussedlandissuesarisinginrelationtoPIDGinvestments.PIDG’s2012businesscasedoesnotsingleoutlandasaparticularareaforattentionandnordoanyoftheannualreviewscarriedoutsubsequently.However,thisdoesnotmeaninvestmentsareimmunetolandissues;inthecaseofEIAF’sinvestmentinAddaxBioenergy,landissuesbecameincreasinglyprominentastheinvestmentexpanded.AsPIDGfacilitiesmakesimilarinvestmentsinirrigationinfrastructureelsewhere,itislikelythatlandissuesaffecttheseinvestments

24 ManagersapplyAgDevCo’sinternalguidancetoinvestmentsbelowthisthreshold.

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5. Findings from three investment facilities


too,eveniftheyarenotraisedinDFID’smonitoringframework.Forexample,Box6highlightshowalackofattentiontogenderimpactsofinvestmentsmeantPIDGfacilitiesdidnotpickuponriskstowomen’saccesstoland.

GAFSP VerylittleinformationisavailableonlandissuesarisingininvestmentsmadethroughGAFSP.GAFSP’2014AnnualReviewstatesthatthetwopublicsectorwindowprogrammesitsupports–theLivestockandAgricultureMarketingProgrammeinMongoliaandtheSmallholderCommercialisationPrograminSierraLeone–havebeendelayedandtheirabilitytoreachtheirrespectivetargetpopulationsof60and198respectivelyisinquestion.Noinformationisavailableonlandissuesininvestmentsmadethroughtheprivatesectorwindow.AsdiscussedinSection2.8,onlythreeinvestments(inMalawiMangoesinMalawi,MountainHazelnutsinBhutanandAfricaJUICEinEthiopia)withinthiswindowtargettheproductionlevel.Allotherinvestmentstargetbanks–toextendlendingtopoorerproducers–ortostorageandprocessingpartsofthesupplychain;noinformationexistsontheactivitiesoftheseinvestees.

Approaches facilities take to managing land-related risk

AGDEVCOAnnualreviewssuggestthatAgDevCowasslowtodevelopitsESGduediligenceinthefirstfiveyears,25but

hasmadeprogressindevelopingtheseinthepastyear.Althoughitdidnothaveformalproceduresinplace,AgDevCoseemstohaverecognisedthecentralityoflandissuestoitsinvestmentsandtackledthesedirectlyastheyhaveemerged,ratherthanadvancingwithinvestmentsdespiteissues.26Inresponsetothenumberoflandissuesitfaced,AgDevCohasbothstrengtheneditsownin-houseESGteamandbroughtinexternalexpertisetoadviseinvestmentsonequitablelandacquisition.Itsriskregisterreferstolandprimarilyasanareaofreputationalriskandsocialrisks,underanoverarchingcategoryofinvestmentrisks.Foritsinvestmentsoflessthan$1million(towhichAgDevCodoesnotapplyIFCPerformanceStandards),itisdevelopingalternativemanualstoaidcompliance.

PIDGThePIDGdocumentationconsultedforthisreviewdoesnotprovidesufficientinformationtoassesshowmuchattentionPIDGsubsidiariespaytolandissuesarisingintheirinvestments.Intheirapproachtosocialandenvironmentalissues,eachfacilityisrequiredtoadopt,asaminimum,theIFCPerformanceStandardsandcertainfacilitiesgofurther:theEIAFhasitsownEnvironmentalandSocialPolicythatitsinvestmentsneedtocomplywith.However,beyondthis,thereisnoavailable(public)informationonhowtheseentitieshavecompliedwiththisguidance.27

GAFSPAswiththeothertwofacilities,thereviewofavailabledocumentsonGAFSP’sprivatesectorwindowfound

25 Forexamplethe2012DueDiligenceReportundertakentoassessAgDevCo’sfinancialcapacitytodeveloptwooutgrowerirrigatedfarmsinNorthernGhana(Turay2012)notedthatAgDevCohadnotyetdevelopeditsownoperatingpoliciesandpracticesthatstaffshouldadhereto.Asaninterimmeasure,thecompanywasusingtheoperatingpoliciesandpracticesofInfraCo(anotherPIDGcompany)untilitdrewupitsownproceduresmorerecently.

26 OnthebasisofAgDevCo’sexperienceinBabator,the2014annualreviewhassuggestedthat‘Ongreenfieldirrigationsites,landtenureremains“the”issuetobeconcretelyagreed,beforeaprojectcanattractthenecessaryinvestmentandproceedtoimplementation.Theownershipfactorhastobeheldfrontandcentreinongoingprojectdevelopment,eveninthepresenceofdocumentedandendorsedagreements.’

27 WedidnothaveaccesstoPIDG’sEnvironmentalandSocialPoliciesandProceduresorEIAF’sEnvironmentalandSocialPolicyforthisreport.

Box 6: Land issues arising through PIDG’s gender study

A2012GenderstudycommissionedbyPIDGhighlightedthepotentialimpactsthatinvesteeprojectsmayhaveonwomenandgirls.Severaloftheseprojectsinvolvedpotentiallynegativeimpactsasaresultofinvestmentsinland.Thestudyalsoincludedexamplesofhowprojectscouldplausiblymonitorimpactsonwomenandgirls.Amongplausiblenegativeimpactsthatcompanies’monitoringplansdidnotcaptureareseveralthatrelatedirectlytoland.TheAddaxBioenergyprogrammeinSierraLeonewasseentopresentimportantriskstolossoflandbywomenthatwerenotcapturedinthemonitoringframework.

PIDGsubsequentlyintegratedtheseandother*findingsandrecommendationsofthestudyintoitsResultsMonitoringStrategy,creatingatooltoassessexpectedimpactsonfemalebeneficiariesfromcompanies’investments.

* More broadly, the study found that of the facilities with operating principles, none made explicit mention of gender, women or goals, although opportunities existed to analyse requirements vis-a-vis impacts on women and girls. The study found that the impact assessments commissioned at the time had not specifically looked at impacts on women and girls and that only one project, the irrigation project in Chanyanga, Zambia had identified potential impacts on women. The management and monitoring plan in place at the time of the study, however, did not monitor these impacts.

thatthereisarequirementforinvesteestoadheretoIFCPerformanceStandardsforESGissues,butdocumentationdoesnotdiscusshowthisisbeingdoneoroverseen.Thelogframefortheprivatesectorwindowdoesnothaveanyindicatorsthatrefertolandissues,whiletheriskmatrixsuggeststhatimpactassessmentsarerequiredonlyforthoseprojectswherenegativeenvironmentalimpactsareforeseeable.

Forallthreeinvestmentfacilities,themaintooltoidentifyandmitigateland-relatedrisksappearstobethe

implementationoftheIFCPerformanceStandards.Astheboxbelowdiscusses,thisispositivebecausetheseincludeprogressiveguidanceonhowtotreatinvoluntaryresettlement;however,itisunclearfromthereportsavailableiffacilitiesareabletodemonstratethattheyaremonitoringcompliancewiththesestandardsacrosstheirinvestees.

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Box 7: IFC Performance Standards

AllthreeinvestmentfacilitiesrelyoncompliancewithIFCPerformanceStandardsataminimumtoguidetheirapproachtoenvironmentalandsocialissues.Fromtheperspectiveofland,thisispositivetotheextentthattheIFCPerformance5onLandAcquisitionandResettlementiswidelyseentobethemostcomprehensiveofallguidanceavailableoninvoluntaryresettlement,whichinmanycasesgoesbeyondthelegalrequirementsinthecountryofdestination(Perera,2014).

Whilecommendable,astatedcommitmenttoapplyperformancestandardsdoesnotprecluderisksifeithertheentitiesortheirsubsidiariesarenottakingactivestepstoimplementthesethroughestablishingandusingenvironmentalandsocialmanagementsystems.TheIFC’sComplianceAdvisorOmbudsmanhaspublishedauditshighlightingwheretheIFC’sownlendingprogrammeshavefailedtomonitorcompliancewiththeperformancestandardsandwhereinvesteeshavebeeninvolvedinhumanrightsandenvironmentalabuses(CAO,2013).ThishighlightstheneedforlenderswhowanttobecompliantwithIFCperformancestandardstoadoptstrongmonitoringandmanagementsystemsthatcanactivelyidentifymaterialrisksandacttomitigatethem.

This situation suggests DFID should verify, through the annual review process or requests for further documentation, if entities have the information management systems in place that demonstrate ongoing compliance with IFC Performance Standards.


Thissectionreflectsonsomeofthechallengesencounteredinaccessinginformationonprogrammesduringthisreviewprocess.Itdiscussessomeoftheareastherevieworiginallyaimedtoexplorebutwasultimatelywasunableto,partlybecauseoftheapproachtakenbutalsoduetothedifficultyinaccessingdocumentation.Itmakesrecommendationsforhowfutureportfoliooverviewscouldovercomethesechallenges,andalsoareastheycouldpotentiallyaddress.

AsthesamechallengeswehaveencounteredinthisreviewarelikelytofaceDFIDstaffdesigningorrunninglandprogrammes,wehavealsosuggestedactionsDFIDcouldtaketoimprovelearning.

6.1 Outstanding questions WeoriginallysoughttodescribehowprogrammeswereperformingbyusingalistofquestionswederivedfromICAIandIDCreports.However,wewereunabletoanswermanyoftheseindetailbecausewecouldnotassesswhatprogrammesweredoingintheseareasonthebasisofthecontentsofbusinesscases,annualreportsandprogrammeevaluations.AreaswewereunabletoexplorearepresentedinTable2.

Oneofthemainreasonswewereunabletoanswerourquestionswasbecausetheprogramme documentation we chose or had access to did not cover our topics of interest.Insomecases,thiswaslikelytobebecauseourtopicofinterestwastoospecific,suchaslookingatlinksbetweenlandprogrammesandnutrition.However,gatheringinformationonissuesthatwewouldhaveexpectedthoseresponsibleforprogrammedesignstohaveconsideredalsopresentedchallenges(e.g.ifprogrammedesignsreflectedthedifferentpoliticalandsocialconditionsacrossthe

6. Gaps and opportunities for learning

Table 2: Questions unanswered in this portfolio review

Area unable to explore Reason for lack of information

Linkages between land programmes and other programmes working in the same sector or geographic location

Annual reviews and other programme documents do not usually discuss linkages with other programmes. There are exceptions: the Ethiopia LIFT business case refers to other DFID rural programmes and land programmes of other donors in detail. However, for most programmes, the annual review reporting format does not consider this as an explicit area of enquiry and therefore does not usually document links. It is therefore difficult to assess how programmes are doing this from reviewing documentation alone.

If close links exist between land and nutrition programmes and outcomes. Programme documentation did not mention linkages between programme design and nutrition interventions or outcomes.

If programmes are upfront about the political challenges they face and realistic about where they cannot achieve outcomes and impacts alone.

Beyond discussing how programmes approach and describe political risks in their risk registries, without opportunity for further investigation, it is challenging to assess if programmes have assessed political challenges correctly and structured their workplans accordingly.

If programmes could do more on climate change and take advantage of ICF funds for this.

See above.

If programmes involved beneficiaries in the design of programmes and consultation around delivery

This is not an area that business cases are required to provide information on, even if they do. With the exception of the DRC 6000 women programme, most programmes do not describe pre-design consultation Some annual reviews discuss feedback with programme beneficiaries (e.g. GEMS 3 2014 Annual Review), but these are also uncommon.

For programmes whose activities are targeted not at improving livelihoods of final beneficiaries but of intermediary outcomes, if evidence exists of their success in reducing poverty

Only one programme reviewed—ICF Africa—fits this programme description. It aims to increase jobs and job security to benefit poor people. However, DFID does not monitor this in its results framework.

areastheyoperatedin,andifintendedbeneficiarieswereconsultedandinvolvedinprogrammedesign).Similarly,whilewewereabletoanalysehowprogrammesconsideredlinkagesbetweentheiractivitiesandclimatechangefromariskperspective,wedidnotknowenoughabouttheprogrammecircumstancestoassesswhereandwhenprogrammescouldhaveincorporatedactiononclimatechangemoreintotheirownactivities.

6.2 Challenges in accessing information Besidesprogrammedocumentslackingtheinformationneededtoanswersomeofouroriginalquestions,theothermainchallengeencounteredduringthisreviewwasinaccessinginformationonprogrammes.

Forthoseprogrammesthatwereonouroriginallist,someofthestandardprogrammedocumentswelimitedoursearchto(e.g.businesscases,logframesandannualreviews)wereunavailableonDevTracker.Foraround15programmes,thesestandarddocumentscouldnotbeeasilylocatedonDFID’sinternalQuestdatabase,andonlybecameavailableonceDFIDprogrammemanagerssentthesethrough.Thefactthattheredoesnotappeartobesingle‘browseable’repositoryforallprogrammedocuments—includingimpactevaluationsandresearchreports—meansthatcollectingprogrammedocumentationwasaslowandsometimesfrustratingprocess.

Anotherkeychallengeinthisreviewisidentifyingprogrammesthatarenotalreadyknowntobelandprogrammes.ThelimitationsofDevTracker’ssearchfunctions(whichdoesnotallowcombinationofsearchterms)andthefactthatmanyprogrammeswithalandcomponentarenottaggedassuchlimitsthepossibilityofidentifyingallrelevantprogrammesthroughthedatabase.UnlessforthcomingmodificationstoDFID’sinformationmanagementsystemcanimproveonthissituation,identifyingrelevantlandprogrammeswillneedtorelyonacombinationofdatabasesearchesandmakingspecificrequestsforinformationwithinDFID.

6.3 Suggestions for improving availability of information AsisclearfromthediscussioninSections3.3and6.2,thereisaneedtobettercommunicatelessonsandevidenceemergingfromlandprogrammes.Thiswouldhelpensurethatknowledgeofwhatworkedanddidnotworkinpreviousandongoingprogrammesiscapturedindesigningandimplementingnewprogrammes.WhilethisandfutureportfolioreviewscancontributetoimprovingunderstandingonwhatDFIDprogrammesaredoingonland,otherideastoimproveinformation-sharingincludethefollowing:

• Commissioncross-programmereviewsoftheapproachesthatdifferentcountryofficestaketodealingwithlandissuesandwhetherornottheprogrammesestablishappropriatelinkages.Topicslikelytobeusefultonumerousprogrammesinclude:o Howtochangeinstitutionalbehaviourandnorms

inlandadministrations,o Howtoguaranteesocialinclusioninlandprogrammes,o Studiesofcosts,cost-recoveryandefficiency

acrosslandagencies,o In-depthreviewsofwhatinterventionshavebeen

successfulinimprovingwomen’slandrightsindifferentcontexts,o Howeffectivelyland,agriculturalandother

investmentprogrammescanworktogethertodelivernewopportunities,protectlandrightsandproperlyaddressESGrisks,includingbothlandandnon-landdimensionsofsocialandenvironmentalrisks,

o Howtobetterintegratepoliticalanalysisintolandprogrammes. • Findopportunities(andperhapsresources)fromwithinprogrammestodocumentlearningonwhathasandhasnotworkedduringdelivery,andthereasonsforthis.Althoughtheperiodicannualreviewsandprogrammecompletionreportsprovidesomeinsightintothis,thedemandstokeepthisfocusedontheresultsframeworkandbriefmeanstheyprovidelimitedopportunitiestodocumenthowprogrammesdevelopandwhatdrivestheirsuccessesandfailures.Someprogrammes,suchastheSouthAfricaULMhaveinvestedconsiderablyinthedocumentationoffindingsfromtheprogramme.Whileitmaynotbepossibleforallprogrammestoputasmuchemphasisonresearchasthisprogrammedid,documentinglessonspresentsanopportunitytosharethelonger-termexperiencesofprogrammestaffwhohavemoreknowledgeoftheprogrammehistorythanauthorsofannualreviewsareabletocapture.

• Createandsustainavirtualhubforknowledge-sharingonlandissuesthatDFIDcantapintotokeeptrackofwhatlearningproductshavebeencommissionedandwherethesecanbelocated.

• Continuetoproduceastreamofevidenceproductscontainingclearmessagesaboutwhatwastriedandwhathassucceededandfailedinaddressingpriorityissues(identifiedabove),withthisgoingbeyondpresentingfindingsevaluationsalone.ThiswillcontributetobettercontinuouslearningwithinDFIDandtherebyrespondtorecommendationsofICAI’s‘HowDFIDlearns’report(ICAI2014d).28

RegardingthefundingDFIDprovidestoinvestmentfacilities,includingGAFSP,PIDGandAgDevCo,itisunclearthatthecurrentmonitoringframeworkDFIDuses

28 ThereportnotesthatDFIDhasinvestedspecificresourcestoimprovethesynthesisanddisseminationofitsresearchandevaluation,althoughthereareconcernsaboutwhetherallcommissionedevaluationscanbesynthesisedintoDFIDoperations,asDFIDstaffhavereportedthatthevariableuseofevaluationsresultsfromtheirnumber,diversity,lengthandlackofspecificitytoquestionsrelevantfortheprojectdesign(ICAI2014dp.11).

36 LEGEND Report


allowsitsprogrammemanagerstoassessifinvesteesarecompetentlyidentifyingandmitigatingland-relatedriskstheyfaceinlinewithIFCperformancestandards.Itisalsonotcleariftheyareadequatelyassessinghowinvestmentprojectscangeneratesharedvaluenewopportunitiesforlandrightsholderswhomaybeaffected,includingwomenandthoseinpoverty.UnlessDFIDhasalternativereliablelinesofcommunicationthatitusestomonitorthis,itissuggestedthatannualreviewsfortheseprogrammesincludeaspecificdiscussiononcompliancewithIFCguidance.

6.4 Reflections for future portfolio overviewsBuildingontheexperienceofthecurrentportfolioreview,futureportfolioreviewsshouldconsiderthefollowingoptionsforapproachingthereview:

• Expandthescopetoincludemoreprogrammesworkingonland.Theresearchprocessforthisreviewhasidentifiedalistofotherprogrammesthatappeartohavelandcomponentsordimensionsbutthatwerenotincludedinthisreport(seeTableA3inAnnex1);afuturereviewshouldexploretheseprogrammesinmoredepthtounderstandwhatworktheyaredoingonland.

• Focusonamorelimitednumberofquestionsorasubsetofprogrammes,eitherusingthecategoriessuggestedinthisreport(e.g.urban,forestlandprogrammes)orinspecificsectors(e.g.infrastructureandclimateprogrammes)toteaseoutanunderstandingoftheirperformance,successesandchallengesingreaterdetail.Thebroadsetofquestionsusedtoguidethisreviewhaveprovidedagoodunderstandingofarangeofissuesacrossthewholeportfolio,butalimitedinsightintoanyparticularprogrammeorquestion.

• Forasmallersubsetofprogrammes,exploreinmoredepththetheoriesofchangethatunderpininterventionstogainanunderstandingofhowconsistenttheseareacrossmajorlandinterventions.Asmanyoftheolderprogrammesdonothaveexplicittheoriesofchangeandnewerprogrammesdonotnecessarilyspelltheseoutindetail,thiswouldlikelyrequirediscussionswithprogrammestaff.Forurbanprogrammesincludinglandinterventions,itwouldbeinterestingtoexploretheextenttowhichthesefitwiththedesignofprogrammestoimproveurbangovernanceandservicedelivery.

• Lookinmoredepthathowinvestmentfacilitiesapproachlandissuesininvesteesandwhatscopeexiststoimprovemonitoringandreportingpracticesto,inturn,ensureboththefacilitiesandDFIDareawareofpotentialland-relatedrisks.

DFIDfundsalargenumberofprogrammesthataimtoimprovelandgovernance–eitherasamainprogrammeobjectiveoraspartofabroadersetofgoals.Thisreviewhaslookedat18programmesthatareunderwayandsixprogrammesthathaverecentlyclosed,butthereareanumberofotherDFIDprogrammeswithlandcomponentsthatarenotcoveredinthisreviewandnewonesthatareduetostart.Thisportfolioencompassesprogrammeswithawiderangeofdesignstargetingimprovementsincountrywidelandgovernance,butalsointheurbanandforestlandsectors.Themajorityoftheseprogrammeshaveclearanddirectobjectivesofreducingpoverty,butthereissomevariationinhowtheyharnessbetterlandgovernancetodothis.

Reviewsofcompletedandongoingprogrammessuggestthatmostareachievingtheirobjectivesagainsttheirworkplans,althoughdeliveryofprogrammeoutputsisoften‘lumpy’withfrequentdelaysagainstmilestonesinsomeperiodsbutsubstantialprogressatothertimes.Asmallnumberofprogrammeswithlandcomponentshavehadtorevisetheirambitionswhenthesehavenotbeenfeasible.

Programmeshaveadoptedawiderangeofdesignsandpracticestomeettheseaims.Severalofthecorelandprogrammescombinelandtenureregularisationwithotheractivitiestoimprovefunctioningofruralmarkets(LIFT),makebetternaturalresourcegovernanceeconomicallyrewardingandattractoutsideinvestment(CLUF).Theportfolioalsoincludesprogrammesthatadoptinnovativeapproaches,suchassettingupanissue-focusedthinktank(theULMprogramme)andusingpeopleandrights-basedapproachestocreatemoredemandforbetterlandgovernance(COPEandGLEI).Programmeshavesuccessfullyprovenapproachestoimprovetenuresecurityforwomeninparticularcontexts,whichmaybeadoptableinothercontexts.Landtitlingprogrammeshaveproventhatgenderequalitycanbedesignedintointerventionsandproducepositiveoutcomesforwomenindifferentstagesoflifeandmatrimonialsituations.

Intheirdesigns,programmesareworkingonanumberofissuesthathavebeenraisedbyrecentreportsbythetwobodiesoverseeingDFID’swork:IDCandICAI.Theportfoliodemonstratessomepositiveexamplesofprogrammesworkingtostrengthenwomen’srightstoland,andthereareclearlinkagesbetweentheprogrammesandDFID’sobjectivesforthecountriesitworksin.Itislessclearwhetherornotagricultureandotherinvestmentfacilitiesandbusinessclimatefocusedprogrammesarehavingpositiveornegativeeffectsonlandrightsandopportunitiesforwomenandgirls.ItisalsonotclearhowfarprogrammesareintegratingrecommendationsforDFIDtodomoretotacklecorruptionandmainstreamclimatechangeintoitsprogrammes.Moreattentionis

neededonwhatprogrammesarealreadydoingintheseareasandwhatmoretheycoulddo.

ForthefundingDFIDprovidestoinvestmentfacilities,includingGAFSP,PIDGandAgDevCo,itisunclearifthecurrentmonitoringframeworkDFIDusesallowsitsprogrammemanagerstoassessifinvesteesarecompetentlyidentifyingandmitigatingtheland-relatedriskstheyfaceinlinewithIFCperformancestandards.UnlessDFIDhasalternativereliablelinesofcommunicationtomonitorthis,itissuggestedthatannualreviewsfortheseprogrammesincludeaspecificdiscussiononcompliancewithIFCguidance.

7.1 Recommendations for the design of land programmesThepoliticsoflandexposesprogrammestointerference,obstructionandsporadicprogress.Thiscallsforprogrammestafftobeperceptivetolocalpolitics,willingtoinvestinmediumtolong-termprogrammesandtoleranttoshort-termdelays.Programmesshouldrecognisethehighrateofcorruptioninland,aimtoreducecorruptioninlandadministrationandpreventitinprogrammeactivities.DFIDshouldconsiderdevelopingfurtherinternalguidancetohelpstaffdesignandimplementprogrammesthatworkinapolitically-smartwayandhelptacklecorruption.

DFID’smainrationaleforpromotingbetterlandgovernanceisthatstrongerlandtenureimproveseconomicgrowthandreducesincomepoverty,includingforpoorerandmoremarginalisedgroups.Manyprogrammesreflectthisrationaleintheirresultsframeworks,whichfocusonthelinksbetweeninterventions,risingproductivityandreducingincomepoverty.Whilethisfocusonincomepovertyiskey,programmeshouldavoidmissingbroaderimpactsonsocialandeconomicempowerment,evenifthesearehardertomeasure.

Programmestaffshoulddevelopresultsframeworksfromathoroughunderstandingoflocalnorms,practices,andwithrealisticexpectationsofthepotentialcontributionsofstrongertenuretohigherincomes,avoidingleapsoffaithintheoriesofchangeormisguidedassumptionsthatasuccessfulinterventioninonecountrywillreplicateelsewhere.

DFID’sportfolioisfullofprogrammesthatrelyondifferentpathwaystostrengthenlandtenuretailoredtocertaingroupsorcontexts,includingformarginalisedwomen.Thesuccessesofdiverseapproachessuggestsnewprogrammesshouldlooktothesesuccessesforlessons,butalsolooktoinnovatelocallybasedonlocally-groundedresearchandexperimentation.

Programmesthatcarryoutlandregistrationmustmakecommensurateimprovementsinlandadministration

38 LEGEND Report

7. Conclusions


tomanagetheforeseeablesurgeinformaltransactions.Programmesmustnotletlandadministrationlagbehind,jeopardisinggainsachievedthroughlandregistration.

7.2 Recommendations for DFID risk managementOuranalysisofthreeinvestmentfacilitiesflagsseveralareaswhereDFIDcanimproveitscurrentpracticesonmonitoringlandrelatedrisks:

• Manyprojectsfundedbyinvestmentfacilitiesareland-intensiveandoperateinland-sensitiveareas.Thisincludesinvestmentsthataimtoraisefarmproductionthroughlargenucleusandoutgrowerfarmingschemesbutalsothosethatbuildinfrastructureinruralandurbanareas(e.g.irrigationorhousing).Whenlanddisputesgounacknowledged,theycandelayprojectplansandraisecosts.Beforemakingsubstantialcommitmentstothesefacilities,DFIDshouldassureitselfthatduediligenceproceduresaresound,andtakefullaccountoflandissuesandrisks.

• WhileDFIDstaffrecognisetheserisks,therisktoolsDFIDusestomonitorprogrammesdonotcaptureenoughinformationonland-relatedrisks.Land-relatedrisksarenotprominentinriskregistries,andannualreviewexercisesdonotregularlyreportonlandissuesunlessthesehavesurfaced.

• Moreover,unlessDFIDcanverifyindependentlythatinvestmentfacilitieshaveestablishedrobustriskmanagementsystems,assurancesthatfacilitiesuseIFCperformancestandardsareunconfirmed:thesearenotreportedonthroughDFID’snormalmonitoringprocesses.

• DFIDshouldthereforeconsiderhowtoimproveitsmonitoringofinvestmentsitmakesthroughinvestmentfacilities.

7.3 Recommendations for LEGEND and for future portfolio reviewsThisportfolioreviewalsoidentifiesseveralareasofprogrammeperformancewheredetailedinformationisstilllacking,duetonotbeingreadilyavailablefromprogrammedocuments.Gapsininformationwouldbenefitfromfurtherattention,eitherthroughfutureportfolioreviewsorotheranalyticalpapers.Areasthatdeservemoreattentionthroughmorein-depthinvestigationinclude:

• howtodopolitically-smartprogrammingforlandprogrammes,

• howtochangeinstitutionalbehaviourandnormsinlandadministrations,

• howtobuildinsustainabilityandsocialinclusionintolandrightsregistrationprogrammes,

• howland,agriculturaldevelopmentandotherinvestmentprogrammescanworkmoreeffectivelytogethertostrengthenlandrightsanddelivereconomicdevelopmentbenefits,

• howprogrammesareaddressingclimatechangeandcorruption(andwhatworksintheseareas),

• thetheoriesofchangeprogrammesuse, • howprogrammesareincorporatingbeneficiariesinprogrammedesign.

References Programmesdocumentsreferredtointhetextarenotlistedindividuallybelow.Thetableoverleafpresentsallthoseprogrammedocumentsthatwereavailableandconsultedforthisreview.TheseareallavailablefromprogrammepagesonDFID’sDevTrackerwebsite(https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/)orfromDFID.

CAO(2013),CAOAuditofIFCInvestmentinCorporaciónDinantS.A.deC.V.,Honduras.OfficeoftheComplianceAdvisorOmbudsman,WorldBankGroup.Availableat:http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/document-links/

documents/DinantAuditCAORefC-I-R9-Y12-F161_ENG.pdfCraeynest,L.(2009).Fromrurallivelihoodstoagriculturalgrowth.ThelandpoliciesoftheUKDepartmentof

InternationalDevelopment.TNILandPolicySeries4,Amsterdam:TransnationalInstitute.DFID(2002).BetterLivelihoodsforPoorPeople:TheRoleofLandPolicy:ConsultationDocument.November2002.

London:DFID.DFID(2007).BetterAccessandSecureRightsforPoorPeople.London:DFIDDFID(2011).Anewstrategicvisionforgirlsandwomen:stoppingpovertybeforeitstarts.London:DFIDDFID(2012).DFIDIndiaOperationalPlan(2011-2015).https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/

attachment_data/file/67379/india-2011.pdfDFID(2014).Securepropertyrightsanddevelopment:economicgrowthandhouseholdwelfare.PropertyRights

EvidencePaper.London:DFIDDFID(2015a).UKAidStrategy-UKaid:tacklingglobalchallengesinthenationalinterest(November2015).https://

www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-aid-tackling-global-challenges-in-the-national-interestDFID(2015b).DFIDPresentation,UKLandForum,4thNovember2015DFID(2015c).AnnualReport2014/2015.https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/

dfid-annual-report-and-accounts-2014-2015EDG(2014).EvaluationoftheMozambiqueCommunityLandUseFundFinalReport.EffectiveDevelopment

GroupJune2014.GlobalDonorPlatformforRuralDevelopment.2015.LandGovernanceProgrammeMap.[ONLINE]Availableat:

https://landgov.donorplatform.org/.[Accessed01December15].ICAI(2014a)DFID’sPrivateSectorDevelopmentWork.ICAIReport35.London:IndependentCommissionforAidImpactICAI(2014b)TheUK’sInternationalClimateFund.London:IndependentCommissionforAidImpactICAI(2014c)DFID’sApproachtoAnti-CorruptionandItsImpactonthePoor.London:IndependentCommissionfor

AidImpactICAI(2014d)HowDFIDlearns.London:IndependentCommissionforAidImpactICAI(2015a)DFID’sapproachtodeliveringimpact.London:IndependentCommissionforAidImpactICAI(2015b)BusinessinDevelopment.London:IndependentCommissionforAidImpactIDC(2015)JobsandLivelihoods.InternationalDevelopmentCommittee.HouseofCommons12thReportofSession2014-

2015.London:TheStationeryOfficeLtd.IDC(2013).GlobalFoodSecurity.InternationalDevelopmentCommittee.HouseofCommonsFirstReportofSession

2013–14.London:TheStationeryOfficeLtdLawryetal.(2014).TheImpactofLandPropertyRightsInterventionsonInvestmentandAgriculturalProductivityin

DevelopingCountries:aSystematicReview.CampbellSystematicReviews2014.1.Locke,A.andHenley,G(2014).TopicGuide:Land.EvidenceonDemand,UK,http://dx.doi.org/10.12774/eod_tg.mar2014.lockehenleyPerera J. (2014). Lose to Gain. Is Involuntary Resettlement a Development Opportunity? Manilla: Asian Development BankPrivate Infrastructure Development Group. 2015. InfraCo Asia. [ONLINE] Available at: http://www.pidg.org/what-we-do/companies/infraco-asia. [Accessed 01 December 15].Turay, R. (2012). Due Diligence Report undertaken to assess AgDevCo’s eligibility for a DFID Accountable Grant. London: Coffey International Development.

40 LEGEND Report


Tabl

e 3:

Pro

gram

me

docu

men

ts a

vaila

ble

and

cons

ulte

d fo

r thi

s re

view

Prog

ram

me

nam

eBu

sine

ss

Case

Year

Log

fram

eYe

arAn

nual

Rev

iew

Mid

-ter

m

Revi

ewPr

ojec

t Co

mpl

etio

n re

port

Year

Impa

ct

Eval

uatio

nYe

ar

Y1Ye

arY2

Year

Y3Ye

arAd

d.

ARs

(Yr.)

Mul

ti-St

akeh

olde

r For

estry

Pr

ogra

mm

e - N

epal

Ye

s Oc

t-12

Yes

Oct-

12Ye

s De

c-12

Yes

Sep-

13Ye

s Oc

t-14

N/A

Yes

(201

5)N/

A

MOL

A (M

ozam

biqu

e La

nd

Actio

n)Ye

s Ju

l-15

Yes

2015

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Spor

t Rel

ief 2

012

- UK

Aid

Mat

ch -

Slum

sYe

s 20

11Ye

s 20

12Ye

s 20

14N/

AN/

AN/

AN/

AN/

A

Fore

st G

over

nanc

e, M

arke

ts

and

Clim

ate

Prog

ram

me

Yes

Oct-

12Ye

s Au

g-15

Yes

Dec-

12Ye

s No

v-13

Yes

Aug-

14Y4

(A

ug-1

5)N/

A

Rwan

da L

and

Tenu

re

Regu

laris

atio

n Pr

ogra

mm

e Ye

s Ju

l-05

Yes

Dec-

14Ye

s M

ar-1

3Ye

s Oc

t-13

Yes

Oct-

14Y4

(O

ct-1

5)N/

AYe

s 20

15

Com

mun

ity L

and

Use

Fund

NoYe

s Fe

b-14

Yes

Feb-

13Ye

s Fe

b-14

NoN/

AN/

AYe

s Ju

n-14

Yes

Aug-

14

Grow

th a

nd E

mpl

oym

ent i

n St

ates

Pro

gram

me

(GEM

S)

Com

pone

nt 3

NoYe

s Ju

l-12

Yes

Sep-

13Ye

s Se

p-14

Yes

2015

N/A

Yes

(2

015)

N/A

N/A

Land

Inve

stm

ent f

or

Tran

sfor

mat

ion

(LIF

T)-

Wea

lth C

reat

ion

Prog

ram

me

Yes

Dec-

14Ye

s De

c-14

Yes

Mar

-15

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Glob

al L

egal

Em

pow

erm

ent

Initi

ative

Yes

Dec-

14Ye

s Ap

r-15

Yes

Dec-

14Ye

s Ju

n-15

N/A

N/A

N/A

Yes

Jul-1

5N/

A

Inve

stm

ent C

limat

e Fa

cilit

y fo

r Afri

caYe

s Ja

n-06

Yes

Mar

-15

Yes

Mar

-12

Yes

Apr-

13Ye

s M

ay-1

4Y4

(M

ay-1

5)N/

AN/

A

Supp

ort t

o Na

tiona

l Pol

icie

s fo

r Urb

an P

over

ty R

educ

tion

(S

NPUP

R)

Yes

Nov-

12Ye

s Ju

l-15

Yes

Aug-

11Ye

s M

ar-1

3Ye

s Se

p-13

Y4 (S

ep

14) Y

5 (A

ug 1

5)

N/A

N/A

N/A

Supp

ort P

rogr

amm

e fo

r Ur

ban

Refo

rms

in B

ihar

Ye

s Ja

n-09

Yes

Oct-

12Ye

s Ap

r-12

Yes

May

-12

Yes

Aug-

13Y4

(Dec

14

)N/

AN/

AN/

A

Fore

st L

and

Use

and

Gove

rnan

ce in

Indo

nesi

aYe

s M

ar-1

5Ye

s De

c-14

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

42 LEGEND Report

Prog

ram

me

nam

eBu

sine

ss

Case

Year

Log

fram

eYe

arAn

nual

Rev

iew

Mid

-ter

m

Revi

ewPr

ojec

t Co

mpl

etio

n re

port

Year

Impa

ct

Eval

uatio

nYe

ar

Y1Ye

arY2

Year

Y3Ye

arAd

d.

ARs

(Yr.)

Mad

hya

Prad

esh

Urba

n In

frast

ruct

ure

Inve

stm

ent

Proj

ect (

MPU

IIP)

Yes

Feb-

15Ye

s M

ar-1

3Ye

s Ja

n-14

Yes

Jan-

15Ye

s Fe

b-15

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Wes

t Ben

gal:

Kolk

ata

Urba

n Se

rvic

es fo

r the

Poo

r (KU

SP)

Yes

Jan-

03Ye

s Oc

t-12

Yes

Nov-

11Ye

s Ju

l-12

Yes

Mar

-13

Y4

(Feb

-14)

Y5

(Feb

15

)

N/A

N/A

N/A

Land

: Enh

anci

ng

Gove

rnan

ce fo

r Eco

nom

ic

Deve

lopm

ent (

LEGE

ND)

Yes

Aug-

14Ye

s Au

g-15

Yes

Aug-

15N/

AN/

AN/

AN/

AN/

AN/

A

Supp

ort f

or th

e Im

plem

enta

tion

of th

e Vo

lunt

ary

Guid

elin

es o

n La

nd Te

nure

(VGG

T)

Yes

Sep-

15Ye

s Se

p-15

Yes

Sep-

15Ye

s Se

p-15

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Crea

ting

Oppo

rtuni

ties

for

the

Poor

and

Exc

lude

d in

Ba

ngla

desh

(COP

E)

Yes

Jan-

15Ye

s Ju

l-13

Yes

May

-15

Yes

Jul-1

5No

N/A

Yes

N/A

N/A

Impr

ovin

g go

vern

ance

of

Land

Use

, Lan

d-Us

e Ch

ange

an

d Fo

rest

ry in

Indo

nesi

a

Yes

Oct-

12Ye

s Oc

t-12

Yes

Mar

-13

Yes

Jan-

14Ye

s M

ar-1

5N/

AN/

AN/

AN/

A

Degr

aded

Lan

d M

appi

ng

for K

alim

anta

n an

d Pa

pua

prov

ince

s

Yes

Oct-

12Ye

s Ju

l-14

Yes

Aug-

13Ye

s M

ar-1

4Ye

s Ju

n-15

N/A

Yes

Yes

2015

Yes

2015

Urba

n La

nd R

efor

m- U

rban

La

ndM

ark

Yes

May

-13

Yes

May

-13

Yes

Jun-

07Ye

s Ju

l-05

Yes

May

-13

N/A

N/A

Yes

Dec-

13Ye

s 20

14

Mad

hya

Prad

esh

Urba

n Se

rvic

es fo

r the

Poo

r (M

PUSP

)

Yes

Oct-

12Ye

s Ju

l-12

Yes

Dec-

11Ye

s M

ar-1

2N/

AN/

AYe

s Ye

s De

c-12

Yes

2013

Tanz

ania

Lan

d Pr

ogra

mm

eYe

s Se

p-14

Yes

Apr-

15N/

AN/

AN/

AN/

AN/

AN/

A N

/A

Thisannexsetsoutthemethodologyfollowedtodefinethescope,produceguidingquestionsandaccessandanalyseprogrammeinformationforthereview.

Defining the scope of the review

Programmes for reviewThescopeofthisreportwasjointlydrawnupwiththeDFID.AsthefirstinaseriesofportfolioreviewsthatwillbedonethroughtheLEGENDprogramme,itwasagreedthatthispublicationwouldlookacrossthoseprogrammesthatDFIDhadalreadyidentifiedashavinganimportantfocusonland.Alistof34programmeswasprovidedwhichincludedtheprogrammesthathadbeenidentifiedduringanearlierassessmentcarriedouttoidentifyrelevantprogrammesforDFID’sentriesintotheLandGovernanceProgrammeMapinearly2015.

Basis for the assessment Theoriginalobjectiveoftheportfolioreviewwasto“reviewandsummarisethecoverage,approach,andcoherencewithintheportfolioofDFID’sprogrammesthattargetorincludesubstantialcomponentson-landgovernance”(DFIDLEGENDTOR2013).Todosowedrewupananalyticalframeworkthatidentifiedcriteriaandguidanceforassessingperformance,guidingquestionsandananalyticalapproachtoextractinginformationfromprogrammedocumentation.

Establishing criteria to assess performanceToestablishcriteriaforassessingperformance,wedrewonreportsfromUKparliamentarycommitteesthathavealongtrackrecordofassessingDFID’sperformanceindifferentareas.TheseincludetheInternationalDevelopmentCommittee(IDC),IndependentCommissionforAidImpact(ICAI)andNationalAuditOffice.Wereviewedthefollowinglistofreports:

Independent Commission for Aid Impact

• ICAI(2015)DFID’sapproachtodeliveringimpact • ICAI(2015)BusinessinDevelopment • ICAI(2015)HowDFIDworkswithmultilateralagenciestoachieveimpact

• ICAI(2015)AssessingtheImpactoftheScale-upofDFID’sSupporttoFragileStates

• ICAI(2014)DFID’sPrivateSectorDevelopmentWork • ICAI(2014)TheUK’sInternationalClimateFund • ICAI(2014)DFID’sBilateralSupporttoGrowthandLivelihoodsinAfghanistan

• ICAI(2014)DFID’sContributiontoImprovingNutrition

• ICAI(2014)DFID’sApproachtoAnti-CorruptionandItsImpactonthePoor

• ICAI(2014)HowDFIDlearns

International Development Committee

• IDC(2015)JobsandLivelihoods • IDC(2013)GlobalFoodSecurity

National Audit Office

• NAO(2014)OversightofthePrivateInfrastructureDevelopmentGroup

• NAO(2014)TheperformanceoftheDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(2013-14)

FromthesereportsweextractedfindingsandspecificrecommendationsspecifictoDFID’sworkonland,andcategorisedtheseintoareasrelatedtocoverage,approachandcoherence.Inaddition,wealsonotedrecommendationstargetedatotherareas(privatesectordevelopment,impact,corruption)thatwerealsopotentiallyrelevanttolandprogrammes.ForexampleICAI’s(2015)reportonprivatesectordevelopmentincludesrelevantrecommendationsonhowprogrammesshouldlinkexplicitlytoDFIDcountryofficestrategiesandobjectives.TableA1presentsextractsfromthesereportsandnoteshowthesearerelevantforestablishingcriteriarelevanttoassessingprogrammes’coverageapproachandcoherence.Notallreportsprovidedrecommendationsthatwecouldeasilyincorporateintothisreview:forexamplerecommendationsfromtheNAOreportsweretoobroadtotranslateintoprogramme-levelrecommendations.

Establishing guiding questionsOnceoverarchingareashadbeendefined,weidentifiedalistofspecificquestionsforeachprogramme,andfortheportfoliooverall.Questionsonapproachweredividedintothoserelatedtooverallapproach,andthosethatthatlinktoareasofDFID’sprioritiesandthathavebeencoveredinICAIandIDCreports,includingprivatesectordevelopment,climate, corruption,andgender.ThislistwascirculatedforcommentamonglandexpertsintheKnowledgeManagementgroupofLEGENDandwiththeleadinDFIDandsubsequentlyrevisedtoensureitcapturedallpriorityquestionsforthereview. ThelistofquestionsispresentedinTableA1.


Annex 1: Methodology for this study

Identifying relevant programme documentationFromtheoutsetitwasdecidedthatthereviewwouldconsulttwomaincategoriesofdocumentationforinformation:

• StandardprogrammedocumentationthateveryDFIDprogrammeproduces.Thisincludestheprogramme’soriginalbusiness case,logframeandtheannualreviewsthattrackprogrammeprogresseveryyear.Forprogrammesthathadended,thisalsoincludedaprojectcompletionreport.Inasmallnumberofcases,DFIDalsocommissionedmid-termreviews.

• OtherprogrammedocumentationthatDFIDorprogrammesthemselvescommissioned.Thisincludesimpactevaluations,researchreportsandaidememoiresthatexplorespecificissuesandimpactsprogrammeshavehad.

• WedownloadedstandardprogrammedocumentationDFID’spublicrepositoryDevTracker.ForotherprogrammedocumentationwewerekindlyassistedbyaDFIDstaffmemberwhosearchedfordocumentationusinglistsweprovided.Usingtheseapproacheswewereabletogathermostprogrammedocumentationweidentifiedasexisting.

Analysing programme documentationWeproducedananalyticaltemplateandusedthistocompileinformationoneachprogrammeinordertoanswerquestions.ThetemplateispresentedinTableA3.Foreachareaofthereviewweconsultedinformationfromeachprogrammeintheportfolio.

44 LEGEND Report


Tabl

e A1

: Mai

n qu

estio

ns fo

r the

por

tfolio

ove

rvie

w

Ques

tion

area

Ques

tions

for t

he p

ortfo

lio

Ques

tions

for p

rogr

amm

esSo

urce

(s) f

or q

uest

ions

APPR

OACH

: gen

eral

Are

links

bet

wee

n la

nd p

rogr

amm

es a

nd h

ighe

r lev

el c

ount

ry a

nd

sect

or s

trate

gies

cle

ar a

nd w

ell-a

rticu

late

d?Do

es th

e po

rtfol

io re

flect

the

dive

rsity

of d

iffer

ent c

ount

ry

situ

atio

ns, a

nd in

clud

e a

corre

spon

ding

ly ap

prop

riate

bal

ance

of

prog

ram

me

type

s?

Is th

e po

rtfol

io b

ased

on

good

evid

ence

?Do

es th

e po

rtfol

io o

verv

iew

as

a w

hole

hav

e a

clea

r ris

k m

anag

emen

t stra

tegy

, doe

s th

is c

onsi

der a

ll th

e re

leva

nt (a

nd

not j

ust fi

nanc

ial)

risks

, and

are

thes

e ris

ks m

anag

ed w

ell b

y DF

ID a

nd/o

r im

plem

ente

rs?

How

muc

h do

es th

e po

rtfol

io re

ly on

diff

eren

t del

ivery

par

tner

s?

Are

expe

ctat

ions

on

the

time

for d

elive

ring

impa

ct re

alis

tic

acro

ss th

e po

rtfol

io?*

Do

es th

e po

rtfol

io p

rom

ote

the

VGGT

s (fr

om 2

013

onw

ards

) and

in

wha

t par

ticul

ar a

reas

?

Do c

ount

ry p

rogr

amm

es re

cogn

ise

dive

rsity

in th

e po

litic

al a

nd s

ocia

l con

ditio

ns a

cros

s a

coun

try a

nd is

this

refle

cted

in p

rogr

amm

e de

sign

? Ar

e la

nd p

rogr

amm

es d

esig

ned

in a

way

that

allo

ws

the

flexib

ility

to a

dapt

to c

hang

ing

circ

umst

ance

s?*

Are

prog

ram

mes

upf

ront

abo

ut th

e po

litic

al c

halle

nges

they

face

and

real

istic

abo

ut w

here

they

ca

nnot

ach

ieve

out

com

es a

nd im

pact

s al

one?

Ar

e pr

ogra

mm

es in

form

ed b

y ap

prop

riate

evid

ence

?Do

pro

gram

mes

hav

e a

clea

r ris

k m

anag

emen

t stra

tegy

, doe

s th

is c

onsi

der a

ll th

e re

leva

nt (a

nd

not j

ust fi

nanc

ial)

risks

, and

are

thes

e ris

ks m

anag

ed w

ell b

y DF

ID a

nd/o

r im

plem

ente

rs?

Wha

t typ

es o

f ris

ks d

o bu

sine

ss c

ases

for p

rogr

amm

es fo

rese

e an

d ho

w d

o th

ey p

ropo

se to

de

al w

ith th

em (i

nclu

ding

soc

ial r

isks

)?Do

revie

ws

sugg

est t

hat p

rogr

amm

es h

ave

succ

essf

ully

iden

tified

and

dea

lt w

ith ri

sks

that

em

erge

dur

ing

impl

emen

tatio

n?

Are

prog

ram

mes

real

istic

abo

ut th

e tim

elin

e fo

r del

iverin

g im

pact

?W

hat p

artn

ers

do p

rogr

amm

es d

elive

r thr

ough

? Do

pro

gram

me

docu

men

ts s

ugge

st b

enefi

ciar

ies

have

bee

n in

volve

d in

pro

gram

me

desi

gn a

nd

cons

ulta

tion

arou

nd d

elive

ry?

Do in

clud

ed p

rogr

amm

es ta

rget

ing

the

agric

ultu

re s

ecto

r com

preh

ensi

vely

cons

ider

and

/or

addr

ess

land

issu

es?

N.B.

this

is re

leva

nt fo

r lar

ger c

entra

lly-m

anag

ed p

rogr

amm

es*

For P

SD p

rogr

amm

es in

par

ticul

arDo

bus

ines

s ca

ses

for P

SD p

rogr

amm

es e

xplic

itly

stat

e ho

w th

ey c

ontri

bute

to b

road

er c

ount

ry

leve

l PSD

stra

tegi

es?

Are

PSD

land

pro

gram

mes

info

rmed

by

over

arch

ing

anal

ysis

of c

ount

ry-s

peci

fic g

row

th

cons

train

ts?

N.B

mai

nly

to fl

ag b

ut u

nlik

ely

for p

rogr

amm

es c

omm

issi

oned

bef

ore

IGDs

.

ICAI

(201

4) D

FID’

s Pr

ivate

Sec

tor

Deve

lopm

ent W

ork

Del

iverin

g im

pact

; IDC

on

Food

Sec

urity

APPR

OACH

: foc

usin

g on

the

poor

, wom

en

and

girls

and

oth

er

vuln

erab

le g

roup

s.

Does

the

portf

olio

focu

s on

redu

cing

pov

erty

?Do

es th

e po

rtfol

io a

ddre

ss w

omen

’s la

nd ri

ghts

?W

hat g

roup

s of

the

poor

do

land

pro

gram

mes

targ

et a

nd to

wha

t ext

ent d

o th

e fo

llow

ing

grou

ps

feat

ure

amon

g th

e in

tend

ed b

enefi

ciar

ies?

[the

poo

rest

]/ [w

omen

and

girl

s]/ [

othe

r spe

cifie

d vu

lner

able

gro

ups]

.Do

pro

gram

me

docu

men

ts s

tate

any

oth

er w

ays

thes

e gr

oups

will

bene

fit, i

f the

y ar

e no

t in

tend

ed b

enefi

ciar

ies?

To

wha

t ext

ent d

o pr

ogra

mm

es re

cogn

ise

risks

to th

ese

grou

ps in

clud

ing

com

plet

e an

d pa

rtial

lo

ss o

f rig

hts

over

land

, and

incl

ude

mea

sure

s to

miti

gate

thes

e ris

ks?

Do p

rogr

amm

es e

xplic

itly

addr

ess

land

righ

ts o

f wom

en?

Is d

ata

on p

rogr

amm

e in

terv

entio

ns a

nd o

utco

mes

gen

der-

disa

ggre

gate

d?Do

less

ons

emer

ge o

n w

hat d

oes

and

does

not

wor

k fo

r im

prov

ing

wom

en’s

con

trol o

ver l

and,

an

d ar

e th

ere

indi

catio

ns th

at th

ese

may

be

appl

icab

le in

oth

er c

onte

xts?

IDC

(201

3). G

loba

l Foo

d Se

curit

y

APPR

OACH

-co

rrupt

ion

Are

ther

e an

y at

tem

pts

to ta

ckle

cor

rupt

ion

in la

nd a

cros

s th

e po

rtfol

io?

If so

, is

it ef

fect

ive in

add

ress

ing

land

-rel

ated

cor

rupt

ion?

Do p

rogr

amm

e do

cum

ents

exp

licitl

y di

scus

s co

rrupt

ion

and

does

the

prog

ram

me

inte

rven

tion

seek

to a

ddre

ss it

? Do

pro

gram

mes

col

lect

info

rmat

ion

on c

orru

ptio

n in

land

-rel

ated

ser

vices

?

ICAI

on

corru

ptio

n,

http://icai.independent.gov.uk/reports/dfids-private-sector-development-work/

http://icai.independent.gov.uk/reports/dfids-private-sector-development-work/

Ques

tion

area

Ques

tions

for t

he p

ortfo

lio

Ques

tions

for p

rogr

amm

esSo

urce

(s) f

or q

uest

ions

APPR

OACH

-Clim

ate

Is th

ere

any

inte

rsec

tion

betw

een

land

pro

gram

mes

and

clim

ate

acro

ss th

e po

rtfol

io?

Coul

d la

nd p

rogr

amm

es d

o m

ore

on c

limat

e an

d ta

ke a

dvan

tage

of

ICF

fund

s fo

r thi

s pu

rpos

e?

How

doe

s cl

imat

e fe

atur

e in

the

prog

ram

me

desi

gn a

nd d

elive

ry, a

nd w

here

it d

oesn

’t w

hat

oppo

rtuni

ties

mig

ht th

ere

have

bee

n?

Do la

nd p

rogr

amm

es u

se IC

F fu

ndin

g fo

r add

ition

al c

limat

e w

ork?

Cou

ld la

nd p

rogr

amm

es d

o m

ore

on c

limat

e an

d ta

ke a

dvan

tage

of I

CF fu

nds

for t

his

purp

ose?

ICAI

(201

4) T

he U

K’s

Inte

rnat

iona

l Cl

imat

e Fu

nd

APPR

OACH

-e

ngag

ing

busi

ness

To w

hat e

xten

t doe

s DF

ID re

ly on

bus

ines

ses

(thro

ugh

loan

s,

equi

ty, g

rant

s, a

nd th

roug

h ch

alle

nge

fund

s) to

man

age

and/

or

impl

emen

t its

land

por

tfolio

? Do

es D

FID’

s en

gage

men

t with

bus

ines

ses

and

impl

emen

ting

agen

ts/p

artn

ers

clea

rly s

et o

ut h

ow to

ach

ieve

pov

erty

redu

ctio

n,

and

how

is th

is m

onito

red?

Do p

rogr

amm

es th

at e

ngag

e bu

sine

ss o

n la

nd ri

ghts

cle

arly

spel

l out

how

effo

rts in

terv

entio

ns

targ

et th

e po

or?

IC

AI o

n Bu

sine

ss i

n De

velo

pmen

t

COHE

RENC

EW

hat i

s th

e ba

lanc

e of

mic

ro, m

id a

nd m

acro

land

rela

ted

inte

rven

tions

with

in c

ount

ries,

are

thes

e co

here

nt, a

nd

coor

dina

ted?

Ho

w a

re c

entra

lly-m

anag

ed p

rogr

amm

es a

nd c

ount

ry

prog

ram

mes

that

add

ress

land

link

ed?

Do p

rogr

amm

e do

cum

ents

cle

arly

desc

ribe

how

the

prog

ram

me

links

to c

ount

ry a

nd s

ecto

r st

rate

gies

? Do

pro

gram

me

docu

men

ts d

escr

ibe

how

pro

gram

mes

fit w

ith o

ther

rele

vant

pro

gram

mes

in

the

coun

try?

ICAI

on

Deliv

erin

g Im

pact

COVE

RAGE

Wha

t is

the

geog

raph

ic c

once

ntra

tion

of th

e la

nd p

ortfo

lio?

Are

DFID

prio

rity

coun

tries

repr

esen

ted

in th

e po

rtfol

io?

Does

the

portf

olio

focu

s on

spe

cific

land

type

s or

con

text

s? (E

.g.

urba

n, ru

ral l

and,

fore

st la

nd, p

astu

re) o

r spe

cific

pur

pose

s or

gr

oups

(com

mer

cial

agr

icul

ture

inve

stm

ent,

smal

lhol

der f

arm

ing,

ur

ban

etc.

)

Whe

re d

o pr

ogra

mm

es o

pera

te?

Wha

t typ

es o

f lan

d do

pro

gram

mes

add

ress

? W

hat g

roup

s do

es th

e po

rtfol

io ta

rget

(als

o se

e qu

estio

n be

low

on

gend

er)?

IDC

(201

3). G

loba

l Foo

d Se

curit

y

IMPA

CTW

hat i

mpa

cts

have

em

erge

d ov

er th

e po

rtfol

io?

W

hat i

mpa

cts

(inte

nded

and

uni

nten

ded)

hav

e em

erge

d du

ring

prog

ram

me

impl

emen

tatio

n?

46 LEGEND Report

http://icai.independent.gov.uk/reports/uks-international-climate-fund/

http://icai.independent.gov.uk/reports/uks-international-climate-fund/

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmintdev/176/176.pdf


Table A2: Programmes for which reports provided insufficient detail on land

Name Detail

Comic Relief Programme Partnership Arrangement/ Common Ground Initiative One of the groups targeted by this programme is poor people in urban slums, but there is no information on activities related to this in Annual or Mid-term reviews.

The International Partnership for African Fisheries, Governance and Trade This programme works on issues to do with tenure of fisheries, but no reference could be found to any work on land.

Policy Development Fund Tanzania This programme supports on-demand support for policy-related work in Tanzania. It is not designed to explicitly target land and funds from the programme have been used to support two short-term assignments on land.

IFUSE This programme supports deployment of experts from UK government and subsidiary bodies, including HM Land Registry. The programme documents provide little detail on the assignments undertaken on land.

Mining Sector Reform Project (DRC) The programme documents make no reference to activities on land tenure or working on property rights.

Trocaire, Uganda This programme could not be identified from available information or from searches on DevTracker

The Rainforest Foundation, Indonesia This programme could not be identified from available information or from searches on DevTracker

48 LEGEND Report

Tabl

e A3

: Not

-inc

lude

d DF

ID p

rogr

amm

es w

orki

ng o

n la

nd (c

onfir

med

and

pot

entia

l)

Prog

ram

me

Loca

tion

Land

Use

Aim

Stat

us

Bang

lade

sh U

rban

Pr

ogra

mm

e, P

hase

2Ba

ngla

desh

Urba

nIm

prov

emen

t in

the

inte

grat

ion

of p

oor c

omm

uniti

es in

to m

unic

ipal

pla

nnin

g, b

udge

ting

and

man

agem

ent,

with

a

parti

cula

r foc

us o

n w

omen

and

girl

s an

d cl

imat

e re

silie

nce;

pilo

ting

of o

ptio

ns fo

r sca

le u

p an

d le

sson

lear

ning

at

natio

nal l

evel

to in

form

ove

rall

urba

n po

licy

and

pove

rty re

duct

ion.

Pipe

line/

iden

tifica

tion

Enab

ling

Path

way

s ou

t of

Extre

me

Pove

rty (E

PEP)

Bang

lade

shRu

ral

To p

rom

ote

sust

aine

d pa

thw

ays

out o

f pov

erty

for e

xtre

me

poor

peo

ple

whi

le b

uild

ing

thei

r res

ilienc

e to

sho

cks

and

vuln

erab

ility.

Pipe

line/

Iden

tifica

tion

Urba

n Pa

rtner

ship

s fo

r Po

verty

Red

uctio

nBa

ngla

desh

Urba

nTo

impr

ove

the

livel

ihoo

ds a

nd li

ving

cond

ition

s of

3 M

illion

urb

an p

oor a

nd e

xtre

mel

y po

or p

eopl

e, e

spec

ially

wom

en

and

girls

.Im

plem

enta

tion

Econ

omic

Em

pow

erm

ent

of th

e Po

ores

tBa

ngla

desh

Rura

lTo

impr

ove

the

livel

ihoo

ds o

f 750

,000

ver

y po

or p

eopl

e, p

artic

ular

ly w

omen

and

chi

ldre

n, b

y in

crea

sing

thei

r eco

nom

ic

wel

l-bei

ng.

Impl

emen

tatio

n

Tran

spar

ency

and

Rig

ht

to In

form

atio

nBa

ngla

desh

N/A

To in

crea

se tr

ansp

aren

cy a

nd a

ccou

ntab

ility

in B

angl

ades

h by

impr

ovin

g sy

stem

s fo

r man

agem

ent a

nd p

roac

tive

publ

icat

ion

of o

ffici

al in

form

atio

n th

at is

rele

vant

and

acc

essi

ble,

tim

ely

and

accu

rate

, and

by

enab

ling

stat

e re

form

ers,

bu

sine

sses

and

soc

ial a

ctivi

sts

to h

old

offic

ials

and

dec

isio

n m

aker

s an

swer

able

for t

heir

actio

ns a

cros

s a

rang

e of

se

rvic

es in

clud

ing

heal

th, e

duca

tion,

loca

l gov

ernm

ent,

clim

ate

finan

ce a

nd la

nd a

dmin

istra

tion.

Impl

emen

tatio

n

Man

agin

g Cl

imat

e Ri

sks

for U

rban

Poo

r(in

itial

ly Pa

kist

an,

Bang

lade

sh, I

ndia

, Vi

etna

m, I

ndon

esia

and

la

ter i

n th

e Ph

ilippi

nes)

Urba

nTh

is p

rogr

amm

e w

ill he

lp c

ities

pla

n fo

r and

inve

st in

redu

cing

the

impa

cts

of w

eath

er-r

elat

ed c

hang

es a

nd e

xtre

me

even

ts, t

hrou

gh a

par

tner

ship

with

the

Rock

efel

ler f

ound

atio

n an

d th

e As

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Impl

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Prog

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nter

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efit 2

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efici

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onor

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for S

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paci

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han

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nesi

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apua

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then

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patia

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elop

men

t pla

ns a

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over

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t sup

porte

d ac

tions

on

low

car

bon

inve

stm

ent w

hich

will

cont

ribut

e to

war

ds e

nsur

ing

envir

onm

enta

l sus

tain

abilit

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Sept

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r 201

5

Detailed findings from completed programmes

MPUSP TheMPUSPwasaprogrammethataimedtocarryoutextensivereformsinurbanplanningandgovernance,withexplicitaimstoincreaselocalrevenueforpoverty-reductionprogrammesandmakesubstantialimprovementsintheavailabilityandqualityofbasicservicesinslums.Onland,mostofitsfocuswasonimprovinglandadministrationaspartofbroadereffortstoexpandandimprovedecentralisedadministrativeservicesthroughCitizenServiceCentres,whichimprovedaccesstolandrecords.Italsostrengthenedstate-levelslumpolicywhichledtoprogrammesdeliveringlandtitles:in2008-09.Inthisperiod24,800households(111,600beneficiaries;around50,220women)wereprovidedwithapatta(tenuresecuritywitha99-yearleaseperiod),ofwhich16,841pattaswereissuedinBhopal.Whiletheprogrammecontributedtothisprocess,theactualissuingofpattaswasdonebyanotherprogramme.

Ontheadministrativeside,theprogrammeaimedtoincreasetheamountofpropertytaxescollectedincities

withoutraisingrates.AcorepartofdoingthisinvolvedanadministrativeexercisetoupdaterecordsofallpropertiesontoaGISplatformandmatchthiswithdatafromsocio-economicandrevenuedata.Thisledtoanadditional175,000propertiesbeingidentifiedandpropertytaxcollectioninthefourlargesturbanareasincreasingbetween50to150%overthepastfiveyears.

Theprogrammealsoembarkedonasuccessfulprogrammeofcitizen-centricgovernance.Throughinvestmentsinimprovedservices,itcutdownwaitingtimesbyhalfforvariousidentitydocumentsandbuildingpermits.Professionalisingtheseservicesalsoledtoareductioninopportunitiesforcorruption.Overall,theprogrammehasdirectlyledtostrengthenedgovernanceatstateandULBlevels,enablingaffordableandsustainableaccesstobasicservicesespeciallybythepoorimprovedaccesstoimpressivenumbersofpoorpeoplelivinginurbanareas.Inthiscase,thiswasachievablewithoutastrongfocusonimprovingtenuresecurityperse.

The Degraded Land Mapping (DLM) programme TheDLMprogrammeaimedtoestablishconsensusaroundtheideasofusingdegradedlandforpalmoil

50 LEGEND Report

Annex 2: Further information on programmes

Figure A1: Improvements in collection of property rights in the MPUSP programme

Notes: (Property tax collections in four ULBs)

plantations,andintroducing‘landswaps’asameanstobringthisabout.ThemainresultsweretheproductionoftechnicalmapsthatshoweddegradedlandandchangesinforestcoverforallfivemainpalmoilproducingislandsinIndonesia,aswellaspublicationsandtrainingstoincreasestakeholderawarenessandcapacityofusingdataanddecision-makingtoolsTheprogrammemetneitherofitsoutcometargetsthatforesawprovincialgovernmentsandtheprivatesectorhavinginplacepoliciesonplantingpalmoilondegradedland,leadingtoatargeted40%ofnewplantationsbeingsitedondegradedland.Giventhattheprogramme’slengthwasthreeyears,thesewereoverlyambitiousoutcometargets,moresoastheprogrammestartwasdelayed.29ThePCRalsonotesthattheprogrammewasnotdesignedtobesuitablyflexibletoadapttothechanginglandscapeofpalmoilsustainabilityissues.

Amajorweaknessidentifiedintheprogramme’sapproachwasthatalthoughtheprogrammeprovidedatechnicalproofoffeasibility30(throughmappingavailabilityofdegradedlands)withoutinvestingtimeinbuildingrelationswithinstitutionsthatcouldgainpoliticaltractiononthisissue,itcouldnotprovethepracticalfeasibility.WhileWRIraisedinterestinthelandswapconceptamongcompanies,seniormanagementinthesecompaniesultimatelyviewedastoohighriskattemptstochangethelegalstatusofland,anddidnotpursuetheidea.

Animportantlessonthatemergedfromthisprogrammesisthattoconvinceacompanytochangepolicy,programmesneedtoensurethatthecaseisconvincingfromthepointofseniormanagement,andnotonlythosewhomtheprogrammeengages.ItwashighlightedthatwasparticularlyimportantintheIndonesiancontext,butlikelyholdstrueelsewheretoo.

Theprogrammealsoseentohavebeentooslowtoadjustitsapproachtotheshiftingdiscourseonsustainabilityandprioritiesofcompaniesandgovernmentworkingonoilpalmmorebroadly.

Community Land Use FundTheprogramme’simpactevaluationfoundtheprogrammehasbeensuccessfulinachievingoutcomesamongitsruralbeneficiaries.Throughtheprogramme145,000peopleon582,000hectareshadtheircommunallandrightssecured(delimitedordemarcatedinthenationalregister,25communitiesandproducerassociationsreceivedhelptoproduceplansforcommunityinvestments,eitheraloneorthroughpartnershipswithoutsideinvestors.Around40communitiesalsobegantoreceiverevenuesfromforesttaxes.

Beneficiarieswerebetterinformedaboutlandrightsandongoodstewardshipofnaturalresources.Thescaleofdeliverywasmoresuccessfulthanoriginallyanticipated,asdemandfortheservicestosecuretenure

undertheprogrammewashigh.Thisatteststothesuccessoftheprogrammedesignaswellascommunicationsandoutreach.However,theprogramme’shopesthatdelimitinganddemarcatinglandwouldcatalysepositiveinvestmentswerenotfullyborneout.Whiledemarcatingandprovidingtitlestolocalassociationstogetherwithoutsideinvestorshasworkedinsomecases,thereisariskthatcommunitiesmaystruggletoregaincontrolofthelandifthepartnershipfails.Theprimaryinterestofcommunitieswasinsecuringlandtenureforprotectionagainstexpropriation,ratherthanusingstrongertenuretoattractoutsideinvestment.

Rwanda Land Tenure Regularisation ProgrammeTheimpactoftheprogrammewastocontributetopovertyreduction,increasedproductiveinvestment,optimizationoflanduse,genderequality&socialharmony,throughoutRwanda.ThemainachievementoftheprogrammewasprovidinglandtitlesforthemajorityofRwandans.BetweenFebruary2010andAugust2013,theprogrammesubstantiallyachievedthedesiredoutcome.10.3millionlandparcelsweredemarcatedandadjudicatedwithover80%beingapprovedtotitle.8.4millionleaseandfreeholdtitleshavebeenpreparedwithover5.7millioncollectedbylandowners.Thiswasachievedatacostestimatedatbetween£3.42and£4.05perparcel.

ThekeylessonsfromtheRwandaprogrammeare:

• Anyprogrammeofmasssystematicregistrationneedstohaveasysteminplacereadytoreceivetheresultsoftheregistrationandabletosupportsubsequenttransfer

• Themasssystematicregistrationshouldnotbeprioritisedoverthecapacityandinstitutionbuildingofthelandadministrationagency

• Acontinualandpervasivemediacampaignbackedupbylocalevents,engagementatlocallevel,andmobilisingwiderresources(communitygroups,women’sgroups,NGO’s)isneededtocommunicatetheunderstandingoftheregistrationprocessandtheneedtoregistertransfer.

• Indicatorsneedtobecarefullychosenthataremeasureableandhaveacausallinktoobjectivesandinterventionmethods

• Thelandadministrationagencyneedstoengagefullyintheprocessesandrecognisethatitwillgothroughsubstantialchange

• Theselectionandappointmentprocesseswithinthepublicadministrationsectorhavebeenfarmorecumbersomeandslowthananticipatedandthishasadverselyaffectedtheproject.

• Itispossibletousethislowcostcommunityengagementapproachtoidentify,demarcate,adjudicateandassignownershiprightstoalargenumberofpeopleatlowunit

29 DLMPCR2014

30 ThetechnicaloutputsoftheprogrammeareassessedasgoodinthePCRandthecombinationoftoolsontheGFWwebsiteiscommended


costs(£6percertificate).Bycomparison,thiscontrastswitharecentprojectinLesothowhichcost$60USDperparcel.Thelowcostapproachembodiestheconceptof“fitforpurpose”,andisflexibleinallowingpara-surveyorsandparalegalstoworkinthefield.

Urban LandMark UrbanLandMarkhasdevelopedandadoptedthepragmaticapproachofincrementaltenuresecurityimprovement,andthishasyieldedrealbenefitswhereithasbeenapplied,resultinginalocalrecognitionofpeople’srighttooccupancy.Themethodologyisbeingtakenupbypractitioners,andanewNationalUpgradingProgrammein49municipalities(morethan2400settlements)isabouttobeinitiated,fundedbynationalgovernment,withsomeoftheimprovementcontractbeingcarriedoutbyformerUrbanLandMarkpartners(e.g.AfesisCorplan)whohavebeenactivelyengagedinthedevelopmentofthesemethodologies.UrbanLandMarkhaspilotedtheinclusivezoningschemesandtheincrementaltenuresecurityimprovementmethodologiesinsettlementsinJohannesburg(HappyValley)andCapeTown(MonwabisiPark)andEmalahleni(Springvalley)anditisnowtoberolledoutfurtherintheNationalUpgradingProgrammetobecarriedoutin49municipalities.TheapproachhasbeendisseminatedinternationallyintheRegionandalsothroughCitiesAllianceandUNHabitat,GLTN(GlobalLandToolsNetwork).Whereapplied,ithasbeenpossibletoimplementsuccessfullyandthereforeresultedinalocalrecognitionofpeople’srighttooccupancy

TheachievementsoftheUrbanLandMarkprogrammecontributedtotheobjectiveofensuringpoorpeopleinurbanareashavingsecureaccesstowell-locatedland,andhasalsohelpedestablishaplatformthatsupportstheachievementofthesetargets,particularlyUrbanLandMark’scontributionstoestablishing:

• legislativeandlegalframeworks, • thenecessaryknowledgeandtools, • theinstitutionalplatformsestablishedthroughagenciessuchastheNationalUpgradingSupportProgrammeandtheHousingDevelopmentAgency,and

• thedevelopmentofthenecessaryprofessionalskillsandcompetenciesinkeyinstitutionsandprofessionalstaff.

Furthermore,theUrbanLandMarkprogrammedevelopedasetofimportantassetsthatwillcontributesignificantlytotheachievementofprogrammepurposegoingforwardandwillassisttheGovernmentofSouthAfricatoachievetheirurbantargetsfor2014.Theseassetsinclude:data,researchregulatoryimpactassessmentcapabilityandlegaldraftingcapacitiesneededbytheGovernmentofSouthAfricainordertoreformthelegislativeandregulatoryframeworksinwayswhichwillcreatemoreenablingenvironments

Global Legal Empowerment ProgrammeTheintendedimpactofthisprogrammewasgreaterlegalempowermentaroundtheworld,i.e.morepeopleabletounderstandandmakeuseofthelaw.AkeyachievementofGLEIhasbeentheestablishmentofNamati,aglobalorganisationdedicatedtoputtingthelawinpeople’shands,withaparticularfocusonparalegals.

MainImpactsforLandComponent:

• Securinglandtenureandstrengtheninglocallandgovernance.InMozambique,Uganda,BurmaandLiberia,Namatiandpartnershavedevelopedamodelfordocumentingcustomarylandclaimsandstrengtheninglocalgovernanceovercommunitylands,withaparticularfocusongenderequality,sustainablenaturalresourceuse,andauthenticcommunityapprovalforalltransactionswithoutsideinvestors.

• NamatihasalsobeenstrengtheninglandrightsinMyanmarthroughtestinghowfrontlineparalegalscanscaleupsupportfarmerstoprotecttheirlandrightsunderanewregistrationprocess.Paralegalshavetestedandmadeprogressinaddressingthefollowingjusticeproblems:securingfarmingrightsinforestland;returnoflandgrabbedbymilitaryandcompany;resistinglandconfiscation;faircompensationforlandtaken;lackofknowledgeamongfarmershowtouselandcertificatestoprotectlandtenurelongterm.Thishasresultedin6000casesbeinghandledtodate.

• InIndiaNamatihasbeenintheearlystagesofunderstandinghowparalegalscanassistcommunitieswhoarealreadyexperiencingindustrialinvestmentsoftheirland.Namatiistestinghowparalegalscanhandlecasespertainingtoregulationofcoastalmanagementzonesanddevelopingtrainingmodelstoempowercommunitiestomonitorcompliance.Bytheendofthereportingperiod47casesarebeingactivelypursuedbyparalegalsinGujaratandUttaraKannada,with12resolved.

Other,transferablekeyimpactsfromtheprogrammeare:

• Paralegalswhohavespecialistknowledgearelikelytogeneratefasterresultsondifficultissuesandbeabletobettereducatebeneficiariesofspecificissues.Thiswasverifiedduringthemonitoringvisit,whenNamatiheldaworkshopinInhambane,paralegalswithtechnicalknowledgeonagricultureandlandrightswereabletomanagelandrelatedissuesandgainthetrustofcommunitiesquickly;and

• Namatihascompletedground-breakingresearch,builtanetworkofover400organizationsanddevelopeditsowninnovativeprojectsineightcountries,aimedatimprovingaccesstojustice,healthcare,landrightsandcitizenshiprights.Namatiworkswithlocalpartnersonthedesign,technicalsupportandevaluationofprojectswhichareimplementedprimarilybypartnersthemselves,withvaryinglevelsofinputbyNamati.As

52 LEGEND Report


wellashelpingresolvethousandsofcases,eitherdirectlyorthroughpartners,Namatihasusedthedatacollectedoncasestoadvocateforsystemicreforms.

• Citizenshavedirectlybenefitedfromlegaladviceandbasiclegalservicestoresolvenumerousjusticeproblems,whetherrelatedtohumanrights,landrightsorsocialserviceaccountability.

• Robustevidenceofhowparalegalscanaddressfailuresintheruleoflawandachievepositiveoutcomesforpoorandmarginalizedgroupshasbeendevelopedandsharedinternationally.

• Legalempowermentpractitionershavebecomemoreeffectivethroughtheuseofevidenceanddataandinternationalexchangeofbestpractice.

• Nationalpolicychangeshavesteeredthelawanditsimplementationtowardsthepoor.

• Auniquecommunitylandprotectionmethodology,whichhasachievedsubstantialimpactinUganda,Mozambique,andLiberia.Itdemonstratestheimportanceofcommunitygovernancetosustainableandgender-balancedstewardshipofland.

Table A4: Overview of land components in logframes of non-core land programmes

Programme Outcomes, Outputs that target land Details


None obvious Although there are no clear components on land governance, the rationale driving the Business Case is that through becoming involved in community forests, poor households will be able to access valuable forest land.


Outcome 1 Output 1

Outcome 1: Proportionately more people benefitting from improved access to affordable and accountable services - primarily water and sanitation; housing; health; education.Output 1-indicator 1.1: Increased proportion of slum dwellers experiencing improved provision of water and sanitation services and improved housing conditions


Outcome, Indicator P.3;Output 1; indicator 1.1

Outcome statement Governance and market reforms that reduce the illegal use of forest resources and benefit poor people. Indicator P.3 Progress with adopting and implementing pro-poor land tenure reforms at national level7/. 7/This refers to (a) improving the legal framework in relation to land, and (b) increasing the security of community land tenure and use rights.Output 1; 1.1: Capability of national stakeholders to participate effectively in deliberative processes in order to deliver political reforms in relation to market, forest, and land tenure in VPA countries12/.Outputs differ by country--they make reference to expected change in policies and implementation.


Outcome D; Output 2. Additional Outcome Indicator D GEMS 3 only:Improved access to land, tax and investment services: Number of land registration, tax or other relevant targeted certificates received by target group. Assumptions: 1. The scale of land registration will only be achieved if funds are being made available by PTCLR/State Governments: total to achieve 0.6 m titles by 2017 July is GBP 4.9m. The disaggregation by year is presented in GEMS3 Dec 2012 Quarterly report. Output 2. Value adding business services and “products (i.e., policies, strategies)” addressing “Land” constraints for target enterprises and firms are identified and strengthened. Indicators: # Improved processes, services, regulations and other “products” related to land :( DBI land related (procedures, time and cost); information services, advocacy and PPD services, land related services)


None, or all! There is no specific output or outcome indicator on land; as issues are not topic specific, but rather more broadly about legal empowerment.


Output 1; indicator 1.2 Output Indicator 1.2: All ICF projects which address constraints in either business or land registration will result in a fewer number of procedures to register the relevant asset.


Impact; Purpose (indicator 2) Impact: States implement security of tenure and at least 1 out of 2 pro-poor policy reforms, earmarking pro-poor budget, reservation of dwelling space of r the urban poor. Purpose indicator 2: Number of additional persons with access to (1) improved water, sanitation and (2) tenure security (deemed beneficiaries) But other outputs on policy documents also likely relevant to land.

54 LEGEND Report

(continued)

Programme Outcomes, Outputs that target land Details


Purpose; Output 4.2 Purpose indicator 1 [about access to services, not land per se). Access of 6.36 million citizens, o/w 2.83 million poor (to be disaggregated by social group and gender) to basic urban services: a). water supply (coverage); b). Sewerage (coverage) in Patna; and c). Sewerage (coverage) in other cities. Output 4: indicator 4.2 percentage of UIs completing municipal land mapping; (b) percentage of UIs using municipal land for private investment


Output 3; Output indicator 3.2 Output 3: Greater financial security from land for poor peopleOutput Indicator 3.2: Number of poor women securing access to land as an asset


Goal, Indicator 3; Goal, Indicator 3; Proportion of the poor, disaggregated by social groups, reporting improvement in livelihood opportunities and security of tenureOutput 2: Number of households taken out of poverty through coordinated Mission approach (this seems to includes work on improving tenure)


Output 4, indicators b, d. Output 4: Legal rights and access to resources realised in programme areas. Indicator b: b) Number of acres of additional khas land leased to poor and marginalised people. d.) Total value (in million £) of government khas land and water bodies accessed by beneficiaries.


Output 2Output 3

Output 2: Improved national and local policies on LULUCF (informed by improved research) Indicator 2.1, 2.2: # of new or revised national policies consistent with legal drafts/reviews/ positions produced and/or advocated by SETAPAK partners on sustainable land and forest resources management; (2.2=2.2 provincial and district governments)Output 3: Improved rule of law on LULUCF and recognition of rights of communities affected by LULUCF (specifically customary land tenure and free, prior and informed consent - FPIC) esp. indicator 3.4: # of Community based forest management permit processes (e.g. Hutan Desa, Hutan Kemasyarakatan, Hutan Tanaman Rakyat) initiated in conjunction with SETAPAK partners’ activities


Output 2, esp. Output 2.1 Public, free access to policy maker-friendly “How to” guidance for sustainable palm oil expansion while avoiding deforestation; 2.1 number of community maps* created within the West Kalimantan (2009-12) pilot site; Number of management plans* created for the spared forest area within the West Kalimantan (2009-12) pilot site

Urban Land Reform- Urban LandMark

Impact: Impact indicator: Number of people living in slums. Supply of serviced land to trade on, to use productively.Functioning property markets which improve access to land for poorer households and communities


Impact, Output 3 (Note: the link made with land tenure in the logframe is not explicit)

Impact: Urban poor with access to improved water and sanitation; Output 3 participatory and citizen centric governance: Average time taken to get access to services- (1) Birth and death certificates; (2) Water Connections; (3) Building Permission


None specified. None specified.

Forest Land use and governance in Indonesia

Outcome 3; Output 1; Output 3 Outcome3: Number of land-based social conflicts; Output 1: More effective and transparent land-useOutput 3, Indicator 3.1 Number of forestry/ land use regulations issued by OJK.


Table A5: Beneficiaries that programmes aim to serve

Programme Direct Beneficiaries (measured at outcome (OC) output (OP) level)


Impact: Poor people, incomes; disadvantaged people, with four sources of income; People in climate vulnerable areas, with activities that reduce their vulnerability. OC: disadvantaged and climate vulnerable households and people, benefiting from revenues of local user group forest products.

MOLA (Mozambique Land Action) Impact: Households in target areas, with higher incomes;OC: # Local councils and local communities, who are more aware of gender issuesOP: Land parcels in rural and urban areas; competent service providers and institutions. # Communities with land rights; investors, traditional leaders with knowledge of gender ; district land authorities that are well-equipped.


Impact: reduction in urban poverty. OT: % Slum households experiencing improved provision of water, improved housing conditions. Slum Children with better health, education % slum dwellers experience higher incomes, better livelihoods (sp. Women).NGO’s performing well and hold authorities to account; Local government expenditure or policy implementation that benefits slum-dwellers


National stakeholders participating in VPA related processes; Policy improvements [likely more at each country level--see country LF]


Impact: vulnerable households, accessing credit; Women, accessing land titles, singly or jointly; citizens, who feel they can participate in local decision making;

Community Land Use Fund OP: # Service providers (sp. Women); community organisations;

OC: # Producer organisations (sp. Women); rural communities benefitting from forestry tax; rural households (sp. women)


Impact: #poor people (sp. Women) registering increases in income; change in income (sp. Women); no. of jobs (sp. women); firms with increased sales (sp. Women owned). OC: business environment indicators (sp. those important to the poor: land, tax, investment; Outputs: all businesses, better biz environment sentiment and practice surveys

Land Investment for Transformation (LIFT)- Wealth Creation Programme

Impact: # Women, Economically empowered; OC: # Rural households, strengthened security of tenure; increased incomes; in which women have equal land rights to men; Woreda incomesOP: Households, with named certificates produced under SLLC process;


OP: # People served by grassroots legal advocates. Legal empowerment organisations and practitioners in a learning network.


OC: Businesses; improved times to register businesses.


Purpose Indicator 2: persons with access to (1) improved water, sanitation and (2) tenure security (deemed beneficiaries) Outputs refer to main policy documents the programme supports and pilot programmes.


Purpose: poor citizens, all citizens able to access basic urban services;OP 3.2, Households, with improved water supply, sanitation. 5.1 Women’s self-help groups (disaggregated by social group inc. religion), with access to loans and financial planning. 5.2women leaders (inc. from Dalit, Muslim communities) in local government groups.


Impact: Urban households, with access to improved water supply; improved sanitation in urban areas. Children, reporting lower incidence of diarrhoea,Outcome: # additional poor men and women with sustainable access to improved drinking and water, and sanitation. OP3: Number of poor women securing access to land as an asset.


Impact: poor, disaggregated by social groups, reporting improvement in livelihood opportunities and security of tenure.Purpose: # poor, disaggregated by social groups with access to basic services, OP: self-help groups, trained; poor youth, in work placements; # poor, with increased incomes; targeted slum dwellers, with access to health care; # poor, disaggregated by social groups with access to basic services,

56 LEGEND Report

(continued)

Programme Direct Beneficiaries (measured at outcome (OC) output (OP) level)

Support for the Implementation of the Voluntary Guidelines on Land Tenure (VGGT)

Impact: Countries in which improved gov of tenure has contributed to the eradication of hunger and poverty; Outcome: Men and Women in target countries confirming improved land governance systems and practice and improved tenure security.


OP: Small partners; organisations; community monitors ; migrant workers in decent work; children withdrawn from hazardous work; girls saved from early marriages; victims of violence receiving medical treatment; children learning native languages in schools; marginalised people participating in local government; Outcomes: beneficiaries of low pay increments through collective bargaining; hectares of land redistributed; marginalised men and women elected to local bodies; women victims accessing justice; numbers of poor and marginalised supported by government safety nets.


Impact: #poor people (provincial poverty rates); OP: Setapak’s partners. (Unspecified in LF); district governments.OP: implied beneficiaries of community forest permits.


OP: oil palm companies. Civil society organisations.

Urban Land Reform- Urban LandMark

Impact: People living in slums, Most vulnerable urban residents

Tanzania Land Programme Impact: Investors, land use rights holders with improved perception of tenure security; Outcome: multi-stakeholder group members; Households with titles;


Impact: poor and disadvantaged young people, supported to access primary school. Men and women, incomes. People, supported to access primary health care. Small and diaspora development organisations

Forest Land Use and Governance in Indonesia

OC: Businesses adopting responsible and sustainable business practices; Social conflicts

Table A6: Programme scores for ongoing and complete programmes

Project / Activity name Land component score Programme Score

Urban Land Reform- Urban LandMark A++ (PCR)


A(2013), A++ (2014)

Global Legal Empowerment Initiative A+ (PCR)

Madhya Pradesh Urban Services for the Poor (MPUSP) A+ (2012 PCR)


Policy on land use and forestry A+ (2015); A+ (2014) Output 3-Rule of law on land use and forestry A+ (2015), A+ (2014)

West Bengal: Kolkata Urban Services for the Poor (KUSP) A (2015); Slum delineation scored A++


Exceeded (2015): Not achieved (2014)

Multi-Stakeholder Forestry Programme - Nepal A (2015)

Land: Enhancing Governance for Economic Development (LEGEND)

A (2015)

Support for the Implementation of the Voluntary Guidelines on Land Tenure (VGGT)

A (2015)

Sport Relief 2012 - UK Aid Match - Slums A (2014)

Forest Governance, Markets and Climate Programme A(2015) A(2014)

Rwanda Land Tenure Regularisation Programme A (AR)

Community Land Use Fund A (PCR)

Land Investment for Transformation (LIFT)- Wealth Creation Programme

A (2015)

Project / Activity name Land component score Programme Score


A (2015)

Support Programme for Urban Reforms in Bihar A (2014)

Degraded Land Mapping for Kalimantan and Papua provinces B (2015 PCR)

Investment Climate Facility for Africa B (2015), A (2014) (Output 1.2: which addresses constraints in either business or land registration (not disaggregated)

Madhya Pradesh Urban Infrastructure Investment Project (MPUIIP) B (2014)

MOLA (Mozambique Land Action) No AR report yet

Forest Land Use and Governance in Indonesia No AR report yet

Tanzania Land Programme No AR report yet

Land: Enhancing Governance for Economic Development (LEGEND) is a DFID programme that aims to improve land rights protection, knowledge and information, and the quality of private sector investment in DFID priority countries. It includes the development and start-up of newDFID country land programmes, alongside knowledge management activities, a challenge fund to support land governance innovations, and management of complementary DFID grants, MoUs and contracts, and supported by a Core Land Support Team.

Readers are encouraged to reproduce material from LEGEND Reports for their own publications, as long as they are not being sold commercially. As copyright holder, LEGEND requests due acknowledgement and a copy of the publication. For online use, we ask readers to link to the original resource on the LEGEND website. The views presented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of LEGEND.

© LEGEND 2016. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial Licence (CC BY-NC 4.0).ISSN: 2052-7209

All LEGEND Reports are available from www.landportal.info/partners/legend


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