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Development and management of theEuphrates–Tigris basinDogan Altinbilek aa International Hydropower Association and Department of CivilEngineering , Middle East Technical University , Ankara, TurkeyPublished online: 22 Jan 2007.

To cite this article: Dogan Altinbilek (2004) Development and management of theEuphrates–Tigris basin, International Journal of Water Resources Development, 20:1, 15-33, DOI:10.1080/07900620310001635584

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Water Resources Development,Vol. 20, No. 1, 15–33, March 2004

Development and Management of the Euphrates–TigrisBasinD.AltinbilekDepartment of Civil EngineeringMiddle East Technical UniversityAnkara06531 AnkaraTurkeyhad@metu.edu.tr

DOGAN ALTINBILEKInternational Hydropower Association and Department of Civil Engineering, Middle EastTechnical University, Ankara, Turkey

ABSTRACT Issues related to the development and management of the Euphrates–Tigris basin arediscussed. Historical perspectives on water conflict, geography, hydrology, water and landresources development in riparian countries, namely Turkey, Syria and Iraq, are examined.Problems and misconceptions related to water utilization are analysed with regard to wateravailability, water loss, water rights, the role of dams and reservoirs, and environmental problemsof the Mesopotamian marshlands. Advantages and areas of co-operation between riparians arereviewed. Water conflict in the Euphrates–Tigris basin requires a hydro-political approach thatcovers legal, political, technical and economic aspects of its multi-dimensional characteristics.

Historical Perspective

The Euphrates–Tigris and its tributaries served as the cradle for many civiliza-tions that evolved in Mesopotamia, ‘the land between two rivers’. Historianshave noted the progression of the Mesopotamian civilizations, with the oldestdating back to 10 000 BC. The well-known civilizations in Mesopotamia (Iraq)were those of the Sumerians, Acadians, Babylonians and Assyrians, who orga-nized efficient hydraulic civilizations that supported some 20 million inhabitantsat their peak and were based on a well-maintained irrigation and flood controlsystem. The history of water-related disputes in the Middle East, and especiallyin the Euphrates–Tigris basin, goes back 6000 years and is described in manymyths, legends and historical accounts that have survived from earlier times.These disputes range from conflicts over access to adequate water supplies tointentional attacks on water supply systems during wars (Gleick, 1994).

The fall of the Ottoman Empire resulted in new borders together with a newtrans-boundary river basin in the Middle East. The present political boundariesin the basin were established in the early 1920s with the establishment of thestates of Syria, Iraq and Turkey. A number of agreements have been reachedbetween involved parties since 1926. The rise of hydro-political problems amongthe riparians of the Euphrates–Tigris goes back no more than 50 years. Soon afterthe Second World War, the need for the development of natural resourcesemerged in Turkey, Syria and Iraq. However, the highly erratic flows of therivers have greatly limited the rate of utilization. It is estimated that during theOttoman Empire (before 1920) only one-seventh of the irrigable land of

Correspondence address: Dogan Altinbilek, Department of Civil Engineering, Middle East TechnicalUniversity, 06531 Ankara, Turkey. Email: hda@metu.edu.tr

0790-0627 Print/1360-0648 Online/04/010015-19 2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd

DOI: 10.1080/07900620310001635584

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Iraq was being irrigated (Altinbilek, 1997). So, the construction of large dams toregulate river flows and extensive irrigation works were started, making once-abundant water a scarce commodity due to the consumptive use of irrigation aswell as reservoir evaporation.

The most important era of the negotiations on the waters of the Euphrates–Tigris basin involved Joint Economic Commission (JEC) meetings and JointTechnical Committee (JTC) meetings. These meetings were initiated in December1980. Although 16 JTC meetings were held between 1981 and 1992, no consensuscould be achieved for the settlement of disputes. The main argument of Iraqduring the negotiations was over its ‘acquired rights’ or ‘historical rights’ whichstem from the existing water installations and the ancestral irrigation systems.During JTC meetings Iraq refused to discuss the Tigris waters as the Tigris wasregarded as Iraq’s sovereign right. Thus, a Turkish offer to compensate for thescarcity in the Euphrates by the surplus in the Tigris was rejected. The Syrianstand was based on the codification efforts in the field of trans-boundary rivers.According to the Syrian arguments, the Euphrates and Tigris rivers are ‘inter-national watercourses’ which should be classified as ‘shared resources’ and mustbe divided among riparian states according to a quota, on the basis of theirdeclared demands. In fact, an agreement between Syria and Iraq was reached in1990 on the use of Euphrates waters, stating that Iraq would receive 58% of thewaters flowing in the Euphrates on the Turkish–Syrian border; Syria’s share isfixed at 42%.

Since the water potential was unable to meet the declared needs of these threeriparians, Turkey proposed in 1984 the ‘Three-Stage Plan for Optimum, Equi-table and Reasonable Utilization of Trans-boundary Watercourses of the Eu-phrates–Tigris Basin’, which involves: (1) compiling an inventory of waterresources; (2) compiling an inventory of land resources; and (3) determining theoptimum total water demands of each country for domestic, industrial andagricultural requirements. Syria and Iraq stated that the Turkish three-stage plancould not lead to an equitable and reasonable solution. They accused Turkey oftrying to seize the largest portion of Euphrates waters, which should be acceptedas collective property. They insisted that the Euphrates and Tigris are separateinternational rivers.

The disagreements between Turkey and the other riparians continued duringthe filling of the Ataturk Dam reservoir and the building of the Karkamis dam.From 1996 onwards, there were also some unfruitful efforts to re-start JTCmeetings. The water conflict over the Euphrates and Tigris rivers was temporar-ily frozen in 2003 due to a change of president in Syria and the occupation ofIraq by the Coalition Forces which ended the rule of the Baath regime.

Geography and Hydrology of the Euphrates–Tigris Basin

The Euphrates–Tigris basin is largely fed from snow precipitation over theuplands of north and eastern Turkey, Iraq and Iran. Extending for almost 3000km, the Euphrates is the longest river in western Asia. Arising near MountArarat at heights of around 4500 m near Lake Van, the Euphrates drops onaverage 2 metres per kilometre of length in Turkey and then crosses into Syriaflowing south-east (Figure 1). After travelling 680 km within Syria’s borders, the

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The Euphrates–Tigris Basin 17

Figure 1. General layout of the Euphrates–Tigris basin. Source: Altinbilek (1997).

Euphrates enters Iraq at Al Qaim. In Iraq, 360 km from the border, the Euphratesreaches a giant alluvial delta at Ramadi where the elevation is only 53 m abovesea level. From that point on, the river traverses the deserted regions of Iraq,losing part of its waters into a series of desert depressions and distributaries,both natural and man-made. Further downstream, near Nasiriyah, the riverbecomes a tangle of channels, some of which drain into the shallow lake ofHammar as the remainder joins the Tigris at Qurna. The Euphrates has a verygentle gradient in Iraq.

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Table 1. Area of the Euphrates–Tigris drainage basin in riparian coun-tries (km2)

TigrisEuphrates

Country km2 % km2 %

Turkey 121 787 21.1 53 052 14.3Syria 95 405 16.5 948 0.2Iran — — 175 386 47.2Iraq 282.532 49.0 142 175 38.3Saudi Arabia 77.090 13.4 — —Total 576.814 100.0 371 561 100.0

Source: UNEP (2001).

The River Tigris, which is the second-largest river in western Asia, originatesnear Lake Hazar (elevation 1150 m) in eastern Turkey. The Tigris is fed byseveral tributaries in Turkey. It forms the Turkish–Syrian boundary for 32 km,and crosses into Iraq. From the Iraqi border up to Mosul, the river is borderedby rolling hills on either side but is still confined to a deep valley in the Mosularea. Within Iraq, the Tigris has several tributaries which contribute significantlyto the water potential of the river. The combined Euphrates and Tigris rivers arenamed Shatt-al-Arab, forming a river almost a kilometre wide and 190 km long.Iran is a co-riparian of the Tigris–Euphrates system by virtue of her contributionto the River Tigris via the lesser Zab, Diyalah and Kharun rivers. In addition, theRiver Kharkeh emanating from Iran flows into the Mesopotamian marshes ofsouthern Iraq. Saudi Arabia is also a part of the drainage basin but does not haveborders with or a contribution to the Euphrates. The Euphrates and Tigris riversare considered parts of a single trans-boundary river system. They are linked bytheir natural course at Shatt-al-Arab, which constitutes a delta.

The areas of the riparian countries in the Euphrates–Tigris basin are shown inTable 1. The estimates of mean annual natural runoff of the Euphrates and Tigrisrivers are given in Table 2. Although the Euphrates drains a larger surface areathan does the Tigris, an overwhelming 98% of Euphrates runoff is produced inthe highlands of Turkey while the remainder of its catchment is an arid regionthat makes little contribution. Turkey contributes an estimated 53% of thedischarge of the Tigris. The rest of the Tigris’s flow is produced by tributariesdescending from the Zagros mountains of Iran and Iraq. Turkey contributes71.4% of the Euphrates and Tigris basin’s combined natural flow.

The characteristic feature that distinguishes the hydrological regime of theEuphrates–Tigris river system is the irregularity of flow both between andwithin years, with large floods originating from the snow-melt in spring. Theannual precipitation in the Anatolian and Zagros highlands exceeds 1000 mm.About two-thirds of the precipitation occurs in winter and may remain in theform of snow for half of the year. With snow-melt in spring, periodic floodingis observed downstream. There are steep differences between maximum andminimum monthly flows, which for the Tigris are nearly 80-fold and for the

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The Euphrates–Tigris Basin 19

Table 2. Contribution of the riparian states to the Euphrates–Tigris basin (km3/y)(excluding River Karun)

TotalEuphrates Tigris

Country km3 % km3 % km3 %

Turkey 33.1 98.5 27.2 53.4 60.3 71.4Syria 0.5 1.5 — — 0.5 0.6Iraq — — 20.7 40.7 20.7 24.5Iran — — 3.0 5.9 3.0 3.5Total 33.6 100.0 50.9 100.0 84.5 100.0

Euphrates 28-fold. The concentration of discharge over the months of April andMay causes not only extensive spring flooding, inundating large areas, but alsothe loss of much-needed water required for irrigation and power generationpurposes during the summer season.

The hydrologic records (1946–1994) of average annual flow for the Euphratesand Tigris rivers are shown in Figure 2. At the Turkish–Syrian border, for theEuphrates, annual discharge values range from a minimum flow of 14 km3/y(1961) to a maximum of 57 km3/y (1969). The discharge values for the Tigris

Figure 2. Average annual flow values for the Euphrates and Tigris rivers.

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20 D. Altinbilek

at the Turkish border dropped to 7 km3/y in 1961 and rose to 34 km3/yin 1969.

Water and Land Resources Development

The development of water and land resources in the Euphrates–Tigris basin goesback as early as 4000 BC. Agricultural settlements with temples and localirrigation networks were part of the Mesopotamian landscape. The Sumeriansand Babylonians brought water to their fields and cities via canals from theEuphrates. Documents from the time of Hammourabi, the Babylonian lawmakerof the early second millennium BC, refer to maintaining the irrigation systems.Flood protection, irrigation and drainage were of the utmost importance. Thedestruction of much of the canal system during the Mongol invasion of the 13thcentury led to a general neglect and abandonment of irrigation and drainagesystems until recent times. During the Ottoman era, old canals were rebuilt, landwas reclaimed and new systems were constructed. In the second half of the 20thcentury modern water storage and hydroelectric plants were built in the upperbasin in Turkey and Syria on the Euphrates and in Turkey, Iraq and Iran on theTigris (Figure 3). A list of the existing major dams in the Euphrates–Tigris basinis given in Table 3. The water and land resources development efforts of theriparian countries are summarized below.

Iraq

The planning and construction of irrigation and flood control systems werestarted after 1950 by the Board of Development created by the Kingdom of Iraq.Subsequently, the Ramadi flood control reservoir, the Habbaniye dam, a regu-lator, canal systems, the Lake Tharthar project and the Samarra dam (1954) wereconstructed. The Tharthar project was significant because it integrated waters ofthe Tigris and Euphrates rivers via a 1100-m3/s-capacity man-made canal. Themost important period of development of Iraq’s water systems was between1972 and 1990. Many new and important hydraulic structures were completed.Among them are the Qadissiyah and Fallujah dams and the main outfall drain,which is also called the Third River.

Estimates of the irrigated area in Iraq have always been contradictory (Altin-bilek, 1997; Belul, 1996; Bilen, 1994; Kliot, 1994) (Table 4). The total irrigable areais estimated to be around 4 million ha. Estimates by the US Corps of Engineersreveal that Iraq has been irrigating 1–1.3 million ha from the Euphrates and 2million ha from the Tigris. After the Iraq–Iran wars and the Gulf War, theirrigation of Iraq may have decreased to a total of 2.78 million ha for theEuphrates–Tigris basin.

Syria

Agriculture has always been the most important sector in Syria’s economy.Although government policies have been favourable towards this sector, agricul-

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The Euphrates–Tigris Basin 21

Tab

le3.

Ex

isti

ng

maj

or

dam

sin

the

Eu

ph

rate

s–T

igri

sb

asin

Gro

ssS

urf

ace

Dat

eo

fH

eig

ht

sto

rag

ear

eaH

PC

ou

ntr

yN

ame

of

dam

Use

aco

mp

leti

on

(m)

(km

3 )(k

m2 )

(MW

)

Eup

hrat

esT

urk

eyA

tatu

rkH

P,

I19

9216

648

.70

817

2400

Tu

rkey

Bir

ecik

HP

,I

2000

531.

2256

.367

2T

urk

eyK

arak

aya

HP

1987

158

9.58

268

1800

Tu

rkey

Kar

kam

isH

P,

FC

1999

210.

1628

.418

9T

urk

eyK

eban

HP

1975

163

3167

513

30S

yri

aB

aath

HP

,I,

FC

1988

—0.

0927

.275

Sy

ria

Tab

aqa

HP

,I

1975

6011

.761

080

0S

yri

aT

ish

rin

eH

P19

9940

1.9

166

630

Sy

ria

Up

per

Kh

abu

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1992

—0.

991.

4—

Iraq

Al

Hin

diy

ahF

D19

18(1

989)

——

——

Iraq

Al

Qad

isiy

ahH

P,

I19

8457

8.2

500

660

Iraq

Fal

luja

hI

1985

——

——

Iraq

Ram

adi-

Hab

ban

iyah

FC

1948

—3.

342

6—

Iraq

Ram

adi

Raa

zza

FC

1951

—26

1850

—T

otal

148.

8485

56

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22 D. Altinbilek

Tab

le3.

—C

onti

nued

Gro

ssS

urf

ace

Dat

eo

fH

eig

ht

sto

rag

ear

eaH

PC

ou

ntr

yN

ame

of

dam

Use

aco

mp

leti

on

(m)

(km

3 )(k

m2 )

(MW

)

Tig

ris

Tu

rkey

Bat

man

HP

,I

1998

711.

1849

.219

8T

urk

eyD

eveg

ecid

iI

1972

330.

2032

.1—

Tu

rkey

Cag

-cag

HP

,F

D19

6814

Tu

rkey

Dic

leH

P,

I19

9775

0.60

2411

0T

urk

eyG

ok

suI

1991

460.

063.

9—

Tu

rkey

Kra

lkiz

iH

P19

9711

31.

9257

.590

Iraq

Al-

Ad

hee

mH

P,

I19

99—

1.5

——

Iraq

Der

ben

dik

han

(Diy

ala)

I19

6212

83.

012

1—

Iraq

Dib

bis

(L.

Zab

)I

1965

153.

032

—Ir

aqD

iyal

aI

1969

12—

——

Iraq

Do

kan

(L.

Zab

)I

1961

116

6.8

270

—Ir

aqH

amri

n(D

iyal

a)I

1980

404.

044

0—

Iraq

Sad

dam

HP

,I

1985

126

11.1

371

320

Iraq

Sam

arra

-Th

arth

arF

D19

54—

72.8

2170

—Ir

anD

ezH

P,

I19

6220

33.

46—

520

Iran

Kar

kh

ehH

P,

I,F

C20

0112

87.

8—

400

Iran

Kar

un

-1H

P,

I19

7720

03.

1454

.810

00Ir

anM

aru

nH

P,

I19

9816

51.

225

145

Tot

al12

1.76

2797

a HP

:h

yd

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ow

er;

I:ir

rig

atio

n;

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oo

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ce:

UN

EP

(200

1).

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The Euphrates–Tigris Basin 23

Figure 3. Present and planned dams in the Euphrates–Tigris basin.

ture cannot provide all of Syria’s needs, mostly because of the rapid populationgrowth. The cropped area in Syria averages 4.8 million ha. The rain-fed arearepresents 85% of the total area cultivated. Surface irrigation has been expandingover the last decade. Wells account for 80% of the recently irrigated land.Significant drops in groundwater levels have already been documented in theDamascus, Asi and Aleppo areas (FAO, 1994). Water resources in Syria arevaried: rivers, springs and groundwater potential. Apart from the Euphrates,

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Table 4. Irrigable lands in Turkey, Syria and Iraq

Euphrates (ha) Tigris (ha) Total (ha)

Turkey 1 777 000 650 000 2 427 000Syria 800 000 150 000 950 000Iraq 2 500 000 1 500 000 4 000 000Total 5 070 000 2 300 000 7 370 000

Syria has 11.4 km3/y potential of renewable water resources (rivers 5.4 km3/y,springs 2.2 km3/y, groundwater 3.8 km3/y) (COMSTECH, 1995). The majordevelopment plan for the Euphrates in Syria consisted of the construction ofthree dams, namely the Tabqa Dam (1975), the Al-Baath Dam (1988) and theTishrine Dam (1999), all of which are in operation.

Syria has development plans for the Khabur river, which is a tributary of theEuphrates but treated separately from the Euphrates. Three dams will irrigate375 000 ha, utilizing 1.6 km3/y, and produce 28 MW power. Apart from theEuphrates and Grand Khabur projects, there exists a project to tap the water ofthe Tigris via pumps for an irrigation project of 150 000 or possibly 375 000 ha.

According to different Syrian sources, cultivable land in Syria is estimated tobe around 6 million ha, of which 4.5–5.5 million ha are under cultivation. Theirrigated area ranges between 530 000 and 620 000 ha according to the SyrianStatistical Abstracts 1990 (Belul, 1996). Irrigation with groundwater accounts foraround 44% of the total irrigated area.

Turkey

In Turkey, work on a major hydroelectric dam on the Euphrates at Keban wasinitiated in 1963 and brought on line in 1975. By regulating river flow patterns,the Keban Dam set the stage for large-scale developments in the upper Eu-phrates.

In 1977, Turkey launched the Southeastern Anatolia Project, or GAP, to use itsTurkish acronym, which is a large-scale and multi-sectoral regional developmentproject. The project area lies in south-east Turkey between and around theEuphrates and Tigris rivers, covering approximately 10% of Turkey’s totalpopulation and surface area. The project area includes 41.5% of the totalwatersheds of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers within Turkey. The total projectarea is 75 358 km2, of which 42.2% is cultivated. When fully developed, GAP willprovide irrigation for 1.7 million ha of land, corresponding to 20% of theeconomically irrigable land of Turkey (Altinbilek, 1997; Southeastern AnatolianProject Regional Development Administration, 2002; State Planning Organiza-tion, 1989). GAP consists of a combination of 13 independent but related majorirrigation and hydropower schemes with a total capacity of 7500 MW, whichinvolves the construction of 22 dams and 19 hydroelectric power plants on theEuphrates and Tigris and their tributaries. After full development of theseprojects, the irrigation projects will consume about 22.5 km3 of water per year

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The Euphrates–Tigris Basin 25

(including reservoir evaporation), corresponding to about 27% of the averageannual virgin runoff volume of the Euphrates and Tigris branches of theShatt-al-Arab river to the Gulf. Altogether 14 dams and seven hydropowerplants, including major water control facilities such as the Keban, Karakaya,Ataturk, Birecik, Karkamis, Kralkizi, Batman and Dicle dams, are already inoperation. Final designs have been completed for the Ilisu and Cizre dams.These dams are located in a series on main branches of the rivers and thepotential heads are almost fully utilized. At present, 72% of the hydropowerpotential and 12% (or 202 000 ha) of the targeted irrigation areas are underoperation.

GAP is an integrated, multi-sectoral regional development project that coversall development-related sectors such as agriculture, industry, transportation,urban and rural infrastructure, health care and education. Project execution isbased on a master plan and an action plan. Many innovative and water-savingapproaches are being implemented for sustainable water resources developmentin GAP (Altinbilek et al., 1997). The project requires US$32 billion of publicsector financing, half of which has already been invested.

Iran

Iran completed its largest hydropower and irrigation development project, theDez Dam, on a tributary of the River Karun in 1962. Within the last decade, Iranhas embarked on a multi-billion-dollar water management scheme on the RiverKarun, which runs to the Shatt-al-Arab delta. Affecting Mesopotamian marsh-lands, the Karun river development project has ecological consequences. In 2001,Iran inaugurated its largest water reservoir on the River Karkheh, which isintended to irrigate 320 000 ha of land. Also planned is a 540-km pipeline fromKarkheh Dam to supply 250 million m3 of fresh water to Kuwait annually.

Present and Future Water Development

In total, there are 32 existing major dams on the Euphrates and Tigris (includingthe Karkheh and Karun river systems) (Table 3). Eight dams are reportedlyunder construction and at least 13 more are planned (Figure 3). The total storageof the existing dams on the Euphrates is 148.8 km3, or five times the river’saverage annual flow. On the Tigris, existing storage totals more than double theaverage annual flow of the Tigris. The total hydropower installed capacity onboth rivers amounts to 11 350 MW, producing more than a billion US dollars’worth of hydropower annually.

The unprecedented level of control that riparian countries exercise on theEuphrates–Tigris flows is best illustrated by the hydrograph of the Euphrates’flow at Hit-Husaiba in central Iraq, upstream of Ramadi dam (Figure 4). Prior todam construction (1938–1973), the hydrograph shows a peak water flow of 2594m3/s in May. After dam construction, the flow in May for the period 1974–1998had dropped by more than two-thirds to 831 m3/s. The river’s flow patternbecame more uniform, avoiding floods. The minimum flow of the river morethan doubled, from 272 to 575 m3/s, providing much-needed irrigation water

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Figure 4. Comparison of the flow regimes for the Euphrates river at Hit-Husabia, Iraq.Source: UNEP (2001).

during the crucial summer months. The hydropower production of the river alsoimproved.

The water budget of the Euphrates–Tigris basin for the present and for fulldevelopment has been estimated by many experts. These computations aredependent on assumptions. As mentioned before, data on the extent of irrigatedlands, irrigable lands and water requirements are varied and contradictory. Thevalues given in Table 4 represent the best estimates of the extent of irrigablelands in Turkey, Syria and Iraq. At present it is estimated the irrigated areascover 202 000 ha in south-eastern Turkey, 350 000 ha in Syria and 2.8 million hain Iraq. Many authors have attempted a water budget analysis for 2010, whichgenerally indicates that demand can be met. However, it may be more instruc-tive to develop a water budget analysis for a full development scenario, whichmay extend to 2040. While many innovations may affect the water supply andthe use within the next four decades, the full development scenario indicates awater deficiency in the Euphrates basin (Table 5). The projections by variousauthors indicate a deficiency of 2–12 km3/y in the Euphrates at full develop-ment. It is generally agreed that there will be a surplus of 8–9.7 km3/y for theTigris. This picture signals a water shortage that will emerge some time after2020. In two decades the requirements of the Euphrates branch will not be metwith virgin flow of that tributary alone. Although the transfer of water from the

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Table 5. Summary of water budgets at full development scenario (km3/y)

US ArmyCorps of

Altinbilek Kolars Kliot Engineers Belul(1997) (1994) (1994) (1991) (1996)

EuphratesNatural flow at Turkish–

Syrian border 31.43 30.67 28.20 28.20 31.4Net withdrawal by

Turkey � 14.50 � 21.6 � 21.50 � 21.5 � 12.3Entering Syria 16.93 9.07 6.7 6.7 19.1Inflows in Syria 2.05 9.484 10.7 4.5 3.1Net withdrawals by

Syria � 5.5 � 11.995 � 13.4 � 4.3 � 10.5Entering Iraq 13.48 6.559 4.0 6.9 11.7Net withdrawal by

Iraq � 15.5 � 13.0 � 16.0 � 17.6 � 19.0Flow into Shatt-

al-Arab � 2.02 � 6.441 � 12.0 � 10.7 � 7.3

TigrisRunoff in Turkey 18.87 18.5 18.5 18.500 19.3Net withdrawal in

Turkey and Syria � 8.0 � 6.7 � 7.2 � 6.7 10.2Entering Iraq 10.87 11.8 11.3 11.8 11.5Inflows in Iraq by

tributaries 30.7 30.7 31.7 30.7 31.0Net withdrawal in

Iraq � 31.9 � 33.4 � 40.0 � 32.8 � 33.5Flow into Shatt-

al-Arab 9.67 9.1 8.0 9.7 9.0

Tigris to the Euphrates is often proposed, this may not entirely solve the watershortage in the Euphrates basin.

The application of water-saving techniques in irrigation could help to save10–20% of irrigation demand. Turkey has already started using water-savingtechnologies by switching to low-pressure pipe systems rather than open canalsand flumes (Altinbilek et al., 1997). The use of water-saving innovations requireshigher investments and necessitates education of the farmers, which may takeyears to progress. Nevertheless, once the full use of water is reached, water-sav-ing techniques become compulsory as part of a scarcity regime. Water pricing isone of the key issues that must be introduced if efficiency of water use istargeted. Properly applied, water pricing can not only bring about some water-saving opportunities but also provide much-needed funds for improving distri-bution systems. Conversely, a lack of water pricing would encourage waste andimproper use of the water.

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Table 6. Average annual water availability per capita (m3)

1990 2000 2010 2020

Turkey 3223 (1611) 2703 (1351) 2326 (1163) 2002 (1000)Syria 1636 1177 880 760Iraq 2352 1848 1435 1062

Source: Bilen (2000).

It is obvious that, in the full development of the basin, the independentundertakings of the three riparian countries may bring too many reservoirs intoexistence, which may cause excessive evaporation. Through full co-ordination ofriver system operation by the three countries, up to 7 km3/y (or 50%) of theevaporation may be saved.

Problems and Misconceptions Related to Water Utilization

Almost all Middle Eastern countries are short of water to varying degrees.Satisfactory means of allocating water between neighbouring countries must bedevised if the water conflict is not to result in armed conflict among the riparianstates of the Middle Eastern water resources. Using modern technology, theEuphrates and Tigris rivers have the potential to make agriculture flourish on ascale undreamed of in ancient times. The anticipated and declared demands ofthe riparian countries are greater than the total water volume of the two rivers.Water, long taken for granted, is already becoming a scarce commodity, as the1999–2001 drought has proven. There is a need to devise an arrangement forusing the waters of the Euphrates–Tigris river basin in a rational, equitable andsustainable way. Unco-ordinated and independent actions of basin countriesmay result in some difficult problems for which remedies cannot easily befound. With proper and co-ordinated planning and implementation, however,many of those problems may be pre-empted, eliminated or greatly minimized.Some of the important problems of water resources development and existingmisconceptions are as follows.

Water Availability

Numerous studies that have been published over the past decade cite Turkey asthe water-rich country of the Middle East. However, this is so only in relativeterms. Water use and water availability can be expressed in cubic metres percapita per year, which is total annual average runoff in a country divided bypopulation. When water availability per capita is 500 m3/person per year or less,a country is accepted as being beyond the ‘water barrier’ of manageablecapacity, which is the case for Israel, Jordan and Palestine. The limit of 1000m3/person per year indicates chronic ‘scarcity’, while less than 1600 m3/personper year is termed as water ‘stress’. For the real water-rich countries of northernEurope and Canada, the water availability is around 10 000 m3/person per yearor more.

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Water availability in Turkey, Syria and Iraq is given in Table 6 (Bilen, 2000).Figures in parenthesis are calculated according to the assumption that only 50%of the Turkish total potential is technically and economically usable. Turkishwater potential is calculated on the basis of total surface runoff, not just that ofthe Euphrates and Tigris, which constitutes only 28% of Turkey’s total waterpotential. From Table 6, it can be deduced that all three countries will by 2020face more or less the same conditions in terms of water supply. The misconcep-tion that Turkey is often thought of as having a water surplus is partly due tothe fact that Turkey, so far, has only developed one-third of its total waterpotential and has a huge unused resource, which Turkey’s economy will needin the future. Compared with Jordan, Israel and Palestine, of course, all threeriparian countries of the Euphrates–Tigris basin can be considered ‘rich’ inwater.

Role of Dams and Reservoirs

Claims that the flow of the Euphrates to Iraq and Syria has declined are alsomisconceptions. The dams, on the contrary, have made a very positive impact onmuch-needed summertime releases. The Euphrates has been tamed and its flowis regularized. Until the dams were built, there were sharp fluctuations betweendifferent seasons and different years (Figure 2). A large proportion of the runoffresults from snow-melt, and there used to be large floods in the spring followedby a drought in the summer and autumn, when average monthly natural flowon the Euphrates reduces to as little as 150 m3/s. Due to the existence of fivereservoirs on the Euphrates, Turkey is able to maintain a minimum monthlyaverage release of 500 m3/s which was committed to Syria in 1987. In practicethe flow often exceeds this commitment considerably. The average annualmonthly flow between 1987 and 2001 was 800 m3/s, with a minimum of 645m3/s for September.

The initial filling of the Keban Dam in 1974, which coincided with that of theSyrian Tabqa Dam, and the initial filling of the Ataturk Dam’s reservoir in 1990created tension and caused a mounting crisis among the basin countries. Duringthe filling of the Ataturk Dam’s reservoir, on 13 January 1990 the flow of theEuphrates was stopped for 1 month for purely technical reasons. A month beforethe filling process got underway, Turkey notified Syria and flow was increasedto 768 m3/s. During the filling process, only 60 m3/s could be released to Syriafrom catchments downstream from the dam. As a result, even at a difficult stageof the filling of the Ataturk Dam, Turkey was true to its commitment. In fact,even during the worst times for its neighbours when they were under aneconomic embargo, and at times of drought, Turkey had more than kept itsword on water release policies and had refrained from inflicting damage on itssouthern neighbours.

Environmental Problems—Mesopotamian Marshlands

One of the more recent controversies about environmental problems was startedin 2001 by a United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) report which statedthat, between 1970 and 2000, 90% of the marshlands of Mesopotamia, which

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originally covered an area of 15 000–20 000 km3, had disappeared (UNEP, 2001).A long-term recovery plan requiring an holistic river basin approach based onthe ultimate goal of sustaining riverine ecology and in which all Tigris–Eu-phrates riparian countries share the rivers’ water in a co-ordinated and equitablemanner was called for. Priority was to be given to allocating an adequateamount of water to the wetlands, while water releases from existing dams couldbe timed to mimic natural flow patterns and bring the marshlands back to life.Negotiations involving all the riparian countries and supported by internationalfacilitation were recommended to establish an agreement on the sharing ofTigris and Euphrates waters. The warning by UNEP caught the attention ofmany non-government organizations who, along with Iraq and UNEP, haveblamed Turkey for building large dams and damaging the ecosystems. Inparticular, the Ilisu Dam, which was planned but not started on the Tigris byTurkey, came under severe attack.

Turkey responded by saying that although the period 1999–2001 encompasseddry years for the Euphrates, a sizeable portion of the flow of the rivers was stillflowing into the Gulf unused. The main cause of the disappearance of themarshlands was the construction of drainage engineering works such as levees,drainage canals, control structures and gates built by Iraq. The voice of Turkeywas not heard in the international community. The negotiations for the IlisuDam have failed as international companies and creditors have withdrawn oneafter another, partly because of these environmental attacks.

The alarmist stand of UNEP was ongoing in March 2003 at the Kyoto ThirdWater Forum, where Mr Klause Toepfer, Executive Director of UNEP, said thatone third of the remaining wetlands, (325 square kilometers) have dried outsince 2000 leaving just seven per cent of the original area. Unless urgent actionwas taken to reverse the trend and rehabilitate the marshlands, the entirewetland would disappear in three to five years. Such urgent action was forth-coming from the Coalition Forces occupying Iraq! The UNEP web site hasreported only two months after the alarmist speech of Mr Toepfer at the KyotoThird Water Forum that:

. . . positive sights of environment recovery have been emerging from theparched Mesopotamian marshlands. These changes are visible in newsatellite images taken in May 2003. . . . They dramatically reveal thatstreams and waterways, which have ebbed and run aground over the pastdecade, surge back to life and drainage canals swollen by exceptionalincrease in water flows. Formerly dry areas have been inundated asfloodgates are opened, embankments and dykes breached and dams emp-tied upstream. Heavy rains have also contributed to the rising waterlevels. . . . When control structures were opened and levees broken bymechanical diggers in April and May 2003, however, water swept throughthe desiccated landscape inundating some areas. (UNEP, 2003)

The Mesopotamian marshland experience has shown that it is possible toharmonize basin-wide development efforts with environmental concerns in asustainable way if problems can be diagnosed correctly.

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The Euphrates–Tigris Basin 31

Water Loss

Even though the presence of a reservoir may serve to augment the useful watersupply, at the same time it causes water losses through evaporation from thelake surface. Such losses are a function of the depth of reservoirs and the meanannual evaporation. Deep reservoirs in a cooler climate may have less water lossper cubic metre of regulated water than shallow reservoirs in hot climates. Forexample, the water loss per cubic metre of active storage in the Keban andKarakaya dams in Turkey is about 50 l/y, while it may be as high as 180–240 l/yin reservoirs in Syria and Iraq. The minimization of water losses requires wellco-ordinated joint reservoir operation that may save up to 6–7 km3/y.

Water Rights

Historically, downstream countries which may be using virgin flows of the riverwater for irrigation may put forward their ‘acquired water rights claim’ to sharewater. There is no established and agreed international water code whatsoeverto settle such claims. Furthermore, the quantity of the claims itself may requirepainstaking technical verifications if they are to be justified.

Advantages of Co-operation

Each country in the Euphrates–Tigris basin is generally inclined to formulate itsplans by considering its national possibilities, resources and objectives, withleast regard for the needs of others. Usually, each country aims at self-sufficiencyand security in solving its water supply problems. Furthermore, water-relatedproblems may be heavily obstructed by inclusion of other issues and controver-sies that hinder agreement. However, there are distinct advantages if and whenbasin countries come together and put forward plans for co-ordinated develop-ment. Some of the areas of possible co-operation are listed below.

• The optimum plan for the basin as a whole can be formulated and imple-mented.

• Seemingly conflicting demands can be harmonized within a broad masterplan that may incorporate many water-supply-augmenting and efficiency-im-proving measures.

• The waters of the Euphrates and Tigris can be utilized equitably and effec-tively, taking into account seasonal and yearly variations in flow due to floodsand droughts.

• Technical co-operation can extend to water transfers between rivers andbetween the reservoirs of the same river.

• Conjunctive use of interconnected water and energy systems can be realized.• Basin-wide management using remote sensing, geographical information sys-

tems (GIS) and optimization technologies can promote optimal use and watersavings.

• Joint regional research institutes, training centres and pilot farms can bedeveloped to exchange not only engineers and technicians but also farmers.

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32 D. Altinbilek

• Water-augmenting techniques such as water harvesting, conjunctive use ofsurface and groundwater sources, reuse of return water and, if necessary,cloud seeding, can be studied, encouraged and practised.

• The Turkish experience of water user associations, which was supported bythe World Bank, can be shared and exchanged with other riparian countriesto increase water use efficiency and the water revenue collection rate and tosave water.

• Demand management plans can be developed for municipal and irrigationwater supplies, especially for possible drought periods.

• Co-operative action may facilitate the achievement of environmental sustain-ability.

• Financing of joint and national projects from various international sourcesmay be easier and more attractive.

Conclusion

The development of the Euphrates–Tigris basin, although far from complete, hasalready resulted in unprecedented levels of storage, flow control, conveyanceand distribution networks in the basin. Riparian states that are benefiting frompresent development have additional ambitious future development plans, notall of which are necessarily economic. Each country aims at self-sufficiency,security and establishing water rights in formulating its development plans,with least regard for the needs of other nations. It is obvious that the Euphratescannot meet the projected demands of the three riparian states. Satisfactorymeans of allocating water between riparian countries must be devised if thewater conflict is not to result in a water war among the riparian states. However,water wars in the Middle East are not a necessity. Using modern technology, theEuphrates and Tigris rivers used jointly have the potential to make agricultureflourish on a scale undreamed of in the past. Although at present no watershortage is experienced, the anticipated and declared demands of the ripariancountries are greater than the total water volume of the two rivers. Thus, thereis a need to limit excessive and uneconomic demands. The analyses of the waterbudget of the Euphrates–Tigris basin for the full development scenario byseveral experts under various assumptions all indicate that the Euphrates basinwill experience water deficiency and the Tigris basin may have a surplus ofwater. It is also estimated that a possible critical water shortage may occur in acouple of decades.

Since the existing water conflict is not purely a technical one, a hydro-politicalapproach covering legal, political, technical and economic aspects is required.First, the political tension and mistrust which governed the region in the pastmust be resolved as many of those political tensions are also interrelated withthe water issue. Second, engineering studies should be undertaken to determinebasin-wide reasonable and equitable utilization rather than the ‘water rightsapproach’ of the past. This approach must also take into account the variabilityof flow between years. Ensuring equitable utilization among the riparians wouldrequire a legal approach as well as goodwill and a spirit of co-operation betweenriparians, realizing that voluntary agreements among riparian countries wouldbe more balanced and longer lasting than reconciliation induced or imposed byoutsiders. Finally, with regard to the management stage of the basin, economic

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The Euphrates–Tigris Basin 33

and technological measures must be incorporated with water saving, waterpricing and marketing, and decision support systems for joint management.Water-supply-enhancing and demand-management technologies must be part ofa comprehensive solution. The overall objective of a Middle East water agree-ment is to provide sustainable utilization of the region’s land and waterresources for the welfare of people. The most important role in achievinghydro-co-operation in the region, rather than hydro-conflict, lies with the re-sponsibility of democratically elected governments of riparian countries.

Acknowledgement

This paper was the result of a session supported by InWEnt (InternationaleWeiterbildung und Entwicklung gemeinnutzige GmbH) at the Third WorldWater Forum, which took place in Kyoto, Japan in March 2003. The authorwould like to express appreciation and gratitude to Dr Ismail Al Baz of InWEntand Prof. Asit K. Biswas and Dr Cecilia Tortajada of the Third Word Centre forWater Management, who organized and chaired the session. Special thanks aredue to Dr Sahnaz Tigrek for her valuable efforts to bring about this work.

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