DEVELOPING A NATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR MANAGING THE … · 23 managing the response to nuclear security events, describing the roles which threat assessment, risk-24 informed approach,

NUCLEAR SECURITY SERIES NO. XX

DEVELOPING A NATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR MANAGING THE RESPONSE TO

NUCLEAR SECURITY EVENTS

DRAFT IMPLEMENTING GUIDE

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

VIENNA, 20XX

NST004

DRAFT- Version 8/07/2015

STEP 8: Soliciting comments by Member States

Interface document: NSGC, RASSC, TRANSSC

FOREWORD

By Yukiya Amano, Director General

The IAEA’s principal objective under its Statute is “to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world.” Our work involves both preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and ensuring that nuclear technology is made available for peaceful purposes in areas such as health and agriculture. It is essential that all nuclear and other radioactive materials, and the facilities in which they are held, are managed in a safe manner and properly protected against criminal or intentional unauthorized acts.

Nuclear security is the responsibility of each individual country, but international cooperation is vital to support States in establishing and maintaining effective nuclear security regimes. The central role of the IAEA in facilitating such cooperation, and providing assistance to States, is well recognized. The Agency’s role reflects its broad membership, its mandate, its unique expertise and its long experience of providing technical assistance and specialist, practical guidance to States.

Since 2006, the IAEA has issued Nuclear Security Series publications to help States to establish effective national nuclear security regimes. These publications complement international legal instruments on nuclear security, such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1540, and the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.

Guidance is developed with the active involvement of experts from IAEA Member States, which ensures that it reflects a consensus on good practices in nuclear security. The IAEA Nuclear Security Guidance Committee, established in March 2012 and made up of Member States’ representatives, reviews and approves draft publications in the Nuclear Security Series as they are developed.

The IAEA will continue to work with its Member States to ensure that the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology are made available to improve the health, well-being and prosperity of people world-wide.

CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................. 1

BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................................ 1

OBJECTIVE ....................................................................................................................................... 2

SCOPE ................................................................................................................................................ 3

STRUCTURE ..................................................................................................................................... 3

2. BASIS FOR A NATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR MANAGING THE RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR SECURITY EVENTS ......................................................................................................... 4

OVERVIEW ....................................................................................................................................... 4

THREAT ASSESSMENT AND RISK-INFORMED APPROACH .................................................. 4

GRADED APPROACH ...................................................................................................................... 5

DETECTION SYSTEMS AND MEASURES ................................................................................... 5

3. TYPES OF NUCLEAR SECURITY EVENT .................................................................................... 5

GENERAL .......................................................................................................................................... 5

GROUPING OF NUCLEAR SECURITY EVENTS ......................................................................... 6

Group 1 Nuclear Security Events 7 Group 2 Nuclear Security Events 7 Group 3 Nuclear Security Events 8

NUCLEAR SECURITY EVENT GROUPS: IMPACT LEVELS ................................................... 10

Level 1: High Impact 10 Level 2: Medium Impact 11 Level 3: Low Impact 11

PLANNING RESOURCES BASED ON IMPACT LEVELS ......................................................... 11

International resources 12 National resources 12 Local resources 12

4. DESIGNING A NATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR MANAGING THE RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR SECURITY EVENTS ....................................................................................................... 13

STRATEGIC AIMS .......................................................................................................................... 14

KEY ACTIVITIES ........................................................................................................................... 15

ORGANIZATIONS, ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES ................................................................... 17

PLANS AND PROCEDURES ......................................................................................................... 18

MULTI-AGENCY COMMAND, CONTROL AND COORDINATION ........................................ 18

NATIONAL COORDINATION ...................................................................................................... 21

5. INFRASTRUCTURE FOR A NATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR MANAGING THE RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR SECURITY EVENTS................................................................................................. 21

AUTHORITY ................................................................................................................................... 21

CAPABILITIES, CAPACITIES AND RESOURCES ..................................................................... 22

TRAINING AND EXERCISING ..................................................................................................... 23

6. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE .......................................................... 23

GENERAL ........................................................................................................................................ 23

ARRANGEMENTS FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY EVENTS ................................................................................................... 24

7. SUSTAINABILITY .......................................................................................................................... 26

PERIODIC REVIEW OF THREAT ASSESSMENT ...................................................................... 27

SHARING OF EXPERIENCE ......................................................................................................... 27

INCORPORATION OF LESSONS LEARNED, EVALUATION AND GAP ANALYSIS ........... 28

MAINTENANCE AND ENHANCEMENT .................................................................................... 28

REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................................... 30

GLOSSARY ......................................................................................................................................... 33

1

1. INTRODUCTION 1

BACKGROUND 2

1.1 A nuclear security event can be very complex. There will often be national and international 3

implications which need to be addressed by the State or States affected. A lack of understanding can 4

cause disproportionate fear among the population when a nuclear security event occurs, placing a 5

heavy responsibility on the State to manage public information along with the response to the event. 6

The presence of nuclear or other radioactive material at an event is not always readily identifiable 7

even with specialist equipment and procedures and, once detected, protecting people from such 8

material, and its safe handling and transport, can also prove very challenging. 9

1.2 States should ensure that their national capability to respond includes the ability to rapidly 10

assess and grade nuclear security events based on factors such as threat, human consequences, 11

environmental consequences, economic impact and the nature of the nuclear or other radioactive 12

material involved in the nuclear security event. The response to a nuclear security event should also 13

support any subsequent legal proceedings associated with the event, including the prosecution or 14

extradition of alleged offenders. 15

1.3 Across the spectrum of nuclear security (Figure1) a State is required to manage numerous 16

activities undertaken by a range of competent authorities and associated entities, all of which need to 17

be coordinated effectively. The need to plan for a coordinated response to a nuclear security event is 18

therefore of paramount importance. The development of a national framework for managing the 19

response to a nuclear security event is an important step in this planning process, ensuring that a State 20

is prepared to deal with such events. 21

DetectionPrevention Response

Assess

Threat

Deter

Dissuade

Protect

Secure

Alarm/Alert

Generated

Alarm/Alert

Assessed

Interdict

Manage

Crime Scene

Protect

Evidence

Analyze

Evidence

Attribute

Return

Item

Prosecute

22 FIG. 1: Spectrum of nuclear security activities. 23

1.4. The development of a national framework creates a structure, around which a State can frame 24

its detection and response functions. The complexities of managing a response to nuclear security 25

events may result in many of a State’s normal response functions being unable to deal with such an 26

event effectively. Many response organizations are not trained or equipped to deal with the hazards 27

2

presented by nuclear or other radioactive material, relying on specialist agencies with whom they may 1

not routinely work and whose capabilities they may not understand. A national framework can help 2

identify the interfaces and the potential inter-agency conflicts which may result from this lack of 3

understanding. The framework also ensures that the various response organizations have clearly 4

defined and understood roles and responsibilities, properly coordinated through the implementation of 5

an effective multi-agency command and control structure. 6

1.5. A national framework further benefits States by creating one single point of reference for all 7

issues related to the response to nuclear security events, reducing fragmentation and promoting multi-8

agency cooperation and coordination. Such a framework can also encourage flexibility in a State’s 9

response to nuclear security events, by enabling the State to respond on a scale appropriate to the 10

event, through proper categorization of the different types of nuclear security events which it may 11

face. 12

1.6. A national framework can ensure that States, when planning for nuclear security events, 13

consider, inter alia, national and international implications, public perceptions and issues related to the 14

identification and safe and secure handling of nuclear or other radioactive materials. Such a response 15

is in the interests, not only of the State, but of the whole international community, a fact recognized 16

by a number of international legal instruments related to nuclear security [1, 2]. 17

1.7. This publication is complementary to and consistent with the Nuclear Security 18

Recommendations on: 19

— Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5) 20

[3]; 21

— Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities [4]; 22

— Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control [5]. 23

1.8. This Implementing Guide provides guidance on implementing the relevant Recommendations 24

and thereby contributing to establishing the essential elements set out in the Nuclear Security 25

Fundamentals [6]. 26

OBJECTIVE 27

1.9. The objective of this publication is to provide guidance to a State on the development of a 28

national framework for managing the response to nuclear security events. The intended audience 29

includes national policy and decision makers, national and local competent authorities and support 30

organizations, as well as other entities and experts that are involved in developing a national 31

framework for managing the response to nuclear security events. 32

3

SCOPE 1

1.10. This Implementing Guide is intended to provide information and advice to States on the 2

development, implementation, maintenance and sustainment of a national framework for managing 3

the response to a nuclear security event. Ultimately the responsibility for developing a national 4

framework for managing the response to nuclear security events rests with the State. 5

1.11. The Guide describes a scheme for grouping types of nuclear security events based on 6

representative scenarios, the anticipated impact levels1 arising from those nuclear security events and 7

their resourcing implications. It provides States with guidance on response actions and considerations 8

which can be adapted to meet their specific circumstances, experience and priorities. This publication 9

may also assist States in developing an appropriate national response plan as recommended in Ref. 10

[5] 2 and procedures according to their capabilities and needs. 11

1.12. While specific measures for prevention and detection of nuclear security events and for 12

response to nuclear or radiological emergencies are not addressed directly in this publication, 13

coordination and integration between related authorities, plans and strategies are critical to ensure a 14

holistic approach to nuclear security. These aspects are covered in other IAEA publications [7–21]. 15

This publication does not provide the full details of a State’s specific national response plan and 16

associated procedures for responding to nuclear security events, but rather it details how a national 17

framework can support the development of such a plan by drawing together the various competent 18

authorities, responding agencies and other entities, legislation, policies and procedures which will 19

ultimately inform the development of a national response plan. 20

STRUCTURE 21

1.13. Following the introduction, Section 2 describes the basis for a national framework for 22

managing the response to nuclear security events, describing the roles which threat assessment, risk-23

informed approach, graded approach and detection systems and measures play in developing the 24

national framework. Section 3 describes a scheme to group representative nuclear security events into 25

three categories which can be linked with their potential impact factors and resourcing requirements. 26

Section 4 addresses the design considerations relevant to a State’s national framework, including 27

design methodology, strategic aims, key activities and example response actions. Section 4 also 28

considers the importance of embedding clearly defined responding agency roles and responsibilities, 29

1 Although events involving the detection of nuclear material with the risk of proliferation are not specifically mentioned within the impact levels, the State should assess the short and long term impacts of such an event and assign an impact level as appropriate. 2 In order to manage nuclear security events, the State should have a comprehensive national response plan for nuclear security events in combination with, inter alia, the national radiological emergency plan. The Plan should serve as: (1) a basis for establishing compatible operational tools (e.g. compatible communications systems) needed for prompt and effective response; and (2) a guide for the competent authorities to ensure that all necessary preparedness and response tasks are given appropriate resources and support [5].

4

single- and multi-agency response plans and procedures, effective multi-agency command and control 1

arrangements and national coordination into the national framework. Section 5 describes the 2

infrastructure required within a State’s framework which will enable it to manage its response to 3

nuclear security events effectively. Factors such as the range of agencies involved in such a response 4

will be discussed, as will the need for effective plans, procedures, training and exercising to enable 5

these agencies to respond in a coordinated manner. Section 6 describes international cooperation and 6

assistance requirements for responding to nuclear security events. Section 7 discusses sustainability 7

of the national framework for managing the response to nuclear security events. 8

2. BASIS FOR A NATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR MANAGING THE RESPONSE TO 9

NUCLEAR SECURITY EVENTS 10

OVERVIEW 11

2.1. In many States, the agencies responsible for response to technological or natural disasters 12

plan for a range of situations, often on an agency-specific basis, detailing how that agency will carry 13

out its response functions. Such agency-specific plans, however, rarely take into account their impact 14

on partner agencies. If this is not done, such plans may hinder, rather than assist partner agencies in 15

carrying out their own response functions, causing any multi-agency response to become fragmented 16

and often lead to delays in the response. The national framework discussed in this publication is 17

designed to address these inter-agency issues by promoting national practices which fully recognize 18

the importance of inter-agency cooperation and coordination when planning for and responding to 19

nuclear security events. 20

THREAT ASSESSMENT AND RISK-INFORMED APPROACH 21

2.2. The very first issue which a State should consider when developing a national framework for 22

managing the response to nuclear security events is the type of events which it is likely to face. Most 23

States do not have the resources to respond to every nuclear security scenario which may present 24

itself, therefore an effective national framework for managing the response to nuclear security events 25

should provide for nuclear security systems and measures that are based on a State’s: (i) identification 26

of threats; (ii) identification of targets and assessment of consequences; (iii) assessment of threats and 27

risks; and (iv) use of a risk-informed approach to prioritize systems and measures to be developed 28

[22]. 29

2.3. Threat assessments consider the motivation, intentions and capabilities of those individuals or 30

groups (adversaries) that may, based on an analysis of acquired data and information, commit a 31

criminal or intentional unauthorized act. The threat assessment may take into account the technical 32

5

feasibility and historical context of the use of nuclear and other radioactive material in criminal or 1

intentional unauthorized acts, either within that State or elsewhere. 2

2.4. A risk-informed approach assists States to evaluate options and prioritize nuclear security 3

measures. It includes an iterative process of identifying and assessing risks; developing, evaluating 4

and implementing options; and monitoring the effectiveness of the resulting systems. In applying a 5

risk-informed approach a State should consider what level of risk is considered to be acceptable and 6

what level of response actions will be needed to keep any risks within acceptable bounds. This 7

approach can be used to guide effective response and consequence management efforts to minimize 8

the more serious perceived risks. 9

GRADED APPROACH 10

2.5. The use of a risk-informed approach also enables States to adopt a graded approach when 11

planning for their response to nuclear security events. A graded approach facilitates the use of 12

security measures that are proportionate to the assessed threat and risk from criminal or intentional 13

unauthorized acts related to nuclear and other radioactive materials, associated activities or facilities. 14

Using this approach a State can ensure that its response is proportionate to the assessment of threat 15

and risk, particularly with regard to the anticipated consequences of a nuclear security event on 16

persons, property, society and the environment. The application of a graded approach can save a State 17

time and money as resources may be focused more effectively on the more serious perceived risks, 18

rather than treating all potential nuclear security events with the same level of effort or resources. 19

DETECTION SYSTEMS AND MEASURES 20

2.6. A State’s ability to identify the nature of nuclear security events (other than those based 21

purely on information alerts) will depend critically on its ability to detect material associated with 22

such events. A State’s detection systems and measures form a critical element of its infrastructure, 23

defining the State’s detection capabilities in accordance with available detection equipment and the 24

practices, processes and procedures associated with its use [23]. This is sometimes referred to as a 25

State’s detection architecture. As such, a State’s detection systems and measures should have robust 26

interfaces with its national response framework [24]. 27

3. TYPES OF NUCLEAR SECURITY EVENT 28

GENERAL 29

3.1. In order to assist States to plan for response measures commensurate with their threat and risk 30

assessments, and the principles of graded approach, this publication includes guidance on grouping 31

nuclear security event types into nuclear security event groups 1 to 3. This grouping is based on an 32

6

assessment of factors which should include the nature of the criminal or intentional unauthorized act 1

involved, the situation at the time the nuclear security event is detected and the nature of the nuclear 2

or other radioactive material involved. The resulting three groups can be summarized as: 3

Group 1- Events with spread of radiation 4

Group 2- Events with confirmed presence of radiation but no spread 5

Group 3- Events where the presence of radiation has not been confirmed 6

3.2. The benefit of grouping nuclear security events in this way is that it enables States to assess 7

which groups of nuclear security event it is reasonably able to plan for in accordance with its threat 8

and risk assessment. For example, the threat and risk assessment may indicate that the State faces its 9

greatest threat from Group 2 and Group 3 nuclear security events. This will enable the State to focus 10

its national framework on the capabilities required to respond effectively to these two types of events. 11

The State can also consider, within its national framework, the national and international support 12

needed to deal with Group 1 nuclear security events, and develop plans to deal with these, but these 13

should not be the focus of its initial national framework development based on its assessment of threat 14

and risk. 15

3.3 A key aim of the national framework should be to identify the measures needed to prevent a 16

Group 3 or Group 2 nuclear security event from escalating. By focusing on its nationally assessed 17

threats and risks the State should be able to achieve this aim much more effectively than it would if it 18

simply planned for any and all eventualities. The grouping of nuclear security events in this manner 19

should be implemented in a flexible manner, as the nature of the nuclear security event may change as 20

the event evolves, or more information becomes available, however if a State can effectively respond 21

to prevent Group 3 and Group 2 nuclear security events from escalating it will have succeeded in its 22

response. 23

GROUPING OF NUCLEAR SECURITY EVENTS 24

3.4. It is suggested that the grouping of nuclear security event types follow the three scenario 25

types described below. These scenarios illustrate three broad types of situation that could be 26

encountered, leading a State to decide that a nuclear security event is taking place and to initiate its 27

response, namely: 28

(i) The spread of nuclear and/or other radioactive material and/or uncontrolled energy release 29

from a nuclear reaction or uncontrolled radiation exposure of person(s) due to nuclear or other 30

radioactive material (Group 1); 31

(ii) The confirmed presence of nuclear and/or other radioactive material without the spread of 32

nuclear and/or other radioactive material or uncontrolled energy release from a nuclear 33

7

reaction or uncontrolled radiation exposure of person(s) due to nuclear or other radioactive 1

material (Group 2); and 2

(iii) Information alerts about potential criminal or intentional unauthorized use of nuclear and/or 3

other radioactive materials or sabotage without the confirmed presence of nuclear or other 4

radioactive material (Group 3). 5

Group 1 Nuclear Security Events 6

3.5. This group includes scenarios in which the spread of nuclear and/or other radioactive material 7

and/or the release of energy from an uncontrolled nuclear reaction, or uncontrolled exposure of 8

person(s) due to nuclear or other radioactive material, has already occurred when the State decides 9

that there is a nuclear security event and initiates its response. In this group, it is assumed that the 10

material is detected, target is known but the adversary may not fully be known. In case of sabotage, 11

the facility or activity is known. Examples of scenarios representative of this group of nuclear security 12

events include, but are not limited to: 13

— Sabotage of a nuclear facility or nuclear material resulting in a release of energy and/or 14

dispersal of radionuclides; 15

— Sabotage of an associated facility or associated activity resulting in dispersal of radionuclides; 16

— A radiation exposure device (RED) or series of REDs, such as a high activity radioactive 17

source, positioned and exposing person(s); 18

— Operation of a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or series of RDDs resulting in dispersal of 19

radioactive material, by means of explosives or other means of dispersal (e.g. by an aerosol 20

generator or via building ventilation system, or manually), 21

— Spread of nuclear material or uncontrolled energy release from a detonation caused by a 22

fission chain reaction, 23

— Radioactive contamination: 24

o At a strategic location, such as the venue of a major public event, 25

o In the food chain, 26

o In the water supply network, or 27

o In cosmetic, pharmaceutical or other products used by the public. 28


3.6. This group includes scenarios in which an information alert and/or an instrument alarm has 30

indicated the presence of nuclear or other radioactive material or sabotage without, as yet, the spread 31

8

of nuclear and/or other radioactive material, uncontrolled energy release from a nuclear reaction or 1

uncontrolled radiation exposure of person(s) due to nuclear or other radioactive material. Such 2

scenarios could arise because an adversary has attempted a criminal or intentional unauthorized act 3

that has been unsuccessful, or because an attempt to commit such an act is in progress. In the latter 4

situation the State’s focus should be on preventing the successful commission of the act in progress, 5

thereby preventing escalation. In this group, it is assumed that ionising radiation from the material is 6

detected, but the adversary and target may not be known. In case of sabotage, the facility inventory is 7

threatened. Examples of scenarios representative of this group of nuclear security events include, but 8

are not limited to: 9

— Attempted sabotage of a nuclear facility or nuclear material without uncontrolled energy 10

release from a nuclear reaction or dispersal of radionuclides; 11

— Attempted sabotage of an associated facility or associated activity without dispersal of 12

radionuclides; 13

— An RED detected without uncontrolled radiation exposure of person(s) due to nuclear or other 14

radioactive material; 15

— Attempted operation of an RDD without the spread of radioactive material; 16

— Anticipated attempt to spread nuclear material or cause uncontrolled energy release from a 17

detonation caused by a fission chain reaction. 18

— Detection of nuclear material with the potential for an intentional or unintentional assembly 19

that can create a detonation caused by a fission chain reaction. 20

— Detection of nuclear or other radioactive material: 21

o Intended for use in an RED or RDD, 22

o Intended to cause radioactive contamination of a food chain, a water supply network, 23

cosmetic or pharmaceutical products, or other products used by the public. 24

o Intended to cause radioactive contamination or irradiation of a targeted individual 25

where the impact may be more widespread. 26

— Detection of nuclear or other radioactive material being trafficked [24]: 27

o At designated and undesignated points of entry and exits, 28

o Within a State’s interior. 29


3.7. This group includes scenarios in which an information alert indicates potential unauthorized 31

use of nuclear and/or other radioactive materials and/or sabotage, without detection by instruments of 32

9

such materials. The State’s focus when responding to this type of nuclear security event should be to 1

prevent escalation. In this scenario group, it is assumed that the target, adversaries and/or material 2

may not yet be identified. Examples of scenarios representative of this group of nuclear security 3

events include, but are not limited to: 4

— Information on unauthorized removal of nuclear or other radioactive material. 5

— Report of a theft or loss or missing nuclear or other radioactive material. 6

— Information on planned sabotage of nuclear or radioactive material or associated facilities and 7

activities. 8

— Information that there is an RED, RDD or fission detonation device in a place in which it 9

could cause harm to persons, property, the economy or the environment and/or disruption. 10

— Operational information from intelligence services, such as an illicit trafficking warning or 11

information on a known adversary. 12

— Information on regulatory non-compliances, such as discrepancies in accounting of nuclear or 13

in a register of radioactive material, or other unauthorized acts. 14

3.8. Figure 2 illustrates how a State may determine into which group a scenario for a nuclear 15

security event may fit. This algorithm should be reviewed regularly by a State as the response to a 16

nuclear security event progresses to ensure that, where the type of nuclear security event changes, 17

either due to the event evolving, or more information becoming available, this can be quickly 18

recognized and the response adjusted accordingly to prevent, where possible, further escalation of the 19

event. 20

10

Was the NSE based only on an Information Alert or was it based

also on an Instrument alarm?

Group 2Group 1 Group 3

Has material been spread or has energy from the material

been released?

NO

Instrument Alarm

Information Alert only

YES

NUCLEAR SECURITY EVENT

INITIATE RESPONSE MEASURES

1

FIG. 2: Flowchart to illustrate the process to determine the nuclear security event group. 2

NUCLEAR SECURITY EVENT GROUPS: IMPACT LEVELS 3

3.9. As with the grouping of nuclear security event types, the impact levels associated with 4

nuclear security events have been separated into three distinct impact levels- high, medium and low. 5

These levels take into account the impact which each type of nuclear security event could have on the 6

State- specifically in relation to persons, property, the economy, the environment and State security 7

and stability. These impact levels will directly influence the resources which a State deploys to deal 8

with the event, as, in general, as the impact factors of a nuclear security event increase, so do the 9

levels of resources assigned to them by a State. 10

3.10. The actual and potential impact of a nuclear security event may evolve as the event develops, 11

and that the actual level of response should evolve to react to this, but for planning purposes, the 12

resources potentially available need to be sufficient to respond to the most severe impacts that can be 13

reasonably foreseen for that event type. As such this process can assist States to assess the potential 14

resourcing requirements for each level of impact. 15

Level 1: High Impact 16

3.11. Nuclear security events potentially having a high impact on a State could include, but are not 17

limited to, those involving an uncontrolled nuclear reaction, sabotage of a nuclear facility leading to a 18

major release of energy and/or dispersal of radioactive material of substantial amounts of 19

radionuclides (for example, by an RDD or a series of RDDs). 20

11

Level 2: Medium Impact 1

3.12. Nuclear security events potentially having a medium impact on a State could include, but are 2

not limited to, dispersal of relatively small amounts of radionuclides (for example, by an RDD) or 3

exposure of a limited number of people (for example, by an RED). The actual impact might also be 4

medium for nuclear security events involving criminal use of nuclear or other radioactive material, or 5

targeted acquisition of such material, if the initial response to the event is successful in preventing an 6

act that could lead to Impact Level 1, for example before a specific target has been identified. 7

Level 3: Low Impact 8

3.13. Nuclear security events potentially having no more than a low impact could include, but are 9

not limited to, an information alert regarding intended criminal use of nuclear or other radioactive 10

material, or targeted acquisition of such material. The actual impact level will usually be low only if 11

the initial response to the event is successful in preventing an act that could result in Impact Levels 1 12

or 2 being reached, for example before an adversary has acquired the material or before a target has 13

been identified. 14

PLANNING RESOURCES BASED ON IMPACT LEVELS 15

3.14. The assessment of the potential impact level of a nuclear security event provides a basis for 16

the State to plan the resourcing needed to respond effectively to that event, using associated 17

resourcing scales. The use of these resourcing scales may assist a State in determining (i) the potential 18

resources required to deal effectively with the nuclear security event and (ii) whether the State itself 19

can meet the scale of resources required for the event, or whether it may need to seek external 20

assistance from other countries or international organizations. While the scale of resourcing needed 21

for response typically increases in proportion to the anticipated or potential impact of an event, there 22

may be exceptions; for example, circumstances in which an event may need the deployment of 23

international resources, even if the impact level was initially categorized as low. Examples of such 24

circumstances include: 25

— The use of a radiation detection instrument that had generated ambiguous results leading the 26

State to immediately requests international reach-back support to interpret the measurement, 27

or 28

— The detection and seizure of very small amount of nuclear material may not have immediate 29

security implication and be graded low, but the investigations could reveal that the seized 30

item is a sample of a large quantity of material out of regulatory control and is available for 31

use in a nuclear security event with international implications. 32

12

3.15. Many States may be able to manage the response to a high impact nuclear security event 1

using only their local and national resources detailed below, but such an event may exceed the 2

capabilities of some States and may therefore need the deployment of international resources. 3

3.16. If the initial response to a medium impact nuclear security event is successful in preventing an 4

act that could lead to a high impact event, for example if radioactive material intended for use in an 5

RDD is detected and safely recovered prior to its use in the RDD, many States may be able to manage 6

the response using only the local resources detailed below, but such an event may exceed locally held 7

capabilities and require the deployment of national resources. 8

3.17. If the initial response to a low impact nuclear security event is successful in preventing an act 9

that could lead to a medium or high impact event, for example before an adversary has acquired the 10

material or before a target has been identified, a State may be able to manage the response to the 11

nuclear security event using only the local resources detailed below. Such an event may, however, 12

require the deployment of national or even international resources depending on the State’s 13

capabilities and the nature of the material involved. 14

3.18. Guidance on planning the resources needed for response to a nuclear or radiological 15

emergency, of any level of impact, triggered by a nuclear security event (or an accident) is provided in 16

other IAEA publications [7, 11, 14, 25]. 17

International resources 18

3.19. International resources are the resources available to a State from responding agencies or 19

specialist teams from other countries or from international organizations such as the IAEA. 20

National resources 21

3.20. National resources are all of the resources available to a State for the response to a nuclear 22

security event, including first responder organizations, specialist scientific teams and other national 23

response agencies. This level of resources involves the mobilization of all available response 24

resources within a State in order to be able to deal with the nuclear security event. 25

Local resources 26

3.21. Local resources include those, such as law enforcement personnel, emergency medical 27

services, civil protection, fire and rescue services or military forces, that are used within a State to 28

protect public safety or security in general, and that will be available to the State for the response to a 29

nuclear security event. These may be supported, where necessary, by specialist resources from the 30

national level within a State, to provide specific support and assistance, for example, to assist in the 31

search for, identification of, or safe handling of, nuclear or other radioactive material. Figure 3 below 32

13

shows an illustrative relationship between nuclear security event impact level and deployment of 1

resources. 2

P

rop

orti

onat

e R

esou

rce

Dep

loym

ent

Low Medium High

Nuclear Security EventImpact Levels x Resource Deployment

Level of Impact

Local resources

National resources

International resources support

3 FIG. 3: Illustrative representation of the relationship between nuclear security event impact levels and deployment of 4 resources. 5

4. DESIGNING A NATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR MANAGING THE RESPONSE TO 6


4.1. The key to designing an effective national framework for managing the response to nuclear 8

security events is the engagement of all stakeholders from the outset of the process. However the State 9

decides to design its national framework, it can only do so effectively with the involvement of all 10

competent authorities, responding agencies and other relevant organizations. 11

4.2 For many States the first step in designing a national framework may involve running a 12

number of stakeholder meetings in order to ensure early engagement with all of the organizations 13

involved in the planning for, and response to, nuclear security events. These meetings should involve 14

senior stakeholders from the competent authorities and responding agencies, as well as relevant 15

government ministries, institutions and organizations, in order to ensure agreement from these 16

organizations at an appropriate national level. 17

4.3 One of the most effective ways of engaging with stakeholders in designing a national 18

framework is to run a series of workshops during which stakeholders are presented with a range of 19

14

nuclear security event scenarios based on the State’s national threat and risk assessment. These 1

scenario-based workshops can be very effective as they ensure that stakeholders are provided with 2

context with which to frame their discussions. 3

4.4 During these discussions stakeholders should be asked to consider a number of key elements, 4

each of which are essential in designing an effective national framework. These elements are: 5

— The types of nuclear security event which a State is likely to face (based on the national threat 6

and risk assessment); 7

— A State’s strategic aims and priorities; 8

— The key activities underpinning those aims, and the response actions associated with those 9

activities; 10

— The competent authorities / other agencies who will carry out those activities; 11

— The roles & responsibilities of those competent authorities and other agencies; 12

— Single and multi-agency response plans and procedures; and 13

— The infrastructure which a State requires in order to respond effectively to nuclear security 14

events. 15

Several of these elements will be discussed in more detail below. 16

STRATEGIC AIMS 17

4.5 A key element of a State’s national framework for managing the response to nuclear security 18

events is a statement of the State’s strategic aims when managing such a response. These strategic 19

aims, once agreed, should drive all of the activity by the State’s competent authorities and other 20

responding agencies, ensuring a coherent multi-agency response in which all stakeholders work 21

towards the same outcome- the achievement of the State’s strategic aims. These aims may, for 22

example, prioritize the protection of people and society from harmful consequences, may seek to 23

protect property or the environment, or ensure that perpetrators are held to account. 24

4.6 Several States, as well as international organizations, have taken the creation of strategic aims 25

as an example of best practice in the promotion of a true multi-agency response to nuclear security 26

events. An example of a State’s strategic aims is set out below, although the responsibility for 27

determining these strategic aims and their relative priority lies with each State and will depend on 28

their particular circumstances: 29

— Preserve and protect lives; 30

— Mitigate and minimize the impact of the incident; 31

— Inform the public and maintain public confidence; 32

15

— Prevent, deter and detect crime; 1

— Assist an early return to normality; 2

— Ensure the health and safety of responders; 3

— Safeguard the environment; 4

— Facilitate legal proceedings and other forms of enquiry; 5

— Review the response and identify lessons learned. 6

KEY ACTIVITIES 7

4.7. Once a State has agreed its strategic aims when dealing with nuclear security events, it should 8

then consider which key activities will be required to achieve those aims. These key activities should 9

be agreed between a State and responding agencies. They play an important role within the national 10

framework, setting out the activities that a State considers as essential to enable its competent 11

authorities and other responding agencies to respond effectively to nuclear security events. 12

4.8 Each key activity should be underpinned by a detailed set of response actions. These actions 13

provide the detail behind the key activities and will often be broken down into single-agency actions 14

within a State’s national response plans. Many single-agency response plans will contain some of the 15

key activities and actions listed below, however, by including them as part of its national framework, 16

a State can ensure that they form part of the State’s multi-agency response to nuclear security events, 17

rather than as isolated single-agency actions. 18

4.9 Table 1 lists examples of the key activities, which are considered to form the baseline key 19

activities and response actions that a State should consider when constructing its national framework. 20

States may choose to adopt these key activities, add to or amend them to suit their particular 21

circumstances: 22

TABLE 1: LIST OF KEY ACTIVITIES AND THEIR ASSOCIATED RESPONSE ACTIONS 23

KEY ACTIVITIES RESPONSE ACTIONS

Information gathering - Assess, confirm and validate alarms and alerts

- Collect information about material, adversary and/or target.

- Confirm nuclear material inventory / radioactive material registry.

- Gather relevant intelligence

Information analysis - Assess possible adversaries and associated networks.

- Protect sensitive information.

- Share information with partners.

- Assess the initial situation (adversary, method, material involved).

- Determine nuclear security event type.

16


- Determine nuclear security event impact level.

- Monitor and review the ongoing nuclear security event.

- Estimate potential consequences (health, economic, societal and

environment)3.

- Assess possibility of multiple events.

- Assess potential international impact (for example impact on shipping /

cross-border movement of goods / people).

- Identify appropriate response resources to deployed (considering graded

approach).

Notification, activation and

deployment4

- Activate response plans.

- Notify relevant organizations.

- Activate relevant organizations.

- Establish multi-agency integrated response command structure at all

levels (strategic, tactical and operational levels).

- Deploy appropriate resources

- Reinforce security measures and activities at strategic locations

- Create and share situational awareness for all response organizations

- Request international cooperation and assistance as necessary

Interdiction - Disrupt an ongoing nuclear security event

- Render safe the device (as applicable)

- Obtain functional control of material and threat components

- Take necessary steps to gain control of seized material

Criminal investigations [26] - Collect evidence associated with the nuclear security event

- Implement radiological crime scene management (as applicable)

- Obtain witness / expert witness testimony

- Maintain evidential integrity

- Ensure chain of custody for all evidence

- Conduct conventional and nuclear forensics.

- Support prosecution.

Public information - Release information to the public [17, 18]

- Gather information from the public

- Provide advice to the public

- Reassure the public

3 Taking into account references [8, 9, 16, 18, 25]. 4 In case of a nuclear or radiological emergency triggered by a nuclear security event, the following references apply for identifying respective emergency response actions related to notification and activation: [8], [12], [16] and [25]. In this case, notification may also be necessary emergency response action on an international level within the framework of Early Notification Convention [27] and its operational tool- EPR-IEComm [28].

17


Consequence management5 - Restrict public access to scene(s)

- Package, transport and store nuclear and radioactive material

- Restore normality

ORGANIZATIONS, ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES 1

4.10. Once a State has agreed its key activities and response actions, it should then clearly identify 2

which specific agency (or agencies) at the local or national level are responsible for the delivery of 3

each action. Where a State does not have the local or national capability to undertake an action it 4

should consider seeking international assistance. 5

4.11 The nature of nuclear security events means that any response will often require the 6

involvement of many more agencies than would normally be required to respond to the more 7

traditional type of civil emergency. This situation makes the clear allocation of roles and 8

responsibilities to those agencies a key component of a national framework, reducing the risk of 9

duplication of effort or omission by organizations during the response. Understanding which agencies 10

are responsible for undertaking which response actions enables planners to develop much more 11

focused, effective response plans and decision-makers, at all levels of command, to make better, 12

informed decisions, balancing priority actions with the resources available at any given time during 13

the response. 14

4.12 The competent authorities and other agencies involved in the response to nuclear security 15

events may include, but is not limited to: 16

— Police and law enforcement agencies; 17

— Fire and rescue services; 18

— Health agencies; 19

— Environmental agencies; 20

— Intelligence agencies; 21

— Nuclear regulatory bodies; 22

— Border guards; 23

— Coastguards; 24

— Customs officers; 25

5 Refs [7], [9–22] and [25] provide guidance on other emergency responses action related to consequence management of a nuclear or radiological emergency triggered by a nuclear security event.

18

— Military units; 1

— Ministries of the interior and/or foreign affairs, or their agencies; 2

— Technical and scientific support organizations; 3

— Operators of nuclear facilities; 4

— Operators of associated facilities (e.g., radioactive material storage facilities, facilities with 5

radioactive sources) and activities; 6

— Utility service providers (e.g., telecommunication, transport organizations, gas, electricity, 7

water and waste management). 8

PLANS AND PROCEDURES 9

4.13. Many of the above organizations within States will have existing single- and multi-agency 10

plans and procedures that may encompass both nuclear security event and non-nuclear security event 11

response. Where agencies develop plans to deliver the key activities directly associated with nuclear 12

security events they should, where possible, be developed to complement existing non-nuclear 13

security event plans and procedures in order to develop synergies and to prevent conflict with those 14

plans and procedures. All such plans and procedures should be developed to recognize the needs of 15

partner agencies. These plans and procedures should include many of the response actions discussed 16

above, as well as other actions appropriate to the State’s circumstances and each agency’s capabilities. 17

4.14. The grouping of nuclear security event types as outlined above may be useful for agencies 18

preparing such plans, enabling the agencies to build plans which have the flexibility to adapt as the 19

type of nuclear security event changes. The State should determine which of these plans and 20

procedures need to be prioritized based on the national threat and risk assessment, as well as the 21

State’s notion of acceptable risk. 22

4.15. Countries with nuclear facilities or nuclear material, as well as countries with radioactive 23

material, associated facilities or associated activities, should have specific response plans for events 24

involving sabotage, but in most of the cases these plans will not be the same as those for events 25

involving RDDs, REDs or similar events. When building their framework all types of nuclear security 26

events should be considered, and response plans developed, as appropriate to the State’s 27

circumstances. 28

MULTI-AGENCY COMMAND, CONTROL AND COORDINATION 29

4.16. When defining the roles and responsibilities of the various responding agencies involved in 30

the response to a nuclear security event, a State should ensure that the relationships between these 31

organizations are clearly defined through formal protocols such as written agreements or memoranda 32

of understanding. This is particularly important given the significant number of different 33

19

organizations which may be involved in the response to nuclear security events, which may require 1

agencies to work together in managing the response who do not normally work together. These 2

relationships are best defined and managed by the use of integrated, multi-agency command, control 3

and coordination structures, which should be regularly tested and exercised to ensure their 4

effectiveness. These command, control and coordination structures should complement those which 5

already exist for the emergency response to events which do not involve nuclear security elements. 6

4.17. The national framework should facilitate appropriate multi-agency command, control and 7

coordination for each type of nuclear security event. These arrangements may need to range from 8

simple to complex, allowing for the escalation or de-escalation of command, control and coordination 9

structures dependent on the type of nuclear security event faced and taking into account any 10

arrangements already established for command, control and coordination for managing a nuclear or 11

radiological emergency [8, 25]. 12

4.18. An integrated command, control and coordination structure for responding to a nuclear 13

security event may include the following components depending on the type and scale of event being 14

faced: 15

— A national policy level; 16

— A strategic level; 17

— A tactical level; and 18

— An operational level (e.g.) [29]. 19

4.19. The policy level should be the highest level with overall responsibility for managing the 20

response to a nuclear security event. At this level, a coordination body comprising, for example, the 21

Head of the Government and a board of relevant ministers should be established, as appropriate to the 22

State’s circumstances. This coordination body should make decisions on the overall management of 23

the nuclear security event, including requests for international assistance. 24

4.20. At strategic level, a Security Strategic Centre (or similar) should be established and staffed, 25

for example, by senior officials from relevant national authorities. Depending on the type and 26

anticipated impact of the event being faced, the strategic level should: 27

— Provide advice to the policy level, when decisions need to be taken; 28

— Ensure proper command, control, coordination and communication; 29

— Assist and provide direction to the local / tactical level; 30

— Determine the need for, and the coordination of, international cooperation and assistance; 31

— Manage public information and provide guidance to the local / tactical level; 32

20

— Secure personnel and financial resources as well as logistic support. 1

4.21. At the tactical level, a local command post should be established and staffed, for example, by 2

a multidisciplinary group of experts, capable of providing technical advice on conducting field 3

operations associated with the nuclear security event. Depending on the type and anticipated impact of 4

the event being faced, the tactical level should: 5

— Continuously perform technical assessments of any threat, including consideration of 6

potential consequences of that threat; 7

— Make decisions on the implementation of field operations; 8

— Establish tactical directions for the on-scene / operational level; 9

— Ensure that the strategic level is regularly informed on the progress and magnitude of the 10

nuclear security event; 11

— Establish a decision making structure to ensure that directions received from the strategic 12

level with respect to public information are followed; 13

— Allocate resources for the operational level; and 14

— Request additional support for operations, as needed. 15

4.22. The operational level should comprise of teams of individuals responsible for performing 16

specific on-scene operations, for example, law enforcement, fire services, radiation assessment and 17

other technical support organizations, military, medical, and paramedical services. Depending on the 18

type and anticipated impact of the event being faced, the operational level should: 19

— Provide on-scene direction to the personnel responding to the nuclear security event in a 20

manner that is compliant with recognized health and safety practices; 21

— Ensure that the tactical level is regularly informed on the progress and magnitude of the 22

nuclear security event; 23

— Execute directions received from the tactical level; and 24

— Ensure that information relevant to the developing criminal investigation is reported in a 25

timely manner. 26

4.23. Communication within each level of the command, control and coordination structure, and 27

between levels, is critical to the efficiency, effectiveness and coherence of the response. 28

4.24. Within such a multi-agency command structure effective, planned and well-defined 29

communication protocols within and between each level of command are important, as these should 30

ensure that each agency’s resources are properly coordinated during the response. Such protocols 31

should be contained within the national framework. 32

21

4.25. Figure 4 shows an illustrative example of an integrated command structure. 1

POLICY LEVEL

STRATEGIC LEVEL

TACTICAL LEVEL

ON-SCENE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

OFF-SCENE ACTIVITIES

PUBLIC SAFETY HEALTH NUCLEAR REGULATOR

INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS ENVIRONMENT MILITARY

NUCLEAR REGULATOR

BORDER SECURITY

HEALTH

FIRE BRIGADE / CIVIL DEFENSE

LAW ENFORCEMENT

INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

MILITARY

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY

VOLUNTEER AGENCIES

LAW ENFORCEMENT – SCENE SECURITY FIRE BRIGADE NUCLEAR AUTHORITY MILITARY

LAW ENFORCEMENT - OPERATIONAL

RESPONSE

FORENSIC PERSONNEL

EMERGENCY MEDICAL RESPONSE SCIENTIFIC SUPPORT

LAW ENFORCEMENT INVESTIGATION LOGISTICSPUBLIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENTAL

ASSESSMENT

PUBLIC SECURITY

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

2

FIG. 4: Illustration of an integrated command structure. 3

NATIONAL COORDINATION 4

4.26. The State should establish coordination arrangements to allow the effective, timely and secure 5

exchange of information between organizations involved in the response to a nuclear security event 6

and between the various command levels. This coordination should be achieved and evaluated 7

through formal arrangements, such as agreements and protocols. 8

4.27 The State should include, as part of its national arrangements, plans and procedures for the 9

provision of public information in the event of a nuclear security event taking into account the 10

protection of sensitive information. Public reassurance as well as, where needed, public health 11

information, are vital components of any State’s national response plans. These arrangements should 12

be included within the national framework. 13

5. INFRASTRUCTURE FOR A NATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR MANAGING THE 14

RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR SECURITY EVENTS 15

AUTHORITY 16

5.1. The State should clearly identify within its national framework a body to coordinate the 17

development and maintenance of the national framework for managing the response to nuclear 18

security events. This body should also be responsible for coordinating the development of the multi- 19

agency plans and procedures for managing nuclear security events that will sit inside the national 20

22

framework. This coordination responsibility should be clearly defined in accordance with appropriate 1

legislation, policies and procedures. In addition to the coordination function, a competent authority 2

should be clearly assigned responsibility for leading the response to nuclear security events. Whether 3

this authority is one and the same as the planning authority is a decision for the State. 4

5.2. Where a nuclear security event may result in a nuclear or radiological emergency, the 5

infrastructure for the response to nuclear security events should be integrated with the infrastructure 6

that is essential to provide the capability for performing functions in an emergency response in 7

accordance with relevant Safety Requirements [7] and related guidance [25]. 8

CAPABILITIES, CAPACITIES AND RESOURCES 9

5.3. Within its national framework the State should identify the capabilities, capacities and 10

resources that are needed to respond to the different types of nuclear security event outlined above, 11

describing through appropriate plans and procedures how these will be obtained and sustained during 12

the response. The State should identify the types of nuclear security event for which it has adequate 13

resources to respond, including human resources with specialized knowledge, skills and abilities to 14

take appropriate actions to deal with the nuclear security event. Where a State identifies that it does 15

not have sufficient resources and expertise to deal with a type of nuclear security event its plans 16

should describe how it will obtain such resources and expertise, for example through a Memorandum 17

of Understanding with a neighbouring State or from an international agency (such as the IAEA). 18

5.4. Capabilities, capacities and resources that should be available to a State may include, but are 19

not limited to: 20

— Specialist law enforcement capabilities (such as protected responders and specialist 21

investigators); 22

— Technical and scientific support; 23

— Specialized rescue capabilities; 24

— Medical support; 25

— Nuclear forensics support; 26

— Equipment and personnel for site survey and search operations (e.g., for mobile/aerial 27

survey); 28

— Equipment for secure communications; 29

— Media management; 30

— Specialized equipment, such as explosives detectors or pyrophoric material handling 31

equipment, and personnel able to use it; 32

23

— Criticality control procedures and equipment; 1

— Radiation detection instruments (mobile and stationary); 2

— Personal protective equipment; 3

— Sample analysis (including delivery of samples and communication of results); 4

— Information for non-specialists on nuclear and radioactive materials. 5

TRAINING AND EXERCISING 6

5.5. All individuals and organizations with defined roles in the response to nuclear security events 7

should be appropriately prepared. This preparation should give them a clear understanding of their 8

single and multi-agency plans and procedures, their roles and responsibilities within the response and 9

those of their partner agencies. All such individuals and organizations should be given the opportunity 10

to test their preparedness through regular exercising. 11

5.6. Those organizations likely to be involved in the response to nuclear security events should 12

regularly train and exercise together to respond to nuclear security events. Training, drills and 13

exercises should address all aspects of plans and procedures, and be conducted at local and national 14

levels [30]. Indeed, within the national framework a State should specify the frequency and extent of 15

national level training and exercising requirements in order to ensure that training and exercising 16

requirements are prioritized appropriately. Organizations should identify and make available the 17

relevant capabilities, capacities and resources to ensure that they can comply with such national 18

training and exercising requirements. 19

5.7. Special attention should be given to training on nuclear security response for the non-20

specialist response organizations that may be involved in response to nuclear security events. 21

6. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE 22

GENERAL 23

6.1. The response to some types of nuclear security event may include the use of international 24

resources, for example where a State lacks the specialist resources or expertise to deal with the type of 25

event being faced. In such cases, the international contribution to the response should be coordinated 26

with the national response. States should describe within their national framework for managing the 27

response to nuclear security events how they intend to cooperate, consult and exchange information 28

with other States, directly or through the IAEA and/or other relevant international organizations. 29

Bilateral and/or multilateral arrangements for cooperation should be established, as necessary, in the 30

national framework, to ensure that international assistance can be obtained promptly if requested. 31

24

6.2. States should share lessons learned and best practices in developing and implementing a 1

national framework for managing the response to nuclear security events. 2

ARRANGEMENTS FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE FOR 3


6.3. International cooperation and assistance for response to any nuclear security event may 5

involve a wide range of organizations, capabilities and resources. 6

6.4. Arrangements for obtaining international cooperation and assistance should be established in 7

advance and form an essential element of a State’s national framework. The mechanisms for such 8

cooperation and assistance should be planned and exercised to ensure that they can be implemented 9

effectively when a nuclear security event occurs. National legal arrangements should be in place to 10

facilitate requests to other States or international organizations for assistance and, if relevant, 11

provision of assistance to other States at their request. 12

6.5. Several international legal instruments, such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of 13

Nuclear Material [2], and the Amendment thereto [31]; International Convention on Suppression of 14

Acts of Nuclear Terrorism [1]; Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or 15

Radiological Emergency [32], as well as the international systems such as the IAEA Incident and 16

Trafficking Database (ITDB), IAEA Unified System for Information Exchange (USIE) [28], 17

Response and Assistance Network (RANET) [13]; INTERPOL Operation Failsafe provide guidance 18

on aspects of the response to nuclear security events, and should be identified and incorporated into 19

the national framework and, where appropriate, into national response plans. These systems have 20

established distinct objectives and protocols for receiving and exchanging security information with 21

and between States. States should therefore understand each system and consider them as a resource 22

for notifications and providing assistance capabilities. 23

6.6. A State’s obligations in relation to international cooperation and assistance, arising from 24

bilateral and/or international treaties and conventions to which they are parties, may include the 25

following: 26

— Reporting cases of unauthorized removal or sabotage. In such a case, or a credible threat 27

thereof, the State should provide information as soon as possible to other States that may be 28

affected and to the IAEA and other relevant international organizations; 29

— In the case of alleged theft of nuclear material, informing other States that may be affected as 30

soon as possible; 31

6.7. In relation to the reporting of, and sharing of, information in relation to nuclear security 32

events a State’s arrangements should include predefined policies, procedures and protocols at the 33

national and international levels in order to make the exchange of information between States, and 34

25

where relevant between States and international organizations, as effective as possible in the event of 1

a nuclear security event. Such policies, procedures and protocols should be contained within the 2

national framework. Policies, procedures and protocols should include: 3

— Information sharing and intelligence cooperation; 4

— A process for sharing information with organizations which are outside of a State’s national 5

response structure where necessary; 6

— Points of contact for regional and international response assistance; 7

— Contact information for regional and international expertise, special training or services 8

needed for response; 9

— Requirements for the identification and handling of sensitive information, and measures to 10

ensure that critical information is available and understandable to all those who need it for 11

their response role. 12

— Exchange of lessons learned following nuclear security events. 13

6.8. Other areas in which a State may have obligations in relation to international cooperation and 14

assistance, arising from bilateral and/or international treaties and conventions, to which they are 15

parties, include: 16

— Recovery and return of seized items; 17

— Rendering of assistance where requested; 18

— Technical cooperation and assistance; 19

— Agreements to provide transport assets and actions to ensure continued capability to respond 20

during a nuclear security event; and 21

— Coordination of law enforcement investigations and prosecutions. 22

6.9. States are encouraged to establish and maintain dialogue at the international level in order to 23

benefit from, and contribute to, the provision of assistance during the response to a nuclear security 24

event. States should seek to interact on a regular basis, to develop and conduct exercises and to test 25

their international preparedness and response. States should also seek to take advantage of 26

international training, such as that available at nuclear security support centres, to build capacity and 27

develop human resource capabilities. 28

6.10. International assistance arrangements should be tested through regular drills and exercises 29

involving regional and/or international components as appropriate. 30

26

7. SUSTAINABILITY 1

7.1. A national framework for managing the response to nuclear security events should be 2

sustained to ensure that it continues to meet the evolving needs of the State. Sustainability involves 3

continuously reviewing, updating, improving and maintaining systems and processes, including 4

equipment, personnel, procedures, protocols and cooperative arrangements. Sustainability requires 5

continuous improvement and needs continued investment in resources by a State to ensure that 6

systems and processes remain effective. Key actions to ensure sustainability include: 7

— Ensuring strong and continuing leadership support. 8

— Establishing and maintaining adequate funding dedicated to response planning. 9

— Ensuring human resources and competencies 10

— Establishing and maintaining mechanisms to guide preparedness and response programmes 11

for nuclear security events. These mechanisms should be the responsibility of the 12

coordinating body discussed in Section 5 above. This body should provide a central point of 13

contact responsible for identifying, disseminating and prioritizing needs for maintenance or 14

improvement and guiding efforts to meet those needs. It should also provide a framework to 15

address specific aspects of local, national, regional and international enhancement / 16

improvement needs. 17

— Establishing and maintaining viable points of contact at the local, national, regional and 18

international levels for all aspects of the national framework and national response plan. 19

Contacts should include entities responsible for: 20

o Resources and equipment; 21

o Plans and procedures; 22

o Notification; 23

o Drills and exercises; 24

o Identification and processing of lessons learned; 25

o Addressing questions and resolving conflicts; 26

o Regional and international cooperation and arrangements; and 27

o Maintaining continuity within and between entities. 28

— National, regional and international funding arrangements. 29

— Establishing and maintaining strong links with stakeholders. 30

— Establishing and maintaining strong links with the media. 31

27

— Establishing and maintaining an evaluation process. 1

PERIODIC REVIEW OF THREAT ASSESSMENT 2

7.2. The Nuclear Security Series of publications provide detail and guidance on how threat 3

assessments are developed [22]. Sustaining the threat assessment involves regular reviews and 4

updates to ensure that the national response plan remains relevant to the evolving threat. Awareness 5

of the nature and level of threats needs to be maintained at all levels (local, national and international) 6

to enable the timely sharing of pertinent threat assessment information with others and to ensure that 7

the national response plan is based on the most current information. Scenario development and 8

planning assumptions should be based on current national, regional and international threat 9

assessment information. 10

PERIODIC REVIEW OF NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 11

7.3. Once national, regional and international cooperation and assistance arrangements have been 12

defined, a schedule and procedure for periodic reviews and revisions should be established. Such 13

review schedules may include routine regular reviews (for example, annually or biennially), but 14

should also provide for a review to be triggered by any major changes to arrangements and/or the 15

threat assessment. 16

SHARING OF EXPERIENCE 17

7.4. The effective sharing of understanding and knowledge regarding nuclear security events 18

between States can help to sustain a State’s ability to manage its response to nuclear security events, 19

by ensuring that best practices are recognized and adopted by responding agencies. As a part of the 20

national framework for managing the response to nuclear security events, local, national and 21

international organizations with responsibility for, or experience of, nuclear security events are 22

encouraged to develop protocols to enable the sharing of knowledge and experiences with other 23

organizations. 24

7.5. Considerations when sharing experience include: 25

— Establishing and using information sharing tools (e.g. secure communication networks, early 26

warning systems, databases); 27

— Establishing regular meetings specifically for the sharing of knowledge and experiences 28

regarding nuclear security events; 29

— Sharing of plans, procedures and updates; and 30

— Publishing experiences from responding to nuclear security events in peer reviewed journals 31

and other appropriate publications. 32

28

INCORPORATION OF LESSONS LEARNED, EVALUATION AND GAP ANALYSIS 1

7.6. Lessons learned from the response to nuclear security events, together with evaluations of the 2

outcomes of training and exercising, should be made available to relevant local, national and 3

international organizations, subject to the requirements of confidentiality. Such information is 4

valuable in the identification of good practices, corrective actions and procedural enhancements. 5

Organizations receiving such information should review it to determine what, if any, information 6

applies to their response activities. When such information is applicable it should be taken into 7

account when developing existing and future plans and activities. 8

7.7. In addition to formally documented lessons learned and evaluations, gap analyses, risk 9

assessments and changes in technology and procedures should also be reviewed to determine whether 10

changes to existing practices would enhance capabilities. Gap analyses compare expected outcomes 11

against actual outcomes to identify where gaps exist. These gaps should be reviewed to determine 12

their cause, identify how to address them and, as appropriate, identify good practices and/or 13

opportunities for improvement. 14

MAINTENANCE AND ENHANCEMENT 15

7.8. Plans for response to nuclear security events should be maintained, and enhanced when 16

appropriate. Examples of maintenance may include routine documentation updates (on, for example, 17

protocols, plans, agreements, procedures, threat assessments and training documents), database 18

management, contact updates, facility and equipment management activities, and other actions that 19

are required to ensure ongoing readiness. Enhancements to increase the performance of routine 20

activities may be identified as a result of a change in leadership or programme direction, new 21

technologies, changing threat assessment, lessons learned reviews, experience from actual nuclear 22

security events or outcomes of evaluation and gap analysis. 23

7.9. Maintenance is typically a routine action performed at a scheduled time, however the nature 24

of nuclear security events means that often maintenance of the components of a national framework 25

may need to be undertaken outside of a regular cycle where, for example, the threat assessment 26

changes and the State needs to update its national response plans to reflect this. Funding for 27

maintenance activities is vital if the national framework and its components are to remain appropriate 28

to the threat and risk faced by the State. 29

7.10 The nature of this maintenance requirement may require States to allocate funding both for 30

routine maintenance activities and an ad-hoc activities as the need arises. Where circumstances dictate 31

that several enhancements are required to the national framework’s components, their implementation 32

may need to be prioritized so that limited funds can be used to implement the most important 33

enhancements first. 34

29

7.11. Many organizations focus their time and effort in the creation of response plans and 1

procedures, however the importance of maintaining these once created cannot be underestimated. 2

3

30

REFERENCES 1

[1] International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Resolution 2

A/59/766, United Nations, New York (2005). 3

[2] Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, United Nations, New York. 4

[3] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Nuclear Security Recommendations on 5

Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5), 6

IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13, IAEA, Vienna (2011). 7

[4] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Nuclear Security Recommendations on 8

Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 14, IAEA, 9

Vienna (2011). 10

[5] EUROPEAN POLICE OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, 11

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL 12

CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION-INTERPOL, UNITED NATIONS 13

INTERREGIONAL CRIME AND JUSTICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, UNITED NATIONS 14

OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIMES, WORLD CUSTOMS ORGANIZATION, Nuclear 15

Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory 16

Control, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 15, IAEA, Vienna (2011). 17

[6] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Objective and Essential Elements of a 18

State’s Nuclear Security Regime, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 20, IAEA, Vienna 19

(2013) 20

[7] FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 21

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR 22

ORGANIZATION, INTERPOL, OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, PAN 23

AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT 24

PROGRAMME, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF 25

HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD 26

METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or 27

Radiological Emergency, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 7, IAEA, Vienna (to 28

be published). 29



ORGANIZATION, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD HEALTH 32

ORGANIZATION, Criteria for Use in Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or 33

Radiological Emergency, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSG-2, IAEA, Vienna (2011). 34

[9] EUROPEAN COMMISSION, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE 35

UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, 36

31

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, 1

PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT 2

PROGRAMME, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Radiation Protection and Safety of 3

Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. 4

GSR Part 3, IAEA, Vienna (2014). 5

[10] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Operations Manual for Incident and 6

Emergency Communication, EPR-IEComm 2012, IAEA, Vienna (2012). 7

[11] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Method for Developing Arrangements 8

for Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, EPR-METHOD 2003, IAEA, Vienna 9

(2003). 10

[12] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Preparation, Conduct and Evaluation of 11

Exercises to Test Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, EPR-Exercise, 12

IAEA, Vienna (2005). 13

[13] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Response and Assistance Network, 14

EPR-RANET (2010), IAEA, Vienna (2010). 15

[14] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 16

Generic Procedures for Medical Response during a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, 17

EPR-Medical, IAEA, Vienna (2005). 18

[15] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION 19

OF FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 20

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION , Manual for First Responders to a Radiological 21

Emergency, EPR-First Responders, IAEA, Vienna (2006). 22

[16] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Generic procedures for assessment and 23

response during a radiological emergency, IAEA-TECDOC-1162, IAEA, Vienna (2000). 24

[17] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Communication with the Public in a 25

Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, EPR-Public Communications, IAEA, Vienna (2012). 26

[18] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Actions to Protect the Public in an 27

Emergency due to Severe Conditions at a Light Water Reactor, EPR-NPP Public Protective 28

Actions, IAEA, Vienna (2013). 29

[19] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Generic procedures for Response to a 30

Nuclear or Radiological Emergency at Research Reactors, EPR-Research Reactor, IAEA, 31

Vienna (2011). 32

[20] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Generic procedures for Response to a 33

Nuclear or Radiological Emergency at TRIGA Research Reactors, EPR-TRIGA Research 34

Reactor, IAEA, Vienna (2011). 35

32

[21] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Generic procedures for monitoring in a 1

nuclear or radiological emergency, IAEA-TECDOC-1092, IAEA, Vienna (1999). 2

[22] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Risk-Informed Approach for Nuclear 3

Security Measures for Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control, 4

IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 24_G, IAEA, Vienna (2015). 5

[23] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Nuclear Security Systems and Measures 6

for the Detection of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control, 7

Nuclear Security Series No. 21, IAEA, Vienna (2013) 8

[24] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear 9

and other Radioactive Material, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 6, IAEA, Vienna (2007). 10



ORGANIZATION, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, OFFICE FOR THE 13

COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, WORLD HEALTH 14

ORGANIZATION, Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, 15

IAEA Safety Standards Series No GS-G-2.1, IAEA, Vienna (2007). 16

[26] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 17

POLICE ORGANIZATION-INTERPOL, UNITED NATIONS INTERREGIONAL CRIME 18

AND JUSTICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, Radiological Crime Scene Management, IAEA 19

Nuclear Security Series No. 22-G, IAEA, Vienna (2014). 20

[27] Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, INFCIRC/355, IAEA, Vienna 21

(1986). 22

[28] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Operations Manual for Incident and 23

Emergency Communication, EPR-IEComm 2012, IAEA, Vienna (2012). 24

[29] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Nuclear Security Systems and Measures 25

for Major Public Events, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 18, IAEA, Vienna (2012). 26

[30] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Preparation, Conduct and Evaluation of 27

Exercises to Test Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, EPR-Exercise, 28

IAEA, Vienna (2005). 29

[31] Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 30

GOV/INF/2005/10-GC (49) INF/6, IAEA, Vienna (2005). 31

[32] Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, 32

INFCIRC/336, IAEA, Vienna (1986). 33

34

35

33

GLOSSARY 1

associated activity The possession, production, processing, use, handling, storage,

disposal or transport of nuclear material or other radioactive material.

associated facility A facility (including associated buildings and equipment) in which

nuclear material or other radioactive material is produced, processed,

used, handled, stored or disposed of and for which an authorization is

required.

authorization The granting by a competent authority of written permission for

operation of an associated facility or for carrying out an associated

activity, or a document granting such permission.

authorized person A natural or legal person that has been granted an authorization. An

authorized person is often referred to as a ‘licensee’, or ‘operator’.

competent authority A governmental organization or institution that has been designated by

a State to carry out one or more nuclear security functions. Example:

Competent authorities may include regulatory bodies, law

enforcement, customs and border control, intelligence and security

agencies, health agencies, etc.

graded approach The application of nuclear security measures proportional to the

potential consequences of criminal or intentional unauthorized acts

involving or directed at nuclear material, other radioactive material,

associated facilities, associated activities, or other acts determined by

the state to have an adverse impact on nuclear security.

nuclear facility A facility (including associated buildings and equipment) in which

nuclear material is produced, processed, used, handled, stored or

disposed of and for which an authorization or licence is required.

nuclear material Any material that is either special fissionable material or source

material as defined in Article XX of the IAEA Statute.

nuclear security event An event that has potential or actual implications for nuclear security

that must be addressed.

34

nuclear security regime A regime comprising:

—The legislative and regulatory framework and administrative

systems and measures governing the nuclear security of nuclear

material, other radioactive material, associated facilities and associated

activities;

—The institutions and organizations within the State responsible for

ensuring the implementation of the legislative and regulatory

framework and administrative systems of nuclear security;

—Nuclear security systems and nuclear security measures for the

prevention of, detection of and response to nuclear security events.

operator Any person, organization, or government entity licensed or authorized

to undertake the operation of an associated facility or to perform an

associated activity.

other radioactive material Radioactive material that is not nuclear material.

out of regulatory control See regulatory control.

radiation exposure device

(RED)

A device with radioactive material designed to intentionally expose

members of the public to radiation.

radioactive material Any material designated in national law, regulation, or by a regulatory

body as being subject to regulatory control because of its radioactivity.

radiological dispersal device

(RDD)

A device to spread radioactive material using conventional explosives

or other means.

regulatory control Any form of institutional control applied to nuclear material or other

radioactive material, associated facilities, or associated activities by

any competent authority as required by the legislative and regulatory

provisions related to safety, security, or safeguards. Explanation: The

phrase ‘out of regulatory control’ is used to describe a situation where

nuclear or other radioactive material is present in sufficient quantity

that it should be under regulatory control, but control is absent, either

because controls have failed for some reason, or they never existed.

35

risk The potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from a nuclear

security event as determined by its likelihood and the associated

consequences.

risk assessment The overall process of systematically identifying, estimating,

analysing and evaluating risk for the purpose of informing priorities,

developing or comparing courses of action, and informing decision

making.

sabotage Any deliberate act directed against an associated facility or associated

activity that could directly or indirectly endanger the health and safety

of personnel, the public or the environment by exposure to radiation or

release of radioactive substances6.

sensitive information Information, in whatever form, including software, the unauthorized

disclosure, modification, alteration, destruction, or denial of use of

which could compromise nuclear security.

sensitive information assets Any equipment or components that are used to store, process, control

or transmit sensitive information.

—Example: Sensitive information assets include control systems,

networks, information systems and any other electronic or physical

media.

strategic location A location of high security interest in the State which is a potential

target for terrorist attacks using nuclear material or other radioactive

material, or a location at which nuclear material or other radioactive

material that is out of regulatory control is located.

target Nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities,

associated activities, or other locations or objects of potential

exploitation by a nuclear security threat, including major public

events, strategic locations, sensitive information, and sensitive

information assets.

6 Radioactive substance and radioactive material have the same meaning.

36

1

Documents

DEVELOPING A NATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR MANAGING THE … · 23 managing the response to nuclear security events, describing the roles which threat assessment, risk-24 informed approach,