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Deterrence and Crisis Stability
F-35 and Joint Strike Missile’s effect on Norwegian security
policy towards Russia
Ole Marius Tørrisplass
Master Thesis
Norwegian Defence University College
Fall 2017
II
Intentionally blank.
III
Foreword
I wrote this thesis as part of the Staff Course at the Norwegian Defence University College in
the fall of 2017. As a military professional with an interest in international relations, I
consider myself lucky that I got the chance to spend time studying a topic close to heart.
Several people supported me with advice and encouragement along the way. First, I have to
thank my family, and particularly my fantastic wife, for accepting my mood swings and a
considerable amount of absent-mindedness as I disappeared into the abstract world for long
periods at the time. I could not have done this without you.
I also have to thank those who agreed to be interviewed. Espen Barth Eide, Sverre Diesen,
Svein Efjestad, Lars Christian Aamodt, and Arne Røksund are all experts on Norwegian
defense and security policy, and their knowledge contributed significantly to improve my
understanding of the topic.
Finally, my supervisor Professor Rolf Tamnes deserves special appreciation for his direct and
honest feedback and for sharing his wealth of knowledge with me. He showed me the
importance of a balanced and nuanced analysis and pulled me back on track whenever I
drifted off course.
Ole Marius Tørrisplass
Bodø
November 2017
IV
Abstract
The topic for this study is how the new F-35 Lightning II and Joint Strike Missile (JSM) may
affect Norwegian security policy towards Russia. The study asks how the systems influence
Norwegian deterrence and defense efforts, crisis stability in a serious crisis, and draws
conclusions as to how an operational concept using the two systems can look in order to best
reconcile the requirements for deterrence and crisis stability. The study is explorative,
answers the research questions through a qualitative approach, and uses theories of
deterrence, crisis stability, and airpower.
The results show that the F-35 and JSM may improve Norwegian defense and deterrence
efforts by contributing to situational awareness, NATO’s collective defense, joint operations,
as well as operations in the air, maritime, and land domains. They also open the door for
deterrence by punishment, both on the battlefield and in support of strategic attacks from
NATO. Finally, the assets improve deterrence credibility by making resistance a more rational
choice for Norway and by tying NATO closer to the defense of the country. In general, the F-
35 and JSM may also contribute to improve crisis stability by raising the threshold for
Russian aggression. However, the stabilizing effect depends on the ability to defend the F-35
bases, and an overly offensive posture may instead cause escalation and threaten stability.
The study proposes three relevant modes of operation for the F-35 in a crisis or war:
defensive, tactically offensive, and strategically offensive. An operational concept for a
security crisis without NATO participation may balance the requirements of deterrence and
crisis stability best by employing the F-35 and JSM in the defensive and in certain
circumstances the tactically offensive mode. A war involving NATO may become a matter of
national survival, and this concept should thus keep all options available and utilize the
defensive, tactically offensive, and strategically offensive modes as required.
Keywords: Norway, Russia, NATO, security policy, defense policy, F-35, Joint Strike Missile,
deterrence, reassurance, crisis stability, operational concept, Armed Forces, military
structure, military posture.
V
Sammendrag
Denne studien analyserer hvordan det nye kampflyet F-35 Lightning II og Joint Strike Missile
(JSM) kan påvirke norsk sikkerhetspolitikk overfor Russland. Studien undersøker hvordan
systemene vil virke inn på norsk avskrekking og forsvar, krisestabilitet i en alvorlig krise, og
trekker slutninger om hvordan et operasjonskonsept med de to systemene kan se ut for best å
balansere behovet for avskrekking, forsvar og krisestabilitet. Studien er eksplorativ, besvarer
spørsmålene kvalitativt, og benytter teorier om avskrekking, krisestabilitet og luftmakt.
Resultatene viser at F-35 og JSM kan forbedre norsk evne til avskrekking og forsvar gjennom
å bidra til bedret situasjonsforståelse, NATO’s kollektive forsvar, fellesoperasjoner, samt
operasjoner i luft-, sjø- og landdomenet. De åpner også opp for avskrekking gjennom straff,
både på slagmarken og ved å støtte strategiske angrep i regi av NATO. I tillegg øker de den
norske avskrekkingens troverdighet gjennom å gjøre motstand til et rasjonelt valg dersom
Russland skulle angripe, og gjennom å knytte NATO tettere til forsvaret av Norge. F-35 og
JSM kan generelt bidra til å forbedre krisestabiliteten ved å øke terskelen for russisk
aggresjon. Effekten avhenger likevel av norsk evne til å beskytte F-35 basene, og en
overdrevet offensiv innretning kan i stedet føre til eskalering og true stabiliteten.
Studien forslår tre relevante operasjonsmåter for F-35 i en krise eller krig: defensiv, taktisk
offensiv og strategisk offensiv. Et operasjonskonsept for en sikkerhetspolitisk krise uten
involvering fra NATO kan balansere kravene til avskrekking og krisestabilitet best gjennom å
benytte F-35 og JSM på en defensiv og i noen tilfeller en taktisk offensiv måte. Krig som
involverer NATO kan bli et spørsmål om nasjonal overlevelse, og dette konseptet bør derfor
åpne for alle operasjonsmåter og benytte den defensive, taktisk offensive og strategisk
offensive måten etter behov.
Nøkkelord: Norge, Russland, NATO, sikkerhetspolitikk, forsvarspolitikk, F-35, Joint Strike
Missile, avskrekking, beroligelse, krisestabilitet, operasjonskonsept, Forsvaret, militær
struktur, militær innretning.
VI
Table of Content
Foreword ................................................................................................................................................ III
Abstract ................................................................................................................................................. IV
Sammendrag .......................................................................................................................................... V
Table of Content ................................................................................................................................... VI
Abbreviations ...................................................................................................................................... VIII
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1
1.1. TOPIC AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS .............................................................................................. 2
1.2. DISPOSITION ............................................................................................................................... 3
1.3. IMPORTANT TERMS AND CONCEPTS ............................................................................................. 4
Part I – Design and Analytical Framework ........................................................................................... 5
2. Research Methodology and Sources ........................................................................................ 5
3. Theory .......................................................................................................................................... 9
3.1. DETERRENCE .............................................................................................................................. 9
3.2. CRISIS STABILITY ......................................................................................................................11
3.2.1. Attributes Conductive to Structural Stability .................................................................13
3.2.2. Attributes that Provide Tools for Crisis Management ...................................................14
3.3. AIRPOWER ................................................................................................................................15
Part II – Background .............................................................................................................................18
4. Strategic Context and Norwegian Security Policy.................................................................18
4.1. RUSSIA .....................................................................................................................................18
4.1.1. Russian Ambitions and Interests in the High North ......................................................18
4.1.2. Conflict Scenarios in the High North ............................................................................19
4.1.3. Russian Military Capabilities and Bastion Defense ......................................................21
4.2. NORWAY ...................................................................................................................................24
4.2.1. Norway – Deterrence and Reassurance ......................................................................25
4.2.2. Norwegian Security Policy – Long Term Plan for the Defense Sector .........................25
4.3. SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................26
5. Traditional Operational Concept and new Capabilities ........................................................28
5.1. TRADITIONAL OPERATIONAL CONCEPT FOR NORWEGIAN AIRPOWER ............................................28
5.2. F-35 PROCUREMENT PROCESS AND REQUIREMENTS ..................................................................31
5.3. NEW CAPABILITIES ....................................................................................................................33
5.3.1. F-35 Lightning II ............................................................................................................33
VII
5.3.2. Joint Strike Missile Capabilities ....................................................................................37
5.4. SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................39
Part III - Analysis ...................................................................................................................................40
6. Deterrence and Defense ...........................................................................................................40
6.1. DETERRENCE CAPABILITY ..........................................................................................................40
6.1.1. Deterrence by Denial ....................................................................................................41
6.1.2. Deterrence by Punishment ...........................................................................................47
6.2. DETERRENCE CREDIBILITY .........................................................................................................50
6.3. SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................51
7. Stability ......................................................................................................................................52
7.1. STRUCTURAL STABILITY .............................................................................................................52
7.1.1. Strike assets should be sufficiently potent to deter a conventional attack ...................52
7.1.2. Strike assets should be able to minimize vulnerability to surprise attack ....................53
7.1.3. Strike assets should be able to mitigate the threat of surprise attack from
the defender ..................................................................................................................54
7.2. CRISIS STABILITY ......................................................................................................................57
7.2.1. Strike assets should be flexible ....................................................................................57
7.2.2. Strike assets should be responsive ..............................................................................58
7.2.3. Strike assets should offer capabilities for signaling ......................................................58
7.3. SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................59
8. Operational Concept .................................................................................................................61
8.1. THE PROBLEMATIC WORD “OFFENSIVE” .....................................................................................61
8.2. SECURITY CRISIS WITHOUT NATO INVOLVEMENT .......................................................................63
8.3. WAR INVOLVING NATO .............................................................................................................66
8.4. SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................68
9. Conclusions and Further Research ........................................................................................70
Reference List .......................................................................................................................................74
List of Figures .......................................................................................................................................85
Appendix A – Receipt from Personvernombudet for Forskning .....................................................86
Appendix B – Approval from the Norwegian Defence University College .....................................89
Appendix C – Interview Guide .............................................................................................................91
Appendix D – Interview Information and Consent Form ..................................................................94
Appendix E – List of Informants .........................................................................................................95
Appendix F – Correspondence Regarding Classification ................................................................97
VIII
Abbreviations
C2 Command-and-Control
DAS Distributed Aperture System
EOTS Electro-Optical Targeting System
GIUK Greenland, Iceland, and United Kingdom
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
JSM Joint Strike Missile
LTP Long Term Plan for the Norwegian Defense Sector
MADL Multifunction Advanced Data Link
MoD Ministry of Defense
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDRE Norwegian Defense Research Establishment
NSM Naval Strike Missile
Project 7600 Project 7600 Future Combat Aircraft
RNoAF Royal Norwegian Air Force
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SAM Surface-to-Air Missile
US United States
WWII World War II
1
1. Introduction
The end of the Cold War brought hope in the West that Russia would soon become a partner
rather than a threat. However, the euphoria cooled down as Russia objected to NATO’s
bombing campaign over Kosovo in 1999 (Gessen, 2014). NATO expansions into the former
Soviet sphere of influence disappointed Russia, and the country felt gradually more alienated
(Kjølberg, 2015). The 2008 war in Georgia proved that Russia was becoming increasingly
assertive on the international area and that it was both willing and capable of using military
force in pursuit of national interests. With the Ukraine crisis in 2014, Russia had de facto
invaded two of its neighbors in less than ten years and this ended any hopes that Russia was
aligning with the West.
The Ukraine crisis triggered much debate in Europe on how to address the new Russian self-
confidence. The response was primarily diplomatic and included a number of economic
sanctions. However, it also caused NATO to refocus back on collective defense and the
alliance implemented a number of specific measures aimed at both assuring its partner nations
and deterring further Russian aggression. Of particular importance were the new enhanced
NATO Response Force, a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, and the Enhanced Forward
Presence (Larsen, 2017).
Russian behavior in the Ukraine caused much insecurity in Norway. The country is not in the
traditional Russian sphere of interests, and the High North is a stable region characterized by
peaceful interaction. Norwegian policy towards Russia has been more cautious than the
policies of some other NATO countries, and Norway has a long tradition of balancing
deterrence with reassurance (Tamnes & Eriksen, 1999). However, Russia’s assertive behavior
has sparked uncertainty in Norway as to the country’s intentions. The Arctic is strategically
important to Russia, and the region has a potential for conflict (Etterretningstjenesten, 2017,
p. 17; Forsvarsdepartementet, 2015c, p. 19; Hamre & Conley, 2017, p. 48). In addition,
Russia has modernized and expanded its military presence in the Arctic in recent years
(Etterretningstjenesten, 2017, p. 14). Consequently, deterrence is back with force on the
Norwegian security agenda.
In parallel with the degrading security climate, the Norwegian Armed Forces are undergoing a
major restructuring. A number of new systems are being implemented and these include new
submarines, helicopters, maritime patrol aircraft, the F-35 Lightning II, and the new long-
2
range precision weapon Joint Strike Missile (JSM) (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2016c). The new
systems are technologically advanced and can potentially improve Norway’s ability to defend
and deter against Russian aggression. However, deterrence and stability are intricate
phenomenon, and improper employment may provoke rather than prevent the behavior they
seek to deter.
1.1. Topic and Research Questions
Norway decided to replace its ageing fleet of F-16s with the new F-35 developed by the
Lockheed Martin Company in 2008. The new jet gives Norway a formidable military
capability that far surpasses the older F-16. The most recent Norwegian Long Term Plan for
the Defense Sector (LTP) describes the F-35 as a strategic capability that is crucial to
Norway’s deterrence and defense efforts, and that can contribute to NATO’s collective
defense (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2016c, p. 63). The combination of the F-35 and JSM’s
improved survivability, lethality, sensor capability, connectivity, range and precision, offer an
offensive capability Norway has not seen before. Consequently, while Norwegian security
policy has traditionally emphasized a defensive posture, the F-35 and JSM give Norway an
opportunity to consider a more offensive approach.
The topic of this study is how the F-35 and JSM may affect Norwegian security policy. It
specifically analyzes the new systems’ effect on deterrence and defense efforts towards
Russia, crisis stability in a serious crisis, and draws conclusions as to how Norway can design
an operational concept using the two systems to best balance the requirements for deterrence
and stability. The research questions are as follows:
How can the F-35 and JSM affect Norwegian deterrence and defense efforts against Russia?
How can the F-35 and JSM influence on crisis stability in a serious crisis between Norway
and Russia?
How can an operational concept involving the F-35 and JSM look in order to reconcile the
need for credible deterrence and defense on the one hand, and for controlled crisis stability
on the other?
The effects of force structure and posture on security are complex and not always intuitive.
The F-35 and JSM add something qualitatively new to the Norwegian Armed Forces, and
3
little academic research has been conducted on their effect in a Norwegian context. Given that
both ineffective deterrence and unwarranted escalation may lead to catastrophic
consequences, Norwegian decision-makers must carefully analyze potential intended and
unintended effects of their policy-choices.
This study aims to analyze how different policies regarding the F-35 and JSM may affect
deterrence, defense, and stability, and seeks to bridge the gap between tactical utility,
Norwegian security policy, and the overarching strategic context. It thus seeks to provide
some new pieces to the puzzle, set the stage for future research, and provide Norwegian
policy-makers and defense-planners with a better foundation for informed decision-making
that optimizes the benefit of the F-35 and JSM.
1.2. Disposition
The study consists of a short introduction, three parts, and conclusions. Part I sets the
analytical framework and starts with chapter 2, which covers the research methodology.
Chapter 3 describes three theoretical perspectives used in the study: deterrence, crisis
stability, and airpower theory.
Part II sets the context for the study and includes two background chapters. Chapter 4 outlines
Russian ambitions, interests, and military capabilities in the High North, and describes
potential conflict scenarios in the region. It also covers contemporary Norwegian security
policy as it appears through official documents. Chapter 5 discusses traditional Norwegian
operational concepts for the use of airpower since the Cold War and looks for traces of a
future operational concept in the F-35 procurement process. Chapter 5 provides a description
of the new capabilities inherent in the F-35 and JSM.
Part III analyzes the three research questions and is the main part of the study. Chapter 6
discusses how the F-35 and JSM affect Norwegian deterrence and defense efforts towards
Russia, and concludes that they may have a positive effect. They also open the door for
deterrence by punishment and contribute positively to deterrence credibility. Chapter 7
discusses how the new assets affect crisis stability in a serious crisis in the High North. This
chapter concludes that improvements in deterrence and defense raise the threshold for Russian
aggression, which may improve crisis stability. However, the effect depends on the ability to
defend the F-35 bases, and an overly offensive posture may instead cause escalation and
threaten stability. Chapter 8 synthesizes the two discussions and analyses how different
4
modes of operation for the F-35 may affect a security crisis without NATO support and war
involving NATO. This analysis concludes that a concept for a security crisis without NATO
could employ the F-35 and JSM in a defensive and in certain circumstances a tactically
offensive mode. The concept for a war involving NATO, on the other hand, should keep all
options available and utilize the defensive, tactically offensive, and strategically offensive
modes as required.
Finally, chapter 9 offers conclusions and suggestions for further research.
1.3. Important Terms and Concepts
Security policy is a key concept in the study and the term security is used in a narrow sense. It
refers to measures taken to ensure the existence, sovereignty, sovereign rights, and integrity of
Norway. This does not exclude so-called hybrid warfare where Russia aims to blur the lines
between war and peace, but the main emphasis is the protection of Norway from state actors,
rather than non-state actors such as terrorists, extremists, and activists.
The study defines a security crisis as a situation that threatens Norway’s territorial integrity
and political sovereignty, but falling short of being a full-scale armed attack in the traditional
sense (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2015c, pp. 8-9). It involves overlapping interests of high
importance where there is a sense of urgency involved (Skogan, 2009, pp. 28-29).
Armed conflict or war is a situation that challenges Norway’s existence, sovereignty,
sovereign rights, and integrity. The use of military force is overt, and the acute nature of the
situation legitimizes the use of all available means to ensure survival and sovereignty
(Forsvarsdepartementet, 2015c, pp. 8-9).
The Arctic is defined geographically and includes the area north of the Arctic Circle. Eight
countries have territory included in the definition, and five of these are littoral Arctic states:
Norway, Russia, the United States, Canada, and Denmark/Greenland (Tamnes & Offerdal,
2014).
The High North refers to all Norwegian territory and maritime zones in the Arctic, as well as
the entire Barents Sea including the Russian zone. It also includes the extended border areas
between Norway and Russia on land (Hønneland, 2012, pp. 28-29).
5
Part I – Design and Analytical Framework
2. Research Methodology and Sources
This chapter describes the research methodology and sources used to answer the research
questions and critically discusses weaknesses and potential threats to validity and reliability.
The study asks how the F-35 and JSM will affect Norwegian security and it answers the
research questions through a qualitative approach. Since little academic research has been
conducted on the F-35 and JSM in a Norwegian context, the study is also explorative and
aims to set the stage for further research. Additionally, it is a case study since it analyzes the
effects of specific technology on the Norwegian context. Finally, while the study uses theory
extensively, it is inductive in that the goal is not to validate existing theories, but rather to
produce new theory on the effect of the F-35 and JSM on Norwegian security.
The nature of the research questions means that theories of deterrence, crisis stability, and
airpower are natural choices. Most theories of deterrence and crisis stability stem from the
Cold War and often address large-scale superpower dynamics. Consequently, certain aspects
may not apply as well to the situation of today. The selection of theory used in this study
provide relevant frameworks for analysis that apply to both conventional and nuclear
deterrence. Morgan’s (2013) contribution to theory of crisis stability is contemporary but is
aimed at the US context. Some of his conclusions do therefore not apply to Norway, which
created a need to critically asses the applicability of certain sides of the theory. Finally,
theories of airpower are often criticized for being both unscientific and unrealistic (Faber,
2015). This is not problematic in this study since airpower theory is primarily used to describe
the phenomenon rather than prescribe the use of airpower.
The selection of sources was purposeful, and the study uses a combination of primary and
secondary sources. Primary sources include official documents, speeches, and five interviews
conducted by myself. Secondary sources include scholarly articles, books, intelligence
assessments, and a few theses. The F-35 and JSM are new and not yet operational in the
Norwegian Armed Forces, so little has been written about the systems’ implications for
Norwegian defense and security policy. Additionally, many of the capabilities of the airplane
are classified. The lack of research available renders this study highly relevant.
Some research was particularly important and applicable to the study. The official report
“Unified effort” (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2015c), written for the Norwegian MoD by an
6
expert commission of scholars, politicians, and military professionals, provided important
insights into issues relating to contemporary Norwegian security policy. The discussion on
Russian interests, intentions, and capabilities leans heavily on the annual threat assessment
from the Norwegian Intelligence Service (Etterretningstjenesten, 2017). Important scholarly
contributions covering Norwegian security policy include “NATO and the North Atlantic.
Revitalising collective defense” edited by John Anders Olsen (2017b), and “Norge og
Russland. Sikkerhetspolitiske utfordringer i Nordområdene” edited by Tormod Heier and
Anders Kjølberg (2015b). The historical background used primarily “Norge og NATO under
den kalde krigen” by Rolf Tamnes and Knut Eriksen (1999); “Fryktens likevekt :
atombomben, Norge og verden : 1945-1970” by Kjetil Skogstrand and Rolf Tamnes (2001);
and the master’s thesis “The 1970-74 combat aircraft analysis. Priority to defensive counter
air and anti shipping operations. How optimizing defence resources altered the use of RNoAF
fighters” by Hans Ole Sandnes (2008).
Regarding other literature of note, Janne Haaland Matlary, Christopher Coker, and Karsten
Friis have added to the study of NATO and Western strategy. Contributions include “NATO
and collective defence in the 21st century: an assessment of the Warsaw Summit” edited by
Friis (2017b), and “Ukraine and beyond: Russia's strategic security challenge to Europe”
edited by Matlary and Heier (2016).
Contributions to the research of the effects of long-range precision weapons are also relevant,
and important publications include “Russia in the precision-strike regime” by Roger
McDermott and Tor Bukkvoll (2017) and “Crisis stability and long-range strike. A
comparative analysis of fighters, bombers, and missiles” by Forrest Morgan (2013).
Some international research is available on the effects of the F-35 and the future of airpower.
Of note is Justin Bronk’s (2016) “Maximum value from the F-35. Harnessing
transformational fifth-generation capabilities for the UK military”, and “The challenges of
fifth-generation transformation” by André Adamson and Mathew Snyder (2017).
Finally, some research also exists on the Norwegian F-35 procurement process, including
“Remnants of Empire: Tracing Norway's F-35 Decision” by Srdjan Vucetic and Rebecka
Rydberg (2015), and “Investing in Fighters and Alliances” by Jens Ringsmose (2013).
The interviews provide nuance and improve the resolution, validity, and reliability of all parts
of the study. I interviewed five experts with overlapping and high-level experience with
7
Norwegian defense and security policy who had been involved in the F-35 procurement
process in different ways. I considered interviewing more informants, but given the scope of
the study, five interviews balanced time available and value added well. All informants I
asked agreed to participate.
A few days prior to each interview, I forwarded the interview guide (Appendix C) and an
information and consent form that everybody signed (Appendix D). All interviews were semi-
structured and I tailored them to meet the background of each informant.
The inclusion of interviews also meant that I had to report the study to the Norwegian
Personvernombudet for forskning (Appendix A) and obtain approval from the Norwegian
Defence University College (Appendix B). Additionally, I gave all the informants an
opportunity to approve any references made to them in the study before publication.
I interviewed the following experts: Espen Barth Eide, Sverre Diesen, Svein Efjestad, Arne
Røksund, and Lars Christian Aamodt. Espen Barth Eide is a politician and an elected member
of the Norwegian Parliament. He served as State Secretary for the Norwegian Ministry of
Defense (MoD) from 2005 to 2010, and had a central role in the F-35 procurement process.
He later served as both Minister of Defense and Minster of Foreign Affairs, and could thus
contribute with important insights into how the F-35 and JSM fit in the larger context of
Norwegian security policy.
Retired General Sverre Diesen is currently a researcher at the Norwegian Defense Research
Establishment (NDRE). He served as Chief of Defense of the Norwegian Armed Forces from
2005 to 2009. Diesen’s experience from the military side of the F-35 procurement process and
high-level defense planning is a valuable addition.
Svein Efjestad is Director of Security Policy and former Director General of the security
policy department of the Norwegian MoD and has extensive experience with and knowledge
of Norwegian security policy. His understanding contributed particularly by connecting the
political level with the military strategic level.
Arne Røksund is Secretary General of the Norwegian MoD and is its highest-ranking official.
Røksund led the F-35 procurement process and the LTP process, and thus offered important
insights into how Norway should employ the aircraft in order to optimize its effect on
Norwegian security.
8
Finally, Major General Lars Christian Aamodt is Chief of Staff of the Norwegian Joint
Headquarters. He contributed with important insights into what the F-35 and JSM can add to
the operational level and how Norway should employ the new assets in a joint context. Just as
important; he has filled several high-level positions in the F-35 program, both internationally
and in Norway, and could thus contribute with a unique combination of perspectives.
Classification was a challenge in two ways. First, section 5.3 describes the F-35 and JSM’s
capabilities. The section was based exclusively on openly available sources, and given the
highly classified nature of the two systems, this may challenge reliability and validity. The
sources stem mainly from the Lockheed Martin Corporation, Kongsberg, and the Royal
Norwegian Air Force (RNoAF), and there is thus a danger that the descriptions of some
capabilities are overinflated. Additionally, some of the most classified capabilities are
withheld, which makes it difficult to appreciate the full picture. However, my background as
an F-16 pilot and previous involvement in the procurement process for the F-35 means that I
have some insights into the classified nature of the F-35. I could thus improve validity and
reliability by critically assessing all information provided by industry and the military.
Second, even if all sources are unclassified, there is a risk that the combination of sources and
the results of the analysis end up at a classified level. It was difficult for me to assess
classification myself, and there was insufficient time for the RNoAF and Norwegian National
Security Authority to make an assessment before the study was due. Consequently, I
classified the study as Restricted (Begrenset), with the intent of officially declassifying it after
it was due (Appendix F).
9
3. Theory
This chapter provides the analytical framework for the study by outlining the concepts of
deterrence, crisis stability, and airpower. First, it offers a definition of deterrence and presents
the main elements of the concept. It then discusses crisis stability with emphasis on how strike
assets can affect the stability of a crisis. Finally, it describes the concept of airpower and
provides special attention to the characteristics that distinguish airpower from land and
maritime forces, as well as how airpower can contribute to deterrence and defense in general.
3.1. Deterrence
With the horrible consequences of the two World Wars, leaders and scholars became
increasingly occupied with preventing the most violent and destructive types of war. Nuclear
weapons and the bipolar superpower conflict of the Cold War meant that deterrence and
avoidance of nuclear war became an important element of security strategy. The role of
deterrence thus grew from being one among a number of tools, to becoming a main strategy.
(Morgan, 2012, pp. 86-87).
Deterrence as theory evolved significantly after the introduction of nuclear weapons. Scholars
started to see these as something qualitatively new. Classical deterrence theory emphasized
how mutual deterrence and the prospect of total destruction could act stabilizing and help
avoid the outbreak of a nuclear conflict. Classical deterrence theory gained prescriptive power
and deterrence became essential in both US and Soviet security policy (Morgan & Quester,
2011, pp. 21-25).
After the Cold War, nuclear weapons lost some of their significance in international relations.
Consequently, as Russia emerged as a potential partner rather than an enemy, deterrence
became less relevant as both strategy and theory (Morgan, 2012, pp. 87-89). However, after
Russia was reconsolidated as a great power with large nuclear and conventional capabilities
and has proven much more assertive on the international arena, deterrence is back on the
agenda for a number of states. Equally important, nuclear proliferation, particularly in Asia,
adds a new dimension to the debate about deterrence. So does asymmetric threats, notably
how to credibly deter terrorists (Etterretningstjenesten, 2017; Forsvarsdepartementet, 2015c).
The concept of deterrence has many definitions. At its core, deterrence “is the use of a threat
(explicit or not) by one party in an attempt to convince another party not to upset status quo”
(Quackenbush, 2010, p. 60). More specific, deterrence is “the persuasion of one’s opponent
10
that the cost and/or risk of a given course of action he might take outweighs its benefits”
(George & Smoke, 1974, p. 11). Consequently, deterrence is a mutual relationship that
involves communication and signaling. It also assumes that states make decisions in
accordance with some sort of rational cost-benefit calculus that can be manipulated. While
coercive diplomacy aims to compel an opponent to carry out an action it would otherwise not
have carried out, deterrence is about preventing certain actions and maintain status quo
(Mazarr & Goodby, 2011, pp. 49-50).
Morgan (1983) divides deterrence into two overarching types: general deterrence and
immediate deterrence. General deterrence is closely related to structural stability and “[...]
relates to opponents who maintain armed forces to regulate their relationship even though
neither is anywhere near mounting an attack” (Morgan, 1983, p. 30). General deterrence thus
involves conflictual relationships where none of the parties go beyond initial considerations of
attacking and crises do not erupt (Morgan, 2003, p. 80). Immediate deterrence “[...] concerns
the relationship between opposing states where at least one side is seriously considering an
attack while the other is mounting a threat of retaliation in order to prevent it” (Morgan, 1983,
p. 30). This situation is specific and attempts to prevent a defined outcome. Immediate
deterrence thus starts when general deterrence is, or is believed to be, failing and involves
situations of heightened tensions and acute crisis (Quackenbush, 2010, pp. 60-61).
States can influence the cost-benefit calculus of an opponent using two main methods:
denying benefits or imposing costs. Deterrence by denying benefits involves convincing the
opponent that it will likely not reach its objectives, or that the perceived benefits are of little
or no value. Deterrence by denial can involve both offensive and defensive capabilities, and
examples include air-defense systems, air-defense fighters, ground forces, as well as the
capability to sustain combat operations over time (Department of Defense, 2006, p. 25).
Deterrence by imposing cost, or punishment, is about convincing the opponent that the risk of
suffering large losses is high and that the cost of a counter-attack will be significant. The key
to deterrence by cost imposition is to communicate to the adversary that the response to an
attack will be both severe and likely to occur. Deterrence by punishment can be based on all
types of capabilities, both offensive and defensive (Department of Defense, 2006, pp. 26-27).
Deterrence success depends on both capability and credibility. Capable threats are those that
can hurt the opponent and that make the adversary prefer status quo to the result of carrying
11
out an attack. A deterring state may lack capability if it does not have the physical ability to
execute the threat or if the aggressive part assesses that the cost of attacking is lower than the
cost of the current status quo (Zagare, 2004, pp. 123-124).
Credible threats are believable threats, and deterrence credibility is judged by the target of the
deterrence efforts. The perception of the threat is what matters most and this underlines the
importance of communication, signaling, and getting the message across as intended (Mazarr
& Goodby, 2011, p. 51; Morgan, 2003, p. 15). Additionally, credible threats are rational for
an actor to carry out. If the adversary is far more powerful than the defender and defeat is
almost certain, it is not given that the defender will fight back rather than surrender to
minimize losses. Credible deterrence thus requires that states posture their deterrence and
defense efforts in ways that make fighting back the rational and most likely choice in case of
an attack (Morgan, 2003).
3.2. Crisis Stability
Deterrence aims to avoid conflict by presenting a would-be challenger with the prospect of
costly consequences that outweigh potential gains. Since deterrence relationships are often
mutual, meaning that both actors believe they are deterring each other, uncertainty,
misperceptions, and misunderstandings may provoke the behavior deterrence seeks to prevent
(Jervis, 1978). However, states also employ strategies of deterrence so that they can avoid
exploitation while successfully pursuing national interests in a competitive environment. A
central concept in that respect is stability, which involves balancing the need for firmness
against the risk of escalation and war (Morgan, 2003, pp. 20-22).
According to Langlois (1991), crisis stability “is about how far one can go in a deliberate
escalation, with a reasonable chance of keeping it under control” (p. 802). This definition
emphasizes that states may use controlled escalation in order to achieve political ends. It is
thus important for both sides to avoid situations where the other part chooses to attack first.
According to Brams and Kilgour (1987), a stable crisis is one in which “neither side in a two-
party conflict has a first-strike advantage that would give it the incentive to preempt the other,
especially in a crisis in which tensions are high and distrust is rampant” (p. 833).
Consequently, crisis stability deals with the likelihood that mutual deterrence between two
states in a conflictual relationship will hold in an acute conflict. Crisis stability is therefore not
12
about warfighting, but rather about how states can posture and structure their forces in order
to secure interests without provoking the outbreak of war. Morgan (2013) puts it this way:
Crisis stability is the degree to which adversaries at the brink of war do not feel pushed
to attack first, either to seize a fleeting first-move advantage or for fear of having to
absorb a crippling first strike from the enemy. (p. 1)
A crisis is stable if each side in a conflict assesses that the other side will not attempt catch it
by surprise. States can base this assessment on their ability to defeat an attack or by
maintaining sufficient survivable offensive capabilities to deter an attack in the first place. On
the other hand, crises are unstable if either side determines that conflict will work to its
advantage and is willing to risk war to further its interests. Crises are also unstable when the
parties of a conflict start to feel that a crisis is getting out of control and that war is becoming
inevitable. This may lead to an urgency to attack that may be intensified if one of the actors
believes that striking first is advantageous for damage limitation or to avoid a disadvantage on
the battlefield (Morgan, 2013, pp. 17-18).
Crises can become unstable even if neither side has aggressive intentions at the start. States
may perceive an opponent’s defensive military preparations in response to a crisis as
aggressive intent, which may prompt them to respond by initiating their own military
preparations. This action-reaction dynamic is often called a security dilemma and refers to
situations where measures taken by one state to ensure its security causes another state to feel
less secure. A security dilemma may fuel uncertainty and trap states in a spiral of escalation
that it is hard to break out of (Jervis, 1978).
The underlying mechanism of the security dilemma, and the reason why cooperation between
states is sometimes problematic, can be found in the game theoretical model called prisoner’s
dilemma. It applies to situations where defection is preferred over cooperation, because the
least preferable outcome is one in which the opponent defects first. Consequently, if the
perceived consequences of a preemptive attack from the opponent are sufficiently serious,
defection becomes the rational choice. This may lead to arms races, unstable crises,
escalation, and ultimately war. Prisoner’s dilemma dynamics are particularly relevant in
situations of increased tensions, high levels of uncertainty, and little communication between
the actors (Nye, 2009).
13
Crisis management is of course about more than just military force structure and posture.
Successful crisis management requires a broad strategy combining a number of tools such as
diplomatic activities, reassurance, and clearly communicated threats. However, military
capabilities are the tools that enable state leaders to put force behind their interests and
demands. Changes in force posture can signal both threats and assurances, and can influence
crisis stability both positively and negatively. Given that military power is a political tool, it is
thus critical that military forces are structured in ways that provide political leadership the
flexibility to modulate their use and posture effectively in response to the situation at hand
(Morgan, 2013, p. 5).
Force structure involves size, composition, disposition, technology, as well as doctrines, and
Morgan (2013) has identified six attributes directly related to force structure and posture that
are conducive to crisis stability. Three of these variables apply to general deterrence, or
structural stability, while the other three concern crisis stability and immediate deterrence.
3.2.1. Attributes Conductive to Structural Stability
Structural stability is related to the concept of general deterrence and “refers to the degree to
which preexisting conditions in the geostrategic environment are conducive to crisis stability
when a confrontation occurs between states” (Morgan, 2013, p. 24). In addition to force
structure, structural stability is affected by conditions such as geography, distribution of
power, and political relationships, and crisis stability is high when the underlying structure of
the geopolitical environment is stable (Morgenthau, 1968; Waltz, 1979).
Morgan (2013) emphasizes three characteristics that contribute positively to structural
stability. First, since deterrence is the foundation for structural stability, strike assets should
be sufficiently potent to deter a conventional attack. While this may seem obvious, it means
that the force structure must be “sufficiently potent and flexible to allow it to be postured in a
way that persuades the adversary that an attack would entail an unacceptable risk of defeat...”
(Morgan, 2013, p. 30). The underlying requirement is the ability to persuade the opponent that
strike assets will contribute to denying the opponent the capacity to reach its objectives and
that the punitive cost may be significant (Morgan, 2013, p. 30).
Second, strike assets should be able to minimize vulnerability to surprise attack. Airborne
strike assets have great effect on deterrence if properly structured and postured, and this may
lead a risk-tolerant opponent to consider conducting a preemptive attack to mitigate the
14
deterrent threat. Consequently, potent strike assets may reduce structural stability if they are
vulnerable to attack. It is therefore critical to reduce exposure and vulnerability. Examples of
such measures include early warning, dispersion, active and passive defenses, concealed
locations, and maintaining bases outside the weapons range of the opponent (Axelrod, 1990;
Schelling, 1966, pp. 224-230).
Third, strike assets should be able to mitigate the threat of surprise attack from the defender.
This characteristic stands in direct tension with military principles, since surprise is a valuable
means of realizing tactical objectives after the outbreak of war. However, the dynamics of
conflict management are different, and an overly offensive posture may instead intensify the
security dilemma and lead to increased uncertainty and unwarranted escalation (Axelrod,
1990; Jervis, 2013; Schelling, 1966, pp. 224-230).
This does not mean that states should always minimize the threat of a surprise attack, because
successful coercive diplomacy and deterrence requires an ability to manipulate the opponent’s
fear of attack. The key is to impose threats of attack in ways that do not threaten vital interests
and give the adversary the impression that there is still time to consider alternatives and
negotiate (Morgan, 2013, pp. 31-32).
3.2.2. Attributes that Provide Tools for Crisis Management
While structural stability is a prerequisite for effective crisis management, the moment a crisis
occurs the state wants to achieve more than simply to deter the adversary. Immediate
deterrence and crisis management aims not only to defuse the crisis, but also to defuse it at
favorable terms. This requires a more active use of pressure and coercive diplomacy, and
since general deterrence has failed, it also runs a greater risk of escalation. According to
Morgan (2013), airborne strike assets play an important role in crisis management and three
attributes are particularly central in that respect.
First, strike assets should be flexible since it is difficult or impossible to anticipate the timing
and location of the next crisis. Strike assets must have the flexibility to switch quickly
between operating modes, missions, and scenarios, and be able to employ a wide selection of
weapons. This flexibility gives decision-makers the opportunity to tailor the use of the assets
to the specific conflict and thus improve or maintain crisis stability (Morgan, 2013, p. 33).
Second, strike assets should be responsive. The key element here is time, which means that
strike assets must be capable of quick deployment and employment. Additionally, it is
15
important that the assets can adjust their operating tempo to match any ongoing diplomatic
efforts. The bottom line is that strike assets should be able to quickly apply and relieve
pressure on the adversary as required (Morgan, 2013, p. 33).
Finally, strike assets should offer capabilities for signaling. Crisis management and
deterrence is about communication and it is therefore important that the adversary can
distinguish between a defensive military posture and preparation for an attack. The credibility
of both deterrence and coercive strategies thus leans on the ability to communicate
willingness and ability to carry out an attack. Effective crisis management, and consequently
crisis stability, requires that states can employ their strike assets in ways that visibly
communicate capability, resolve, and restraint to the adversary (Morgan, 2013, pp. 33-34).
3.3. Airpower
Air assets, or airpower, possess certain characteristics that set them apart from land and
maritime forces. Airpower takes advantage of the fact the earth is covered with air and this
gives it three core attributes: speed, reach, and height. The speed of aircraft and other
airborne assets means that they are responsive and can achieve military effect rapidly. Since
airpower is normally not affected by terrain, it can also quickly reach areas not available to
other types of forces. The advantage of height means that airpower can observe the
battlespace more effectively than forces at ground level (NATO, 2016a).
Speed, reach, and height enable three other characteristics that are particular to airpower:
ubiquity, agility, and concentration. Airpower’s reach makes it is flexible to project power
over large areas rapidly and this gives it a ubiquitous attribute that may create a sense that it is
everywhere all the time. Since airpower is responsive and often consists of multi-role
platforms, it is also agile to switch operating modes even within the same mission. This
means that decision-makers can escalate or de-escalate operations in response to political and
strategic demands. Finally, due to its height and reach, planners and decision-makers can
concentrate air assets in time and space to create effects where and when they require. The
introduction of precision technology also means that significant effect can be achieved with a
relatively small number of assets (NATO, 2016a; Von Porat Erichsen & Ødegaard, 2016, pp.
197-198).
The ability to threaten an opponent’s military forces, territory, economic resources, and
population from the start of a conflict gives airpower a particularly important role in
16
deterrence (Lebow, 2010). However, it does have limitations as well. First, airpower is
impermanent in that it requires frequent ground service and rearming. This can be alleviated
by employing the forces sequentially, but will stretch resources and influence the ability to
concentrate effect. Second, and related to impermanence, aircraft can carry limited payload.
Developments in precision and miniaturization technology has mitigated this to a certain
degree, but available payload is still a limitation. Third, air assets are vulnerable since they are
lightly armored, depend on advanced technology, are exposed to hostile fire, and require
regional bases for support. This puts limitations on operational concepts and tactics, and may
restrict how decision-makers choose to use their air assets (NATO, 2016a).
Airpower can contribute to achieve a range of effects at the strategic, operational, and tactical
level, and can contribute to joint operations through a number of roles. Three roles are
relevant to this study: counter-air; attack; and contributions to Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR).
Counter-air operations seek to control the air and thus enable friendly forces to operate
without interference from enemy air forces. Offensive counter-air aims to destroy, disrupt, or
degrade an adversary’s air and missile capabilities as close to the source as possible. Such
operations may be conducted into enemy territory and can consist of both surface-attack, air-
to-air missions, and missions aimed at suppressing or destroying enemy air-defense systems.
Defensive counter-air operations defend friendly forces and interests from enemy air attacks.
Active defenses include combat air-patrols and ground-based air-defense systems, while
passive defenses aim to physically defend important infrastructure, equipment, and personnel.
Examples of passive measures include hardened shelters, dispersion, deception, and
concealment (NATO, 2016a).
The attack role seeks to influence the adversary by affecting his behavior or course of events,
and attacks can be aimed at targets with tactical, operational, or strategic value. Strategic
attacks go after military, political, or economic targets that are selected to achieve strategic
and political objectives. Targets often include the adversary’s center of gravity, and strategic
attacks seek to reduce the ability or political will to continue fighting. Airpower is particularly
suited for strategic attacks since it can strike far into enemy territory without having to fight
through layers of ground forces to get there (NATO, 2016a; Von Porat Erichsen & Ødegaard,
2016, p. 202).
17
Counter-surface operations are attacks aimed at the enemy’s fielded forces or supporting
infrastructure and seek to reduce the ability or will to keep fighting. Air-interdict includes
operations conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, degrade, or destroy the enemy’s military
capabilities before they can affect friendly forces. The distance from friendly forces means
that air-interdict operations do not require special coordination to avoid hitting own forces by
mistake. Close air-support, on the other hand, are attacks on enemy targets that are in close
proximity to friendly forces, which means that close coordination and de-confliction is
required to avoid fratricide (NATO, 2016a).
Airpower can contribute to counter-maritime operations by attacking the adversary’s maritime
forces, either independently or in support of own forces. Specifically, anti-surface warfare are
missions that target naval surface-forces, while anti-submarine warfare intends to deny the
enemy effective use of its submarines (NATO, 2016a).
According to NATO (2016a), ISR is “an integrated intelligence and operations set of
capabilities, which synchronizes and integrates the planning and operations of all collection
capabilities with processing, exploitation, and dissemination of the resulting information in
direct support of planning, preparation, and execution of operations “ (p. 1-15). The
combination of advanced sensors, communication technology such as data-link, height, reach,
and speed, means that air assets can contribute to many aspects of ISR. Airpower can thus
improve the quality of political and military strategic decision-making by providing leaders
with better situational-awareness and understanding of a potential or ongoing crisis.
Additionally, air assets can enhance the effect of other friendly forces by distributing
collected information (Von Porat Erichsen & Ødegaard, 2016, pp. 203-204).
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Part II – Background
This part sets the background for the discussion of how the F-35 and JSM affect deterrence,
defense, crisis stability, and choice of operational concept. Norwegian security policy,
traditional operational concepts, and military capabilities all affect Norway’s room to
maneuver in regards to a future operational concept involving the F-35 and JSM. The strategic
context is also important since it involves stakes, the range of potential outcomes, the
relevance of these outcomes to the crisis at hand, as well as leaders’ ability to commit to the
outcomes (Schelling, 1966). Consequently, proper analysis requires a thorough understanding
of Norwegian security policy, the strategic context within which it operates, and the
capabilities of the F-35 and JSM.
4. Strategic Context and Norwegian Security Policy
This chapter establishes the strategic context and outlines Norwegian security policy. It starts
by discussing Russian ambitions and interests in the High North before outlining potential
conflict scenarios relevant to the region. It then looks at the concept of bastion defense with
emphasis on Russian military posture, capabilities, and activities pertinent to a conflict
between Norway and Russia. The chapter then turns its attention to Norway and discusses the
role of deterrence and NATO in Norwegian security policy. Finally, it discusses
contemporary Norwegian security policy as well as the main tasks of the Norwegian Armed
Forces by outlining relevant points from the recent LTP.
4.1. Russia
The High North is a stable region characterized by pragmatism, peaceful interaction, and
strong institutions. Norway and Russia cooperate on a number of issues, but Russia is acting
increasingly assertive on the international arena. Consequently, after the Ukraine crisis, the
relationship has been under strain and tensions have risen. Russia has strong interests in the
Arctic, and the Russian military footprint is significant. Thus, even if open conflict may be
unlikely, the potential for conflict is there (Børresen, 2015).
4.1.1. Russian Ambitions and Interests in the High North
While it is difficult to accurately assess Russian intentions, it is possible to say something
about the country’s interests and ambitions. Beginning in earnest with the wars in Georgia
and the Ukraine, Russia has proven far more assertive on the international arena. The Expert
19
Commission on Norwegian Security and Defense Policy (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2015c, p.
16) describes Russia as an authoritarian state with anti-Western dispositions. Russia wishes to
regain its position as a great power and has proven both willing and capable to use a number
of tools, including military force, to achieve this. The Norwegian Intelligence Service
(Etterretningstjenesten, 2017, p. 20) supports this view: Russia sees itself as one of the great
power poles in a multipolar world. This leads to a new strategic rivalry that may last for many
years.
The Arctic, and consequently the High North, is strategically significant to Russia for several
reasons. First, the Arctic is historically tied to Russia’s position as a great power and plays an
important role in Russia’s national identity and nationalism (Hamre & Conley, 2017, p. 48).
Second, the Arctic is rich with natural resources and Russia aims to establish the region as its
main strategic base of natural resources in the near future. Reduced petroleum prices have
hampered these plans in recent years (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2015c, p. 19). Third, Russia
works actively to set the stage for increased shipping through the Northwest Passage, even if
there are no signs that this is about to take off in the near term (Etterretningstjenesten, 2017,
p. 17). Finally, and most important from a conflict perspective, a large portion of Russian
nuclear forces are based at the Kola Peninsula, and the direct line between the US and Russia
passes over the Arctic. The High North thus holds an important military strategic position in
Russia, and the defense of Russian nuclear assets is vital to Russia’s security and standing as
a great power (Etterretningstjenesten, 2017; Forsvarsdepartementet, 2015c).
4.1.2. Conflict Scenarios in the High North
According to Efjestad (2017, pp. 65-66), it is unlikely that an armed conflict between Russia
and NATO will have its roots in the High North. While there are overlapping interests in the
region, Russia will probably want to solve these in accordance with international law.
However, since Russia has strategic interests in the north, such as its nuclear bases at the Kola
Peninsula, a conflict starting in other parts of the world may spread to the High North.
Norway is an integrated member of NATO and this means that Russia will see Norway within
the context of the overarching threat from the alliance (Heier & Kjølberg, 2015a, p. 180).
Consequently, the most probable conflict scenario is one in which the High North and the
Arctic becomes an arena for military conflict, rather than the cause of the conflict.
20
Technological developments influence the way conflicts play out. Highly precise long-range
weapons that are unhindered by geographical borders, frontlines, or terrain, favor the
offensive part and make it is difficult to establish strategic depth in both time and space
(Forsvarsdepartementet, 2015c, p. 34). States that possess these weapons also gain the
flexibility to engage targets in a number of regions without having to deploy forces between
them. Consequently, major military conflicts will probably not be contained to one specific
region and this increases the likelihood that the High North will become involved in conflicts
starting elsewhere (Efjestad, 2017, p. 66).
In the event of war, Russia will most likely seek to protect its strategic assets at the Kola
Peninsula by closing off the maritime areas between Greenland, Iceland, and United Kingdom
(GIUK) and deny American and allied forces access to the Norwegian and Barents Sea. An
important element in such a strategy will be to establish bubbles of denial at for instance
Svalbard, in Lofoten, or even further south. New technology means that Russia can extend
such anti-access zones to threaten distant targets without having to deploy traditional land
forces and effectively threaten the link between North America and Europe across the North
Atlantic (Tamnes, 2017).
Even if bilateral military conflicts are unlikely seen from the perspective of Norwegian
analysts, one cannot rule out the option entirely. Disagreements may escalate if Russia
believes that its interests are threatened and that it risks suffering a humiliating blow to
prestige. Russia may also employ coercive diplomacy on a more general level to pressure
Norway into making concessions. These situations may prove very difficult to handle for the
Norwegian government, and a main concern will be to ensure activation of Article 5 and
receive support from NATO. Russia will also likely employ a number of hybrid measures,
which will make it challenging to maintain proper situational awareness
(Forsvarsdepartementet, 2015c, p. 52; Heier & Kjølberg, 2015a, p. 181).
These are Norwegian assessments of the conflict potential. According to Zysk (2015, pp. 79-
81), Russian officials believe that conflicts may start in the Arctic. Access to resources will
become increasingly important to states in the future, and this competition may, in the
Russian view, necessitate the use of military measures and lead to military conflict.
Consequently, Russia does not rule out that bilateral and regional conflicts may escalate and
remain contained to the Arctic.
21
In the event of a conflict between Norway and Russia in the High North, Russia may,
according to Gjeseth (2015, pp. 156-160), use its land forces in three main ways. It may
deploy forces to the border in an attempt to pressure the Norwegian government and provoke
an unproportioned response. It may also employ pressure through limited incursions into
Norwegian territory, and finally by initiating a larger scale invasion in order to control a
portion of Finnmark. The latter strategy will aim to achieve a fait accompli before Norwegian
forces can muster a response.
4.1.3. Russian Military Capabilities and Bastion Defense
In recent years, Russia has increased its military presence in the High North and Russian
forces are undergoing a significant modernization. Russian military spending more than
doubled from 2005 to 2015, and even if this trend is reversing today, it indicates the extent to
which Russia emphasizes military power (Etterretningstjenesten, 2017, pp. 13-14).
New measures specific to the Arctic include an Arctic Joint Strategic Command, plans for a
dedicated Arctic brigade (Granholm, Carlsson, & Korkmaz, 2016, pp. 23-26), and a number
of new air-defense capabilities and airbases scattered across the Russian Arctic. In addition to
the political implications, the latter aims to improve early warning as well as the ability to
disperse and deploy the Russian bomber force stationed at the mainland (Tamnes, 2017, p.
21).
Russia has conducted a number of large-scale exercises in the Arctic since 2011. Some of
these involved forces from other Strategic Commands, included as many 80,000 troops, and
were at times conducted as snap exercises with little warning to both NATO and the
participating forces. Russia has thus demonstrated improved mobility and ability to deploy
forces on short notice, and these are far more capable today than only a few years back.
Evidence of this can also be found in both the Ukraine and Syria (Etterretningstjenesten,
2017, p. 13).
Russian nuclear-related forces at the Kola Peninsula consist of a triad of submarines,
bombers, and ground-based systems. The systems are vulnerable before deployment, and the
Northern Fleet plays a key role in protecting their equipment, bases, and infrastructure
(Norberg & Westerlund, 2016, p. 38). In the event of an escalation, Russia will attempt to
establish sea-control in the near vicinity of the forces and deny NATO forces access to areas
further west (Figure 1). This layered approach is commonly referred to as bastion defense and
22
is more or less the same concept today as the one seen during the Cold War (Tamnes, 2017, p.
21).
Figure 1. The Russian bastion and the reach of the bastion defense. Adapted from “Unified Effort,” by
Forsvarsdepartementet, 2015, p.21. Copyright 2015 by Forsvarsdepartementet.
The Northern Fleet is Russia’s most capable naval force and currently operates at a tempo not
seen since the Cold War. According to Olsen (2017a, p. 6), Russia wants to re-establish an
offensively oriented navy that can operate in the North Atlantic, and the addition of long-
range weapons makes this a realistic prospect. While strategic submarines form the core of
Russian strategic deterrence, the Northern Fleet also consists of a number of surface vessels,
air assets, and ground forces. Surface forces include cruisers, destroyers, landing ships, as
well as Russia’s only aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov (Norberg & Westerlund, 2016, p.
35). Air assets consist of one squadron of SU-33 Flanker D fighter aircraft and SU-25
Frogfoot attack aircraft, one regiment of Mig-29KR Fulcrum ground attack fighters, one
23
regiment of Mig-31BM Foxhound and SU-24M Fencer ground attack fighters, as well as a
number of anti-submarine warfare assets. Ground forces include three naval infantry brigades
as well as coastal artillery and missile troops. Additionally, the Northern Fleet has three
dedicated Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) regiments (International Institute for Strategic
Studies, 2017, pp. 218-219).
In addition to the Northern Fleet, Russia has a number of air force assets based at or close to
the Kola Peninsula. Long-range aviation is an important part of Russian nuclear deterrence,
and this is centered on a force of strategic bombers that includes the TU-160 Blackjack, TU-
95 Bear, and the medium-range Tu-22 Backfire. These can carry both nuclear and
conventional cruise missiles that can strike targets all over Europe (International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 2017, p. 211; Norberg & Westerlund, 2016, p. 46). Also, a number of
tactical air assets, such as the SU-27 Flanker air-defense fighter, SU-24MR Fencer ground-
attack fighter, and MIG-31 Foxhound intercept fighter, are based in the region (Granholm et
al., 2016, p. 27).
Russian emphasis on firepower, range, and the formation of large bubbles of denial means
that Russia can negatively affect Norway’s ability to operate at and from its own territory
(Etterretningstjenesten, 2017, p. 14). Developments within two types of systems are
particularly important: long-range cruise missiles and air-defense systems.
Regarding cruise missiles, one of the most important new weapons to the Russian anti-
access strategy is the Iskander system, which has a range of up to 500 kilometers. The
missile appears as both a ballistic and a cruise missile variant and can carry
conventional or nuclear warheads. The missile is highly accurate and uses imaging
technology to identify and hit its target. It is launched from mobile launch platforms on
land, which makes it a versatile weapon that is difficult to find and negate. The Kalibr
cruise missile can be launched from both surface vessels and submarines, and comes in
variants that can strike targets at sea, on land, as well as submarines. This missile boasts
a range of up to 2,500 kilometers, and Russia plans to deploy it on a number of new
surface ships and submarines. Finally, the Kh-101 is an air-launched cruise missile that
can be carried by the TU-95 and TU-160 strategic bombers. The missile has a range of up
to 4,000 kilometers, and when combined with its low radar signature, it can threaten
targets in most of Europe (Askvik, 2015, pp. 40-42; Tamnes, 2017, p. 26).
24
Russia emphasizes advanced integrated air-defense systems, and Russian SAMs are among
the best in the world. Current systems are highly capable and new systems are in development
(Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, pp. 79-80). Long-range SAM-systems pose a threat to
the defense of Norway and are an important element of Russia’s anti-access strategy. Russia
has stationed a number of advanced SAM-systems close to the Norwegian border and these
include the S-400 with a range of up to 400 kilometers (Tamnes, 2017, p. 25), as well as the
older S-300 that can reach up to 150 kilometers (Granholm et al., 2016, p. 28). Finally, Russia
is also in the process of introducing the new S-500 to the Arctic (Etterretningstjenesten, 2017,
p. 29), which can engage 10 targets simultaneously and has a maximum range of 600
kilometers (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 80). Consequently, Russia’s air-defense
coverage stretches past Finnmark and can potentially hinder or deny allied air operations over
large portions of Norwegian territory and maritime areas (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Coverage S-400 and S-500 located close to Norwegian border.
4.2. Norway
The goal of Norwegian security and defense policy is to ensure sovereignty, territorial
integrity, and political freedom to pursue national interests. As a small state, Norway must
balance a number of tools to ensure this, and a rule-based world order leaning on robust
institutions is important to ensure freedom to act and to prevent exploitation from more
powerful states. However, since the international arena is an anarchy, Norway cannot be
25
certain that international rules and regimes will always prevent aggression. Consequently,
Norway must maintain a national military force capable of fending off limited aggression
from Russia and work to tie allied partners to its defense in the event of an attack of scale
(Tamnes, 2014, p. 47).
4.2.1. Norway – Deterrence and Reassurance
Norway joined NATO in 1949, and the alliance has been the cornerstone of Norwegian
deterrence efforts towards Russia since then. Due to Norway’s close proximity to Russia and
the asymmetry between the two countries, deterrence has a softer meaning in Norwegian
policy than it has for some major NATO countries. While reassurance in a NATO context
focuses mainly on assuring other NATO partners of the credibility of Article 5 and collective
defense, Norway has traditionally balanced deterrence with measures of reassurance aimed at
reducing tensions with Russia and preventing unwarranted escalation (Holst, 1967). These
measures include self-imposed peacetime restrictions in Norway on allied activity, exercises
close to Russia, basing of forces, and nuclear weapons. After the end of the Cold War, the
concepts of deterrence and reassurance gradually moved to the background of Norwegian
security policy (Kjølberg, 2015), but with the return of Russia as a potential adversary, the
two concepts are back on the Norwegian agenda (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2016c).
Norwegian defense policy leans on a national ability to deter Russia through the prospect of
denial. However, since Norway cannot expect to deny a significant Russian military attack
alone, the main role of the Norwegian Armed Forces is to delay a Russian advance until
NATO forces can arrive. NATO forces will likely conduct offensive operations against
Russia, and this also brings the prospect of deterrence by punishment, using both
conventional and nuclear weapons, to the table (Kjølberg, 2015).
4.2.2. Norwegian Security Policy – Long Term Plan for the Defense Sector
Norway works actively to tie NATO closer to the defense of the country. The latest LTP
approved by Parliament in November 2016 underscores the importance of revitalizing
NATO’s collective defense and also that a credible and capable national military force is a
requirement for allied support in the event of a crisis (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2016c).
The Norwegian Armed Forces thus play an important role in Norwegian security policy, and
the LTP establishes that they have nine overarching tasks. Of these, four are relevant to this
study. First, Norwegian Armed Forces shall ensure credible deterrence based on NATO’s
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collective defense. This involves signaling the ability to impose unacceptable cost to a
challenger if it chooses to threaten Norwegian security, territory or political freedom to act. In
the current security climate, the Norwegian Armed Forces must thus be able to conduct and
sustain high-intensity warfare both alone and in a NATO context (Forsvarsdepartementet,
2016c, p. 22).
Second, Norwegian Armed Forces will defend Norway and allies against threats, aggression
and attacks, within the framework of NATO’s collective defense. This task is about the
practical application of military force and can come as a response to a number of threats
ranging from states to non-state actors. In the event of a serious threat to Norwegian security,
NATO will take command of most Norwegian forces and operations will be conducted as
joint operations. It is thus important that Norwegian forces are interoperable and trained to
operate within NATO’s command structure and together with other NATO forces and
branches of service (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2016c, p. 23).
Third, the Armed Forces will prevent and manage incidents and security crises, including the
facilitation of allied support. These are crises and episodes that the Norwegian Armed Forces
are expected to handle alone. Norway may also have to defend against military aggression
alone while waiting to involve or receive help from NATO. Since it is difficult to predict how
the next crisis will unfold, Norwegian Armed Forces must therefore be flexible and able to
respond quickly (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2016c, pp. 23-24).
Fourth, ensure a national basis for decision-making through surveillance and intelligence.
The ability to make quick and well-informed decisions is important at all levels during a
crisis. According to the LTP, all appropriate Norwegian military assets and units will
contribute to collection, dissemination, and analysis of relevant data, which seeks to provide
decision-makers with timely and accurate information. NATO also relies on national
intelligence sources for situational awareness, and Norwegian assets thus play an important
role in supporting the alliance with intelligence and data (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2016c, p.
24).
4.3. Summary
Russia is increasingly assertive on the international arena and is both willing and capable to
pursue its interests with the use of military force. Russia has strategic interests in the Arctic,
and while the conflict potential in the High North is low today, one cannot rule out the
27
possibility of a military confrontation either as part of a conflict in other regions or as a local
disagreement in the future. Technological developments, particularly within the realm of
long-range precision weapons, favor the offensive part and means that conflicts are less likely
to be contained to one specific region.
Russia has increased its military capability in the High North in recent years and has deployed
a number of long-range precision weapons, such as cruise missiles and advanced SAM-
systems, to the region. In the event of war, Russia will likely attempt to establish bubbles of
denial that cover substantial parts of Norwegian airspace and territory.
Since NATO was founded in 1949, Norway has based its policy against the threat from the
Soviet Union, and later Russia, on deterrence. Deterrence has a softer meaning in Norwegian
policy than in some major NATO countries, and has traditionally been complemented by
measures of reassurance aimed at reducing tensions. Norway cannot hope to defend against
major military aggression from Russia alone, and Norwegian policy thus works actively to tie
the alliance to the defense of the country. The key objective in that respect is to ensure
activation of Article 5 in the event of a military assault.
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5. Traditional Operational Concept and new Capabilities
Norway decided in 2008 to replace its F-16 fleet with the F-35, which is as fifth-generation
combat aircraft developed and produced by the Lockheed Martin Corporation. Norway
received the first jet in the fall of 2017 and if the implementation goes as planned, it will
achieve initial operational capability by 2019 (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2015b). In parallel, the
MoD saw the need for a long-range precision weapon to fulfill all the requirements set for the
F-35. Since no weapons carried by the F-35 currently fulfill these requirements, Parliament
decided to integrate and continue the development of the Norwegian made JSM for the F-35
(Forsvarsdepartementet, 2011).
Operational concepts are important since they set the baseline for defense planning,
operational plans, and tactics. If made public, they also play an important role in signaling
Norwegian intent and commitment to both Russia and NATO. Consequently, operational
concepts are not about tactical dispositions, but seek to bridge the gap between the tasks of the
Norwegian Armed Forces on one side, and doctrines and political directives on the other
(Forsvarsdepartementet, 2015c, p. 64).
In addition to the strategic context, the domestic political environment will affect the choice
of operational concept involving the F-35 and JSM. Political constraints and priorities
influence to what degree a concept is politically acceptable, and these can be more restrictive
than what technology allows. The chapter therefore starts by discussing traditional Norwegian
operational concepts for the use of airpower, before turning its attention to contemporary
concepts as they appear through unclassified documents and plans. It then searches for traces
of a future concept by addressing the F-35 procurement process.
In order to understand how the F-35 and JSM will affect deterrence, defense, and crisis
stability, it is essential to understand the overall capabilities of the new systems. Capabilities
determine the extent to which a given operational concept is realistic and achievable. The
second part of the chapter therefore outlines the specific characteristics of the F-35 and JSM
with emphasis on improvements in capability.
5.1. Traditional Operational Concept for Norwegian Airpower
The operational concept for the use of Norwegian airpower has varied since the RNoAF was
established during World War II. In the first years after the war, the main task of the
Norwegian Spitfire force was mainly defensive and included air defense and support
29
operations. From 1953 to 1954, the US and NATO introduced the concept of massive
retaliation, which relied heavily on strategic bombing and offensive air operations. In the
same period, Norway received equipment and aircraft from the US as part of the mutual
defense assistance program, and Norwegian combat aircraft were designate to support
operations inside the Soviet Union. The Norwegian operational concept thus took an
offensive posture and the intent of the doctrine was to hit the enemy before he could use his
full attack potential against Norway (Skogrand & Tamnes, 2001).
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Support of Nuclear Operations With Conventional Attacks
(SNOWCAT) mission was the most important offensive mission for Norwegian combat
aircraft. The aim of the mission was to support NATO aircraft carrying nuclear weapons by
attacking Soviet radar installations and communication nodes, as well as by overloading the
Soviet Command-and-Control (C2) systems so that the enemy could not distinguish nuclear-
carrying aircraft from those carrying conventional weapons (Skogrand & Tamnes, 2001).
The offensive concept primarily came as a result of US and NATO doctrine and war plans,
rather than national priorities. Norwegian priorities also included the ability to defend Norway
until allied reinforcements could arrive. This involved the notion of “holding time”, which
meant delaying the advance of Soviet forces for as long as possible. When the US and NATO
turned to the concept of flexible response in the 1960s, the RNoAF gradually abandoned the
SNOWCAT mission. Analyses performed by the NDRE in the 1970s showed that a defensive
concept, where Norwegian fighter aircraft prioritized defensive counter-air and anti-surface
warfare operations, would provide the longest “holding time”. Norwegian military planners
adopted the concept, and the use of Norwegian airpower thus changed from an offensive to a
defensive concept (Sandnes, 2008, pp. 76-80).
The defensive concept survived well past the end of the Cold War. According to Sandnes
(2008), primary tasks for the F-16 were to fly defensive counter-air, combat air-patrol, and
anti-shipping (p. 81). With the decommissioning of the Penguin missile, anti-shipping
missions more or less disappeared from the concept, but towards the end of the 1990s,
Norwegian F-16s gradually implemented an air-to-ground capability. According to Nergård
(2009), this process came as a result of an increased focus on maneuver warfare, in which
offensive operations are an important element of defensive war. At the turn of the century,
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Norwegian F-16s also received upgrades that enabled precision ground attacks, and the formal
training program for Norwegian pilots increasingly included air-to-ground training.
The operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya, meant that the use of the Norwegian F-16
fleet became mostly associated with out-of-area operations, and the Norwegian doctrine for
air operations from 2002 listed international engagement as one of its primary tasks
(Forsvarets Overkommando, 2002, p. 79). This illustrates that the operational use of
Norwegian F-16s from 2001 to 2014 de facto emphasized offensive operations in the form of
close air-support and air-interdict (Henriksen, 2013).
Since the crisis in Crimea and the Ukraine in 2014, the idea that Norwegian combat aircraft
may have to fend off Russian aggression is again a realistic outlook. The new threat scenario
includes highly capable Russian air-defense systems that render the use of Norwegian F-16s
for offensive operations into Russian territory, and even over areas of Finnmark, very risky.
The latest LTP points to the merits of combat aircraft as strategic assets due to their short
reaction time, great firepower, and ability to operate over long distances. The main task for
the F-16 today is to establish control of the air in addition to support operations and precision
engagements, but the LTP does not go into details about the character of operations and does
not specify if they include offensive missions such as offensive counter-air or strategic attack
(Forsvarsdepartementet, 2016c, pp. 62-64).
In a formal response to questions forwarded by the Norwegian political opposition in
Parliament regarding the LTP, the government asserted that it does not involve a conceptual
change in the use of Norwegian military forces. Further, the response emphasized that the
procurement of strategic assets does not pose an offensive threat to Russia and that power
projection into Russian territory is not part of the Norwegian Armed Forces’ portfolio
(Forsvarsdepartementet, 2016e). This wording is more careful than the rhetoric used in the F-
35 procurement process discussed in the next section. However, while the Norwegian Armed
Forces are structured to primarily defend Norwegian territorial integrity, the F-35 and JSM
provide an offensive capability not seen in decades. A later response acknowledges this and
highlights the importance of controlling the air in the event of an armed conflict with Russia.
In order to achieve this, Norwegian combat aircraft must be able to affect Russian long-range
air-defense systems on both land and at sea, as well as Russian offensive air-assets. According
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to the response, the F-35 represents a modern and provident capability that can defeat enemy
air-defense systems and ensure sufficient control of the air (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2016f).
In sum, the LTP is somewhat ambiguous when it comes to a future operational concept using
the F-35, but it considers it a strategic asset and emphasizes its ability to establish control of
the air through attacks on enemy air-defense systems and offensive air-assets
(Forsvarsdepartementet, 2016c, pp. 62-64).
Norwegian military doctrines only cover the use of airpower in general terms. The joint
doctrine for the Armed Forces mentions offensive and strategic air-operations but it is
descriptive rather than prescriptive (Forsvaret, 2014). The latest doctrine for Norwegian air-
operations specifically discusses offensive counter-air operations, airfield-attack and strategic-
attack. However, the doctrine was published in 2002 and is thus largely outdated (Forsvarets
Overkommando, 2002).
The procurement process and the requirements that formed the basis for the decision to
purchase the F-35 can provide signs of the operational concept the aircraft was intended to
fulfill. This is the topic for the next section.
5.2. F-35 Procurement Process and Requirements
Since the early 1990’s, several studies and analyses have concluded that Norway needs
combat aircraft to credibly deter and defend against aggression. Consequently, the Norwegian
Parliament decided in 2001 to initiate a formal process to replace the ageing F-16 fleet
(Forsvarsdepartementet, 2006, p. 16). The new project, Project 7600 Future Combat Aircraft
(Project 7600), was tasked with identifying different conceptual solutions, and in 2006 it
concluded that the best way ahead would be a complete replacement of the F-16. The MoD
now began to analyze relevant candidates, and after Eurofighter withdrew from the
competition in 2007, two candidates remained: the F-35 Lightning II and the JAS-39 Gripen
NG (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2006, p. 7).
The first step in the analysis involved determining which requirements and specifications the
future aircraft would have to meet. This work was primarily conducted by the Norwegian
Armed Forces with support from the NDRE. The overall level of ambition was set in
Stortingsproposisjon 48 from 2008 (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2008a), which stated that combat
aircraft are central to the overall defense capability of Norway and that they are an important
capability in regards to fire support, information gathering, and employment of long-range
32
precision weapons. Further, the future combat aircraft would have to be flexible and solve a
number of tasks related to crises, episodes, and war. Specific tasks included ground-attack and
anti-shipping in support of ground and maritime forces, and the ability to conduct independent
offensive air-operations in defense of the country (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2008a, p. 80). The
requirements were thus far more explicit in regards to offensive operations than the latest
LTP.
Project 7600 developed a number of classified scenarios and concepts of operations based on
NATO’s requirements and assessments of how combat aircraft would likely be used after
2015. With these scenarios as a baseline, the project decided on a number of specific
requirements related to military, industrial, and security policy priorities
(Forsvarsdepartementet, 2008c). Military requirements emphasized interoperability with
NATO forces, range, sensor capability, survivability, and specific mission types included
counter-air, ground attack, support operations, and strategic attack. In regards to security
policy, the future combat aircraft was specifically required to contribute to the overall tasks of
the Norwegian Armed Forces and NATO operations in order to tie allied partners to the
defense of Norway (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2008c, pp. 20, 25-26). However, the bilateral
relationship to the US was not included as a specific requirement (Barth Eide, 2017).
Project 7600 presented its recommendations in 2008 and it concluded that the F-35 met or
exceeded all requirements. It was also the least expensive alternative. The JAS-39 did not
meet all requirements, and the group thus concluded that Norway should replace the F-16
with the F-35 (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2008c, pp. 36-38).
In June 2009, based on Stortingsproposisjon 36, the Norwegian Parliament gave its consent to
initiate negotiations with Lockheed Martin about purchasing the F-35. The proposition was in
line with previous assessments and reasserted that Norwegian combat aircraft can be used to
conduct missions related to counter-air, ground attack, support operations, as well as strategic
operations. Counter-air missions included offensive and defensive counter-air, which
explicitly involved attacking ground based air force elements. Tasks related to ground attack
included air-interdict, close air-support, destruction of enemy air-defenses, and maritime
operations, while support operations involved armed reconnaissance, electronic warfare,
support of search-and-rescue operations, tactical airborne air-control, battle-damage
assessment, as well as surveillance. Finally, strategic operations were defined as operations
33
seeking to achieve effect against the enemy’s center of gravity and could include or be a part
of all the operations mentioned above (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2008b, pp. 1-2).
While Parliament had opened up for initiation of negotiations in 2009, the final decision to
purchase a fleet of up to 52 F-35s came in 2012 based on Stortingsproposisjon 73S.
Regarding a future operational concept, the proposition emphasized a defensive posture
through counter-air and offensive missions in support of land and maritime forces, but no
longer mentioned strategic operations explicitly (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2012).
5.3. New Capabilities
Military capabilities affect a state’s ability to deter and defend against aggression and may
influence the stability of a crisis directly. In addition, a state’s military inventory determines
the range of options available when designing or choosing between operational concepts. The
F-35 and JSM offer Norwegian defense planners something qualitatively new, particularly in
the realm of offensive warfare and ISR. This section thus sets the stage for the analysis of
how the F-35 and JSM affect deterrence, defense, crisis stability, and choice of operational
concept.
5.3.1. F-35 Lightning II
The F-35 is a single-seat fifth-generation fighter jet boasting stealth, fully fused sensor
information, advanced network capability, as well as fighter speed and agility. Compared to
legacy fighters, such as the F-16, the F-35 offers greater survivability, situational awareness,
and lethality, which enables the jet to perform a number of mission types without support
from other aircraft. According to Lockheed Martin (2017c), the F-35 is thus a multi-role
combat aircraft that can replace the need for larger formations of specialized aircraft.
The F-35 has a maximum gross weight of 31 metric tons, 40,000 pounds of thrust, a
maximum speed of 1.6 times the speed of sound, and a range of 2,200 kilometers. The latter is
about 30% more than the range of the Norwegian version of the F-16 (Forsvarsdepartementet,
2015a).
The F-35 program has been subject to some controversy, and both official reports and experts
have criticized the jet for being too expensive, subject to delays, vulnerable to software
glitches and cyber-attacks, too heavy and underpowered to challenge adversary fighters, and
for having serious design flaws (Bender, 2015; Department of Defense, 2016; Dillow, 2016).
34
However, Norway received its first F-35 according to schedule in November 2017
(Forsvarsdepartementet, 2017a), and the MoD stresses that most problems have either been
solved or are in the process of becoming solved (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2016d).
Additionally, the price per jet has come down the last years (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2016a).
Since the F-35 carries its weapons internally, the MoD also asserts that the F-35 has similar or
better maneuverability than the F-16 when both aircraft carry a combat load of weapons and
equipment (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2014). The latter is supported by a Norwegian test pilot
(Hanche, 2016), who claims that the F-35 does not stand back to the F-16 when it comes to
maneuverability and performance in dogfight situations. Nevertheless, some of the technology
in the F-35 is still under development and the plane has not yet proven itself in combat.
Consequently, there is still some uncertainty as to the real capability and combat worthiness
of the aircraft.
Low observability, or stealth, is often highlighted as the characteristic that sets the F-35 apart
from legacy type aircraft like the F-16. While stealth does not mean that the F-35 will be
invisible, it can better evade detection from radars, infrared sensors, and emission interception
through a combination of aircraft design, tactics, and technology (Lockheed Martin, 2017d).
The F-35 is built to avoid detection from active radar systems through an airframe design that
absorbs and deflects incoming radar emissions. When combined with internally carried stores,
this minimizes radar cross-section significantly. While some radar energy will make it back to
the sender, the reduced radar signature means that the F-35 will be much closer to the radar
site when detection occurs. Additionally, the F-35 emits less heat than traditional jet aircraft.
This reduces the range at which passive infrared sensors can detect it. Finally, it is designed to
avoid detection from passive electromagnetic systems by controlling and limiting
electromagnetic emissions (Hanche, 2015; Lockheed Martin, 2017d).
The combination of design, emission control, and tactics thus makes the F-35 less visible to
the opponent. This may increase survivability in contested areas such as those protected by
SAM-sites and gives the F-35 an ability to penetrate enemy air-defenses. Low observability
also provides the F-35 with an advantage in air-to-air situations, since it may find and engage
enemy aircraft before they can detect it (Figure 3) (Hanche, 2015; Lockheed Martin, 2017d).
35
Figure 3. Combat advantage gained through stealth. Adapted from “Norway. F-35 overview” in
presentation from Lockheed Martin Corporation. Copyright 2016 by the Lockheed Martin Corporation.
Advanced sensors give the pilot a high level of situational awareness and precise target
information at long ranges. The radar, an AN/APG-81 designed by Northrop Grumman, is an
active electronically scanned array radar. Radar energy is directed electronically, which gives
the radar fast update rates and enables it to track and engage multiple targets in the air and on
the ground simultaneously (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2016b). The radar can also generate high-
resolution images of the ground (Hanche, 2014) and can be used to disturb or jam enemy
radar emissions (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2016b).
The F-35 carries two types of electro-optical sensors: a Distributed Aperture System (DAS)
and an Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS). First, the DAS is a 360-degree, spherical
situational awareness system consisting of six infrared cameras installed around the aircraft. It
projects high-resolution imagery directly to the pilot’s helmet in real time, which allows the
pilot to see terrain clearly regardless of time of day. It also displays relevant information from
other sensors, such as the radar, and provides missile detection and tracking, launch-point
detection, weapons support, and tracking of friendly aircraft (Lockheed Martin, 2017b).
Second, the EOTS gives the F-35 precise air-to-air and air-to-surface targeting capability
through a combination of forward-looking infrared and infrared search-and-track
functionality. The system is integrated in the fuselage and does not affect stealth or drag
36
(Lockheed Martin, 2017b). In addition, the EOTS includes a laser designator which enables
the pilot to steer laser guided precision weapons to the target with high accuracy
(Forsvarsdepartementet, 2016b).
Additionally, the F-35 has improved electronic warfare sensors that warn the pilot if enemy
radars are tracking the plane and provide the capability to locate enemy emitters and radars.
This, when combined with self-protection systems and countermeasures, increases the ability
to respond appropriately to threats and thus increases survivability compared to the F-16
(BAE Systems, 2017; Lockheed Martin, 2017e).
The F-35 boasts improved sensor fusion and connectivity. Legacy aircraft, such as the F-16,
display most sensor information on individual screens dedicated for each sensor. This
increases workload since the pilot must switch attention often and correlate overlapping
information himself. The F-35 on the other hand, fuses all sensor information and displays it
to the pilot as one unified picture of the battlefield. This decreases workload, increases
situational awareness, and provides the pilot with an opportunity to focus on what he or she
determines is most important at any given time (Lockheed Martin, 2017b). Additionally, the
aircraft can share much of the information with other units in real-time using Link-16
datalink, which is a standard system in NATO (Northrop Grumman, 2012). Still, Link-16
usage is detectable by enemy forces. The F-35 therefore carries its own Multifunction
Advanced Data Link (MADL), which is a high-data-rate, directional link that enables
formations of F-35s to share a large amount of information among themselves in high-threat
environments with reduced probability of detection (Lockheed Martin, 2017a). However,
some critics point to how limitations in bandwidth may restrict the types and amounts of data
the F-35 can share with the outside world, which may negatively affect its capability to act as
an ISR platform (Streetly, 2017).
Summarized, while the aircraft is not yet combat proven, the F-35 gives Norway a fifth-
generation combat aircraft with improved survivability, lethality and flexibility compared to
the older F-16. The combination of stealth, increased situational awareness, and high-fidelity
sensors means that the F-35 can solve demanding missions with low force requirements and
little need for support from specialized assets (Figure 4). According to the Norwegian MoD
(Bø, 2017), the new jet is a game-changer that is able to engage and defeat well defended
targets at long range with high precision. Furthermore, the MoD asserts that the F-35 is
37
crucial for Norway’s ability to handle conflicts of varying intensity, and it is therefore an
important element of Norwegian deterrence policy (Søreide, 2016).
Figure 4. Operational impact of F-35. Adapted from “JSF 101. F-35 Lightning II Program” in
presentation from Lockheed Martin Corporation. Copyright 2016 by the Lockheed Martin Corporation.
5.3.2. Joint Strike Missile Capabilities
The procurement of the JSM provides Norway with a precision standoff capability not seen
before. The ability to affect well-defended high-value targets at long distances may have a
direct bearing on deterrence, defense, and crisis stability, and opens the door for a more
offensive operational concept including strategic attacks for the F-35.
The JSM is an air-launched and low-observable cruise missile that the F-35 can carry
internally. The missile is developed by the Norwegian Kongsberg group using the already
operational Naval Strike Missile (NSM) as a baseline. The decision to develop a new missile
came after the Norwegian MoD expressed a requirement to engage heavily defended land and
naval targets with the F-35 (Scott, 2014).
The missile offers several attributes that set it apart from similar existing weapons and it is
currently the only fifth-generation cruise missile to be integrated in the F-35. As for key
characteristics, the missile has a length of 4.0 meters, weighs 416 kilograms, flies at high sub-
sonic speeds, and has a modern 500 pound warhead with a high explosive charge that offers a
combination of blast and fragmentation damage (Kongsberg Defence Systems, 2017b).
38
Kongsberg advertises a range of over 180 kilometers in a low-low profile and in excess of 550
kilometers if launched in a high-low profile (Scott, 2014).
The JSM is designed for anti-shipping missions over open sea and in littoral areas, as well as
to engage targets on land. Kongsberg has included features that enable the missile to exploit
the topography, such as an advanced engagement planning system, accurate navigation
system consisting of both global positioning system and inertial navigation system, and high
maneuverability that allows a flight path close to the terrain (Kongsberg Defence Systems,
2017a; Scott, 2014).
According to Kongsberg (2017b), the JSM is highly survivable against modern and future air-
defense systems. Survivability is ensured and increased by using only passive sensors, which
prevents the opponent from detecting incoming missiles until they are within radar detection
range. Additionally, the missile has a very low radar signature, and, when combined with low
sea-skimming altitude and a terrain-following flight path, this reduces the range at which it
will be detected by radar. Finally, the missile is highly agile and can follow selectable end-
game flight profiles. This reduces the probability that the adversary can neutralize it before it
hits the target (Kongsberg Defence Systems, 2017b; Scott, 2014).
The sensor in the JSM is the same passive high-resolution imaging infrared seeker as the one
found in the NSM, but the JSM includes new algorithms and more computing power. Imaging
technology enables embedded autonomous target recognition functionality, which provides
real time target recognition and classification. The JSM can thus autonomously discriminate
between types of targets, targets from nearby landmasses, as well as targets from non-targets.
Additionally, the lethality of the missile is improved since the seeker is accurate enough to
select specific aim-points at the target. Future growth includes a second seeker in the form of
passive radio frequency that can aid in identification as well as guidance (Scott, 2014).
The inclusion of Link-16 datalink makes the missile interoperable with current and future
networks to include the F-35. The missile thus supports in-flight target updates, re-targeting,
mission abort, as well as battle-damage assessments in real time (Scott, 2014). However,
since Link-16 is detectable by the enemy, this functionality may have limited utility in the
most demanding scenarios.
In sum, the range, survivability, target selectivity, and lethality of the JSM makes it a flexible
system that can enhance the capability of the F-35. The new missile provides a new tool for
39
long-range precision attacks and gives Norway the ability to strike well-defended high-value
targets.
5.4. Summary
The Norwegian concept for the use of airpower has varied since WWII and has included
offensive operations through the SNOWCAT missions. Since the 1970s, the Norwegian
concept has addressed the Russian threat through a primarily defensive posture. Main tasks
have been defensive counter-air operations and ground-attack in support of land and maritime
forces. The current operational concept, as found in the LTP, also emphasizes defensive
operations.
While the procurement process for the F-35 and JSM explicitly included requirements to
attack ground-based air force elements and strategic targets, recent documents, including the
formal decision to purchase the F-35 and the latest LTP, do not include any references to
strategic attacks. Whether intentional or not, this indicates that the topic is politically
sensitive.
In any case, the F-35 and JSM offer significant improvements in survivability, lethality, and
situational awareness compared to the F-16 and will add something qualitatively new to
Norwegian deterrence and defense efforts. The F-35 is multi-role, can conduct a number of
tasks simultaneously without support from specialized systems, and the addition of stealth,
advanced self-protection systems, and long-range precision strike capability opens the door
for an offensively oriented operational concept. The capabilities of the F-35 and JSM thus
provide political and military decision-makers with increased flexibility to choose between
different operational concepts.
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Part III - Analysis
Part III consists of chapters 6 to 8 and provides answers to the three research questions.
Chapter 6 discusses how the F-35 and JSM affect Norwegian deterrence and defense efforts
against Russia. It concludes that the new assets may influence Norwegian deterrence by
denial positively, introduce the prospect of deterrence by punishment, and improve
Norwegian deterrence credibility towards Russia. Chapter 7 analyzes how the assets influence
on crisis stability in a security crisis or war between Russia and Norway as a NATO member.
This chapter concludes that the systems may improve crisis stability, but that this requires
proper posturing and the ability to defend Norwegian F-35 bases. Finally, chapter 8 turns its
attention to how a Norwegian operational concept involving the F-35 and JSM could look in
order to reconcile the need for credible deterrence and defense on the one hand, and for
controlled crisis stability on the other. This discussion concludes that a concept for a security
crisis without NATO could employ the F-35 and JSM in the defensive and in some
circumstances the tactically offensive mode. The concept for a war involving NATO, on the
other hand, should keep all options available and utilize the defensive, tactically offensive,
and strategically offensive modes as required.
6. Deterrence and Defense
Deterrence involves communication and signaling that seeks to persuade an opponent “that
the cost and/or risk of a given course of action he might take outweighs its benefits” (George
& Smoke, 1974, p. 11). Deterrence and defense are closely interconnected, and measures
taken to improve one may improve the other. Deterrence may also continue to play an
important role long after hostilities have started (Schelling, 1966).
This chapter looks at deterrence and defense in combination. First, it covers deterrence
capability, with emphasis on how the F-35 and JSM affect Norwegian deterrence by denial
and punishment. Finally, the chapter discusses how the two systems affect deterrence
credibility and concludes that the F-35 and JSM have the potential to affect Norwegian
deterrence and defense efforts positively.
6.1. Deterrence Capability
Capable threats can hurt the opponent to the point where he prefers status quo to the potential
consequences of carrying out an attack. According to Bronk (2016, pp. 2-3), there are two
main schools of thought regarding the added-value and capability of the F-35. First, the F-35
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can be seen as an advanced platform that can perform traditional tasks more effectively than
before. The combination of stealth, high quality sensors, sensor fusion, and long-range
precision capability, provided particularly by the JSM, makes the F-35 a highly flexible tool
for both deterrence and defense that can contribute effectively to the tasks of the Norwegian
Armed Forces.
Second, high fidelity sensors, sensor fusion, and the connectivity of the F-35 offer something
qualitatively new not seen in older Norwegian systems. This means that the F-35 can act as a
combat ISR-platform and provide assets in all domains with enhanced situational awareness.
This may improve decision-making processes, provide high-quality target information in real
time, and thus enhance the warfighting potential at all levels of command (Bronk, 2016, p. 3).
If successfully used in this way, the F-35 cannot only affect deterrence and defense efforts by
itself, but also improve the deterrence and defense capability of all branches of the Norwegian
Armed Forces and NATO.
With this in mind, the next part discusses how the F-35 and JSM affect Norwegian ability to
deter Russia by denial.
6.1.1. Deterrence by Denial
Deterrence by denial involves convincing Russian decision-makers that they will likely not
reach their objectives, or that the benefits of attacking Norway have little value (Department
of Defense, 2006, p. 25). In the event of war with Norway and NATO, Russia will probably
attempt to protect its strategic assets at the Kola Peninsula by establishing zones of control
and denial over and from Norwegian territory. The overarching objective is to close the GIUK
gap and to deny offensive NATO-operations against the Russian nuclear triad. Russia will
likely see the need to occupy certain areas of Norwegian territory to achieve this. Whether
this will involve a large-scale invasion of Norway is uncertain, but long-range SAM-systems
and cruise missiles can establish large zones of denial even from Russian territory (Tamnes,
2017, p. 21). A limited bilateral conflict will probably be similar, and involve attempts to
deny Norway access to certain areas over land and at sea. This will enable Russian control of
the air, sea, and land, which sets the stage for more or less unhindered operations in these
domains.
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The F-35 and JSM can contribute positively to deterrence by denial in six main areas:
situational awareness, NATO deterrence, joint operations, and operations in the air, maritime,
and land domains.
First, surveillance and intelligence in support of national decision-making is one of the main
tasks of the Norwegian Armed Forces. In line with Bronk (2016), improved ISR capability
means that the F-35 can aid in establishing sufficient situational awareness in the buildup to,
and during, a crisis. Assuming that the F-35’s bandwidth issues are manageable, the
connectivity of the aircraft also means that it has the potential to distribute high quality
information to all levels of leadership in-real time. This provides both military and political
leadership with an improved basis for decision-making, which sets the stage for proper
diplomatic efforts.
Proper situational awareness is particularly important in situations where the opponent uses
hybrid strategies and tactics in an attempt to create confusion and uncertainty, which is a
likely scenario in a conflict with Russia. The sensor capability, range, and speed of the F-35
mean that it can gather high-fidelity information over large and remote areas quickly. It may
thus contribute to handling difficult and complex situations by either defusing them or
providing intelligence that can ensure activation of Article 5. However, the capabilities of the
F-35 and JSM may also cause Russia to seek untraditional options and trigger an increased
use of hybrid tools. Improved ISR capabilities can therefore lead to more use of hybrid
warfare, but may raise the threshold for its use and likely contribute to deter certain hybrid
measures that risk triggering an Article 5 response if they fail.
Second, in a major crisis with Russia, Norway will likely wish to involve NATO. The F-35
and JSM contribute positively to the overall deterrence efforts of the alliance since robust
national capabilities reduce the overall vulnerability of the alliance in line with Article 3. By
establishing proper situational awareness and the prospect of capable defense of the northern
flank, the F-35 and JSM can support NATO’s deterrence efforts in the north and consequently
contribute positively to collective defense.
NATO relies on national ISR capabilities for situational awareness. Surveillance and
intelligence data collected by the F-35 can be distributed to NATO headquarters, and this may
provide NATO leadership with a better foundation for decision-making in times of peace,
crisis, and war. The High-North is a large and remote part of NATO’s area of responsibility,
43
and Norway is alone in bordering Russia in the region. Consequently, Norwegian data is
crucial to NATO’s situational awareness, and the F-35 in combination with other assets, such
as intelligence, submarines and the future P-8, will play a key role in understanding Russian
intentions, capabilities, tactics, and modus operandi.
Improved warfighting capability in combination with improved situational awareness also
means that Norwegian leadership gains a more suitable tool to escalate a situation in order to
trigger Article 5 if required. Situational awareness is necessary to ensure that the F-35 and
JSM is applied where, when, and how they can best escalate a situation, and the capabilities
are well suited to turn a low-intensity situation into a high-intensity situation. The ability to
control escalation, and thus trigger Article 5 when needed, raises the threshold for Russian
aggression and contributes positively to both NATO and Norwegian deterrence efforts.
The F-35’s ability to challenge Russian denial strategies, control the air, and support ground
and naval forces, which is discussed below, means that Norway will more effectively delay
Russian advances and improve “holding time”. After NATO becomes involved, the F-35 may
also contribute effectively to offensive operations in combination with NATO forces and
long-range weapons. Consequently, by hindering and delaying Russian advances, the F-35
can put NATO in a better position to fend off and punish Russian aggression in the north
when the alliance becomes involved.
Since the F-35 is a US built plane, it improves interoperability with other US systems at
several levels. First, interoperable technology means that Norwegian F-35s can operate more
effectively with other NATO forces without facing significant technological challenges.
Second, since a number of NATO countries, including Norway, train their F-35 pilots in the
US, they share some of the same cultural background, education, and tactical perspectives.
Consequently, interoperability enables allied forces to fight more effectively alongside each
other in the defense of Norway and in other operations (Schaub, 2016).
Third, the RNoAF stresses that the F-35 will be employed in a joint context (Rygg, 2017), and
Norwegian and NATO doctrines and planning guidance emphasize joint operations
(Forsvaret, 2014; NATO, 2016b, 2017). In this perspective, the aim of military operations is
to achieve certain effects in support of pre-determined political end-states. Which branch or
service ends up executing the attack is of secondary interest.
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The interoperability and flexibility of the F-35 makes it suitable for joint operations. Through
advanced sensors, sensor fusion, and Link-16, the aircraft can find and designate targets for
other assets in all domains. The F-35 can, for example, locate SAM-systems that are
consequently attacked by special-forces or naval assets, or provide the location of Russian
naval forces to friendly submarines or surface ships that are better positioned to attack.
Information can also flow the other way, and the F-35 can receive target data from other
systems and assets. Special forces can locate and identify hidden targets, or the Navy and P-8
can provide the position of Russian surface vessels. Additionally, the F-35 can support ground
and naval forces with close air-support and air interdict using more traditional weapons such
as laser guided weapons and small diameter bombs even in high-threat scenarios. This may
improve the overall effectiveness of these forces significantly.
The F-35 can thus act as a force multiplier by enabling more effective operations on a general
level. According to the US Air Force (2015, p. 9), enhanced battle-space awareness will
enable more dynamic C2, which sets the stage for higher operational tempo and self-
synchronization of forces. Since commanders share the same picture, they can fight in a more
coordinated manner and adjust to changes more quickly. This applies both to NATO and in a
national context. The F-35 therefore has a potential to increase the general warfighting
capability of Norwegian and NATO forces by improving overall flexibility, tempo, accuracy,
and coordination of effort, and provides military commanders with the flexibility to employ a
number of tools to achieve the desired effect.
However, this requires that the C2 system is able to collect, process, and take advantage of the
increased flow of information. Large amounts of information available to all levels of
command do not always ensure success, and may instead cause information overload. It may
also temp high-level decision-makers to interfere with the details of an operation. While this
is not always inappropriate, it challenges the concept of mission command (Høiback, 2016).
However, these issues are likely solvable, and the F-35 provides planners with increased
flexibility to establish systems that can take advantage of improved availability of
information.
In an armed conflict, Russia will try to contest the flow of information and attempt to limit the
effectiveness of the F-35 through electronic warfare, cyber operations, and kinetic attacks on
communication nodes. Dependency on technology may lead to vulnerability, particularly if
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systems and procedures lack robustness and redundancy (Ministry of Defence, 2012, pp. 2-3,
2-5). Further, the data-link systems of the F-35 are limited in terms of badwith, and Link-16 is
detectable by the enemy. The internal data-link, MADL, is stealthier but can currently not
share information with platforms other than the F-35 (Bronk, 2016, p. 6). Consequently,
planners must be careful to not end up in a technology trap, where doctrines, procedures, and
concepts of operation take an overly optimistic position as to the effectiveness of new
capabilities. This may lead to a system that excels in training, but fails at war. In order to
maintain warfighting capability in contested environments, it is therefore important that
Norwegian decision-makers plan and train for situations where Russia negates or reduces the
effectiveness of the F-35s information sharing capability and develop robust technology that
can withstand attempts at degradation.
Fourth, the F-35 and JSM can contribute positively to the air domain and control of the air,
which is the primary task of the RNoAF (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2016c, p. 62). Gray (2015,
p. 164) asserts that control of the air is a fundamental prerequisite to employ airpower
effectively. It allows aircraft to fly when and where they wish and enables them to attack
enemy forces unhindered from the other side’s airpower. It also prevents such attacks in
return. The F-35 and JSM may improve Norwegian deterrence and defense efforts by
challenging the Russian ability to control the air in two ways: by mitigating the threat of
Russian SAM-systems and mitigating the threat from Russian aircraft.
Stealth and increased survivability means that the effective range of Russian SAMs is
decreased, and the F-35 can thus continue to operate in some contested areas where the F-16
cannot. Additionally, the standoff capability of the JSM allows the F-35 to target and attack
Russian long-range SAM-systems. If the F-35 is able to successfully eliminate the threat from
these, Russian aircraft can no longer attack Norwegian ground forces within the sanctuary of
their own air-defense umbrella. This sets the stage for more effective joint operations and
support of other branches as discussed above.
Russian aircraft also contribute to establishing and maintaining control of the air, and the
Russian inventory consists of a large number of advanced combat aircraft. However, the F-35
can challenge Russian fighters more effectively than the F-16. In the recent large-scale
exercise Red Flag, held in the US in 2017, the F-35 proved a kill-ratio of 20 to 1 in
demanding threat scenarios. While this was only an exercise, it illustrates the F-35’s ability to
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handle advanced air-threats while simultaneously conducting ground-attack missions
(Forsvaret, 2017; Lockie, 2017). Consequently, even if Norway is numerically inferior to
Russia, the F-35 can defend against Russian air-to-air fighters more successfully in the initial
stages of a Russian attack than the F-16 could, and may delay or hamper a Russian advance
more effectively. As soon as NATO forces become involved, the F-35 also provides a capable
addition to the alliance’s struggle to control the air.
Fifth, the F-35 and JSM can contribute positively to the maritime domain. Naval forces will
likely play a key role in acute crises or war in the High North, and Russia might attempt to
establish zones of sea-control and denial as part of the bastion defense. If successful, this may
affect NATO’s ability to operate freely and ship supplies and forces across the North-Atlantic
(Tamnes, 2017, p. 21).
With the F-35 and JSM, Norway can realistically challenge the Russian objective at an early
stage of a crisis. The range, survivability, and precision of the JSM mean that Norwegian F-
35s can target and potentially sink Russian vessels without putting the pilot and aircraft at
severe risk. As a small country, the inventory of missiles will be limited, and this restricts the
number of targets the F-35 can attack. However, the missile is likely highly survivable and
can discriminate between types of targets. Norwegian F-35s can thus attack key vessels and
affect the Russian ability to reach its objectives with a small number of weapons, even before
NATO forces become involved. This may improve Norwegian and allied freedom to operate
in contested waters and help secure supply routes across the North Atlantic.
Regardless of whether the effectiveness of the missile lives up to expectations or not, it
creates uncertainty as to how easily Russia can achieve its objectives of sea-control. It also
introduces the prospect of Norwegian sea-denial. This uncertainty impacts Russian cost-
benefit calculations both structurally and in situations of acute crisis. Consequently, the JSM
improves Norwegian deterrence by denial by introducing a realistic prospect of sinking
Russian ships at an early stage of a crisis.
Finally, improvements in the air and maritime domain mean that the F-35 and JSM can more
effectively contribute to operations in the land domain. By mitigating Russian control of the
air and sea, Norwegian and NATO forces can operate more freely in all domains. This
increases the room to support ground forces with close air-support and air interdict, which
may improve “holding time” and the overall effectiveness on the ground.
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The range from the main F-35 base at Ørland to the Russian border is approximately 1200
kilometers, and this may negatively affect the ability to contribute to the six areas discussed
above. Long distances mean that Norwegian F-35s will require air-to-air refueling for sorties
furthest to the east and north, and Norway does not have this capability today. Certain sortie
types also require that the F-35 loiters in order to locate and attack fleeting targets or provide
combat ISR support, and the withdrawn location of Ørland reduces the time available for this.
Long distances thus increase the dependency on support assets from NATO and reduce sortie
rates, limit the ability to concentrate or mass effects, and thus reduce the potency of the F-35
and JSM (Morgan, 2013, p. 79; Watts, 2005, p. 49). Norway will maintain a quick-reaction
alert at Evenes, which is located further north, but the base will operate a limited number of F-
35s and will not have the same infrastructure as the main base (Forsvarsdepartementet,
2016c). It is possible to deploy to bases further north in the event of a crisis, but this will
involve a certain logistical footprint and requires that the bases have the necessary
infrastructure available to serve the F-35. Temporary bases are also harder to defend than
permanent bases, which means that forward deployments may increase the vulnerability of the
F-35.
In sum, the capabilities of the F-35 and JSM contribute positively to Norwegian and NATO
deterrence by denial. Increased situational awareness provides a better foundation for wise
decision-making both domestically and in NATO. Robust defense of the north improves the
overall deterrence efforts of the NATO alliance, and the F-35 is interoperable to fight
alongside NATO forces. The F-35 is also a flexible system that can improve the effectiveness
of joint operations both in Norway and NATO. Finally, the combination of the F-35 and JSM
means that the assets can challenge Russian control of the air, sea, and land. However, this
requires that Norwegian defense-planners establish systems that can take advantage of both
the improved warfighting capability inherent in the assets themselves, as well as the capability
to act as a combat-ISR platform and force multiplier.
6.1.2. Deterrence by Punishment
Deterrence by punishment, or cost imposition, aims to convince an opponent that aggressive
behavior will result in large losses and that the cost of a counter-attack will be significant
(Department of Defense, 2006, p. 26). Deterrence by punishment is thus about
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communicating to Russia that the cost in human lives, equipment destroyed, economy, or
prestige will outweigh any potential benefit of attacking.
Deterrence by punishment is usually associated with offensive operations of strategic nature.
Classical deterrence theory emphasizes the deterring effect of strategic weapons, such as
nuclear weapons, due to their huge damage potential (Morgan, 2012, pp. 86-87). States can
take advantage of this to forward their security interest in two principal ways. First, while
conventional weapons cannot inflict the same total damage as nuclear weapons, long-range
precision weapons can inflict significant punitive cost where it hurts the most. Some even
argue that these weapons can provide an alternative to nuclear deterrence (Watts, 2005, p. 37).
According to McDermott and Bukkvoll (2017, p. 10), some Russian thinkers believe that the
potential strategic effect of conventional precision bombing may render nuclear weapons
obsolete in the future. Second, attacks on military strategic targets involved in the warfighting
may prove equally costly to an opponent. Russian strategy depends on long-range systems
such as cruise missiles and advanced SAM-systems, and the prospect of losing assets of
military strategic value adds potential cost and introduces uncertainty as to Russia’s ability to
achieve its military objectives. Consequently, deterrence by punishment involves both cost-
impositions on the battlefield as well as strategic effects not directly related to combat
operations.
NATO’s forces in Europe are too small to deny and defend against a Russian attack of scale.
Deterrence by denial thus lacks capability standing by itself, both in Norway and the rest of
Europe, and must be complemented by deterrence by punishment (Friis, 2017a).
In contrast to the F-16, the offensive capability and survivability of the F-35 opens the door
for more extensive Norwegian deterrence by punishment not seen since the days of the
SNOWCAT missions. Airpower’s ability to conduct parallel operations independent of an
ongoing ground-war and frontlines, combined with the capability of the F-35 and JSM, means
that Norway acquires the ability to strike highly defended targets both in Norway and Russia.
Consequently, the F-35 and JSM is capable of imposing costs both on the battlefield and
against strategic targets well inside Russia.
Punishment on the battlefield plays an important role in defense and denial efforts, and the F-
35 and JSM’s ability to strike high-value targets, such as ships, long-range SAM-systems, C2
infrastructure, and airfields, puts Norway in a position to impose cost on important Russian
49
combat forces. Aside from own and allied submarines, Norwegian F-35s are the only NATO-
assets with a significant offensive capability based in the northern theatre. This means that
these can impose cost on Russian targets, both strategic and tactical, at an early stage of a
crisis and even before NATO becomes involved.
The relationship between Norway and Russia is highly asymmetric, and Norway cannot
expect to achieve political and strategic effects alone. Still, the F-35 and JSM can contribute
to strategic attacks in a NATO context similar to the SNOWCAT missions. First, F-35s armed
with the JSM can attack C2 infrastructure, radar sites, and long-range SAM-systems at an
early stage of a crisis in order to open up Russian defenses for attacks using long-range
bombers and cruise missiles from NATO. In the same scenario, F-35s can perform offensive
counter-air missions to mitigate the threat from Russian air-defense fighters. Second, the F-35
and JSM can contribute directly by supplementing strategic attacks from NATO. This way
Norway can improve the potency of NATO operations and alleviate some of the pressure on
the alliance by freeing up resources for use elsewhere.
Nevertheless, using Norwegian F-35s for strategic attacks can be problematic for at least three
reasons. First, offensive operations have a negative connotation in the Norwegian security
policy discourse, and it may be difficult to find domestic support for strategic attacks. Second,
an operational concept that explicitly involves strategic attacks may intensify the security
dilemma by reinforcing Russian uncertainty over NATO’s intentions, particularly if such
attacks threaten Russian strategic security interests like the nuclear forces at the Kola
Peninsula. Third, strategic attacks on the Kola Peninsula run the risk of triggering a nuclear
response from Russia. These issues are discussed in chapters 7 and 8.
In sum, the F-35 and JSM’s power to hurt is less affected by the small size of the Norwegian
Armed Forces than other branches and structures, and the assets offset some of the power-
asymmetry between the two countries. Consequently, they influence Norwegian general and
immediate deterrence positively by giving Norwegian leadership the option to deter Russia in
a hypothetical situation where NATO support is unclear, not a question, or questionable, or to
participate in NATO’s efforts to punish Russian aggression and inflict cost. This adds further
uncertainty to Russian cost-benefit calculations, which may contribute to influencing Russian
leaders into pursuing its interests peacefully.
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6.2. Deterrence Credibility
Norwegian deterrence credibility is determined by Russia and involves the degree to which
Norwegian threats are believable or not. Credible threats are rational to carry out, and this
means that they must be both politically acceptable for Norway and sufficiently capable to
realistically resist Russian aggression (Morgan, 2003, p. 15).
Given the asymmetrical relationship between Norway and Russia, Norwegian deterrence
credibility cannot be assumed. If Russia believes that it can overwhelm Norwegian forces and
achieve a fait accompli before NATO becomes involved, it may assess that Norwegian forces
will give up rather than put up a fight. More importantly, since Norwegian deterrence leans
heavily on the prospect of NATO assistance, doubts about the sincerity of NATO’s Article 5
pose a serious threat to credibility.
The introduction of the F-35 and JSM affect Norwegian deterrence credibility positively.
First, as discussed above, the capabilities of the two systems mean that Norway can contribute
effectively to denying Russian military and political objectives. Systems such as the F-35 and
submarines are important because it is not possible to plan a military campaign around them.
Their ubiquitous nature, the ability to evade detection, and the ability to strike targets at long
range, introduce uncertainty to the Russian cost-benefit analysis. Such assets thus make it far
more realistic that Norway will attempt to defend against Russian aggression, and make it
more likely that Norway can escalate a situation to the level needed to activate Article 5. This
is particularly important in crises where NATO support may not be an option. Consequently,
the F-35 and JSM make fighting back a more rational choice for the Norwegian government
and increase the probability that Norwegian decision-makers will also choose to resist
coercive strategies. This may raise the threshold for Russian aggression.
Second, by ensuring a national ability to defend Norwegian territory in accordance with
Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, Norway supports NATO’s framework for collective
defense. Further, the F-35 can effectively support other NATO countries in times of need,
which improves the solidarity of the alliance. This is particularly important in a time when
Russia actively seeks to break the internal cohesion of NATO (Conley, James, Ruslan, &
Martin, 2016).
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6.3. Summary
The F-35 and JSM have the potential to affect Norwegian deterrence efforts towards Russia
positively, both in a NATO-context and bilaterally. Deterrence by denial is strengthened by
advances in six main areas: situational awareness, NATO deterrence, joint operations, and
efforts in the air, maritime, and land domains. Norwegian F-35s may thus contribute to the
decision-making foundation for both Norway and NATO, increase Norway’s “holding time”,
and potentially deny Russia from reaching certain objectives. However, this requires that
Norway can capitalize on both the improved warfighting capability inherent in the F-35, as
well as the aircraft’s capability as a combat ISR platform.
The new offensive capability also introduces a realistic Norwegian ability to impose cost and
punish Russian aggression. This can involve attacks against high-value forces directly
involved in the warfighting or against strategic targets in an attempt to affect the Russian will
and ability to continue fighting. Norwegian F-35s can contribute to the latter either by
mitigating the threat from Russian long-range SAMs and air-defense fighters, thus setting the
stage for strategic attacks by NATO assets, or by participating directly in the strategic attacks.
Finally, the F-35 and JSM help communicate to Russia that fighting back is the rational
choice for Norway and contribute to solidifying NATO’s cohesion. The acquisition signals to
NATO and Russia that Norway is serious about its commitment to the alliance. Consequently,
Norway contributes positively to NATO’s collective defense and cohesion by establishing
robust defense of the northern flank. This likely increases the overall deterrence credibility of
both Norway and NATO.
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7. Stability
The stability of a conflict is not about warfighting, but rather about how states can pursue
national interests under pressure without causing unwarranted escalation to war. The goal is to
create a situation conducive to non-violent conflict management, both structurally and during
acute crises, where neither side assesses that launching a preemptive attack is preferable to
showing restraint. Consequently, crises are unstable when either part of a conflict assesses
that a military confrontation will leave them better off than not attacking and starts to feel an
urgency to attack. The following chapter discusses how the F-35 and JSM can influence on
crisis stability in a serious crisis between Norway and Russia, and concludes that, if properly
employed, they can improve stability and thus contribute to setting the stage for peaceful
crisis management.
7.1. Structural stability
The stability of a crisis depends not only on short-term actions taken to manage it, but also on
the overall structural stability of the system. In a structurally stable system, states are less
inclined to consider pursuing national interests by the use of force. A stable system affects
crisis stability positively, both because acute crises are less likely to occur in the first place
and because acute crises are more likely to be resolved peacefully. This section discusses how
the F-35 and JSM affect the structural stability in the High North by analyzing the systems’
effect on deterrence, vulnerability to a Russian surprise attack, and Russian fear of a surprise
attack from NATO.
7.1.1. Strike assets should be sufficiently potent to deter a conventional attack
Chapter 6 concludes that the F-35 and JSM can have a positive effect on Norwegian
deterrence towards Russia. They improve deterrence by denial and introduce a capable
prospect of deterrence by punishment. Additionally, the new systems have a positive effect on
deterrence credibility since they increase the likelihood that Norwegian forces will fight back
and prevent a fait accompli, and that NATO will become involved at an early stage of the
fight. This raises the threshold for open aggression, which increases structural stability.
However, the stabilizing effect comes with two caveats: the F-35’s vulnerability to Russian
attacks and Russian fear of a surprise attack from NATO.
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7.1.2. Strike assets should be able to minimize vulnerability to surprise attack
Given that the relationship between Russia and NATO is one of mutual deterrence,
Norwegian deterrence efforts may come at the expense of Russia’s perception of its own
security. The security dilemma may prove particularly intense if Russia perceives that its
strategic deterrence and nuclear forces are threatened. The offensive capabilities of the F-35
and JSM may therefore cause instability if Russia believes that it is better off by removing the
threat before it can be brought to bear on Russian interests. According to Morgan (2013, p.
39) a combination of capable but vulnerable assets may invite preemptive attack, which
indicates that the stabilizing effect of the F-35 and JSM relies on the ability to protect them
from attacks.
Russian long-range precision-weapons make the F-35 vulnerable to attack while on the
ground, and according to Askvik (2015), Russia can threaten targets and infrastructure all
over Norway. Norwegian geography and topography make it challenging to defend against
cruise missiles, and even well defended targets are at risk. Additionally, Russia may choose to
attack targets in the cyber-domain or using special forces.
Norwegian F-35s will be based at two location: Ørland Main Air Station and Evenes. The
latter is planned as a quick reaction base with limited footprint, while Ørland is the main base
(Forsvarsdepartementet, 2016c, p. 62). This increases vulnerability since Russia can focus its
attacks on a limited number of target areas. The F-35 fleet can of course disperse to other
Norwegian bases when needed, but this requires at least some warning of what is to come.
Additionally, other bases are likely not as well defended as the main base, so the decision to
disperse will be a trade-off between the ability to defend against attacks and the potential gain
from dispersing.
Norway cannot reduce the vulnerability by basing the F-35 outside the range of Russian
weapons since Russia can strike all bases in Norway. The only remaining option is ensure that
the bases are appropriately defended. This requires a robust combination of active and passive
defenses, such as air-defense systems, hardened shelters, camouflage, decoys, force
protection, cyber-defense, and sufficient early warning. According to the LTP
(Forsvarsdepartementet, 2016c, p. 64), Norway is in the process of procuring long-range air-
defense systems for the defense of Ørland. However, these are not yet in place, and it remains
54
to see which systems the government will choose. Further, Norway will build new hardened
shelters for the F-35 at Ørland that can house up to 24 F-35s (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2017b).
Early warning is critical to avoid being caught by surprise, and this requires high-quality
intelligence and surveillance data. The ISR capability of the F-35 can thus improve stability
by providing decision-makers with adequate information to take proper defensive measures
before an attack occurs. This reduces the probability that Russia can catch Norway and NATO
off guard, and reduces the Russian incentive to launch a surprise attack.
According to Diesen (2017) and Barth Eide (2017), the vulnerability of the F-35 bases is not a
major threat to structural stability since such missile attacks will lead to activation of Article
5. In a conflict with NATO, the main threat to Russia is US strikes, and in this context the
small number of Norwegian missiles is almost negligible. Consequently, while a war with
Russia will likely involve cruise missile attacks on Norwegian F-35 bases, such attacks will
be part of the larger war effort, not because Russia fears the effect of Norwegian weapons
alone. Additionally, it is unlikely that Russia fears a preemptive attack from Norway. In a
bilateral conflict, Russia will seek to avoid activation of Article 5 to prevent NATO
involvement, and a preemptive attack of scale on Norwegian F-35 bases will defeat this
purpose (Aamodt, 2017). However, this means that Russia may instead attempt to eliminate
the threat using other methods, such as cyber-attacks and special forces. These tools are much
harder to trace back to Russia and are less likely to trigger Article 5.
In sum, vulnerable bases do not invite a Russian attack using long-range precision weapons
by default. However, Russia may choose to attack with more subtle tools, and successful
attacks, both overt and covert, may significantly reduce Norway’s ability to resist Russian
aggression. This may affect Norwegian deterrence and defense efforts negatively, which may
be problematic in regards to stability. Consequently, it is crucial to protect the F-35 bases in
order to maintain deterrence, safeguard the ability to defend against aggression, and ensure
crisis stability.
7.1.3. Strike assets should be able to mitigate the threat of surprise attack from
the defender
Russian fear of a surprise attack from NATO may cause increased tensions, invoke an arms
race, and challenge structural stability in the High North (Morgan, 2013, pp. 31-32).
According to the Norwegian intelligence service (Etterretningstjenesten, 2017, p. 22), Russian
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foreign policy contains an element of fear and mistrust of NATO, and an overly offensive
posture may trigger further militarization and cause a spiral of mistrust. Additionally, Åtland
(2014) concludes that there is currently a security dilemma in the Arctic. Ultimately, if Russia
fears that an attack from NATO is imminent, particularly against its nuclear weapons at the
Kola Peninsula, it may conclude that the best course of action is to initiate preparations for an
attack of its own.
Norway has traditionally aimed to mitigate this problem through a combination of reassurance
and deterrence. It is unlikely that Russia fears unilateral aggression from Norway. However,
when seen in the context of NATO, Norwegian posture can cause uncertainty and trigger fears
of an attack from the alliance. The effect of Norwegian force structure and posture is thus
closely related to the security situation at hand and NATO’s overall posture.
Jervis (2013, p. 107) concludes that structural stability is threatened when offensive weapons
have an advantage over defensive weapons, and when offensive postures are indistinguishable
from defensive postures. When seen in isolation, the long-range offensive capabilities on both
sides may therefore challenge structural stability since they favor the offensive part and make
it difficult to clearly distinguish between defensive and offensive postures. The offensive
capability is inherent in both the F-35 and JSM, and this puts a premium on establishing a
posture that clearly signals defensive intent.
Norway actively signals defensive intent towards Russia in a number of ways. First, the F-35
base at Ørland is located approximately 1,200 kilometers from the Russian border, while the
forward base at Evenes is more than 550 kilometers away. This may reduce the fear of a
surprise attack from NATO and come across as less provoking to Russia than a base located
further north. In contrast, the Russian air forces in Olengorsk and Severomorsk, which include
both TU-22 Backfire bombers and a number of fighter jets, are 200 and 150 kilometers from
the Norwegian border (Westerlund & Norberg, 2016, pp. 81-82).
Second, the Norwegian Joint Headquarters communicates exercise activity of a certain size to
Russia well in advance. It ensures that operational patterns are recognizable and that
Norwegian military presence in the High North is the norm. Norwegian military activity is
thus predictable, which helps establish the region as an area characterized by transparency and
low tensions (Aamodt, 2017).
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Third, security policy, explicit operational concepts, and doctrines are important elements of
the Norwegian posture, and the ideal ambition must be to signal defensive intent while at the
same time exploiting the F-35 and JSM’s potential for deterrence. Even though the self-
imposed restrictions have been adjusted since the Cold War, reassurance continues to be an
important element of Norwegian policy. Norway still enforces restrictions on foreign air-
activity close to the Russian border (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2016e, p. 15) and this signals
defensive intent because it distances NATO from the everyday military presence in the north
and removes the possibility that a preemptive attack from NATO is imminent. Consequently,
Norwegian F-35s may reassure Russia by signaling that Norway is able to ensure its
sovereignty without involvement from NATO.
On the other hand, one should not exaggerate the destabilizing effect of an offensive
operational concept. Offensive operations are natural elements of modern warfare, including
defensive warfare, and both Norwegian and NATO doctrines specifically emphasize their
importance (Forsvaret, 2014; NATO, 2016b). Russia likely expects that NATO and Norway
will attempt to attack its forces in the event of war, particularly air-defense systems and
maritime forces. This is a natural consequence of warfare involving long-range precision
weapons. Consequently, an offensive operational concept will not challenge structural
stability by itself, but Norwegian decision-makers must be careful to not give the expression
that a preemptive attack from NATO is imminent or threaten Russian core interests in a way
that may cause it to prepare for a preemptive war.
The main question is how Norway, being a NATO member, can signal that Norwegian F-35s
do not pose a threat to the Russian nuclear forces at the Kola Peninsula. The strategic
importance of the nuclear bases means that uncertainty and fear can quickly intensify the
security dilemma. If Russian leadership perceives that an attack from NATO is imminent, it
may find itself in a prisoner’s dilemma where activation and enforcement of the bastion
defense is the only rational choice. Further complicating the matter; since Russia is
conventionally inferior to NATO, the strategic effect of conventional long-range precision
weapons may trigger a nuclear response (Morgan & Quester, 2011, p. 38; Watts, 2005, p. 35).
In sum, and in line with Jervis (2013), the F-35 and JSM may challenge structural stability if
they are postured in a way that incites Russian fears of a surprise attack from NATO or the
US. Russia does not fear unilateral attacks from Norway, and the threat thus relates mainly to
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a NATO context. The vulnerability of Russian nuclear forces is of prime concern, and
Norway must avoid a posture where Russia perceives that the survival of these is threatened.
What matters, are the specifics as to security policy, base structure, and the shape and content
of the operational concept. Consequently, through a combination of reassuring measures and a
carefully tailored concept, it is possible for Norwegian decision-makers to capitalize on the
offensive capability of the F-35 and JSM without aggravating Russian fears of a surprise
attack.
7.2. Crisis Stability
An acute crisis indicates that deterrence is about to fail. Crises involve specific disagreements,
threats, and outcomes, and deals with situations where at least one part of the conflict
seriously considers using force in pursuit of its objectives (Morgan, 1983, p. 30).
Norwegian and NATO crisis management aims to defuse crises in terms favorable to their
interests, and this requires a combination of compromise and active pressure to compel Russia
to agree to an outcome that is acceptable to both sides and deter the use of force. Certain
attributes are conducive to crisis stability, and the following discusses how the F-35 and
JSM’s flexibility, responsiveness, and capability for signaling affect the stability of a crisis.
7.2.1. Strike assets should be flexible
It is impossible to predict the exact nature and timing of future crises in the High North.
Consequently, assets that provide Norwegian and NATO decision-makers with utility in a
wide variety of scenarios can improve stability if their use is tailored to supplement ongoing
diplomatic and bargaining processes (Morgan, 2013, p. 33).
The flexibility of the F-35 and JSM provides decision-makers with a potent tool for crisis
management that has the potential to improve crisis stability. The speed, reach, and height of
the F-35 mean that it can conduct parallel operations independent of frontlines, and its multi-
role nature increases flexibility compared to the F-16. Additionally, through improved
survivability, lethality, sensor capability, and standoff, the F-35 can solve a number of
different mission types in scenarios ranging from low-intensity conflicts to high-intensity
warfighting in contested airspace. The connectivity and sensor capability also means that the
F-35 can distribute information that may enhance the flexibility of other assets and systems.
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7.2.2. Strike assets should be responsive
Responsiveness involves the capability for prompt alert, deployment, and employment.
Responsive assets have the potential to act stabilizing on a crisis since decision-makers can
modulate their operating tempo to match diplomatic efforts (Morgan, 2013, p. 33).
The F-35 is highly responsive and can therefore contribute to stabilize an acute crisis. With
the speed, reach, short reaction time, and capability of the jet, Norway and NATO can quickly
increase the coercive pressure in the High North when needed. The F-35 can for example
change from a defensive posture to high-intensity offensive operations within minutes.
Pressure can also be relieved swiftly as a gesture of reassurance or if a more reconciliatory
approach is warranted.
7.2.3. Strike assets should offer capabilities for signaling
Deterrence and crisis management aim to influence the opponent through signaling (George
& Smoke, 1974, p. 11). Consequently, neither the flexibility nor responsiveness of the F-35
matter if it is unable to get the message across as intended. When tensions are rising and
crises are acute, actions speak louder than words, but misperceptions and misunderstandings
can cause unintended effects and unwarranted escalation (Faber, 2015, p. 36; Jervis, 2006).
Therefore, the effect of military assets in crisis management depend on whether or not they
can be employed in ways that clearly and unambiguously communicate capability, resolve,
and restraint (Morgan, 2013, p. 33).
The F-35 is a flexible and responsive tool for signaling and can quickly communicate
Norwegian and NATO resolve and capability. Examples of such communication include
forward deployments to bases close to the region of interest, show of force through large force
exercises and live-fire demonstrations, patrols, and overall presence. This is not specific to the
F-35, but the stealthy nature of the aircraft means that it can signal capability in contested
areas in ways that the F-16 cannot. While other forces, particularly ground forces, may send a
stronger signal to Russia, these are less flexible and will require far more time to deploy.
In addition, any actions taken to signal resolve and capability must be carefully balanced
against the risk of misperception. The F-35’s ability to signal restraint and reassure Russia
that NATO does not have aggressive intent is therefore just as important as the ability to
signal resolve and capability. This can be problematic, given the offensive capability of the
aircraft. However, the key in such a process is to signal that an attack is not imminent, and
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that there is still time to negotiate and back down (Schelling, 1966). This may include
redeploying to withdrawn bases, reduced activity in contested areas, and emphasizing
defensive operations. Further, Norwegian F-35s will operate in the High North on a regular
basis, and this means that operations with Norwegian F-35s close to Russia will appear far
less provoking than similar operations involving forces from other NATO partners. The
capability of the F-35 represents a potent deterring threat and enables Norway to handle
certain acute situations without support from NATO. This may reduce Russian fear of a
surprise attack from the alliance and prevent unwarranted escalation and instability. However,
the small size of the Norwegian Armed Forces means that credible deterrence still requires
NATO involvement at an early stage of a major military crisis.
7.3. Summary
The F-35 and JSM have the potential to improve crisis stability in a serious crisis or war
between Norway and Russia, but the effect depends on the vulnerability of the F-35 bases and
how the assets are postured and employed.
Structural stability will improve if Norway can establish uncertainty as to Russia’s ability to
strike at vulnerable F-35 bases and destroy a sufficient number of F-35s in an initial attack.
However, one should not exaggerate the destabilizing effect of vulnerability since Russia
understands that an attack of scale will almost certainly trigger activation of Article 5.
The offensive capability of the F-35 and JSM combined with the flexibility inherent in
airpower makes it harder to distinguish between offensive and defensive postures. This may
challenge structural stability. Since the offensive capability is inherent in the systems,
posturing becomes the prime concern. A posture where Russia perceives that Norwegian F-
35s, in conjunction with NATO efforts, represent a threat to its nuclear forces at the Kola
Peninsula is most problematic and destabilizing. Given the deterring effect of the F-35 and
JSM, the overall Norwegian goal must be to capitalize on their capabilities while clearly
signaling that Norway and NATO are not moving closer to launching an attack. Posturing
issues are thus manageable, but require a careful combination of reassuring measures at
different levels.
When it comes to crisis stability and management, the multi-role nature of the F-35 makes it
well suited to supplement ongoing diplomatic processes. It provides decision-makers with a
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range of options for crisis management and can quickly modulate its operating-tempo to
match political requirements.
Norway can thus use the flexibility and responsiveness of the F-35 to send diplomatic signals
during a crisis. The F-35 can signal resolve, capability, or restraint effectively, which may act
stabilizing if employed properly. However, the offensive capability of the aircraft means that
decision-makers must carefully balance signals of resolve against the risk of provoking an
unwarranted Russian response. Yet, compared to NATO forces not native to the High North,
operations involving Norwegian F-35s are less likely to provoke an adverse response from
Russia. What sets the F-35 apart from other structures, such as land and maritime forces, is
the ability to quickly modulate pressure in response to diplomatic developments. The F-35
can thus signal restraint more or less instantaneously, and in a far more expeditious way than
ground and naval forces.
Overall, the F-35 and JSM provide Norwegian leadership with increased strategic flexibility
that can contribute positively to crisis stability and set the stage for peaceful crisis
management in the High North. However, in order to achieve the optimum trade-off between
deterrence and crisis stability, decision-makers must balance a combination of measures that
go beyond simply force structure and military posture.
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8. Operational Concept
This chapter discusses how a Norwegian operational concept involving the F-35 and JSM
could look in order to reconcile the need for credible deterrence and defense on the one hand,
and for controlled crisis stability on the other. Operational concepts do not address tactics but
seek to bridge the gap between the tasks of the Norwegian Armed Forces on one side, and
doctrines and political directives on the other (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2015c, p. 64).
Operational concepts thus set the premises for defense planning, operational plans, and
tactics. If made public, they can also signal Norwegian intent and commitment to Russia.
The chapter starts by discussing how conceptions of the nature of modern warfare at the
political level influence the debate over how to utilize the F-35 and JSM. It then argues that
the new systems can contribute through three main operating modes: defensive, tactically
offensive, and strategically offensive. The chapter then discusses the relevance of the three
modes in two overarching scenarios: a security crisis without NATO involvement and a war
involving NATO. The chapter concludes that an operational concept for a security crisis
should involve the defensive mode, while also opening up for the tactically offensive mode in
the most severe types of crises. A war involving NATO means that the Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (SACEUR) takes control of Norwegian F-35s, and this concept should
allow all three modes as required to meet the situation at hand.
8.1. The Problematic Word “Offensive”
Reassurance has been an important element of Norwegian security policy since the Cold War,
and contemporary Norwegian security discourses indicate that many see the prospect of any
offensive operations towards Russia as problematic (Eliassen & Sandnes, 2015;
Forsvarsdepartementet, 2016e). The debate lacks nuance, which may limit the ability to
develop policies that exploit the potential of the F-35 and JSM in a manner that best ensures
Norwegian security.
Modern warfare is not linear. Airpower and long-range precision weapons enable parallel
operations unrestricted by the situation on the ground. Those in possession of such weapons
can thus produce effects over large areas and attack the enemy when and where it is most
effective (Gray, 2015, pp. 295-296). The Russian inventory consists of a number of long-
range precision weapons, and Russia can project power far into Norway without ever crossing
the border (Askvik, 2015). The range of Russian SAM-systems also means that Russian
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defensive weapons can support offensive operations by establishing control of the air. Again,
without having to deploy the systems across the border. Modern warfare is thus not purely
defensive or offensive, but requires an ability to switch between defending and attacking
seamlessly (Forsvaret, 2014). In addition, offensive operations is a general term and does not
capture the range of options it may involve. There is a significant difference between
attacking enemy forces involved in the fight, regardless of where they are located, and
attacking strategic targets far into Russian territory.
The offensive capabilities inherent in the F-35 and JSM do not mean that they are exclusively
strategic tools. Improved capabilities open the door for a number of effects, also tactical
effects. For instance, the utility of stealth applies not only to offensive strikes deep into enemy
territory, but also provides an advantage in purely defensive operations such as defensive
counter-air. Consequently, the F-35 and JSM are not offensive or defensive in themselves,
and the offensive capability does not restrict their ability to achieve tactical effects in a
defensive war (Aamodt, 2017).
A valid discussion of a Norwegian operational concept thus requires categories that go
beyond the simple offense-defense distinction. What matters is the intended effects a certain
concept seeks to achieve. It also matters whether a concept involves attacks on Russia to
include its territorial sea, as well as strategic targets or not. The discussion to follow is based
on three main categories or operating modes for the F-35: defensive, tactically offensive, and
strategically offensive.
The defensive mode does not preclude offensive operations, but Norwegian F-35s will not
attack targets in Russia. It involves strikes on targets in Norway, as well as in and over
international waters, to achieve tactical and military strategic effects. A tactically offensive
mode also aims to achieve tactical and military strategic effects, and allows attacks on
military targets involved in the warfighting also located in Russia. Finally, the strategically
offensive mode involves strategic attacks on centers of gravity in both Norway and Russia
with the intent of achieving military strategic and political effects. It is still about defensive
intent, but aims mainly to affect Russian ability and political will to continue fighting.
Further, the optimal response to a given situation depends on the nature of the crisis, which
means that Norway may have to employ different operational concepts depending on the
situation at hand. It is difficult to foresee how a crisis will unfold, and a crisis between
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Norway and Russia may range from limited security crises to an armed conflict and war. The
transition between stages will likely also be gradual and continuous, and this opens up for a
large range of possible developments, stages, and outcomes. The discussion to follow looks at
two overarching or ideal type scenarios: 1) a security crisis without NATO involvement. This
is the third task of the Norwegian Armed Forces as described in section 4.2.2. 2) War with
Russia involving NATO, which is the second task of the Armed Forces. A real crisis will not
fall perfectly within the two scenarios, but for the sake of clarity and analysis, the discussion
treats the two as distinctly different and dichotomous situations. For simplicity, the term
NATO is used to describe both involvement from NATO as a collective institution as well as
from individual allied partners. Regardless of the outcome from the deliberations made in the
North Atlantic Council on whether or not to assist Norway, each individual member state is
free to determine its own level of involvement. Consequently, an operation may take the form
of a coalition of countries willing to contribute even if NATO has not decided to participate
(Forsvarsdepartementet, 2015c, p. 8).
It is not certain that decision-makers need to communicate all sides of an operational concept
publically. A concept has two functions. First, it sets the framework for classified operational
plans, tactics, and modus operandi. Second, it is a security policy tool used to signal
intentions and capabilities. A publically explicit concept may reduce Norway’s room to
maneuver. Additionally, uncertainty is an important element of deterrence. The unspoken
threat can therefore be just as deterring as explicit threats, and the former is less likely to
trigger an enemy’s doubts over Norwegian intentions. Consequently, a certain level of
ambiguity in the publically communicated concept may work in Norway’s favor, and
Norwegian decision-makers must balance the requirements to signal resolve, capability, and
restraint against the need to keep all options available if a crisis escalates (Røksund, 2017).
8.2. Security Crisis without NATO Involvement
A security crisis falls short of a full-scale armed attack but still threatens Norway’s territorial
integrity and sovereignty. This is a scenario between war and peace where it can be
challenging to maintain situational awareness and appreciate what is in reality happening.
Security crises may involve political-military pressure and the use of hybrid measures, and are
the result of important conflicts of interests or misunderstandings that run the risk of further
escalation (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2015c, pp. 8-9).
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Since Norway is a member of NATO, the alliance always remains a tacit bargaining tool in
Norwegian crisis management. However, depending on the situation, Norway may have to
resolve a security crisis without support from the Alliance. First, NATO or key allies may
need some time to decide and respond, or they may in worse case abstain from supporting
Norway. Second, Norway may not wish involvement from NATO, but seek to manage limited
crises alone in order to reduce tensions and attempt to de-escalate the situation. Severe
security crises are more difficult for Norway to handle alone and may require intentional
escalation in order to trigger Article 5.
The defensive operating mode, one in which Norwegian F-35s do not attack targets inside
Russia, is similar to Norway’s traditional operational concept involving the F-16. This mode
can include mission types such as defensive counter-air, close air-support, air interdict, anti-
shipping, ISR, and attacks on forward deployed C2 infrastructure and air-defense systems.
In a security crisis, a concept emphasizing the defensive mode may balance reassurance and
deterrence well, and may signal Norwegian resolve without causing undue escalation. Norway
can still challenge Russian control of the sea, attack Russian forces inside Norway, continue
to operate in certain contested airspace, and perform tasks related to ISR. Since the
Norwegian posture is defensive, Russia is unlikely to interpret it as a prelude for a preemptive
attack from NATO. Additionally, the defensive nature of such a concept means that it will not
appear politically problematic. It is therefore realistic that it will receive broad political
support in Norway. Consequently, in less severe security crises where unwarranted escalation
is the prime concern, a concept leaning on the defensive mode may best balance the
requirements of credible deterrence against the need for controlled crisis stability.
However, in a serious security crisis involving stakes of high importance, the defensive mode
may not be sufficient to deter Russian aggression. The defensive posture may lead Russia to
believe that it can achieve a quick fait accompli before NATO can react. Even if NATO does
eventually come to Norway’s aid, a defensive concept may give Russia more time to solidify
an advantageous position. Consequently, in order to prevent a deteriorating situation that can
quickly get out of hand, a serious bilateral security crisis may warrant a more offensive
Norwegian posture.
An operational concept based on the tactically offensive operating mode involves targets in
both Norway and Russia, as well as in and over international waters. It may include defensive
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counter-air, close air-support, air-interdict, anti-shipping, ISR, offensive counter-air, and
attacks on air-defense systems, radar sites, and C2 infrastructure in Russia. This allows
Norwegian F-35s to attack forces not yet involved in the fight and more effectively mitigate
the threat from Russian SAM-systems and maritime forces. This challenges Russian control
of the air over Finnmark, which means that ground and maritime forces may be able to
operate under less risk of Russian air-attacks.
By introducing the prospect of striking important assets inside Russia, Norway can offset
some of the power asymmetry between the two countries. In a bargaining situation, this may
deter Russian aggression and prevent certain forms of coercive diplomacy since it opens the
door for a damaging blow to Russian prestige. The offensive capability of the F-35 and JSM
also means that Norway can more easily escalate a situation to the level required to trigger
Article 5, and potentially put allied forces in a more advantageous situation when they arrive.
However, there is a risk that an offensive posture may escalate a conflict beyond what
Norway was prepared for. If the Norwegian posture reinforces Russian fears of encirclement
and a surprise attack from NATO, a tactically offensive concept may cause unwarranted
escalation and give Russia an incentive to activate the bastion defense. It is thus important
that Norway does not employ the tactically offensive mode unless the situation has already
deteriorated past a certain point. Norway may also see the need to supplement it with
measures of reassurance to convince Russia that a major attack from NATO is not imminent.
Achieving broad political support for the tactically offensive operating mode may also prove
challenging (Aamodt, 2017), and the notion of offensive operations into Russia during a crisis
may trigger negative reactions. According to Diesen (2017), it is possible to achieve political
support, but this may require preemptive efforts to improve the understanding of military
principles and their effects on Norwegian security at the political level.
The strategically offensive operating mode includes attacks on targets with strategic value in
Russia. These are centers of gravity that are believed to have a disproportionate impact on the
enemy system (Warden III, 2015, p. 106). Norway cannot expect to achieve substantial
strategic effects in Russia alone. Consequently, the strategically offensive mode does not add
significantly to Norwegian deterrence and defense efforts in a bilateral security crisis with
Russia compared to the tactically offensive mode.
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Further, a concept that includes strategic attacks in Russia may challenge the stability of a
security crisis. Even if Norway signals that its F-35s will only attack strategic targets not
related to Russia’s nuclear deterrence capability, the signal will cause uncertainty, may come
across as threatening, and Russia will likely perceive the posture itself as provoking. Overt
threats to attack strategic targets in Russia will likely trigger an adverse response from Russia
that may cause a significant escalation of the crisis. Russia may also find itself in a prisoners’
dilemma where it sees no choice but to activate the bastion defense. Additionally, Russia may
use this as an opportunity to frame Norway as the aggressive part, which will further
complicate matters. Finally, it is unlikely that strategic attacks on Russia during a security
crisis will receive political support in Norway. Consequently, it is difficult to see how
strategic attacks will serve Norwegian interests during a security crisis not involving NATO.
In sum, a Norwegian operational concept for a bilateral security crisis may involve both the
defensive and the tactically offensive operating modes depending on the intensity of the crisis.
The defensive mode may prove to best balance the requirements of deterrence and
reassurance in limited security crises where Norway wants to avoid increased tensions and
unwarranted escalation. More severe crises, where important security interests are at stake,
may require a tactically offensive mode in order to deter Russian aggression, resist coercive
diplomacy, ensure escalation to trigger Article 5 if required, and to prevent a rapidly
deteriorating situation and possible fait accompli.
8.3. War Involving NATO
This section discusses a scenario of war in the High North where certain NATO partners have
decided to contribute to the defense of Norway. A major armed conflict may be less
ambiguous than a security crisis. Such a situation will likely be both severe and dangerous,
and may threaten the existence, sovereignty, and integrity of Norway. Consequently, this is a
state of emergency that will likely legitimize the use of all available resources to defend the
country (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2015c, pp. 8-9).
After activation of Article 5, NATO will take command of most Norwegian military forces
and operations will be conducted jointly (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2016c, p. 23). This means
that Norway’s room to maneuver will be restricted, and that the Norwegian operational
concept will have to fit into the overall concept of NATO. However, even if armed conflict or
war means that deterrence has failed, it does not mean that crisis stability and further
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escalation is no longer an issue. War is a bargaining process where both sides aim to settle the
ongoing dispute at favorable terms, and all actions and reactions must be measured to ensure
that the level of escalation does not spiral out of control (Schelling, 1966, p. 142). It is, for
example, imperative to keep an armed conflict below the nuclear threshold. Consequently,
Norwegian posturing and signaling may still matter, but will be subordinate to the overall
posture of NATO.
Norway may employ the F-35 and JSM in the defensive operating mode at the initial stages of
a war in an attempt to manage escalation and tensions. Examples include situations where an
ongoing war between NATO and Russia in other regions risks spreading to the High North as
well. However, Russia can take advantage of the defensive posture and attempt to make quick
gains. After NATO takes command of Norwegian forces, the alliance may want to use the
offensive capabilities of the F-35 and JSM in a manner more in line with the tactically
offensive mode as an alternative or supplement to the defensive mode. Norway can insist on
national caveats and demand that NATO must employ the F-35 and JSM in a defensive mode.
However, this will likely seem problematic to SACEUR and other NATO partners, and may
challenge NATO cohesion.
War with Russia means that deterrence has failed and escalation is a fact. A tactically
offensive operating mode is therefore less problematic in regards to domestic opposition and
potential for unwarranted escalation in this scenario than during a security crisis. According to
the LTP (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2016c, p. 23), Norway should seek to seamlessly transition
from crisis management to collective defense if the situation warrants. This may require an
early focus on a tactically offensive mode in order to hamper Russian advances effectively. If
Norwegian F-35s can successfully challenge Russian control of the air and sea in the initial
stages of the conflict, Norway can contribute to set the stage for more effective follow-on
operations by NATO. Additionally, the tactically offensive mode means that Norwegian F-
35s can contribute more effectively alongside NATO forces in the High North and potentially
attack Russian air-defense systems in support of strategic attacks by NATO similar to the
SNOWCAT missions.
NATO will likely conduct strategic attacks on Russian centers of gravity in the High North as
part of the overall war efforts. The offensive capabilities of the F-35 mean that Norway can
take part in such attacks, and this makes the strategically offensive operating mode a realistic
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prospect. Such strategic attacks may cause further escalation. However, what matters in a war
is what NATO and the US does. Norwegian restraint may have little impact or even go
unnoticed. Consequently, while it is important to avoid a posture that may trigger
uncontrolled escalation, strategic attacks conducted by Norwegian F-35s and JSMs may
contribute positively to NATO’s overall war efforts. The strategically offensive mode may
thus prove to be a relevant element of a Norwegian operational concept in a war involving
NATO.
Depending on intensity of the war efforts, both the tactically offensive and strategically
offensive modes may encounter political opposition in Norway. However, the serious nature
of a major armed conflict means that both the public and political opposition will likely see
the use of extreme measures, including strategic attacks, as legitimate responses to an
aggressive and dangerous opponent.
Overall, a Norwegian operational concept for the use of the F-35 and JSM in this scenario
should keep the door open for all three modes. The defensive mode may be relevant in the
early stages of a war if Norway and NATO want to avoid further escalation in the High North.
However, as NATO becomes increasingly involved, Norway must seamlessly allow a
transition to a tactically offensive mode in support of the overall war efforts from NATO.
Norway can also support strategic attacks from NATO if the situation requires, which means
that the strategically offensive mode should also be included as an option.
8.4. Summary
A valid discussion of a Norwegian operational concept for the use of Norwegian F-35s and
JSMs requires accurate categories and proper understanding of the nature of modern warfare.
In that regard, this study proposes three distinct operating modes for Norwegian F-35s:
defensive, tactically offensive, and strategically offensive. The defensive mode involves no
targets in Russia, the tactically offensive mode accepts attacks on forces directly involved in
the warfighting in both Norway and Russia, and the strategically offensive mode allows
strategic attacks against centers of gravity anywhere in Russia or Norway.
In order to reconcile the need for credible deterrence and defense on the one hand, and for
controlled crisis stability on the other, Norway could adopt different operational concepts
depending on the severity of the conflict.
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Security crises without NATO that fall short of a full-scale armed attack can prove very
demanding for the Norwegian government. Depending on the intensity of the crisis, Norway
may or may not seek NATO involvement. Additionally, NATO support is not always
guaranteed. Low-end security crises where unnecessary escalation is of prime concern may
warrant an operational concept leaning towards the defensive mode, since this balances
towards reassurance while still providing deterring effect. High-end security crises may
require a concept that also includes the tactically offensive mode in order to deter Russian
aggression, ensure escalation to activate Article 5, and to prevent a fait accompli.
Wars will likely involve NATO. They may threaten Norway’s sovereignty, integrity, and
existence and legitimize the use of all the state’s tools to ensure survival. After activation of
Article 5, NATO will take command of most Norwegian forces and this will restrict
Norway’s room to maneuver. A Norwegian operational concept for a war should keep the
door open for all three modes. The defensive mode may be applicable to the early phases of a
war in order to manage escalation and tensions. After escalation is a fact, NATO may expect
that Norwegian F-35s contribute to the overall warfighting in line with the tactically offensive
mode. Finally, Norway can also realistically contribute to NATO’s strategic attacks according
to the strategically offensive mode if required.
Norway does not have to communicate publically all aspects of the chosen operational
concepts. The defensive mode of operation is least problematic, both domestically and in
regards to potential escalation, and Norway may choose to communicate this explicitly as a
reassuring measure towards Russia. The tactically and strategically offensive modes are more
problematic, and a certain level of ambiguity may be in place since some of the deterring
effect is inherent in the capabilities of the systems. By communicating these two modes in
broad terms only, Norway may capitalize on the deterring effect of the unspoken threat
without causing undue tensions in the relationship to Russia and avoid negative domestic
reactions.
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9. Conclusions and Further Research
This study has analyzed the F-35 and JSM’s effect on Norwegian security policy towards
Russia. It specifically answers how the new systems affect Norwegian deterrence and defense
efforts, crisis stability in a serious crisis between the two countries, and draws conclusions as
to how an operational concept involving the F-35 and JSM can look in order to reconcile the
need for credible deterrence and defense on the one hand, and for controlled crisis stability on
the other. The study leans on theories of deterrence, crisis stability, and airpower, and aims to
close the gap between the strategic context, Norwegian security policy, and the F-35 and
JSM’s capabilities and tactical utility.
The strategic context is characterized by an unpredictable Russia that seeks to regain its
position as a great power. Russia is both willing and capable to use military power to achieve
this and has modernized its military force significantly in recent years. While the High North
is a stable and peaceful region, there is a potential for conflict both bilaterally and as part of a
larger conflict with NATO. Russia has many interests in the Arctic, of which the nuclear
bases at the Kola Peninsula are most important from a conflict perspective. In the event of an
escalation, Russia will probably defend these bases by activating the bastion defense, which
includes large bubbles of sea control and denial stretching all the way to the GIUK gap.
Norwegian security policy has balanced deterrence with reassurance towards Russia since the
beginning of the Cold War and the tradition is still alive today. Reassurance aims to reduce
tensions by signaling that Norway does not have aggressive intentions on behalf of NATO
and includes specific peacetime restrictions on allied presence and activity in the country.
Deterrence efforts combine a national and allied capability to delay and deny Russian
aggression with the prospect of punishment. The credibility of deterrence in the High North
thus depends on NATO or allied support.
Regarding the first research question, the F-35 and JSM can improve Norwegian defense and
deterrence efforts towards Russia both nationally and in a NATO context. Russia cannot plan
a military campaign around the systems, and this may influence the Russian cost-benefit
calculations in a way that raises the threshold for the use of military force. If a conflict
escalates, the F-35 and JSM can also contribute to delay a Russian advance more effectively
and potentially deny some Russian objectives altogether. Finally, the offensive capabilities of
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the systems open the door for Norwegian deterrence by punishment in a severe security crisis
or war. Combined, this also improves Norwegian deterrence credibility.
As for the second research question, the F-35 and JSM may contribute to improve crisis
stability in a serious crisis between Norway and Russia if employed appropriately.
Improvements in deterrence and defense can increase structural stability since this raises the
threshold for Russian aggression. However, the vulnerability of Norwegian F-35 bases may
invite a preemptive attack from Russia, both overtly using cruise missiles and covertly using
cyber-attacks or special forces. Proper defense of the bases is thus a prerequisite for effective
defense and deterrence, as well as structural stability.
The ability to mitigate Russian fears of encirclement and attack from NATO is a key premise
for crisis stability. Russian strategic interests and the nuclear forces at the Kola Peninsula are
particularly problematic, and stability will suffer if Russia perceives that NATO plans to
attack these forces. Since the offensive capability is inherent in the F-35 and JSM, it is
imperative that Norway and NATO posture their forces in a manner that clearly signals
defensive intent.
The third research question asks how an operational concept involving the F-35 and JSM can
look in order to reconcile the need for credible deterrence and defense on the one hand, and
for controlled crisis stability on the other. Explicit operational concepts communicate
capability and intent, and an ideal Norwegian concept should signal defensive intent while
still exploiting the full capability of the F-35 and JSM. This study suggests three main modes
of operation for Norwegian F-35s: defensive, tactically offensive, and strategically offensive.
The defensive mode does not involve targets in Russia, the tactically offensive mode accepts
attacks on forces directly involved in the warfighting in both Norway and Russia, and the
strategically offensive mode accepts strategic attacks against centers of gravity anywhere in
Russia or Norway.
The nature of a bilateral security crisis differs substantially from a war involving NATO, and
Norway should thus adopt different operational concepts depending on the situation at hand.
In a security crisis, Norway may or may not seek involvement from NATO, and support from
the alliance is not always guaranteed. Low-end crises where undue escalation is of prime
concern may thus warrant an operational concept emphasizing the defensive mode, since this
will act reassuring while still providing deterring effect. Severe security crises may require a
72
concept that also includes the tactically offensive mode in order to deter Russian aggression,
ensure escalation to activate Article 5, and to prevent a fait accompli.
A war with Russia may threaten Norway’s existence, sovereignty, and integrity, and this
could legitimize the use of all the state’s tools to ensure survival. After activation of Article 5,
NATO will take command of most Norwegian forces and this will restrict Norway’s room to
maneuver. A Norwegian operational concept for a war should thus keep the door open for all
three modes. The defensive mode may be particularly relevant in the early phases of a war in
order to manage tensions. After escalation, NATO may expect that Norwegian F-35s
contribute to the overall warfighting in line with the tactically offensive mode. Finally,
Norway can also realistically contribute to NATO’s strategic attacks according to the
strategically offensive mode if required.
Consequently, in order to reconcile the need for credible deterrence and defense on the one
hand, and for controlled crisis stability on the other, Norway should adopt different
operational concepts depending on the severity of the conflict. The concept for security crises
should include the defensive mode with an option to transition to the tactically offensive
mode if required, while the concept for a war involving NATO should utilize all modes as
required.
It is not certain that all sides of an operational concept need to be communicated publically. A
publically explicit concept may reduce Norway’s room to maneuver domestically by inviting
political disagreement and disputes, and vis-à-vis Russia by restricting the options available in
a crisis. Uncertainty is an important element of deterrence. The unspoken threat can therefore
be just as deterring as explicit threats, and the former is less likely to trigger Russian
uncertainty over Norwegian intentions. Consequently, a certain level of ambiguity in the
publically communicated concept may work in Norway’s favor, and Norwegian decision-
makers must balance the requirements to signal resolve, capability, and restraint against the
need to keep all options available if a crisis escalates.
More work and research remains before the Norwegian Armed Forces and NATO are ready to
exploit the full potential of the F-35. They must establish systems, doctrines, procedures, and
tactics that take advantage of both the F-35s increased warfighting capability as well as its
ability to act as a combat-ISR platform. This requires a robust C2 system that can efficiently
process, distribute, and utilize high volumes of data, and ensure sufficiently fast decision-
73
loops that can capitalize on the F-35s ability to find and track fleeting targets. Additionally, it
is not certain that the current C2 structure is optimized for warfare involving fifth generation
assets like the F-35.
Researchers should study further the specific effects of the F-35 and JSM on Norwegian
security and how Norway can best utilize the assets in pursuit of national interests. Examples
include the specifics as to how Norway should employ the F-35 for effective signaling during
an acute crisis, how it can contribute to address non-conventional threats and hybrid warfare,
and how it can help intentionally escalate a conflict to trigger Article 5 when required.
Finally, there is tension between the need for secrecy to ensure the ability to defend against
aggression and the need to signal capability to deter it. More research is required on how
Norway can best balance the need to communicate the capabilities of clandestine assets such
as the F-35 and submarines to improve deterrence, while at the same time maintaining an
upper hand and the element of surprise should deterrence fail.
In conclusion, the F-35 and JSM provide Norwegian policy-makers with a robust and
versatile tool for crisis management that Russia cannot plan a military campaign around. This
raises the threshold for Russian aggression, which may have a positive effect on Norwegian
deterrence. If the systems are employed wisely, they may also improve crisis stability in a
serious crisis with Russia. In order to best balance the requirements of deterrence and crisis
stability, an operational concept for a security crisis should include the defensive and in some
circumstances the tactically offensive modes of operation, while a concept for a war should
involve all modes as required to meet the situation at hand.
74
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List of Figures
Figure 1. The Russian bastion and the reach of the bastion defense .............................. 22
Figure 2. Coverage S-400 and S-500 located close to Norwegian border. ..................... 24
Figure 3. Combat advantage gained through stealth. ...................................................... 35
Figure 4. Operational impact of F-35.. ........................................................................... 37
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Appendix A – Receipt from Personvernombudet for Forskning
87
88
89
Appendix B – Approval from the Norwegian Defence University College
90
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Appendix C – Interview Guide
Introduksjon
Dette intervjuet er del av en mastergrad ved Forsvarets Høgskole/Stabsskolen. Med din
godkjennelse vil det bli brukt lydopptaker under intervjuet og intervjuet vil så bli transkribert.
Alle lyddata vil bli slettet straks transkribering er gjennomført. Intervjuet er i utgangspunktet
ikke anonymt, med mindre du ønsker at det skal være det.
Du kan trekke deg når som helst under eller etter intervjuet dersom du skulle ønske det. Du vil
også få mulighet til å lese oppgaven før den leveres, slik at du kan kvalitetssikre sitatene.
Utfylling av samtykke-erklæring.
Påminnelse om at intervjuet og informasjonen må ligge på ugradert nivå.
Min bakgrunn
Generell informasjon om forskningsprosjektet og intervjuet
Bruk av F-16 var basert på et defensivt operasjonskonsept i hele sin levetid.
F-35 og Joint Strike Missile medfører nye kapasiteter og langt større offensiv evne.
Jeg analyserer systemenes innvirkning på avskrekking, evne til forsvar og krisstabilitet.
Basert på dette vil oppgaven si noe om konsekvensene av forskjellige operasjonskonsept.
Demografi
Navn, nåværende stilling.
På hvilken måte har anskaffelsen av F-35 og Joint Strike Missile vært tema for deg i løpet av
din karriere?
Hvilken rolle hadde du i anskaffelsesprosessen for nye kampfly?
Arbeider du med denne tematikken i dag?
Implikasjoner for norsk sikkerhetspolitikk
Avskrekking
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Hvordan tror du F-35 og JSM vil påvirke norsk sikkerhetspolitikk mot Russland?
Hvordan tror du at anskaffelsen av F-35 og JSM vil endre tenkningen vedrørende militær
terskel for Norge?
Hvordan påvirker systemene evne til avskrekking gjennom..
Denial?
Punishment? – nasjonalt/NATO
Hvordan påvirker systemene troverdigheten (deterrence credibility) til norsk avskrekking?
- Nasjonalt?
- Relatert til NATO?
I hvor stor grad øker systemene norsk evne til å forsvare seg mot et Russisk angrep?
Hvor viktig er systemene i forhold til andre strukturelementer?
Hvordan mener du at systemene bidrar til å motstå Russisk bruk av tvangsdiplomati, press og
«hybride metoder»?
Kristestabilitet
Jeg definerer her krisestabilitet som evne til å motstå press uten at det fører til unødvendig
eskalering. Altså sannsynligheten for at kriser løses fredelig uten eskalering, og uten at Norge
må gi etter på sentrale interesseområder.
På hvilken måte tror du F-35 og JSM kan påvirke krisestabiliteten mellom Norge og
Russland?
- Strukturell stabilitet
- Krisestabilitet – akutte kriser
Hvordan bør systemene brukes for å optimalisere krisestabiliteten?
- Innretning, doktriner, operasjonskonsept, signalisering, øvelsesmønster
Hvilken betydning har JSM spesifikt?
- Lang rekkevidde, gjennombruddsevne og høy presisjon.
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Hvordan vil et offensivt konsept kunne påvirke stabiliteten i nord?
- Taktisk offensivt/strategisk offensivt
Operasjonskonsept
Norsk operasjonskonsept med F-16 var defensivt, blant annet fordi systemet ikke var i stand
til å overleve et offensivt konsept. Et offensivt konsept fremstår også som politisk
problematisk i dag.
Hva legger du i begrepet offensivt konsept, og hva er bakgrunnen for at ordet «offensivt» har
en så negativ klang i Norge?
- Taktisk offensivt – luftvern, sjøstyrker, militære styrker
o Angrep mot russisk territorium eller ikke
- Strategisk offensivt – angrep på mål ikke direkte involvert i striden, også på russisk
territorium
Vil det være politisk spisbart å åpent signalisere et offensivt konsept? – taktisk/strategisk
Med avskrekking, evne til forsvar og krisestabilitet i mente, hvordan bør et operasjonskonsept
som involverer F-35 og JSM se ut?
- Defensivt
- Taktisk offensivt
- Strategisk offensivt
Avslutning/oppsummering
Er det noe som ikke er dekket og som du mener vil være relevant å snakke om?
Har det blitt sagt noe i løpet av intervjuet som du ikke ønsker å siteres på – eller som er
gradert og
derfor må behandles deretter?
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Appendix D – Interview Information and Consent Form
Informasjonsskriv i forbindelse med intervju
Dette intervjuet er del av en mastergradsoppgave ved Forsvarets Høgskole. Masteroppgavens
målsetning er å bidra til økt kunnskap og forståelse om hvordan innføringen av de nye
forsvarssystemene F-35 og Joint Strike Missile vil påvirke norsk sikkerhetspolitikk.
Problemstillingene som søkes besvart er:
How can the F-35 and JSM affect Norwegian deterrence and defence efforts against Russia?
How can the F-35 and JSM influence on crisis stability in a serious crisis between Norway and
Russia?
How should an operational concept involving the F-35 and JSM look in order to reconcile the need
for credible deterrence and defence on the one hand, and for controlled crisis stability on the other?
Oppgaven skal leveres i slutten av november 2017 og det vil bli gjennomført en muntlig eksamen før
sensur. Resultatet fra undersøkelsen vil bli publisert, og oppgaven gjøres tilgjengelig på Forsvarets
Høgskoles hjemmeside.
Resultatene fra intervjuet vil i utgangspunktet ikke bli anonymisert, med mindre du ønsker dette. Med
din tillatelse vil det bli benyttet lydopptaker under intervjuet, og det vil bli transkribert. Lydfilen og det
transkriberte intervjuet vil bli lagret på en datamaskin som tilhører Forsvarets Høgskole. Jeg er den
eneste med tilgang til denne. Alle lyddata vil bli slettet etter at oppgaven er levert i slutten av
november 2017.
Prosjektet er meldt til Personvernforbundet for forskning samt godkjent av nemd nedsatt av Forsvarets
Høgskole i henhold til Forsvarets reglement. Intervjuet vil vare i ca. 1 time. Generelle forskningsetiske
retningslinjer og retningslinjer fra Personvernombudet vil bli benyttet for behandling av informasjon
som fremkommer i intervjuet.
Masteroppgaven vil publiseres som ugradert. Jeg ber derfor om at gradert informasjon ikke omtales
mens lydopptakeren er påslått. Dersom det likevel omtales gradert informasjon ber jeg om at det
presiseres slik at lyd-fil kan oppbevares i henhold til gjeldende regelverk..
Dersom du har spørsmål til undersøkelsen kan jeg nås på telefon 484 00 503 eller e-post
[email protected]. Veileder, Rolf Tamnes, kan nås på telefon 990 92 280 eller e-post
Deltakelse er frivillig og du har anledning til å trekke deg når som helst under eller etter intervjuet. I så
fall vil all informasjon om deg, og transkriberinger fra intervjuet, slettes umiddelbart.
Vennlig hilsen
Major Ole Marius Tørrisplass
FHS/Masterstudiet
Jeg har mottatt og forstår informasjon om undersøkelsen, og samtykker til å delta.
Dato og signatur:
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Appendix E – List of Informants
Espen Barth Eide
Espen Barth Eide is a politician and an elected member of the Norwegian Parliament and has
a degree in political science from the University of Oslo. He served as State Secretary for the
Norwegian MoD from 2005 to 2010, Minister of Defense from 2011 to 2012, and Minister of
Foreign Affairs from 2012 to 2013. Barth Eide currently serves as First Vice Chair, Standing
Committee on Energy and the Environment in the Norwegian Parliament.
Sverre Diesen
Retired General Sverre Diesen was Chief of Defense from 2005 to 2009 and is currently a
researcher at NDRE. He has a Master’s Degree from the Norwegian Institute of Technology
and is a graduate from the Norwegian Army Academy and Staff College from both Norway
and the United Kingdom. He has served as Commander of the Royal Guard, Chief of Staff of
the Norwegian 6th Division, Commander of Distriktskommando Nord-Norge and
Commander of the Norwegian land forces at the National Joint Head Quarter. He has
published “Strategi – en innføring i maktens logikk”, Cappelen Akademiske Forlag 2003, and
“Fornyelse eller forvitring – Forsvaret mot 2020”, Cappelen Damm 2011.
Svein Efjestad
Svein Efjestad has worked at the Norwegian MoD since 1981 and is currently its Policy
Director. He has a Master’s degree in political science from the University of Oslo and he
served at the Norwegian delegation to NATO from 1986 to 1990. From 1990 to 1995,
Efjestad was Principal Officer of the Security Policy department and he served as Director
General for security policy from 1995 to 2013.
Arne Røksund
Arne Røksund is Secretary General of the Norwegian MoD. He is a graduate from the
Norwegian Naval Academy and Staff College from both Norway and Paris. He also has a
Doctor’s degree in History from the University of Oslo. He has served as commander of the
96
Norwegian Staff College and the Defence University College, and he was Director General of
the department for defense policy and long term planning in the MoD from 2007 to 2011.
From 2011 to 2013 he served as Secretary General of the Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal
Affairs before he became assistant Secretary General of the Ministry of Trade, Industry and
Fisheries. He has served as Secretary General of the Norwegian MoD since 2017.
Lars Christian Aamodt
Major General Lars Christian Aamodt is Chief of Staff of the Norwegian Joint Headquarter.
He is a graduate from the Norwegian Air Force Academy, Defence Command and Staff
College, National Defence College, and has a Master’s degree from the National Defense
University in the United States. He served as Wing Commander of 137th Air Wing from 2008
to 2012, ISAF National Contingent Commander in Afghanistan from 2012 to 2013, Chief of
the Norwegian Inspectorate of Air Operations from 2014 to 2017, and is currently co-
chairman of the F-35 program’s Senior Warfighter Group. Major General Aamodt has served
as Chief of Staff of the Norwegian Joint Headquarter since 2017.
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Appendix F – Correspondence Regarding Classification
Hei, Og gratulerer med masteroppgave. Så lenge det er du som har vurdert, og besluttet, at oppgaven skulle sikkerhetsgraderes til B, er det også du som kan nedgradere oppgaven jfr Forskrift om informasjonssikkerhet (FIS) § 2-11 . Ved at oppgaven er basert på ugraderte kilder, tolker jeg til at de er åpne kilder? I tillegg har du fått Luftforsvaret til å se igjennom innholdet, noe som jeg anser som veldig riktig. FSA er ikke eier av informasjonen, og har ikke mulighet til å vurdere sikkerhetsgradering på eget grunnlag. Vi ville ha tatt kontakt med Luftforsvaret, slik du allerede har gjort. Ut ifra opplysningene i denne mail og basert på din egen skadevurdering, jfr FIS § 2-1, kan du gradere/omgradere din masteroppgave. Mvh █ Vibeke Søyland Major/Seksjon for styring og forvaltning Avdeling for sikkerhetsledelse Forsvarets Sikkerhetsavdeling
E-post: [email protected]
Telefon: 0510 7625/ 2309 7625 Besøksadresse: Bygning 66, Akershus festning, Oslo Fagside sikkerhetstjeneste: http://intranett2.mil.no/fag/sikkerhet/sikkerhetstjeneste/Sider/default.aspx Fra: Øvland, Kenneth
Sendt: 1. februar 2018 09:27 Til: Tørrisplass, Ole Marius
Emne: SV: Gradering masteroppgave ved FHS
Hei Da har jeg lest gjennom, og fått tilbakemeldinger fra Roof på den teksten som omhandler F-35 konkret. All den tid informasjon utelukkende er hentet fra åpne kilder, kan ikke jeg se problemer med at oppgaven nedgraderes. Dette basert på mine vurderinger etter gjennomlesning og tilbakemeldinger fra oblt. Bakke. Sagt dette, sitter jeg ikke på noen «myndighet» til hverken å gjøre det ene eller det andre. Men fra våres ståsted kan oppgaven nedgraderes.
█ Kenneth Øvland Oberstløytnant/Juridisk Rådgiver
Luftforsvarsstaben
E-post: [email protected] (ugradert)
Telefon: 97 97 44 99
Telefon mil: 0520 8004
Besøksadresse: Flyplassveien 300, 1590 Rygge Flystasjon
