DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW · continuing control room improvement program. The commitments that were 1.5/020684 CON ED/#42 1-2 I. then planned to be implemented by the Cycle

DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW

INDIAN POINT UNIT 8402220058 840214 U PDR ADOCK 05000247 F PDR

PROGRAM PLAN

2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

LIST OF FIGURES ................................................. v

LIST OF APPENDICES............................................. vi

1.0 INTRODUCTION .............................................. 1-1

1.1 General .............................................. 1-1

1.2 Objectives ........................................... 1-1

1.3 Previous Human Engineering Reviews & Transition to Work

Defined by This Plan .................................. 1-2

2.0 CONTROL-ROOM DESIGN REVIEW PLAN............................. 2-1

2.1 General............................................... 2-1

2.2 Planning ............................................. 2-2 2.3 Review ............................................... 2-4

2.3.1 Methodology.................................... 2-7

2.3.1.1 Criteria ............................... 2-8

2.3.1.2 Human Factors Engineering Review .......... 2-9

2.3.1.3 Operating Experience Review ............... 2-9

2.3.1.4 System Function and Task Analysis ......... 2-14

2.3.1.5 Control Room Inventory................... 2-18

2.3.1.6 Control Room Survey ..................... 2-19

2.3.1.7 Verification of Control Room Function ...... 2-23

2.3.1.8 Validation of Control Room Function ....... 2-23

3.0 MANAGEMENT AND STAFFING.................................... 3-1

3.1 Detailed Control Room Design Review Management Procedure 3-1

3.2 Integration of DCRDR with Other Supplement 1 Activities 3-1

3.3 DCRDR Team Structure and Personnel...................... 3-2

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TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

PAGE

4.0 DCRDR ASSESSMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ........................... 4-1

5.0 DOCUMENTATION AND DOCUMENT CONTROL ............................ 5-1

5.1 Documentation Generated by the DCRDR Process ............. 5-1

5.2 Documentation System and Control ......................... 5-1

6.0 SUMMARY..................................................... 6-1

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LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURES TITLE PAGE

2-1 OVERVIEW OF THE DCRDR PROCESS 2-24

2-2 DCRDR REVIEW TEAMS 2-25

2-3 THE DCRDR TASK STRUCTURE 2-26

2-4 LAYOUT OF CENTRAL CONTROL ROOM 2-27

2-5 SAMPLE CRITERIA MATRIX SHEET 2-28

2-6 FLOW DIAGRAM FOR SELECTING OPERATIONAL EVENTS FOR SFTA 2-29

2-7 CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW SYSTEM BREAKDOWN 2-30

2-8 CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW EMERGENCY EVENT SEQUENCES 2-31

2-9 EXAMPLE OF A FUNCTIONAL (DECISION-ACTION) FLOW DIAGRAM 2-32

2-10 CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW FUNCTIONAL SEQUENCE PER SELECTED OPERATIONAL EVENT 2-33

2-11 CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW OPERATOR TASK IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS 2-35

2-12 CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW INSTRUMENT DETAILS 2-36

2-13 TYPICAL SPATIAL SEQUENCE DIAGRAM 2-37

2-14 EXAMPLE OF A TRAFFIC LINK DIAGRAM 2-38

2-15 SAMPLE COMPLIANCE CHECKLIST 2-39

4-1 ASSESSMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION METHODOLOGY 4-3

4-2 ASSESSMENT FACTOR CRITERIA 4-4

4-3 SELECTION OF DESIGN IMPROVEMENTS 4-5

4-4 HUMAN ENGINEERING OBSERVATION FORM 4-6

5-1 SAMPLE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TABLE OF CONTENTS 5-3

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a.,

LIST OF APPENDICES

APPENDIX A - QUALIFICATION OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW TEAM AND DESIGN

REVIEW TEAM MEMBERS

APPENDIX B - TYPICAL REVIEW FORMS

APPENDIX C - FILING INDEX

APPENDIX D - TYPICAL OPERATING EXPERIENCE REVIEW QUESTIONS

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 GENERAL

This describes the Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. (Con Edison) plan to perform a supplemental Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) of Indian Point No. 2 (IP-2) in accordance with our response to Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 dated April 15, 1983.

1.2 OBJECTIVES

Con Edison intends to complete this review in a timely and cost-effective manner with the overall objective of accomplishing the goals of NUREG-0700 as follows:

o Determine whether system status information, control capabilities, feedback, and analytical aids necessary for control room operators

to accomplish their functions in an effective, safe and reliable manner are provided in the control room.

0 Identify characteristics of the existing control room instrumentation, controls, other equipment, and physical arrangements that may significantly impact operator performance.

o Analyze and evaluate potential problems that could arise from this

rev iew.

o Define and implement a plan of action that applies required human factors principles to enhance operator effectiveness. Particular

emphasis will be placed on improvements affecting control room design and operator performance under abnormal or emergency

conditions.

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o Integrate the DCRDR with other areas requiring the application of

human factors principles identified in Con Edison's response to

Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737.

o Utilize previous studies already completed and work already

implemented or planned for implementation.

1.3 PREVIOUS HUMAN ENGINEERING REVIEWS AND TRANSITION TO WORK DEFINED BY THIS PLAN

In response to the NRC Confirmatory Order of February 11, 1980, Con Edison

contracted with Essex Corporation to perform a human engineering review of

the Indian Point No. 2 central control room. The central control- room

review included surveys, interviews with operators, simulator exercises of

procedures, video-taping of selected emergency procedures, and a review

and revision of selected emergency procedures. As a result of that

review, numerous human engineering discrepancies (HED) were identified.

Gibbs & Hill was retained by Con Edison in June 1981 to evaluate the

significance of HEDs identified in the Essex report. The evaluation

performed by Gibbs & Hill also included the design review of control room

modifications made after the initial review and recommended appropriate

changes to address the discrepancies.

In its letters of December 29, 1980, May 15, 1981, February 11, 1982, and

May 14, 1982, Con Edison documented proposed corrective actions and

implementation schedules based on the early control room reviews. Con

Edison has implemented several of these changes in the control room.

These are summarized in Con Edison's Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737.

In a letter to the NRC, dated February 11, 1982, Con Edison proposed

modifications to the Indian Point No. 2 central control room to correct

HEDs identified during the 1980 and 1981 reviews as part of Con Edison's

continuing control room improvement program. The commitments that were

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I

then planned to be implemented by the Cycle 6/7 (1984) refueling outage include:

o Annunciator point relocations and consolidations

o Audible alarm localization, flash rate frequency, and horn silence controls

0 Eliminating normally lit annunciator points to achieve a dark board of normal operations

o Regrouping of alarms

o Control/display alignment

o Prevention of inadvertent actuations

o Integration of recent control room modifications

Because of continuing control room modifications due to the integration of requirements from other Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 programs several of the

above items as proposed in the February 11, 1982 letter, have been deferred

pending their consideration in this review. The resolution of annunciator

tile, panel device labeling, and lamp test capability for all ESF. systems will be integrated with this review.

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2.0 CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW PLAN

2.1 GENERAL

Recognizing the NRC's commitment to allow credit for prior activities

performed in good faith toward the goal of improving control room human

engineering, the 1980 and 1981 reviews will be supplemented by the follow

ing activities:

2.1.1 Submittal of this, IP-2 program plan which utilizes the prior

activities to optimize the supplemental review efforts.

2.1.2 Task analysis, utilizing selected new emergency operating

procedures and coordinated with their verification and validation

program to document the control and display requirements for

performance of operator tasks.

2.1.3 Control room survey and assessment of control room modifications

since 1980 and 1981 reviews, as well as assessment of overall

control room integration using new emergency operating procedures,

PROTEUS rudimentary SPOS, and instrumentation to detect inadequate

core cooling.

2.1.4 HED assessment and documentation of process or criteria used to

prioritize and evaluate HEDS for correction.

2.1.5 Design/develop corrective actions.

2.1.6 Verification of proposed control room modifications and HED

corrections.

2.1.7 Summary Report.

2.1.8 Implementation of corrective actions.

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The overview of the DCRDR processes is shown in Figure 2-1 which is a copy

of Exhibit 3-1 of NUREG-0700. This program plan describes the following:

o Planning (Section 2.2)

0 Review (Section 2.3)

0. Management and Staffing (Section 3.0)

o Assessment and Implementation (Section 4.0)

o0 Documentation and Document Control (Section 5.0)

2.2 PLANNING

The planning phase covers relevant actions completed to date or planned as

noted herein.

Con Edison organized a management team to guide, monitor and implement this

program and has retained Torrey Pines Technology, a division of GA

Technologies Inc as its consultant with major contractual responsibilites

for planning functions. The functions of this team (which is supplemented

by Torrey Pines Technology personnel as necessary) are:

o Assure proper relationships and awareness between this project and

other initiatives of Con Edison's response to Supplement 1 to

NUREG-0737

0 Assignment of key management and design review team personnel

o Approve final program plan

o Provide resources required to implement the program plan.

0 Identify and assure that plant operational constraints and project

requirements are properly coordinated

o Monitor DCRDR progress

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o Review and approve control room improvement recommendations

o Establish and initiate the control room improvement program, as

required

The planning activity includes the following:

o Definition of all man/machine interfaces and related activities to

be reviewed

o Definition of objectives

o Definition of management team role

o Formulation of the task structure for the program (see Figure 2.3)

o Development of administrative procedures to govern this review.

Con Edison has assigned engineering and operations specialists along with

Torrey Pines Technology personnel as necessary to the design review team

that has the responsibility for the technical scope of the DCRDR.

A filing index has been established to permit easy auditing of all data and

documents generated in this program. (See Appendix C.)

A library will be established to support this effort. It will contain the

pertinent plant documents and many of the human factors literature noted in

NUREG-0700.

Con Edison plans to review the content of this program plan with the NRC

prior to its formal issue. This process will allow us to optimize the

program prior to its formal submittal to the NRC.

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2.3 REVIEW

The review phase is basically the investigative phase. This effort is

organized into specialty task groups per Figure 2-3. Specialized personnel

are selected as required for each task group from Con Edison and Torrey

Pines Technology. Human factors specialists will provide a major role in

all tasks and assignments will be made for- cross fertilization of the

various functional task groups. -This concept will be extended into the

management review team and accordingly the project engineer will be assign

ed to the management team. Approximately 15 engineers and key operations

personnel will participate in the detailed reviews and evaluations of the

task groups.

The following types of personnel are included:

0 Nuclear systems designers and analysts_

o Human factors specialists

0 Control board designers

o Instrumentation and control engineers

0 Computer and data management engineers

o Plant operators

o Licensing personnel

This review will cover the following consoles and panels including the

rudimentary SPDS displays which are used by the operators for normal and

emergency operations:

PANELS AND DESCRIPTION

FAF Turbine first out annunciator

FBF Feedwater control

FCF Reactor control

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FDF Reactor first out annunciator

SAF Reactor coolant system (RCS)

SAF-1 Process radiation monitor

SBF-1/2 Safeguards

SCF Condensate and boiler feed

SDF Turbine recorder

SEF Turbine startup

SFF Chemical and volume control system (CVCS)

SGF Auxiliary coolant system (ACS)

SHF Electrical

SJF Cooling water and air

SHF Bearing monitor

SLF Weld channel

SMF Safety injection

SNF Containment isolation

SOF Electrical heat tracing and deluge

Computer/Operator Consoles

Accident Assessment Panel

Gas Turbine Remote Start Panels for Gas Turbine 1, 2, and 3

13.8 kv Electrical Control Panel

Al Protection Set I

A2 Protection Set I

A3 Protection Set I

A4 Protection Set I

A5 CVCS

A6 CVCS

A7 RCS, ACS

A8 RCS

A9 Protection Set II

A1O Protection Set II

All Protection Set II

A12 Protection Set II

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Bi

B2

B3

B4

B5

B6

B7

B8

B9

B1O

Bil

Protection Set III

Protection Set III

Protection Set III

Feedwater control

Feedwater control

Pressurizer control

Rod control

Delta-t rod control

Protection Set IV

Protection Set IV

Leading Edge (LE) flow measurement system

Cl Rod position rectifier and rod

C2 Rod position rectifier and rod



C5 Nuclear Instrumentation System




C9 Reactor Coolant Pump Vibration

C10 Saturation meter

D1 Power monitor

D2 Process monitor

D3 Process monitor

D4 Incore monitors

D5 Incore monitors

D6 Incore monitors

D7 Incore monitors

D8 Incore thermocouples

D9 Test equipment

D10 Steam dump

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bistable assembly

bistable assembly

bistable assembly

bistable assembly

(NIS)

Digital Metal Impact Monitoring System

E3 Reactor protection channel IVA

E4 Reactor protection channel IlIIA

E5 Reactor protection channel IIA

E6 Reactor protection channel IA

E7 Safeguards initiation 1-1

E8 Safeguards initiation 1-2

F3 Reactor protection channel IVB

F4 Reactor protection channel IIIB

F5 Reactor protection channel IIB

F6 Reactor protection channel IB

F7 Safeguard initiation 2-2

F8 Safefuard initiation 2-1

F9 Turbine overspeed protection

G1 Power failure system sequence 1

G2 Power failure system sequence 2

The DCRDR will extend to other man/machine interfaces identified as a

result of the analysis of selected events during the SFTA activity. Figure

2-4 illustrates the layout of the central control room.

2.3.1 Methodology

Each task team will initially develop guidelines and, where necessary,

procedures for executing the task. These guidelines or procedures may be

modified to optimize team operation. Each typical report covering the full

scope of each task activity will include the guidelines and/or procedures

needed. In general guidelines and/or procedures will consider the follow

ing as applicable:

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o Objectives

o Team membership and assigned duties

o Methodology including flow chart of all activities required to

complete the task objectives

0 List of constraints if any

o Reporting requirements

o Special instructions.

2.3.1.1 Criteria

The design review team will prepare a criteria report which will include

control room design conventions and review criteria. This report will

stress the human factors considerations and requirements for the control

room design, based on NUREG-0700 guidelines. Figure 2-5 shows a sample

criteria matrix sheet.

This document will describe the function of the control room and plant

systems related to external communications. It will al so address one of

the major post-TMI-2 concerns, the systems and human factors features for

Annunciator/Computer/Safety Equipment interfaces relative to prioritization, consistency, and overall integration. It will also include detailed

human factors data useful to this review and to guide future control room

modifications.

The following topics and definitions will be included in this document:

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A. Introduction

B. General

C. Control.Room Layout and Features

D. Main Control Panel Layouts and Features

E. Human Engineering Guidelines (specific adaptations of NUREG-0700,

Section 6, and other guidelines not covered in other major topics)

F. Special Guidelines Associated with the Application of Human

Factors Engineering to Control Room Design

G. References

Criteria will be developed considering:

o Pertinent NUREG documents, plant documents and Regulatory Guides

o Established criteria from general industry, EPRI, INPO, government

sources, Con Edison conventions, standards and practices.

2 .3.1.2 Human Factors Engineering Review

This review will cover the modifications made to Indian Point No. 2 central

control room after September 30, 1981 in accordance with Section 2.1.3 and

2.1.4. The review of these areas coupled with the results of past reviews

will provide a NUREG-0700 review.

2.3.1.3 Operating Experience Review

The review of operating experience is intended to complement the earlier

reviews done by Essex and Gibbs & Hill and will provide early information on potential problem areas in the central control room by studying actual plant incidences and exploring the wealth of information possessed by the plant operations personnel. The result of this task provide key informa

tion for the investigators performing the central control room survey and the analysts performing the system function and task analysis.

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The operating experience review is divided into three distinct elements: a

review of operating history, a review of operations personnel responses to

a structured questionnaire, and a review of the interviews of operations personnel.

2.3.1.3.1 Review of Operating History Documents

A review will be made of the Licensee Event Reports (LERs) and Significant

Occurrence Reports (SORs) for Indian Point No. 2 for the past five years.

Individual reports will be reviewed to determine potential human factors

involvement. Those items that are suspect will be reviewed further during

the operating personnel interviews. If the interviews indicate human

factors involvement the results of the investigation for each suspect

individual report will be given to the control room survey task group or

the system function and task analysis task group for background

information. The following criteria will be used to review reports with

human factors implications.

1. Event involves a detection error due to high workload, high noise

level, poor location of signal, confusion of alarms due to poor

legibility or poor grouping of alarm in location.

2. Event involves a display identification error due to inadequate

labeling; inadequate differentiation by shape, color, grouping or

demarcat ion; poor display legibility; inadequate display scale;

inappropriate scale units requiring mental conversion.

3. Event involves a decision error due to inadequate training, insuffi

cient information available, poor integration of information, or lack

of decision aids or diagnostic procedures.

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4. Event involves a procedure error due to inadequate training, proce

dures poorly written or organized, or panel layout not corresponding to the operating sequence.

5. Event involves an execution error due to inadequate labeling; inade

quate differentiation of controls caused by shape, color coding,

grouping or demarcation; violation of movement stereotype; inadequate

labeling of control positions; inadequate device feedback; or insuffi

cient training.

6. Event involves a communication error due to inconveniently located or

insufficient communication equipment, poor signal-to-noise ratio of

c ommunication system, or lack of standard lexicon or syntax for messages.

7. Event involves a side effect error due to devices poorly positioned in

workspace or due to a crowded workspace.

2.3.1.3.2 Review of Questionnaire Respones

A questionnaire booklet will be prepared covering the following topics:

o Workspace & Environment

o Communications

o Annunciator Warning Systems

o Controls

o Visual Displays

o Labels and Location Aids

o Process Computers

o Panel Layout

o Control/Display Integration

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o Procedures, Manning and Training

o Control Room Equipment and Storage.

This booklet will be processed through the design review team and distri

buted to operations personnel in the following disciplines:

o Reactor operators

0 Senior reactor operators

o Unit shift supervisors

0 Shift technical advisors

0 Appropriate station management and training personnel.

Questions will be posed such that the responses requiring an explanation

will be indicative of an undesirable or problematical control room design

aspect. For these responses, respondents will be asked to explain the

specific problem or deficiency and, if applicable, to identify the panel,

system, equipment, and/or component. See Appendix D for typical questions

and format structure to be used.

The responses to the questionnaires will be analysed by Torrey Pines

Technology with the following objectiyes.

1. Determine those problem areas that should be explored in more

detail during the interviews.

2. Provide the control room survey and system function and task

analysis task groups with reference material.

3. Provide reference material for HEOs that will be prepared in the

later task efforts.

4. Provide summary results for the OER report.

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2.3.1.3.3 Review of Interview Responses

The human factors consultant (Torrey Pines Technology) will handle operations personnel interviews exclusively. A minimum of fifty (50) percent of

India n Point No. 2 operations personnel will be interviewed. Interviews

will take place in the vicinity of the central control room or simulator

equipment to facilitate visual explanations of problem areas.

The interviews will be based on the results of the questionnaire responses

and the following considerations:

1. Interviews will identify those aspects of the central control room

equipment layout and general design which are considered by the operations personnel to provide opportunities for improvement relative to their decision making processes.

2. Questions will be focused on those details of the central control

room environment which are projected to indicate notable success,

failure, and near-miss situations based on past experiences.

3. Respondents will be advised that the information obtained will not

be used for performance evaluation purposes.

4. The respondents will be encouraged to speak openly about problems from their past experience or perceived potential problems and suggested solutions.

5. Other kinds of human factors concerns such as those related to employee programs.

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6. Other questionnaires developed by industry and research groups in

previous projects.

7. The interviews will be structured to allow for additions of

material developed during the interview.

Data evaluation will be done immediately following completion of the

interview period to assure maximum benefit from the interview. The data

evaluation results will be forwarded to the management review team for

review. The results of this work will be evaluated and summarized. A re-review of areas of significant changes may be required.

Human Engineering Observations will not be prepared for the operating

experience review task unless an observation is not covered by a criteria

included in Section 6 of NUREG-0700. All problem areas or Observations

will be noted as Operating Experience Review Observations. These

Observations will be tied into a NIJREG-0700, Section 6 Criteria and the

validity of this Observation as a Human Engineering Observation will be

established during the control room survey.

2.3.1.4 System Function and Task Analysis

The system function and task analysis team will perform a functional

review and task analysis of the central control room complex to determine

the input and output requirements of control room operator tasks in

accordance with Section 2.1.2. This work will be done considering the

following:

1. A top-down approach starting with a review of systems, subsystems

and their functions to assure that all operator functions and tasks are considered.

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2. The use of function and task analysis (that had been used as the

basis for developing emergency operating procedures, technical guidelines and plant specific emergency operating procedure) to identify control room operator tasks and information and control requirements during emergency operations.

3. Selection of event sequences for analysis, considering the

following selection criteria (see Figure 2-6 for flow diagram for selecting operational events for SFTA):

o Utilize a broad range of control room functions

o Require time dependent action by the operator

o Require multi-system operation and interaction by the

operator

o Represent potential high stress or complex situations for the

operator

The following event types will be considered as being most representative of each of the four criteria:

o Events that utilize a broad range of control room functions.

- Steam generator tube rupture with a loss of offsite power

- Plant startup or shutdown

- Loss of coolant accident (LOCA)

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o Events that require rapid action by the operator.

- Steam line break

- Loss of coolant accident

o Events that require significant multi-system operation and

i nteracti ons.

- Load rejection

- Turbine trip

- Loss of coolant accident

o Events that represent potential high stress or complex situations

for the operator.

- Steam line break

- Loss of coolant accident,

- Loss of secondary heat sink

4. Development of functions, tasks, steps (subtasks or action steps),

and related information for each selected event.

5. A functional review and traffic flow analysis of the central

control room for each selected event.

6. A detailed task sequence analysis of the control panels for each

event.

7. Evaluation of analysis results and documentation of results

including description of human factor observations.

NOTE: For steps 5 and 6 a SRO will assist in the establishment of

these sequences.

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The existing plant procedures and selected new emergency operating

procedures will be used to develop a tabulation of the functions, tasks and

subtasks for each selected event. Forms used are shown in Figures 2-7 to

2-14. A Data Base Management System (DBMS) will be used to store, sort,

and print out reports of this information. Detailed data required for the

SFTA will be collected and stored for each subtask. The use of a DBMS for

sorting the task step information will allow for sorting of the data by

tasks, step sequence, operator or panel. This will provide tabulations of

the step sequences that will be used in the traffic flow and the task

sequence analysis. Traffic link diagrams which show operator travel

between panels will be generated to evaluate the panel contents and traffic

flow. Panel devices that are not grouped according to function and device

layouts that result in unnecessary operator travel will be identified as a

Human Engineering Observation (HEO). A typical traffic link diagram is

shown in Figure 2-14.

Operational spatial sequence diagrams which show the operator actions on

each panel will be generated to evaluate the device layout. Equipment

which is not grouped according to task sequence or is not grouped properly

in order of use will be recorded as HEOs. Other checklists criteria such

as grouping by function, frequency of use or importance, etc. will also be

evaluated in the same manner. A typical operational spatial sequence

diagram is shown in Figure 2-13.

A significant amount of interaction between the SFTA and the other DCRDR

tasks such as control room inventory, verification and validation is

required. A verification of the presence of the proper device and the

proper device specifications for each step is required. This is accom

plished by a comparison of the inventory and the task sequence data files

using the file link option of the DBMS.

For the validation effort customized printouts of the task step sequences

are required. These printouts, sorted by operator and step sequence will

be useful as a checklist in performing the walk and talk through of the

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validation events. Walk through/talk throughs will be conducted in the

control room or simulator to validate the adequacy of the procedures

covering the events selected for validation.

The SFTA results for all the selected events will be integrated and a final

evaluation of the potential HED will be made. A. report will be written

presenting a description of the SFTA, the results and conclusions. This

report included a description of the methodology, tabulations of the step

sequences and associated data, the traffic flow (link diagram) analysis,

the operational sequence analysis, and the final overall conclusions. The

conclusions will include all the recorded HEOs and the SFTA. These obser

vations will be submitted to the Assessment Review Task Team for evaluation

and resolution.

2.3.1.5 Control Room Inventory

An inventory of controls, instrumentation, displays, and other equipment

on the control room man/machine interfaces is completed as part of the Con

Edison plant documentation from earlier studies. This inventory estab

lishes a reference data base for comparison with the requirements

established by operator task analysis. Pertinent inventory items will be

entered into the DBMS to facilitate the SFTA verification process.

2.3.1.6 Control Room Survey

A survey of Indian Point No. 2 central control room will be performed in

accordance with 2.1.3 to document compliance with the criteria report.

The control room survey task team will perform the following tasks:

1. Prepare plant specific checklists (see Figure 2-15) for the

following topics:

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o Control Room Workspace

o Communications

o Annunciator Warning System

o Controls

o Visual Displays

o Labels and Location Aids

o Process Computers

o Panel Layouts

o Control-Display Integration

2. Submit checklists for review and approval.

3. Finalize checklists.

4. Perform control room survey.

5. Evaluate data, summarize observations.

6. Prepare HEOs with recommended corrections in accordance with

Sections 2.1.4 and 2.1.5.

The following are typical considerations for conducting the Control Room

Survey.

1. Workspace

o Determine the presence of and the adequacy of the control board

devices for detecting and correcting abnormal plant conditions

o Evaluate the relationship between control room layout and

manning

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o Evaluate the physical human factors characteristics and

suitability of control board devices

o Evaluate the control room environment.

2. Communications

o Assess the intelligibility of signals -at the defined operators

communications locations. This is important for those plant

areas where the noise level is high

o A special effort is planned to include all communications

hardware in the control room inventory.

3. Annunciator System

o Review compatibility of the system and the operating procedures

o Review alarm system design versus requirements dictated by the

task analysis. This involves a review of alarm set points

o Evaluate the nuisance alarm content of the system

o Evaluate the viewing field versus typical operations

o Evaluate physical characteristics versus establish conventions.

4. Controls

o Review the requirements for accuracy, range, and function as

required by task analysis

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o Verify that control room conventions for controls are followed

consi stently.

5. Visual Displays

o Review the requirements for range and accuracy as required by

task analysis

o Verify that control room conventions for displays are followed

consistently

o Review for ease of maintenance and servicing

o Review for compatibility with verbage requirements.

6. Label and Location Aides

o Verify consistency of all labeling to established abbreviations

o Verify proper application of hierarchical labeling techniques

o Evaluate adequacy of engraving, style, color, orientation and location

o Evaluate administrative controls for controlling labeling

changes

o Evaluate consistency of "as i s" labeling versus operating

procedures

o Verify usage of mimics and demarcation aids to established

conventions or need to establish conventions or guidelines

o Evaluate administrative controls for changing location aids.

1.5/020684 CON ED/#42

2-21

o Verify consistency in terminology between alarms/controls and

operating procedures.

7. Process Computer

o Evaluate the human factors design features of the computer work

stations and peripherals

o Evaluate operator computer interactions

o Evaluate effectiveness of the operating procedures that call

for computer usage

o Evaluate CRT displays as available during scheduled review

period

8. Panel Layout

o Verify that the layout fulfills the needs identified by Task

Analysis

o Determine consistency with established conventions

o Determine adequacy of demarcation.

9. Control Displays Integration

o Verify consistency with Task Analysis requirements

o Verify consistency with established conventions.

This activity requires judicious usage of inputs to facilitate the evalua

tion of HEOs.

1. 5/020684 CON ED/#42

2-22

2.3.1.7 Verification of Control Room Function

A verification will be made of the availability of instruments and equip

ment needed to implement each task which will include Section 2.1.6. This

verification will be made by comparing the requirements identified by SFTA

to the control room inventory list. A determination of operator-equipment

interfaces adequacy for task accomplishment will be made and the

observations will be recorded. Formatted information developed during the

inventory and system function task analysis activities will be used.

2.3.1.8 Validation of Control Room Function

A validation will be performed as part of the SFTA activity to determine

whether the control room operating crew can perform allocated functions

within defined procedures. The bulk of this effort will be performed at

the simulator using walk-through/talk-through techniques.

1.5/020684 CON ED/#42

2-23

2. SYSTEM FUNCTION REVIEW & TASK ANALYSIS 3. CONTROL ROOM

INVENTORY

CONTROL ROoM INVLNTORY LIST

4.rU oNIRULUUM SURVEY

SURVEY CR FOR COMPONENT CONFORMANCE TO lIE FINDINGS

GUIDELINES AT THE IITEMS COMPONENT LEVEL SUBSTANDARD

IN GENERAL)

S. VALIDATION OF CONTROL ROOM 5. VERIFICATION Of TASK FUNCTIONS AND INTEGRATED

PERFORMANCE CAPABILITIES PERFORMANCE CAPABILITIES

COMPARE TASEK AS WALE AND TALK INSIR.EUOIP. DBSERVAEIONS THROUGH OPER. R ...UI.EMENIT a MISSINGISUPER ATING EVENT TOINVENORY FLOUSiTE PROCEDURES

ASSESSMENI. IMPLEMENTATION. AND REPORTING (SEE SIC FION 43

FIGURE 2-i. OVERVIEW OF THE DCRDR PROCESS

1. OPE RATING EXPERIENCE REVIEW

EXECU

CHIEF ME GEN. MANAGEF

CHIEF I

t MANAGE

rIVE REVIEW TEAM REVIEW AND APPROVE FINAL

* PROGRAM PLAN CHANICAL ENGINEER 0 CRITERIA I, NUC. POWER GENERATION e FINAL REPORTS JUCLEAR ENGINEER 0 DESIGN IMPLEMENTATIONS

EMENT REVIEW TEAM REVIEW AND APPROVE PRELIMINARY AND FINAL

UBSECTION HEAD * PROGRAM PLAN ERATIONS ENGINEER o CRITERIA ANT NUCLEAR ENGINEER o DESIGN REVIEW FINDINGS NT PROJECT ENGINEER 0 REPORTS

* DESIGN IMPLEMENTATION

IGN REVIEW AND NICAL TASK TEAM

ING, OPERATIONS AND DEVELOP AND EVALUATE

'ERSONNEL AS REQUIRED o PROGRAM PLAN * CRITERIA

PAL INVESTIGATOR o CHEIS

ERING AS REQUIRED 0 S TE M FUNT I 0 SYSTEM FUNCTION

AND TASK ANALYSIS ERING AND TRAINING A SVS

AS REQUIRED 0 INVENTORY

C WALK THROUGH/ CONSULTANTS TALKTHROUGH

E PROCEDURES OJECT ENGINEER 0 OBSERVATIONS

PROJECT ENGINEER

ANALYSIS LEADER PREPARE EXPERIENCE REVIEW LDR TEMS SPECIALIST 0 DESIGN IMPLEMENTATION ATOR REVIEW LEADER RECOMMENDATIONS INVENTORY

FACTORS SPECIALISTS

FIGURE 2-2. DCRDR REVIEW TEAMlS

2-25

C&I S CHIEF OP

C&I COGNIZi CONSULTA

DESI TECHI

ENGINEEF LICENSING P

PRINCI ENGINE

ENGINEl

PRI ASST. TASK

OPERATING SYS

ANNUNCI

HUMAN

REVIEW PHASE I ASSESSMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION

PROJECT REVIEW TEAM RECOMMENDATIONS CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONAL STUDIES

~MANAGEMENT TEAM APPROVES FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS

UTILITY MANAGEMENT AUTHORIZES PLANNED CHANGES

FIGURE 2-3. DCRDR TASK STRUCTURE

CEILING CRT'-

FIGURE 2-4. LAYOUT OF CONTROL ROOM 2-27

CRITERIA IATRIX

6.2 Conmunl cat ions

NJE- -O oo7 GUI LINE DTA fOLLEC T - - - - - -. . . .. .ENTS /REFEREUT ------------------I CRITERIA MTHD I

K77 7.~~~ ~ ~ I% -- _V J Ee C _ n~~~ TonS -- - --- 8b TT W _E T 3 A -f - - ------------------------------------------ I 6.2.1.1 General Requirements I I I- --- --- 6.2.1.1 Examine handsets, cords - to

for Voice Cownunication I I I I I I I assure easy handling and good ear

Systems I X I I X I I X I I contact, sufficient cord len-th for

I"1 I I I I I I operator mobility. Gain control on all I I I I I I I units along with the use of non-kinking

I I I I I I I or retractable cords. II I I I I I II II I I I I I II II I I I I I. II II I I I I I II

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- I 16.2.1.2 Conventional-Powered I I I I I I I 6.2.1.2(a): Intelligible and clearly I Telephone Systems I I .1 I I I I understood. Use INPO word list to

IX I I X I I X I I checkout system. I I I I I I I II I I I I I I I I

6.2.1.3 Sound-Powered I I I I I I I 6.2,1.3(a) Use INWO word list to check I Telephone Systems I I I I I I I out Intelligibility. I xil lxl Ilx I

II I I I I I II II I I I I I II

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- I 6.2.1.8 Walkie-Talkie Radio I I I I I I I 6.2.1.4(a) Use INPO word list to check Transceivers I I I I I I I out Intelligibility.

lX I I X l X l X l I I I I I I I I II I I I I I II

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- I 6.2.1.5 Fixed-Base U-F I I I I I I I 6.2.1.5(a) Use INPO word list to check Transceivers I I I I I I I out Intelligibility. Ixil lx l lxi I

-- I I I I I I III I I I I I I

FIGURE 2-5. SAMPLE CRITERIA MATRIX SHEET

REVIEW PERTINENT

PLANT DOCUMENTS

DEVELOP EMERGENCY ,

EVENT SEQ.UENCES

DEVELOP

SELECTION CRITERIA

ZEII DOCUMENT SOE SELECTION AND

SYSTEM FUNCTION AND TASK ANALYSIS

FIGURE 2-6. FLOW DIAGRAM - FOR SELECTING OPERATIONAL EVENTS FOR SFTA

2-29

INTERVIEW EXPERIENCED

CON ED OPERATING PERSONNEL

REVIEWSOE RECOMMENDATIONS AND EMERGENCY EVENT SEQUENCES

I SELECT

SOEs

IPERFORM SYSTEM

FUNCTION AND TASK ANALYSIS

CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW SYSTEM BREAKDOWN

EVALUATOR

SIGNATURE

DATE

PAGE OF

REF

SYSTEM TITLE SYS. SAFETY SUBSYSTEM TITLE SUBSYS. PANEL SAFETY

DESIG. PANEL CLASS DESIG. CLASS

CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW EMERGENCY EVENT SEQUENCES

EVALUATOR

SIGNATURE

DATE

PAGE OF

REF

CHECK SYSTEM DESIGNATOR INVOLVED EST. TIME NO. TITLE# # # # # # INVOLVED

:FIGURE 2-8.

FIGURE 2-9. EXAMPLE OF A FUNCTIONAL

(DECISION-ACTION) FLOW DIAGRAM

2-32

CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW FUNCTIONAL SEQUENCE PER SELECTED OPERATIONAL EVENT

EVALUATOR________ ____

SIGNATURE_________ ____

DATE

PAGE -______OF_______

REF

SYSTEM STATUS AT ONSET OF EVENT SYSTEM STATUS OF REMARKS

FIGURE 2-10.

EVENT TIT LE:

CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW FUNCTIONAL SEQUENCE PER SELECTED OPERATIONAL EVENT

EVALUATOR

SIGNATURE

DATE

PAGE OF

REF

EVENT TITILE:

SEQUENCE D INTERFACES COMMUNICATION

NUMBER FUNCTION DESCRIPTION SYSTEMS INVOLVED PERFORME INVOLV TEMUCIN

I I - U

CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW OPERATOR TASK IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS

EVALUATOR

SIGNATURE

DATE

PAGE OF_

REFLIST OF TASKS FOR EVENY:

TASK/STEP TASK OBJECTIVE DESCRIPTION ALTERNATIVE TASK IF REFERENCE PERFORMED PANEL LIST EQUIPMENT REQ NUMBER (LIST IN SEQUENCE) PRIMARY TASK IS NEGATIVE I BY NO. TO COMPLETE TASK

FIGURE 2-11.

CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW INSTRUMENT DETAILS

EVALUATOR

SIGNATURE

DATE

PAGE OF

REF

EVENT TITLE:

TASK/STEP PARAMETER DEVICE PANEL RANGE INITIAL SEQUENCE I I NO. NO. I VALUE

1:

CP-007 TURBINE GENERATOR

FIGURE 2-13. TYPICAL SPATIAL SEQUENCE DIAGRAM

2-37

11,11444 m m =

00607 ~ 73

2 91 122 3 52 125

SoH 125 76 *27 79 128

23

LEGENO: I. TRAFFIC PATH (D STARTS AT PANEL 001. THEN GOES TO 002.

003 ANO RETURNS TO 001. THIS IS ASOREVIATED (1-2-3.1h

2. TRAFFIC PATH () IS (1-2-1)

3. TRAFFIC PATH 3 IS (I1.411

4. TRAFFIC PATH (D IS (S-4.6)

S. TRAFFIC PATH (D IS (S-7-5) & TRAFFIC PATH () IS (7-10-7)

SUMMARY OF TRAFFIC PATHS: I. PATH ( OCCURS 20 TIMES

2. PATH (Z OCCURS Z TIMES

3. PATH ® OCCURS STIMES

4. PATH (D OCCURS 4 TIMES

S. PATH () OCCURS 2 TIMES . PATH () OCCURS 1 TIME

FIGURE 2-14. TRAFFIC LINK DIAGRAM

2-38

COMMUNICATIONS 6.2

VOICE COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS 6.2.1

COMPLIANCE CHECKLIST N/A I Yes NoI Referenca/Comment

GUIDELINE

6.2.1.1 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR VOICE COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

Generally there are six varieties of voice communication systems found in control moms: Conventional-powered telephones, sound-powered telephones, walkie-talkie radio transceivers, fixedband UHF transceivers, announcing systems, and point-to-point intercom systems. Human factors requirements specific to each type of voice communication system will be considered individually in Guidelines 6.2.1.2 through 6.2.1.7 while 6.2.1.8 will address voice communication by the operator wearing an emergency mask. The following requirements are relevant to communication systems in general. a. INSTRUCTIONS-lnstructions should be pro

vided for use of each communication system, including suggested alternatives if a system becomes inoperable.

b. PERIODIC MAINTENANCE TESTS-These should be performed on all communication systems to ensure that the system is normally operative and effective under changes in ambient noise levels that may have occurred since the last check.

c. EMERGENCY MESSAGES (1) OUTGOING -Priority procedures should

be established for the transmission of emergency messages from the control room by any of the communication systems.

(2) INCOMrNG-Procedures should be established for handling communications during an emergency and these procedures must be known by all operators.

FIGURE 2-15. SAMPLE COMPLIANCE CHECKLIST

2-39

FIGURE 2-15. (CONT'D)

DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW CONTROL ROOM SURVEY

REFERENCE/COMMENT FORM

DATE: PAGE-OF

GUIDELINE CRITERIA ITEM NO.: HEO REFERENCE NO.:

CRITERIA PANEL/ I I ELEMENT NO. CONSOLE NO. SUBPANEL REFERENCE/COMMENT

DIAGRAM/PHOTO NO.:

2-40

OBSERVER:

LOCATION:

3.0 MANAGEMENT AND STAFFING

3.1 DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW MANAGEMENT PROCEDURE

o The management planning activity is described in Section 2.2

o The basic organization and functions are shown in Figure 2-2

o The management review team will meet throughout the program as

required to perform its basic functions. Meetings will be called

and directed by the principal investigator. In addition, it may be

necessary to hold special meetings to meet scheduled requirements.

o The DCRDR consultant project engineer is a member of management

team and will be available for these meetings as needed to

facilitate completion of meeting agenda items

0 Minutes of all meetings will be taken and recorded.

3.2 INTEGRATION OF DCRDR WITH OTHER SUPPLEMENT 1 ACTIVITIES

As a complement to improvements that will result from implementation of

the SAS/SPOS and from new emergency operating procedures, the continued design review activities will identify any additional. potential discrep

anices. For conducting this review of new emergency operating procedures,

we will coordinate with the results-of their verification and validation. This will be reviewed by Con Edison's human factors engineering task force, to identify any additional control room HEDs from an operational

perspective.

1.5/020684 CON ED/#42

The supplemental DCRDR will include an evaluation of the PROTEUS rudimen

tary SPDS. The supplemental DCRDR also will include a human engineering

review of the Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation addressed in the Con

Edison response to Generic Letter 82-28.

Additional interfaces between supplemental DCRDR and other Supplement 1

initiatives include the following:

o Documentation and implementation of control room corrective

actions resulting from the supplemental DCRDR will be integrated

with the Reg Guide 1.97 review.

o Control room corrective actions will be reviewed in order to

determine if they should be reflected in the emergency response

facility, emergency operating procedures, and training.

3.3 DCRDR TEAM STRUCTURE AND PERSONNEL

The basic DCRDR team structure, tasks and personnel types are defined in

Figure 2-2 and 2-3. Resumes of assigned personnel are included in Appendix

A and are consistent with the review criteria of NUREG-0801.

1.5/020684 CON ED/#42

4.0 DCRDR ASSESSMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION

All observations identified during the review phase will be processed

according to the assessment and implementation methodology presented in

Figures 4-1 to 4-4. The design review team will document these observa

tions and recommendations on Human Engineering Observation forms (Figure

4-4) which are then submitted to the assessment review team for assess

ment.

The initial step by the assessment review team will be to accept or reject

the formatted information where, in the latter case, they return the HEO

to the design review team for further evaluation and resubmittal. accept

ed HEOs will be categorized according to the Assessment Factor Criteria

(Figure 4.2). The criteria chosen provides for a simple, but effective,

relationship between assessment factor and implementation requirements

commensurate with the significance of the observation. This approach

greatly reduces the need to consider various levels of safety while still

accomplishing the assessment objectives of NUREGs 0700 and 0801. The

assessment review team will submit its findings and recommendations to the

management team to initiate the implementation phase.

All observations assigned Categories A, B or C will be identified as HEDs

and will be analyzed for correction (Figure 4-3). Correction of Category

D results are optional. The first step in this process will be to

identify those HEDs which can be corrected by enhancement. The remaining

HEDs will be analyzed to identify design improvement alternatives and to

select solutions. In addition, some HEDs may be corrected through

training. An integral part of this step will be a re-application of the

control room review process as appropriate to ensure that:

1.5/020684 CON ED/#42

o Other guidelines are' not violated

o Other corrections are not invalidated

o Any resulting increase in significance of other findings is

identified and accommodated.

Solutions which do not bring the discrepancies into full compliance with

the guidelines will be identified and justified accordingly.

Use will be made of the following activities in the assessment program.

a) Plant computer, including safety parameter display

system

b) Emergency operating procedure implementation

c) Regulatory Guide 1.97 assessment

d) Emergency response facility improvements

e) Station requested control room improvements

1.5/020684 CON ED/#42

rmin m I I

Limmmm HEO REJECTED

rm mln mm 1I

IE Im il mBillm l II

ASESMN REECE

DESIGN REVIEW TEAM * PERFORMS REVIEW * PREPARES HEO FORMS

IOBSERVATIONS MANAGEMENT REVIEW TEAM " ASSESS

OBSERVATIONS " CATEGORIZE

OBSERVATIONS * DIRECTS ANALYSIS

FOR CORRECTIONS * RECOMMENDS

DISPOSITION

HED'S

EXECUTIVE REVIEW TEAM " REVIEW HED'S " REVIEW RECOMMENDATIONS

mm mm mm mj J~ IMPLEMENTATION I I I I I I I

ASSESSMENT I PROCESS I

I I I I B

ASSESSMEN APPROVE

LEGEND: HEO - HUMAN ENGINEERING OBSERVATIONS HED - HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY

FIGURE 4-1. ASSESSMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION METHODOLOGY

4-3

IREVIEW PROCESS OBSERVATIONS

L ASSESS 0BSERVATIONS

(1) EXAMPLE: RESULTS IN UNSAFE OPERATION, VIOLATION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

ASSESSMENT FACTOR CRITERIA

ASSESSMENT IMPLEMENTATION CATEGORY FACTOR (RATING)

A SAFETY(1) PRIOR TO OR CONSEQUENCES DURING NEXT

REFUELING (MANDATORY)

B PLANT AT EARLIEST AVAILABILITY OPPORTUNITY ENHANCEMENT (HIGH PRIORITY)

C GENERAL CONVENIENT ENHANCEMENT OUTAGE

(ACCEPTED)

0 MINOR MAY OR MAY NOT BE REQUIRED (NONMANDATORY)

ANALYSIS -0 0F O R

CORRECTION

CAT 0

RECOMMEND YES CORRECTIONS

NO

I DOCUMENT

ASSESSMENT FACTOR CRITERIA

* uCrV~ (CAT A ~ V [1L.LI U

FIGURE 4-2.

I

HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES

TO BEANALYZED FOR CORRECTION

(FROM THE HED SELECTION PROCESS)

ANALYSIS FOR CORRECTION BY ENHANCEMENT

NOT JUSTIFY AND CORRECTED DOCUMENT

ASSESS EXTENT OF CORRECTION

PARTIALLY CORRECTED

JUSTIFY AND SCHEDULE DOCUMENT IMPLEMENTATION

YES

DESIGN

IMPLEMENT DOCUMENT

FULLY SCHEDULE CORRECTED IMPLEMENTATION

DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT I

FIGURE 4-3. SELECTION OF DESIGN IMPROVEMENTS

ANALYSIS TO IDENTIFY DESIGN IMPROVEMENT ALTERNATIVES AND SELECT RECOMMENDED SOLUTION

* FUNCTION ANALYSIS

* ALLOCATION I MAN MACHINE

1 VERIFY ALLOCATION-------

* SELECT PREFERRED DESIGN ALTERNATIVE

* VALIDATE DESIGN--------

HUMAN ENGINEERING OBSERVATION ASSESSMENT

OBSERVATION

PLANT EVALUATOR-- HED#

TASK SIGNATURE

CLO - CL ITEM# DATE

CL TITLE HEO CATEGORY

PANEL TITLE PANEL #

HEO DESCRIPTION

[] SUPPORT MATERIAL ATTACHED

POTENTIAL OPERATOR ERROR(S)

RECOMMENDED REVISION

RECOMMENDED IMPLEMENTATION:

[] Prior To Or At Next Refueling H At Convenient Outage [] At Earliest Opportunity [ Non-Mandatory

TECHNICAL REVIEW CHAIRMAN - DA

1] Concur.

[] Concur With Comment/Note.

[3 Reevaluate & Resubmit For Following Reason:

Comment/Note/Reason:

TE

MANAGEMENT REVIEW

CHAIRMAN DATE. ] Concur.

[1 Concur With Comment/Note.

[ Reevaluate & Resubmit For Following Reason:


- 1I-rflTklI Ane lI/A T TAM CnDM

HUMAN ENGINEERING OBSERVATION

ASSESSMENT

P m P A A

5.0 DOCUMENTATION AND DOCUMENT CONTROL

5.1 DOCUMENTATION GENERATED BY THE DCRDR PROCESS

The following basic documents will be submitted to the NRC for approval in this review:

0 Program Plan Report (this document)

o Executive Summary Report, which will address methodology, review findings, and implementation (see Figure 5-1).

The following documents will be generated in support of the review.

0 Criteria Report

o Operating Experience Review Report

o System Function and Task Analysis Report

o Control Room Survey Report

o Compilation of-Observations & HEDs

5.2 DOCUMENTATION SYSTEM AND CONTROL

The design review team will develop a data base which will be reviewed by the management review team. This data base will consist of computerized printouts and hard copy files of cross referenced information including:

o Listings of reference plant documents used

0 Listing of human factors referenced documents used

o The program plan report (this document)

o Pertinent documents defining requirements for the DCRDR

o The control room criteria report

o The outputs of the individual task groups (see Figure 2-3).

1. 5/020684 CON ED/#42

o Minutes of meetings

o All findings, HEDs, and dispositions as processed

o Executive Summary Report

o Detailed DCRDR Report

o Pertinent correspondence.

1.5/020684 CON ED/#42

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section Title Page

TABLE OF CONTENTS i

LIST OF FIGURES' ii

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS iii

SUMMARY vi

PREFACE X ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Xv

1.0 INTRODUCTION 1-1

1.1 GENERAL COMMENTS 1-1

1.2 DCRDR PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES 1-2

1.3 PLANT DESCRIPTION 1-2

1.4 DEFINITION OF CONTROL ROOM 1-3

1.5 CONTROL BOARD STATUS 1-3

2.0 OCROR PLAN, METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 2-1

2.1 PLANNING 2-1

2.2 REVIEW 2-2

2.3 METHODOLOGY 2-3

2.3.1 Criteria 2-3

2.3.2 Operating Experience Review 2-4

2.3.3 Systems Function and Task Analysis 2-7

2.3.4 Control Room Inventory 2-11

2.3.5 Control Room Survey 2-12

2.3.6 Verification of Control Room Functions 2-14

2.3.7 Validation of Control Room Functions 2-14

2.3.8 Annunciator Review 2-15

2.3.9 Special Studies 2-16

2.3.10 Effectiveness 2-18

3.0 DCRDR ASSESSMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION 3-1

3.1 METHODOLOGY 3-1

3.2 ASSESSMENT RESULTS 3-2

FIGURE 5-1. SAMPLE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

Title

INDIAN POINT NO. 2 DCROR MAJOR REPORTS

RELATIONSHIP OF NUREG 0660 TASK ACTION ITEMS

ARTIST'S RENDITION OF INDIAN POINT NO. 2

CONTROL ROOM LAYOUT

OVERVIEW OF DCRDR PROCESSES

OVERVIEW OF OCRDR ORGANIZATION

PROGRAM TASK ORGANIZATION

DEMARCATION STUDY PANELS

ASSESSMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION METHODOLOGY

SELECTION OF HEDs TO BE ANALYZED FOR CORRECTION

SELECTION OF DESIGN IMPROVEMENTS

CHECKLIST OBSERVATION PROCESS

CHECKLIST OBSERVATION

Page

xiv

1-4

1-5

1-6

2-20

2-21

2-22

2-23

3-4

3-5

3-6

3-7

3-8

FIGURE 5-1. SAMPLE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT'D)

Figur~e

-- - - - -

6.0 SUMMARY

Con Edison Company considers that this program plan for -the Detailed Control Room Design Review of the Indian Point No. 2 Station is extensive,

complete and consistent with the pertinent document noted herein.

The program is in progress and it is our intention to comply with the content of this program plan. Con Edison reserves the right to make changes in its best interest and will notify the NRC of all planned or executed deviations.

1. 5/020684 CON ED/#42

APPENDIX A

QUALIFICATION OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW TEAM AND

DESIGN REVIEW TEAM MEMBERS

ARNALDO ADORNO, PE Principal Engineer

Con Edison Contract Engineer Principal Investigator of

Design Review Team

EDUCATION

Bachelor of Marine Science - 1961, Maine Maritime Academy Human Factors Engineering Training course, Gibbs & Hill - 1980

EXPERIENCE

Gibbs & Hill (1969 to Present)

Principal Engineer Controls department presently working as Cognizant Engineer for the Con Edison Control Room Design Review project. Supervising Instrumentation and Controls engineer on various nuclear power plants designed by Gibbs & Hill for both Italian and Spanish utilities. Supervising engineer for lessons learned task force presentation to Brazilian utility (Furnas), and Con Edison Human Factors Review of Indian Point No. 2 Central Control Room.

Supervising engineer verification and validation program for Beaver Valley Nuclear Power Plant emergency response facilities.

Responsible engineer for the selection and purchasing of all nuclear class valves on Comrnanche Peak steam electric Westinghouse power units 1 and 2.

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

Control Systems Engineer State of California Certificate No. CS-001866

1.5/020684 CON ED/#42

WILLIAM R. ARNOLD Assistant Project Engineer Torrey Pines Technology

Member of Design Review Team

PROFESSIONAL SPECIALTY

Reactor protection and instrumentation systems: design and analysis, operation, startup, trouble shooting, and equipment qualification.

EDUCATION

BSEE, University of Texas, 1958. Graduate Courses, Electrical and Nuclear Engineering.

EXPERIENCE

Worked on the control room design review for the South Texas Project Nuclear Generating Station. Participated in all phases of the review including control room survey, system function and task analysis, and annunciator review. Also, participated in subsequent redesign of control panel layouts for this project.

Review of qualification data for safety-related equipment for PWR projects. Responsible for assuring that the data packages met the general requirements of NUREG-0588 and the specific requirements referenced and that the equipment represented is satisfactory for use in a harsh environment.

Review of safety-related plant control and protection system logic and operation to confirm that components important to safety are properly classified for PWR projects at Bechtel.

Field investigation and solution of reactor protection system trips and transients during startup of Fort St. Vramn station. Liaison on operational and licensing aspects with utility operations and with NRC.

Completed design and documentation for licensing of reactor plant protection systems. Accomplishments included logic design, cabling, customer liaison and review of specifications and layout for compliance with applicable NRC design criteria.


Registered Control Systems Engineer, California, 1975.

1.5/020684 CON ED/#42

JOHN J. CURRY Chief Operations Engineer

Con Edison Member of Design Review Tgam

EDUCATION

Bachelor of Science, Mechanical Engineering -Poly Technic Institute, New York Master of Science, Industrial Management - Poly Technic Institute Graduate School of Industrial Management, New York

EXPERIENCE

1979 - Present

Indian Point No. 2 nuclear generating station.. Manage the saf e and efficient operation of the plant and related functional groups responsible for operations. Directs and supervises a staff of 120 nuclear field operators in operations engineering, operations staff manager, senior watch supervisors, support facility supervisors.

1978 - 1979

Director of nuclear training responsible for the development and implementation of nuclear training programs for Con Edison.

1976 - 1978

Simulation engineer responsible for operational maintenance and testing of Unit No. 2 nuclear simulation facility and operator simulator retraining programs.

1971 - 1976

Various assignments of increasing responsibility in nuclear and fossil fuel plant operations.


USAEC (USNRC) Senior Reactor Operator City of New York High Pressure Boiler Operating Engineers Certificate 1972 - No. 16824

1. 5/020684 CON ED/#42

A- 3

JUDE G. DEL PERCIO Senior Nuclear Engineer

Con Edison Member of Design Review Team

EDUCATION

SC.D. Degree Candidate Nuclear Engineering - Columbia University, New York City - 1976, 1977 Master of Science, Nuclear Engineering - Columbia University, New York City - 1974, 1976 Bachelor of Arts, Mathematics and Physics - Queens College, Flushing 1970, 1974

EXPERIENCE

1982 - Present

Con Edison Company

- Presently responsible for the overall licensing coordination of the initiatives of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737.

- Lead discipline engineer for the EOP upgrade program.

- Lead licensing engineer for IP-2 1OCFR50 Appendix R.

- Coordination of many IP-2 responses to NRC inquiries.

- Other concurrent responsibilities include unresolved safety issues, timely introduction of safety and licensing requirements into the engineering design change process and a full range of activities of licensing engineer.

- Operated Gas Turbines at the Gowanus Station during the nine week system contingency in 1983.

1976 - 1982

American Electric Power Service Corp.- D.C. Cook Nuclear Plant

- Lead Engineer - Nuclear Safety & Licensing Section

- Responsible for direct supervision of several engineers for the licensing support of D.C. Cook Plant

- Member of the AESPC NSDRC and Subcommittee on Design Changes

- Coordination and liaison with all AEPSC engineering/design divisions

- Had major concurrent multidisciplinary responsibilities in the successful operating licensing review of the D. C. Cook Plant

1.5/020684 CON ED/#42

Jude G. Del Percio Page 2

In-depth understanding of the accident and transient analyses for ECCS, engineered safeguards system actuation, reactor protection and containment integrity evaluations for D.C. Cook, SNUPPS, Palo Verde, Pebble Springs, Skagit and TMI.

- Responsible for training other engineers of the section.

SPECIALIZED TRAINING

1976 - Westinghouse PWR Information Course 1978 - SAI Probabilistic Risk Assessment Seminar 1979 - 1982 - Westinghouse Owners Group Emergency Operating Procedures

Seminar

1.5/020684 CON ED/#42

A-5

PATRICK M. DUGGAN Electrical Generation & Controls Engineer


EDUCATION

B.S.E.E. Degree, September 1968 - Manhattan College, Riverdale, N.Y. Power Technology Institute - Course Completed May 21, 1979

EXPERIENCE

1970 to Present

Con Edison Company Electrical Engineering Department, Electrical Generation & Controls Subsection

Present Function Assigment

Direct supervisory responsibility for 15 engineers for designs associated with major generating stations and gas turbine installations.

Major Responsibilities

- Coordination and design for all Indian Point No. 2 TMI related projects including "Near Site" Interim actions.

- Protection, control and safety designs and licensing support for Indian Point Unit Nos. 2 & 3.

- Design for "backf it" installation for Emergency Core Cooling System and Permanent License Modifications for Indian Point Unit No. 1.

- Electrical design for alternative Cooling Tower schemes at Indian Point Unit Nos. 2 & 3.

- Designs fo r various conventional plant and commercial building projects.

1968 - 1970

Con Edison Assigned to Nuclear Power Generation Department at Indian Point site from 1969-70 and Electrical Engineering from 1968-69.


Registered Professional Engineer, New York State License No. *05933 Member IEEE Nuclear Power Engineering Committee, Subcommittee SC-6 since 1973. Senior Member IEEE, Active on local Chapter Public Affairs & Publicity Committees.

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ERROL P. GAGNON Staff Engineer

Torrey Pines Technology Member of Design Review Team


Licensing, safety criteria and technical specification preparation and review.

EDUCATION

B.S., Engineering, San Diego State University, 1965

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE AT GA TECHNOLOGIES INC. (Since 1969)

Currently Assistant Project Engineer for the DCRDR of Pilgrim Station. Responsible for SFTA, Assessment and Reporting Phases. Will assist in SFTA for the Kewaunee DCRDR Project.

Assisted in the SFTA for the control room design review for the South Texas Project under contract to Bechtel Power Corp.

Chairman of the Results Review Committee of the Human Factors Evaluation program for the Palo Verde Nuclear Power Generating Station control room and responsible for coordination of the program tasks. Performed SFTA for Palo Verde.

Developed safety/licensing positions and criteria for various applications of nuclear power plants.

Evaluated nuclear power plant systems and components to identify and prioritize technical, safety and licensing issues.

Developed nuclear power plant transient performance specifications.

Senior Technical Representative at Fort St. Vrain responsible for technical coordination and guidance on the conduct and evaluation of the startup test program.

Manager of the French Licensee Program responsible for the administrative and technical-transfer aspects of the nuclear power plant licensing agreements and contracts.

Performed simulation studies and evaluations of nuclear power plant transient performance/safety analyses, control systems, control room configurations and plant startup procedures.

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS/HONORS

Member, American Nuclear Society

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A-7

V.N. JAYARAI4AN Cognizant Senior Engineer (Nuclear)


EDUCATION

Bachelor of Science Degree in Physics 1956, India Bachelor of Science Degree in Electrical Engineering 1963, India

EXPERIENCE

Con Edison (1981 to Present)

Cognizant Nuclear engineer responsible for the establishment, development and implementation of engineering modifications to Indian Point No. 2 power plant nuclear power systems and equipment. Directs various engineers in the preparation of modification packages, purchasing requisitions, selection of hardware, trouble shooting and coordination of control room modifications. Responsible for liaison with power generation, nuclear engineering safety and licensing and other departments in the scope of a nuclear project.

1980 - 1981

Burns & Roe. Cognizant Instrument and Control engineer for the Clinch River Breeder Reactor project. Responsible for the development of I&C loop and logic diagrams, instrument selection, panel design, installation criteria for tubing systems.

1958 - 1980

Employed in India in various areas of responsibility in nuclear power projects instrumentation and control. Projects included:

- Twin 220 MWe Madras Atomic Power Project - Twin 220 MWe Rajasthan Atomic Power Station


Institution of Engineers (India)

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L. GRANT LEW-IS Operations Staff Manager


EDUCATION

Bachelor of Arts Math - 1970 Vanderbilt University Master Business Administration - 1984 Fairleigh Dickinson University U.S. Navy Nuclear Power School (Officer Course) 1970 U.S. Navy Nuclear Power School (Enlisted Course) 1963

EXPERIENCE

1982 - Present

Operations staff manager, Con Edison Indian Point No. 2. Responsible for a staff consisting of operations analysts preparing operating procedures, responses to NTC audits, QA audits, INPO evaluations. Operations representative on station nuclear safety committee and NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 requirements commyittee. Con Edison representative in Albany for emergency preparedness exercises.

1980 - 1982

Quality assurance systems manager, GPU nuclear, Oyster Creek. Primary responsibility for upgrading quality assurance procedures to POST-TMI standards, review and approval of modifications, specifications, procurement specifications and vendor contracts.

1960 - 1980

U.S. Navy various assignments in the naval nuclear program, advancing through enlisted rating to chief petty officer and officer ranks to l ieutenant commander. Assignments included teaching at nuclear plant prototype, engineering representative for submarine nuclear plants under construction and chief engineer of nuclear submarine.


USNRC Senior Reactor Operator License

ANSI N 45.23 Qualified Lead Auditor

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A- 9

SAL F. LUNA Project Engineer



Design and development, instrumentation and control; human factors

EDUCATION

B.S., Chemistry, Magna Cum Laude, Niagara University, 1947 Specialty courses: Seismic - Wyle Labs, Human Factors - University of Tennessee and Electric Power Research Institute.

EXPERIENCE

Project Engineer responsible for NUREG-0700 type design review of the South Texas Project, Pilgrim and Kewaunee control rooms.

Project Engineer responsible for Human Factors review of Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station control rooms. Performed Annunciator Prioritization Study for same.

Directed design of advanced control room control consoles and unitized cabinets including: human factors engineering, full scale mock-ups, modular construction and seismic qualification.

Project Engineer responsible for Probabilistic Risk Assessment Study for Fire Protection Program Assessment of Northeast Utilities Nuclear Plants - Connecticut Yankee, Millstone 1, and Millstone 2.

Consultant, review of PG&E equipment qualification documents for NRC approval. Developed formats and organized walkdown teams for PP&L equipment qualification program.

Design of a wide variety of systems for advanced HTGR plants. Special studies for application of all technology for modernizing existing nuclear power plants featuring a "Diagnostic Console."

Directed development of in-core and ex-core instrumentation to study Fort St. Vramn core fluctuation phenomena.

Directed site engineering and craft effort to provide fire protection of critical Fort St. Vramn cabling.

Prepared specifications, designed special testing equipment conducted qualification tests, evaluated results and prepared reports for cabling and instrumentation for Fort St. Vramn equipment qualification program.

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Sal F. Luna Page 2

EXPERIENCE (Continued)

Managed a wide variety of instrument ational control and development groups at Westinghouse Electric Corp. for the nuclear navy and commnercial nuclear programs. Cognizant engineer for Annunciator Systems for same.

Directed the design and development of a wide variety of processing plant instrumentation systems for Catalytic Construction Co.

PUBLICATIONS

Editor of Cassette Control Val-ve Training Program. Author of chapter on Maintenance - ISA Control Valve Handbook. Author of chapter on Liquid Level Measurement - ISA publication. Also authored a wide variety of technical papers including methodology and results of human factors review of Palo Verde, and advanced control room design.

PROFESS IONAL ASSOCIATIONS

Registered Professional Engineer (control) California Fellow Grade Member of ISA Past Vice President Long Range Planning Department of ISA Nuclear Power Plant Standards Committee of ISA Member Human Factors Society

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RICHARD C. POTTER Staff Engineer



Power plant dynamic and steady-state systems design and analysis including large scale systems simulation.

EDUCATION

B.S., Mechanical Engineering, University of Minnesota M.S., Mechanical Engineering, University of Southern California

EXPERIENCE

Presently Assistant Project Engineer for the DCRDR of Kewaunee. Responsible for operating experience review, SFTA, Documentation. Assisted in the SFTA for the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station. He recently completed an assignment as Assistant Project Engineer on the control room design review of the South Texas Project where he performed system functions and task analysis, performed a-control room survey, developed program plans and directed other engineers during the review.

Mr. Potter was responsible for a fire vulnerability study of three Northeast Utilities nuclear power plants. Study involved the use of probabilistic risk assessment techniques for predicting the shutdown capability of these plants in the event of a fire.

He also participated in a probabilistic risk assessment of the Fort St. Vramn plant to determine clean up costs versus probability for on-site contamination due to an interruption of cooling event.

On the Fort St. Vramn Nuclear Generating Station project responsible for: modifying and maintaining computer models for the simulation of steady-state and transient plant performance review which included data monitoring and analysis as required to ensure proper plant operation; and performing steady-state and dynamic analysis to support the plant startup testing program.

While assigned to the Gas Cooled Fast Reactor Project he performed a conceptual analysis of a natural convection, drum-type and condensertype shutdown cooling system.

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Richard C. Potter Page 2

EXPERIENCE (Conti nued)

On the HTGR nuclear project he was responsible for the following: modifying and maintaining the steady-state and transient plant performance programs, the pipe rupture analysis program and the core afterheat analysis program; predicting power plant nominal, shutdown and refueling performance for use by design and analysis groups within the company and for use by the customers and performing parametric and application.studies relating to the overall plant design and performance.

Prior to joining Torrey Pines Technology, he directed activities involving propulsion analyses, application studies and computer simulation work on large liquid rocket engines. He has al so worked as a design engineer responsible for design and detailing of ground support equipment for rockets.


Professional Mechanical Engineer in State of California Member of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Member of Pi Tau Sigma

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A-13

ROBERT REDDING Operations Analyst Con Edison Company


EDUCATION

Bachelor of Science, Iona College, 1982 Associates Degree, Westchester Community College

EXPERIENCE

1971 - Present

Con Edison

Presently working as Operations Analyst on Operations Staff rewriting operations procedures.

Eleven years experience as Senior Reactor Operator working in the Control Room of Indian Point Unit #2.

Member of Site Commitment Review Committee.

Interface with Essex Corporation for Central Control Room Initial Human

Factors review, Post TMI Review.


Senior Nuclear Reactor Operator License U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission License No. SOP-1778-5

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A-14

RAYMOND SABEH HUMAN FACTORS SPECIALIST Torrey Pines Technology



Human Factors Engineering, Operations Research Analysis

EDUCATION

PH.D., (candidate), Experimental Psychology, Ohio State University M.A., Industrial Psychology, Ohio University B.A., General Psychology, Davis and Elkins College

EXPERIENCE

Responsible for developing and conducting the Operations Personnel Questionnaire, the Interviews and the Control Room Survey to conform with NUREG-0700 Guidelines for the Pilgrim Station and the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant.

Responsible for Human Factors review of corrective enhancements, hierarchical labeling, and demarcation for the South Texas Project.

Responsible for special studies and operations personnel validation via operator questionnaire interview evaluations for the Palo Verde Plants. In addition, responsible for conducting a Human Factors review of the Palo Verde Safety Parameters Display System in conformance with NUREG-0700 and NUREG-0835.

Responsible for preparing and implementing the human factors portion of the NUREG-0700 plan for three NU nuclear operating plants and a fourth NTOL plant. Served as the human factors team member on the NU Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) program that will be designed, developed, and implemented for as consortium of some 10 separate utility plants. Prepared Human Factors Engineering Orientation Course material used for instructing nuclear engineers and reactor operators.

Northeast Utilities - served as project leader and carried out nuclear operations analysis assignments concerning nuclear regulatory requirements to conduct human factors study, analysis and review of all activities affecting man-machine power plant design and operation. In this capacity was appointed as subcommittee chairman to technically monitor and direct the Westinghouse Corporation's efforts for developing a generic system function and task analysis on their PWR plants under contract to Westinghouse Owner's Group.

Consultant - responsible for human factors design of a control center for the storage and retrieval of nuclear waste.

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Raymond Sabeh Page 2


Manager/man-machine analysis branch at the Naval Electronics Laboratory - performed human engineering analysis of the Automated Record Data System for the E4A Aircraft. Also performed a man-machine analysis of the FFGX-CIC space and work place design for SEAMOD, a ship-shore communications effectiveness study. Designed the operator interface for the Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network Message Processing Mode including the development of computer simulation techniques to assess alternate operator interface designs.

Engineering Psychologist - initiated and coordinated research in development of methods and techniques used in human factors engineering system design and development. Technical leader of a communications effectiveness study effort and shipboard habitability programs.

Planned and technically directed the National Military Command System, the Emergency Action Room and World-Wide airborne command post studies for the Defense Communications Agency.


Human Factor Society Operations Research Society of American National Academy of Sciences Armed Forces-NTD Committee on Vision Southwest Regional Director, Society for Information Displays

PUBLICATIONS

Review of the Safety Parameters Display System for Palo Verde, Torrey Pines Technology, GA-C17368, November 1983.

Human Factor Review of the Palo Verde ERFDADS Terminal CRT Display and the ESFAS Annunciator Window Box, Torrey Pines Technology, GA-C17154, June 1983.

Control Room Operator Personnel Survey for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Torrey Pines Technology, GA-C17155, June 1983.

Human Factors Review of the Foxboro 250 Series Indicators and Controllers for Palo Verde, Torrey Pines Technology GA-C17072, May 1983.

Human Factors Engineering Orientation, Northeast Utilities, October, 1982.

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A-16

FRANK P. SCALETTA Senior Engineer



Safety, reliability, maintainability of nuclear plant mechanical

systems and equipment.

EDUCATION

B.S., Math/Physics, University of Chicago, 1950.

EXPERIENCE

Currently involved in updating the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Stations Units 2 & 3 FSAR for Bechtel.

Performed systems analysis work in support of TVA's PRA study for Brown's Ferry.

Reliability/safety studies of a gas-cooled reactor's Nuclear Steam System and BOP System including FMEA and fault/event trees; data evaluation; low probability events; fire; unplanned releases; design reviews.

Performed Ship System R/M/A analyses; FMEA's data evaluations; proposal preparation; liaison on FDLS, LHA, D.G. programs.

Provided Mission/Vehicle/Systems/Component Reliability analysis; design reviews; system analyses; proposals on space launch vehicles and boosters.

Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion - Prediction of material, component, or system behavior in a nuclear aircraft environment; recommend corrective actions; radiation testing; develop predictive techniques; conduct tradeoff studies. Engineering Test Lab - Qualification testing of B-36 and B-58 Aircraft Hydraulic, pneumatic, mechanical, and optical components; design/build test fixtures; instrument design and installation.

Performed Reliability Analyses of Saturn Space Booster Components and Systems.


Certified Reliability Engineer Member, ANS and ASQC

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A-17

JANES G. SCANDIFFIO Engineer


EDUCATION

Bachelor of Science, Electrical Engineering, Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn, 1973

On site I&C Opeartions Training at Cook Nuclear Plant, Bridgman, Michigan, August 1981

EXPERIENCE

Con Edison Company Qf (1983 to Present)

Engineer, Generation Programs and Control Section, Mechanical Engineering Department

Presently working as Cognizant Engineer for Indian point Unit No. 2 Regulatory Guide 1.97 Revision 2 Feasability Study. Also responsible for several on-going control room modification to existing control systems at Indian Point Unit 2 Station, including preparation of instructions for installation of new equipment and procedures for check-out and testing of this equipment.

American Electric Power Service Corporation of New York (1979 - 1983)

Engineer, Instrumentation and Control Section, Mechanical Engineering Department.

Project Coordinator and cognizant engineer for the installation and procurement of a microprocessor based Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) to meet NUREG-0737 requirements. Responsible for the development of the RMS control room panel design in accordance with Human Engineering guidelines and for interfacing of several required parameters into the plant SAS computer, writing of the System Description for the RMS and revision of several control system descriptions.

1978 - 1979

Burns and Roe, Incorporated, New Jersey.' Support Engineer, Instrumentation and Control Section, Mechanical Engineering Department.

Responsible for the development of control system loop and logic diagrams for HVAC Systems, on the Clinch river Nuclear Breeder Reactor Project. Responsible for control room and local panel developments for both nuclear safety and non safety systems.


Instrument Society of America, New York Section - Member No. 04040904

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A- 18

FREDERICK W. TODT Staff Engineer



Process computer systems conceptional design, configuration and application development.

EDUCATION

B.S., Physics, Wayne State University, 1956. Electronics Schools, U.S.M.C.

EXPERIENCE

Coordinated proposal efforts to supply computer hardware and software for emergency response facilities for nuclear plants.

Implemented computer demonstration of plant disturbance detection concept.

Developed real time application programs to support start-up testing and reactor operation. Monitored, system behavior during start-up, located deficiencies and made modifications as needed. Trained plant personnel to use computer facilities.

Section leader for large plant computer system application software development.

Specification writing for plant computer hardware and software and participation in the vendor evaluation process.

Performed nuclear design and analysis calculations associated with reactor power shaping, fuel cycles, control poison worth, and safety evaluations of HTGR and PWR reactors.

Developed methods and computer programs for nuclear fuel cycle studies, fuel cost analysis, and automation of reactor design parametric studies.

Performed nuclear design studies on small power, research, and space reactor concepts using a variety of fuels, moderators, and coolants.

Evaluated nuclear design calculation programs (computer codes) by comparison with critical experiments.

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F. W. Todt Page 2


Performed laboratory work with radioactive isotopes including sample counting, dosage preparation, standardization. Calibrated x-ray machines and radiation measurement equipment. Performed radiation shielding surveys.

Installed, maintained, and repaired radio receivers, transmitters and telephone carrier equipment.

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION

American Nuclear Society

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WARDELL B. WELCH HUMAN FACTORS SPECIALIST Torrey Pines Technology



Human Factors Engineering

EDUCATI ON

B.A., General Pscyhology, San Diego State University, 1966 Graduate study in Human Engineering, University of Michigan, 1967 M.S., Industrial Psychology, San Diego State University, 1968

EXPERIENCE

Fourteen years experience as an Engineering Psychologist in the Human Factors Division of the Naval Ocean Systems Center, San Diego, California. Currently working on the Boston Edison Company Room Survey.

Served as Human Enginering Project Manager for major center programs, including: Naval Aviation Logistics Command Management Information System; Ocean Surveillance Information System; Hydrofoil and Advanced Surface Craft 'Development Programs, and the MEECN Message Processing System. In this capacity, prepared plans, collected and analyzed data on performance requirements for use by system design engineers and supervised other human engineering personnel. Made recommendations on man-machine performance requirements to the system engineers.

Performed command control and communications studies for the Defense Communications Agency on the National Military Command System for use by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This involved determining operator performance requirements, improving design of existing capabilities by recommending changes in man-machine workspace environments and solving operator- system interface problems.

Originated development of a mockup facility at Naval Ocean Systems Center with an extensive capability for providing both reduced and full-scale mockups for use in systems analysis. Used mockups and video recording techniques extensively for analysis purposes to support design recommendations.

Using mockups, designed new operator consoles and electronic devices. When deadlines were critical, fabricated prototypes of consoles, work stations and new equipment for evaluation, without detailed drawings and specifications.

Recommended improved equipment and changes in equipment arrangements for such spaces as the National Emergency Airborne Command Posts for the President and the Emergency Action Room in the Pentagon. This

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Wardell B. Welch Page 2

involved utilizing mockups in the analysis of operator control panel layouts and control/display relationships to eliminate the possibility of operator errors during critical situation.

Used MIL-STD 1472c Human Engineering Criteria for Military Systems Equipment and Facilities extensively in evaluating equipment and systems. Also, used it as a primary reference in the design of new equipment.

Analyzed Human Engineering and system safety aspects of weapons and communications and subsystems for nuclear powered cruisers, redesigned communications facilities for the 688 class nuclear attack submarine and the Navy's TACAMO aircraft. Monitored and evaluated contractor performance for the Improved Point Defense System, design of

communications spaces of the TRIDENT submarine and a new multi-mode display console for SONAR operators.

Developed an extensive maintainability checklist based on human engineering criteria which has been incorporated in the Human Engineering Manual for NAVSHIPS Development Programs.

All work performed involved a close interaction with multi-disciplines in the scientific and engineering fields and all levels of operational personnel.

PUBLICATIONS

Human Factors and Habitability Aspects of Hydrofoil Generalized Mission Trials, NELC, May 1968 (co-author).

Human Factors and Habitability Discrepancy Report of the PGH-2 (USS Tucumcari), Technical Report No. 811814, NELC, November 1968 (co-author).

Source Data Entry Requirements for Naval Air Logistics Command Management Information Systems, NELC 9175 (co-author).

Human Engineering in NAVSHIPS Development Programs, Vol. II, NELC, May 1970 (co-author).

National Military Command Center Audio Visual Improvement Sutdy, NELC, June 1977 (co-author).

Human Engineering Analysis and Evaluation of the Integrated Record Data System for the EC-135 Aircraft, NELC, June 1977 (co-author).

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THOMAS Q. WONG Senior Electrical Engineer


EDUCATION

Bachelor of Electrical Engineering - City College of New York - 1971 Master of Science, Electrical Engineering - Columbia University - 1974 Applied Human Factors in Power Plant Design & Operation -General

Physics Corporation -1982

EXPERIENCE

1982 - Present

Con Edison Company

1971 - 1980

Project Electrical Engineer in the Electrical Generation & Controls Division responsible for the design and engineering of electrical auxiliary power and control systems for the Company's generating and related facilities.

Present Functional Assignment

Direct responsibility for 5 engineers, Alternate member of Con Edison's Nuclear Facilities Safety Committee - Operations Subcommittee. Major Project Responsibilities include:

- Human Factors Engineering, Modifications to the Indian Point No. 2 Control RoomI

- Appendix R Fire Protection Responses

- Indian Point Probabilistic Risk Assessment Studies & Associated Risk Reduction Modifications

- Alternate Safe Shutdown Systems

1980 - 1982

Gibbs & Hill, Incorporated. Controls Engineer in the Instrumentation & Controls Section. Major Projects included:

- Lead Engineer in Human Factors Engineering - Review of Indian Point No. 2 Control Room

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Thomas Q. Wong Page 2


Registered Professional Engineer in New York State No. 54132 - 1976

Member of IEEE Subcommittee SC-7. - Human Factors and Control Facilities

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APPENDIX B

TYPICAL REVIEW FORMS

HUMAN ENGINEERING OBSERVATION ASSESSMENT

OBSERVATION

PLANT HED_ EVALUATOR

TASK HEO_ SIGNATURE

CLO - CL ITEMf DATE

CL TITLE HEO CATEGORY

PANEL TITLE PANEL 0

HEO DESCRIPTION

TECHNICAL REVIEM CHAIRMAN DA

[] Concur.


[3 Reevaluate & Resubmit For Following Reason:


rTE

[] SUPPORT MATERIAL ATTACHED

POTENTIAL OPERATOR ERROR(S)

RECOMMENDED REVISION

HANAGEMENT REVIEW CHAIRMAN DA [] Concur.


(] Reevaluate & Resubmit For Following Reason:


RECOMMENDED IMPLEMENTATION:

(] Prior To Or At Next Refueling [] At Convenient Outage [] At Earliest Opportunity [] Non-Mandatory

TE

APPENDIX C

FILING INDEX

CON-EDISON - DCRDR

FILING INDEX

ISSUE DATE

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ISSUE #

Rev. 0 12/23/83

ISSUE # ISSUE DATE

FILING SYSTEM INDEX

1.0 PLANNING AND PROGRAM PLAN REPORT

Correspondence and Minutes of Overall Planning Meetings

Correspondence with NRC

Other Correspondence

All Issues of Program Plan

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2.0 GENERAL

2.1 Communications for Initiating DCRDR Program

2.1.1 Correspondence

2.1.2 Conference Notes

2.1.3 Telecons

2.2 Basic Vendor Bid Package and Related Correspondence

2.3 Vendor Proposals and Related Correspondence

2.4 Bid Evaluations and Related Correspondence

2.5 Signed Contract

2.5.1 Contract Revision No. 1 and Related Correspondence

2.5.2 Contract Revision No. 2 and Related Correspondence

2.5.3

2.5.4

2.5.5

2.5.6

2.6 Contract Invoices

2.7 Schedules

2.7.1 Contract Schedule

2.7.2 Working Schedule

2.8 Progress Reports

2.8.1 Telecons

2.8.2 Monthly Progress Letters

2.9 Program Communications


2.9.2 Conference Notes

2.9.3 Telecons

2.10 Internal Correspondence

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C-3

3.0 ADMINISTRATION

3.1 Procedures and Instructions

3.2 List of Library Material

3.3 Master File Index (Latest Revision)

3.4 Policies

3.5 Data Management System

3.5.1 Subject - Codes

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4.0 REVIEW

4.1 Operator Experience Review


4.1.2 Team Meetings and Conference Minutes

4.1.3 Telecons

4.1.4 Guidelines and Procedures

4.1.5 Forms (Questionnaire and Interview Drafts with review

comments

4.1.6 Raw Data for Plant Experience Document Reviews,

Questionnaire Responses and Interview Responses

4.1.7 Evaluations, Summaries or Reports (Each Major Draft

with Review Comments)

4.1.8 HEOs

4.1.9 Graphic Arts Material

4.2 System Review and Task Analysis (Including Verification and

Validation)


4.2.2 Team Meeting and Conference Minutes

4.2.3 Telecons


4.2.5 Blank Forms

4.2.6 Work Sheets and Completed Forms

4.2.7 Verification Results (Worksheets and Completed Forms)

4.2.8 Validation Results (Worksheets and Completed Forms)

4.2.8.1 Video Tapes

4.2.9 Evaluations, Summaries or Reports (Each Major Draft with

Review Comments)

4.2.10 HEOs


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4.3 Control Room Inventory


4.3.2 Team Meetings and Conference Minutes

4.3.3 Telecons


4.3.5 Forms

4.3.6 Completed Forms

4.3.7 Control Room Inventory Results and Printouts

4.3.8 Evaluations, Summaries or Reports -(Each Major Draft with

Review Comments)


4.4 Control Room Survey


4.4.2 Team Meeting and Conference Minutes

4.4.3 Telecons


4.4.5 Checklist Forms

4.4.6 Checklist (each Major Draft with Review Comments)

4.4.7 Completed Checklist Work Sheets (Raw, Data with Support

Sketches, Photos etc.)

4.4.7.1 Work Space

4.4.7.2 Communications

4.4.7.3 Annunciator

4.4.7.4 Controls

4.4.7.5 Visual Displays

4.4.7.6 Labels and Location Aids

4.4.7.7 Process Computer

4.4.7.8 Panel Layout

4.4.7.9 Control-Display Integration

4.4.7.10 Control Room Equipment and Storage

4.4.8 Evaluations, Summaries and Reports (Each Major Draft


4.4.9 CRS - HEDs


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5.0 HEO ASSESSMENT AND HED IMPROVEMENT

5.1 Assessments and Improvement Reviews


5.1.2 Assessment Team Meetings Minutes

5.1.3 Telecons


5.1.5 Forms

5.1.6 Completed Forms

5.1.7 Results and Computer Compilations (HEOs/HEDs)

5.1.8 Submittals to Management and Replys



5.1.10 Graphic Arts Materials

5.2 Improvements Implementation (Human Factors Related)


5.2.2 Meeting Minutes

5.2.3 Telecons


5.2.5 Work Effort Results




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C-7

6.0 NRC MEETINGS AND AUDITS

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7.0 SPECIAL STUDIES

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C-9

8.0 DOCUMENTATION

8.1 Final Report


8.1.2 Meeting Minutes

8.1.3 Telecons


8.1.5 Reports (Each Major Draft with Review Comments)


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C-10

APPENDIX D

0. CONTROLS

1.Are the controls arranged to facilitate correct operator responses?

C)Yes C)No (explain) ___________________

2. Are there any controls that are difficult to operate?

C)No C)Yes (explain) -

3. Are there any controls that are difficult to identify?

C )No C )Yes (explain) __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

CONTROLS (cont.)

4. Are there any controls that are difficult to reach and manipulate by both short and tall operators?

C)No C)Yes (explain) ____________________

5. Withi-n a given system, are the controls arranged in a logical and functional manner?

C)Yes C)No (explain)__________ ___________

6. Are the number of controls optimum for accomplishing all required functions?

( ) Yes C)No (explain) ____________________

7. Does the arrangement of controls make accidental activation unlikely?

()Yes ()No (explain) ____________________

CONTROLS (cont.)

8. Is the arrangement of controls consistent across panels and systems?

C)Yes C)No (explain)__________ ___________

9. Are the physical characteristics of controls (shape, size and type), used for performing the same function on all panels the same?

C)Yes C)No (explain)__________ ___________

10. Are legend pushbuttons readily distinguishable from legend lights?

()Yes ()No (explain)_________ ___________

11. Do all rotary control settings increase in value with clockwise rotation?

( ) Yes ()No (explain)__________ ___________

D-3

CONTROLS (cont.)

12. Are protective devices used on critical controls to prevent accidental activation?

()Yes C)No (explain)__________ ___________

13. Are there any controls on panels that are no longer used and should be removed?

C)No ()Yes (explain)__________ ___________

14. Are there spare handles or keys available for those controls using removable switch or key operators?

C)Yes C)No (explain)__________ ___________

CONTROLS (cont.)

15. Are there any controls which have lost their distinct detent positions making it difficult to determine if the switch is in the correct position?

()No ()Yes (explain) _____________________

16. What is the most desirable control improvement you would like to see implemented?

17. What is the current best controls feature of the control room?

CONTROLS (cant.)

ADDED COMMENTS

Please include any additional comments below.