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Jurgen Visser sub="auth" name="Authentication failed" srcip="172.16.160.210" user=“root" caller="root" reason="Too many failures from client IP, still blocked for 537 seconds" <54>Jul 5 17:17:43 SymantecServer SEP- PROD: Virus found,IP Address: 10.235.237.89,Computer name: A41021,Source: Real Time Scan,Risk name: Backdoor.IRCBot!win32 <177>Jul 5 14:18:53 SourceFire snort[10340]: [1:2007933:3] ET EXPLOIT Microsoft Office Memory Corruption Vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) [Classification: Microsoft Application Attack] [Priority: 2]: {TCP} 72.246.97.42:80 -> 10.12.1.140:1629 <54>Jul 5 14:05:55 SymantecServer SEP- PROD: Virus found,IP Address: 10.11.8.78,Computer name: A372d759,Source: Scheduled Scan,Risk name: W97M.Melissa.A <30>Jul 5 19:22-19:16:27 aua[4983]: id="3005" severity="warn" sys="System" sub="auth" name="Authentication failed" srcip="172.16.160.210" user=“sysadmin" caller="root" reason="Too many failures from client IP, still blocked for 517 seconds" Designing The SIEM Monitoring Environment To Address Visibility and Blind Spots From Foundational SIEM to Realizing Cyber A.I.

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Page 1: Designing The SIEM Monitoring Environment To Address

Jurgen Visser

sub="auth" name="Authentication failed" srcip="172.16.160.210" user=“root" caller="root" reason="Too many failures from client IP, still blocked for 537 seconds"<54>Jul 5 17:17:43 SymantecServer SEP-PROD: Virus found,IP Address: 10.235.237.89,Computer name: A41021,Source: Real Time Scan,Risk name:Backdoor.IRCBot!win32<177>Jul 5 14:18:53 SourceFire snort[10340]: [1:2007933:3] ET EXPLOIT Microsoft Office Memory Corruption Vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) [Classification: Microsoft Application Attack] [Priority: 2]: {TCP} 72.246.97.42:80 -> 10.12.1.140:1629<54>Jul 5 14:05:55 SymantecServer SEP-PROD: Virus found,IP Address: 10.11.8.78,Computer name: A372d759,Source: Scheduled Scan,Risk name: W97M.Melissa.A<30>Jul 5 19:22-19:16:27 aua[4983]: id="3005" severity="warn" sys="System" sub="auth" name="Authentication failed" srcip="172.16.160.210" user=“sysadmin" caller="root" reason="Too many failures from client IP, still blocked for 517 seconds"

Designing The SIEM Monitoring Environment To Address Visibility and Blind Spots

From Foundational SIEM to Realizing Cyber A.I.

Page 2: Designing The SIEM Monitoring Environment To Address

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Jurgen VisserSecurity Operations Center (SOC) Architect

Professional Skills

Cyber Security Specialist passionate about analyzing cyber security risks and strategizing, architecting, building, maturing them into enterprise level cyber security initiatives.

▪ 11 years+ of working experience in Cyber Security and Information Technology (IT).▪ University Bachelor degree in Information Security Management.

▪ 3x General Cyber Security Certified: CISSP, CISSP-ISSAP, CEH▪ 3x Standards Certified: ITIL, ISFS ISO27001, Agile SCRUM▪ 5x Cloud Certified: 1x CCSP, 2x Amazon AWS, 1x Microsoft Azure, 1x Google GCP ▪ 3x Threat Intelligence Certified: GCTI, CTIA, CRTIA▪ 10x SIEM Certified: 4x ArcSight, 4x IBM QRadar, 1x Splunk and 1x ELK

▪ Native in Dutch and English, intermediate at Mandarin Chinese (HSK3).▪ Strategic, Critical, Abstract, Design, Analytical, Holistic and Systems Thinker.▪ Information Security Blogger at www.correlatedsecurity.com

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Context

• A large sized business has hired a new CISO!

• The CISO has a big budget and wants to rapidly expand security!

• The CISO hires YOU to handle anything related to SOC

• Questions or needs from CISO come sudden and out of the blue and you need to come up with solutions

Page 4: Designing The SIEM Monitoring Environment To Address

I need

use cases!

Let’s do a constructive

Use Case Strategy!

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Data Strategy: Asset, Software and Attacker-Centric

External Threats

- Attacker-centric threat modelling

Internal Threats

- Asset-centric Threat modelling

- Software-centric threat modelling

Internal Threats“knowing yourself”

External Threats“knowing your enemy”

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Methodology for Building an Organizational Context and Content-Informed Cyber Threat modelling Strategy that aligns with an Use Case Management Program

Attacker-Centric Information

List of Business Competitors

List of Known Threat Actors

Internal Threat Intelligence Reports

Current Threat Landscape

Software-Centric Information

List of used 3rd party dependencies

List of Security Coding Practices

List of Critical Software code repos

List of Critical Software Components

Asset-Centric Information

List of Critical Servers

List of Critical Network Segments

List of Critical Applications

List of Critical User Accounts

Risk Information

Cyber Risk Strategy

Cyber Risk Governance Structure

Asset, User & Data Classification Model

Cyber Risk Management Register

Business Information

Critical Organizational Departments

Organizational Assets

Current Pressure Posture

Stakeholder Needs Mapping

Architecture Information

Application Architecture

Network Architecture

Security Architecture

DevOps (CD/CI) Architecture

2. Decide and Apply a “Threat Modeling Strategy” based on

Attacker, Software, Asset or Risk-Centric Threat Models

Cyber Security Program Overall Maturity Core Business & Business Model Enterprise IT Architecture

List of Previous Security Incidents List of In-house Built Applications Computer Management DB (CMDB)

1. Collect, Identify and Prioritize

Risks, Attackers, Software and AssetsC

ON

TE

XT

CO

NT

EN

T

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Methodology for Building an Organizational Context and Content-Informed Cyber Threat modelling Strategy that aligns with an Use Case Management Program

Attacker-Centric

Cyber Kill Chain

Diamond Model

Security Cards

Persona non Grata

Software-Centric

VAST

DREAD

CVSS

Asset-Centric

TRIKESTRIDE

LINDDUN

hTMM

2. Decide and Apply a “Threat Modeling Strategy” based on

Attacker, Software, Asset or Risk-Centric Threat Models

ATT&CK OCTAVE

QTMM

Attack Trees

3. Identify, Prioritize and Operationalize:

Use Cases and Integrations

TH

RE

AT

MO

DE

L

Risk-Centric

PASTA

NIST SP 800-154

CAPEC

MITRE TARA

INTEL TARA/TAL

IDDIL/ATC

OWASP

Invincea

CORAS

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Methodology for Building an Organizational Context and Content-Informed Cyber Threat modelling Strategy that aligns with an Use Case Management Program

3. Identify, Prioritize and Operationalize:

Use Cases and Integrations

Use Case Management Process

SIEM SOAR EDR IDS IPS DAM TIP AV

IMP

LE

ME

NT

AT

ION

Use Case Framework

NETMON

VPN DDOS WAF HONEYPOT FIREWALL NAC PROXY DLP ... *

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In Summary

- 1st. Elaborate Organizational Content

and Contextual Analysis

- 2nd. Determination on Threat modeling

strategy: 1st: Asset-centric 2nd: Attacker-

centric Threat modeling methodology

- 3rd. Use a Use Case Framework that

can house different threat modeling

methodologies and allows for flexible

prioritization.

Page 10: Designing The SIEM Monitoring Environment To Address

I Need Use

Case

Coverage

Reporting!Let’s use the

a Use Case Framework

to organize SIEM use

cases building

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SPEED Use Case Framework

Why a Use Case Framework?

• To have a holistic “frame of reference” where detection use cases can be categorized into.

• To quickly see where your use cases are lacking and need more attention (blind spots).

• To facilitate a phased approach of expanding new use cases based on a large variety of inputs and priorities (Use Case Roadmap).

What is the Added value by the SPEED Use Case Framework?

• Clear Location for log source monitoring use cases

• Location for generic Threat actor Threat modelling using the kill-chain

• Location for threat modelling threat actors like “APT1” using the kill-chain

• Key Distinctions between Threat intelligence types

• Key Distinction between Attacker-centric and Defense in depth model

• Very clearly defined naming conventions that are consistent all over the framework

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Use Case Overview

• Combining the Process and Use Case Framework in one.

Threat drivers

Business Risks

Compliance driversRisk drivers

The Use Case Lifecycle

Roadmaps Lists Criteria Governance Process

Use Case Library (UCL)

LogSources

DetectionCapabilities

External Use Case Sources:- Vendor Use Cases- Threat Detection Markets- Open Source Use Cases

Organization Information:- Assets Classification- Network Architecture- Critical Applications- Data Classification

SPEED Use Case Framework

Continuous GrowingDetection Capabilities

1. Requirements

2. Identify Data Sources

3. Design Logic

4. On-board & Validate Data

5. Proof Of Concept

6. User Acceptance

Test

7. Playbook Design

8. Train Analysts

9. Promote to Production

10. Finetuning

11. Periodic Review

Use CaseManagement

Process

Secu

rity

Op

era

tio

ns

Ce

nte

r (S

OC

)

- Rule Directories

- Rules

- Detection Categories Guidelines

- Naming Conventions Guidelines

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SPEED Use Case Framework

Internal Threats

AnomalyDetection

Self Monitoring

Access Control

Application

Host

Mobile

Wireless Network

Internal Network

Cloud

Perimeter

Physical

Policy

External Threats

QuantitativeThreat analysis

Attack Patterns

A. Insider Threat

01) Reconnaissance

02) Weaponization

03) Initial Access

04) Execution

05) Persistence

06) Privilege Escalation

07) Defense Evasion

08) Credential Access

09) Discovery

10) Lateral Movement

11) Collection

12) Exfiltration

13) Command and Control

B. Script Kiddie

01) Reconnaissance

02) Weaponization

03) Initial Access

04) Execution

05) Persistence

06) Privilege Escalation

07) Defense Evasion

08) Credential Access

09) Discovery

10) Lateral Movement

11) Collection

12) Exfiltration

13) Command and Control

C. Cyber Criminal

01) Reconnaissance

02) Weaponization

03) Initial Access

04) Execution

05) Persistence

06) Privilege Escalation

07) Defense Evasion

08) Credential Access

09) Discovery

10) Lateral Movement

11) Collection

12) Exfiltration

13) Command and Control

D. Nation State

01) Reconnaissance

02) Weaponization

03) Initial Access

04) Execution

05) Persistence

06) Privilege Escalation

07) Defense Evasion

08) Credential Access

09) Discovery

10) Lateral Movement

11) Collection

12) Exfiltration

13) Command and Control

Threat Intelligence

a. Commoditized Threat Intelligence

b. Regional Threat Intelligence

c. Industry Threat Intelligence

d. Tailored Threat Intelligence

QualitativeThreat Analysis

AttackerProfile #1

AttackerProfile #2

AttackerProfile #3

Attack Pattern #1

01) Reconnaissance

02) Weaponization

03) Initial Access

04) Execution

05) Persistence

06) Privilege Escalation

07) Defense Evasion

08) Credential Access

09) Discovery

10) Lateral Movement

11) Collection

12) Exfiltration

13) Command and Control

Attack Pattern #2

01) Reconnaissance

02) Weaponization

03) Initial Access

04) Execution

05) Persistence

06) Privilege Escalation

07) Defense Evasion

08) Credential Access

09) Discovery

10) Lateral Movement

11) Collection

12) Exfiltration

13) Command and Control

Attack Pattern #3

01) Reconnaissance

02) Weaponization

03) Initial Access

04) Execution

05) Persistence

06) Privilege Escalation

07) Defense Evasion

08) Credential Access

09) Discovery

10) Lateral Movement

11) Collection

12) Exfiltration

13) Command and Control

Asset-centric & Software-centric

Threat modeling

Attacker-centric

Threat modeling

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ArcSight & QRadar SIEM examples

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ELK & Splunk Examples

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Naming conventions for Rules

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0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

00.   Self-Monitoring

01.   Access Control

02.   Application

03.   Host

04.   Mobile

05.   Wireless Network

06.   Internal Network

07.   Cloud

08.   Perimeter

09.   Physical

10.   Policy

11.   Attack Patterns

11a.      Insider Threat

11b.      Script Kiddie

11c.       Cyber Criminal

11d.      Nation State

12.   Threat Intelligence

12a.      Commoditized Threat Intelligence

12b.      Regional Threat Intelligence

12c.       Industry Threat Intelligence

12d.      Tailored Threat Intelligence

13.   Threat Modelling

13a.      Attacker Profile name #1

13a i.     Attack Campaign A

13a ii.     Attack Campaign B

13a iii.     Attack Campaign C

13b.      Attacker Profile name #2

13a i.     Attack Campaign A

13b ii.     Attack Campaign B

13c iii.     Attack Campaign C

13c.      Attacker Profile name #3

13c i.     Attack Campaign A

13c ii.     Attack Campaign B

13c iii.     Attack Campaign C

Use Case Coverage Report

Page 18: Designing The SIEM Monitoring Environment To Address

I want Agile

in my SOC!

Let’s split Monitoring to

the OODA lifecycle and

Use Case Development

to a SCRUM lifecycle!

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The Use Case Lifecycle

1. Requirements

2. Identify Data Sources

3. Design Logic

4. On-board & Validate Data

5. Proof Of Concept

6. User Acceptance Test7. Playbook Design

8. Train Analysts

9. Promote to Production

10. Finetuning

11. Periodic Review

Page 20: Designing The SIEM Monitoring Environment To Address

Information & Cyber Security Services Catalog

Se

cu

rity

Se

rvic

es

Organization’s Core Business

Co

re

CIO Office - Business Function Supporting & Governing: Information Services

CISO Office - Business Function Supporting & Governing:

Information Security Services

IT O

rga

niz

ati

on

Information Security Quality Assurance Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) (+auditability)

Continuous Improvement

Plan, Do, Check and Act (PDCA)

Continuous Improvement

Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA)

Cyber Threat Intelligence Services

Deception Services Purple Team Services

Risk Management Services

Detection ServicesThreat Hunting Services

Architecture Services

Prevention Services

Security Collaboration Services

Security Culture Services

Information & Cyber Security Strategy

… <other services>

Vulnerability Services

SOC Delivery Services

Security Incident Services

Automation Services

CT

I Info

rmin

g S

erv

ice

s

Scrum Agile Development:

Security Operations:

Continuous Integration (CI)Analyze, Design, Construct, Integrate, Test (SCRUM)

Process Strategy

Page 21: Designing The SIEM Monitoring Environment To Address

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ANALYZE DESIGN CONSTRUCT TEST

ITERATIVE INCREMENTS

Detection Services- Detection Use case & Detection Source Integration Management Process

Automation Services- Playbook Automation & Integration Management ProcessP

RO

CE

SS INTEGRATE

Process and KPI’s related to SCRUM

Detection Services- # of new use cases proposed

Automation Services- # of new automations proposed

KP

I’s Detection Services

- # of new use cases analyzed/designedDetection Services- # of new use cases constructed

Detection Services- # of new use cases built

Automation Services- # of new automations analyzed/designed

Automation Services- # of new automations constructed

Automation Services- # of automations integrated

ANALYZE DESIGN CONSTRUCT TESTINTEGRATE

Page 22: Designing The SIEM Monitoring Environment To Address

I want

Automation!

Let’s use the OODA

lifecycle and attempt to

close the loop with

SOAR and EDR!

Page 23: Designing The SIEM Monitoring Environment To Address

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SIEM

SPEED Use Case Framework

Rule #1

Rule #2

Rule #3

Rule #4

Rule #5

Rule #6

Use Case B

Use Case A

Categories of Action

Escalation

Enrichment

Mitigation

SOAR

SIEM

Alerts

Use Case Categories

are Mapped to Incident

Categories

Incident Category A

Incident Category B

Incident Category C

Use Case

Library

Types of Automation

Defensive Automation

Forensic Automation

Offensive Automation

Categories are mapped

to Playbooks

Playbook #1

Playbook #2

Playbook #3

Playbook #4

Playbook #5

Playbook #6

Semi

Automated

Playbook

Fully

Automated

Playbook

Playbook #7

Playbook #8

Playbook #9

Manual

Playbook

Use Case

Category

Contextual Variables

Considered for Specific

Playbook Escalation

Asset Criticality

Alert Criticality

SLA Classification

Data Classification

App Criticality

Network Criticality

User Criticality

Deception Automation

Log Data Analysis

SIEM to SOAR relationship

Page 24: Designing The SIEM Monitoring Environment To Address

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SIEM

SPEED Use Case Framework

INTERNALNET-VPNDENIES-001

Massive VPN denies detected on VPN

High amount of VPN denies detected

Categories of Action

Mitigation:

Disables VPN

User and

Blacklists src IP

SOAR

SIEM

Alerts

Use Case Categories

are Mapped to Incident

Categories

Remote Working

Incident Category B

Incident Category C

Use Case

Library

Types of Automation

Defensive Automation

Forensic Automation

Offensive Automation

Categories are mapped

to Playbooks

VPN Threats

Playbook

Playbook #4

Playbook #5

Playbook #6

Semi

Automated

Playbook

Fully

Automated

Playbook

Playbook #7

Playbook #8

Playbook #9

Manual

Playbook

SPEED Use Case Category:

08. Internal Network

Contextual Variables

Considered for Specific

Playbook Escalation

Asset Criticality

Alert Criticality

SLA Classification

Data Classification

App Criticality

Network Criticality

User Criticality

Deception Automation

Log Data Analysis

SIEM to SOAR relationship: example

Page 25: Designing The SIEM Monitoring Environment To Address

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TechnologyStrategy

SIEM “ORIENT”

Correlation Engine

Cyber Threat Intelligence

SOAR “DECIDE”

SIEM

Alerts

Types of Automation

Playbooks

Semi Automated Playbooks

Fully Automated Playbooks

Manual Playbooks

EDR “ACT”

Endpoint Response

Endpoint Isolation

Executable Quarantine

Remote Backdoor

File Upload & Download

Forensic Memory Dumps

Registry Add/Remove/Modifications

Process Execution, Termination & Block

EDR “OBSERVE”

Endpoint Detection

File Add/Remove/Modifications

Registry Add/Remove/Modifications

DNS & Network Connections

Shell/CMD Command Executions

Process & Cross-Process Executions

User Behavior Activity

Binary & Executable Storage

EDR

Alerts

Vulnerability Management

Analysis

Reports

Alerts

Dashboards

Network Model/Hierarchy

Defensive Escalation Automation

Defensive Enrichment Automation

Defensive Mitigation Automation

Forensic Escalation Automation

Forensic Enrichment Automation

Executable Sandbox AnalysisCyber Threat Intelligence

Forensic Analysis Automation

SOAR

Actions

Forensic Findings

Modeling New

Countermeasures

DECIDE

ACTOBSERVE

ORIENT

OODA

User Behavior Analytics

Cross-Log Source Correlation

Link Analysis Visualization

other technologies

Page 26: Designing The SIEM Monitoring Environment To Address

I want world

class

analysts!

Let’s hire a mix of junior,

medior and senior

security analysts!

Page 27: Designing The SIEM Monitoring Environment To Address

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Cyber Security Analyst Maturity Curve“A senior cyber security analyst should be able to reach the simplicity at the far side of complexity and to be able

to communicate the cyber security risks, threats and related countermeasures simply, effectively and actionable.”

GeneralSimplicity

Initial Observation

In-depth

Investigation

Final Report

DetailedComplexity

JuniorLow Experience

SeniorHigh Experience

What is the

Alert/Event Context?

What is the

Alert/Event?

What is the:

Anomaly?

Look-up

User Account

What is the

Network Context?

What is the

Data Context?

Look-up

Network Subnet

Look-up

File Hash

What is the

Application Context?

Understanding

Network Architecture

Understanding

Business Application Function

Look-up

Message

Understanding

Application Architecture

Understanding

Application Data Content

Understanding

Data Classification

Understanding

Baseline System Behavior

Understanding

The Degree of Deviation of the Baseline

Who is the

User and the User’s Properties?

Look-up

IP/Domain

Data

Queries

What is the

Business Impact?

What is the

Technical Impact?

What are the recommended

Detective countermeasures?

What are the recommended

Response countermeasures?

What is the

Technical Risk?

Is the analyst report a Well Structured, Formatted, Actionable and Easy-

to-Read Analyst Report?

What are the recommended

Recovery countermeasures?

What are the recommended Most Effective, Low Cost Countermeasures

in Relation to Business Risk?

What is the

Business Risk?

Who is the

Threat Actor?

What are the

Techniques, Tactics, Procedures? Understanding

Attacker Patterns

Understanding

Threat Actors

Understanding

Overall IT Architecture

Understanding

The Organization

Understanding

Technical Risk

Understanding

Business Risk

Understanding

The Organization

Understanding

Response Countermeasures

Understanding

Recovery Countermeasures

Understanding

Preventive

Countermeasure

What is the:

Threat?

Understanding

Threat Techniques

Understanding

Threat Technique Outcomes

What are the recommended

Preventive countermeasures?

What is the

Host and the Host’s Properties?

What is the

File and the File’s Properties?

v2.0

Page 28: Designing The SIEM Monitoring Environment To Address

I Want

Artificial

Intelligence!

A.I. is a big idea, let’s do

a gap analysis first

before we do this!

Page 29: Designing The SIEM Monitoring Environment To Address

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MACHINE

LEARNING

CYBER SECURITY ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCEMACHINE

UNDERSTANDING

MACHINE

ACTION

CONTEXT

DETECTION USE CASES

Contextual Correlation Alerting

Event Aggregation Alerting

Event Correlation Alerting

Single-Event Alerting

PLAYBOOKS

Automated Contextual Enrichment

Automated Decision Tree’s

Automated Malware Analysis

Automated Escalation

AUTOMATION

Defensive Automation

Forensic Automation

Offensive Automation

Deception Automation

MACHINE LEARNING

Supervised Machine Learning

Unsupervised Machine Learning

CONTEXT (not limited to the following examples)

Asset Criticality

Alert Criticality

SLA Classification

Data Classification

Application Criticality

Network Criticality

User Criticality Communication Classification

TECHNOLOGY TECHNOLOGY TECHNOLOGY

TECHNOLOGYSIEM, UEBA & Security Big Data Lake SOAR

Security Tools & IT InfrastructureThreat Intelligence Platform (TIP)Security Tools & IT Infrastructure

SOAR

Incident Category Criticality

ALGORITHMS

PROCESSOODA

OBSERVE ORIENT

Deep Machine Learning

OODA

ORIENT DECIDE

OODA

DECIDE ACT

PEOPLE PEOPLE PEOPLE

A.I. TUNING

RESOURCESSecurity Analyst Incident Analyst & Responder

Digital Forensics AnalystCyber Threat Intelligence AnalystSecurity Device Administrator

Incident Responder

FRAMEWORKNIST CSF NIST CSF NIST CSF

IDENTIFY DETECT DETECT RESPOND RESPOND RECOVER PROTECT

THE GAPFULLY AUTOMATIC

LOG SOURCE

ONBOARDING

FULLY AUTOMATIC

THREAT DETECTION

RULE CREATION

FULLY AUTOMATIC

PLAYBOOK

CREATION

FULLY AUTOMATIC

RESPONSE

SELECTION

FULLY AUTOMATIC

AUTOMATION

INTEGRATION

FULLY AUTOMATIC

RESPONSE

SELECT / EXECUTE

Page 30: Designing The SIEM Monitoring Environment To Address

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1. FULLY AUTOMATIC LOG SOURCE ONBOARDING

TARGET STATETHE GAPCURRENT STATE

Automated:A. Application log monitoring integration as part

of the DevSecOps Continuous Monitoring

(CM) Pipeline (for Containers using FluentD).

B. Use Terraform to create log sources

C. Standardized Instance Images or Start-up

Scripts with log forwarding agent embedded.

Semi-Automated:A. Assigning existing parsers to a log source

(heavily depends on collection protocol and

SIEM vendor of choice).

Manual work:A. Any Custom Application logs, non-supported

API or non-cloud log source will require

intensive manual work on collection and

parsing. – Many vendors or developers are still

not making a log API a high priority.

Automated:

No Automation

Semi-Automated:

No Semi-Automation

Manual work:

A. Configuring a log

source to send logs

B. Building or relying

on a vendor for a data

parser.

Automated:

A. Automated Log

source onboarding

B. Automated Parser

Building

Semi-Automated:

No Semi-Automation

Manual work:

No Manual Work

Page 31: Designing The SIEM Monitoring Environment To Address

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There is still a major challenge withAPI Standardization for log collection

Page 32: Designing The SIEM Monitoring Environment To Address

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2. FULLY AUTOMATIC THREAT DETECTION RULE CREATION

TARGET STATETHE GAPCURRENT STATE

Automated:A. Pull in newly created rules by open source

community. SIGMA is a open standard for

formatting search rules in SIEM.

Pulling these automatically in.

Semi-Automated:A. Creating log agnostic detection rules that

automatically catch any data in new onboarded

log sources.

Manual work:A. Finetuning of the rules, every environment is

unique so there might be false positives.

Automated:

No Automation

Semi-Automated:

No Semi-Automation

Manual work:

A. Creating or

importing rule sets.

B. Finetuning the rule

is still required before

promoting to

production

Automated:

A. Automated Rule

Creation or Importing

B. Automated Rule

Tuning

Semi-Automated:

No Semi-Automation

Manual work:

No Manual Work

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3. FULLY AUTOMATIC PLAYBOOK CREATION4. FULLY AUTOMATIC RESPONSE SELECTION

TARGET STATETHE GAPCURRENT STATE

Automated:A. Pull in newly created rules by open source

community. CACAO is a open standard for

formatting for vendor neutral SOAR. Pulling

these automatically in. *currently v1.0 JSON

standard is still in draft.

Semi-Automated:N/A

Manual work:A. Finetuning of the playbooks, every

environment is unique so there might be things

that do not work.

B. Integrations with the environment are highly

dependent on the environment the system is

residing in, therefore additional intensive work

is required.

Automated:

No Automation

Semi-Automated:

No Semi-Automation

Manual work:

A. Creating a playbook

B. Connecting the right

response integrations

to the playbook

Automated:

A. Automated

Playbook creation

B. Automated

Response Integration

Selection

Semi-Automated:

No Semi-Automation

Manual work:

No Manual Work

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5. FULLY AUTOMATIC AUTOMATION INTEGRATION6. FULLY AUTOMATIC RESPONSE SELECT / EXECUTE

TARGET STATETHE GAPCURRENT STATE

Automated:N/A

Semi-Automated:A. Supported API’s that are known and

standardized like Cloud Services can be used

as a templated and modified.

Manual work:A. Integrations with the environment are highly

dependent on the environment the system is

residing in, therefore additional intensive work

is required.

Automated:

No Automation

Semi-Automated:

No Semi-Automation

Manual work:

A. Creating or

importing integrations

B. Configuration of

Integrations with the

correct parameters

Automated:

A. Automated

Automation integration

B. Automated

Response

configuration

Semi-Automated:

No Semi-Automation

Manual work:

No Manual Work

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CONCLUSION

• The A.I. GAP cannot be entirely bridged but we can start working towards it.

• Most cyber “A.I.” are very narrow point solution that only can do a limited use case.

• A.I. that does everything out of the box with a scope on the entire infrastructure does not exist.

• The cloud gives us a great boost towards realizing A.I. in Cyber Security

• If a organization is 100% in 1 cloud deployed without any other dependency on any other vendor for applications in the infrastructure the organization can potentially get to the closest of realizing A.I. in it’s infrastructure

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MACHINE

LEARNING

CYBER SECURITY ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCEMACHINE

UNDERSTANDING

MACHINE

ACTION

CONTEXT

DETECTION USE CASES

Contextual Correlation Alerting

Event Aggregation Alerting

Event Correlation Alerting

Single-Event Alerting

PLAYBOOKS

Automated Contextual Enrichment

Automated Decision Tree’s

Automated Malware Analysis

Automated Escalation

AUTOMATION

Defensive Automation

Forensic Automation

Offensive Automation

Deception Automation

MACHINE LEARNING

Supervised Machine Learning

Unsupervised Machine Learning

CONTEXT (not limited to the following examples)

Asset Criticality

Alert Criticality

SLA Classification

Data Classification

Application Criticality

Network Criticality

User Criticality Communication Classification

TECHNOLOGY TECHNOLOGY TECHNOLOGY

TECHNOLOGYSIEM, UEBA & Security Big Data Lake SOAR

Security Tools & IT InfrastructureThreat Intelligence Platform (TIP)Security Tools & IT Infrastructure

SOAR

Incident Category Criticality

ALGORITHMS

PROCESSOODA

OBSERVE ORIENT

Deep Machine Learning

OODA

ORIENT DECIDE

OODA

DECIDE ACT

PEOPLE PEOPLE PEOPLE

A.I. TUNING

RESOURCESSecurity Analyst Incident Analyst & Responder

Digital Forensics AnalystCyber Threat Intelligence AnalystSecurity Device Administrator

Incident Responder

FRAMEWORKNIST CSF NIST CSF NIST CSF

IDENTIFY DETECT DETECT RESPONDRESPON

DRECOVE

RPROTECT

THE GAPFULLY AUTOMATIC

LOG SOURCE

ONBOARDING

FULLY AUTOMATIC

THREAT DETECTION

RULE CREATION

FULLY AUTOMATIC

PLAYBOOK

CREATION

FULLY AUTOMATIC

RESPONSE

SELECTION

FULLY AUTOMATIC

AUTOMATION

INTEGRATION

FULLY AUTOMATIC

RESPONSE

SELECT / EXECUTE

Page 37: Designing The SIEM Monitoring Environment To Address

• Jurgen Visser

• @jurgenvi

• www.linkedin.com/in/JurgenVisser/

• www.CorrelatedSecurity.com/

sub="auth" name="Authentication failed" srcip="172.16.160.210" user=“root" caller="root" reason="Too many failures from client IP, still blocked for 537 seconds"<54>Jul 5 17:17:43 SymantecServer SEP-PROD: Virus found,IP Address: 10.235.237.89,Computer name: A41021,Source: Real Time Scan,Risk name:Backdoor.IRCBot!win32<177>Jul 5 14:18:53 SourceFire snort[10340]: [1:2007933:3] ET EXPLOIT Microsoft Office Memory Corruption Vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) [Classification: Microsoft Application Attack] [Priority: 2]: {TCP} 72.246.97.42:80 -> 10.12.1.140:1629<54>Jul 5 14:05:55 SymantecServer SEP-PROD: Virus found,IP Address: 10.11.8.78,Computer name: A372d759,Source: Scheduled Scan,Risk name: W97M.Melissa.A<30>Jul 5 19:22-19:16:27 aua[4983]: id="3005" severity="warn" sys="System" sub="auth" name="Authentication failed" srcip="172.16.160.210" user=“sysadmin" caller="root" reason="Too many failures from client IP, still blocked for 517 seconds"

THANK YOU