THE USE OF NEW ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY BY CANADIAN PARTIES

by

Douglas A. DeRabbie

Department of P o l i t i c a i Science

Submitted in partial fulfihnent of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Faculty of Graduate Studies The University of Western Ontario

London, Ontario December 1996

Douglas A. DeRabbie 1997

National Library Biblioth&que nationale du Canada

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ABSTRACT

The thesis explores how the use of new electxonic

technology has changed party furid-raising methods and the

conduct of party election carnpaigns ta determine whether

Canadian political parties are experiencing a transformation.

The thesis looks at how parties use computers to conduct

research, polling, and conmunication. It then examines the

impact of that technology on the structure of the national

parties, particularly their riding associations. Finally, the

thes is reviews how success f ully Canadian parties have adap ted

to the new technology. Through the use of new electronic

technology, Canadian parties have found new ways to fulfil

traditional soles, as well as beginning to perform new ones.

Parties are strongly centralizing in the hands of the national

offices, and thus having a detrimental effect on local

parties. Canadian parties have had difficulty adapting to the

new technology for a number of reasons. Nevertheless, they

are entering a new party systera.

iii

This thesis is dedicated to rny mother fo r al1 her patience and support.

1 would l i k e to thank Professor S.J.R. Noel f o r his guidance and insight. 1 would also like to thank Doug Ferguson and Marg Stewart f o r providing

invaluable information.

TABLE

CERTIFICATE OF EXAMINATION . . ABSTRACT .................... ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............

.......... TABLE OF CONTENTS. LIST OF TABLES .............. LIST OF APPENDICES ..........

Page .. ii . iii ... v . . vi viii . ix

....................................... CHAPTERI-INTRODUCTION 1

1 . The Impact of the New T e c h n o l o g y on Party Furictions . . - 3 2 . The impact of the New Technology on Party Structure . . - 4 3 . The Impact of the New Technology on Parties and

.............................................. Politics 5 ........................................... 4.Methodology 6

........................... 5.TheSt~ctureoftheThesis 8 ............................................. Endnotes 11

CHAPTER 2-THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON PARTY FUNCTZONS ...... -13 1 . Individual Level Data Collection and-alysis ........ 1 4 2 . PublicOpinionPolling ............................... 19

..... 3 . Cornputer AssistedTelephone Interviewhg Systems 22 4 . PoliticalComuriication .............................. 25

....................... 5 . Direct Mail: List Production. -26 6 . DirectMail: Fund-Raising ........................... -27 7 - DirectMail: Targetbg ............................... 29 8 . Voter Communication: Electronic Mail and the

............................................. Intemet 3 5

............................................. Endnotes 42

CHAPTER 3-THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON PARTY ORGANIZATION .... 49

1 . The Impact of T e c h n o l o g y on L o c a l Party Fund-Raising -49 2 . The Impact of Technology on L o c a l Party Activity ..... 57 . ................. 3 Obstacles to Local Use of Technology 60

4 . The Impact of Technology on L o c a l Volunteers .. .. ..... 63 5 The Impact of Technology on L o c a l Party Organization . 69 6 . The Impact of Technology on Local Carnpaigns .......... 74

............................................. Endnotes 79

TheMarkethg Industryand Politics ........ The Influence 0fAmerica.n Parties .......... Borrowing F r o m O t h e r Canadian Parties ...... Adoptingthe New Technology ......-...... .... Obstacles to the Adoption of New Technology Budgetary C o n c e r n s .........................

................................... Endnotes

vii

LIST OF TABLES

Table Description Page 1 Number of Individual Contributions to Parties,,,.,.30

II Constituency Association Assets .................... 50 III Election Revenues and Expenses of Liberal

Candidates ......................................... 52

Revenues, Expenses and Reimbuxsement of Candidates, 1979, 1980, 1984, 1988 and 1993 General Elections .................................. 54

V Funds Currently Available to Constituency Associations, 1991 ................................. 55

VI The Diffusion of Political Innovation, , . . . . . . . . . . . .90

VI1 Election Expenses of Parties and Candidates ....... 1 0 7

viii

LIST OF APPENDICES

~ppendix

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX C

APPENDIX D

APPENDIX E

Page

London South 1990 Election Analysis ...... 1 1 9

............... Generai Canvass Entry Fo rm 120

Cornputer Campaign Fields ................. 121 Compusearch Report ....................... 122

........ L e t t e r f r o m Sue Barnes. Candidate 123

C f U P m R 1: INTRODUCTXO~

The use of new electronic technology has become an

increasingly important facet of Canadian electoral politics.

The purpose of this thesis is to explore how the use of that

technology has changed party fund-raising methods and the

conduct of party election campaigns. The main (but not

exclusive) focus is upon the federal Liberal Party, using the

London West Liberal Association as a riding level case study.

The main questions which will be examined are : does the use of

new technology constrain a party's ability to perform its

traditional roles, or does the new technology rather enable a

party to perform those roles more efficiently and more

effectively? Or does new technology create new roles?

John Meisel and Matthew Mendelsohn identify seven tasks

that have been assigned to Canadian political parties:

providing links between citizens and the state; setting the

policy agenda and formulating policy; recruitment of elites;

organization of government; st~cturing the vote and

elections; organizing public opinion; and aggregating

interests. They then proceed to argue that technological

change has led parties to experience a relative decline over

the past thirty years in their ability to fulfil these roles

in the Canadian political system. They cite, for instance,

the increased use of polling which has diminished the need for

local volunteers to relay their knowledge

to elected representatives. Moreover,

of public sentiments

they maintain, that

2

various forms of cornputer technology have reduced the two-way

f low of communication between parties and voters .' Despite the evidence of decline, Meisel and Mendelsohn

liken Canadian parties to chameleons which constantly survey

the political landscape, transforming themselves to react to

new circumstances in order to sustain their relevance as part

of the Canadian political process . They accordingly f eel that parties are becoming increasingly aware of the gap between

themselves and voters and are evolving in order to find new

ways to perform their traditional r o l e ~ . ~ In other words,

parties are transforming themselves in response ta changes in

the environment.' The argument of this thesis is that one of

their most important responses is the adoption of new

electronic technology for fund-raising and campaign purposes.

R . K . Carty has divided Canadian political history into

three party systems. ~eisel and Mendelsohn suggest that

although the third and most recent party system (1963 to the

present) was characterized by party decline, it may have been

a transitional stage to which parties are adapting themselves,

and a new "fourth" system is now emerging which is defined

above al1 by the parties0 use of the new campaign technology.

It would seem that the parties' main objective in this fourth

system is to reestablish links with voters through various

technological devices, such as direct mail, persona1 (as

opposed to mass) media. and public opinion polls .' This new

party system, Meisel and Mendelsohn speculate. may be

7 d

distinguished by "hyper-accountability", and in the long run

may serve to reaffirm the electoraters attachent to political

institutions by involving broad participation and off ering

more direct links between parties and voters.'

In order to detemine whether Canadian parties are

entering a fourth party system, the thesis will review

evidence so as to chart changes, if any, in party functions,

behaviour and organization.

THS -ACT OI THB HBW -LOGY ON PmTY m T I O N S

Cornputer applications such as polling, direct mail,

demographic analysis, and voter identification have

transformed the ways in which parties go after votes by

providing a cheaper, faster and more sophisticated means of

handling inf onnation. In doing so , the new electronic

technology brought about by the communications revolution may

also re-shape the ways in which voters interact with parties

by providing for meaningful two-way contact through new forms

of political expression.' Whereas television and talk radio

once weakened the ability of parties to offer constituents a

forum to express their views, the Internet helps to strengthen

the parties in their performance of this role. With the

potential for effective two-way co1[11~1unication through feedback

forms (questionnaires) and chat rooms (on-Une discussion

forums), the new technology may provide the means for

restoring the parties' central role as a link between

Parliament and voters. f f indeed parties have found a n e w

4

medium with computer technology through which they can more

ef fectively conmiunicate their message to voters, has this had

a reciprocal ef fect on p o l i t i c a l campaigning? More

importantly, has this change affected party structure?

T R s IMPACT O? TEB HEw ~ t O O Y OH PARTY S T R V C ~

Partly a response to the relative party decline of the

third system, a possible transformation of Canadian parties

would feature stronger central party organizations, as

reasoned by Meisel and ~endelsohn. Strong central party

organizations would theoretically mean a reduced role for

local riding associations and volunteers. A. Brian Tanguay and

Alain-G.Gagnon contend that use of the new communications

technology by the national offices, such as direct mail, has

made traditional party organizations less relevant to the

winning of elections . It is argued that, for the most part, local volunteers

no longer maintain a great deal of prominence within a party.

Instead, it i s the political professionals who have taken

preeminence w i t h i n party organizations. Since the early

198Os, polit ical candidates and parties have increasingly

depended on these professionals "to massage polling data,

generate direct mail material, group and classify voters on

the lists of electors, and identify priority polls for special

campaign attentionn.10 Accordingly, modern campaigning has

shifted the strategic role of the party from conception to

execution.ll Hence, has this shift in party orientation led

to the centralization of party organizations?

TRE =ACT OF THS NEW TSCl3NûtOOY Or0 PARTIES AM) POLXTICS

Rfter examining if parties have found new ways to

reestablish links between them and voters, with a

corresponding change in party structure, the question is

raised as to whether these changes have had a beneficial or

detrimental impact on Canadian parties and politics . With

computer technology cornes an increased capacity for electoral

exploitation and manipulation by parties than previously

possible.'* By setting different agendas for different voter

subgroups, has political marketing orientation made politics,

as suggested by Nicholas J. OyShaughnessy, more inconsistent

and opp~rtunistic?'~ Moreover, if parties prefer to use

technological wizardry ins tead of dialogue and compromise,

will the search for consensus and understanding be seriously

weakened?I4

Canadian parties have attempted to adapt to, and even

control, the newpoliticalrnarketing technologies(with varying

degrees of success) .15 Parties today must cope with rapidly

changing technologies. With each new election campaign,

another level of technical sophistication is added, of ten . -

going beyond the unders tanding and interes t of the party . -=

In light of this, have Canadian parties successfully kept pace

with recent developments in data processing, computer software

especially designed to implement political strategies, and

numerous other changes which appear on a daily basis?"

6

Technology is not just the hardware, nor is it j u s t the

set of arrangements which enable that technology to operate.

It is also the set of decisions about how that technology

ought to w~rk.'~ Hence, how have parties decided to use the

new technology? Are Canadian political parties using the new

technology to respond to changes and "lead" the public; or are

parties simply using it to more effectively "reflect" public

sentiments, and thus failing to understand the new technology?

M S T B O r n ~

This thesis examines the use of computer technology by

Canadian political parties, with a particular focus on the

federal Liberal Party. Cornputers were chosen as the form of

technology to focus on because they are involved in almost

every major aspect of election campaigns, such as individual

Ievel data collection, public opinion polling, and voter

communication. As well, cornputers are increasingly being used

by Canadian parties for both fund-raising and campaigning . üntil recently, it was difficult to find a political campaign

that effectively used persona1 computers. Now, however, al1

Canadian parties depend heavily on the capabilities of their

computer hardware and software.

The use of computers in the 1988 and 1993 federal

elections will be specifically examined, although sorne

historical background will also be reviewed, These two

elections were chosen because computer technology was

extensively used during both campaigns; and more importantly,

7

new uses of computer technology were introduced in these

elections.

The federal Liberal Party was chosen as the main focus

of the thesis for a number of reasons. First, as a major

party, it has the capability to raise the substantial funds

which are required for the use anci development of computer

technology. Second, the Liberal Party was chosen because it

is one of the traditional parties; hence, through it, it is

possible to chart the historical use of technology by a

Canadian party. Third, since the Liberal Party is large and

well-organized, Ft is also possible to explore the initial

impact of technology on party organization. Finally, the

Liberal party was chosen because it employs most applications

of cornputer technology.

The London West Liberal Association will be used as a

case study, looking at how it used technology during the 1993

federal election campaign. The thesis will discuss the

various techniques the party used, the problems they

encountered, why technology was used, and its affects on the

local campaign. The association will be used to illustrate

major points throughout the thesis.

The sources which are used include books, articles,

essays, publicly available information on the Internet and the

research studies done for the Royal Commission on Electoral

Reform and Party Financing (Lortie Commission) . Although the main focus is the Liberal Party, various officials, campaign

8

managers and office workers of the Progressive Consemative

Party, the NDP, and the Reforrn Party were interviewed. In

doing so, the use of computer technology by the Liberal Party

will be compared and contrasted with other Canadian parties

where relevant. Cornparisons with how American political

parties use computer technology are also made throughout the

thesis. The methodology of the thesis is an interview-based,

qualitative case study.

THE STRVCTmE OF TEE THESIS

Chapter Two examines the history of the use of computer

technology by Canadian political parties, particularly during

the 1988 and 1993 federal elections, and explores how

computers have been used in preparation for elections and

during elections. This chapter attempts to assess the efforts

of Canadian parties to f ind new wayç to reestablish links with

voters . Three main computer applications are investigated:

namely, research, polling, and communication. The f irs t

application to be surveyed in this chapter is research. How

computers aid in the collection, storage and analysis of data

on issues and on individual voters is profiled. Cornputers

have increased the efficiency with which parties perform t h i s

function. Yet, how has this increased efficiency impacted on

how parties r u n their canipaigns? Regarding polling, computer

assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) and predictive dialling

systems will be examined. How computers aid in tracking the

'political moodn in both individual ridings and the nation as

a whole will be explored. The third and final application is

the use of contemporary technology to communicate information

about candidates, party, and policy to the public, The use of

electronic mail and the relatively recent use of web sites on

the Internet by Canadian political parties are examined. In

addition, the use of direct mail will be surveyed, in terms of

both targeting and fund-raising. The thesis looks at how

parties use CD-ROMs, especially in setting up databanks of

past and potential contributors, and computerized methods of

mailing for fund-raising purposes, which will illustrate how

political marketing techniques were extended to the field of

party finance . Chaptes Three examines how computer technology is used

by the central organization of Canadian parties and by their

local riding associations. In looking at the former, how the

national office prepares for an upcodng election is given

significant attention, including the creation of direct mail

packages for their riding associations. The use of computer

technology by the riding associations focuses on local

polling, the tracking of the vote, and the collection of

individual data. The chapter then assesses which functions,

previously performed by local volunteers, have been taken over

by cornputers. In doing sa, the a b is to interpret how the

use of computer technology has changed the nature of Canadian

political parties, and especially of party organizations.

10

Chapter Four examines where t h e Liberal Party acquires

ideas on how t o use computer technology. Are they obta ined

f rom volunteers? From prof essionals? From other parties? From

other countries? Why do they choose certain technologies over

o the r s? T h i s chapter also discusses how political parties

have adapted to the new electronic technology. In doing s o ,

possible explanations of the differences between the Liberals

and o t h e r parties are explored.

The thesis concludes by reviewing the impact which the

use of technology has had on Canadian political parties, and

by trying to answer if parties have indeed entered a " fou r th"

party system. With the advent of new computer technology, the

personnel within the campaign organization of parties has

indeed changed. But, has the takeover by election technicians

weakened the grassroots party organizations? Have they become

weak and hollow as computers and other technology have taken

over their primary role of reaching voters with the party's

message? Or, have these new political techniques i n fact

strengthened p a r t y organizations and Ied t o a transformation

of Canadian political parties?

1. John Meisel and Matthew Mendelsohn, "Meteor? Phoenix? Chameleon? The Decline and Transformation of Party in Canadan,Partv Politics in Canada, 7th ed., ed.~ugh G. Thorburn, ( Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada lac. , 19 9 6) ,

2. Meisel and Mendelsohn, pp.178-9.

3. Meisel and Mendelsohn, p.192.

5. Keith Melder, "The Birth of Modern Campaigning", The Road to Victorv, ed. Ron Faucheux, (Dubuque:Kendall/Kunt Publishing Co., 1995), p.569, and Meisel and Mendelsohn,

6. Thomas S. Axworthy, "Capital-Intensive Politicsw, Issues in Partv and Election Finance, ed. F.Leslie Seidle, volume 5 of the Research Studies, (Ottawa and Toronto:RCERPF/Dundum, 1991), p.199, and Ron Faucheux, " Campaigri Trends ' 9 6 " , [http://www.camelect,com/july/record.htm] , July 1996.

7. R.K. Carty, "Party Organization and Activity on the Ground", in Canadian Parties in Transition, 2nd ed., eds. A. Brian Tanguay and Alain-GoGagnon, (Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1996) , p.75, and Axworthy, p. 199.

8. Meisel and Mendelsohn, p.192.

9. A. Brian Tanguay and Alain-G, Gagnon, "Introductionw, in Canadian Parties in Transition, 2nd ed., p . 5 .

10. John Laschinger and Geoffrey Stevens, Leaders and Lesser Mortals, (Toronto:Key Porter Books Ltd., 1992), p .23 .

11 . R.M. Lee, One Hundred Monkevs, (Toronto: Macfarlane Walter and Ross, 1989), p.135.

12. A.Brian Tanguay, "Canadian Party Ideologies in the Electronic Agen, Canadian Political Partv Svstems, ed. R.K. Carty, (Toronto:Broadview Press, 1992), p.479.

13. Nicholas J. OfShaughnessy, The Phenornenon of Political Marketinq, (fiondomThe Macmillan Press Ltd., 1990), pp.6-

14. Meisel and Mendelsohn, p.193.

15. Tanguay and Gagnon, p .6 .

16. Frank 1 . Luntz, Candidates, Consultants, and C - a i s n s , (Oxford: Basil Blackwell L t d . , 1988). p.14.

17. Melder, p.569.

18, John Street, Politics and Technolow, (London: Macmillan, 1992) , p.9 .

CHAPTBR 2 : THB IMPACT OF TgCfIWOtOOY ON PARTY WHCTIONS

The purpose of this chapter is to survey the use of

computer technology by Canadian political parties,

particularly the federal Liberal Party. It will focus on the

various techniques used by parties for f und-raising and during

the federal election campaigns of 1988 and 1993. Cornparisons

with American parties will be made where relevant. The

chapter will examine three specific applications of computer

technology: voter data collection and analysis, public opinion

polling, and communication. The thesis of this chapter is

that the use of technology by political parties illustrates

that they have found new ways to perforn traditional roles.

The new cornputer technology is composed of three

characteristics which distinguish it from previous election

technology : speed, reactivity, and interactivity . l Computers

have enhanced a party's ability to respond to voters, issues,

and attacks from other parties or candidates. They make

possible an aimost instant reaction to a question posed by a

voter or another candidate; and more importantly, a quick

party response t o shifts in public opinion. The enhanced

ability of parties to collect and store data on voters,

through computerization, has led to increased interaction

between the two groups. The computer may thus be the medium

that allows for the interactivity between voters and

politicians that television failed to provide.

INDIVIWAL LEVBG MTA COG&SCTXOW AND m Y S I S

The information candidates presently have about the

attitudes of their constituents has never been greater.

Obtained f rom either cons tituency-level polling data or

" individual-level" data, political information is used to

improve a Party's ability to analyze and understand voters.'

Although polling data rexnains important, parties are beginning

to recognize a need to know more details about individual

voters .' As a result, parties have been progressively pursuing

"data scooping activities", which means acquiring information

on a voter prior to contact.' They attempt to capture basic

persona1 data such as age, occupation, gender and lifestyle,

as illustrated by a Liberal Party campaign manual which

suggests various "campaign fieldsn (Le. headings} for the

computer in order to accommodate the new information (see

Appendix A). Moreover, by using contemporary software

packages, newly acquired information can easily be added to a

computer file for future reference.'

Parties are using computer technology to track ridings

so as to compile a highly accurate voter's list for the next

election. With Elections Canada supplying voter list data on

diskettes six days after enumeration is completed, a local

campaign is able ta extract and sort these lists to f i l 1 in

the missing names and addresses on its list of voters. In

doing so, the campaign can gain a head start on door-to-door

canvassing . The 1993 f ederal campaign was the f irst in which

15

the Liberal Party had a voter's list on cornputer disk. The

list contained the voterf s complete address, but lacked phone

nubers . The London West Liberal Association used a customized

software program, designed by local party volunteers, during

the 1993 f ederal election because the List provided on disk by

the national party w a s incomplete. The association's program

compiled a voter's list based on the lists from the previous

federal, provincial and municipal elections, as well as from

the 1992 referendum. Once completed, these lists were stored

according to poll number in a computer database. Telephone

numbers were then looked up and entered into the system for

each voter. When completed, these lists w e r e printed and used

for phone canvassing, in w h i c h interviewers could check off

how the respondents said they would vote, and if Liberal,

whether they wanted a sign or wished to volunteer. The

information obtained from the phone canvasç was then entered

into the systen. This process was similar for the general, or

door-to-door, canvass. The data that was collected and

inputted culminated in a list of identified party supporters

that was then used in home centres* on election day. These

lists, of course, contained the supporters' phone nwnbers, so

they could be contacted to ensure that they had voted (see

Appendix B) .

Home centres rnonitor who has voted and contact identified supporters who have yet to vote.

16

Transaction generated data provides parties with an even

more detailed portrait of a voter, especially when linked wi th

polling data.' Retailers, such as A&P grocers, offer

individual computerized " discountm cards to cus tomers willing

to s igr: a £0- providing personal information. C I J . Alexander states that, "in exchange for the right to track one* s

individual shopping habits, the person receives a

tsurveilla.ce ~ubsidy'".~ The compiled lists of names, along

with other important information, are then rented out tu other

businesses, and also to political parties. This process will

be discussed in greater detail later i n the chapter.

Once obtained, parties analyze and interpret this raw

data in ways t h a t are much more meaningful and revealing than

previously possible. Elections Canada, for example, is

becoming more and more "wiredn, and this has the potential to

provide signif icant advances in a party* s conduct of election

campaigns. It now provides election results in a machine

xeadable format, and this allows for greater ease of analysis

in preparation for future electoral event~.~

Using historical election data, polls in a riding can be

ranked according to the partyfs vote percentage in the

previous election. For the past three provincial elections,

the Ontario Liberal Party (OLP) has distributed cornputer

programs for p o l l analysis to the local riding associations.

These programs were capable of perf orming the necessary

calculations and producing a list of the polls in the riding

17

divided into strong, swing and weak polls ( s e e Appendix C ) . For the 1995 election, OLP developed a new program entitled

"VotePron. This DOS-based program was to be used to track

voter support during the campaign. Although difficult to

operate, it contained useful information such as an unof f icial

voter s list , some telephone numbers , and demographic

information. More importantly, a riding association could

extract the data f r o m this program and enter it into their own

custom database program, as did the London South Liberal

Association.

In addition to election analyses, survey research has

also been used by some parties and candidates to conduct

computerized media buying." In this instance, computers are

used to analyze the ratings of television shows not j u s t by

the nuniber of people who are watching, but also by the kind of

people who are watching.I2 This allows a party to both

eff ectively target their ads during times of optimum viewing,

as well as targeting particular ads to certain demographic

sectors of society. For example, Cornpusearch offers the 1995

Television Spending Index ( T S I ) . This is a media planning and

buying tool based on a linkage of Compusearch's PSYTE

segmentation system and Nielsen Marketing Research television

audience measurement services. Variations of this program are

also available for magazine, newspaper, cable and radio

applications. As can be seen, computers are changing the

nature of election campaigns by enabling parties and

18

candidates not only to analyze past election results, but also

to use new methods of analyçis and advertising placement.

The advent of the high-speed micro-computer, along with

the existence of more than 3,500 electronic databases, enables

parties to survey the f l o w of new ideas and social issues.

Cornputer technology eliminates the countless number of

volunteer hours needed to read hunùreds of thousands of

publications, coding and clipping articles of interest, and

then filing them in an easy-to-use reference systern." With

h-andreds of outlets pos ting thousands of pages of publicly

available information, parties will soon be able ta do most of

their issue research on the fnternet . L4 Additionally,

today's commercially available databases contain almost

everything being published. As a result, parties have the

ability to scrutinize several million articles in order to

determine the frequency with which an issue or subject has

been mentioned over a specif ic t h e period, and this quickly

generates a trend that can then be incorporated into a

campaign strategy. Moreover, a set of issues can be tracked

through a particular medium to monitor bow treatment and

patterns of coverage differ.15 This new form of issue or

trend analysis allows parties to conduct research comparable

to the speed with which issues emerge and change in today's

society. Traditional methods of analysis simply cannot keep

pace with a society where information rnoves at the speed of

light . '' With improved methods of collecting information on

19

issues, parties not only have the potential to make a more

infomed decision on a particular policy, but they also have

the ability to respond to television news reports and,

possibly, to better educate voters on issues.

PUBLIC O P ~ O W POtIinm

The second application to be reviewed is the use of

cornputer technology to conduct public opinion polling.

Polling in Canada began during the Second World War when

Ottawa conunissioned opinion surveys on the home front. The

first political polls were conducted by the Gallup

organization during the Ontario election of 1943. Yet, it

would take two decades before polling became a regulax feature

of political campaigning, although during the 1950s the

federal parties had done some limited partisan polling.17

Systematic national polling was first applied in

Canadian federal campaigns by the Liberal party in the early

1960d8 Impressed with t h e way that John F. Kennedy had

used polling during his run for the American presidency in

1960, Keith Davey, the Liberals national director at t h e tirne,

commissioned Kennedy's pollster, Louis Harris, to do surveys

during the 1962 and 1963 federal elections .19 The Liberals

also hired ~arris between elections to monitor public opinion,

and this was the first time t h a t a Canadian political party

had sys tematically checked public opinion. 'O By the Trudeau

era, polling was considered essential in Canadian political

life.21

20

The 1962 election was also the first in which polling

was used to match a candidate to a constituency, which today

is c~mmonplace.~~ In this, polling is used to determine in

which riding a candidate should run by comparing the strengths

of the candidate with the demographics of the riding.

Conducted by the national party, this type of poll analysis is

used in only exceptional cases, such as for a party leader

without a seat or a 'star8 candidate.

The Liberals s u ~ e y e d extensively during the 1970s, with

Martin Goldfarb contracted to do most of the Party's

business. 23 Goldf arb was the f irst Canadian pollster hired

to work on a continuing basis with a political party."

Since the early 1970s, both the Liberals and the Conservatives

have forged close links with particular polling f irms whose

main business is market re~earch.~' The Conservatives, under

Robert Stanfield, began an ongoing relationship with Robert

Teeter and the Decision Making Information group of Richard B.

Wirthlin. Canadian expertise has over the years been

developing, and political pollsters are now considered - -

indispensable partners in camgaign planning and strategies.-'

Canadian parties, however, are beginning to use new

technology to run sophis ticated " in-housen programs of their

own, which combine polling and canvassing. Optical scanning

technology, for instance, speeds up sorne of the more labour-

intensive and mundane aspects of political canvassing. A

system of bar-coded lists enables a phone bank supervisor to

obtain canvassing results by waving a l igh t pen attached to a

micro-cornputer. Specialized software and pr in ters then

produce phone and general canvass lists with voter

identification numbers translated into bar codes sirnilar to

those found on rnost co~ercial goods . Each response to the

survey questions is likewise coded. In a matter of hours,

data from a phone or general canvass can be collected and

processed optically; and faster processing means faster

turnaround on f ollow-up calls and mailings . After the

scanning is completed, the resulting file cari either be loaded

into a computer, transmitted to campaign headquarters, or sent

to the campaign's direct mail consultant. This process is

considered user-friendly, but it is not cost-ef fective for

srna11 campaigns to use.27 Aithough this technology was made

available to provincial ~iberal riding associations during the

1995 Ontario election, it was neither extensively nor

effectively used.

Despite interna1 applications, Canadian parties continue

to rely heavily upon professional pollsters to capture the

political mood.'' For the major political parties in Canada,

polling has become the basic antenna that guides the election

campaign. '' According to Khayyam Zev Paltiel:

Pollsters attempt to track and monitor the impact of the campaign through close and ongoing observation of key ridings and sub-constituencies, the object being to allow quick tactical adjustment based on perceived shifts in public opinion. Their findings prompt party strategists to modify preset campaign plans, including the itineraries and the content of their national leaders ' speeches. 'O

As noted above, polling has been a mainstay of Canadian

campaigns for over thirty yearç. However, the arriva1 of

advanced computer technologyhas enhanced and extended polling

techniques, as evidenced by candidate-feasibility studies,

riding analyses, issue assessment, and vote targeting."

Using cornputers programmed with census data, addresses, and

past voting patterns, pollsters prepare lists of specific

questions for telephone callers to ask voters on a particular

st~eet.'~ Cornputers have also greatly improved a pollster's

ability to measure the public's response ta a candidate and

his or her ideas and then to instantly calculate shif ts in

opinion. One such application allows a computer to collect

information f rom hand-held devices on which participants in

focus groups twist knobs or punch digital keypads to register

their feelings about a commercial, a speech, a debate or any

other component of a campaign. Borrowed from commercial

advertising, the main attraction of this system is its ability

to f ollow an audience ' s response ins tantaneously wi thout

having to wait until afterwards in order to question people

about what they liked and di~liked.'~

COmawmR AsszsTBn ~ P f f O ~ I w m R V I m (CATI) SYSTmas

Political pollsters now survey public opinion using a

systern originally designed by market research f irms . Known as Cornputer Assis ted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) sys t a s , these

sophisticated systems automate much of the activity before and

after an interview.34 For example, the CATI system either

23

stores telephone numbers internally or provides its own

numbers using a random digit telephone number generator."

Telephone polls are often done by a system called

random-digi t dialling where no directories are used, but

rathsr phone nurnbers are selected at random frorn known working

exchanges and area codes. 36 RDD sampling programs are built

into most carnpaign software packages, eliminating problems

such as unlisted and out-of-date numbers, as well as answering

machines. Since random-digit dia1 procedures are cornputer

generated, they rninimize staff t h e and effort , only requiring

the entry of preliminary information specific ta the local

area. After a few minutes of staff the, the programs

generate numbers and p r i n t thern in lists, on call sheets, or

store them electronically for integration with other survey

software. 37

Another aspect of the CATI system is its ability to

instantly decide how to handle each call. It notes completed

interviews and ineligible numbers, which are then retired from

the file, It detects busy signals and no-answers and calls

these back at programmed t h e intervals. It also makes note

of those who cannot start or finish an interview, and then

dials them back later to complete the q~estionnaire.'~ When

the cornputer finally identifies a human voice, the cal1 is

instantaneously routed to an available conununicator,

Once a voter answers the phone, the interviewer is

prompted by a display of textual material and questionnaire

24

items displayed on a video screen in the party's or firm's

office. Each possible response category for each question is

also displayed, together with a code number for each category,

as well as the complete history of the re~pondent.~~ In such

a fully automated polling center, the interviewer barely needs

to do anything other than stare at the screen and talk with

the respondent , thereby virtually eliminating paperwork. 'O

During the interview, CATI directs the flow of the

questionnaire, accomodating cornplex "if-then" routines that

make the order of questions contingent on the string of

previous an~wers.~' Checking for ineligible responses, it

also allows interviewers to back up and review earlier

questions. More importantly, its dialling and number-

management keep the calls moving along . " When the

respondent answers a question, the interviewer enters the

appropriate response code and then proceeds to the next

questionnaire item. As the CATI system assists the

interviewer, the information on each registrant is used to

constmct a database, thus adding to the knowledge-base about

each potential voter polled." Moreover, at any tine in a

survey, researchers can analyze the growing database, as well

as monitor trends and obtain early indications of public

views . 44 Using this kind of machinery, an interviewer is

able to reach more deeply into a list than ever bef ore, and do

so at a lower ~ost.~'

The New Democratic Party (NDP) campaign in the 1993

25

federal election used this type of cornputer system to provide

high level contact with voters. Chosen for its predictive

dialling capability rather than for comprehensive number

crunching, this new technique enhanced the partyts telephone

canvassing and f und-raising by means of automated dialling ,

electronic data entry of the responses, and computerized

telephone lists purchased from telephone ~ompanies.'~ It was

also able to provide detailed voting information £rom the

targeted ridings , and as the Partyt s campaign increasingly

focused on a few winnable seats, the utility of predictive

dialling g r e w correspondingly . " DMZ Direct Marketing Ltd.

also offers a predictive dialling system, which allows

campaigns to combine a highly targeted direct mail carnpaign

with a fully computerized phone bank system to reinforce the

campaign message.

POLITZCAL CO-CATIOH

The final application to be explored is how computers

f acilitate voter communication. Today, more than ever ,

political campaigns are conmiunication campaigns . 49 The

sophisticated use of modern technology has brought about

significant changes in political campaign communications,

enhancing the ability of parties to interact with voterda

As home computer use spreads, and as Internet comect ion

becomes more common, the nature of campaigns could be

fundamentally altered through computers by allowing voters to

interact with the candidate from their own homes. This rapid

26

and "personal" interaction might permit candidates the

possibility of repositioning their stance on certain issues,

and it might also encourage voters to modify their views

regarding the candidate.

DXRSCT B¶Ut:tIST PROOIlCTIO~

Since cornputers firs t made in-roads into political

campaigns during the mid-i980s, communications have become

increasingly targeted and personalized, as evidenced by the

growing use of direct mail by p o l i t i c a l parties.52 In order

to target potential voters more accurately, parties compile

lis ts that provide highly specialized information about

voters.53 These lists are assembled from a variety of

sources, such as previous donors, contacts lists, and marked

lists, such as those whose names w e r e generated by

canvassing. 54

Parties today increasingly rent lists £rom brokers when

their own list does not include names which would be relevant

to a particular mailing ." Even though the Liberals have a

custom designed database system, they also use a list broker

to contract out large direct mailings, particularly through

the Canadian Direct Marketing ~ssociation.'~ "List brokers"

analyze the party's data needs, research what is available,

and then arrange an agreement between buyer and seller."

Through InfoDirect, an affiliate of Be11 Canada, a party has

access to over ten million consumer and business listings

across Canada. These lists are nomally rented for a "one-

27

time use", and then only for a purpose arraaged contractually

with the Clients must then provide a copy of the

mailing piece or telephone script pr io r to the provision of

the Est. Moreover, InfoDirect reserves the right to refuse

the rental of its lists to any organization. 59

DIRECT M U L : m - R A I S -

A direct mail fund-raising effort by a political party

or candidate is a two-step process. During the "prospecting"

phase, personalized letters are sent to potential campaign

donors to solicit a contribution. The second step is the

renewal or *housen phase where direct mail appeals are sent to

proven donors.

Using gimmicks and personalization, parties produce

letters to thank recipients for previous donations and to

refer to a specific future electoral campaign. Compter

personalization has become useful not so much for its ability

to reproduce the donorfs name in the greeting and elsewhere

throughout the letter as it is for its capacity to make

specific references to the donorfs prior giving history, plus

a few relevant facts concerning his or her life? This

letter is usually closed with a carefully tailored " P . S * "

message for each type of registrant .62 This technique

requises an elaborate cornputer program and the highest quality

laser printer . 63

A major advancement in direct mail resulted f r o m the

arriva1 of the high speed laser printer, This type of printer

28

has become an essential component of a campaign, espec ia l ly

çince a party must follow up a phone cal1 hmediately with

persuasion mail.64 Combining both speed and quality, the

laser printer has the ability to do almost anything the

computer tells it to do, such as print in different fonts ,

pxint words sideways and upside dom, and print "handwritten"

notes. Interestingly, this kind of technology has actually

lowered and not increased the overal l cost of pxoducing a

direct mail campaign. 65

The PC Party first began its direct m a i l operation in

1975, followed by the NDP in 1978 .66 Although the Liberal

Party made its first effort in 1981, its first ' serious'

effort was not made uitil the 1984-1985 period. In the

Liberal Party, interna1 computer use in direct mail is

currently confined to list generation, project analysis, and

receipting. The party prefers to employ an outside agency to

conduct the prograd' The PCs first used directhail in the

1970s when, out of power, the party had difficulty raising

money from large con tribut or^.^' Taking advantage of the

incentives for individual contributions offered by the

election expense reforms of 1974, they employed the knowledge

of the U S . Republican Party's direct mail experts.69

The Republican Party, which has been using direct mail

for fund-raising since the l97Os, has generated a significant

portion of its revenue through this technique. In 1975, the

party had a list of only 24,000 names; but by 1984, its list

29

of proven donors had expanded to over 2 -1 million."

Canadian parties have also experieaced an increase in the

number of individual contributions. For example, the Liberal

Party received donations f r o m 13,373 individuals in 1975.. By

1991, this number had almost doubled to 26,396 (see Table 1) . Larry JI Sabato argues that direct mail broadens the committed

base of a party, since contributing money usually strengthens

the tie between a voter and any organization." Even though

the overall number of individual contributors to Canadian

parties has increased, this number wildly fluctuates f rom year

to year. (see Table 1) Consequently, it m a y be premature to

Say that direct mail fund-raising provides the means with

which to broaden the committed base of Canadian political

parties.

DIRECT M U & : TARGETIMG

The whole range of gimrnicks and computer personalization

devices developed over the years by direct mail fund-raisers

to elicit contributions are now used in targeted mailings to

attract voter support. 72 By allowing campaign organizations

to be highly selective in targeting audiences, direct mail

offers parties something that cannot be readily duplicated by

any other existing f o m of political advertising." These

computer generated letters are used to provide a partial

connection between the po tential voter and the candidate. '' For instance, letters for George Bush in 1980, when he was

running for vice-president of the United States, included

YEAR P.C. LIBERAL M)P

1974(5 months) 6 423 4 117 27 910

1975 10 341 13 373 58 889

1976 23 409 18 261 56 142

1977 20 339 2 1 063 60 169

1978 35 615 22 350 67 133

1979 34 952 13 025 63 655

1980 32 720 17 670 62 428

1981 48 125 24 735 56 545

1982 52 694 27 968 66 665

1983 99 264 33 649 65 624

1984 93 199 29 056 80 027

1985 75 117 28 545 97 364

1986 52 786 35 369 90 487

1987 39 320 28 972 87 927

1988 53 893 30 642 118 390

1989 40 191 19 970 89 290

1990 27 702 36 361 116 448

1991 27 391 26 396 94 080

Source:Table 8.2, volume 1, RCERPF, p. 521-

3 1

reprints of news articles with "personal" notes from Bush

laser printed in the top margini ." Tasgeting is based on the assumption that voters are

individuals with varying demographics, attitudes and

lifestyles and that these differences should be recognized in

any communications strategy, either during the pre-mit period

or the actual ~arnpaign.'~ During the 1984 federal election,

the PC Party experimented with direct mail as a means of

political commuaication. Esnploying the services of Mary Ellen

Miller, a Republican direct mail expert, they used the

geodemographic targeting" technique of locating vo ters in

" swing" ridings , who then received letters and telephone

solicitations ." P a r t of the P C s f success in the 1988 election cari be

attributed to their mastery of campaign technology, which

ranged f rom their clever application of polling results t o

their unders tanding of television to their s trong interna1

communications netwosk, as exemplif ied by Target ' 8 8.

Designed to reach as many undecided voters as possible, Target

' 88 featured a highly defined list of about 5000 voters in

each of the forty ridings cho~en.'~ To identify these

voters, Decima's riding-profile polls were consulted. The

idea was to identify four "lifestylen categories that

contained a high ratio of undecided voters. A list of al1

voters in the riding who f itted those lifestyle categories was

then obtained £rom InfoDirect. Another company at tached

addresses, phone numbers and postal codes to the names. This

process took only a couple of days to camplete. Next, a laser

printer generated a cus tomized "personal letter to each

undecided voter, mechanically signed by then-prime minister,

Brian ~uironey.~~ It asked each person on the list to mite

back with their views and concerns. The letter was followed

up with a phone cal1 asking about the voterr s concerns and

then by a second letter with a response, one of thirty-three

prepared beforehand, tailored to the person's specific

problems or opinions. Finally, a second phone cal1 was made

on election day to ensure that the person had in fact

voted."

Market profiles are quickly evolving into detailed

mosaics of individuals. Technological advances have made it

both cheaper and easier than ever to gather database

information. 82 The Claritas Corporation, founded in 1971,

has created forty separate "clusters", which contain al1 of

America's neighbourhoods that exhibit similar socio-economic

and demographic char acte ris tic^.^^ The Company develops an

action plan which locates the optimum, or lowest risk, small

geographic areas where the people live who are most likely to

respond to the message delivered in a positive mannes. 84 The

system created by Claritas, called Prizm, was first used in

Novernber of 1978 when the opponents of a proposed right-to-

work resolution in Missouri contracted the Company in order to

maximize the campaign' s resources . 95

Geodemographic targeting has

Canadian political parties, thanks to

Social Research Limited of Toronto

3 3

been widely used by

Compusearch Market and

Founded in 1974,

Compusearch crossbred Statistics Canada census data with the

national system of postal codes to produce a detailed database

on the way every Canadian household lives. Created in 1984,

"Lifestyles" was a database t h a t neatly divided the nation

into 70 kinds of neighbourhoods t h a t are easy t o identify. 36

PSYTE is Compusearch' s new c l u s t e r system based on the 1 9 9 1

Census. Six rnonths in the rnaking, it came out in October 1994

with 60 clusters. After a riding is 'clusteredf, computers

then decide which letter is most likely to appeal to a voter,

depending on the block where the citizen lives.''

Contracted by the Liberal caucus in 1993, Compusearch

designed a lifestyles report for a lirnited number of ridings.

The report contained specific information such as the number

of households in each 'lifestylef in the riding, the

percentage that each lifestyle composed in the riding, and the

benchmark percentage as compaxed to the overall average i n the

province (see Appendix D). The 'lifestyles codesf are based

on the assumption t h a t similar households tend to Iive

together or 'cluster'. This knowledge is then used to target

specific voters regarding issues t h a t they are most likely t o

be concerned about. Databases such as the one created by

Compusearch enable a party to more effectively use direct

mail.

34

The emerging technology of database marketing indicates

a trend toward more personalized and differentiated direct

mail appeals by Canadian parties and candidate^.'^ With this

new technology, parties are cultivating an increasingly

personalized bond between the voter and candidate." For

example, the Liberal candidate in London West, Susan Barnes,

used a geodemographically-generated letter in the final weeks

of the 1993 federal election. Using the lifestyle codes

obtained from Compusearch, letters were sent to those codes

where the Liberal vote was even or behind, specif ically voters

aged 25-44 with average to above average incornes and w i t h

young children. This demographic was reflected in the letter

sent to these voters, as it focused on job creation, health

care and the deficit - issues which the party knew £rom its polls would be of most interest to these particular voters.

The letter, of which between 1000 and 1500 wexe sent out, was

simple, addressed personally to the voter, actually signed by

Barnes, and hand-delivered (see Appendix E) . By providing a

more meaningful connection between the voter and the party,

cornputers enable parties and candidates to make more extensive

gel-out-the-vote and voter contact efforts.

Computerized direct mail allows parties to set dif ferent

agendas for different voter sub-groups, discovering groups to

elhinate, as well as groups on which to f o c u ~ . ~ ~ Saying

different things to different people is not a modern

technique, but targeting through computerization is easier to

3 5

do and harder to catch.g1 This practice may accordingly have

harmful implications for the political process . BY

encouraging voters to adopt a black and white v i e w of the

world, targeting may further accentuate differences between

voter groups .g2 Moreover, most people accept the agenda set

by targeted campaigns, which may lead to a rise in se l f i sh

expe~tation.~' Voters will expect parties to deliver on

promises made during a campaign because targeting demons trat es

to voters that parties are a w a r e of and understand their

concerns, and more importantly, c l a h to be able to resolve

them. This, of course, can easily backfire. Thus, parties

must be extremely cautious in how they use new electronic

technology to control the political agenda.

An unmistakable property of the new technologies is that

it enables parties and voters to send and receive information

much faster than previously p~ssible.~' With an Internet

connection, e-mail is easily exchanged, thereby providing a

sense of immediacy and convenience that other forms of

communication fail to o f f e ~ . ' ~ Nicholas Negroponte, founding

director of the Media Lab at the Massachusetts Inst i tute of

Technology, believes that e-mail will be the dominant

interpersonal medium of the future. 96 If, as Negroponte

speculates, e-mail does become the major interpersonal medium

of communication, it will be important for Canadian parties to

fully understand this medium i f they w i s h to use it to

36

establish links between them and voters.

Of al1 the properties of the new communications

technology, the capacity for interaction between party and

voter sharply dis tinguishes the new technology , especially the

Internet, £rom the old." Through the Internet and

particularly the World Wide Web (WWW) , voters can typically

view speeches, biographies, positions on issues, press

releases, campaign schedules, and information on how to

support the candidate or make a donation. In addition to

communicating with voters through the Internet, parties and

candidates also solicit suggestions on a wide variety of

issues and topics. Voters are further able to talk back to a

candidatesf campai- or a political party through e - m a i l or

on-line polling." Both the Reform party and the NDP, for

example, have questioanaires that people can f il1 out on the

partiesf respective web sites.

The new electronic technology enables vote rs to acquire

m o r e information, to acquire new kinds of information, and

change how they access information. Voters today are able to

acquire more information electronically than can be conveyed

by other means, such as through newsclips or political

For instance, systems of expanded user control, particularly

the Intemet, allow voters to acquire more information about

how a political party proposes to deal with their particular

concerns . As Marshall McLuhan wrote three decades ago in

37

Understandina Media, a new communication system never simply

extends an old one, since new technology creates new

content. 'O1 Through the Internet, the public can create

entirely new kinds of information, and more importantly,

voters have the power to determine the type of information

which they receive.'02 With high-tech web sites, parties are

increasingly posting news-breaking political information for

voters to view.

The new electronic technology has greatly expanded the

ways in which voters gain access t o existing information.

Although this information has always been available, it was

usually beyond the reach of the average p e r ~ o n . ' ~ ~ With the

World Wide W e b , a person can browse the Internet without

having to learn a lot of comands, thus making the process of

accessing sites on the Internet extremely user-friendly."'

By of fering voters informative speeches which can be

downloaded at will on any topic they want, and the opportunity

to express their opinion, parties are opening up new

opportunities for voters to participate in campaigns without

leaving their homes, and at a t h e of their choosing. This

will require finding new ways to practice politics "at the

retail level around the clock. 'O5 ~merican parties have

begun to respond to this change, as evidenced by the 'Dole for

President web site, which greeted visitors with an on-line

guest book, volunteer and donation forms, and campaign

information. The Dole Campaign web site sets itself apart

38

f rom other campaign sites through its considerable

interactivity. Major new sections are planned to corne on-line

soon including a section f o r children that, it is claimed,

will serve as "both an information and educational t oo l " . 'O6

The Internet is becomBng increasingly popular as a

channel of communication for political parties and candidates.

For instance, rather than scheduling a press conference,

Republican presidential candidate L a m a r Alexander announced

his candidacy on-line on February 27,1995. Three months

later, he opened a campaign headquarters on the Web, which is

that part of the Internet where users can browse and download

tex t , sound, images and video. ' O 7

Previously, parties were best able to deliver their

messages to voters through television; but this is beginning

to change with the emergence of the Internet. Candidates are

using the power of this new two-way interaction to reach out

to voters, hoping to inform them, and more importantly, to

recruit them into t h e i r campaigns. The Internet thus affords

a possible return to true grass-roots organizing . 'O8

However, parties should remember that the Interner is not a

political "panacean, as it is unlikely that it will cornpletely

replace other means of voter contact.lo9 According to Adam

Sohn, Director of Technology for the 1996 Clinton/Gore

Campaign, W e want to get everybody involved and you can

canvass al1 you want and we're going to. But, this is another

way, it is a complimentary[sic] tool to reach out to hundreds

3 9

of thousands of voters. ''O

Canadian political parties have slowly begun to

recognize the possibilities which present themselves through

rnaintainiag a web site on the Internet. Through the federal

Liberal Partyf s web site, which went on-line February 22,

1996, voters can offer suggestions and comments, and they can

also access information concerning the party and its policies.

Although there is no opportunity at the present time f o r

voters to make policy suggestions through their web site, the

Liberal party hopes to eventually make their web site another

means of gathering policy input."'

The Liberal Party believes that its web site will take

some of the pressure off its communications team, especially

its information office, as the information most commonly asked

for is now available on-line. According to Natalie Rawlings,

the Web Master f o r LPC, the Liberal Party built a web site in

order to communicate its message more effectively to Canadians

and to solicit feedback f rom them. 11' Currently averaging

oves 2000 "hitsn (Le . attempts to gain access) a week, the

partyfs web site is apparently proving to be a worthwhile

inves trnent . A successful w e b site must be graphically appealing and

contextually engaging. but its most important function will be

to disseminate and collect information frorn its audience.lL3

The Reform Party was the first federal party to recognize the

importance of a highly interactive web site, going on-line

40

January 7, 1995. Reform is now attempting to put its

individual MPs on-line. As of April 9,1996, fourteen Reform

MPs had a web site, and this number has been steadily

increasing over the past two years. The Reform Party's web

site had approximately 400,000 hits in its f irst year on-line.

Currently, about l9,OOO people visit the site on a weekly

basis . lf4 This vast number of bits reflects the

interactivity of Reform's web site. For instance, in an

effort to get feedback from Canadians coast to coast, the

Ref orm Party asked Canadians to send in their thoughts on what

the priorities of the governent should be when Parliament

resumed on February 27,1996. The question posed by the party

was: "If you could mite one sentence into the Throne Speech,

what would it be?" . From the suggestions solicited by the

party, Reform produced a "People's Response to the Throne

Speechm, which was in fact read in the House of Cornons.

Additionally, the party posted some of the suggestions which

it received on its web site for people to read.

Canadian parties are beginning to realize the

possibilities of the Internet as a supplementary election

tool. The PC Party, for example, is currently developing a

strategy which will include an aggressive use of the Internet

during the next federal ele~tion."~ In this it is following

Reform, which was again the f irst Canadian party to use the

Internet as a campaign tool. Al1 six Reform candidates for

the March 25, 1996 Eederal by-elections had web sites. Some

4 1

of the sites - such as those of Deon Hancock, the candidate

for Humber-St . Barbe-Baie Verte, and John McGrath, the

candidate for Newfoundland-Labrador - were quite elaborate, containing volunteer and donation f orms , and information on

issues. Others simply had the name of the candidate, a

picture, a short biography of the candidate, and a contact

number . Although slow to appear on-line, some Liberal MPs are

rapidly realizing the potential which the Internet affords.

For example, the home page of Reg Alcock, the rnember for

Winnipeg South, is perhaps the rnost advanced of any lQ

currently on-line. It enables both constituents and others to

send feedback, to participate in a survey, and to obtain

government documents. In addition, people can see how

M r . Alcock has voted on legislation, thereby potentially

improving his accountability to his constituents.

In conclusion, this chapter bas examined the use of

cornputer technology by Canadian political parties. Through

the use of this new technology, parties are able to perforn

their traditional functions more efficiently. More

criticaïly, parties are begiming to carry out functions not

usually considered to be "traditional", in particular the

coordinating of political activity, the disseminating of

political information, the monitoring of political events , and

(albeit marginal at the present tinte) the education of voters.

By extensively affecting election campaigning, the new

42

technology is forcing Canadian political parties to invent

more modem means of performing traditional tasks.

15. Crave and Haliett, pp.69-70.

16. Crave and Haliett, p.70.

17. Ian Ward, " M e d i a Intrusion and the Changing Nature of the EstabLished Parties in Australia and Canadaw, Canadian Journal of Political Science, vo1.26, no.3 (Septeniber 1993), p.484.

18. Khayyam Zev Paltiel, "Political Marketing, Party Finance, and the Decline of Canadian Parties", Canadian Parties in ~ransition, 2nd ed., eds- A-Brian Tanguay and Alain-&Gagnon, Scarborough:Nelson Canada, 1996). p.412.

19. Ward, p . 484.

20- Jeffrey Simpson, "The Most fnfluential Private Citizen in Canadaw, Saturdav N i s h t , vo1.99, no.7 (July 1984), p.12.

21. Claire Hoy, Karqin of Error, (Toront0:Key P o r t e r Books, l989), p.30.

22. John Laschinger and Geoffrey Stevens, Leaders and Lesser Mortals, (Toronto:Key P o r t e r Books, 1992), p.62 .

23. David Taras, The Newsrnakers, (Scarborough:Nelson Canada, 1990), p-181.

24. Simpson, p.12.

25. Ward, p.484.

26. Paltiel, p.412.

27. Martin Davis, "Scanning the Horizon", Campaisns and Elections, (~arch/April 1989), p.26.

28. Paltiel, p.412.

29. David Taras, "Political Parties as Media Organizations: The Art of Getting Electedm, in Canadian Parties in Transition, 2nd ed., p-429.

30. Paltiel, p.412.

31. Paltiel, p.412.

32. Simpson, p.17.

33. Andrew Rosenthal, "Campaigning to Instant Responses", New York Times, (July 25, 1987), p . 9 .

Selnow, p .58 .

Getter and Titus,

Hoy, p.85,

Selnow, p-30.

Selnow, p.59.

Getter and Titus,

Armstrong, p.185.

Selnow, p .54 .

Selnow, p.60.

Getter and Titus,

Selnow, p.60.

Armstrong, p . 159.

p-85,

p.85.

p.85, and Selnow, p.60.

Alan Whitehorn, 'The NDP's Quest for Sumival", The Canadian General Election of 1993, eds. Alan Frizzell, Jon H-Parnmett and Anthony Westell, (0ttawa:Carleton University Press, N94), p.47, and Alexander, p.599.

Promotional material for DMZ Direct Marketing Ltd..

Selnow, p.4.

Judith S. Trent and Robert VJriedenberg, Political C a x n ~ a i m Communication, 3rd ed., (Westport: Praeger, l995), p.11.

Trent and Friedenberg, pp -63 -4.

Selnow, p-xiv.

Ji11 Smolowe, IlRead This!!!", Time, ~01.136, no.23 (November S6,l99O), p - 4 5 .

W.T. Stanbury, Monev in Politics, volume 1 of the Research Studies, (Ottawa and Toronto: RCERPF/Dundurn, lggl), pp.247-8.

Alexander, p.598.

56. Alexander, p-600.

57. A l e x a n d e r , p-597.

58. Selnow, p-82-

59. Promotional material for InfoDirect,

60. Armstrong, p.58.

61. Armstrong, p-96.

62. Getter and Titus, p.85.

63. Stanbury, p-247.

64. R e n Babcock, "Voter F i l e Maintenance", in The Road to Victorv, p 66.

65. Armstrong, pp . 82-3 66. Stanbury, p-272.

67. George Young, [web-rnaster@lpc-nhq.immedia.ca], "Liberal party and technologyn, Private e-mail message to Doug DeRabbie, 3 April 1996.

68. Taras, The Newsmakers, p.186.

69. Axworthy, p. 189,

70. Larry J-Sabato, The Partvfs Just Be-, (Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1988). p.77-

71. Ibid.

72. Armstrong, p.241f.

73. Trent and Friedenberg, p.272.

74. Frank Tobe, "New Techniques in Computerized Voter Contactn, in Canmaims and Elections, p.137.

75. Larry J. Sabato, "How Direct Mail Worksw, in C a m ~ a i a r i s and Elections, p . 9 3 .

76. Promotional material for DMZ Direct Marketing Ltd..

77. Axworthy, p.190.

78. R.M. Lee, One Hundred Monkevs, (Toronto:MacfarIane Walter and Ross, l989), p.260.

79. Lee, p.261, and Taras, The Newsmakers, p.186.

80, Lee, p.261.

81, Taras, The Newsmakers, pt186f-

82. Jared Mitchell, "Nowhere to H i d e " , Re~ort on Business Maqazine, vol . 6, no. 11 (May 1990) , p. 6 5 .

83. Jonathan Robbin, "Geodemographics:The New Magic", in Cam~aicms and Elections, p.106.

84. Robbin, p-107.

Robbin, pp. 111-112 . 86. Mitchell, p-67,

87. Axworthy, p.192.

89. A.Brian Tanguay, "Canadian Party Ideologies in the Electronic Agen, Canadian Political Partv Svstems, ed. R.H.Carty, (Toronto:Broadview Press, 1992), p.465f.

90. Frank Tobe, "Understanding Targeting", (Los Angeles: Below, Tobe and Associates, Inc., 1990), p.1.

91. Jef frey B. Abramson, F. Christopher Arterton and G a r y R. Orren, The Electronic Commonwealth, (New York: Basic Books, 1988) , p. 5 2 .

92. Armstrong, p-127.

93. Selnow, p.137-

94. Abramson, Arterton and Orren, p. 45

95. Cathy Lynch, "Internet brings the world to your doorstepw, Globe and Mail, (March 25 , 1996), p.SI.

96. Robert Fulford, "A faithful correspondent l eans the e- mail waltzn, Globe and Mail, (April 24,1996), p.Cl.

97. Abramson, Arterton, and Orren, p . 5 8 .

98. John Dickerson, "Campaigning in Cyberspacen, [http://www.org/newshour/bb/cyberspace/cyberspace~ll- 13.html], February 1996.

99, Dickerson, "Campaigning in Cyberspace" .

100. Abramson, Arterton and Orren, pp.97-8,

101. Marshall McLuhan, Understandina Media, (New York: McGraw-HiIl Book Co. , 1964) . p . v i i , and Fulf ord, p .Cl.

102. Abramson, Arterton, and Orren, p.46, and p.58f.

103. Abramson, Arterton, and Orren, p.34 .

104. Lynch, p S 1 .

105. Noble, "International Cyberspacingw.

106. The web site's URL is: www.dole96.com/dole96/main.html.

107. Dickerson, "Campaigning in Cyberspacen . 108. Ibid.

109. Mike McComeli, "Putting the Web to Work", [http: / /www. camelect .corn/ july/web ,to. work. h l ] , July 1996.

110- Jonathan Karl, "Campaign '96 goes into cyber-spacen, Cable News Network, Saturday, April 13, 1996.

111- Rawlings, "Technology use in LPCM.

112. Ibid.

113. McComeli, "Putting the Web to Work".

114 . Brad Farquhar, [ f arquhar@reforrn. cal , " Reform and technologyn, Private e-mail message to Doug DeRabbie, 4 March 1996.

115. Walter Robinson, [wjr@cyberus.ca], "Consemative party and technologym, Private e-mail message to Doug - - DeRabbie, 15 April 1996.

CHUTER 3 :TBB IMPACT Or TRcfesotOQY Or0 PARTY OR6ANfZATTON

This chapter examines the impact of the new electronic

technology on Canadian political parties, first, by

investigating the initial impact of its use on local party

activities such as fund-raising; second, by exploring how its

use has affected gxassroots volunteers; and third, by

examining its effects on election carnpaigns at the riding

level. The thesis of this chapter is that the new electronic

technology is strongly centralizing control of Canadian

parties in the hands of the national offices, thus furthering

the evolution of a "fourth" party system - a system driven and

shaped by electronic technology.

TES -ACT OF T R C ~ L O O Y OH LOCAL PARTY EWtlD-RATSING

Traditionally, local riding asçociations raised funds

through the personal contacts of members and special events

such as a dimer with a guest speaker. The arriva1 of new

technology, particularly computerized direct mail, has

transformed local party fund-raising efforts by altering how

riding associations approach local members and constituency

residents for donations. More importantly, direct mail

increases the number of people who can be approached by a

riding association during a fund-raising drive. Although

requiring a level of technology that most associations

currently lack (see Table II), by 1991 over half of Canadian

riding associations had direct mail programs in place largely

as a result of initiatives taken by the national parties to

TABLE II

CONSTITUENCY ASSOCIATION ASSETS (percentage owning asset)

Ggnk~ive Christian Conservative Liberal NDP Refonn Heritage

Computer 46 19 12 14 14

Photocopier 10 3 2 18 - Telephone/answering 14 10 15 39 - machine

Source: Table 3.8, Volume 23 RCERPF, p-45.

51

implernent direct mail programs.' Though still relatively

unsophisticated, these local direct mail programs have the

potential to increase the nuniber of donors contributing on a

consistent basis, as weli as to rnobilize interest within a

riding and increase an association's total rnember~hip.~

Joseph Wearing daims that through direct mail

technology, local fund-raising efforts have become more

effective, and this has led to better financed riding

associations. These associations cari aow match the funds

raised and spent by the national office.' Table III

illustrates that during the 1993 federal election, the 295

candidates for the Liberal Party raised $4,891,802 £rom

individual contributors and spent $12,23 0.2 12. ' More

inportantly, the table shows that the number of individual

contributors during an election, along with the total arnount

of individual contributions, has steadily increased in every

election since the 1984 general election. Thus, it would seem

that fund-raising efforts by local candidates have been

increasingly successful, and as a result, candidates no longer

need to depend as heavily on their partyfs central

organizations for funds.

In the 1984 election, there were only two members of

what Laschinger and Stevens have called the $100,000 Club -

candidates who raise $100,000 in donations in a single

election period. With inproved fund-raising techniques, the

club expanded to ten members in the 1988 election, and then to

TABLE 111

Election Revenues and Expenses of Liberal Candidates

Year Number of Total amount of Total Total Reimbursements individual individual contributions election contri butions contributions ex penses

Sowce: Chief Electoral Officer, 1988 and 1993, and Volume 1 RCERPF, pp.586-588, and p.592.

5 3

thirteen in the 1993 electi~n.~

In 1992, Laschinger and Stevens suggested that with

improved fund-raising, local candidates amassed personal

fortunes through the tax credit system of the EEA and the

partial reimbursement of election expenses af ter the 1984 and

1988 f ederal elections . Liberal Party candidates, for

instance, enjoyed a surplus of $13,995 on average after the

1988 election period.' According to W.T . Stanbury, over three-quarters of Conservative and Liberal candidates, and

almost sixty per cent of New Democratic candidates garnered a

financial surplus af ter the 1988 election (see Table IV) . a

Even though candidates may generate surpluses, there is

little evidence that riding associations receive these funds

af ter an election. Only twenty-four per cent of the riding

associations which responded to the RCERPF survey in 1991

claimed to have $10,000 or more available and only nine per

cent reported that they had more than $25,000 (see Table V) .' Moreover, the national parties insist on taking the

reimbursments of election expenses from local riding

associations. In 1988, at the beginning of the campaign, the

Liberal Party, and to a lesser extent the NDP, required al1

candidates to sign over half of their future reimbursements to

the national Party.'' For the 1993 election, the Liberal

Party once again required half of the federal rebate to be

returned to the national office. This ef f ectively reduced

the net amount of a candidate's surplus that could be

TABLE IV

Revcnrrs. ucpnscs and rrimburscmcat of cud-dates. 1979.I980.1984.[988 and 1993 g a l a d elecrioils (- of dollars)

1993 K Libenl NDP

1988 Fc Liberal NDP

1984 PC Libenl NDP

L980 Pc Likd NDP

L979 PC Liknl NDP

Source: Tdle 121. vohnc 1 RCERPF. p586 and W.T.S. Smbury. 'Rcgularïng the Ftnancing of Fedcnl mes and Candidates". Cadian Rrtits in Transition. 2nd ed.. p.377.

Naes: Bracketcd numkrs indicm atgative sums, i.e- dcficit

TABLE V

Funds currently available to constituency associations, 199 1 (percentages)

less than $1 000 $1 ûûû-4 999 $5 OMI-10 000 greater than $10 000

PC 8 Liberal 29 NDP 53 Refonn 9

Source: Table 4.1, volume 23 RCERPF. p.75.

56

transferred to the local riding association. l2 In addition,

the election expenses reports filed by local candidates do not

include pre-election expenses such as the purchase of a

cornputer or a riding profile done by Compusearch, nor are

campaign activities such as polling considered to be election

expenses . Indeed, election expenditures tend to be mucb

higher than reported by candidates, and thus, they generally

do not arnass large surplus funds, and riding associations in

turn only receive relatively modest funds (if any) after an

election.

A final impact of the new technology on local fund-

rais ing and finances has been increased competi tion be tween

the national level and the local level for individual

donations. Since direct mail is a more lucrative means of

raising funds, membership and donor lists have become a

j ealously guarded commodi ty , Voters generally join a

political party through their local riding association, and as

a result, i t is the association which possesses a list of

names of those likely to contribute to the party. Many riding

associations tend to maintain these mailing lists for their

exclusive use : for example, thirty-eight per cent of

Conservative riding associations reserve their lists for local

fund-raising efforts . l3

In the Liberal party, access to membership mailing lists

has also been an ongoing problem for the national party.

Currently, i t only has access to provincial-level lists , which

57

in some cases are out-of-date and contain numerous errors,

Riding associations maintain exclusivemembership lists mainly

because they believe that national direct mail campaigns

hinder local fund-raising efforts, as judged by f orty-four per

cent of Liberal associations, l4 Traditionally, riding

associations have a very s m a l l base of committed contributors,

and thus must compete with the national level for donations

from many of their nominal supporters .15 As local parties

try to shield their rnembership lists, the national offices are

attempting to centralize party rnembership lists. For example,

the Consemative Party has jus t initiated a National

Membership Program (NMP) . Now, when one joins a local PC

riding association, one also automatically becomes a m e m b e r of

the PC Party of CanadaDL6 The attempt of the national

parties to develop a completely integrated national party

membership, and the simultaneous improvement in the capacity

of local direct mail campaigns to generate revenue, may

illustrate one instance where technology use could divide and

perhaps weaken Canadian political parties. " To put it

differently, local riding associations are using the new

technology to become more independent of the national offices,

while the national offices are attempting to use this

technology to strengthen their control over local

associations.

THB IMPACT OF TEC-LûG'Y OH LOCAL PARTY ACTIVITY

Cornputers are becoming increasingly necessary for

58

carrying out the tasks required of an active riding

association. These are: organization maintenance, electoral

preparation, policy-f ocused s tudy and discussion, and

communications." Each task has accordingly been affected by

the arriva1 of the new electronic technology.

Many riding associations are using computers to maintain

accurate and up-to-date membership and donors ' lists, and thus

changing organization maintenance. Regarding electoral

preparation, computers have Unproved opposition research,

campaign planning and organizing, and poll analyses -

Cornputers have enriched policy-focused study, as illustrated

by the advances in issue research. About two-thirds of a l1

riding associations s tudy and develop policy between election

periods , As of yet, there is no direct way for local party

activis ts to influence the direction of party policy excep t

through their delegates to biannual national conventions, and

that is a particularly crude instrument. Even though the

membership wings of political parties have always been of only

marginal importance as a source of ideas, as they do not

effectively articulate interests, parties must be able to

incorporate and charnel grassroots activity on policy

questions successfully or else risk damaging party morale and

alienating their most committed supporte~s.'~

The final local party task affected by the new

technology is communications. With the Internet, direct mail,

and desktop publishing programs for newsletters, local

5 9

campaigns can respond to and reflect local concerns .20 In

doing so, cornputers have altered how parties communicate with

both their own members as well as the electorate. The most

common means of communication between riding associations and

their membership remains the traditional practices of

sponsoring public meetings and mailing out newsletters , A f ew

riding associations, however, have begun to embrace the more

modem technologies to communicate with their

constituencies . 21 The BurIington Reform Constituency

Association, for instance, has a "Demon Dialerw, which gives

a person information or asks for their opinion. This cornputer

dialler system informs members about the dates, times and

places of up-coming events and meetings in a 28 second

message, This system thus has the potential to Save many

volunteers a lot of their valuable personal the. Moreover,

this is an econornical method of disseminating local party

information: the cost is less than seven cents per call, which

compares favourably with the cost of approximately seventy-

five cents to send a ne~sletter.~~

The riding associations of the Reform Party have been

quick to acquire new technology, as evidenced by the 124

ridings that are represented in the party ' s e-mail

databa~e.'~ As a new party, the absence of existing elites

committed to traditional methods may have made the adoption of

new technology in the constituencies easiergz4 Another

possibility is that starting f rom scratch, Ref orm' s riding

60

associations simply bought the most modem communications

technologies available . 25

Use of the Internet has not been restricted to the

central party, candidates or MPs; riding associations are also

slowly getting on-line . The Calgary North Ref orm Association, for example, has a web site through which one can find

information about the sitting MP for the riding, the names and

numbers of the executive, upcoming events, and an opportunity

to sign the party's 'guest book', where one can also leave

comments. Thirty-nine Reform riding associations have web

sites, as of August 1996. A standard charge of ten dollars

for the initial set-up, plus fifty dollars a year thereafter,

links a local home page to Reformr s national web site.26 As

cari be seen, local riding associations are begiming to use

new electronlc technology to help carry out some of their

traditional roles . OBSTACLES TO UûE O? TECIWOWGY

Although the new technology off ers local parties the

opportunity to become more organized and efficient, the

majority of Canadian riding associations have been reluctant

to &race electronic technology. In a survey carried out for

the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party

Financing(RCERPF) in 1991, computers w e r e notably absent among

cons tituency associations. For instance, onïy nineteen per

cent of the Liberal riding associations which responded to the

survey owned a ~ornputer.~~ Although some associations may

61

have had access to a computer through a party mernber , this is

obviously not a desirable situation as it leaves the

association dependent on volunteer resources and vulnerable to

losing access to equiprnent and data at critical t i m e s Z e

Another concern of some riding parties is where to store the

computer during non-election years. Without sufficient Eunds

to rent or lease a permanent office, these associations look

to house the computer with a volunteer, preferably an

executive rnember, between elections. However, this can once

again present problems of use and access.

Cost can also prevent a local association £rom

effectively using the new technology. For small or poorly

funded riding associations, cost is an important

consideration. In 1991, fifty-eight percent of Liberal riding

associations reported having less than $5000 in the

association' s bank account . Such limited resources are

used mainly to support traditional local party activities

instead of being invested in new electronic technology. Even

when supplied by the national office, the new technology can

s till be rather expensive. The f ederal Consemative Party,

for example, paid for the collection of polling data in 1988;

yet local party candidates did not have access to the results

without first remitting $5000 to the national officea3* To

sign on with Target ' 88, a local candidate had to dedicate

$5000 of limited campaign funds, as well as ten volunteers, to

a program controlled by the party' s headquarters .31 It is

62

unknown whether a similar program was designed for the 1993

federal election.

With elections today, a basic cornputer is no longer

sufficient to run a local campaign. In addition to at least

two or three high-powered computers, a local campaign also

requises software, a modem for e-mail, and especially a laser

printer for direct mail appeals. In the 1993 federal

election, the London West L i b e w a l Association used two desk-

top cornputers, a notebook and a laser printer. Along with the

hardware, the association used a variety of commercially

available software programs, including Microsoft Access,

WordPerfect and Excel. To purchase a similar cornputer systern,

a riding association can expect to spend approximately $5000 .

With the introduction of sophisticated electronic equipment,

local campaigns must not only be concerned about the costs

involved, but more critically, having the expertise to

properly and effectively operate the technology.

A fusther concern is that the level of knowledge and

experience with computer technology tends to be low in many

riding associations and often, as a result, this technology is

not very well used. Composed of volunteers and with limited

resources to hire expertise, they rely on the national office

to provide them with services and software that are both

af fordable and easy to use. Consequently, when introducing

computer applications, the national office mus t keep the

lowest common denominator in mind. Another problem of

63

attempting to find software which can be adequately used by

a l1 the ridings is that riding associations have neither the

same needs nos the same level of expertise a~ailable.~~ With

scarce funds and limited access to technological innovations,

local parties will likely continue to rely for technical

expertise on grassroots volunteers, whose expertise is often

minimal . TEE IMPACT O? TZCH#OtOOY OH LûCAh VOL-S

Local constituency associations are the basic unit for

activity in Canadian political parties. These associations

provide for citizens the main organizational tie to the

national parties and the world of electoral cornpetition. 33

Through an association, one can participate in policy

development, nominate local candidates, select party leaders,

and help prepare for and fight an election campai-. Even

though Canadian parties are open and accessible, f ew choose to

join or actively participate in them. Between 1987 and 1990,

local party association memberships averaged 600, wbile during

the election year of 1988, it was 750.34

A i 1 Canadian parties have had difficulty sustaining

active local organizations . 3 5 AS a result , they have been

f orced to depend on relatively srna11 numbers of local members

to keep their riding associations active, and these numbers

fluctuate suddenly and extensively? Between 1987 and 1990,

membership in the riding associations of the Liberal Party

varied between 7 and 6000 ." For many voters, there simply

seems to be little point in maintaining their membership

between ele~tions.~' Consequently, parties tend to be hollow

entities that corne to l i f e only at election t h e or for a

leadership convention. lg

Arguably, there is less interest in local campaigns

today and f ewer people involved in them. Part of the decline

in interest may be attributed to the capacity of television to

convey emotional and personal messages f r o m political parties

to a wide audience of voters. With the arriva1 of television,

voters no longer needed to become involved in a campaign in

order to experience the drama and motion of an election, and

as a result, the number of volunteers willing to work on local

campaigns de~lined.~~ In 1988, only sixteen per cent of the

riding associations surveyed said they had enough

volunteers. Party organizations required an average of 2 3 1

volunteers to run an effective local campaign, according to

local organizers, yet in 1988, each campaign had an average of

170 volunteer~.~~ The new technology is transforming both

the number of volunteers needed to run an effective local

campaign and the roles available for them to perform. New

electronic technology now performs roles normally carried out

by volunteers, such as tracking the vote and voter

communication, and hence, fewer volunteers are needed than in

previous campaigns . Yet , these volunteers are increasingly

required to have computer skills. Volunteers m u s t be able to

input data collected by canvassing, to operate software

65

programs designed by the national party, and to design direct

rnailings . If local campaigns are to be succeçsful, they mus t carry

out three fundamental functions : first, they must target their

support; second, they must communicate their message; and

third, they must mobilize their vote on election day."

The first function of targeting party supporters has

been signif icant ly af f ec ted by the new technology ,

particularly the arriva1 of computer software for polling that

has enabled local campaigns to track the electorate during a

campaign with much greater accuracy and detail than previously

possible.44 More local campaigns are relying on polling

rather than volunteers to provide information on voters . For

example, approximately me-third of canadian r iding

associations claimed to have polled during the 1988 election

campaign. '' Selle and Svasand claim that technological developments

have reduced the information role of local party

organizations . 46 Grossman s tates that party organizations

are no longer relied upon to provide expertise and leadership

during an election. 47 Taras argues that parties, which were

once useful in relaying their knowledge of public sentiments

to their national leaders, have been replaced in this role by

public opinion polls and sample surveys which perform the same

function with a t least equal, and arguably much greater,

accuracy." All are of the view that party members have seen

66

the influence they once had through their local constituency

offices diminished, and that m o n e y and media have replaced

personal contact as the chief energizing sources of

politics. " As Thomas S. Amorthy notes, "Capital can now

purchase what only mass organization was once able t o

provide. " 50

Communicating the partyrs message has also been

influenced by the arriva1 of new technology, although to a

lesser extent. The distribution of campaign literature

continues to be important, with eighty-six percent of riding

associations clairning that it was very important or somewhat

important in their campaigns in 1988.51 Canvassing a l so

remains an essential aspect of a local campaign, rnostly

because of the persona1 contact that is invol~ed.~' It

reinforces the party loyalty of supporters, and it can a l so

rnake a significant difference, especially in a close race or

by-election. 53

Even though canvassing and literature drops are seen as

important for comunicating the party' s message, loca l

campaigns are increasingly turning to direct mail as a more

productive m e t h o d . In effect, efficient campaign technologies

are being substituted for less efficient volunteers. 54 By

creating substantial increases in efficiency andproductivity,

the new c o r n p u t e r technology allows f ewer people to perf orm

more tasks . s5 Direct mail production technology has become

so highly automated that the role of the volunteer in p o l i t i c s

67

has been considerably diminished.'= It would be premature to

conclude that the new electronic technology has replaced

grassroots volunteers. Parties today reLy on fewer but more

skilled volunteers

The third local campaign task of mobilizing the vote on

election day still depends upon an army of volunteers. They

monitor who has voted, offer rides and daycare senrices to

supporters, and contact those supporters who have yet to vote.

A strong grassroots organization is also considesed to be

crucial during an election campaign because without one, a

party will experience both long-term and short-term

difficulties, as the Ontario Liberals found out when elected

to a majority government in 1987 without a corresponding party

machine? In 1990, the Liberals were forced to rely more on

poli tical prof essionals than local volunteers, which was a

factor in their defeat.

Computerized direct mailing techniques aid cornputer

analysis of voting patterns have reduced the participatory

elements within local political parties, making more routine

the tasks left for the great mass of campaign activists. 5 9

This means that traditional means of campaign participation

such as literature drops and door-to-door canvassing have been

replaced by direct mail and polling. Only those tasks which

require manual labour, such as envelope stuffing and putting

up lawn signs, remain as opportunities for technologically

unskilled citizens to involve themselves in a political

68

campaign. In doing so, the new technology has reduced the

' creativer elements of participation fox the lower level of

party activists. At the same the, technical advances in

campaign methods have relieved elite party activists f r o m

routine functions which are tiresorne and boring, thereby

Leaving them more t h e for the design and implementation of

campaign s trategy . 60

Canadian political parties still try to recruit large

numbers of volunteers because most party organizers continue

to believe that the most politically effective contact is the

direct person-to-person link b e t w e e n campaign volunteer and

voter.61 Also, a large body of volunteers is seen as giving

the candidate ~redibility.~~ ut if the mind set of Canadian

parties changes to more fully embrace new electronic

technology, local activists may have to look for alternative

ways for pol i t i ca l involvement.

Richard Armstrongmaintains that computer technology has

so far been a dynamic force for the namateurization" of

political campaigns because the new technology off ers skilled

party activists the opportunity to fil1 new positions which

require a high level of technical expertise? The Reform

and Conservative parties, for instance, did not have to use a

professional firm to design their respective web sites;

ins tead they relied on volunteers who fully understood the new

te~hnology.~' The Liberal Party in London West during the

1993 f edexal election used information provided by

69

Compusearch, but the riding association also relied upon local

volunteers who possessed the expertise to design and operate

a cornputer software program that was used to produce a list of

voters, as well as to track voters throughout the campaign,

Wi th a powerful computer, well-designed campaign software, and

knowledgeable volunteers, a local campaign no longer requires

the large number of volunteers used in past campaigns. A

strong party organization is still required, but it is smaller

and more technologically skilled, not the same type of

organization that once engaged in mass canvassing and

railied'

THE IMPACT OF T B m L û G Y ON IiOCAI, PARTY ORGAMIZATZON

Thraugh the new technology, the national parties have

extended their influence over and control of local campaigns ,

While there are some instances where improved methods of

approaching voters has enabled independent or little-known

candidates to avoid national party chanriels altogether, such

instances are rare? The general effect of new technologies

is to create a wide range of opportunities f o r the national

parties to centralize campaign strategy, fund-raising, and

election spending. 67 Direct mail fund-raising, for example,

has enabled the national parties to raise the substantial

funds required for the use and development of new electronic

technology. But, more importantly, the national parties

possess the knowledge of how to use the new te~hnology.~'

According to John Street, technology creates dependence

70

relationships in which the supplier of the technology

manipulates the recipient . 69 Local campaigns have thus

become captive to strategies and decisions made at the

national level. They cannot significantly influence the

direction of the national campaign, and they possess a lixnited

independent capacity to communicate their own messages?

Fox exarnple, the PC Party has developed national standards for

al1 of t s associations to follow in their use of the

Internet. In order to be featured in the 'Ridings and

Regions' section of the national party's web site, an

association must satisfy six conditions, A riding

association' s web site must include the f ollowing : the PC

Party's new logo; the name of the riding, as w e l l as the

riding presidentrs name, adâress and phone number; an

executive Est; the date of the riding's founding meeting; a

l ist of upcoming events; and a brief description of the

riding's new boundaries ." Another means of manipulation of local campaigns by the

national parties bas been statistical analyses of ridings,

which have been a mainstay of federal election campaigns for

over thirty years. In 1962, the Liberal party began to

analyze ridings based on a system developed by Daniel Lang,

the Ontario federal campaign committee chairman, Using this

information, bath financial and organizational resources were

devoted to those ridings which the party supposedly had the

best chance of wi~ing.'~ Since then, parties only monitor

71

those ridings where a relatively rnodest shift in voter support

cari win the election. 73

With the advent of sophisticated riding analyses brought

about by cornputer technology, parties are able to accurately

target more of their attention and spending on certain ridings

rather than others. This obviously affects riding

associations in two ways. First, those ridings which receive

a great deal of attention are vulnerable to having the local

campaign being taken over by the national organization,

thereby alienating local volunteers. Second, those ridings

which receive little or no attention are susceptible to low

morale and may even become virtually non-existent for lack of

volunteers.

Electronic mail, geodemographic targeting and

computerized direct mail have al1 extended to the parties'

national offices the capability to bypass their local

constituency associagions and speak instantaneously and

directly to individual voters, thus making riding associations

less necessary for communication purposes. 74 Currently, f ew

riding associations have an e-mail address or web site; yet

al1 the national parties do, offering on-line mernberships and

the opportunity for voters to contribute directly to the

national party. As noted in Chapter Two,, the Liberal web site

averages over 2000 hits a week, while the Reform Party's w e b

site avexages about 19,000 bits per week. If v o t e r s

increasingly turn to the national party for political

involvement, then local riding associations could be in danger

of becoming dispensable. With new techniques of poli tical

communications fabricating different m e d i u n s of reaching

voters, the importance of the national organization has indeed

been enhanced at the expense of the local riding

associations 75

Contributing to the streagthening of the national

parties has been the arriva1 of campaign speciali~ts.'~

Their role in national campaigns, and their influence, is

concentrated in the national party organizations and in the

leaders ' entourages, which have become the basic instrument of

election campaigns ." As L a r r y K. Grossman notes:

Every political campaign of any significance today is run by highly specialized experts, full-the political professionals who have the skills, experience, and resources to orchestrate and exploit voters* motions and influence their views ." Writing in 1987, Rhayyam Zev Paltiel argued that

American-style specialized political consultants had failed to

take root in Canada because Canada' s party and leader-f ocused

campaign process suppressed the candidate orientation which

underlay the broad and profitable market for professional

experts in the United s t a t e d g It remains the case that few

individual candidates in Canada rely on professional political

consultants to manage a campaign for the reason Paltiel cited

and also as a result of close ties between party and

candidate, restrictions on television advertising, and lirnits

on election spending." R.K. Carty notes that in Canada

73

consultants are employed only in those instances where the

party believes that an infusion of special talent might pay

electoral dividends or where the situation is so desperate

that there is no local member available to take on the job."

Since 1987, however, the national parties themselves

have corne to rely heavily on political consultants- Following

similar trends in the United States, Canadian political

parties have chosen "to place their political fortunes

increasingly in the hands of professional managers,

consultants, and strategists . "" Accordingly, they have

developed close ties with American consultants. For example,

in the 1993 federal election the Reform Party employed Frank

~untz, an American political consultant, to help design their

campaign strategy. The need to assemble a team of political

professionals to design and direct a campaign has led to

increased election expenses and fewer opportunities for party

activists to participate at the national campaign level. In

doing so, the nature of parties and election campaigns has

been al tered . 83 The organizational structure of political parties has

evolved because of their need to assume the attributes of

media organizations to f ight elections . Although the new

electronic technology has not made party organizations

redundant, it has redefined the relationship between the

national office and the riding associations, and has tended to

transform the party from a bottom-up to a top-dom

74

organi~ation-~~ Ta put it differently, party organization

has switched from an organization mainly on the ground to an

organization that mainly gives direction to the ground?

With a transformation in interna1 organization, a party's

activities and behaviour are likewise modified- As Angelo

Panebianco argues, "a change in organizational physiognomy

implies change in party activity and behaviour " . " Yet, how

has this change in national organization and behaviour

affected local campaigns?

THE IMPACT OF T S m L d O Y 0 W GOCA& CAMPUGHS

In the days before the new communications technology,

the day-to-day political campaign was conducted mostly at the

local level through the parties' constituency associations.

As the new technology has transf ormed political campaigning at

the national level, so has the technology had a considerable

impact in the constituencies . The emphasis of campaigning has shifted still further from the local candidate to the national

leader, and the leader' s emphasis has largely shifted from

regional concerns to national ones." These shifts have

reçu1 ted in part f rom increasing national control of local

campaigns, as evidenced by the sophisticated election services

which they supply to local candidates and associations.

In many ridings, local organizations receive material

under a group purchase arrangement that provide "considerable

economies of scale" where the unit price of materials is

noticeably discounted. Known as Riding Services Packages

75

( R S P s ) , the concept and the contents of these packages have

achieved a widespread acceptance among the New Democratic,

Consemative and Liberal parties- In the Liberal Party, for

example, the use of RSPs by local associations in Ontario has

been growing since 1985, prior to which few had any experience

dealing with central services of thiç sort. One of the

selling points of RSPs is that when purchasing for a large

number of ridings, the economies of scale can be quite

significant. Most associations, if they decide to buy the

RSP, have the potential to Save money. More importantly, a

significant portion of the package usually falls outside

campaign spending limits. In the 1993 federal election, the

Liberal Party's RSP cost associations between $4,500 and

$5000, depending on the size of the ridi~~g.~'

What is most significant about the increasing use of

RSPs is the standardkation of political campaigns- When a l1

riding associations are required (or strongly pressured) to

purchase the same package, the national parties have more

control over local campaigns. Ken Tilley, an advertising

consultant, assembled the Ontario Liberals' RSP for the 1990

provincial elec tion . The package included brochures on the

government's record, personalized for each of the 130

candidates; a tabloid-size newspaper; stickers, banners,

buttons, rnanuals and training sessions. The package cos t

Liberal riding associations anywhere between $3,500 and $4,100

payable to the central campaign. ''

76

For most Canadian riding associations, the national

offices provide a n d e r of services, such as polling and

technical advice, on which they depend. The national office

of the Liberal Party, for exampIe, provides a considerable

number of services to its riding associations, such as a

' Speaker ' s Bureau ' , merchandising , and campaign manuals ,

training materials and sdnars . For the 1993 federal

election, the Reform Party satisfied requests £rom

constituency organizations and local candidates to set up

local polling organizations. The national office initiated

the constituency polling operation, while Gorgias Research

Consultants of Calgary developed an inexpensive standardized

polling package that could be implemented at the local level,

using campaign volunteers. 92

The Liberal Party, in conjunction with Mind Computer

Products, an Ottawa-based firm, offered a national purchase

plan for microcornputers to al1 ridings in the 1993 federal

election. Three computers, ranging between $1900 and $2300,

were singled out as preferable by LPC. In addition to the

computers, the national purchase plan featured a number of

benefits, such as delivery and installation, a service

program, and a technical support hot-line. The national

office had basic criteria that each riding was advised would

be required. The "National Standing Offern was made available

for both the Mind Computer hardware package and the Promark

software package. According to Janice Nicholson, the

77

administrative assistant to the national director,

approximately twenty ridings acquired the Promark software,

while between t w e n t y and forty-five ridings acquired the Mind

Computer hardware under the national standing offer

guidelines. 93

Currently, the federal Liberal Party is negotiating with

Microsoft and Compaq for bulk pricing of hardware and

software, and the party will strongly recommend that the

riding associations purchase whatever Microsoft, Compaq and

the Liberal Party agree to." While the national party

offices are increasingly determining the software and services

which will be used by local party candidates and associations,

some still prefer ta assess on their own what is available,

determining on their own which campaign tools to use . 9 5 The

London West Liberal Association for example used software and

services in the 1993 election that were not provided by or

recommended for use by the national office.

The national offices also seek to develop new programs.

For example, the Liberal Party is currently attempting to

develop a program which w i l l make it easier for riding

campaigns to track voter intentions, issues, volunteers, and

sign locations. 96 As such programs becorne available, it is

likely that local riding associations will become even more

dependent on their national office for cornputer software and

services in order to run an election campaign. fndeed, the

availability of riding services £rom the federal parties has

78

had a "nationalizing" effect on local ~ampaigns.~'

In conclusion, this chapter has attempted to show the

initial impact which technology bas had on both the national

party organization and the local riding associations. The

decision of the national political parties to use the new

technology to establish direct links between them and the

voters has also been, in effect, a decision to strengthen the

national parties at the expense of local riding associations.

On balance, it now appears that the new technologies stxongly

centralize Canadian politics in the hands of the national

party organizations . This has meant that local riding

associations have to find new ways to perform theis accustomed

roles. Although local parties have seen their influence

diminished, local candidates continue to depend on grassroots

volunteers. The key volunteers, however, are now f e w e r in

number and more expert in the use of computer technology.

ENDNOTES

10.

Il.

12.

13.

1 4 .

1s 0

R.K. Carty, "Party Organization on the Groundn, in Canadian Parties in Transition, 2nd ed., p.200.

R.K. Carty, Canadian Political Parties in the Constituencies, volume 23 of the Research Studies, (Ottawa and Toronto :RCERPF/Dundum, 1991) , p. 90.

Peter Wooistencroft, "'Doing Politics Differently': The Consemative Party and the Campaign of 1993", in The Canadian General Election of 1993, p.22, and Joesph Wearing, Strained Relations, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1981) , p.225.

Elections Canada, Contributions and menses of Recristered Political Parties and Candidates, 35th General Election 1993, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 19931, p . 3 5 .

John Laschinger and Geoffrey Stevens, Leaders and Lesser Mortals, (~ofonto:~ey Porter Books Ltd., 1992) , p. 149 , and Chief Electoral Officer,1993.

Laschinger and Stevens, p.148.

Laschinger and Stevens, p.146.

W . T . Stanbury, Monev in Politics, volume 1 of the Research Studies, (Ottawa and Toronto:RCERPF/Dundurn,

Carty, Canadian Political Parties in the Constituencies, p.75.

Carty, Canadian Political Parties in the Constituencies, p.191.

Liberal Party mema from Jack Heath, Riding Services Package Chair, January 1993.

Stanbury, p.325.

Carty, Canadian Political Parties in the Constituencies, p.91.

Carty, Canadian Political Parties in the Constituencies, p.89.

Carty, Canadian Political Parties in the Constituencies, p.29.

32. Natalie Rawlings, [web__master@lpc-nhq,imrnedia.ca], "Techaology use in LPC", Private e-mail message to ~ o u g DeRabbie, 26 March 1996.

33, Carty, "Party Organization and Activity on the Groundn, p-190.

3 4 . Carty, Canadian Political Parties in the Constituencies, p-28,

35. fan Ward, "Media Intmsion and the Changing Nature of the Established Parties in Australia and Canada", Canadian Journal of Political Science, vo1.26, no.3 (September 1993 ) , p . 487.

36, Carty, "Party Organization and Activity on the Ground", p.195.

37. Table 3.2, volume 23 of the Research Studies, p-33.

3 8 , Carty, "Party Organization and Activity on the Ground", p.194.

39. David Taras, The Newsmakers, (Scarborough: Nelson Canada, l99O), p.238.

40 . Ward, p. 479. 41. Carty, Canadian Political Parties in the Constituencies,

p.167.

42. Bell, Fletcher and Bolan, p.190.

43. Carty, Canadian Political Parties in the Constituencies, p.167.

44, Richard Armstrong, The Next Hurrah:The Communications Revolution in American Politics, (New York:Beech Tree Books, 19881, p.22.

45. Carty, Canadian Political Parties in the Constituencies, p,180.

46. Per Selle and L a r s Svasand, "Membership in P a r t y Organizations and the Problem of Decline of Parties", ~oÏ&arative Political Studies, vo1.23, no.4 (January 1991) , p. 469.

47. Larry K. Grossman, The Electronic Re~ublic, (New York:Viking, l99S), p.122.

48. T a r a s , p . 2 3 8 .

49. John ~eisei and Matthew Mendelsohn, "Meteor? Phoenix? Chmeleon? The Decline and Transformation of Party in Canada", in Partv Politics in Canada, 7th ed., p. 187, and Grossman, p. 122

50. Thomas S. Axworthy, nCapital-Intensive Politicsw, Issues in P a r t y and Election Finance, ed. F.Leslie Seidle, volume 5 of the Research Studies, (Ottawa and Toronto:RCERPF/Dundurn, 1991), p.200.

51. Bell, Fletcher and Bolan, p.191.

5 3 . Jerome K. Black, "Revisiting the Effects of Canvassing on Voting Behaviour", Canadian Journal of Political Science, ~01.17, no.2 (June 19841, p.357 , and Carty, Canadian Political Parties in the Constituencies, p.167.

54. Larry J. Sabato, The Party's Just Be-, (Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1988) , p. 186.

55. Axworthy, p.189.

56. Armstrong, p.83.

57. Wearing, Strained Relations, p . 8 8 .

58. Georgette Gagnon and Dan Rath, Not Without Cause, (Toronto :Harper Collins Publishers Ltd., 1991) , p. 89.

59. Alan Ware, Citizens, Parties and the State, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 19871, p.148, anà p.233 .

60. Selle and Svasand, p.469.

61. Carty, Canadian Political Parties in the Constituencies, p.177.

62. Bell, Fletcher and Bolan, p.191.

63. Armstrong, p.247.

64. Farquhar, "Reform and technology", and Walter Robinson, [ w j racyberus . cal , "Conservative party and technologytt , Private e-mail message to Doug DeRabbie, 15 April 1996.

65. Selle and Svasand, p.474.

66. Grossman, p.122.

67. Sabato, p . 7 0 .

Armstrong, p.120.

John Street, Politics and Technoloqr, (London:Macmillan, 1992), p.96.

~ a v i d Taras, wPoliticai Parties as Media Organizations: The Art of Getting Electedm, in Canadian Parties in Transition, 2nd ed., p.435.

Robinson, Tonsemative party and technology".

Joseph Wearing, The L-Sha~ed Partv: The Liberal Partv of Canada 1958-1980, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 19811, p . 3 5 f .

David C. Walker, "Pollsters, Consultants, and Party Politics in Canadan, in Canadian Political Party Svstems, pp.517-8.

Carty, Canadian Political Parties in the Constituencies,

Selle and Svasand, p.473f.

Larry J. Sabato, The Rise of Political Consultants, (New York:Basic Books, 19811, p . 7 .

Taras, "Political Parties as Media Organizations", p.424.

Khayyam Zev Paltiel, nPolitical Marketing, Party Finance, and the Decline of Canadian Partiesn, in Canadian Parties in Transition, 2nd ed., p.412.

Carty, Canadian Political Parties in the Constituencies, p.157.

S.J.R.Noe1, "Patronage and Entourages, Action-Sets, Networksn, in Canadian Parties in Transition, 2nd ed., p.241.

Taras, "Political Parties as Media Organizationsn, p.434.

Taras, "Political Parties as Media Organizations", p.436.

85. Bell, Fletcher and Bolan, p.193£, and Selle and Svasand, p . 469.

86. Lee, p . 3 9 .

87. Ange10 Panebianco, Political Parties:Orcranization and Power, (Cambridge :Cambridge University Press, 19 88 ) , p.262.

88. Bell, Fletcher and Bolan, p.193.

89. Bell, Fletcher and Bolaa, p.185f.

90. Liberal Party memo from Jack Heath, Riding Services Package Chair, January 19 9 3 .

91. Gagnon and Rath, pp.132-3.

92. Faron Ellis and Keith Archer, "Reform: Electoral Breakthrough", in The Canadian General Election of 1993, pp . 66-7.

93. Janice Nicholson, [web-master@lpc-nhq.immedia.ca], "Liberal Party and technologym, Private e-mail message to Doug DeRabbie, 9 July 1996.

94. Rawlings, "Technology use in LPC".

95. Bell, Fletcher and Bolan, p.186.

96. Rawlings, "Technology use in LPC".

97. Bell, Fletcher and Bolan, p.186.

WmR 4: MAFTING TO mm mw TBCIWOLOOY

This chapter examines how the national partieç are

adapting to the new electronic technology. Sn doing so, it

explores the question of whether Canadian parties have been

successful in keeping pace with technological developrnents,

This chapter begins by reviewing where parties acquire ideas

on how to use computer technology. It then looks at the

factors which condition a partyf s use of this technology . Finally, it outlines the obstacles which parties face in

attempting to keep pace with new developments in computer

technology.

I#DCIST'RY AND PûGLTfCS

A considerable number of the parties ' fund-raising and

campaign techniques, such as polling and direct mail, have

been borrowed from the marketing industry. These techniques

have become cornmonplace in election campaigns , as poli tical

parties adopt marketing methods to research, analyze, and

quantify votersl attitudes and opinions. ~oliticians today

sel1 themselves and their political agendas to voters using

esçentially the sarne marketing techniques that are used in the

selling of goods and services - thus, Larry K. Grossman

concludes, altering politics "from a dedicated personal

calling to a large, thriving, expens ive service indus try . " ' It is not surprising, therefore, that business firms are

beginning to enter the potentially lucrative market of

performing traditional party tasks. For instance, GWE

86

Eiection Services, a Calgary-based company, offers a variety

of services to C a n a d i a n political parties, such as datzbase

and lis t services, campaign research, and rapid-turnaround

polling. ' Nost of these firms of fer their services and software to

al1 parties. Their brochures attempt to persuade parties that

the services they provide, along with their expertise, pave

the road to victory. Each business focuses on a key theme,

such as organization, control, or persuasion, in order to

attract business. J&T Cornputing Ltd., also a Calgary-based

company, offered a program named 'Candidaten in 1993 that was

developed specifically for political campaigning. 'Candidate'

was supposedly a user-friendly, relational database, which

automated the information gathering process and provided

immediate access to al1 information.' Software packages have

become increasingly available since the 1993 federal election.

For example, Riding Computing Inc. of Richmond Hill, Ontario

offers a useful program called 'Politix', which is a program

for riding record management. The program was initially

designed to be used mainly for reporting to the Commission on

Election Finances. But, af ter consultations with Canadian

parties, other features were added, such as a volunteers

report and sign location report. Priced at $450 plus

applicable taxes, the latest version of this program is

designed, according to the company, especially for use by the

' average volunteer ' .

87

Campaign software has become the most popular item of

political technology currently purchased by parties. Promark

Software Inc. of Vancouver markets a program entitled

MailBaset . This PC-based software enables a campaign t o

access postal code information, eliminate duplicates, and

speed up the delivery of mailings. The Company claims t h a t

this is the "ultimate program for precision mail management

and powerful target x~tarketing."~

For the m o s t part, software programs simply enable

parties to collect an arrange voter data, to print mailing

lists, and to organize the various aspects of a political

campaign into one comprehensive cornputer summary - Over the

past few years, however, systems that go beyond these basic

lis t management functions have appeaxed in poli tical

campaigns. For example, one particular new system uses

geographical databases along with conventional voter lists and

demographic information to allow for more effective data

analysis. Mapping data, as it is called, is a powerful means

of analyzing list-based information because it can arrange on

a map voter locations and voter attitudes, and then display

this projection on-screed In doing so, such a system

virtually elhinates duplication and errors. By linking voter

data directly to a fixed geographic location, this new system

is challenging the boundaries of traditional political

software .' Deciding which software w i l l be used i n a campaign is

88

critical, especially since there is ready access to powerful

and inexpensive computer programs that provide many of the

same capabilities as bookkeepers, schedulers, volunteers

coordinators, and researchers; or the services of pollsters,

fund-raisers , printers , and mailing houses. This could have

signif icant implications, for if parties and candidates decide

to use polling software, for example, then determining public

opinion on a particular issue would no longer be susceptible

to the intervention of a third party, such as a professional

polling f i m or the press. Potentially. this could allow for

more direct interaction between parties and voters.

In addition to providing parties with data and analyses,

a Company such as Compusearch also offers some of the software

used for the companyfs analyses to political parties for their

own in-house research needs. Micro-computer software such as

fnsight, a desk-top marketing information system, and Geo-

D i s c , a set of data and analysis packages for direct

marketing, consumer spending and financial services, are al1

available f rom Compusearch for purchase by Canadian poli tical

partiedo Other comercially available software can be used

as a further source of lists for either fund-raising,

targeting or canvassing . For example, Canada Phone contains every residential and business telephone number in Canada on

a single CD-ROM. With quarterly editions, the cost of Canada

Phone is only $125 and it can be purchased at any computer

software store. The information provided by Canada Phone can

89

then be dom-loaded into a database program. In the 1995

provincial election, the London South Liberal Association

merged the phone numbers of the Canada Phone CD-ROM with the

information on Vote Pro, and in doing so, created an up-to-

date and accurate voter list which was used for phone

canvassing during the campaign." The increased use of

business techniques and computer technology aff ords parties

the opportunity to improve the efficiency of certain

functions, particularly fund-raising, as well as allowing for

increased interaction between parties and voters.

TRE m- OF AbarCRLCM PARTIES

Historically, American political parties have often

furnished Canadian parties with new and innovative ideas on

how to use technology - albeit with a substantial tinte h g , since it takes, on average, between five and ten years for an

American campaign innovation to be used by a Canadian

political party (see Table VI) .12 Canadian parties,

moreover, f o r reasons to be discussed later, rarely achieve

the same level of technical expertise as American parties.

Despite lagging behind American parties in the adoption

of new technology, al1 major Canadian parties believe that it

is necessary to keep track of the latest American techniques

and technologies. C a m ~ a i a n s and Elections, an American

magazine which f eatures articles on new technologies and

techniques(a1though it is mainly an advertising outlet for

companies to solicit business) holds training seminars on a

TABLE VI

THE DIFE'USION OF POLITICAL INNOVATION

United States Canada

1. Radio political broadcasts 1924

2. Dtamatized radio ads 1944

3. Advertising agency influence 1952

4. Network television political broadcasts 1952

5. Network teIevision spot advertising 1952

6, Strategic use of polling 1959

7. Televised leaders debates 1960

8. "Negative" 30- or 60-second advertising 1964

9, Direct-mail fiind-raising 1964

10. Direct-mail vote targeting 1966

1 1. Home video(VCR) campaigning 1980

12. Cable political advertising 1982

13, Satellite teleconferencing campaigning 1984

14, Computer-assisted production of quick response ads 1984

Source: Table 5.2, Volume 1, RCERPF, p. 190-

91

xegular basis in the U n i t e d States, In 1990, it offered its

f irst Canadian campaign training serninar . H e l d over a three-

day weekend, the seminar featured workshops presented by

American experts on a variety of topics, such as targeting,

direct mail, fund-raising, opposition research, and polling.

out of the 211 participants, the four major Canadian political

parties were represented by 154 registrants . l3 Hence ,

~merican politics extends to Canadian parties fresh

technologies and techniques to draw upon.

BOREIûWIWG ?Ra PARTIES

Not only do Canadian political parties borrow heavily

£rom business and American parties, but they also borrow from

each other . Ideas for Canadian political parties ' web sites,

for example, are obviously acquired from each other. New

rnaterial for the Reform Party's web site is, for the rnost

part, obtained by observing what the other parties do on-

line.14 Yet, since Reform was the first major Canadian party

on-line, they have also provided other Canadian parties with

an array of ideas. New material for net use by the Liberal

Party is acquired by browsing the Intemet and through normal

interaction with individuals in the field .lS The

Conservatives' web site owes the least to its competitors , It

is mostly static, which means that there is little opportunity

for personal interaction, and most of its rnaterial cornes from

existing party documents, reports or press releases. l6 For

al1 parties, the development of new techniques appears to be

almost non-existent . Canadian pof itical parties, it would

se-, prefer to rely on campaign methods that have worked in

the past, borrowing only those new ideas and techniques which

have been successfully used by either the business community

or another political party.

A party8 s willingness to embrace new technology seemç to

be conditioned to a considerable extent by its electoral

fortunes , For example, the U . S. Republican party

wholeheartedly embraced direct mail once the computer

revolutionized the handling of mailing lists and was able to

target specific audiences.'' At the time, however, the

Republicans were perennial undesdogs, and they therefore

presumably felt the need to put forth more effort and try

something new. During the 1960s and lWOs, the Dernocrats held

most of the congressional offices and thus had moçt of the

staff, as well as more patronage to dispense in order to

secure Eollowers. To offset these built-in Democratic

advantages, Republican nominees were willing to experiment

with new campaign technologies that might help them to

overcome their traditional electoral weakne~ses.~~ The same

situation could be said of the Progressive Conservative Party

in Canada during the 1970s and early 1980s. Out of power for

most of this t h e , the PCs turned to technology, primarily

computer-generated direct mail, to help overcome their failure

to win goverrunent. For example, they quickly saw the

93

possibi lities of increasing their revenue under the tax-credit

system, established by the Elections Expenses Act(EEA) of

1974, by adopting Republican-s tyle cornputerized direct mail

fund-raising.lg Thanks primarily to this new technology, the

PC Party secured a three-fold increase in party donations

between 1980 and 1984, surpassing both the Liberals and the

NDP. 20

The Liberal Party made a sustained ef fort to employ

direct mail only after the PCs had beea using it for nearly a

decadeO2' Even after the passage of the EEA, the Liberals

determined that the constituency would continue to function as

the main organizational basis of fund-raising. Prominent

Liberal officiais did not appreciate the potential amount of

revenue Chat could be gained by using the direct mail

technique. 22 At the time, they believed that nothing could

surpass the face-to-face approach in soliciting contributions

at the local leveL2= Direct mail thus seemed to conflict

with the party * s existing fund-raising methods . Along with these dated views of successful fund-raising techniques, the

Liberals were slow to use direct mail partially due to their

organizational structure. With no national mernbership list

and little or no access to provincial rnembership lists, the

party's headquarters found it difficult to build up a

centralized mailing list containing the names of people apt to

respond to a Liberal fund-raising drive. The Liberals also

failed t o recognize the benefits of a well-funded national

headquarters . 24

Eventually, fiscal necessity stimulated changes in the

Liberal Party's methods of fund-raising. *' After the 1984

federal elec tion, the Liberals became increasingly divided and

disorganized and, without an effective meanç of fund-raising,

the party plwiged i n t o debt. As a result, during the 1988

federal election, the party was reduced to a "low-rent"

polling operation: it was outspent by the PCs by at least five

to one, and badly trailed in integrating polling data with

campaign s trategy . 26

In 1990 -1991, the f ederal Liberal Party f inally began t o

think about the need to invest in new technology. The party

did have an older system which tracked data regarding

financial donations to the party. However, in the early

1990s, party executives were discovering that there were data

that they required which could not be acquired with the older

system. As a result, some senior party executives began t o

consider the need for a new program to track persona1

political information and give better service t o

constituents . 27 Entitled ' Inf oplace' , this program enables

an Me to create and maintain a file on constituent case work.

It cari also be used to keep track of volunteer lists, donor

lists, and membership lists. The Liberal Party's willingness

to develop and use this new program largely depended on its

electoral fortunes at the time and the state of its finances.

In some instances, the adoption of new technology may

encourage more creativity and flexibility in a party's

campaign strategy. Parties can conduct more public opinion

surveys with computers, and accordingly, tbey are able to try

dif f erent techniques to exceed old limi ts . '' The Internet

provides parties with yet another tool for campaign innovation

as its use is directly controlled by the parties themselves.

Since technology offers parties new ways to perform

their traditional roles, it may theoretically lead parties to

experience a resurgence, eventually. However, it appears that

Canadian parties have generally misunderstood the

possibilities which computers open up to political campaigns.

Parties, for example, initially misperceived the

potential of television; only belatedly realizing that it had

become the major medium of political communication, and " then

they embraced it clwisily and with exaggerated

e~pectations".'~ Today, parties still seem to view the

Internet as a medium similar to television. Their web sites,

which contain press releases, party information and

newsletters, are essentially a combination of Newsworld, the

Home Shopping Network, and typical television ads. According

to Mark Bonchek, the main point that parties and candidates

have difficulty understanding is simply that the Internet is

not television - ratfier it is a unique medium which works best

when people interact with and relate to each other, sharing

96

information, opinions and experiences, Consequently, instead

of building static web sites around pictures and press

releases, parties should use chat rooms, newsgroups,

unofficial web sites and mailing lists to build "virtual

communitiesn around issues and ideas. The priority for any

party should def initely be to induce voters to discuss the

issues that rnatter most to its ~ampaign.~~ Hence, in order

to use the Internet ef fectively, Canadian political parties

mus t change how they campaign as opposed to simply refining

current techniques.

The parties record to date suggests that critics such as

pollster Allan Gregg are justif ied in questioning whether they

can keep pace with the new technology that is rapidly becoming

available , Gregg estimates that campaign managers only employ

a quarter of the technology presently accessible by them.lL

Vijay Jog of the Corporate Renaissance Group also daims that

Canadian political parties have not adapted to the new

technology very well. His company ' s program ' Campaign

Coordinator Canada' failed to sell, the disillusioned Jog

believes, because "candidates have no funds, no technical

expertise, and run the campaign almost on an 'ad-hocr

basis " , 32 Even with new electronic technology commercially

available , parties adopt new technologies and techniques as

the need arises as opposed to anticipating what might be

needed.

Parties fail to realize the full potential of new

technology for a variety of reasons. A partyts interna1

structure can hinder the effective development and use of

computer technology, as evidenced by the Liberal Party. The

partyes national office (LPC) is the link between provincial

organizations and elected MPs, but it is without effective

levers of power, performing mainly service and CO-ordinating

functions? The national office cannot force its riding

associations to do anything. For instance, even though it

knows that computers are increasingly essential for riding

associations. it has so far been unsuccessful in convincing

many of these associations that a computer is a necessary and

worthwhile invest~nent.~~ As noted in chapter three, only

twenty to forty-five ridings acquired a persona1 computer

under the Liberal Party's national purchase plan in 1993.

A second obstacle is that many canpaign organizations

are not sufficiently prepared in zdvance of an election period

to be able to incorporate sophisticated technologies into

their campaign efforts. '' Without adequate preparation, a

campaign will encountex numerous problems that will limit the

effectiveness of the campaign technology. The experience of

the Ontario Liberals in 1990 is a case in point. When they

settled into their summer campaign head-quarters, in the lead-

up to the 1990 Ontario election, the phone lines were not

connected, and consequently, nei ther the fax machines nor i ts

e-mail links to the campaign bus could be used. Moxeover,

half of the Party's intenial computer network remained

98

unpacked as technicians attempted to assemble it. '"ven the

mos t basic and elementary aspects of carnpaign organization cari

thus affect a partyrs use of the new technology.

Trying to incorporate new technologies when there is a

lack of suf f ic ient advance organization can also isolate local

campaign organizers. During the 1988 federal election, a

number of carnpaign managers complained about the absence of

adequate advance training of staff and volunteers . 37 For

example, in two Ontario ridings, Perth-Wellington-Waterloo and

Markharn, al1 the major political parties experienced

communication dif f iculties between the riding and the national

office. Direct computer link-ups were used to facilitate

communication with national party headquarters, which was

supposed to permit virtually instantaneous communication

between the riding offices and national strategists . However, for various reasons, including technical difficulties

in reliably installing and operating the systems and problems

in locating volunteers who knew how to properly use the

technology and had the t h e to devote to these tasks, the

system did not work as hoped. 3g In circumstances like these,

parties are not controlling the new technologies, but rather

coping with them as a "problemn.

There are some obstacles to the effective use and

development of n e w technology that are beyond a Party's

control. The Internet, for example, is potentially a source

of trouble. There is a legitimate fear by parties and

99

candidates that they could lose control of the message which

they are trying to convey; for example, if one message either

contradicts what the party or candidate has previously said or

if erroneous information is put out which can then be seen by

anyone, particularly one's opponents. Moreover , once

information is posted on the Internet, it is very easy f o r

another candidate or party to cut it £rom one page and attach

it somewhere else, thereby distorting its true meaning o r

masking its true source in the process." images taken £rom

web sites can also be easily distorted or taken out of context

and used in attack ads.

New privacy protecting technology, which is rapidly

becoming available to the public, m a y also present parties

with some difficulties, particularly concerning pol l ing .

Call-management telephone technology, or ' caller ID ' , f o r

example, allows people to identify and screen incorning calls

before answering them. As a result, fewer residents are

accepting calls from polling companies ." Pollsters are

nervous that mounting refusal rates m a y increase their

expenses to the point where telephone surveys no longer make

financial sense. Moreover. with high refusal rates, pol l s ters

fear that they will not be able to draw representative,

statisticaily valid samples for phone sulveys . 42 There is a

growing concern in the industry to find new rnethods of

measuring opinion.

While opportunities for taking advantage of information

100

technology in the home are increasing, these opportunities are

m o s t accessible to people in higher income households who cari

af f ord a personal computer." Financial limitation thereby

restrict the number and range of voters who can be contacted

by parties through the Internet. According to the 1994

Generai Social Çurvey (GSS) , 56 per cent of adult Canadians, or

approximately 12.3 million, were able to use a computer."

However, only 25 per cent of Canadian households had a home

computer, up from ten per cent in 1986. One in three of these

2 -6 million households , approximately 884,000 households , was

equipped with a modem, which sends and receives information

over telephone lines and allows households to access on-line

services, BBS and t h e ~nternet.'~ Although these numbers are

increasing, the Internet as yet can only be used by a minority

of voters.

As has been discussed, a partygs decision to use a

particular form of technology depends on a number of f ac to r s

such as a Party's interna1 structure, campaign preparedness,

arid the technology itself. However, the most effective limit

on the utilization of new technology is the partyrs ability to

afford the financial ~ o s t . ~ ~ Although the costs of

maintaining and using new technology are relatively modest,

initial costs remain high.47 As a result, parties are

restricted in their ability to acquise some of the more

expensive types of technology. Yet, some parties also realize

10 1

that new technology, if ef fectively uçed, will eventually pay

for itself. The federal Liberalsr spending on information

technology, for instance, has been steadily increasing,

despite their budget deficit after the 1993 federal

election .'' The improved capabilities of low-cost persona1

computers and data analysis software have alço encouraged

parties to use the new electronic technology . '' The Internet is both relatively cheap and highly cost-

effective, since those voters who search for information on

issues on the Internet are interested enough to make the

effort, and are therefore(presumab1y) more than likely to

vote. To mail comparable amounts of information would cost a

campaign millions of dollars .'O Indeed, one of the main

advantages to parties and candidates of Internet use is

reduced phone, fax and courier charges for of fice-to-office,

home-to-office and office-to-voter communicati~n.~~

Establishing a web site on the Internet is a relatively

modes t investment , especially when compared to party

expenditures on polling and direct mail. These costs are

becoming necessary business investments that parties must make

if they wish to become competitive and cost-effi~ient.'~ The

Reform Party's web site has an annual budget of about

$12,000.s3 The Liberal Party's web site cost $15,000 to

implement, and about $500 per month to maintain.=' The PC

Partyf s web site costs $500 per month for on-line charges and

102

HTML(Hyper Text Mark-up ~anguage)' auth~ring.~~ C o s t s are

thus more or less sunilar for the parties to maintain their

respective web sites, which will more than likely prove to be

worthwhile investments. They are now indispensable,

particularly between elections when, as Robert Blaemire notes,

"Every dollar spent in the non-election period is worth at

least two spent during the campaign season. "56

As the growing cost of television puts the medium beyond

the reach of an increasing number of candidates, voter

persuasion or candidate advocacy direct mail is being viewed

as a more effective, and much less expensive, alternative .'' Even though relatively expensive, compared to Internet use,

many campaigns farm out mailings to local data processing

firms, who are cost-cornpetitive in this line of advertising.

The laser printer has brought direct letter personalization

within the f inancial range of even a modestly funded party or

an di date.'^ The cost of a direct mail solicitation in 1990

ranged f rom $0.40 to $0.50 per "piece" for a prospect or donor

acquisition mailing to about $1.00 for a house-list mailing

using a personalized greeting." Since a direct mail piece

can be quickly generated, the possible number of voters who

can be contacted is increased, thus increasing the number of

direct links between parties and voter^.^'

The Election Expenses Act has not stifled the capacity

of Canadian parties to spend money on the use and development

HTML is the standard format for writing Web pages.

of computer

not need to

is dropped,

103

technology, but rather encourages it. Parties do

declare any money spent before the election mit

nor do they need to discloçe how much they spend

on "researchn during the election(inc1uding polling and focus

groups) . Parties can "shieldn many of their administrative

costs, such as telephones, travel expenses, and printing, by

treating them as pre-election expenses.61 Direct mail can be

an expensive technique, but demographic analys is conduc ted

outside of the official campaign period is considered not to

be an "election expensen . 62

Despi te the arriva1 of some relatively inexpens ive

innovations such as the Internet, modem political marketing

still relies heavily on relatively expensive technologies,

such as direct mail and polling, standard items in modem

election campaigns .63 One of the m a i n reasons why the

Liberals lagged behind the Consematives in their use of

direct mail technology iç its high start-up cost. The federal

Liberal Party, for example, did not use direct mail seriously

u n t i l the 19844985 period, and then spent $1.7 million to

only raise $1.76 million.64 In 1988, the Liberals were even

less successful spending $2,178,313 to raise 1,432,721- 65

Nevertheless , the Liberal Party continues to heavily inves t in

this technique.

Public opinion polling is another expensive technique

that has become a mainstay of Canadian elections. According

to John Laschinger and Geoffrey Stevens, polling costs a

104

minimum of $50,000 for a f ifteen minute national questionnaire

with 1,500 respondents . 66 National polling accounts for ten

to fifteen per cent of a partygs spending or $800,000 to $1.2

million, which is roughly $20,000 a day, in a typical

campaign- It bas become so crucial, and so expensive, that

polling constitutes an ever-increasing share of a party's

budget? For instance, it is expected that before long, if

parties wish to make a respectable showing in a national

election, tbey will have to be prepared to invest $40,000 to

$50,000 per day in various polling technique^.^'

Despite suspicious views of polling, as well as

budgetary considerations , Reform Party off icials eventually

realized that they required polling data in order to gauge

voter response to their ~ampaign.~~ Reform did survey public

opinion in Preston Manning's riding during the 1993 federal

election, but it could not afford to do the kind of in-depth

polling of the national electorate that is done for the major

parties. As a result, Reform's polling was much more

rudhentary and much l e s s important to its election strategy

than was the case for the Liberals and PCs. It did little

more than seek public opinion by way of open-ended question

and answer sessions at public

The NDP has also had an ambivalent attitude towards

polling and more importantly, less money than the Liberals or

PCs to spend on it. For the 1988 federal election, the NDP

spent $330,000 on opinion research. ~ h i s amount increased

105

during the 1993 election to $525,000 .?' Due to limited

resources, along with the high costs of certain computer

techniques, the NDP also lags behind the other national

parties in the use of computer technology.

Budget constraints also limit the ability of parties to

purchase the level of professional technical expertise

required in a campaign. Predictive dialling, for example, is

cost-effective but requises sophisticated, well-trained

administrative and supervisory perso~el.'~ With computers

playing a more central sole in campaigns, and appearing

increasingly in campaign headquarters, there is the need to

have at least one person in the office at al1 times who knows

how to operate the computers and the corresponding software.

This can accordingly present local campaigns with problems,

especially if relatively few volunteers understand and can

operate the technology.

The pace of innovation in election technol&y has been

brisk in the United States partially because candidates are

able to spend more.74 Hence, with more money available t o

spend on the developrnent of technology, American parties and

candidates have been inventing new techniques at a rnuch f as ter

pace than their Canadian counterparts. The Pace of election

technology research has been slower in Canada because Canadian

campaign managers face a number of dif f icult trade-of £S. For

instance, if they spend money on computer software, this will

reduce the amount they c m spend on advertising, since, unlike

106

in the United States, the total amount of cmpaign spending is

lirnited by la^.'^ As A l a n Ware argues, where limits on

election spending exist, there is reduced pressure on parties

to make use of campaign technologies whenever possible. 76

Candidates for the Liberal Party spent on average $41,458 in

1993, with an average election expense l M t of $59,670 (see

Table VII) .'? Meanwhile, Democratic candidates for the House

of Representatives in 1994 spent on average $425,977, and

Republican candidates spent $3 56.782. 78 Although in Canada

the national parties pay a higher proportion of campaign

costs , these figures show that American candidates have more

funds at their disposal to independently determine which

campaign technologies will be used. Local candidates in

Canada conversely rely on the national parties, as evidenced

by their substantially lower campaign expenditures. Even with

a limited capacity for campaign innovation, Canadian parties

have adopted (albeit slowly) new electronic technologies to

respond to the changes taking place around them.

1 n conclus ion, this chapter has examined how Canadian

political parties have adapted to the new technologies,

looking at what conditions a Party's use of this technology,

and the obstacles to its effective use and development. As

noted, Canadian parties have not always success fully kept pace

with new developments in campaign techniques, especially when

compared with mesican political parties, and there also

appears to be significant differences among the Canadian

TABLE VII

Total Election Expenses of Registered Politid Parties, General Elections, 1979-1993

Source: Chief Electoral Officer, 1993.

Totd E l d n Expenses of Candidates

Liberai 2,6 16,ûûû Progressive Consetvative 1,779,000 New Democratic Party 5 16,000

Liberal 9,676,996 Progressive Consecvative 1 1,864,239 New Dernomtic Party 7,306,414

Liberal 12,230,212 Progressive Consecvative 12,963,905 New Dernomtic Party 4,871,183

Source: Chief Electorai ûffïcer, 1966, 1988, 1993.

108

parties themselves. With scarce resources and a generally l o w

ievel of technological expertise, Canadian parties are unable

to rely as extensively on the new electronic technology to

perform their traditional roles as Arnerican parties.

ENDNOTES

Larry K.Grossman, The Electronic Re~ublic, (New York: Viking, 1995) , pp. 57-58.

Promotional material for GWE Election Services.

Promotional material for J&T Computing Ltd..

Promotional material for Riding Computing Inc..

Promotional material for Promark Software Inc..

Christopher Sachs, "Map-Based Data Management", in The Road to Victorv, p.67.

Sachs, pp.67-8.

Edward Segal, "Choosing the Right Campaign Software", in The Road to Victorr, p.72 .

Judith S. Trent and Robert V. Friedenberg , Political Cam~aicrn Communication, 3 rd ed. , (Wes tport : Praeger, l995), p.64.

Promotional material for Compusearch.

Doug Ferguson, "Lists! Lists! Lists!", Report of the LPC (O) Organization Coordinator, (Woods tock, June 1996 , p . 4 .

Thomas S. Axworthy, "Capital-Intensive Politics", in volume 5 of the Research Studies, p.159.

This information was taken frorn the seminarrs registration list.

Brad Farquhar, [farquharQreform.ca], "Reform and technologyn, Private e-mail message to Doug DeRabbie, 4 March 1996.

George Young, [web,,master@lpc-nhq.immedia.ca], "Liberal party and technologyn, Private e-mail message to Doug DeRabbie, 3 April 1996.

Walter Robinson, [wjr@cyberus.ca], "Conservative party and technologyn, Private e-mail message to Doug DeRabbie, 15 April 1996.

Bruce L. Felknor, Political Mischief: Srnear, Sabotase, and Refom in U.S. Elections, (New York:Praeger, 1992), p.13.

18. Larry J. Sabato, The Partv's Just Beaun, (Glenview: Scott Foresman and Company, 19881, p .75 .

19. Ian Ward, "Media Intrusion and the Changing Nature of the Established parties i n Australia and canadam, Canadian Journal of Politicaï Science, ~01.26, no.3 (September l993), p.491.

20 . Charlotte Gray, " Purchas ing Powern , Saturdav Nic rh t , (March l989), p.15.

21. W.T.Stanbury, Monev in Politics, volume 1 of the Research Studies, (Ottawa and Toronto:RCERPF/Dundurn, 1991), p . 2 5 0 .

Stanbury, pp.255-6.

Stanbury, p. 250 . Ibid. - Ibid.

David Taras, The Newsmakers, (Scarborough: Nelson Canada, IWO), p.182.

C.J. Alexander, "Plugging Into New Currents", in Party Politics i n Canada, 7th ed.,pp.599-600.

Gary W. Selnow, Hish-Tech Cam~aians, (Westport: Praeger, 1994), p . 5 5 .

S.J.R.Noel, "Patronage and Entourages, Action-Sets, Networksn, i n Canadian Parties In Transition, p.238.

Mark Bonchek, "It's about community, stupid!", [http://www.iguide.com/pol_crovt/cyberpol/msgtopo1.htm], February 1996.

John Laschinger and Geoffrey Stevens, Leaders and Leçser Mortah, (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1992), p.250.

Letter correspondence from Vijay Jog, June 10, 1996.

Joseph Wearing, The L-Shaped Partv:The Liberal Party of Canada 1958-1980, (Toronto:McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1981), p.144.

Natalie Rawlings, [web__master@lpc-nhq~immedia.ca], "Technology use in LPCn, Private e-mail message to Doug DeRabbie, 26 March 1996.

4

35. Russell W-Getter and James Emerson Titus, "Voter Regis tration Tapes " , in Cam~aisns and Elections , p. 87 .

36. Georgette Gagnon and Dan Rath, Nat Without Cause, (Toronto: H a r p e r Collins Publishers Ltd., 1991), p.207.

37. David V.J.Bell and Catherine M-Bolan, "The Mass Media and Federal Campaigning at the Local Levela, volume 20 of the Research Studies, p.88.

38. Bell and Bolan, p.87f-

39. B e l l and Bolan, p -88.

40. John Dickerson, "Campaigning in Cyberspace", [http://www.org/newshour/bb/cyberrçpace/cyberspace~ll- 13.html1, F e b r u a r y 1996.

41. Laschinger and Stevens, p.251.

42. Laschinger and Stevens, p.252.

43. Statistics Canada, Preparing for the Information Highway:Information Technology in Canadian Households, by Jef frey Frank, [http://www.statcan...Trends/infotech,ht], Aprii 1996.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid-

46. Joseph Wearing, "The High Cost of High-Tech: Financing the Modern Leadership Campaign" , Partv Democracv in Canada, ed. George Perlin, (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1988), p.76,

47. Frank Tobe, "New Techniques in Computerized Voter Contactn, in Cam~aiqns and Elections, p.136.

4 8 - Alexander, p.600.

49. Selnow, p.61.

5 0. Dickerson, "Campaigning in Cyberspace" . 51. Frank Tobe, "Putting the Internet and E-mail to Workw,

in The Road ta Victory, p.585.

52. Tobe, "Putting the Internet and E-mail to Workn, p.586.

53 - Farquhar, "Ref orm and technology" .

54. Young, "Liberal party and technology" . 5 5. Robinson, Conservative party and technology" . 56. Robert Blaemire, "The Permanent Campaignn , in The

Road to Victorv, p. 82.

57- Frank I.Luntz, Candidates, Consultants, and Campaiqns, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell ttd. , 1988) , p . 215 -

58. Luntz, p.152, and Blaemire, p.66.

61. Gray, p.15.

62. Stanbury, p.271.

63. Larry J. Sabato, The R i s e of Political Consultants, (New York:Basic Books, l981), p.312f.

64. Wearing, The L-Sha~ed Partv, p. 188.

65. Stanbury, p.544.

66. Laschinger and Stevens, p. 65 - 67. Laschinger and Stevens, p.68.

68. Ibid.

69. Faron Ellis and K e i t h Archer, "Reform: Electorai Breakthroughw, in The Canadian General Election of 1993, p.66.

70. Ellis and Archer, p.66, and ~avid Taras, "Political Parties as Media O?ganizationsn, in Canadian Parties in Transition, 2nd ed., p. 430.

71. Alan Whitehorn, "The NDP Election Campaignn, in The Canadian General Election of 1988, p.45.

72. Man Whitehorn, "The NDPfs Quest for Survivaln, in The Canadian General Election of 1993, p.46.

73. Roger S. Conrad, "Winning Votes on the ~nformation Super-Highwayu, in The Road to Victorv, p.78.

76, Aian Ware, Citizens, Parties and the State, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987) , p. 118.

77. These numbers were obtained by dividing the figures in Table V f I by the number of Liberal Candidates (295) .

78. Theodore J-Eismeier and Philip H. Pollock III, "Money in the 1994 Elections and Beyondw, Midterm: The Elections of 1994 in Context, ed. Philip A. R l i r i k n e r , (Bou1der:Westview Press, 1996), p . 8 5 .

CIUOTn 5: C O ~ t U S I O ~

Canadian political parties are adopting new electronic

technology to respond to the changes taking place in the

environment around them. This technology allows Canadian

parties to more ef f ectively and ef f iciently perf orm some of

their traditional roles, particularly reestablishing links

between them and voters. With dmographic data and more

sophisticated public opinion polls, parties are amassing

greater and more detailed information on voters. Moreover,

they are using new methods of anaiysis to interpret this

information. Theoretically, at leas t , parties should now have

a better understanding of voters than ever before, and be able

to use this to their advantage when communicating with them.

The adoption of new technology by C a n a d i a n parties has

resulted in a number of consequenceç for both parties and the

Canadian political system. One consequence is that parties

now have less t h e to make important decisions and to react to

everyday events. As voters become accustomed to technological

developments, and with it a speeding up of the political

process, they will expect parties to make decisions in a

shorter t h e span than ever before. This, of course, is not

necessarily a dangerous developmeat. However, if parties

cannot keep pace with new developments, voter expectations

will exceed what parties can deliver, and thus possibly add to

the currently low confidence in Canadian parties.

A second consequence is that parties are mainly using

115

the new technology to replace decision-making and innovation,

and in doing so are failing to understand the possibilities

which computer technology opens up to political campaigns . With computer software, parties can design an entire campaign

strategy before an election, taking into account every likely

scenario. As a situation arises during an election, campaign

managers çimply have to consult with the computer program to

follow the directions given on how to best respond to the

situation at hand. Additionally, it would seem that

innovation, especially at the local level, is discouraged by

the national parties as cornputer applications such as direct

mail are believed to be more reliable, and as already noted,

parties prefer techniques proven to have been successful

instead of risking an election on new and innovative campaign

techniques.

In terms of political communication, the new technology

is used by parties rnainly to tell voters what they already

believe instead of generating active discussion on relevant

issues. As Richard Armstrong observes, the use of new

technology has tended to make political parties " facilitative"

rather than " ins tNrnentalN . ' In other words , parties no

longer decide what needs ta be done but rather how a

particular decision is to be carried out. With the new

technology, parties may arguably be better equipped to execute

political decisions, but it would seem that parties will deal

with political crises as they axise as opposed to anticipating

future problems . The opportunities created by technology are there for

parties to exploit. But, for one reason or another, the

potential is left largely untapped. Some riding associations

and local candidates are still not convinced that technology

has a significant place in contemporary campaigns. However,

technology has become a main part of everyday society. Even

though parties have expanded their use of new technology, it

doeç not compare to the alxnost encompassing use of the new

technology by business and industry. The result is a

political party systern seriously lagging behind the rest of

society, and this in turn leads to a party system t h a t cannot

keep pace with new developments and the issues which they

raise.

Another consequence is that parties appear to be

entering a new "fourthn party system which offers more direct

links between parties and vo ters in order to encourage broader

participation. But it would seem that the adoption of new

electronic technologies and techniques are transforming their

functions and structure as opposed t o effecting a resurgence.

Although parties are attempting to involve mors people in

politics through t he new technology, voter participation

remains passive and is often relatively meaningless.

Voters are now potentially better equipped to obtain and

respond to political information, and thus possibly shape the

political agenda. Through the Internet, for example, voters

can quickly download information on issues from their own home

whenever they want. By changing howvoters access information

and the type of information which they can access, computer

technology is expanding the number of options available to

voters for political involvement. Ta respond to these

changes, parties should employ the opportunities opened up by

the new technology. This means that parties must realize the

interactivity of the new electronic technology and accordingly

shape their development and use of technology to ref lect this

characteristic. For example, the fnternet, a medium through

which genuine two-way contact can take place, should be

carefully examined by parties as a more meaningful way of

approaching vo ters . Despite attempts to act independently of the national

parties, riding associations and local candidates continue to

rely heavily on them for services and resources that are

mavailable at the local level. If local candidates view

their electoral success largely resulting from the national

campaign, ties between candidates and riding associations may

be severed. By once again changing the nature of the

relationship between the national level and the local level,

the use of new electronic technology may further alter party

structure.

INTO TISE FoTmE

As political communication evolves, television may see

i ts position as the dominant political medium gradually

118

eroding. The new electronic technology provides parties with

alternative methods for approaching voters, methods that are

both cheaper and more effective; for example, direct mail and

web sites on the Internet . Hence, the replacement of mass

media with personal media may increasingly characterize future

political campaigns.

T h e importance of campaign technology to electoral

success, however, c m easily be overstated. Elections and the

choices voters make among parties and candidates are too

cornplex and involve too many variables to be determined by a

single element.' Hence, it would be an exaggeration to state

that use of new technology will absolutely determine the

victors in future elections. Yet, it seems safe to predict

that, other factors being equal, parties which invest in and

develop their capacity to use technology will achieve a higher

level of eiectoral success than those which do not.

ENDNOTES

Richard Armstrong, The Next Hurrah:The Communications Revolution in American Politics, (New York:Beech Tree

2. Larry J. Sabato, The Rise of Political Consultants, (New York:Basic Books, 1981), p.15.

eg. Petition 1 Ca6e (A) ??tition 2 Csce (5) Town Hal1 1 CdCo (Cj Comtituency remest C $ C ~ (Ci Constituency a s e 1 Csda (2 Connituerij case 2 C~CI (5 Coffee p a t y CaCe (Gi

City &sue Yau cm keep trô& of W t &sue tRe

Posta1 Cade Vety lmpanant - ensures 1imely peson is unemed &ut- defie y and cm &e Gnked Io demgraphiC Sta&tiQ eg- Envirunment Cade (A)

Unemnloyment Cade (9) Home Phone ~onst&&n Code (Cl

Pensions Code (0) ausiness Phone

Campaign Th& cade wauid tell you how supporters Po11 Nurnber Pull dNls&s are a m 7 . e fmm wu& be want ;O be i i l v e d id tne

Sections Canada campagn

'House" When the housWld c~nta.m a r e eg. poli ~ ~ r ' d e f Cade (A) trian one petsun. a cade 13 Phone Camass CGe (5) ~ssigned ra Viem far ease ai Donor Cade (C) taçeting and lo eUmrumr~te d u m e Lawn Sign Code (O) m w ~ ~ sent to one home. Liberai Memer Code (E)

e-g. singta person househald - Vote 77t& 13 tne mst impotTant caa'e. You ~ r n

Coda (01 get rmst al th& infamatian f i m jraur

CO~PUSEARCH Nrrket ird Social Rcrerrcfr Ltd, 1991 Liftstyles R e p o r t < a 5 1 Ares Lardon uut:

Oefinjtion y FE0 3enc-rk Onrrrio

o t f iniciori ly Province

rork UPSULE

TOTAL ntOOLE AWb uPPER !41OOLE CUSS

TOTAL LOUER f ~ f f l ~ 1,895 4.2 6.8 6 1

TOTAL YWWC SIMG~ES 3.317 7.3 3.1 IW

iOTAL Y a W C CUIPLES 3,568 7.8 1 191

~ O ~ A L w n NLSTERS 6.79s 14.9 12.1 ta

TOTAL O U & RETIRED 6,126 13.5 5.3 OS

TOTAL ETHWCC 106 0.2 5.1 5

TOTAL NON-URUN UPSfALE AM0 I(t00LE CUSS O 0.0 10.2 O

lOTAL MON-URW VORIIWG AN0 LWER lNC1J)lf O 0.0 S-8 O

TOTAL WON-URBU FARM [WC O 0.0 1.3 'O

---- ,,-*tt~--rrrrt+rrrtrrrrt---

TOT AL HOUSEHOLOS cs , n o

SOURCE: COMPUSURcn

Dear Fricndss

D h g the be several wecks. 1 have been meethg as many residenu of Lonaon We8 o I codd ui Lineaing to cheu questions and concem. 1 have found many people b m al1 waiks of We s&re a common concem.

Those with fiudies are concerned about the b u r e for their childrcn and ~ c h i l d r c n , ïhe mibbody hi@ unernployment tate, and the C o m a k position shat n o m g wiil c b g e und riie year 2000, points to a blealr fuMc for our Eimilics.

The Li- Party has a plan of hope, and a plan for change. A Li"berai Govemment will:

couccnûau on hclping d business. w h m mon jobs are crratcd offcf a National Apprenticahip Program m pivc young people a cimce to work bring the annuai deficit down graduadiy to $% oTGDP, h m the c m 5.5% . e m &u Medicarc will remain availablt to al1 Canadians.

Please call rny headquarte~ at 471-6361 if you have any 4 ~ & t i ~ ~ about the Liberai pl= When 1 am elected, you have rny cornmitment to rcpment you to the b e n of my ability.

Bcst regards,

Sue Barnes

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