DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY • · PDF fileAs a Mean Starlight qualified night vision ... yet another example of the unforgiving nature of Tactical Naval Aviation ... DEPARTMENT OF THE

·- • DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY COMMANDER NAVAL AIR FORCE

UNITED STATES PAC I FIC FLEET

NAVAL A IR STATI ON . NORTH I SLAND

SAN DIEGO , CA LIFORNIA 92135· 5 100

~=~ 0 31/ 118 9 4

t• NOV 1992

SIXTH ENDORSEMENT on CDR USN ltr of 20 Jun 92

From: To:

Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet Judge Advocate General (Code 33)

Subj: INVESTIGATION TO INQUIRE INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE FLIGHT MISHAP INVOLVING BUNO 164031 WHICH OCCURRED ON 7 MAY 1992

1. Readdressed and forwarded, concurring in the proceedings, findings of fact, opinions and recommendations of the investigating officer and previous endorsers .

2 . As a Mean Starlight qualified night vision goggle pilot with over 2000 hours in the aircraft, it is reasonable to assume that LCDR McGuire was comfortable in the low altitude flight regime both day and night. It is also reasonable to assume that a daylight, single-plane flight, limited to 1000 ft AGL by Standard Operating Procedures may have been viewed as mundane and unchallenging by LCDR McGuire . This subtle complacency coupled with possible overconfidence while flying in clos e proximity to the ground offer the only plausible explanation of why a senior, highly r e spe cted pilot would knowingly violate SOP and ultimately fail to e xtricate himself from an extremis situation. We have yet another example of the unforgiving nature of Tactical Naval Aviation and the fact that eve n a brie f lapse in professionalism can produce catastrophic results.

3. CDR should i ndeed b e comme nded for his clear, concise and in-de pth inve stigati on of the circumstances surrounding this tragic mishap. His innovative u se o f compute r graphic s should s erve as a model for the presentation of dynamic elements in f uture inves tigative pac k a ges .

Copy to: COMTHIRDFLT COMCARGRU COMSTRKFI GHTWINGPAC cvw 11 VFA 22 CDR , USN

26

e >rr. I

33.~

(b) (6)(b) (6) (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

• DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY COMMANDER THIRD FLEET

FPO AP 96601 -6001

• IN REPLY REFER TO:

5800 Ser OOJ/0447 14 Sep 92

FIFTH ENDORSEMENT on CDR S . USN, ltr of 20 Jun 92

From: To:

Commander THIRD Fleet Judge Advocate General

Via: Commander, Naval Air Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet


1 . Readdressed and forwarded, contents noted . This matter falls under t h e primary cognizance of Commander, Naval Air Force , U. S . Pacific Fleet .

Copy to: COMCARGRU-3 COMSTRKFIGHTWINGPAC CVW- 11 STRKFITRON-22 Investigating Office r

----.:::.. K. R . VIENNA By direction

(b) (6) (b) (6)

• DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY COMMANDER CARRIER GROUP THREE

• FPO SAN FRANCISCO. CAUFORNA IMS801-4303

lit MPL y lti:J"D TO:

5800 Ser 003/466 7 AUG 92

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on CDR S. USN, ltr of 20 Jun 92

From: Commander, Carrier Group 3 To: Commander, Third Fleet


1. Readdressed and forwarded, concurring in the proceedings, findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations of the Investigating Officer and previous endorsers.

2. Apparently a highly respected professional crashed and died while flying very unprofessionally. This extraordinary lapse of judgment evidently occurred without any outward warning signs. I cannot accept that. Either we missed the signs or the Strike Fighter community s hould reexamine its criteria of professionalism . We cannot incur such a loss and fail to discover and understand the underlying cause.

Copy to: COMSTRKFIGHTWINGPAC CVW-11 STRKFITRON- 22 Investigating officer

J. J. DANTONE

24

(b) (6) (b) (6)

• DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY ' COMMANDER STRIKE FIGHTER WING

U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

NAVAL AIR STATION

LEMOORE. CALIFORNIA 93246·5022 IN REPLY REFER TO:

5800 Ser 011/ 150 3

2 7 JUL 1992 THIRD ENDORSEMENT on CDR S. USN, ltr of 20 Jun 92

From: To: Via:

Subj:

Commander, Strike Fighter Wing, U.S. Pacific Fleet Judge Advocate General (1) Commander, Carrier Group THREE (2) Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet

INVESTIGATION TO INQUIRE INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE FLIGHT MISHAP INVOLVING BUNO 164031 WHICH OCCURRED ON 7 MAY 1992

1. Readdressed and forwarded, concurring in the proceedings, findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations of the Investigating Officer and previous endorsers.

2 . The "lesson learned" in this mishap is one which has been learned and re-learned by naval aviators over the years. The lesson here is that well-established safety procedures have been put in place to protect the pilot and his aircraft . These rules can be disregarded only at the peril of the mission pilot. I am equally at a loss to explain or understand the behavior of a naval aviator who had the highest reputation for professionalism within his squadron and this community. It is incumbent upon each of us in leadership positions to re-double our efforts to ensure that all aviation events are pursued aggressively, but within the bounds of established procedures.

3. I also commend CDR for an outstanding report. The use of computer-generated figures greatly added to the Investigating Officer's report and the ability of reviewing officials to understand what happened in this case. I concur that this computer tool should be made available to Investigating Officers in future cases where appropriate.

Copy to: STRKFITRON 22 Investigating Officer COMCARAIRWING ELEVEN

R. E. ARNOTT Acting

23

(b) (6) (b) (6)

(b) (6)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY COMMANDER

CARRIER AIR WING ELEVEN FPO SAN FRANCISCO 96601-4408

' 5800 Ser 00/096 09 J uly 1992

SECOND ENDORSEMENT o n CDR S. USN, ltr of 20 Jun 9 2

From: Comma nder , Carrier Air Wing 11 To : Judge Advocate General (Code 33) Vi a : (1) Comma nder , Strike Fighter Wing, U.S. Pac i f i c Fleet

(2 ) Comma nder Naval Air Force , U.S. Pa c i f i c Fleet

Subj: INVESTIGATI ON TO I NQUIRE I NTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE FLI GHT MISHAP INVOLVING BUNO 164031 WH I CH OCCURRED ON 07 MAY 1992

1. Forwarded.

2. The Mishap Pi l ot (MP) broke clearly articulated a n d we ll understood ru l es . The result wa s his tragic death a nd the l oss of a valuable aircraft . I will never unders t a nd what prompted this fi ne nava l of ficer a nd h i ghly skilled pi l o t to disregard squadron SOP , CNO instruction s a nd common sense . Rules i n Naval Aviatio n are often written from tragic experi e n ce . If nothing else , LCDR McGuire's death will serve to remi nd Naval Aviator s of t h is fact a n d graphica lly poi n t out the potentially devastating consequ e nces of se l ectively disregarding or obeying rules accordin g to whi m or preferen ce .

3 . Th e Investigating Officer is to be commended for a t horough and expert invest i gation , in particular , the graphic represen tations of the mishap aircraft immediately prior to impact. Th e endorser found t h is tool very useful in clari fying t he flig ht of the mishap aircraft. This methodo l ogy a nd the attendan t computer too l s shou ld be taught and made available for use i n all similar investigations.

4 . Su bject to the foregoing , the findings of fact , opin i ons and recommendations of the Investigating Officer a nd first endorser are concurred in.

Copy to : COMCARGRU THREE CO , VFA 22 CDR J. A .

22

(b) (6) (b) (6)

(b) (6)

= ' • • DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY STRIKE FIGHTER SQUADRON 22

FPO AI' 9660 1-e202

IN REPLY REFER TO:

5800 Ser ADMIN/241 8 Jul 92

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CDR S. , USN , l tr of 20 Jun 92

From : To: Via :

Subj:

Encl :

Commandi ng Officer , Stri ke Fighter Squadron 22 Judge Advocate General (1) Commander , Carrier Airwing ELEVEN (2) Commander, St rike Fighter Wing, U.S. Pacific (3) Commander , Car rier Group THREE (4) Commander, Naval Air Forces , U.S. Pacific Fleet

INVESTIGATION TO INQUIRE INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE FLIGHT MISHAP INVOLVING BUNO 164031 WHICH OCCURRED ON 07 MAY 1992

(44) Mishap Aircraft Assymetric Flight Considerations

.

1. Readdressed and forwarded . The investigation results were delayed beyond the 30 day requirement while waiting the outcome of engineering investigation results .

2. Summary of facts . This mishap invol ved an FA-l8C , Buno 164031 , Modex 300, assigned to Strike Fighter Squadron 22 (VFA- 22) which crashed dur i ng unauthorized low l evel fl ight 07 May 1992 at 0925 local . The pi lot , LCDR Kenneth F. McGui re , USN, of VFA- 22 was ki lled on i mpact . The crash site is on uninhabited u.s. Forest l and in Marbl e Canyon , approximately 7.5 nautical miles (NM) southeast of Bishop, CA and 8 NM east of t he first VR-208 check-point. Weather was 10,000 feet scattered , 15,000 feet scattered and 40 mi l e visibility. Witnesses establish the beginning of unauthorized low level flight north of the R-2508 complex along the Owens River. The aircraft was heading north and made a right turn at 200 feet AGL into Black Canyon. Credible witness in Black Canyon immediately prior to Marble Canyon judged the mishap aircraft turning through the natural canyon bend to be at 150 feet above the canyon floor in a level left hand 90 degree angle of bank turn trailing white vortices from the wing tips. Calculations show that at the completion of thi s turn 1200 horizontal feet and 1.5 seconds remained to the first impact point with 1600 feet and 2 seconds required for a successful pull up maneuver (see figures l - 4, pages 16-17) . Fi rst impact point was 150 feet above the canyon floor. The second impact point was 300 yards beyond , 20 degrees el evation above the first. The ai rcraft had no outstanding maintenance discrepancies relevant to t he mishap . LCDR McGuire was scheduled as a single plane adversary (call sign Beef >) to oppose a second flight of four VFA- 22 aircraft (call sign Beef 2) on a low level navigation training sortie . The 72 hours history of LCDR McGuire preceding the mishap indicates no significant sociological, psychological , or human factors relating to the mishap . LCDR McGuire was fully qualified to conduct the assigned mission. The mission, including adversary

19

(b) (6) (b) (6)

Subj: INVESTIGATION T041tQUIRE INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES ~ECTED WITH THE FLIGHT MISHAP INVOLVING BUNO 164031 WHICH OCCURRED ON 07 MAY 1992

rules of engagement, was briefed in accordance with squadron standard operating procedure (SOP). LCDR McGuire took off 5 minutes ahead of Beef 2 flight. Search and Rescue was initiated out of Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, by COSO 35, a Navy HH- 1 helicopter. COSO 35 arrived at the crash s i te approximatel y 1040 l ocal. LCDR McGuire's body was discovered by the SAR crew at approximatel y 1200 local . Initial identification was made by flight gear markings with final identi fication by autopsy fingerprint. Salvage operations are complete.

3. Opinions. Concur with the opinions of the Investigating Officer with the following comments:

a . Opinion 4. Recommend modify to read as follows: The unauthorized l ow level portion of the mishap flight began pr ior to entering the foothills. Witnesses establish LCDR McGuire at approximately 200 feet AGL heading north along the Owens River Vall ey and making a right hand turn into the foothills at Black Canyon.

b. Opinion 6. Recommend add the following statement: In addition to the stated aerodynamic considerations, finding of fact 10 establishes potential for asymmetric flight with one drop tank on centerline and one on a wing pylon . In the worst case scenario where the drop tank on wing pylon 3 would not transfer (still containing approximately 2300 pounds of fuel equating to 16, 790 foot pounds asymmetry), it is determined in enclosure (44) that the angle of attack limits are -6 to +12 degrees. Finding of fact 31 and 32 show that approximately +10 degrees AOA was the maximum available to LCDR McGuire at time of impact. Therefore , l oss of control due to asymmetric flight was not a factor i n this mishap.

c. Opinion 10. Recommend modify to read as follows : Visual illusions resulting from the combined effects of multi- colored rock , morning shadows, and a sloping canyon floor, existed at both the canyon bend and the first impact site. These illusions, when coupled with the lack of any reported preflight terrain study, contributed to the mishap by delaying LCDR McGuire's recognition of the rising canyon floor and rock outcroppings for a brief, but critical instant of time. (Findings of Fact (12), (20), (34), (35), and (36)) .

d. Opinions 9, 11, 12 and 13. The following comments are provided : As VFA-22 ' s most experienced FA-18 pilot (2175 hours in type), Night Visi on Goggl e Pilot and Operations Officer, LCDR McGuire routinely demonstrated mature judgment and decisive tactical performance. This clear breach of flight discipline, while uncharacteristic, nevertheless requires that responsibility and accountability for this mishap rests solely with the pilot, LCDR McGuire.

4. Recommendations.

a. Incorporate VFA-22 and Commander, Strike Fighter Wing, Pacific, single aircraft SOP of 1000 feet AGL minimum altitude during daylight into existing VFA- 22 low level briefing guide training rules. These ru l es, bri efed prior to every low level flight , would reinforce the 1000 feet minimum altitude to pilots on single ship missions. This reminder is particul arly important to NVG pilots who are authorized to train at night, single aircraft, and 200 feet AGL. Complete.

20

• Subj: INVESTIGATI ON TO INQUIRE INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE FLIGHT MISHAP INVOLVING BUNO 164031 WHICH OCCURRED ON 07 MAY 1992

b. Classify squadron adversary sor ties in the VFA- 22 low level trai ning rules as singl e ship missions for the purpose of l ow level flight. Complete .

5 . The investi gating officer , CDR S. , USN, is to be commended for a thorough and timel y report .

6. Subject to the foregoing, the pr~;~~~ ' findings of recommendat ions of the i nvestigating ~~~re approved.

C. R. RONDESTVEDT

21

f act , opi nions and

(b) (6) (b) (6)

• • 20 Jun 92

From: CDR USN To: Commander, Canier Air Wing Eleven Via : Commanding Officer, Strike Fighter Squadron Twenty Two

Subj: INVESTIGATION TO INQUIRE INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE FLIGHT MISHAP INVOLVING BUNO 164031 WHICH OCCURRED ON 07 MAY 1992.

Ref: (a) (b)

Enc1: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) ( 8) (9) (1 0) (11)

(12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)

(21)

(22) (23) (24) (25)

(26)

(27) (28) (29)

JAG Manual COMSTRKFIGHTWINGPACINST 5830.1 B

COMCARAIRWING ELEVEN Appointing Order, 07 May 92 Request for Extension of Reporting Deadline CVW-11 Approval of Extension Request LCDR McGuire's orders Aeromedical Clearance for LCDR McGuire F/ A-18 NATOPS qualification for LCDR McGuire Instrument qualification for LCDR McGuire Flight Physiology record for LCDR McGuire Flight Time Summary for LCDR McGuire BUNO 164031 Flight time summary and FCF Data BUNO 164031 list of Outstanding Aircraft Discrepancies and Aircraft Inspection I Acceptance Record BUNO 164031 Special Inspection Data BUNO 164031 list of Outstanding Technical Directives BUNO 164031 Aircraft configuration VF A-22 Flight Schedule of 07 May 92 Statement of LCDR BEEF 2 flight leader Statement of LCDR BEEF 2 flight member Oakland center Radar voice transcript and track information Weather Observation for Bishop airport, CA, 07 May 92 Statement of Colonel USAF(R), Mammoth Lakes, CA, witness Investigating Officer's notes from telephone interview of Mr.

Bishop, CA, witness Maps of mishap area showing locations of witnesses Photographs of Black Canyon and the mishap site Statement of Dr. Bishop, CA, witness Investigating Officer's notes from personal interview of Dr.

Investigating Officer's notes from telephone interview of Lt.

China Lake SAR pilot Photographs of impact areas Plot of aircraft debtis field Engineering Investigat ion results for aircraft engines

1

(b) (6) (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)(b) (6) (b) (6)

(b) (6) (b) (6)

(b) (6) (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6) (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

• Subj: INVESTIGATION TO INQUIRE INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE FLIGHT MISHAP INVOLVING BUNO 164031 WHICH OCCURRED ON 07 MAY 1992.

(30) Engineering Investigation results for flight control actuators and ejection seat components

(31) Investigating Officer's Observations (32) Aircraft flight path, turning G, and pullup calculations (33) Photographs of morning shadowing at the Black Canyon bend and

the mouth of Marble Canyon (34) 72 Hour History of LCDR McGuire (35) Autopsy Report for LCDR McGuire (36) Flight Surgeon's assessment of Autopsy report (37) VFA-22 PAC XRAY Message DTG 072226Z May 92 (38) Inyo Register newspaper dated Friday, 08 May 1992 (39) OPNA VINST 3710.7N, Para 509 (40) STRKFITRON22INST 3500.1 CH-1, page 11-6, para 6 (41) OPNAVINST 3710.7N, Para 533 (42) Statement of LCDR regarding environmental impact of

F/A-18 Aircraft Materials (43) NAVSAFCEN NORFOLK VA Messsage DTG 081500Z JUN 87

regarding mishap site cleanup

2

(b) (6)


PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. As directed by enclosure (1 ), per reference (a), a one officer JAG Manual

Investigation was conducted to determine an facts and circumstances

surrounding the mishap ofF/ A-18 aircraft Bureau Number (BUNO) 164031,

modex 300, on 07 May 1992, which resulted in the death of the pilot, LCDR

Kenneth F. McGuire.

2. A 14 day deadline extension was requested and approved (enclosures 2 and

3) on 08 June 92 in order to allow additional time for preparation of the

Autopsy Report and Engineering Investigation by other sources.

3. The Investigating Officer was senior in rank to LCDR McGuire, and outside

of his chain of command.

4. This investigation is submitted with no existing prejudices, pre-conceived

opinions, or inclinations in judgment based upon any other findings by the

concurrent mishap investigation.

5. No evidence, findings of fact, opinions, recommendations, or other parts

of this investigation are classified. This report may be handled as with other

unclassified material, but is not intended for casual distribution.

6. Salvage operations on aircraft BUNO 164031 have been completed. The

aircraft impact site is located on uninhabited U.S. Forest Service Land

approximately 7.5 nm southeast of Bishop, CA, and accordingly, claims or

litigation against the United States are thought to be unlikely.

7. F I A-18 BUNO 164031 was destroyed upon impact. The data storage unit

and mission computers were not salvageable, therefore the parameters of

flight sunounding this mishap could only be estimated.

3


8. Classified aircraft components and avionics from BUNO 164031 have been

recovered or are assumed to have been completely destroyed as a result of

ground impact and aircraft explosion. There is no reason to suggest any

compromise of classified material.

9. Per reference (b), privacy act statements and legal warnings were not

deemed necessary for witnesses and are not included.

10. Per reference (b), a line of duty /misconduct determination was not made

due to the fatality of LCDR McGuire.

11. Legal advice during the course of this investigation was obtained from

CDR , J AGC, who is assigned to Strike Fighter Wing Pacific,

Lemoore, CA.

12. I certify that all documents which are originals are authentic a nd that all

enclosures which are photocopies are actual representations of the original

authentic documents.

4

(b) (6)

----------------------------------------------------------~---

Subj : INVESTIGATION TO INQUIRE INTO THE CIRCUMSTAN CES CONNECTED WITH THE FLIGHT MISHAP INVOLVING BUNO 164031 WHICH OCCURRED ON 07 MAY 1992.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The mishap pilot, LCDR Kenneth F. McGuire, USN, /1310 was

on active duty attached to VFA-22 and was designated a Service Group One

Naval Aviator. (Enclosure (4)).

2. LCDR McGuire was fully qualified for flight on 07 May 92. (Enclosures (5),

( 6), (7), (8)).

3. LCDR McGuire had accumulated a total of 3233 flight hours, 2175 of which

were in the F I A-18. He had flown 119 hours in the previous 90 days, and 45

hours in the 30 day period preceding the mishap. (Enclosure (9)).

4. The mishap aircraft was an F 1 A-18C Lot 12, BUNO 164031, modex 300.

(Enclosure (10)).

5. Aircraft BUNO 164031 had 814.9 total hours since new and was last flown

on 06 May 92. (Enclosure (10)).

6. The last Functional Check Flight (FCF) was flown on 26 April 92 after

incorporation of IPPC 79 in both engines. From 26 April 92 to 07 May 92,

BUNO 164031 flew 17.5 hours. (Enclosure (10)).

7. BUNO 164031 had no downing discrepancies on the morning of the

mishap. There were no outstanding aircraft discrepancies relevant to the

mishap. A proper daily /turnaround inspection had been performed on

BUNO 164031 prior to the mishap flight. (Enclosure (11)).

8. All technical directives which applied to the aircraft had been incorporated

or were in compliance prior to the mishap flight. All phase and special

inspections had been completed within the prescribed time frame. (Enclosure

(12), (13)).

5

(b) (6)

Subj : INVESTIGATION TO INQUIRE INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE FLIGHT MISHAP INVOLVING BUNO 164031 WHICH OCCURRED ON 07 MAY 1992.

9. LCDR McGuire signed the aircraft inspection and acceptance record ("A"

sheet) certifying that he had reviewed the discrepancies for the ten previous

flights. (Enclosure (11)).

10. BUNO 164031 was configured with five pylons, external fuel tanks on

stations 3 and 5, and no external ordnance. (Enclosure (14)).

11 . LCDR McGuire was scheduled as a single plane adversary (callsign BEEF

3) to oppose a second flight of four VFA-22 aircraft (callsign BEEF 2) on a low

level navigation training sortie. The flight schedule was signed by the

squadron Commanding Officer. (Enclosure (15)).

12. LCDR McGuire briefed with BEEF 2 flight (led by LCDR at 0730

hours on the morning of the mishap. Rules of engagement for simulated

attacks on the formation were covered. There was no discussion of spedfic

flight profile for LCDR McGuire. (Enclosures (16), (17)).

13. LCDR McGuire (BEEF 3) took off at 0905 local and approximately 5

minutes ahead of BEEF 2 flight. (Enclosures (16), (17)).

14. LCDR McGuire checked in with Oakland Center at 0908L (13 nm from

Lemoore), immediately cancelled his instrument clearance, then proceeded

VFR at 17,500 ft MSL toward the Sien·a Mountains. At 0918L, LCDR McGuire

reported to Oakland Center th at he was "descending and switching".

(Enclosure (18)).

15. Radar track of BEEF 3 continued until 0918L at which time the radar

controller removed this track from the system. Parameters of the last sweep

were: location N3715.8 W118 52.6, altitude 17,500 ft MSL, groundspeed 296

knots. This location corresponds to a position over the central Sierra

mountain range, 30nm west of the mouth of Black Canyon. (Enclosure (18)).

6

(b) (6)


16. Observed weather for Bishop airport at 0850 local on 07 May 92 was

reported as 10,000 ft scattered, 15,000 ft scattered, visibility 40 nm, air

temperature 69 degrees f, wind 310 degrees at 4 knots. (Enclosure (19)).

17. Retired Air Force Colonel flying a small civil aircraft

near Bishop, observed BEEF 3 fly north in Owens Valley, then tum towards

Black Canyon. He estimated the F 1 A-18's altitude at "perhaps 1000 ft AGL or

lower." Moments later, Colonel noted a large b lack smoke plume

from Marble Canyon and proceeded to the mishap site while reporting the

crash via Bishop Airport Unicorn. (Enclosure (20)).

18. Mr. , a fisherman standing on the Owens River witnessed BEEF

3 fly over his position and enter the mouth of Black Canyon at an estimated

altitude of 200ft AGL. Mr. moved several yards and regained sight of

BEEF 3 an instant before the second impact. (Enclosure (21 )).

19. Maps of the mishap area showing the positions of the witnesses are

included as enclosure (22).

20. Photographs of Black Canyon are included as enclosure (23). The terrain

consists of steep, gravel and brush covered slopes, and sharp ravines with

multi -colored rock.

21. Dr. an Emergency Room doctor from Bishop, and his wife,

witnessed BEEF 3 flying low and fast up Black Canyon. Dr. and his

wife were driving along the road in Black Canyon about 1 nm west of the

mishap site. They could not see the impact site from their position. Dr.

stated that the F I A-18 overflew his car at about 150ft AGL

(Enclosures (22), (23)).

22. BEEF 3 disappeared from the view approximately 3 seconds before impact with the rock outcropping. The last viewed BEEF 3 in a

7

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level left turn, through the natural canyon bend, approximately 90 degrees

angle o f bank and trailing white vortices from the wing tips. (Enclosures (24), (25)).

23. BUNO 164031 impacted a rock outcropping at the mouth of Marble

Canyon, approximately 150ft above lhe canyon floor. Impact time was

approximately 0925 local. A portion of the aircraft continued to a second and

final impact uphill from, and approximately 300 yards beyond, the first

impact. Several sma11 brush fires were ignited as a result of the aircraft

explosion. (Enclosures (24), (25)).

24. The aircraft m ishap site is located at approximately 5700 feet above mean

seal level in rugged, mountainous ten·ain at 37 17.5N 118 13.6 W. This area is

uninhabited U.S. Forest Service Land approximately 7.5 nautical miles SE of

Bishop, CA, and 8 nm prior to VR 208 point Alpha. (Enclosures (22), (23)).

25. SAR was initiated out of NWC China Lake, CA by call sign COSO 35, a

Navy HH-1 helicopter. COSO 35 arrived at the mishap site at approximately

1040 local. (Enclosure (26)).

26. The body of the pilot was discovered at approxim a tely 1200L by the NWC

SAR crew. A presumptive identification of LCDR McGuire was m ade at that

time based on p ersonal effects and flight gear markings. (Enclosure (26)).

27. Alignment of the two impact marks indicates an aircraft flight path pitch

angle of approximately 20 degrees above the horizon. (Enclosure (27)).

28. Portions of the left wing, drop tank, and aft fuselage were located around

the first impact point. The nose section and forward fuselage were located at

the second impact area. (Enclosure (28)).

8


29. Engineering investigations were conducted on various engine and

hydraulic flight control components recovered from the mishap aircraft

wreckage. TI1e engines were turning at high RPM and all fli ght control

components examined appeared to be operating nonnally at the time of

impact. Flight surface positions at time of impact were assessed to be:

(Enclosures (29) and (30)).

Right rudder: undetetminable

Left rudder: 16° trailing edge right

Left aileron: 16° trailing edge down

Right ai1eron: 25° trailing edge up

Right horizontal stabilator: 6° leading edge down

Left horizontal stabilator: undeterminable

30. Engineeting investiga tion of ejection seat rocket motors and hardware

indicates that LCDR McGuire made no attempt to eject. (Enclosure (30)).

31. From tests conducted in the F/A-18 flight simulator at 35000 lbs. gross

weight, 5500 ft. MSL and 450 KCAS, the following data was obtained:

Maximum AOA attainable with full aft stick (7.5G) = Approx 10°

Minimum time to change FPA from +5°to +20°using full aft stick

(7.5G) was approximately 2 seconds. (Enclosure (31 )).

32. Calculations for time, distance and Gin the canyon turn were made for

various airspeeds. Using an airspeed of 450 KCAS and a turn radius of 3000 ft.

(the maximum turn radius possibl e in the canyon) , yields a turning G of 6.6

for the 60° tum. From the end of this tum to the first impact point is

approximately 1.5 sec and 1200 horizontal feet. (Enclosure (32)).

33. At 450 KCAS, a 2 second pull-up maneuver requires approximately 1600

horizontal feet. (Enclosure (32)).

9


34. 1l1e faces of the white rock outcroppings around the first impact point

were in shadow at 0925L on 07 May 1992. Shadowing of these outcroppings

causes them to blend with adjacent darker rock and the background, giving

the casual appearance that the outcroppings are set farther away or are non

existent. (Enclosure (33)).

35. At a speed of 450 KCAS and altitude of 200ft AGL, LCDR McGuire could

not have seen the rock outcropping until he rounded the canyon bend

approximately 4 seconds before impact. (Enclosure (32)).

36. The floor of Black Canyon rises approximately 200 vertical ft between the

natural canyon bend and the mouth of Marble canyon (impact site)

approximately 1/2 nm farther upstream. (Enclosure (22)).

37. In his 80 to 90 degree angle of bank left tum prior to impact, LCDR

McGuire's radar altimeter would have registered its maximum of 5000 ft AGL

or ranged off of the canyon wall on the outside of his tum, indicating 500 to

700 ft AGL. (Enclosure (31)).

38. The 72 hour history of LCDR McGuire preceding the mishap indicates no

significant sociological, psychological or human factors relating to the

mishap. LCDR McGuire took Sudafed medication for allergy on the

afternoon before the mishap. (Enclosure (34)).

39. Autopsy of LCDR McGuire's remains indicated that cause of death was

multiple blunt force injuries from high G impact. Toxicologic tests revealed

the presence of Pseudoephedrine in LCDR McGuire's body. (Enclosure (35)).

40. The Autopsy report positively identified LCDR McGuire by fingerprint.

(Enclosure (35)).

10


41. A Navy Flight Surgeon, reviewed the 72 hour history and toxicologic

report for this investigation and assessed that the Pseudoephedrine found in

LCDR McGuire's body tissue was residual h·om his ingestion of Sudafed

tablets the day before, and would not have impacted his performance in the

aircraft. (enclosure (36)).

42. BUNO 164031 received strike damage resulting from impact with the

ground and subsequent explosion. (Enclosure (37)).

43. The aircraft mishap produced a short term public affairs response in the

local community, including a h·ont page newspaper article and a short

segment on a local Bishop evening television talk show. (Enclosure (38)).

44. OPNA VINST 3710.7N, "Flight Rules for Naval Aircraft", paragraph 509

states "Except when necessary for takeoff and landing or when the mission of

the flight requires otherwise, flights in fixed-wing aircraft shall not be

conducted below an altitude of 500 ft above the terrain or surface of the

water". (Enclosure (39)).

45. STRKFITRON22INST 3500.1, VFA-22 Standard Operating Procedures,

states, for single aircraft, "flight below 1000 ft is not authotized except for

takeoff, landing, weapons delivery, and NVG operations". (Enclosure (40)).

46. OPNAVINST 3710.7N paragraph 533 imposes a maximum aircraft

indicated airspeed of 250 Knots below 10,000 ft MSL when operating outside of

a Military Operating Area or the confines of a published low level training

route. (Enclosure (41)).

47. Salvage of wreckage tram B UNO 164031 was completed on 19 May 92 by

the Mishap Investigation Team. Thirty-five tri-wall containers of recovered

parts and material were removed tram the mishap site and transported to

1 1

--- ~~~---~~~ -~-- ~~-~--~ ~----~----------------------------


N AS Lemoore for analysis. All known pieces of wreckage and debris were

removed from the mishap site. (Enclosure (31)).

48. Some of the debris from BUNO 164031 fell into a small creek in Marble

Canyon. This creek disappears underground at the mouth of Marble Canyon.

Several acres of land at the mouth of Marble Canyon is privately owned by

Mr. of Bishop, CA. He expressed his intent to u se Marble creek

water in a future holding pond and questioned the mishap team members

concerning possible contamination by residual hazardous material from the

aircraft. (Enclosure (31)).

49. Informal research into the environmental impact of residual F I A-1 8

materials from aircraft mishap indicated that studies have been completed by

the manufacturer, McDannel Aircraft Corporation. The conclusion of these

studies is that there is no h azard posed by the materials used in the F I A-18.

(Enclosure (42)).

50. A 1987 message released by the Naval Safety Center addresses cleanup of

aircraft wreckage containing carbon graphite composite material. The

message states "No medical evidence of a significant health hazard associated

with composite fiber material [released by fire] has been found," and

"Composite fiber panels which fracture in aircraft crashes but are not

subjected to fire have proven to be biologically benign." (Enclosure (43)).

12

(b) (6)


OPINIONS

1. The mishap mission was properly authorized, scheduled and b1iefed.

(Findings of Fact (11), (12)).

2. LCDR McGuire was fully qua li fied and proficient to conduct the briefed

mission. (Findings of Fact (1), (2), (3)).

3. F/ A-18 BUNO 164031 was functioning normally up to the time of impact.

(Findings of Fact (7), (8), (29)).

4. LCDR McGuire descended over lhe Sierra Mountains, crossed Owens

Valley, and entered Black canyon at approximately 200ft AGL and 450 KCAS.

(Findings of Fact (14), (15), (17), (18), (21)).

5. LCDR McGuire entered a 6 to 7G left tum as he passed over the rock

promont01y which marks the beginning of the Black canyon bend. From the

point at which he started his tum, the canyon floor appeared relatively flat,

and LCDR McGuire could nol see what lay around the bend, only seconds

ahead of him. (Findings of Fact (20), (22), (32), (35), (36)).

6. As he rounded the canyon bend, LCDR McGuire perceived his decreasing

altitude and the closing canyon ahead and initiated a hard rolling pull-up to

avoid the ground. His pull-up began approximately 2 seconds prior to impact

on the rock outcropping. The flight path of the mishap aircraft in the final

seconds precedin g ground impact is depicted in figures 1, 2, a nd 3. (Findings

of Fact (27), (31 ), (32), (33), (37)).

7. F/ A-18 BUNO 164031 impacted a rock outcropping in a near wings level,

nose up attitude as depicted in figure 4. The aircraft exploded upon contact

with the rock outcropping. (Findings of Fact (23), (27), (28)).

13

---------~~-----~-------------------


8. LCDR McGuire was killed instantly when the aircraft impacted the rock

outcropping. (Findings of Fact (26), (28), (30), (39)).

9. The most probable cause factor of the mishap is pilot error in that LCDR

McGuire executed a high G, level tum around a canyon bend without

knowledge of the terrain that lay only seconds ahead of him. LCDR McGuire

did not recognize his worsening situation until after a point at which his

aircraft performance was insufficient to prevent ground impact. (Findings of

Fact (22), (31), (32), (33), (35), (36), (37)).

10. Visual illusions resulting from the combined effects of multi-colored

rock, morning shadows, and a sloping canyon floor, existed at both the

canyon bend and the first impact site. 11-tese illusions contributed to the

mishap by delaying LCDR McGuire's recognition of the rising canyon floor

and rock outcroppings for a brief, but c1itical, instant of time. (Findings of

Fact (20), (34), (35), (36)).

11. LCDR McGuire was operating as a single aircraft during his transit

through Black Canyon and, as such, was subject to all regulations for single

aircraft low level flight. Black canyon is outside of controlled airspace and

outside of the confines of a published military training route. LCDR McGuire

violated the following regulations by intentionally flying at low altitude

(below 500 ft AGL) and high speed (approx 450 KCAS) through Black canyon:

(Findings of Fact (11), (18), (21), (24)).

OPNAVINST 3710.7N Para 509 and 533

STRKFITRO N22INST 3500.1 Para 6.a.(2)

12. Proper adherence to the regulations lis ted above would have p revented

the mishap. (Findings of Fact (44), (45), (46)).

13. Responsibility and accountability for this mishap rests with the pilot,

LCDR McGuire. (Findings of Fact (23), (44), (45), (46)).

14

• Subj: INVESTIGATION TO INQUIRE INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE FLIGHT MISHAP INVOLVING BUNO 164031 WHICH OCCURRED ON 07 MAY 1992.

14. Due to the nearly complete disintegration and burning of the aircraft,

unrecovered classified avionics and aircraft mate1ials were completely

destroyed and do not pose a security risk. (Finding of Fact (47)).

15. Every reasonable effort has been made to remove all aircraft m ateria ls and

wreckage from the mishap site. There is no known hazard to the public from

any residual material. (Findings of Fact (47), (49), (50)).

16. Because the aircraft crashed on uninhabited U. S. Forest Service Land,

public claims or litigation against the government as a result of this mishap

are unlikely. Future public interest regarding the environmental impact of

this mishap remains possible. (Findings of Fact (24), (48)).

1 5

DISAPPEARS FROM WITNESS'S VIEW,HARD LEFT TURN,TRAILING WHITE VORTICES FROM WINGTIPS

®

FIGURE 2 FIGURE 3

FIGURE 4

\ l


RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Forward this report to the Judge Advocate General in accordance with

references (a) and (b).

18

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY COMMANDER CARRIER AIR WING ELEVEN

UNIT 25120 FPO AP 96601-4408

From: Commander, Carrier Air Wing 11 To : CDR S. USN, /1310

• 5800 Ser 00/078 7 May 92

Subj: INVESTIGATION TO INQUIRE INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE AIRCRAFT FLIGHT MISHAP INVOLVING BUNO 164031 WHICH OCCURRED ON 07 MAY 1992

Ref : (a) JAG Manual

1. This written appointment is in confirmation of my verbal orders of 07 May 1992 to conduct an informal investigation in accordance with Chapters II, VI, VIII and IX of reference (a) as soon as practicable, for the purpose of inquiring into all the circumstances connected with the aircraf t flight mishap which occurred on 07 May 1992, resulting in the loss of BUNO 164031.

2. You will conduct a thorough investigation into all circumstances connected with said incident and report your findings of fact, opinions and recommendations as to the cause, the resulting damage, injuries to the members of the Naval Service and their line of duty and misconduct status, potential claims for or against the government, and responsibility for said incident, including any recommended administrative or disciplinary action.

3. You shall comp ly with the requirements set forth in sections 0306, 0308 and 0505 of reference (a) which pertain to warnings required before requesting statements regarding injury; compliance with the Privacy Act; and improper performance of duty. Any personnel suspected of an offense must be advi sed of their rights under Article 31, UCMJ. Your attention i s further directed to provisions of sections 0817, 0901, 2002-2007, 2404, Chapter VIII and Appendi x A-3-a of reference (a).

4. You are directed to forward your completed report not later than 08 June 1992 . If, for any reason, the report cannot be forwarded within that period, report in writing the reason for the delay and estimated date of forwarding. This assignment has priority over all other regularly assigned duties.

DlJf!b

Encl ( I ) _ I_ of _j_

(b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6)

From: To:

Subj:

Ref:

• 8 Jun 92

CDR S. Commander, Carrier Air Wing Eleven

REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF DEADLINE FOR JAG MANUAL INVESTIGATION OF MISHAP ON 07 MAY 92

(a) Commander, CVW-11 Appointing Letter Ser 00/078 of 07 May 92

(b) JAG Manual

1. Reference (a) specifies a reporting deadline of 08 June 1992.

2. As of 08 June 1992, I have not received the autopsy/pathology report, or the engines engineering investigation response. Per reference (b), both of these documents are required enclosures to the JAG investigation.

3. Given the nature of this mishap, these documents are important to ensure completeness. In particular, the autopsy/pathology report is the primary means of legally identifying the deceased. Both documents are reportedly nearing completion and I expect to receive copies by 17 June 1992.

4. In light of the above, I respectfully request a 14 day extension of the report deadline.

Encl ( 2 ) of I

(b) (6) (b) (6)

(b) (6)

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MEM~~R IS ELIGigLE ~OR INTER!~ TOP SECRET ACCESS. CONTACT THE CE NTRAL ADJUDICATIO~ ~AClLITY FOR FINAL CLEARANCE.

DETAC HI NG C OM~ A NO : MEMBER WILL REQUIRE A CURRENT SPECIAL BAC~GROU~D INVESTIGATION (5 8 !) COiviPLETED wiTHIN THE PAST FI VE YEARS FOQ ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTME NTED !~FOR M ATI ON (SCI) AND TOP SE CR ET, IF SUCH HAS NOT ALRE4DY 9EEN COMPLETED OR I~ITIATED, COM~A~·D DELIVERING ORDERS DIRECTE () TO I NI TIATE RE QU EST FOR SBI FOR SCI AN) TQP SEC RE T ~!THIN FIFTEEN DAYS. SUBMIT REQUEST AND FOR~S U~DER

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CLEARANCE NOTICE (Aero-Medica l) • e DATE.-- I'?/)? /1/C v .2

·- - ~ NAVMEO 641 0 / 2 (Rev . 6 -78) ! F o rm erl y NAVMF.D 13111 1 S I N 0\ 0S· Lf 206· 4)\CJ

FROM : (Ship or $tarion.J T O:

~/IS'"L COMMAND ING OFFICER,

1. The above named individual has been found physically qualified and aeronaut ically adapted for duty involving flyong in Class 2 0 OR

SERVICE GROUP .E. 0 0 'upon completing physical examination for_: (1) 121 131

0 Orders from Commanding Officer. 0 Check-in physocal examonation.

0 Following aircraft acciden t and/or incident . 0 Return from extended leave or absence from f lying.

0 No BuMed approved Std. Form BB present in individual's health record .

0 Return to duty involving flying from sick or grounded list.

OATE INDIV IDU AL GROUNDED

REASON FOR GROUNDING

Copy to: Oper . Off . (also nordy by phone) Records Section (Entry made on NavMed 6150/2

/f/A-~ 'f:L by ~ (Date) 'iifliii8isJ

Copy to : File

Other (Stare reason for examination)

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· E -lT MC USNRD 0 0

PHT SURGEON AVME A VMO 0 H ER (Specify )

IF~THER , RECE IVED CONCUR RENCE F ROM :

NAME

* U.S .GPO: 1987·0·726·006/4 1613 UNIT

. . -.

Encl ( ~ ) 1 of l

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'IATOPS EVALUATION REPORT llND NASL (301 3500 / 10 (11-78)

HMII( f L••t . /'' ' ' '"''' • IJ McGUIRE, KENNETH F.

STRKFITRON 22 TO TAL P ! L. OT / rt l c.MT HOUAS

2995

REQUIREMENT

CLOSED BOOK EX~ i NA T I ON

1.8

•• FA-18C

TOTAL t-tOUftS IN WQO( L

1950 NAT OPS EVALUAT I ON

DATE CCMPLETED

27 AUG 91

27 AUG 91

28 AUG 91

28 AUG 91 A I ~CitA FT !\.'C

164062

G IUO[

0-4 CA(W I'OS I TIOfrol

PILOT OA T( Of L.A ST ( V AL V A T I ()N

17 AUG 90

GRADE· 0

Q 0V[~ A LL F I'IAL :OIU Q(

LCQR McGUIRE FLEW A LOW LEVEL SORTIES OVER SAUDI ARABIA. AREAS EVALUATED INCLUDED PREFLIGHT BRIEF, AIRCRAFT PREFLIGHT, DECK PROCEDURES, FLIGHT PROCEDURES AND SIMULATED EMERGENCIES. ALL ASPECTS OF THE FLIGHT WERE CONDUCTED SAFELY AND WERE PER NATOPS.

EXPIRES 31 AUG 92

u

0 CHECI( IF CONTt,.UEC ONAE't'ERSE SID(

LCDR D. E. , USN g&Of , ,.,..,"'( Qf (V4 LU([

LCDR K. F. McGUIRE, USN

CDR G. R. DARWI N, CO •tsr. Uf'T , t ;IJT. u r cnr ~pt r _.. ' accordance ,., th OPNAVINST 35 10 . 9F

OAT[

OAT[

OAT£

29 AUG 91

29 AUG 91

29 AUG 91 Encl ( ~ ) _I_ of _l_

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NATOPS INSTRUMENT RATING REQU EST OPNAV 37 10/'i. ( REV. 1-711) SI N 0 107 -LF- 7 28- 2 9 0 3

REF: OPNAVINS T 371 0 7 SER IES OPNAVINST 351 0 9 SER I ES NATOPS INSTRUMENT' f L IGHT MANUAL

... .. ..,. ... as .. . GN AOE

LCDR 0ll Dec 1991 McGUIRE Kenneth F.

VFA-2 2 aD~ & TfON I S ~EREBY """MA AN INS TRutrotENT RA fl NG (CI\ tc ' ont J

U STANDARD ' t:j SPECI AL

EXPERIENCE SUMMARY

MI SCELLANEOUS SU~ARY INSTRUMENT P ILOT TI ME

I T'[ ... I L4ST LAST ' &ST LAS T TO T Al I T(tr.~ 6 " 0 1 1 MO . 12 wo . 6 MO &:. l Y( Ht!

I 1

PREC IS ION ACTUAL 75 . 2 29.8 258.4 APPROACHES

I 47 81 S IMULATED 2.3 2.0 296.9

'ION · PRECI S I ON I INSTRUMENT PILOT T IME TOTAL I 77 .s 31.8 555 . 3 APPROACHES I

6 TOTAL YEARS FLY I ~G EXPER IENCE

I 6 IN• t !Cary a•d c ... , .. r, Ia! ) 10

I THIS I S TO CERT I fY THAT THE APPL ICANT ,.. ... 5 . . .

TOTAL PILOT TIME 3115 ~ xbQd SAT I SFACTOR ILY c=J UNSAT ISFACTOR I LY &t•: ••r• C~.o AL i t' t C .t. T t ONS

.....,,, 1- . . . COMPLETED TH E ~R ITTE~ EXAMINATION FOR AN I NS TQuME~T

F/A- 18 • RATING AS REDU IRED BY THE NATOPS INSTRUMENT FLIGHT MANUAL z -Cl.l t•t~ · IUT l hG :::E 1ST [lAM (G.-oth J liHO [l ... (Qdtl / 1"0 [Jii A W ( 'jrod 1 1

• Qd SPEC X ... IJ I LC• · s l l lt f )ot0 Al z

4 . ; .. od,, ... LT

A ,23 j EB 59 ,_

-,_ -s t (iJrri.A1' u AE or ... Jt - ( I Y~ 0: Uh!T ~/ OAT£. 3t 11 Dec . VFA- 125

I. PART ONE I Ba.<" I rut rt.Hftf rt t s J OVAl PART TWO II •Hru"'t •t Fl•rhc ~ • rh•• '""''c/ 0+ . .. UNOUAL u,.ra~ lo.' lllt ~"'t~ ltiJ~I ~ ,, , ~'OR . TACA'f :W 'I t',.. ~ ,l tu s r bc ,• I ' ... U •l • f..

II I~ ST RIJ'.4ENT TAKEOH OH •o•o lJ X

I rLIG,_.T PLANNING X

= 2 zj" CL IM8 1NG OESCENOING ANO TI MED TURNS X 2 CLEARANC E COMPLIANCE X

<I . = 3 STEEP TUI;lNS X

3 INSTRUMENT AP PROACHE S X -' ... - . >!. RECOVERY F'ROM UNUSUAL ALT I TUDES X 4 COMMuN ICATIONS AND NAV IGAT ION EDU I PMENT X

~ ! s VOR.' TACAN POSI T ION I NG X 5 EMERGENCY PROCEDURES X

: ! 6 PART I AL PANEL AIRWORK X 6 VOICE PROCEDURES X

l ' ADr / MOf ORIENTATION I X

! •\o t r e qu1red when e• • lu a t t on 1S condu ct~d under lttua l ln s trument c ond1t 10ns.

QUALIFIED lAW OPNAVINST 3710 . 7

28 FEB 93

Encl C7) _L o f j_

1991

=

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

.. , ..... : •• ' NATOPS FLIGHT PERSONNEL TRAINING/QUALIFICATION JACKET OPNAV 3780/32F 14-811 SN 0107-LF-138-2170

SECTION I liB - OPERATIONA L PHYSIOLOGY & SURVIVAL TRAINING

RA N K/RATE

TYPE OF TRAINING

COURSE CATEGORY

R~fR~~HER TRAINING lAW OP'!'IV!C';ST 37 1.~ES

H~ ~~

T • ~ IIOC~tAT

~@@!)

SERE: / COMPLETED ~ \NCOMPLETE -

OEST: COMPlETED INCOMPL~TE

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

SJU-~/A(LECT/~ -&lij 8/A(b~CT/1511 81-) iiCO~AC(L&CJ '~WQit

~ t\'&SI ~ b~SI ( €{o~G IIT r:wD

Pensacola, FL

Miramar, CA

Norfolk , VA

Corpus Christ i, TX

Lemoore. CA

El Taro , CA

Jacksonville, FL

DATE

DATE

DATE

D ATE

UN IT D A TE

SIG NATUR E

TRAINING ACTIVITIES

8. Barbers Point , HI

9. Cecil Field, FL

10. Cherry Point. NC

11. Whidbey tsland , WA

12. Beaufort , SC

13. Point Mugu, CA

14. Patuxent River. MD

15 . Brunswick , ME

16. FASOTRAGRUPAC

17. FASOTRAGRULANT

18. MCAS New River , NC

19. Okimwa

20 . Other (List)

2 1.

<A u .s. o ower nment Printi n g Office: l'C2-:S0 5 ·1 a .:;n :5 18 :!· 1

Encl ( ~ ) _L of .i_

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(b) (6)

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(b) (6)

(b) (6)

•• NATOPS FLIGHT PERSONNEL, TRAINING/QUALIFICATION JACKET OPNAV 3760/32F (4-811 SN 0107-LF-736-2170

SECTION 1118 - OPERATIONAL PHYSIOLOGY & SURVIVAL TRAINING

NAME

COURSE CATEGORY

SJU-5/:= I &IH 8t'A

-s ANNVA--t... SG+7

L ~--c711ALf£

MARTIN BAKER

~~ ------~

I. Pensacola, FL

2. Miramar , CA

3. Norfolk, VA

4 . Corpus Christi, TX

5. Lemoore, CA

6. El Toro, CA

7. Jacksonville, FL

DATE

SIGNATURE

TRAINING ACTIVITIES

8. Barbers Point, HI

9. Cecil Field, FL

10. Cherry Point, NC

I I. Whidbey Island, WA

12. Bea ufort , SC

13. Point Mugu, CA

14 . Patuxent River, MD

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20 .

21.

LAND SURVIVAL, OW EST,

SERE

DATE

SIGNATURE

DATE

SIGNATURE

Brunswick, ME

FASOTRAGRUPAC

F ASOTRAGRULANT

MCAS New River, NC

Okinawa

Other (List)

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UNIT

U N IT

U NIT

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UNIT

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