Demurrer in Re Mann vs Minneapolis City Council Case No. A14-0026

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  • 7/27/2019 Demurrer in Re Mann vs Minneapolis City Council Case No. A14-0026

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    STATE OF MINNESOTA

    IN COURT OF APPEALS

    ____________________________________

    In re Doug Mann, Hennepin County District Court

    Case type: Other Civil

    Petitioner Case No. 27-CV-13-13029

    Presiding Judge:

    vs. The Honorable Phillip D. Bush

    Minneapolis City Council Appellate Court Case No. A14-026

    Respondent

    DEMURRER TO ANSWER OF RESPONDENT

    MINNEAPOLIS CITY COUNCIL

    ____________________________________________________________________

    MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO ANSWER OF RESPONDENT

    Introduction

    Petitioner has challenged the determination of the District Court of Hennepin County in

    its order dated November 12, 2013 to deny and dismiss the petition for a writ of mandamus in

    Mann vs. Minneapolis City Council, case no. 27-CV-13-13029. To summarize Petitioners

    legal arguments:

    The District Court ruled in favor of the petitioner on two issues:

    1) Petitioner's standing to sue the City Council by virtue of his status as a taxpayer with a

    vested interest in enforcing the city charter.

    2) Local sales taxes authorized by the Legislature and imposed by the City of Minneapolis to

    pay for a professional sports facility are "city resources" within the meaning of Chapter 15,

    section 13 (Section 13) of the Minneapolis City Council.

    The District Court determined that section 13, which requires a referendum was

    applicable to approval of Session Laws of Minnesota (the Stadium Act), Chapter 299, article 3.

    However, the District Court also ruled that Section 13 was preempted by the Stadium Act,

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    Article 3, section 4.

    Petitioner alleges that the Judge erred in ascertaining legislative intent and interpreting the

    law. The first sentence of the Article 3, section 4 of the Stadium Act, which was voided by the

    District Court decision, states that:

    Any amounts expended, indebtedness or obligation incurred including, but not limited to, theissuance of bonds, or actions taken by the city under this act, are deemed not an expenditure orother use of city resources within the meaning of any law or charter provision. . . .

    The District Court erred in determining that the second and third sentences in article 3,

    section 4 of the Stadium Act and provisions inseparably connected to it are still valid. In

    argumentation in the memorandum in support of the petition, I note the following:

    1) Minn. stat. section 645.16 LEGISLATIVE INTENT CONTROLS: "The object of all

    interpretation an construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the

    legislature. . ."

    2) Minn. stat. 645.20 CONSTRUCTION OF SEVERABLE PROVISIONS.

    . . . . If any provision of a law is found to be unconstitutional and void, the remainingprovisions of the law shall remain valid, unless the court finds the valid provisions of thelaw are so essentially and inseparably connected with, and so dependent upon, the void

    provisions that the court cannot presume the legislature would have enacted theremaining valid provisions without the void one; or unless the court finds the remainingvalid provisions, standing alone, are incomplete and are incapable of being executed inaccordance with the legislative intent.

    3) Minn. Stat. 645.17 PRESUMPTIONS IN ASCERTAINING LEGISLATIVE INTENT.

    In ascertaining the intention of the legislature the courts may be guided by the followingpresumptions. . . .(3) the legislature does not intend to violate the Constitution of theUnited States or of this state. . .

    The Stadium Act, Article 3, section 4 as written did not preempt the Chapter 15, Section

    13 of the Minneapolis City Charter. The Legislature did not intend to "preempt" the

    Minneapolis City Charter but stated only that it did not apply. Under the rules of

    Preemption, the City Charter provisions would be voided on the grounds that State has

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    occupied the area of law addressed by them.Nordmarken vs. City of Richfield, 641 N.W. 2d

    343, 347-48 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) . The legislature can also unilaterally and unconditionally

    withdraw or modify powers vested in a home rule charter by enactment of general law, but not

    by enactment of special legislation. Neither of these occurred under the Stadium Act.

    Respondent's answer does not address issues re legal errors of the District Court

    Because respondent has chosen to not address the legal arguments regarding errors of

    law by the District Court, Petitioner stands on original arguments in the memorandum in

    support of the petition.

    Respondent's answer does not challenge petitioners standing to sue as a taxpayer

    Because respondents have chosen to not challenge the petitioners assertion of a right to

    sue by virtue of his status as a taxpayer with a vested interest in enforcing the Minneapolis City

    Charter, Petitioner stands on original arguments in the memorandum in support of the petition.

    Respondents Arguments are limited to technical objections to Petitioners filing.

    Respondent alleges that Petitioner did not appeal the District Court order dismissing

    and denying a writ of mandamus in Mann vs. Minneapolis City Council.

    The filing can stand as an appeal and request of review of errors committed by the

    District Court Judge as Petitioner has followed the requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of

    Civil Appellate Procedure. Alternatively, Petitioner has complied with Rule 120.01 et seq. in

    filing a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus. The papers were filed within the time allowed for

    filing an appeal. The relief sought is an order commanding the District Court to vacate its

    order dated November 12, 2013 and to issue a writ of mandamus commanding the Minneapolis

    City Council to refer approval of the use of "city resources" in excess of 10 million dollars to

    the voters in a referendum. In either case, the remedy sought would be no different.

    In respondent's memorandum in opposition to the petition, on page 8, last paragraph and

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    page 9 respondent states

    Rule 103.03(g) provides that an appeal "may be taken to the Court of Appeals. . . from afinal order, decision or judgement. . . .made in a . . . .special proceeding"See Minn. R.Civ. P. 103.03(g). InMoritz v. Burns, the plaintiff brought a mandamus action in thedistrict court to compel the defendant to remove an obstruction in an alleged public roador, alternatively, to relocate the road.Moritz v. Burns, 292 Minn. 165, 166 (1972). Thedistrict court dismissed the mandamus action.Id. The Supreme Court concluded that theorder was appealable under Rule 103.03 as a final order in "a 'special proceeding'"Moritzv. Burns, 292 Minn. 165, 166 n. 1 (1972). [. . . ] (in Mortitz, The Supreme Court notedthat an order dismissing a mandamus action is appealable as a final order affecting asubstantial right made in a special proceeding." (emphasis in original).

    However, inMoritz v. Burns, the petition for a writ of mandamus was not dismissed on

    procedural grounds. ". . . the trial court correctly concluded that there was no dedication of a

    public road by statutory user pursuant to Minn. St. 160.05."Moritz v. Burns, 193 N.W. 2d.

    621 (Jan. 14, 1972) and 292 Minn. 165 (1972). In the decision's concluding paragraph, the

    Court states "The finding and conclusion of the trial court on the threshold issue of dedication

    by statutory user is dispositive of plaintiff's claim. We accordingly affirm the order of

    dismissal without discussion of the other grounds upon which the order was additional based."

    Moritz v. Burns, 193 N.W. 2d. 622.

    Respondent's memorandum in opposition to the petition, on pages 7 and 8 states that

    mandamus ". . . is an "extraordinary" remedy that should only be granted where there is no

    adequate remedy at law.In re State of Minnesota v. Hart723 N.W. 2d 254, 257 (Minn. 2006)"

    The Court determined that there was another remedy for the state "rather than an appeal, our

    case law dictates that the state's remedy, when a complaint has been dismissed "in the interest

    of justice," is to refile the complaint. . ." id."Syllabus A district court's pretrial decision to

    dismiss a criminal case with prejudice is not appealable. The state's remedy is to refile it

    complaint, and a district court may be compelled, via a writ of mandamus, to make a probable

    cause determination on the refiled complaint."In re State of Minnesota v. Hart723 N.W. 2d

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    255. "Holdings: The Supreme Court, Gildea, J., held that: (1) State was not procedurally

    precluded from petitioning for a writ of mandamus (2) district court had a duty to make a

    probable cause determination on refiled complaint. . ." n re State of Minnesota v. Hart723

    N.W. 2d 254. In other words, the state had no option to appeal the decision whatsoever, be it

    via mandamus or via a writ of error.

    Respondent alleges that petitioner could have challenged the constitutionality of the

    stadium law.

    The case under consideration concerns the duty of the City Council under the charter to

    hold a referendum before it can commit City resources beyond $10 million for a professional

    sports facility. Petitioner is challenging the determination of the District Court that there was a

    preemption of the Minneapolis City Charter, chapter 15, section 13 by the Stadium Act,

    Article 3, section 4 on the basis of judicial error in ascertaining legislative intent and

    interpreting the law.

    Because of the District Court's determination that local taxes imposed by the City of

    Minneapolis are "city resources" belonging to the City, and not the State, the petitioner

    additionally has grounds to challenge the constitutionality of Article 2 of the stadium Act,

    which authorizes the sale of bonds, based on Article X, section 1 of the Minnesota

    constitution. The petitioner has done so as a petitioner inMann et al vs. Showalter et al, in the

    Minnesota Supreme Court, case no A14-0029. Both cases involve the use of Minneapolis sales

    taxes. However, in this case, the constitutionality of provisions authorizing the sale and

    issuance of bonds is not at issue.

    CONCLUSION

    Based on the foregoing reasons, the relief requested by Petitioner and any other relief

    as the Court sees fit, should be granted.

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    Dated: January 21, 2014

    ___________________________________

    Doug Mann Petitioner, pro se 3706 Logan Avenue N. Minneapolis, MN 55412 Phone: (612) 824-8800

    ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

    Petitioner acknowledges that sanctions may be imposed pursuant to Minn.Stat. 549.211

    ______________________________

    Doug Mann