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Policing Overview
Leon Kukkuk
01 July 2010
4 Democratic Republic of Congo
4.1 Introduction Established as a Belgian colony in 1908, the Republic of the Congo gained its independence in 1960, but its early years were marred by political and social instability.
In November 1965, Colonel Joseph Mobutu seized power in a military coup. Mobutu ruled the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, then Zaire) for 32 years. Mobutu’s reign is associated with human rights abuse, sham elections, brutal force and authoritarianism.1
Ethnic strife and civil war, sparked by a massive inflow of refugees in 1994 from fighting in Rwanda and Burundi saw Laurent Kabila topple the Mobutu regime in 1997. Several countries, including Zimbabwe, Angola, Chad and Namibia fought on the side of the new Kabila government.
In August 1998 Kabila was challenged by a second insurrection again backed by Rwanda and Uganda. Confrontation was triggered in July 1998, when Kabila tried to drive out the Rwandan army, igniting the Second Congo War, as eight African nations (DRC, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Angola, and Chad) as well as a number of rebel armies engaged in the largest interstate war in modern African history. At the height of the conflict, 60 per cent of the country was under foreign control.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), with Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe signed the Ceasefire Agreement for a cessation of hostilities between all belligerent forces on 10 July 1999 in Lusaka, Zambia.
In December 1998, the UN Security Council (UNSC) for the first time indicated that it was prepared to consider the active involvement of the United Nations, in co‐ordination with the OAU (Organization for African Unity, predecessor of the African Union (AU)), to assist with the implementation of a ceasefire and an agreed process for a political settlement. This mandate was extended and expended several times, culminating in resolution 1279 of 30 November 1999, firmly establishing the Mission d’Organisation des Nations Uniées au Congo (UN Mission to the Congo –MONUC). The Secretary‐General was requested to accelerate the development of a concept of operations based on assessed conditions of security, access and freedom of movement, and co‐operation on the part of the signatories to the Peace Agreement.
Laurent Kabila was assassinated in January 2001 and his son, Joseph Kabila, was named head of state. In October 2002, the new president was successful in negotiating the withdrawal of Rwandan forces occupying eastern Congo. After four years of fighting and a series of failed mediation attempts, the All Inclusive Peace Agreement (Pretoria II) was signed on 17 December 2002 by the government of Joseph Kabila and all Congolese rebel groups, leading to the formation of the Transitional National Government (TNG). Joseph Kabila as president and four vice presidents represented the former government, former
1 An Audit of Police Oversight in Africa African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum 2008 http://apcof.org.za/images/stories/apcof_police_oversight_web.pdf (accessed 01 October 2009)
Policing Overview
Leon Kukkuk
01 July 2010
rebel groups, and the political opposition. The Kinshasa‐based International Committee for Supporting the Transition (CIAT) was formed as a broad‐based coalition of African and external powers that successfully kept the transition on a steady keel.
The first democratic elections in four decades were successfully held in 2006, ending the mandate of the transitional government and the formation of a new government in February 2007. The National Assembly was installed in September 2006. Its president, Vital Kamerhe, was chosen in December. Provincial assemblies were constituted in early 2007, and elected governors and national senators in January 2007.2
Even though the war is officially over, the current situation can best be described as a violent peace. Dozens of rebel armies remain fighting in the east. Due to the continued insecurity in the country, especially in the east, MONUC adopted a more forceful and pro‐active approach in early 2005 that helped to improve the security situation in the eastern provinces to some extent.
The United Nations peacekeepers were given two especially difficult tasks – protection of civilians and defeating rebel forces with the assistance of the Congolese Army. These objectives were often in conflict. Thousands of former rebels were absorbed into the Congolese Army. Although Congolese commanders are nominally in charge, former rebels continued to control their own territory and even imposed taxes.
The security situation in the country remained fragile during the course of 2006, causing “some donors [to] indicate that they want to reduce MONUC to a pure security mission, charged only with supporting the Congolese army in the troubled East and providing technical assistance on human rights, demobilisation and civil affairs. This would strip away its important political capacity to act in a conflict prevention or conflict management mode.”3
Nevertheless, MONUC found itself in an untenable situation in 2009, when it participated in joint military offensives with the Congolese Army.4 UN legal advisers explicitly warned MONUC not to participate in combat operations with the Congolese Army if there was a risk that Congolese soldiers might abuse human rights. Faced with few options, since not co‐operating with the Congolese Army risked the possibility that the abuses will happen without the UN having any control over events, the joint mission went ahead. The abuses took place as feared.
Perhaps partly because of the political fallout of these military offensives the Congolese government reportedly insisted on a troop drawdown to demonstrate sovereignty before 2 African Police Resource Network http://www.aprn.org.za/Countries/CountryDetail.asp?Cnt_ID=11 (Accessed 09 January 2009) 3 International Crisis Group, Congo: Staying Engaged after the Elections Africa Briefing No 44 09 January 2007 http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central‐africa/dr‐congo/B044‐congo‐staying‐engaged‐after‐the‐elections.aspx
4 The military offences (Kimia I and II) were designed to disarm the (Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda) FDLR, giving rise to massive civilian displacement, casualties, aftermath atrocities and retaliation by rebels as soon as UN and Congolese army troops left.
Policing Overview
Leon Kukkuk
01 July 2010
the 50th anniversary of the country's independence on 30 June 2010. It is possible that the government had grown sensitive about the increased perception that foreign forces prop it up. Thus, it asked the United Nations for an exit plan. It also requested support for military, police, judicial reforms and elections.
A UNSC delegation visited Kinshasa from 13‐15 May 2010 to discuss MONUC’s future. The UNSC then renewed the MONUC mandate on 28 May. In June, as part of a small but symbolic troop reduction, 2 000 troops were withdrawn from the relatively stable west. Peacekeeping continues in the east of the country, with future reduction guided by a joint monitoring mechanism. From 01 July 2010, MONUC will become a stabilisation mission, renamed MONUSCO, and will focus on civilian protection.
4.2 Police
4.2.1 History
Policing in DRC has been anything but a coherent process. Those elements that performed police functions descend from a variety of colonial and postcolonial structures. These were constantly reorganized, renamed, absorbed by other services, or disbanded altogether. Police duties were assigned to both military and civilian security organizations, often simultaneously. The police underwent alternating periods of centralization, decentralization, and transfer of authority. The performance of the police always remained mediocre at best and, at worst, completely dysfunctional and occasionally criminal.5
Founded in 1888, the colonial Force Publique fulfilled the basic functions of both a police force and an army. This dual role caused tension within the organization and was a major factor in its poor discipline and lack of effectiveness. The requirement to act as a police force caused members of the colonial army to be dispersed throughout the country. There they normally came under the control of local civilian administrators.6
After World War I, military and policing functions were divided into Garrison Troops (military) and Territorial Service Troops (police). In 1959, the Territorial Service Troops were reconstituted into Gendarmerie Nationale.7 The Garrison Troops were intended to serve as a military force oriented against an external threat. The Territorial Service Troops had the mandate of a gendarmerie or police force. Although the Territorial Service Troops remained an integral part of the Force Publique and could revert to the control of the commander, elements were deployed throughout the country under the operational control of the territorial administrators. Although this change theoretically created two distinct organizations, the separation of powers was not routinely applied.8
5 Zaire Development of a National Police Force 6 Zaire Development of a National Police Force http://www.country‐data.com/cgi‐bin/query/r‐15161.html (Accessed 09 January 2009) 7 An Audit of Police Oversight in Africa 8 Zaire Development of a National Police Force
Policing Overview
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01 July 2010
Garrison Troops also gradually came under the control of the civilian administration and acted like a police force. In 1959 the Territorial Service Troops were re‐designated as gendarmes, although their duties and responsibilities remained essentially unchanged.
In addition to the Territorial Service Troops, two other police forces existed during the colonial period. The Chief's Police, a rural force based in the local territories, maintained order and also functioned as messengers, jailers, and court attendants. This force served under the local chiefs and had no regional or national command structure. Although its members wore uniforms and maintained internal order, they did not carry weapons and received little training. At independence, this force totalled about 10 000 personnel.9
The Territorial Police was a more structured organization, numbering between 6 000 and 9 000 personnel at independence. Created in 1926 and placed under Belgian administrators, this force performed numerous functions including maintaining order, running prisons, and guarding public buildings, as well as reinforcing the Chief's Police. After independence, each province maintained its own force, which was officered by former Belgian policemen. In some cases, during the immediate post‐independence period, these forces became, in effect, private armies.10
At independence in 1960, the Gendarmerie was integrated into the military Armee Nationale Congolaise (ANC).11 Most of the gendarmes were thus incorporated into the national police, totalling 6 000, out of a 25 000‐member force. The remaining gendarmerie was a small, mostly rural police force.
In 1961, all police functions were merged into a centralized policing unit in the Ministry of the Interior, the Police Nationale. The chaos of the immediate post‐independence period, along with the departure of the experienced Belgian officer corps, resulted in the disintegration of the Gendarmerie.
The UN presence in the early 1960’s restored some order, but the central government faced a long and tedious task of rebuilding its security forces. For the first four years, UN personnel and other foreign advisers conducted training programmes in an effort to rehabilitate the police. Nigerian detachments established on‐the‐job training programmes, and a limited number of Belgian police returned as advisers. The United States also initiated a broad assistance program to provide specialized training, arms, and equipment.12
Rebellions in the mid‐1960’s complicated the task of restoring coherence to police organizations. The increase in the number of provinces from six to twenty‐one also exacerbated this process. As each new provincette achieved control of its provincial police force, it inflated its size, and these organizations began to resemble provincial armies.13
Mobutu assumed power in 1965. In December 1966, he removed the police from provincial control. He standardized police organization and equipment. Control became centralized
9 An Audit of Police Oversight in Africa 10 Zaire Development of a National Police Force 11 An Audit of Police Oversight in Africa 12 Ibid. 13 An Audit of Police Oversight in Africa African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum 2008
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01 July 2010
under the Ministry of Interior (changed to the Ministry of Interior and Security in 1993). The 1966 law establishing the National Police gave it responsibility for regular police functions in both urban and rural areas.14
With an authorized strength of 25 000, the new police force absorbed many personnel from the overgrown provincial forces. Politically unreliable or undesirable elements were largely culled. The re‐organization was effective in reducing local paramilitary threats to the regime's authority. It did not significantly improve the performance of basic police functions. Additionally, the deployment of the National Police was limited, for the most part, to urban centres. Responsibility for internal security and public order in the rural areas remained mainly with the existing Gendarmerie of the ANC.15
At the local level, a large number of unarmed, untrained, and locally recruited Zairians still performed basic police tasks in support of local authorities. Their numbers were estimated at nearly 30 000 in 1993. Some local areas had almost no police presence as a result of a lack of funding to pay them. Even if the police were present, their local activities typically were not co‐ordinated with the national police elements. They probably were neither capable of nor motivated to support national or regional security objectives.16
On 01 August 1972, President Mobutu dissolved the Police Nationale (National Police) and merged it into a single force with the largely rural gendarmerie, creating the Gendarmerie Nationale (National Gendarmerie). This significantly increased the size of the national police force and made it institutionally and hierarchically equivalent to the Zaire Armed Forces (FAZ). The political authority over the new National Gendarmerie was transferred from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Defence (changed to the Ministry of Defence and Veterans' Affairs in 1993), but its Inspector‐General reported directly to the President.17
Another police organisation, the Civil Guard, was set up in 1984. This was used to intimidate and repress political opponents.
In 1985, Mobutu re‐arranged the police organisations once again, creating the Police Nationale Congolaise (PNC) by amalgamating the Force Publique, Gendarmerie, Police Urbaine, and Guarde Civile.18 Its estimated strength at that time was around 100 000–140 000 members.
The other important police organisation is the Police de Parquets (Judicial Police). It is part of the justice system. They are the equivalent of detectives in an Anglophone system.
4.2.2 Current Era
In comparison with the army, the structure and future composition of the law enforcement sector was largely neglected by negotiators at Sun City. The only provision relating to the
14 Zaire Development of a National Police Force
15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 An Audit of Police Oversight in Africa
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01 July 2010
police in the 2002 Global and All‐inclusive Accord (‘Pretoria Agreement’) stated that “an integrated police force shall be responsible for the security of the Government and population.”
The creation of the PNC in 1985 brought together a mix of former Force Publique, the civil guard, urban police and gendarmerie. The transitional; agreements reached in 2002 then saw combatants from each of the former belligerent groups being added, including quotas for senior‐ranking officers for each group, regardless of the individual’s training or experience. The result was a police service that comprised of trained and untrained police officers, ex‐militia and ex‐soldiers, and widows and orphans of former agents.19 Although a new integrated police leadership was quickly appointed and housed with MONUC, the lack of equipment, logistics, training and personnel records posed major obstacles.
Memorandum II on the Army and the Security Forces, signed on 29 June 2003 by the signatories to the Global and All‐inclusive Agreement, made provision for two policing units responsible for security during the transition period. The first was the Close Protection Corps (CPR), responsible for the security of political leaders. The second unit was an integrated police unit (IPU), responsible for the general security environment.20 The Agreement made the police, instead of the army, responsible for securing the transitional elections. The army were to be confined to barracks during the election, to prevent former warring groups from disrupting the election process. This created unprecedented focus and pressure on the Police Nationale Congolaise which had previously always been subordinate to the army.
In mid‐June 2004, the DRC’s Transitional Government appointed a new police high command in Kinshasa, followed by the appointment of provincial police chiefs.21 Due to political changes as well as occasional purges of the police force, there is a high rotation rate of the high command.
State policing in DRC is characterised by human rights abuses, brutal force, arbitrariness and regime policing.22 For security citizens tend to rely on private companies or traditional structures.
According to the International Crisis Group the various police organs are “. . . primarily predatory . . . used by politicians and officers to pursue individual political aims and economic goals while perpetrating massive human rights abuses. . .The Congo police have
19 Davis, Laura. Justice‐Sensitive Security System Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo, IFP Security Cluster, February 2009 www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu/.../Justice_Sensitive_Security_System_reform_in_the_DRC.pdf (Accessed 09 January 2010) 20 Boshoff, Henri. Overview Of Security Sector Reform Processes In The DRC African Security Review 13(4), 2004 http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/asr/13No4/AWBoshoff.htm (Accessed 09 January 2010) 21 Rauch, Janine, Whose idea was this anyway? Initiating police reform in the DRC South African Journal of Criminal Justice 22 African Police Resource Network http://www.aprn.org.za/Countries/CountryDetail.asp?Cnt_ID=11 (Accessed 09 January 2009)
Policing Overview
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01 July 2010
never been able to provide basic law and order and have themselves ranked among the top abusers of citizens’ basic human rights.” 23
Accusations of unlawful killing, arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, repression of political opposition and impunity abound. Corruption across all levels of government and all government agencies remains rampant. The introduction of formal salaries, which at any rate often remain unpaid if paid at all, have done little to reduce corruption, and men in uniform still demand money from citizens as their way of generating an income.
Capacity and oversight are lacking in the police and justice system.24 The police force has no formal budget or even a clear idea of its manpower. Instead of an operating budget, it relies on “envelopes” of operational funds. Estimates of police manpower between 2003 and 2006 fluctuated between 80 000 and 114 000. A personnel audit in 2006 counted 99 000.25
The army is still deployed to deal with major outbreaks of public disorder, as a way of bypassing the structural weakness of the police.26
An internal DFID document, produced in 2006, claimed that “[d]uring the most recent conflicts the PNC has become dis‐integrated. The PNC mandate extends to not more than forty per cent of the national territory and many of its members have either joined composant groups, have fled into exile, drifted away or regrouped in the capital city of Kinshasa.”27
4.3 Donor Support to Police Reform
"Since the beginning of the Transition Period in April 2003 international partners have invested considerable resources in the [DRC's] justice, police, and defence sectors . . ."28
During the transition phase from 2003‐2006, the international community’s support to policing was focussed on securing the elections. It aimed at a basic level of training in crowd
23 International Crisis Group, Security Sector Reform in the Congo, (Africa Report N°104) 13 February 2006 24 Davis, Laura. 25 International Crisis Group, Congo: A Stalled Democratic Agenda, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°73, 8 April 2010
26 International Crisis Group, Congo: A Stalled Democratic Agenda, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°73, 8 April 2010
27 DFID. The Democratic Republic of The Congo: Security Sector Reform – The Need For A Strategic Approach To Police Reform. A discussion document prepared for DFID by Keith Biddle during 2006
28 Boshoff, Henri. Handrickson, Dylan. Sylvie More. Vircoulon, Thierry. Supporting SSR in the DRC: between a Rock and a Hard Place An analysis of the Donor Aproach to supporting Security Sector Reform in the Democratic republic of Congo, Netherland Institute for International relations “Clingendael,” April 2010
Policing Overview
Leon Kukkuk
01 July 2010
control, rather than in investigating crime.29 The previous colonial powers provided the first support. France trained 1 000 officers for the Kinshasa‐based Rapid Intervention Force (PIR) specialised in riot control. Together with Belgium, it also trained an integrated police brigade in Kisangani.30 In December 2004 Belgium backed the initial EUPOL‐Kinshasa civilian police mission.31
After an initial focus on Kinshasa to secure transitional institutions, police capacity‐building expanded nationwide. The immediate priority was to bring the PNC up to an efficient professional policing standard in order for it to play its role in facilitating free and fair elections.32
During the course of 2004 the government started to emphasise the importance of establishing national security and with it came the realisation that “plans for the longer‐term strategic reform of policing should also be developed.”33
On 9 August 2004 a national police seminar34 was held, during which the Transitional Government was expected to develop a comprehensive plan for the overall reform and training of the newly integrated police force. Although the concerns of the PNC leadership “were understandably more concerned with immediate improvements in the working conditions of their members than with longer‐term changes to the police institution and practice,”35 one of the Transitional Vice‐ Presidents, Azarias Ruberwa, presented a timetable that included, in addition to more immediate election related requests, an appeal to:
• develop a comprehensive national security sector policy in an integrated and transparent manner; and
• ensure budgetary provisions for the establishment and maintenance of security entities.
29 Davis, Laura. 30 ISIS EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’: testing EU co‐ordination, coherence and commitment to Africa Europe European Security Review Number 25, March 2005 http://www.isis‐europe.org/pdf/esr_26.pdf (Accessed 09 January 2010) 31 Kelly, Catherine. Belgian Intervention Policy in the DRC: Causes and Consequences of the Reorientation, 1999‐2006 Harvard University Department of Government, Université Libre de Bruxelles. www.rmes.be/CDR%208/CDR8_Kelly.pdf (Accessed 09 January 2010)
32 Rauch, Janine, Whose idea was this anyway? Initiating police reform in the DRC South African Journal of Criminal Justice 33 Rauch, Janine, Whose idea was this anyway? Initiating police reform in the DRC South African Journal of Criminal Justice 34 This was facilitated by MONUC, with funding from the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) and the support of the international community.
35 Rauch, Janine, Whose idea was this anyway? Initiating police reform in the DRC South African Journal of Criminal Justice
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Donors were challenged to revise their priorities in the region. Amongst the recommendations were the requests for the establishment of an advisory group on Security Sector Reform (SSR), possibly attached to MONUC, to assist the transitional government to plan and implement its reform policies and a donor co‐ordination mechanism under the joint chairmanship of the transitional government and MONUC to review SSR progress every six months.36 Although the donors engaged in election related police assistance realised that support required a wider and more long‐term process of institutional and governance reform in order to be sustainable, there appears to have been little understanding that “[e]fforts to reform the Congo’s military and police start from levels that were in many respects less than zero.”37 There is an inverse relationship in the Congo between the need for SSR and the ability to do so sustainably. A relatively functional state framework to guide and manage reforms as a minimum requirement for the sustainability of reforms has not yet been achieved. Existing and growing political and social cleavages exposes – and tend to entrench ‐ the inherent limitations of security institutions that have always been organised to protect the elite rather than public interests. Over the years SSR support by a number of different actors developed as a motley collection of unconnected, largely donor driven activities. Apart from programmes dedicated to SSR, there are also a number of initiatives that may include an SSR component. Programmes to reform the police are often not very ambitious and focused on specific tasks, such as training specialised police units to investigate sexual and gender based violence (SGBV). It would be impossible to give a complete account of all these activities, further complicated by incomplete and inaccurate data, in a very fluid environment, as well as the unavailability of updated information from actors such as Angola and, to some extent, South Africa. Angola frequently provides assistance under the umbrella of the EUPOL‐Kinshasa mission. The reform agenda is largely set by outsiders whose experience of the Congo is limited to Kinshasa and often have a limited command of French. Competition between donors, different views and philosophies as to what a future police force should look like, a lack of credible co‐ordination and local ownership results in the absence of a common strategic framework for international support. Discussions are frequently limited to technical and institutional reform, with no thought of citizen security and the reduction of crime. Projects are also implemented in isolation from essential overarching political reforms. The kinds of capacity and behavioural changes that could lead to significant improvements are therefore unlikely to be achieved.
36 Davis, Laura.
37 International Crisis Group, Security Sector Reform in the Congo, (Africa Report N°104) 13 February 2006
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Leon Kukkuk
01 July 2010
On the African front, in addition to its role as mediator during transition negotiations, South Africa deployed 1 268 troops and signed a Joint Bilateral Commission (JBC) with the DRC in January 2004, worth US$10 billion. The agreement enabled it to train some 300 police officers at a cost of $5 million, partly funded by the Dutch and British.38 Similarly, Angola trained 3 800 police, 80 members of an anti‐crime brigade and 40 police trainers. It is not clear what contribution these countries are making at the moment. The European Commission initially deployed an electoral mission to the DRC for the constitutional referendum in December 2005. On 30 July 2006, it positioned for legislative elections and the first round of the Presidential elections, deploying for the second time for the provincial elections on 29 October 2006.39 On 9 December 2004, a mission called EUPOL‐Kinshasa was approved and on 12 April 2005 launched officially. Initially it comprised 29 international staff and police officers headed by a Commissioner. Contributing countries included France, Italy, Portugal, Sweden, the Netherlands and Belgium, as well as two invited nations, Canada and Turkey.40 EUPOL‐Kinshasa became a police coordination support element that had to ensure an enhanced and coordinated response of the Congolese crowd control units in Kinshasa, in case of disturbances during the electoral period, with a mandate until 31 December 2006.41 Since 2007 it has been primarily involved in the discussions of the GMRRR, discussed below. The United Nations oversees the Rule of Law unit for the justice system and UNPOL for the police, discussed in more detail in the next section.42 UNDP, funded by the Japanese aid agency JICA, have signed an agreement in 2009 to train the national police force in North Kivu and the Oriental Province until 2012. An initial three‐month project was intended to reinforce the capacities of police officers to effectively fulfil their mission according to international human rights standards. A further 2 000 police members will be trained on security concerns, human rights, sexual violence, and the safety of the population. The fight against impunity, interaction with communities; capacity‐building; effective and efficient management; as well as human resources and logistics are
38 Kagwanja, Peter. DRC Needs New Post Election Partnerships, Africa Policy Institute Africa Policy Brief No. 23 2007 http://www.africapi.org/siteimages/Africa%20policy%20Briesf%20No%2023%202007.pdf (Accessed 09 January 2010) 39 Hoebeke, Hans. Carette, Stéphanie. Vlassenroot, Koen EU support to the Democratic Republic of Congo centre d'analyse stratégique 2007 40 Hoebeke, Hans. Carette, Stéphanie. Vlassenroot, Koen EU support to the Democratic Republic of Congo centre d'analyse stratégique 2007 41 Hoebeke, Hans. Carette, Stéphanie. Vlassenroot, Koen EU support to the Democratic Republic of Congo centre d'analyse stratégique 2007
42 International Crisis Group, Congo: A Stalled Democratic Agenda, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°73, 8 April 2010
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due to be emphasised. The training will be given by MONUC with trainers selected from the PNC.43 More recently, a number of actors, such as China, Sweden, Germany, a variety of EU institutions, the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) became more involved in the DRC. There are important differences between all these actors in terms of interests, philosophy, approach, resources, relationship with the Congolese government and the effectiveness of activities.
In November 2005, the government established the Groupe Mixte de Réflexion sur la Réforme et la Réorganisation de la Police Nationale Congolaise (the ‘Mixed Reflection Group on the Reform and Reorganisation of the PNC’(GMRRR)). It began its deliberations in 2006.44 Its 23 members consisted of Congolese and foreign police officers as well as representatives of institutions (UN and EC) and countries (Angola, France, South Africa and the UK). Only six were Congolese and all six were police officials. No participation was provided for Congolese civil society, elected representatives, justice personnel, traditional authorities or officials from other national government departments.45 The GMRRR was tasked with preparing the Comité de Suivi de la Réforme de la Police (CSRP), to monitor the police reform process and to establish the basis for future donor engagement. The GMRRR submitted reform proposals to the PNC in May 2006. Feedback was given to the GMRRR in early 2007. A three‐day seminar was then held in Kinshasa on police reform in April 2007. For the first time civil society, a variety of state departments, elected members of parliament and members of the judiciary participated. The final proposal included the "Principle of Unity" of the police. This would result in the integration of the Immigration and Judicial police into the PNC. It also expressed the achievement of a republican, civil and apolitical police organisation.46
43 UNDP and Japan to train 2,000 police officers in DRC 16 December 2009 http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2009/december/‐undp‐and‐japan‐to‐train‐2000‐ (Accessed 09 January 2010) 44 Rauch, Janine, Whose idea was this anyway? Initiating police reform in the DRC South African Journal of Criminal Justice 45 Rauch, Janine, Whose idea was this anyway? Initiating police reform in the DRC South African Journal of Criminal Justice
46 Boshoff, Henri. Handrickson, Dylan. Sylvie More. Vircoulon, Thierry. Supporting SSR in the DRC: between a Rock and a Hard Place An analysis of the Donor Aproach to supporting Security Sector Reform in the Democratic republic of Congo, Netherland Institute for International relations “Clingendael,” April 2010
Policing Overview
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01 July 2010
The CRSP began meeting in 2008. It continues to search for a definition of its role to realise the police reforms first conceptualized. This CSRP focused police reform process was not taken seriously by the PNC officers or senior government. The relationship between the CSRP and PNC leadership was not well‐conceived. No thought was given to procedures for mandating and report‐back to police command structures. Reform planning is not even communicated to police officials across the country, many of them completely uniformed about proposed reforms.47 The European Commission and DFID continue to be central and dominant players in this process. There appears to be a complete lack of interest in police reform by the government or parliament. Pres. Kabila openly acknowledges that the security sector is weak and abusive, yet the Congolese government has actively resisted or obstructed international efforts to target this institutional dysfunction. "International partners have paid little attention to the role of parliament in terms of budget‐approval and oversight, as well as passing legislation essential for police reform."48 The law proposed that the Police Judiciaire come under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior, which the Ministry of Justice initially opposed,49 before finally agreeing to it but over a phased timeframe. The CSRP is nearing the end of its planning phase but the draft police law prepared in 2006 has yet to be debated in parliament and the 'Action plan for Police Reform' is still awaiting Ministerial and Cabinet approval. In this political environment, DFID’s Parliamentary Under‐Secretary of State launched in early 2008 a 5‐year £60 million Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform Programme (SSAPRP)50 in the DRC. If this DFID plan takes off as hoped, the focus of reform will shift to 47 Boshoff, Henri. Handrickson, Dylan. Sylvie More. Vircoulon, Thierry. Supporting SSR in the DRC: between a Rock and a Hard Place An analysis of the Donor Aproach to supporting Security Sector Reform in the Democratic republic of Congo, Netherland Institute for International relations “Clingendael,” April 2010
48 Boshoff, Henri. Handrickson, Dylan. Sylvie More. Vircoulon, Thierry. Supporting SSR in the DRC: between a Rock and a Hard Place An analysis of the Donor Aproach to supporting Security Sector Reform in the Democratic republic of Congo, Netherland Institute for International relations “Clingendael,” April 2010
49 Kagwanja, Peter. 50 The SSAPR Programme is made up of the following programmatic areas:
An External Accountability Component focusing on strengthening civilian participation, oversight and control mechanisms. This will include support to parliamentary defence, security and justice commissions, civil society and academic institutions and think tanks;
An Internal Accountability Component focusing on: (i) strengthening financial accountability, discipline and conduct through support to financial and human resource management reform initiatives to address pay and conditions of service as well as support anti‐corruption measures, and; (ii) cross‐cutting issues including the following broad areas: o Supporting cross‐government co‐ordination, accountability and internal oversight of
security sector institutions,
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police headquarters. The CSRP will assume the role of monitoring the implementation of planned reforms and impact evaluation and co‐ordinating donor action. “In spite of . . . detailed technical preparations and the deployment of a huge number of UN and European experts to Kinshasa, there has been little progress.51 ". . . Consensus today is that progress . . . has been limited."52 The government of the DRC has other pressing security sector concerns. Police reform is unlikely to remain a priority. Donors consider that the police secured the election and are thus worthy of reform, but from the government side police reform is seen as less important than military reform and internal security is considered less important than defence. Donors pursue the creation of an accountable, rights respecting security sector. Government is most concerned with creating effective fighting forces. A state unable to fulfil its basic sovereign responsibilities has no strong institutional framework within which to anchor SSR. Even under optimal conditions it is very difficult to undertake a complex policy initiative such as SSR requiring long‐term strategic planning and co‐ordination across different sectors of government. Within a highly autocratic governance system SSR is very sensitive ‐ impacting on state sovereignty. The government tends to resist donor interventions it feels is being imposed. There also appear to be lack of understanding that the impact of police reform will be limited without links to justice and penal reform. “A lack of financial realism also
o Supporting government capacity to monitor and evaluate service delivery in the security
and justice sector. To include work with the SSAPR M&E team to design and implement a government‐led and owned baseline survey; and,
o Improving financial accountability through increasing efficiency, effectiveness and transparency of the budget and its expenditure;
A Police Support Programme focusing on support to the national police reform process and capacity building for the Police Nationale Congolaise, and;
A Monitoring and Evaluation Component. http://evaluation.francophonie.org/IMG/doc/1227_SSAPR%20positions.doc (Accessed 01 October 2009) 51 International Crisis Group, Congo: A Stalled Democratic Agenda, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°73, 8 April 2010
52 Boshoff, Henri. Handrickson, Dylan. Sylvie More. Vircoulon, Thierry. Supporting SSR in the DRC: between a Rock and a Hard Place An analysis of the Donor Aproach to supporting Security Sector Reform in the Democratic republic of Congo, Netherland Institute for International relations “Clingendael,” April 2010
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01 July 2010
characterises the government’s approach to police reform, whose action plan is estimated to cost $1.3 billion.”53
Finally, there is no commitment by the government for reform and civil society is not enabled to demand reform.
4.4 UN Civilian Policing Support All UN police activities in DRC all fall under the broader umbrella provided by the civilian police component (UNPOL) of MONUC.
Security Council Resolution 1565, 01 October 2004, established a series of additional tasks and responsibilities for MONUC. Increasing the mission strength, it established that MONUC was “to ensure the protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel, under imminent threat of physical violence, to support the transitional government to conduct DDR, facilitate voluntary demobilisation, and provide advice and assistance to the transitional government regarding security sector reform, DDR and training and monitoring of the police.” Thus, in addition to supporting the police, MONUC was mandated to co‐ordinating security sector reform initiatives undertaken by different donor countries and agencies.54 MONUC established the Joint Commission on the SSR sub‐committee on policing. Belgium, France, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and the European Commission are all members. Committee members provided technical assistance and expertise to the PNC.
However, the co‐ordination of police reform remained the responsibility of the Comité de Suivi de la Réforme de la Police (CSRP) mentioned earlier. In reality, the CSRP and the reform agenda have been dominated by European police officers of EUPOL. The UNPOL component of MONUC was more engaged in practical assistance to the PNC across the country as MONUC always struggled to implement its mandate of protecting civilians.
The recommendations of the 2000 Brahmini report notwithstanding, as well as the lessons learned from the UN mission in Haiti, the police component of MONUC was never very robust. This was largely due to the difficulty of contributing countries to spare police. With troop contributions varying between 15 000 and 21 000 soldiers, the police component averaged 200‐300 personnel. Only for the purpose of elections did Security Council Resolution 1621 (2005), authorize a temporary increase of 841 personnel in the strength of the Mission, including additional police, and up to five formed police units of 125 officers each, for the period of the elections and their immediate aftermath.
53 International Crisis Group, Congo: A Stalled Democratic Agenda, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°73, 8 April 2010
54 An SSR Coordination Office was created inside MONUC for this purpose, but focussed largely on DDR and defence reform, leaving police reform to the CSRP which is a Gov. of DRC body created by legal decree.
Policing Overview
Leon Kukkuk
01 July 2010
Agenda item 34 during the Sixty‐second session of the UN General Assembly (A/62/659–S/2008/39) on 23 January 2008 reiterated the importance of SSR in their “Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects.” On 12 May 2008, the UN Security Council formally added SSR to MONUC's mandate through resolution S/PRST/2008/14.
The Council asked MONUC to work with the Congolese government on a comprehensive plan for SSR. It was also tasked to coordinate the work of donors in order to eliminate the existing redundancies and contradictions. After 2008, member states increasingly conditioned MONUC's eventual withdrawal on progress on SSR. Congolese officials, including the president, have tried to sideline MONUC's role in SSR and are insisting on a full withdrawal of MONUC by the end of 2011. MONUC’s SSR officials are provided minimal contact with their Congolese counterparts. President Joseph Kabila and his government have frustrated all UN co‐ordination efforts. It has repeatedly failed to commit itself to the institutional reforms to which it often paid lip service and had in many cases requested. The impending withdrawal of UN peacekeepers, a key partner in the success of SSR initiatives, only serves to further highlight the lack of commitment to reform by the government. Considering that most of the countries involved have no pressing national security interests in DRC, it is unlikely that donors will commit the required political capital and resources to pressure the Congolese government into adopting an effective SSR strategy. The international community's most effective potential instrument for pursuing SRR in the DRC will be lost if MONUC leaves or if there is a substantial drawdown by mid‐2011. This seems increasingly likely. The Congolese government will continue to accept bilateral training but resist genuine institutional reform.
4.5 Oversight
As can be seen from the preceding narrative, the DRC police have never operated within a democratic environment. Senior police officers still understand their mission as protecting the state from internal or external enemies.
In an incident Bas Congo, the capital of Province Orientale, in the beginning of 2008, Human Rights Watch observed many instances when soldiers and police officers fired indiscriminately at demonstrators.55 Reprisal killings continued for days and months afterwards as soldiers and police officers allegedly summarily executed injured persons and others suspected of being opposition supporters.
55 Van Woudenberg, Anneke. Statement by Human Rights Watch to the DRC Parliamentary Commission Investigating Events in Bas Congo 12 April 2007 www.friendsofthecongo.org/pdf/bascongo_hrw.pdf (Accessed 09 January 2010)
Policing Overview
Leon Kukkuk
01 July 2010
A number of high profile assassinations over the last few years have generally been ascribed to members of the security forces, mostly the military but also the police. These include Daniel Boteti, a vice‐president of the capital's provincial assembly, at the beginning of July 2008 for which two members of the republican guard were arrested. The murders of journalists Franck Ngyke Kangundu in June 2006 and Bapuwa Mwamba in July 2006 remain largely unresolved but suspicions abound of either police or army complicity. The most recent case is that of Floribert Chebye, the head of Voix des Sans‐Voix (Voice of the Voiceless (VSV)) found strangled on 02 June 2010. He had been called to a meeting with the Inspector General of Police (IG), General John Numbi, the previous evening. The IG was suspended soon after this incident.
On 04 June 2010 the U.S. State Department issued a release56 that accurately sums up the general state of affairs: “We are concerned about the killings of other human rights defenders in the DRC in recent years, and note that Congolese human rights groups remain particularly vulnerable to harassment, arbitrary arrest and detention, and other abuses by security forces.”
Issues of major concern in the DRC are the prevalence of popular justice; killings in Province Orientale and North and South Kivu; political killings in Bas Congo and Kinshasa; deaths in prisons; sexual violence and extrajudicial executions; impunity and the weakness or absence of the criminal and military justice systems.
The police have not yet been fully demilitarised, and have in addition absorbed a large number of ex‐rebels and demobilised soldiers, very few of them whom have received any police training. Oversight mechanisms meet resistance from the police hierarchies, which operate within a managerial culture where questioning authority is neither encouraged nor tolerated. This has been heavily criticised by Congolese civil society. The DRC government’s general disregard for oversight and accountability mechanisms results in democratic oversight remaining a serious challenge.
4.5.1 Internal Oversight
There are a number of government agencies that have potential police oversight functions. The Public Prosecutors offices and the judiciary officially have oversight roles.
During the elections in 2006, the National Electoral Commission and the High Authority of the Media and Communication played an oversight role. This role is unlikely to be repeated for the 2011 elections, which may take place with no UN presence and perhaps even overt and covert limitations on international observers.
56 U.S. Department Of State, Statement on Death of Floribert Chebeya Bahizire, 04 June 2010 http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans‐english/2010/June/20100604171830SBlebahC0.8006207.html#ixzz0sPoius8P
Policing Overview
Leon Kukkuk
01 July 2010
The judiciary’s role as an overseer may be limited. The Constitution includes a provision that judicial decisions are enforced in the name of the President, which may result in illegitimate political interference into court decisions. The President has the authority to appoint and dismiss a judge without any restriction.
The Assembly and Senate Committees on Defence and Security also have oversight powers. These were exercised ‐ once ‐ early in 2008 when the Inspector‐General of the PNC was called to appear before Parliament after police shootings in the province of Bas Congo. The parliamentary inquiry was broadcast on television.
The PNC established a division for internal monitoring in early 2008 – the Inspection‐Generale d’Audit. The role of this division is not yet clear. The internal disciplinary system for the PNC is that of the Armed Forces of the DRC. This arrangement is Constitutionally‐prescribed, as part of the wider justice system. Thus, misconduct of soldiers, police and civilians are dealt with through the military justice system. From the perspective of civilian jurisprudence, the military justice system is particularly problematic.
Since the PNC does not have its own justice system, it is not possible to confront police corruption or misconduct in a reform process where the focus is only on the PNC. Internal police discipline cannot be considered separately from justice reform.
The Congolese police do not have a union that can protect the interests of members. At any rate, even civil society organisations and unions that do exist, struggle to effectively communicate to the political levels, to reach to their members or communities, and to organise activities to increase protection.
The development of civil oversight institutions in the DRC has been led almost exclusively by external partners working at national and local levels to reform governance.
4.5.2 External Civilian Oversight A number of international organisations (such as Global Rights, Human Rights Watch) non‐government organisations and research groups play a role in providing independent, civil society scrutiny over the behaviour of the police.57
Once again there are a large number of institutions and organisations involved, some of whom may have an oversight component as part of a larger programme. The major players in civil oversight reform are the same players currently engaged in police and justice sector reform. There are significant overlap with these more highly funded programmes, which are complimentary to oversight and judicial reform efforts. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) started a $390 million governance programme in 2008 that will run through to 2012. The political governance branch of the programme seeks to provide support for institutions such as the Parliament and provincial assemblies, as well as political parties, the media, and civil society organisations. The legal and security governance component will work towards judicial reform, capacity‐building in
57 An Audit of Police Oversight in Africa
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01 July 2010
the security forces, efforts to combat corruption in public administration, and action to strengthen internal and external audit institutions.58 UNDP claims that the programme priorities were determined through a broad‐based consultation and dialogue with the DRC Government, Parliament, civil society organisations and international financial and technical stakeholders, but it is likely to be sensitive.
The Carter Centre has worked in the DRC to help strengthen democracy since observing the country's 2006 elections through a series of initiatives to strengthen the justice sector including the judiciary, police force, and various government ministries dealing with human rights protection.
Since 2007, the Carter Centre has trained more than 200 Congolese police officers59 and judges in human rights policy and practice; established and trained a network of Congolese nongovernmental organization (NGO) partners in human rights; and trained women and men as paralegal consultants in the prevention and redress of gender‐based violence.
“The Centre offers training in both human rights legal frameworks as well as professional skills needed for the daily application of human rights standards, including the investigation and prosecution of crimes of sexual and gender‐based violence, the rights of minors, and the right to due process for all detainees.” 60
DFID contracted the Institute for Democracy in Africa (IDASA) to assist in the GMRRR process. Working with the South African Police Service (SAPS), it facilitated and hosted a series of conferences to discuss reform. Up to the end of 2009 it managed projects to ensure that civil society and citizens are informed of the issues surrounding reform of the police force, in addition to providing and enabling environment in which these groups can contribute to the process.61 The programme supported the creation of a national civil society network on SSR, which has over 100 members; and nodes in every province. The International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) has a Swedish‐funded programme in the Congo which includes a focus on accountability for human rights abuses as well as a focus on SSR. It has “organized several training programs in 2009 of leading civil society actors to raise awareness of the links between transitional justice and security system reform (SSR), particularly police reform. ICTJ is engaged in ongoing advocacy on army and
58 UNDP, UNDP to sign US$390 million governance programme with DRC, 25 January 2008 http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2008/january/drc‐governance‐20080125.en
59 It is not clear whether this is the PNC or Judicial Police or both.
60 Carter Center Conducts Human Rights Training for Congolese Police Officers 20 February 2009 http://www.cartercenter.org/news/features/p/drc_021709.html (Accessed 09 January 2010)
61 Gilbert, Stefan, Celebrating South Africa in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) IDASA newsletter, 29 April 2008 http://www.idasa.org.za/index.asp?page=output_details.asp%3FRID%3D1447%26oplang%3Den%26OTID%3D4%26PID%3D49
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01 July 2010
police reform, seeking to infuse a justice‐sensitive approach to SSR by advocating for the identification and removal of past human rights abusers from the army, police and other security forces and create ongoing accountability mechanisms in these sectors.”62 The ongoing instability in the country, combined with an increasingly autocratic system of governance does not bode well for the success of any one of these initiatives, at least in the short to medium term. Oversight is a sensitive issue, even in the best of circumstances, and donors need to become more systematically informed by considerations of accountability, coherence, justice and national ownership in the implementation of these programmes.
With such a dire need for reforms, programmes are either designed or implemented in practice to meet short term operational requirements; neglecting long term transformational initiatives including capacity, behavioural change and a value system that would allow oversight mechanisms to take hold and operate effectively.
Donors also need to recognise the dangers of overloading the government reform agenda with unrealistic ambitions and subsequent resistance.
62 http://www.ictj.org/en/where/region1/646.html
