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Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe Analysis and Recommendations for the UNDP Country Programs in Belarus, Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine.
29 April 2009
Harvard Kennedy School Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
Emily Cintora
Report for UNDP
Bratislava Office
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
1
Democratic Governance in Eastern
Europe
Analysis and Recommendations for the UNDP Country Programs in
Belarus, Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine.
I. Executive Summary
The last two decades have brought innumerable changes to Eastern Europe. Caught between old
legacies and new international norms, Eastern Europe is at once making both gains as well as facing
complex challenges in the democracy transition. These conflicting trends are evident in the countries of
concern for the UNDP’s Bratislava office: Belarus, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine.
After the “colored revolutions” in the early part of the decade, Georgia and Ukraine turned the corner
towards improved democratic governance. Although pervasive problems such as corruption,
inefficiency, and political deadlock have prevented more comprehensive transitions, both countries
have opened up to key political and administrative reforms. The UNDP provide targeted support to
capitalize on existing momentum to encourage further democratic reforms.
Despite these regional success stories, the UNDP must also provide targeted support to the
underperformers: Belarus and Russia. High levels of centralization and weak civil society threaten
governmental effectiveness and existing democratic institutions. In Belarus and Russia, the UNDP must
support programs that effect substantive changes yet will not be obstructed by political barriers.
UNDP faces considerable challenges in the region, including political instability, governmental
ineffectiveness, poor rights protection, and low responsiveness to citizens’ needs. Nevertheless, the
current context provides opportunities for projects targeting public administration reform, local
governance, anti-corruption and civil society and the media.
Report Objectives
This report will summarize the key challenges in the region and identify the areas the UNDP can
strategically address. UNDP priorities are determined based on the needs of the countries and the
feasibility of programs in specific country contexts. The report presents a range of policy options in the
areas of public administration reform, anti-corruption, local governance, civil society and media and fills
in the blanks of existing UNDP programs in these countries. Finally, the recommendations present a
strategic plan for the UNDP’s funding, programming, and regional partnerships.
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
2
General Recommendations
UNDP Office Recommendations for Priority Areas of Democratic Governance
Bratislava Create a strategic funding and program plan for the region based on key challenges
and political feasibility.
Build a regional strategy based on shared concerns such as public administration
reform, local governance, anti-corruption, and civil society and media supplemented
with country-specific targets to fill in existing UNDP programmatic gaps.
Engage regional partners such as USAID, the World Bank, and other development
agencies and NGOs where appropriate to maximize the potential for program
success.
Belarus Focus on politically feasible programs targeting public administration reform, local
service delivery and corruption in order to gain foothold in the country.
Georgia Capitalize on existing momentum in anti-corruption, local governance and public
service delivery and build up existing civil society and media to support other
democratic reforms.
Russia Focus on politically feasible programs targeting public administration reform, local
service delivery, and corruption and assist support networks of media and civil
society to promote transparency and accountability.
Ukraine Capitalize on existing momentum in local governance and public service delivery b
building up existing civil society and media to support other democratic reforms.
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
3
II. Table of Contents
I. Executive Summary .................................................................................................................. 1
Report Objectives ....................................................................................................................... 1
General Recommendations ........................................................................................................ 2
II. Table of Contents ................................................................................................................. 3
III. Key Challenges in the Region ................................................................................................ 4
IV. Causes of Key Challenges ...................................................................................................... 8
UNDP’s Strategic Priorities for the Bratislava Office ................................................................ 12
V. Policy Options and Strategic Programmatic Interventions ................................................... 14
VI. Conclusions ......................................................................................................................... 18
VII. Technical Appendix ............................................................................................................ 19
Appendix I: Regime Indictors .................................................................................................... 19
Appendix II: Human Development Report 2007 Data .............................................................. 20
Appendix III: Indicators Used in this Report ............................................................................. 21
Appendix IV: Decentralization in Europe, UNDP Measures ..................................................... 23
Appendix V: Regional Partners and their Existing Projects ...................................................... 27
Appendix VI: General Indicators ............................................................................................... 28
Appendix VII: Policy Options Case Studies................................................................................ 28
VIII. Endnotes............................................................................................................................ 33
Published Sources ..................................................................................................................... 33
Data Sources ............................................................................................................................. 35
Cover photos from Wikipedia.org, undp.org, Google Images, and Getty Images.
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
4
III. Key Challenges in the Region
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a new generation of nations took shape in Eastern Europe.
Belarus, Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine are integral actors in Eastern Europe’s economy and society and
also represent the overall region’s successes and setbacks to democracy. Popular indicators, like
Freedom House or Polity IV, fail to agree on the state of democracy in several of these countries,
indicating complex transition processes. Yet four key challenges are evident, including political
instability, ineffective government functioning, insufficient protection of rights, and unresponsive
relationships between governments and their citizens.
Political Instability1 Fluctuating political stability has a significant impact on the quality of services and
efficiency that their governments can provide to their citizens. Since 1996, these countries have shown
small gains in political stability, as shown in Figure 1. Notably the largest improvements were made in
Figure 1: Political Stability in Eastern European Countries
Source: Kaufman and Kraay, World Bank Indicators, 2008.
Note: Political stability measured from -2 to +2. In 2007, Belarus and Ukraine ranked in the 50th-75th percentile of
the world’s countries in political stability while Russia and Georgia ranked in the 10th to 25th percentile.
Georgia and Ukraine in the early part of this decade after the Rose and Orange Revolutions. Also
significant is the relatively and consistently higher stability of Belarus (likely due to firm government rule
under Lukashenka since 1994), which nevertheless has made the least progress in the sectors of
democratic governance. Despite showing some initial promise in achieving stability in the 1990s, Russia
took steps back under the Putin presidency, which is it slowing attempting to regain. Despite some
deceptiveness of the indicator in the case of Belarus, political instability continues to hinder the
potential of governments and institutions in the region.
Democratic Governance Not Always Linked to Political Stability in
Bratislava's Countries of Concern
-1.8
-1.6
-1.4
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Year
Po
liti
ca
l S
tab
ilit
y E
sti
ma
te
Belarus
Georgia
Russia
Ukraine
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
5
Governmental Ineffectiveness2 Likely part of a feedback loop with regional instability, governmental ineffectiveness also challenges the region (see Figure 2). Although some improvements have been made over the last ten years, these four countries continue to rank below or near to the 50th percentile of governmental effectiveness worldwide. Furthermore, all four governments consistently had negative scores for the last ten years. In Georgia, this translates into a lack of territorial control and of capacity in local governance structures and in the judicial system. In Ukraine, governing ability is hindered by political deadlock between the prime minister and president, a lack of funding to support an independent judiciary, and predicted rising rates corruption. In Russia and Belarus, local outlets for governance are non-existent or serve as delegates to the central government.
Figure 2: Governmental Effectiveness in Eastern Europe
Source: Kaufman and Kraay, World Bank Indicators, 2008.
Note: Governmental effectiveness measured from -2 to +2. In 2007, all countries except Georgia ranked
below the 50th percentile of governmental effectiveness in the world. Georgia ranked between 75th and
50th percentiles.
Ensuring the Rights and Freedoms of Citizens3 According to indicators on political and civil rights, these Eastern European countries also fall short on protecting their citizens (See Appendix I). Under Lukashenka’s and Putin’s presidencies on Belarus and Russia, political rights and freedom of expression have been targeted. Elections in these two countries are widely considered to be not free and unfair.4 Crackdowns on media outlets and civil society organizations in the two countries have further restricted citizen expression and participation in politics. Despite UNDP’s and other regional partner’s human rights programs, Belarus and Russia continue to fall behind the Eastern European standards of human rights protection.5 While Ukraine and Georgia have a better record on human rights, there is still room for significant improvement. In particular, after the contested Georgian elections of 2007 and the Georgian-Russian conflict in 2008, Georgia stands at a crossroads between continuing the momentum of
Modest Improvements in Governmental Effectiveness
in Bratislava's Countries of Concern:Belarus Lags Far Behind Other Countries
-1.6
-1.4
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Year
Go
ve
rn
me
nta
l E
ffe
cti
ve
ne
ss
Belarus
Georgia
Russia
Ukraine
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
6
its democracy-building of the mid 2000s and recentralizing.6 Figure 3 shows that in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine less than half of citizens feel that they are free—less than in other regional countries, consolidated democracies like Sweden, and the world average (See Figure 3). Almost 60% of Georgia’s citizens indicate that they feel free, yet this percentage remains below the world average.
Figure 3: Citizens Not Feeling the Effects of Democratization in Eastern Europe
Weak Responsive Relationships between Governments and their Citizens7 As a result of poor rights
protections and ineffective governance, Eastern European nations are characterized by a wider trend: a
lack of responsive governance. The disconnect between governments and their citizens is evident in
almost all sectors, from elections to civil society opportunities and especially vulnerable and opposition
groups. In Georgia, voter dissatisfaction led to a strong opposition movement in 2007 which was harshly
put down by the Saakashvili government. Georgians also voice little confidence in key democratic
institutions such as the court system. In Ukraine, the upper echelons of government remain in a
deadlock and are unable to make significant movement on constitutional amendments on elections,
local governance and anti-corruption. In Russia, the gap between the government and its citizens is
growing as the administration centralizes institutions, thus diluting voice and accountability. In general,
citizens in these four countries do not believe their governments are progressing towards democracy
(See Figure 4), indicating a need for governments to be more responsive to the practical needs of their
citizens.
47
5955
58
47
73
82
44
80
020
40
60
80
Ho
w m
uch
fre
edo
m y
ou fe
el (
%)
Belar
us
Geo
rgia
Hung
ary
Polan
d
Russ
ian
Federa
tion
Slove
nia
Swede
n
Ukr
aine
Unite
d Kin
gdom
Note: The percentages reflect the amount of the population that feels they are free. Red line notes world average.
Source: QoG Dataset, World Values Survey, 2008.
Eastern European Countries Feel Less Free than the Average World Citizen
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
7
Figure 4: Democracy Progress Slow in Eastern Europe
020
40
60
De
mocr
acy
is d
eve
lopin
g in
ou
r co
un
try
(%)
Belar
us
Geo
rgia
Hung
ary
Polan
d
Russ
ian
Federa
tion
Slove
nia
Swede
n
Ukr
aine
Unite
d Kin
gdom
Source: QoG Dataset, World Values Survey, 2008. Red line indicates world average.
Note: This graph indicates the proportion of citizens that believe democracy is developing in their country.
Populations have less Faith in their Countries' Democratic Progress than the Average World Citizen
Eastern European Countries Have Low Opinion of Democratic Progress
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
8
IV. Causes of Key Challenges
While a myriad of factors contribute to the state of governance in these four countries, three recurring trends may be at the root of the key challenges, including insufficient public engagement with central and formal institutions to ensure governmental accountability; the lack of local institutions and informal outlets for public engagement; and the prominence of corruption in both lower and higher levels of government.
Insufficient public engagement in central and formal governance institutions8: A key concern in
democratic governance in the Eastern European region is the lack of government engagement with the public, as indicated by the voice and accountability scores (Figure 5). Although Georgia and Ukraine have seen upward trends in voice and accountability in recent years, there still remains much room for improvement. In Georgia, improvements to voice and accountability are hindered by crackdowns on opposition politicians and parties while in the Ukraine, public disillusionment with constitutional reforms and judicial independence has reduced confidence in central institutions. Meanwhile, Russia and Belarus continue to struggle in this area and have seen a decline in voice and accountability. Russia’s top-heavy government recently reduced electoral representation with changes in electoral laws and recent elections were marred by harassment of the opposition, biased media coverage, and significant abnormalities in the southern provinces. Belarus’ elections are also controlled by the executive and are marked by fraud and harassment of the opposition. Figure 5: Voice and Accountability in Eastern European Countries
Source: Kaufman and Kraay, World Bank Indicators, 2008.
Note: Voice and Accountability measured from -2 to +2. In 2007, all four countries were ranked in or below the
50th
percentile of the world countries in voice and accountability.
Diverging Trends in Voice and
Accountability in Bratislava's Countries of
-2
-1.8
-1.6
-1.4
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
1996
1998
2000
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Years
Voi
ce a
nd A
ccou
ntab
ility
Belarus
Georgia
Russia
Ukraine
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
9
Figure 6: Level of Competitiveness Drives Local Levels of Stability
Figure 7: Ability to Participate in Politics Also Tied to Higher Political Stability
Low political competition and low engagement are key drivers behind weak voice and accountability. Data shows that contestation and inclusiveness in the political process is significantly linked to higher political stability and is a key characteristic of highly democratized countries to emulate—such as
BLR
GEO
HUN
POL
RUS
SVN
SWE
UKR
GBR-1
01
2
Conte
sta
tion (
Copp
edg
e e
t al.
)
-2 -1 0 1 2Political Stability (World Bank)
Contestation Correlation between variables significant at the 80% confidence level.
Source: QoG Dataset, World Bank Indicators and Coppedge et al., 2008.
Note: Contestation measured from -2 (not competitive) to +2 (competitive). Political stability measured -2 (unstable) to +2 (stable).
Belarus is the Regional Exception
Low Political Competitiveness Contributes to Low Stability
BLR
GEO
HUN
POL
RUS
SVN
SWE
UKR
GBR
.6.8
11.2
1.4
Inclu
siv
enes
s (
Co
pped
ge e
t al.)
-2 -1 0 1 2Political Stability (World Bank)
Inclusiveness Correlation significant at the 95% confidence level.
Source: QoG Dataset, World Bank and Coppedge et al., 2008.
Note: Inclusiveness measured -2 to +2. Political Stability measured -2 to +2.
Inclusiveness Closely Tied to Political Stability
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
10
Sweden and regional success, Slovenia (Figure 6 and 7). Higher contestation and inclusiveness are key to ensuring the responsiveness of governments to their citizens needs.
Insufficient Outlets for Public Participation9: In addition to the divide between citizens and central government, Eastern European countries also lack adequate informal and local outlets for citizen engagement, including civil society organizations and local government units. Weak local level institutions restrict the channels between governments and their citizens and can also reduce efficient service delivery and administration.10 According to UNDP’s decentralization indicators (See Figure 8 and Appendix IV), there are many opportunities for more political, administrative and fiscal decentralization. While Georgia and Ukraine have made strides towards empowering local communities through local governance, Russia and Belarus has effectively recentralized governance.
Figure 8: Overall decentralization ranking per group of countries
11
Source: UNDP, 2008. Note: Decentralization measured on a scale of 0 (not decentralized) to 4 (effectively
decentralized).
Similarly in the realm of informal outlets, Georgia and Ukraine have active and functioning civil societies
protected by legislation and the courts. These country’s civil societies are often given credit for the
successes of the “colored revolutions” which began new eras of democratic progress. Their successes
can also be linked to higher levels of human rights protections, relatively free and fair elections, and
greater government accountability and effectiveness. However, Belarus and Russia have placed severe
restrictions placed on civil society organizations through excessive administrative barriers and outright
harassment and closure. This limits the informal outlets for public participation which typically promote
government accountability and effectiveness.
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
4.50
Cze
ch R
epub
lic
Slova
k R
epub
lic
Slove
nia
Latv
ia
Poland
Rom
ania
Bulgar
ia
Eston
ia
Hun
gary
Lith
uani
a
Alban
ia
Cro
atia
FYR M
acedo
nia
Geor
gia
Mon
teneg
ro
Serbia
Armen
ia
UN
Adm
in. P
rov.
Koso
vo
Rus
sian
Fed
erat
ion
Bosnia
& H
erze
govin
a
Kazakh
stan
Kyrgy
stan
Mol
dova
Tajik
ista
n
Turke
y
Ukr
aine
Azerb
aija
n
Uzb
ekista
n
Turkm
enist
an
Belaru
s
Active Decentralizers Advanced Intermediate Decentralizers Early Intermediate Decentralizers Non decentralizers
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
11
Corruption and Weak Rule of Law:12 As final, significant causal factor of struggling democracy in Eastern
Europe is the prevalence of corruption and weak rule of law. The misuse of public funds and bribing of
officials at all levels of government has severe consequences for government effectiveness,
responsiveness and legitimacy. Although Georgia in particular has made significant strides in anti-
corruption, the issue remains pervasive in the other three countries (See Figure 9 and Appendix VIII).
Only Georgia and Ukraine have implemented or created strategic anti-corruption plans, while Russia and
Belarus efforts remain ad hoc. Belarus showed a significant increase in corruption according to
Transparency International’s corruptions Perceptions Index—falling from 36th to 107th place from 2002
to 2005. Russia currently ranks 143rd out of 180 countries on the TI Index, with indications that lower
level administrative corruption is decreasing while high level political corruption is increasing.13 Weak
rule of law allows ongoing corruption at various levels of government (Figure 10).
Figure 9: Corruption in Eastern Europe
Source: Kaufman and Kraay, World Bank Indicators, 2008.
Note: Corruption measured from -2 to +2. In 2007, Belarus and Russia ranked in the 10th
-25th
percentile for
corruption in the world’s countries while Georgia and Ukraine ranked in the 25th
to 50th
percentile.
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
12
Figure 10: Rule of Law in Eastern Europe
Source: Kaufman and Kraay, World Bank Indicators, 2008.
Note: Rule of law measured from -2 to +2. In 2007, Belarus and Russia ranked in the 10th
-25th
percentile for rule of
law in the world’s countries while Georgia and Ukraine ranked in the 25th
to 50th
percentile.
UNDP’s Strategic Priorities for the Bratislava Office
In summary, the key challenges of the region include political instability, ineffective governance, poor rights protection, and unresponsive relationships between governments and their citizens. The primary causes of these challenges include insufficient public engagement with central government institutions to ensure accountability, the lack of local and/or informal outlets for public engagement, and the prominence of corruption and weak rule of law. Figure 11 ranks priorities for UNDP in each of the countries according to the pervasiveness of problems in the sectors, gravity of the challenges, and opportunity for improvement.14 Given its unique position as a UN agency and the political realities of the region, UNDP must carefully maneuver and plan programs to address key concerns. In many cases, this renders programs directly targeting issues like human rights unfeasible in the face of government opposition. Thus, UNDP should focus on gaining influence and key footholds using less polarizing programming such as public administration reform and anti-corruption programs. The priorities circled in red in Figure 11 indicate areas in which UNDP could gain strategic footholds, have a significant impact, and create a regional strategy. The other priorities should not be ignored but are indirectly addressed by the programs this report will recommend.
Low and Volatile Enforcement of Rule of Law in Bratislava's
Countries of Concern
-1.4
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Year
Ru
le o
f La
w (
esti
ma
te)
Belarus
Georgia
Russia
Ukraine
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
13
Figure 11: Priorities for UNDP’s Regional Office
Belarus Georgia Russia Ukraine
Public Administration
Reform/Local
Governance/Anti-
Corruption
3
1
3
1
Human Rights/ Justice 1 1
Representation/
Gender
Media and Civil Society 2 2 2 2
Electoral Reform 3 3
Constitution-Building
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
14
V. Policy Options and Strategic Programmatic Interventions
The following section presents a range of policy options available to the UNDP within the priority areas identified. Figure 12 summarizes the opportunities available in each of the categories: public administration reform, anti-corruption, local governance, and civil society and media.
Figure 12: Menu of Policy Options
Public administration reform:15 The direct intent of public administration reform is to tackle
government ineffectiveness at its roots. Indirectly public administration reform also promotes
democratic culture, augments government responsiveness to citizens, combats corruption, and
increases transparency and public information. The various mechanisms available include conducting
social audits to identify key public concerns, training and capacity-building of public servants to improve
Program Options
Key Priority Areas
Eastern Europe Region UNDP's Policy Options
Public Administra-tion Reform
Social Audits
Training/ Capacity-building
Legislation on Civil Service
Responsibilities and Processes
Increasing Public Access to Civil
Service (ie. egovernment)
Anti-Corruption
Corruption Commissions
Anti-corruption training/ education
Social Audits
Legislation on Preventing and Punishing Low and High Level
Corruption
Right to Information
Laws and Document
Publication
Local Governance/ Decentraliz-
ation
Political Decentralization
(elections, legislative changes)
Administrative Reform(public
service or policy-making
decentralization)
Fiscal Reform (increased local
revenue and expenditure
responsibilities)
Capacity-building in all three types of
decentralization
Civil Society and Media
Legislation protecting media expression and
NGOS
Capacity-building
Micro-grants to Media and Civil
Society Organizations
Foster dialogue between media, civil society, and the government
Support Watchdog
Organizations
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
15
service quality, legislation on civil service processes and responsibilities to promote transparent
procedures, and increased public access to civil service. Social audits have been used with success in
other countries to identify citizen needs, including India and Ukraine.16 Innovative approaches to
enhancing public service access include e-government, which has met with success in countries like
Estonia and Bulgaria.17 Currently, UNDP already conducts various forms of public administration reform
in all four countries of concern (See Figure 13 for the full list). See Figure 14 for recommendations.
Anti-corruption programs:18 Anti-corruption programs tackle government misuse of funds, unequal
access to services, and governmental ineffectiveness at its core. Various tools can be used to combat
corruption, including anti-corruption commissions to create strategic plans, anti-corruption
training/education, social audits, passing legislation on preventive or punitive measures, and right to
information legislation and implementation. Georgia is a regional success story in this area, showing
significant improvement over the years through a combination of legislation, training, raising public
awareness, and prosecution.19 While both Georgia and Ukraine have right to information legislation and
strategic plans to combat corruption, Russia and Belarus do not. Russia does have an anti-corruption
working group, but it does not currently have active projects. UNDP does not currently support anti-
corruption projects in Belarus, Georgia and Russia and supports only a trade transparency program in
Ukraine. Anti-corruption is a key area where UNDP can increase its regional impact on democratic
governance. See Figure 14 for a full list of short and long-term recommendations.
Figure 13: Existing UNDP Programs in Priority Areas20
Belarus Georgia Russia Ukraine
Public Administration
Reform
Administrative Procedures
Reform
Capacity-building Fund
Civil Service Registry
Reform
Modernization of the
Finance System
Reforming the Budgeting
Process—Implementing
Performance- based
Budgeting
Civil Service Reform
Anti-Corruption None None None EUBAM Project
(increasing trade
transparency
Local Governance None Strengthening local
governance in vulnerable
regions
Territorial
decentralization support
None None
Media and Civil Society Legal clinic at Belarusian
State University
Promoting Democracy
through the Internet
Increasing Public
Participation in Electoral
Process
Civil Society-State
Relations Project
Consumer Society and
Citizens Networks
Marketing Democracy
Project
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
16
Local Governance:21 Local governance programming targets the lack of responsiveness to citizen’s
needs as well as increasing voice and accountability. Local governance and decentralization also can
diffuse intergroup tensions, protect the rights of vulnerable groups by increasing their participation in
decision-making and can reduce corruption and government ineffectiveness by increasing transparency
and the quality of local needs assessments. Decentralization encompasses a broad range of governance
restructuring techniques at the political, administrative, and financial levels. Political decentralization
often entails the use of legislation or constitutional amendments and electoral reform to territorially
federalize a nation, allot local representation, and define local government responsibilities.
Administrative decentralization can involve the devolution of public service delivery (often the least
controversial) and/or policy-making to the local governance structures. Financial decentralization refers
to the reassignment of revenue collection and expenditure assignments to the local level. Various
combinations of the decentralization techniques have been used with success in various regional
countries such as Croatia and Macedonia (See Appendix VIII).
With the significant momentum behind democracy in Ukraine and Georgia, there is a window of
opportunity to promote the three forms of decentralization. UNDP already supports local governments
in Georgia and should expand this assistance to Ukraine (See Figure 13). UNDP does not currently
support local governance in Belarus and Russia, likely due to their strong central governance. Therefore,
UNDP should promote incremental decentralization, beginning in the short term with public service
decentralization to build momentum for further decentralization in the future. See Figure 14 for
complete recommendations.
Media and Civil Society: Programming for media and civil society is essential for increasing the
legitimacy and sustainability of democratic governance. By assisting locals with the skills and tools to
monitor, report, and advocate, countries are able to combat problems on their own. A wide range of
programs can be instituted including the easing of restrictive legislation or creation of protective
legislation for media and civil society organizations, capacity building and training for journalists and
non-governmental organizations, micro-grants to media and civil society organizations, promotion of
dialogue between national governments and civil society actors, and the creation or support of
watchdog organizations that can monitor the freedom of media and civil society.
The strong tradition of civil society22 and media involvement in Georgia and Ukraine is supported by
legislative protections and capacity-building opportunities. Thus, these countries are in a key position to
tackle key national challenges, such as constitutional amendments in Ukraine and the electoral process
in Georgia. However, Georgia must strive to regain some media freedom after a 2007 crack-down. Yet
in Russia, media and civil society freedom has regressed due to bans on certain types of programs,
complex registration processes, frequent tax audits, some cyber warfare against opposition internet
sites and the recent Law on Extremism.23 In Belarus the state essentially controls the media and civil
society organizations are faced with restrictive laws. See Figure 14 for recommendations and Appendix
VII for case study on USAID’s ProMedia program in Bulgaria.
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
17
Figure 14: Regional and Country-Specific Recommendations
Public Administration Reform Local Governance/
Decentralization
Anti-Corruption Civil Society and Media
Belarus Short-term: Continue to support
administrative procedures reform
and consider a social audit.
Long-term: Support civil service
capacity-building programs.
Short-term: Promote
decentralization of public service
delivery.
Long-term: Extend decentralization
agenda to fiscal and political
spheres.
Short-term: Propose a commission to
create a strategic anti-corruption plan
and conduct social audit.
Long-term: Promote greater
transparency with right to know
legislation and publication of budget
and program functioning.
Short-term: Promote national
dialogue between the
government and non-
governmental actors.
Long-term: Work to relax
legislation restricting media and
civil society organizations.
Georgia Short-term: Continue to support
the capacity-building fund, civil
service registry reform and
financial modernization.
Long-term: Improve public access
and provide more outlets for
participation through e-
government programs
Short-term: Continue to fund local
governance capacity-building in
vulnerable regions and territorial
decentralization.
Long-term: Promote further
political decentralization supported
by fiscal and administrative
devolution.
Short-term: Continue to provide
strategic and technical advice to
Georgia’s thriving anti-corruption
effort.
Long-term: Promote anti-corruption
education in school curriculums.
Short-term: Continue elections
and media project.
Long-term: Provide training for
NGO workers and journalists and
create a micro-grant project to
fund existing and new
organizations.
Russia Short-term: Increase funding for
performance-based budgeting and
conduct a social audit.
Long-term: Promote egovernment
and local governance to reach local
level with greater public service
efficiency.
Short-term: Promote
decentralization of public service
delivery.
Long-term: Extend decentralization
agenda to fiscal and political
spheres.
Short-term: Provide assistance in
crafting anti-corruption strategy with
existing inter-agency anti-corruption
working group.
Long-term: Promote greater
transparency with right to know
legislation and publication of budget
and program functioning.
Short-term: Promote national
dialogue between the
government and non-
governmental actors.
Long-term: Work to relax
legislation restricting media and
civil society organizations.
Ukraine Short-term: Continue civil service
reform and promote egovernance
projects.
Long-term: Continue to promote
public access to services and
provide capacity-building.
Short-term: Fund local governance
capacity-building.
Long-term: Promote further
political decentralization supported
by fiscal and administrative
devolution.
Short-term: Continue to support
EUBAM project, support government
enactment of “Measures Plan,” and
conduct a social audit.
Long-term: Introduce anti-corruption
education and other forms of
capacity-building.
Short-term: Continue supporting
civil society and citizen networks.
Long-term: Provide training for
NGO workers and journalists and
create a micro-grant project to
fund existing and new
organizations.
Regional
Successes24
Estonia: Use of E-Government
programs to increase service
delivery and transparency. Also
used in Bulgaria.
Ukraine: Social audits for citizen
report cards (Public Affairs
Foundation).
Croatia: Mixture of political, fiscal,
and administrative decentralization
measures implemented. While not
fully implemented yet, the country
is on track to become a EU member
country and scores well above
neighbors in democratic
governance indicators.
Georgia: Anti-corruption strategy
plan, an implementing council,
legislative reforms to promote
transparency in government, training,
and new workplace rules. Significant
improvement since 2003.
Ukraine and Georgia: Mixture of
donors funding civil society and
media capacity-building
programs, media-protecting
legislation, and reduction in
barriers to opening NGOs.
ProMedia Project by USAID
Regional
Partners
Currently
Implementing
Projects in
these Areas25
World Bank
OSCE
OSI
USAID (in Georgia and Ukraine)
World Bank
OSI
EU
World Bank
Transparency International
OSI
EU
World Bank
OSCE
OSI
USAID
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
18
VI. Conclusions
With democratic and economically prospering European Union neighbors on one side and a legacy of Soviet-style rule on the other, Eastern European countries are currently facing difficult transitions to democratic governance. While challenges exist in the sectors of human rights/justice, electoral processes and constitution-building, by focusing on public administration, local governance, anti-corruption, and civil society issues, the UNDP can promote internalized and more sustainable democratic change that will initiate and support further reforms in other areas.
Figure 16: Summarized Recommendations
UNDP Office Recommendations for Priority Areas of Democratic Governance
Bratislava Create a strategic funding and program plan for the region based on key challenges
and political feasibility.
Build a regional strategy based on shared concerns such as public administration
reform, local governance, anti-corruption, and civil society and media supplemented
with country-specific targets to fill in existing UNDP programmatic gaps.
Engage regional partners such as USAID, the World Bank, and other development
agencies and NGOs where appropriate to maximize the potential for program
success.
Belarus Focus on politically feasible programs targeting public administration reform, local
service delivery and corruption in order to gain foothold in the country.
Georgia Capitalize on existing momentum in anti-corruption, local governance and public
service delivery and build up existing civil society and media to support other
democratic reforms.
Russia Focus on politically feasible programs targeting public administration reform, local
service delivery, and corruption and assist support networks of media and civil
society to promote transparency and accountability.
Ukraine Capitalize on existing momentum in local governance and public service delivery b
building up existing civil society and media to support other democratic reforms.
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
19
VII. Technical Appendix
Appendix I: Regime Indictors
Country Name Civil Liberties
(Freedom
House)
Political Rights
(Freedom House)
Freedom House
Status
Regime Type
(Cheibub Gandhi
Regime)
Polity Regime
Type (Polity IV)
Belarus 6 6 Not Free Dictatorship -7
Georgia 4 4 Partly Free Dictatorship 5
Russian Federation 5 5 Partly Free Democracy 7
Ukraine 4 4 Partly Free Democracy 7
* Source: QoG dataset, 2008. Countries are graded between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free) for Freedom House measures and on a scale of -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic) for Polity.
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
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Appendix II: Human Development Report 2007 Data
Indicators Belarus Russian Federation Ukraine Georgia
Human development index value
2005 0.804 0.802 0.788 0.754
Life expectancy at birth, annual estimates (years)
2005a 68.7 65.0 67.7 70.7
Adult literacy rate (% aged 15 and older)
1995-2005b 99.6 e 99.4 e 99.4 e 100.0
GDP per capita (PPP US$)
2005 7,918 10,845 6,848 3,365
GDP per capita, annual growth rate (%)
1975-2005 2.2 g - 0.7 g - 3.8 g - 3.9
1990-2005 2.2 - 0.1 - 2.4 0.2
Public expenditure on health (% of GDP)
2004 4.6 3.7 3.7 1.5
Public expenditure on education (% of GDP)
1991 5.7 3.6 6.2 ..
2002-05c 6.0 3.6 h 6.4 2.9
Military expenditure (% of GDP)
1990d 1.5 i 12.3 .. ..
2005d 1.2 4.1 2.4 3.5
Gender-related development index (GDI) value
2005 0.803 0.801 0.785 ..
Notes: a. The HDI rank is determined using HDI values to the sixth decimal point. b. Data refer to national literacy estimates from censuses or surveys conducted between 1995 and 2005, unless otherwise specified. Due to differences in methodology and timeliness of underlying data, comparisons across countries and over time should be made with caution. For more details, see http://www.uis.unesco.org/. c. Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified. d. Because of limitations in the data, comparisons across countries should be made with caution. For detailed notes on the data see SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). 2007c. SIPRI Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. e. For purposes of calculating the HDI, a value of 99.0% was applied. f. UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund). 2004. State of the World’s Children 2005. New York. g. Data refer to a period shorter than that specified. h. National or UNESCO Institute for Statistics estimate. i. Data refer to the closest available year between 1991 and 1992. Source: column 1: calculated on the basis of data in columns 6-8; see Technical note 1 for details. column 2: UN (United Nations). 2007e. World Population Prospects 1950-2050: The 2006 Revision. Database. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. New York. Accessed July 2007, unless otherwise specified. column 3: UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) Institute for Statistics. 2007a. Correspondence on adult and youth literacy rates. May. Montreal, unless otherwise specified. column 4: World Bank. 2007b. World Development Indicators 2007. CD-ROM. Washington, D.C., unless otherwise specified; aggregates calculated for HDRO by the World Bank. column 5: World Bank. 2007b. World Development Indicators 2007. CD-ROM. Washington, D.C.; aggregates calculated for HDRO by the World Bank. column 6: World Bank. 2007b. World Development Indicators 2007. CD-ROM. Washington, D.C.; aggregates calculated for HDRO by the World Bank. column 7: World Bank. 2007b. World Development Indicators 2007. CD-ROM. Washington, D.C. column 8: UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) Institute for Statistics. 2007b. Correspondence on education expenditure data. April. Montreal. column 9: UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) Institute for Statistics. 2007b. Correspondence on education expenditure data. April. Montreal. column 10: SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). 2007b. Correspondence on military expenditure. March. Stockholm. column 11: SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). 2007c. SIPRI Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. column 12: calculated on the basis of data in columns 3–10; see Technical note 1 for details.
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
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Appendix III: Indicators Used in this Report26 Source Indicator(s) Benefits Drawbacks
World Bank Institute
1) Political Stability Estimate: measures perceptions that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and/or violent means. 2) Rule of Law Estimate: “the extent to which people have confidence in and abide by the rules of society” 3) Government Effectiveness Estimate: indicates the “inputs required for the government to produce and implement policies and deliver public goods”
Widely acknowledged source and indicators
Derived from multiple sources with allowance for standard errors
All countries under the scope of this report are recorded individually (i.e. separate indicators for Kosovo and Montenegro)
No consideration of civil and political rights in governance definition
Potential unreliability of conceptual concepts across individual indicators compiled in the aggregate estimates
Freedom House 1) Political Rights: measures the right to participate freely in the political process 2) Civil Liberties: measures “the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference *of+ the state” 3) Status: combining the measures of political right and civil liberties, the status of a country is rated as free, partly free, or not free.
Widely used in literature and reports as well as by other indicators
Measures civil liberties and political rights as a part of governance
Accounts for gradations of democracy, yielding more detailed analysis
Lists of rights used to has changed over time rendering comparisons unreliable
Some OSCE members may object to the rights-based concept of governance
Polity IV 1) Combined Polity Score: ranks regimes from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). 2) Polity fragmentation: The operational existence of a separate polity, or polities, comprising substantial territory and population within the recognized borders of the state and over which the coded polity exercises no effective authority (effective authority may be participatory or coercive).
Slight fragmentation indicated under 10%
of country subject to local authority,
moderate fragmentation is 10-25%, and
serious fragmentation is25-50%, state
failure results at 50%+.
Accounts for gradations in the level of democracy, allowing for more detail
Widely used in literature and reports as well as by other governance indicators
Objective and replicable
No polity score for Bosnia-Herzegovina as it is classified as a case of foreign interruption
Non-transparent assessment by experts
Excludes civil liberties
Some conceptual vagueness
Cheibub and Gandhi
1) Regime Type: a dichotomous assessment of whether a country is a democracy or a dictatorship
Highlights the acute problem areas
Quick and clear regime description
Can oversimplify the governance context and be subject to false positive or false negative results
Lacks diplomatic utility and may encounter resistance from national leaders
World Values Survey27
1) How much freedom do you feel?: measures the percentage of people who believe they are free in the country. 2) Belief that democracy is advancing: measures “the degree to which citizens feel their country is becoming more democratic”
Portrays a view from the citizens’ perspectives
Widely used data source seen as legitimate
Useful to measure program implementation and progress of certain agendas
Potential for response bias if citizens are afraid to speak negatively of their government
Respondents have different definitions of concepts
Time series data is limited.
Data missing for some countries in this report
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
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Coppedge et al. 28
1) Inclusiveness: measures “the
variation in the proportion of the
population entitled to participate
on a more or less equal plane in
controlling and contesting the
conduct of the government. “
Measured on a scale from -2 (not
inclusive) to +2 (inclusive).
2) Contestation: measures the
ability of citizens to contest the
decisions made by their
government.
Uses existing accepted indicators (Polity and Freedom House)
Times series and wide coverage of countries
Measures equality in participation and rights
Accounts for political party trends and elections results
Subject to the expert bias of indicators used (Polity and Freedom House)
Subject to the conceptual non-equivalence of indicators used
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
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Appendix IV: Decentralization in Europe, UNDP Measures Methodology for the ranking of countries according to their level of decentralization
29
Scores from 01 to 04
Political Decentralization
Indicator: Existence of elected sub-national tiers
NO sub-national tiers with elected sub-national assemblies and executives 1
ALL or SOME sub-national tiers with elected assemblies but ALL with executives
Appointed by central government 2
SOME BUT NOT ALL sub-national tiers with elected assemblies and executives 3
ALL sub-national tiers with elected assemblies and executives 4
Administrative Decentralization
Indicator 1: Assignment of expenditure responsibilities between the central and the local governments in the law and actual
implementation of the law
No specification of different responsibilities 1
Legal framework exists but it is not clear 2
Clear legal framework exists but it is not implemented 3
Clear legal framework exists and it is implemented 4
Indicator 2: Actual primary responsibility for public service delivery
Centre 1
Significant deconcentration 2
Some devolution 3
Substantial devolution 4
The index of administrative decentralization consists of the mean of indicators 1 and 2
Fiscal Decentralization
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
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Indicator 1: Arrangements for fiscal transfers from the central to the local governments
None 1
Ad hoc 2
Formula in theory but not implemented or formula with arbitrary element built-in 3
Transparent formula implemented 4
Indicator 2: Local Expenditure as a percentage of Total Public Expenditure
< 15% 1
16 to 25% 2
26 to 35% 3
> 36% 4
The index of fiscal decentralization consists of the mean of indicators 1 and 2
Overall Decentralization: The average of all the indicators used above.
Overall decentralization ranking per sub-region30
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
4.50
Cze
ch R
epub
lic
Slova
k R
epub
lic
Slove
nia
Latv
ia
Poland
Rom
ania
Bulgar
ia
Eston
ia
Hun
gary
Lith
uani
a
Alban
ia
Cro
atia
FYR M
acedo
nia
Mon
teneg
ro
Serbia
UN
Adm
in. P
rov.
Koso
vo
Bosnia
& H
erze
govin
a
Turke
y
Geor
gia
Armen
ia
Rus
sian
Fed
erat
ion
Mol
dova
Ukr
aine
Azerb
aija
n
Belaru
s
Kazakh
stan
Kyrgy
stan
Tajik
ista
n
Uzb
ekista
n
Turkm
enist
an
Central & Eastern Europe Western Balkans & Turkey Western CIS & Caucasus Central Asia
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
25
Ranking of countries according to their level of political, administrative and fiscal
decentralization
Graph 1 - Extend of Political Decentralization per Sub-Region
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Bulgar
ia
Cze
ch R
epub
lic
Eston
ia
Hun
gary
Latv
ia
Lith
uania
Slova
k Rep
ublic
Slove
nia
Poland
Rom
ania
Alban
ia
Bosnia &
Her
zegov
ina
Cro
atia
FYR M
acedo
nia
Mon
teneg
ro
Serbia
Turke
y
UN A
dmin. P
rov.
Koso
vo
Armen
ia
Azerb
aijan
Belaru
s
Geor
gia
Moldo
va
Rus
sian
Fed
erat
ion
Ukr
aine
Kazakh
stan
Kyrgy
zsta
n
Tajik
istan
Turkm
enist
an
Uzb
ekista
n
Inde
x S
cor
e
Central & Eastern Europe Western Balkans & Turkey Western CIS & Caucasus Central Asia
Graph 2 - Extend of Administrative Decentralization per Sub-Region
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Bulg
aria
Czec
h Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Slovak
Republic
Slovenia
Pola
nd
Rom
ania
Albania
Bosn
ia &
Herz
egovina
Cro
atia
FYR M
acedonia
Monte
negro
Serb
ia
Turkey
UN A
dmin
. Pro
v. K
osovo
Arm
enia
Aze
rbaija
n
Bela
rus
Georg
ia
Mold
ova
Russ
ian F
edera
tion
Ukra
ine
Kaza
khsta
n
Kyr
gyzs
tan
Tajikista
n
Turkm
enista
n
Uzbe
kista
n
Ind
ex
Sc
ore
Central & Eastern Europe Western Balkans & Turkey Western CIS & Caucasus Central Asia
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
26
Graph 3 - Extent of Fiscal Decentralization per Sub-Region
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Bulgar
ia
Cze
ch R
epub
lic
Eston
ia
Hun
gary
Latv
ia
Lith
uani
a
Slova
k R
epub
lic
Slove
nia
Poland
Rom
ania
Alban
ia
Bosnia
& H
erze
govin
a
Cro
atia
FYR M
acedo
nia
Mon
teneg
ro
Serbia
Turke
y
UN
Adm
in. P
rov.
Koso
vo
Armen
ia
Azerb
aija
n
Belaru
s
Geor
gia
Mol
dova
Rus
sian
Fed
erat
ion
Ukr
aine
Kazakh
stan
Kyrgy
zsta
n
Tajik
ista
n
Turkm
enist
an
Uzb
ekista
n
Inde
x S
cor
e
Central & Eastern Europe Western Balkans & Turkey Western CIS & Caucasus Central Asia
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
27
Appendix V: Regional Partners and their Existing Projects USAID World Bank OSCE Other Aid Agencies
Belarus Eurasia Foundation Program (increasing civil society participation)
Focus on program budgeting in Belarus
Encourages third party engagement and monitoring of World Bank projects in Belarus
Civil Society Fund
Fostering dialogue between the government and civil society
Capacity-building for government workers
Public discussions on freedom of information and the use of the internet
Gender equality
EU (has offered re-engagement plan to the government)
OSI
Georgia Elections assistance Increasing governance
efficiency through technology
Communities Empowered for Local Empowerment Project
Parliament and political party strengthening
Civil society dialogue Justice sector
reorganization
Public sector financial management reform
Support to electoral commission and civil society watchdog groups
Parliamentary reform for more competitive government
Training for journalists Civil registry reform Making legislation process
more transparent
EU IMF DFID (funding only) SIDA Netherlands Ministry
for Development Cooperation
Romania Poland OSI
Russia Local governance and public service delivery projects
Community development for a stronger civil society
Elections monitoring Politician training Media training Increasing political
participation Monitoring corruption in
elections
Judicial reform Customs development Treasury development Improving central and
local government fiscal relations
None Transparency International (joint World Bank program)
DFID (funding only) OSI
Ukraine Capacity-building for civil society and the media
Creating a more effective and more transparent parliamentary process
Supporting political competitiveness through capacity building and monitoring
Monitoring and capacity building for courts and
Administrative and civil service reforms
Evidence based program management
More transparent budgeting procedures
More efficient service delivery
Promoting gender equality Increasing public
participation in decision-making
Support media legislation Strengthening the electoral
process Micro-grants and capacity
building for civil society organizations
Using E-government to combat corruption
EU SIDA DFID (funding only) Denmark Netherlands Germany Slovak Republic Poland Japan Switzerland OSI
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
28
Appendix VI: General Indicators Indicators of good governance, by world region, 2006
Voice and accountability
2006
Political stability
2006
Government regulatory quality
2006
Rule of law
2006
Corruption 2006
N. of states
Industrialized 1.35 0.88 1.39 1.46 1.62 30
C & E Europe -0.10 -0.11 -0.01 -0.33 -0.31 26
Latin America & Caribbean 0.26 -0.01 0.04 -0.20 -0.04 33
East Asia -0.76 0.15 -0.58 -0.32 -0.61 4
SE Asia & Pacific -0.07 0.40 -0.27 0.09 -0.30 23
South Asia -0.69 -0.88 -0.28 -0.19 -0.44 7
Africa -0.59 -0.51 -0.75 -0.74 -0.65 49
Arab states -0.97 -0.61 -0.26 -0.16 -0.11 18
World -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 190
Note: The indicators range from -2.0 (negative ratings) to +2.0 (positive ratings).
Source: Kaufmann-Kray World Bank Institute Indicators of Good Governance, 2006.www.worldbank.org. Originally
created by Pippa Norris.
Appendix VII: Policy Options Case Studies
Political Decentralization Case Study: Macedonia31
UNDP identified Macedonia’s decentralization agenda as the most active and promising regional
example of political decentralization. Macedonia is one of only two countries in the Balkan region that
has created a multiyear, strategic plan for decentralization. Still, like other Balkan states, Macedonia
pursues its decentralization strategy in a highly fragmented and ethnically-charged context. Yet, instead
of being paralyzed by ethnic divisions that co-opt decentralization, as in near neighbor Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the country has used political decentralization to diffuse ethnic tensions.
Avoiding civil war at the time of the break-up of Yugoslavia, Macedonia adopted a new constitution in
1991 with a unitary system governed by a parliamentary democracy with executive, legislative, and
judicial branches. The constitution recognized the right to local self-governance but the government
proceeded to centralize powers in the early 1990s. The constitution created a central government level
and a local government level with 84 municipalities and the capital territory of Skopje. In the later
1990s decentralization programs began with new laws on local self-governance passed in 1995 and
1996, the European Charter on Local Self-Government ratified in 1997, and the decentralization
program articulated in the Government Program and the Government Strategy for Reforming Public
Administration in 1999.
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
29
In early 2001, ethnic tensions erupted between the Albanian minority and Macedonia majority over
political power and minority rights during which several people were killed and thousands of people
were displaced. The Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) ending the violence also included details of
further political decentralization, public service decentralization, and central-local relationships. While
devolving significant political and public service powers to the local level, the Ohrid Framework
Agreement specifically rejected an ethnically based territorial solution to local governance. Thus, the
agreement emphasizes the unitary nature of the state of Macedonia while ensuring that all citizens and
especially minorities have greater voice in the local functioning of government and public services. The
OFA also outlined new decision-making procedures including require dual majority of votes for passing
laws of special interest for ethnic communities.
While much remains to be done in Macedonia in synchronizing the three spheres of decentralization
and promoting political stability, the political decentralization under the OFA and other arrangements
has prevented wide-scale violence or governmental collapse experienced by other nations in the
Balkans.
Fiscal and Administrative Decentralization Case Study: Croatia32
Since the early 1990s, Croatia’s decentralization progress has been largely political and ad hoc, leading
to fragmentation and inefficiency in local governance structures. However, according to UNDP, Croatia
has a high potential for successful decentralization given its relatively high per capita income and large
public sector. Recent improvements indicate that Croatia may soon become a regional model for
decentralization incorporating all three spheres of political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization.
Before the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the Croatian state had 118 local governments with a significant
amount of autonomy. After independence in the early 1990s, while Croatia initially embarked upon
state centralization the local governance structure split 118 areas into 426 municipalities, putting a high
strain on local financial, administrative, and human resources. Despite calls by some for local
consolidation of municipalities, the central government claims strong political opposition to redrawing
local government territories—a similar problem albeit on a smaller scale to the proposed redrawing of
politically decentralized entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Croatia currently has three levels of governance: the central state, 20 counties (also called districts), and
426 municipalities. A 2000 constitutional amendment deconcentrated regional authorities and defined
the responsibilities of municipal governments as environmental and urban planning, pre-school
education, culture, sports, primary health care, fire-fighting, and social welfare. The Local Government
Act of 2002 further defined county responsibilities as regional policy coordinators between
municipalities and providers of services in the realms of elementary and secondary education, health
care, social welfare, economic development, zoning and urban planning, transportation and
infrastructure. In 2004 a Decentralization Commission was established to strengthen the legislative
framework for decentralization by amending the Law of Local Self-Government, the Law on Local
Elections and the Law on Territorial Structure.
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
30
Although the focus in Croatia has been political decentralization, these recent legislative and
administrative changes have devolved a significant amount of responsibility of service delivery and
increased fiscal responsibility for these functions. The Law on Financing Local and Regional Self-
Governing Units and other legal documents create a public revenue assignment system based on non-
shared state taxes (such as customs duties, excise and VAT taxes), shared state taxes (revenues split
between the central and local government, including the personal income tax and the corporate income
tax), and local own source taxes and fees (including inheritance/gift taxes, motor vehicle licenses,
consumption tax, and trade permits). The Croatian government also uses intergovernmental transfers
to offset unequal regional development and revenue generation, although criticisms have been made
about the lack of local accountability and central oversight of this transfer system. Local borrowing is
also permitted under the regulation and limitations of the Budget Law.
Although there are still many flaws and inefficiencies in Croatia’s administrative and fiscal
decentralization programs largely due to its ad hoc nature, local governments are unique in the region in
that they are permitted real administrative responsibilities and fiscal opportunities to support local
governance. As UNDP urges, the next priority is not pursuing more decentralization but to “rationalize
the structure that has emerged.”33
Case Study of Civil Service and Anti-Corruption Tools: Ukraine Social Audits34
Despite a relatively strong civil society presence in Ukraine, there are still some gaps between the
citizens and the government. To improve citizen voice and to increase government responsiveness
UNDP supported along with other organizations a social audit process that yielded government reports
cards in Ukraine. The program sought to close these lapses in communication, increase public
confidence in state institutions, increase public consultation in state decision-making, and to provide a
form of capacity building for local civil society organizations to conduct similar audits in the future.
The audit took the form of surveys distributed in various Ukrainian cities and was monitored by local
civil society and a council representing a wide cross-section of Ukrainian society, including women,
youth, and minorities. Prior to conducting the audit, organization received training in survey
administration and design and policy formation based on results found. The survey questioned the local
population and businesses about their satisfaction and experiences with public services, including
questions on corruption.
After the survey data was collected and compiled into a report card form, civil society organizations
organized media campaigns to publicize the findings and promote local and national dialogue. This
dialogue continued at a more formal level in a series of town level community meetings and in advisory
councils made up of government and NGO leaders.
The results of the program are successful in all pilot communities. The social audits have increased the
interaction and cooperation between NGOs and local government and provided citizens with a platform
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
31
to voice concerns and suggestions for improvement. In one pilot community the audits resulted in the
creation of citizen task forces and the creation of service centers where citizens can pay for all municipal
services in one place. Overall, the program has increased governmental transparency and promoted
cooperative relations between civil society and the Ukrainian government.
Case Study on Anti-corruption and Public Administration Reform:
Georgia’s Post-Revolution Reforms35
Georgia has been heralded by many as a model of success in the region, moving from weak democratic
governance to a regionally higher performer in the areas of governmental effectiveness, voice and
accountability, and rule of law. Most significant is Georgia’s success in the anti-corruption, having
realized significant improvements according to World Bank and Transparency International indicators
since 2003.
Successful anti-corruption programming is often attributed to the Saakashvili administration which has
tackled corruption on many fronts. In particular, success has been linked to internal changes in the
government’s structure. One of the first moves to combat corruption was public administration reform
and the downsizing of the government workforce by up to 50% in some agencies and bureaus, including
the “power ministries” like the Interior Ministry, State Security Ministry, and the Ministry of Defense.
The downsizing sought to reduce nepotism and allow for higher salaries to attract qualified candidates
for government positions, especially in the police force, judiciary, and customs. State representatives
also received a salary increase of up to ten times and increased pensions to prevent bribe-taking.
Salaries are regularly paid on time and in full. The salary increase was supported by a fund created by
UNDP and the Open Society Institute.
Another part of Georgia’s anti-corruption strategy including the reducing of tax burdens and of state
bureaucratic procedures. Bureaucratic processes specifically targeted the licensing system for
businesses, cutting the number of activities requiring a license from 909 to 105. Caucaz Net reports that
as a result of this policy there has been an increase in tax collection causing state revenues to more than
double.
At the central level, Georgia articulated its plans in a 2005 National Anti-Corruption Strategy. In addition
to supporting structural changes and procedural reform, the plan sought to promote meritocracy in
government hiring and patronage. In January 2009, the government established a new anti-corruption
council. This council, led by the current Minister of Justic, is tasked with updating the 2005 action plan.
Public Administration Case Study: E-Government in Estonia36
Upon independence in 1992, the Estonian government began plans to open government actions up to
the public through technology. In 2000, the Estonian government began broadcasting cabinet and other
meetings on the internet. In addition, cabinet members can attend meetings by telecommuting,
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
32
allowing them to attend more meetings while they travel to various parts of the country. In addition to
real time transparency of government decision-making, cabinet decisions are also posted to the internet
site within 30 seconds. The Estonian government also has created various online forums for citizens to
comment on and suggest ideas to the government, including the portal call “Today, I Decide.”
The benefits of e-government have been remarkable in Estonia. Since independence, the government
administrations have included reached out to the younger generation and more young policymakers are
involved in government, bringing with them new forms of government innovation. Citizens also appear
to be satisfied with increased government transparency and accountability that e-government has
created in the formerly closed system. The government also reports higher efficiency since the
institution of e-government—reporting that cabinet meetings that once ran ten hours now regularly
take 45 minutes. The government also reports that proposals from the citizens on government websites
have led in several cases to legislative changes. Estonia was also ranked by a Harvard University study as
the 5th most developed e-government in the world.
The e-governance model is one that can also be transplanted in other parts of Eastern Europe. Estonia
has started an e-government academy in conjunction with UNDP and the Soros Foundation to teach
other countries how to develop similar systems and tailor them to their countries’ needs. However,
some hindrances to the system exist including the national access to internet and citizens’ computer
skills. To increase the effectiveness of e-government in other Eastern European countries, UNDP must
partner with regional NGOs to promote citizen capacity building and to increase internet access.
USAID’s ProMedia Project in Eastern Europe37
One regional partner in UNDP’s media strengthening projects could be USAID’s Pro Media Program. The
program provides funding a support for capacity-building and micro grants to media organizations to
promote greater public information access and higher standards of reporting and journalism. Their
capacity building programs include workshops and journalist exchanges within participating countries.
The program also targets journalists reporting on political corruption with special grants. The program
also intends to develop an online capacity-building site with case studies, training courses, key contacts
and reference sources, news and links to other sources of information on independent media and
support.
Pro Media has supported media programs in the past in the past in Ukraine and Georgia as well as the
former Yugoslavian countries, Bulgaria and other Eastern European countries. ProMedia is currently
working in Belarus to support the creation of independent media outlets. Successes in the region
include Bulgaria where ProMedia assisted the government in creating legislative protections for
journalists, supporting right to public information acts, assisted in creating professional media
associations, and provided training to journalists to cover legal and democratic governance stories. As a
result Bulgaria developed a media training center which produces and airs a regular anti-corruption
television show.
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
33
VIII. Endnotes
Published Sources
Alberti Adriana and Fatma Sayed. “Challenges and Priorities in Reforming Governance and Public Administration
in the Middle East, Northern Africa, and Western Balkans.” DPADM Discussion Paper. United Nations,
2007.
Batt, Judy. 2003. “Introduction: Defining Central and Eastern Europe.” Developments in Central and Eastern
European Politics. Eds. Stephen White, Judy Batt, and Paul G. Lewis. Durham: Duke University Press.
Collier, David and Robert Adcock. 1999. “Democracy and dichotomies: A pragmatic approach to choices about
concepts.’’ Annual Review of Political Science 1: 537-565.
De Vries, Michiel. “The Rise and Fall of Decentralization: A Comparative Analysis of Arguments and Practices in
European Countries.” European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 38 (2000): pp. 193-224.
Devas, Nick and Simon Delay. “Local Democracy and the Challenges of the Decentralising State: An International
Perspective.” Local Government Studies, Vol. 32, No. 5 (Nov. 2006): pp. 677-695.
Elkins, Zachary. 2000. “Gradations of Democracy? Empirical tests of alternative conceptualizations.” American
Journal of Political Science 44 (2): 293-300.
International Crisis Group. “Georgia: Sliding Towards Authoritarianism?” Europe Report N. 189. 19 December
2007. Online at www.crisisgroup.org.
Ibid. “Russia and Georgia: The Fallout.” Europe Report N. 195. 22 August 2008. Online at www.crisisgroup.org.
Krishna, Anirudh. “How Does Social Capital Grow?: A Seven Year Study of Villages in India.” Journal of Politics Vol.
69 No. 4 (November 2007): pp. 941-956.
Nodia, Ghia. “Nations in Transit: Georgia.” Freedom House 2008. Online at www.freedomhouse.org.
Norris, Pippa. 2008. ‘The Globalization of Comparative Public Opinion Research.’ For the Sage Handbook of
Comparative Politics Eds. Neil Robinson and Todd Landman. London: Sage Publications. Available at
www.pippanorris.com.
Ibid. Driving Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
OSCE. Online country pages for Belarus, Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine. Online atwww.osce.org.
Ibid. “Chapter Seven: Federalism and Decentralization.” Driving Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2008.
Orttung, Robert W. “Nations in Transit: Russia.” Freedom House 2008. Online at www.freedomhouse.org.
Rodden, Jonathan. “Comparative Federalism and Decentralization: On Meaning and Measurement.” Comparative
Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Jul. 2004): pp. 481-500.
Silitski, Vitali. “Nations in Transit: Belarus.” Freedom House 2006. Online at www.freedomhouse.org.
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
34
Shushko, Oleksandr. “Nations in Transit: Ukraine.” Freedom House 2008. Online at www.freedomhouse.org.
Teorell, Jan, Soren Holmberg & Bo Rothstein. 2008. The Quality of Governance Dataset Codebook, version
15May08. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, www.qog.pol.gu.se.
Treisman, Daniel. The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007.
Ibid. 2007. ‘What have we learned about the causes of corruption from ten years of cross-national empirical
research?’ Annual Review Of Political Science 10: 211-244 2007.
Tusalem, Rollin F. “A Boon or Bane?: The Role of Civil Society in Third- and Fourth-Wave Democracies.”
International Political Science Review (2007) Vol. 28 No. 3: pp.361-386.
UNDP. 2008. “Strengthening Democratic Institutions in Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent
States.” Annual Report of UNDP’s Regional Democratic Governance Practice. www. undp.org.
Ibid. 2008. “Decentralization in Europe and the CIS.” Discussion Paper on Democratic Governance Practice.
Bratislava, 2008. Online at http://europeandcis.undp.org/governance/.
Ibid. Human Development Report. New York: United Nations Development Programme. 2007.
Ibid. “Fiscal Decentralization in Transition Economies: Case Studies from the Balkans and Causasus.” Bratislava.
Online at www.undp.org/europeandcis. 2005.
Ibid. “Country Programme Document for Belarus (2006-2010). Online at www.undp.org.
Ibid. “Draft Country Programme Document Between the Republic of Georgia and the UNDP (2006-2010). Online at
www.undp.org.
Ibid. “Country Programme Outline for the Russian Federation (2004-2007). Online at www.undp.org.
Ibid. “Country Programme for the Russian Federation (2008-2010). Online at www.undp.org.
Ibid. “Country Programme Action Plan (2006-2010) Between the Government of Ukraine and the UNDP. Online at
www.undp.org.
USAID. “Indicators of Decentralization from USAID’s Decentralization and Democratic Local Governance
Handbook.” Online at www.usaid.gov.
Ibid. Country pages for Belarus, Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine. Online at www.usaid.gov.
World Bank Country pages for Belarus, Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine. Online at www.worldbank.org.
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
35
Data Sources International IDEA. Voting Turnout since 1945. www.IDEA.int
Kaufmann, Daniel and Art Kraay. World Bank Institute. Good Governance. www.worldbank.org
Quality of Governance (QoG) dataset. 2008. www.qog.pol.gu.se
UNDP. 2007 Development Report online indicators. www.undp.org
World Values Survey, 1981-2005. http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/
1 Recent developments taken from the Freedom House reports of 2008 for all four countries and the UNDP
situation assessments from the most recent UNDP country program papers. See the published sources for more
information.
2 See the Freedom House reports of 2008 for all four countries and the UNDP situation assessments from the most
recent UNDP country program papers. See the published sources for more information.
3 See the Freedom House reports of 2008 for all four countries and the UNDP situation assessments from the most
recent UNDP country program papers. See the published sources for more information.
4 In the most recent Russian elections, the OSCE even refused to monitor due to high restrictions and obstruction
by the Russian government.
5 A red flag for Russian human rights is a recent, large increase in the number of Russian claimants at the European
Court of Human Rights.
6 For more on Georgia’s unique position and the events of 2007 and 2008, see International Crisis Group’s two
reports on Georgia listed in the references.
7 See the Freedom House reports of 2008 for all four countries and the UNDP situation assessments from the most
recent UNDP country program papers. See the published sources for more information.
8 See the Freedom House reports of 2008 for all four countries and the UNDP situation assessments from the most
recent UNDP country program papers. See the published sources for more information.
9 For more on the benefits of decentralization and civil society see Norris (2008), Alberti, and Tusalem.
10 See literature on decentralization by Alberti and Norris for more on the link between government effectiveness
and local governance/decentralization.
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
36
11 UNDP. “Decentralization in Europe and the CIS.” Discussion Paper on Democratic Governance Practice.
Bratislava, 2008. Online at http://europeandcis.undp.org/governance/. “In order to obtain an overview of the
status of decentralization in the Europe and CIS region a methodology was devised to rank countries according to
their level of decentralization on the basis of five indicators: one for political decentralization, two for
administrative decentralization and two for financial decentralization. For each indicator countries scored 1 to 4
points (1 for the lowest level of decentralization and 4 for the highest). A composite index consisting of the
average of the scores for the five indicators mentioned above was created to rank countries according to their
overall level of decentralization.” (p.10)
12 For more on the effects of corruption, see Norris, STM 103 class presentation on corruption and Treisman
(2007). See Freedom House and UNDP’s country reports and programs for more details in each country.
13 Freedom House, Russia report, 2008.
14 Essentially, ranking were determined by looking at low scores in the World Bank aggregate indicators and
qualitative contextual evidence from the Freedom House and UNDP country reports. Given the gravity of human
rights abuses, these were marked as a top challenge in the countries where basic rights were not protected de jure
and/or de facto, such as Belarus. Further prioritization was determined given the recurring mentions of key
problems in the literature on each country.
15 For more on public administration reform programs see the April 6th
, 2009 Presentation Notes for STM 103 at
www.pippanorris.com.
16 See Appendix VII for more information on Ukrainian social audits.
17 See Appendix VII for case a case study of egovernance.
18 For more on corruption and anti-corruption programs see Treisman (2003) and the April 6
th 2009 Presentation
Notes for STM 103 at www.pippanorris.com.
19 See Appendix VII for more on Georgia’s anti-corruption program.
20 Programs found on UNDP’s website, individual country pages. For more information on these programs see
www.undp.org.
21 For more on the benefits and drawbacks of decentralization see De Vries, Norris, and Alberti.
22 For example, in Ukraine 99% of civil society organizations noted some form of interaction with central of local
government entities according to the latest Freedom House country report (2008).
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
37
23 The Law on Extremism was passed to create criminal punishment for slander of public officials. From Freedom
House’s Russia report (2008).
24 See Appendix VII for case studies on regional successes mentioned. Description of media protection in Georgia
and Ukraine is included in the body of this report.
25 Information on these existing programs found on the World Bank’s, OSCE’s, and OSI country pages. See
Appendix V for more details and more actors in the region.
26 Originally compiled for Cintora, Report to the OSCE on Democratic Governance in the Balkans, March 2009.
27 For more on public opinion surveys, see Norris, Pippa (2008).
28 Coppedge et al. 2008. “Two Persistent Dimensions of Democracy: Contestation and Inclusiveness.” Journal of Politics. Online
at
http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:Du5z5cy_eBQJ:sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/files/cFgGoU/Dimensions%2520of%2520Demo
cracy%2520COPPEDGE.pdf+Coppedge,+Alvarez+%26+Maldonado+inclusiveness&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=9&gl=us&client=firefox-a.
Original definition from Dahl (1971).
29 Methodology taken directly from UNDP. “Decentralization in Europe and the CIS.” Discussion Paper on Democratic
Governance Practice. Bratislava, 2008. Online at http://europeandcis.undp.org/governance/. (Appendix 1)
30 UNDP. “Decentralization in Europe and the CIS.” Discussion Paper on Democratic Governance Practice. Bratislava, 2008.
Online at http://europeandcis.undp.org/governance/. (p. 15).
31 Case study from Cintora’s policy options report to the OSCE on decentralization, 2009. Macedonia case study
information from UNDP, “Fiscal Decentralization in Transition Economies” and Bieber’s “Institutionalizing Ethnicity
in the Balkans,” and for more on OFA see Crisis Group’s piece on Macedonia and
www.fes.org.mk/pdf/SVETOMIR%2520SKARIC%2520-
%2520OHRID%2520AGREEMENT%2520AND%2520MINORITY%2520COMMUNITIES.pdf+ohrid+agreement&cd=4&
hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.
32 Case study from Cintora’s policy options report to the OSCE on decentralization, 2009. For more on this case
study and decentralization in Croatia see UNDP (Bratislava, 2005).
33 UNDP (2005), 83.
34 For more on Ukraine’s social audits and report cards system, see UNDP’s report at
www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs08/sofia/Case%20Study%201-
%20Citizens%20Report%20Cards%20Ukraine%20FINAL.pdf.
Democratic Governance in Eastern Europe 29 April 2009
38
35 For more on Georgia’s anti-corruption programs, see Transparency International’s country page for Georgia at
www.transparency.ge, the Carnegie Endowment at www.carnegieendowment.org and Caucaz Europe News article
at http://www.caucaz.com/home_eng/breve_contenu.php?id=191.
36 For more on E-government in Estonia see BBC news article
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/3690661.stm.
37 For more on the ProMedia Project see USAID’s description at http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/bj2001/ee/cee/. For
more on Pro-Media;s success in Bulgaria see http://bulgaria.usaid.gov/media-program/page.html.