Democracy and the Legal Regulation of Political Parties

8/13/2019 Democracy and the Legal Regulation of Political Parties

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1 Prepared for USAID's conference on "Change in Political Parties," Washington, D.C.,

1 October 2004. This intended to serve as what Jack Walker called a smirking paper. As

such, it is intended to provoke discussion. I reserve the right to abandon, or even attack, any of

the views expressed here.

2For example, see Goodwin-Gill (1994).

Democracy and the Legal Regulation of Political Parties1

Richard S. Katz

The Johns Hopkins University

Those who are concerned with the institutionalization, stability, or improvement of

democracy often look first to legal reforms. It is easy to see why this should be so. On one

hand, if democracy is defined in institutional terms2, then the most obvious way to improve

democracy is to improve institutions. On the other hand, if political practice results from the

pursuit of individual and group objectives in circumstances structured by culture and institutions,

then it appears obvious that of this triad of objectives, culture, and institutions, the last is most

easily changed, at least in the short run. Attempts to improve democracy through institutional

reform have been most pronounced, and pronounced for the longest time, in the realm of

electoral systems - in part because these are necessarily created by legislation - but more recently

political parties have also been the object of efforts to improve or assure the quality ofdemocracy through legislative reform.

Political scientists and political practitioners alike generally accept E. E. Schattschneiders

(1942: 1) dictum that political parties created democracy and that modern democracy is

unthinkable save in terms of the parties....The parties are not therefore merely appendages of

modern government; they are in the center of it and play a determinative and creative role in it.

That being so, it is understandable that parties would be an object of interest for democratic

reformers. Make the parties more democratic, and you make the system more democratic. This

claim, however, is more problematic than it may appear at first blush, for three inter-related

reasons. First, it is not clear what a more democratic party is. While it may appear reasonably

easy to identify a non-democratic or anti-democratic party (the Communist Party of the Soviet

Union or the Parti Dmocratique de Guine, for example), as Macpherson (1965) has shown,even such avowedly anti-liberal-democracy parties may have an historically valid claim to the

epithet democratic. Moreover, once one enters the category of parties that do not overtly reject

the principle of inter-party competition, the problem of identifying those characteristics that make

some parties more democratic than others has no obvious solution. Part of the reason is the

difficulty of predicting the actual consequences of institutional reforms. Another part, and the

second reason why it is problematic to claim that making the parties more democratic will make

the system more democratic, is that the meaning of democracy itself is contested. At the very

least, this point is illustrated by the radically different institutions - including the radically

different party systems - that define Lijpharts (1984; 1999) models of majoritarian and consensus

democracy. And once one recognizes that both of these models fit squarely within the relatively


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3This notwithstanding Rousseaus famous claim that men might have to be forced to be

free.

narrow confines of what Bachrach (1967) called the elitist theory of democracy or what Barber

(1984) called the thin theory of democracy, the range of meanings of democracy and the range

of conditions that might identify a political system as more or less democratic expand

enormously. The third problem with claim that making the parties more democratic will make thesystem more democratic is that it is not clear to what extent it is consistent with democratic values

to make parties be anything in particular. As with support of capital punishment on the grounds

that killing is the ultimate wrong, there is something potentially oxymoronic - particularly within

the liberal tradition - about forcing parties to be democratic.3

In this paper, my objective is not to solve these problems, because they are fundamentally

insoluble, but rather to make more explicit the normative choices that are implicit in reforms of

political parties. My focus will be specifically on legal regulation of political parties through

party laws, but the analysis is relevant mutatis mutandisboth to the legislative regulation of

other aspects of the political process (e.g., to electoral systems) and to reforms of parties that are

not imposed by legislation.

Purposes of Party Laws

What have come to be identified as party laws (in contrast to party statutes, which

generally are sets of rules generated by each party for its own internal governance) have been

enacted for three basic purposes. One has been to resolve the question of who is entitled to be

recognized as a political party. This has several aspects. The first has to do with ballot access.

Assuming that the use of a partys label is valuable to a candidate and informative for the voters,

who is entitled to use of the label, and how are conflicts over the label to be resolved? If

established parties are to be given privileged access to the ballot, how does a group become an

established party, and what must it do to retain that status? A second aspect has to do with the

allocation of public resources such as financial subventions or access to publicly owned massmedia. If it is accepted that, in the words of the German Basic Law for example, Political parties

shall participate in the formation of the political will of the people (Art. 21, sect. 1), then parties

might be deemed to be entitled to public support in discharging this public function. But given

that all sorts of other organizations also might be seen to contribute to the formation of the

political will of the people, who qualifies for this public support? A third aspect concerns the

role of parties within the government itself. If, as is generally the case, parliamentary committee

assignments, rapporteurships, etc., are allocated among parties, who is entitled to share in these

allocations? While it is not, in fact, clear that parties must or should be officially recognized and

distinguished from other kinds of organizations, and while there is room for dispute as to what the

rules concerning the recognition of parties should be if they are to be officially recognized, it is

clear that so long as the provision and interpretation of ballots is regarded as a public function, orpublic moneys are being spent, or public offices are being allocated, legislation is the appropriate

means for making or changing these decisions.

A second purpose of party laws is to regulate the forms of activity in which political


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parties may engage. In the absence of special party laws, political parties generally have been

regulated in the same way as other organizations. In this respect, party laws may either impose

greater restrictions on parties, most often with regard to the raising or spending of money but not

necessarily limited to such financial activities, or they may confer special privileges on parties,such as free(r) (either in financial terms or in terms of being less subject to outside editorial

control) access to media. Clearly, parties need to have some form of legal personality if they are

to make contracts (e.g., for advertising or office space). Equally, some forms of behavior, such as

bribery or assault, do not become acceptable simply because they are done in the name or interest

of a political party. Some forms of behavior such as incitement to riot or sedition may, indeed, be

thought to be more likely or more damaging if committed by a party or its agents. The questions

are whether parties should be regulated differently from other organizations, and how regulations

of this type, whether specifically applied to parties or of more general application, can be

reconciled with such basic freedoms as freedom of speech and freedom of assembly that are

thought to be essential to the maintenance of democratic competition and governance.

The third, and most problematic, purpose of party laws has been to regulate the forms ofinternal organization and political behavior that are acceptable for political parties. Examples

would include requirements that party executives be elected by a party congress or directly by the

partys members, that party nominations be balanced between men and women or with regard

to some other characteristic, or that parties refrain from campaign messages that would be

offensive to religious or other minorities (or majorities). The problem, of course, is that if

democracy is about the political resolution of contentious issues - including, for example,

questions of gender equality or the acceptability of religious or cultural practices or the reaction

of ones country to foreign events that are loaded in religious or ethnic terms (such as the

conflict in the Middle East) - then far from contributing to popular democratic decision,

regulations of this type may be seen as imposing one particular solution and muzzling its

opponents. Moreover, as will be suggested below, it is far from clear that democracy at the levelof the political system is furthered by the imposition of democratic processes within individual

parties.

What is Democracy?

Before one can assess the democratic character of a political system or of political parties,

or assess the democratic appropriateness of actions to reform the parties, one must first

understand the nature of democracy. While there is a tendency to define democracy in the same

way Potter Stewart defined pornography (I know it when I see it), this is fundamentally

inadequate. Instead, five inter-related big questions must be addressed.

The first big question concerns the scope of democracy. The I know it when I see itdefinition generally equates democracy with the choice of government through competitive

elections in the sense that it sees competitive elections as both the necessary andsufficient

condition for democracy. In Joseph Schumpeters words (1950: 269), for example, democracy

is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire

the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the peoples vote. A [political]

party is a group whose members propose to act in concert in the competitive struggle for political

power. (283) In this view, a democracy is no more nor less than a political system in which


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4As this indicates, I would suggest that the election of a parliament that will determine

which parties enter into government is fundamentally different in kind from the election of a

parliament from which it is preordained that a grand coalition government must emerge, even if

that government formally will be responsible to the parliament. This is not to say that such pre-

negotiated coalition governments are not desirable, or even necessary, in some circumstances,

only that they, and the elections that produce them, are different.

political leaders are chosen in reasonably free competition among political parties.

In contrast to this, there is a tradition (that is fundamentally truer to the original Greek

idea of democracy) that identifies politics, and thus democracy as a form of politics, with (in

Abbie Hoffmans words) the way you live your life. In this view, one would not talk about ademocratic government, but rather about a democratic society, because to restrict attention to the

method through which political decision makers are chosen is totally to strip democracy of its

core meaning. Indeed, at the extremes, democratic theorists of this persuasion often are hostile,

or at best deeply skeptical, about political parties and elections, both of which they identify with

the elitist, thin, version of democracy, as no more than popular choice between competing elites.

In more moderate form, with political parties accepted as institutions through which the values of

societal democracy might be advanced, even if never completely achieved, however, the contrast

between these two views has profound implications for the proper nature of political parties.

The second big question is whether an election is properly understood as the choice of a

government or as a choice of representatives. The key point, reflected in the grammar of the

preceding sentence, is that a government is singular, whereas there may be many representatives.On one hand, this means that some standards of, for example, representativity that are considered

appropriate for governments might more appropriately be applied to the parliament as a whole

rather than to the individual parties that make it up. On the other hand, because choice of a

government implies choice against some alternative, some forms of inclusiveness that might be

considered appropriate for parliaments would be inappropriate for governments, even though

governments are plural in the sense of including more than one person even if there is a single

chief executive. Jumping ahead to clarify these points by way of examples, one might achieve

ethnic balance within a parliament through the proportional representation of parties each of

which is ethnically pure, but while one might regard proportional balance among the political

views held by the voters to be appropriate at the level of the parliament as a whole, for all views

to be represented in the government would make a nonsense of the idea of elections as choicesbetween alternative governments.4

Third, are elections contests among parties or among candidates, or posed a bit less starkly

and more realistically, are voters properly understood to be choosing among parties, each of

which has particular individuals as its standard bearers, or rather are they choosing among

individual candidates, each (or most) of whom are associated with political parties?

Parliamentary democracy as actually practiced in modern states, and even more proportional

representation electoral systems, of course, are predicated not only on the idea that parties are

cohesive units but also on the idea that it is those cohesive units for which electors vote and

which therefore have a democratic mandate from the voters. At the same time, many

constitutions emphasize the personal responsibility of individual MPs either to their own


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5Die Abgeordneten des Deutschen Bundestages werden in allgemeiner, unmittelbarer,

freier, gleicher und geheimer Wahl gewhlt. Sie sind Vertreter des ganzen Volkes, an Auftrge

und Weisungen nicht gebunden und nur ihrem Gewissen unterworfen.

6Tout mandat impratif est nul.

7In thinking about the version of democratic theory that I have identified as liberal

democracy, it is important to remember the second, as well as the first, word of that phrase. In

particular, while we might argue about the degree to which liberal political rights or a free

market economy are prerequisites for the inauguration or sustainability of democracy, they

clearly are not sufficient consitions, and hence a liberal free market economy is nota synonym

for liberal democracy, let along democracy tout court. The point of adding democracy to the

phrase, even for such unreconstructed liberals as Jeremy Bentham, would be a recognition that

ordinary people need some protection against the natural rapaciousness of their leaders -

including judges and central bankers - and that they need such protection all the more given that

natural rapaciousness is the fundamental assumption of liberalisam and especially of capitalism.

8I Democracy and Elections (Katz 1997), I took equality more or less as a given, and

only developed the other four values.

constituents or to their own consciences. For example, the German constitution says that

members of the Bundestag shall be representatives of the whole people, not bound by orders and

instructions, and shall be subject only to their conscience5 -- even as the electoral system means

that voters are choosing parties rather than individual MPs while the Constitution of the 5thFrench Republic says All binding instructions from outside bodies...shall be null and void.6(at

least here in the context of a candidate oriented electoral system).

Fourth, is the objective of democracy to allow the citizens to protect themselves against

their rulers, by giving them the opportunity reactively to punish those of whose policies, or

results, they disapprove (what I have called liberal democracy or in its extreme form what

Michael Pinto-Duschinsky has called removal van democracy)7, or is it to allow the citizens to

rule themselves, by actively deciding the policies to be pursued (what I have elsewhere called

popular sovereignty). Moreover, in addition to these two potentially opposed objectives, what

attention is to be devoted to other, also potentially inconsistent democratic values or objectives:

the personal development of citizens as autonomous human beings; the fostering of a true (as

opposed to a merely juridical) political community; and political equality.

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The fifth big question concerns the primary role of citizens in the context of an election

campaign. Are they primarily to be judges among the contestants or are they to be active

participants and partisans?

Implications for Parties

In broad terms, in the case of each of these five questions, the first answer suggests a more

elite and party oriented sense of democracy, where the second suggests a more egalitarian and

participatory sense of democracy. Thus, although each question can be taken independently, all


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9It should be noted that the Downsian argument suggests that the outcome (centrism and

moderation) that Lijphart claims as the special virtue of consensus democracy might best be

produced by the institutions Lijphart associates with majoritarian democracy.

five are closely connected with regard to their implications for parties in general, and for both the

appropriateness and the content of party laws in particular.

Beginning with what was identified above as the third function of party laws, the

regulation of the internal organization of parties, one point of contrast concerns what AustinRanney, writing about the responsible parties debate with regard to American parties described as

the little civil war about intraparty democracy (1962, 156). Does democracy require (or indeed

is democracy even furthered) by requiring that parties be democratic with regard to their internal

(policy formulation, candidate selection, etc.) procedures? Although it is appealing to assume

that the answer to this question must be yes, and although there have been moves in this

direction within the regulatory systems of many democracies (for example, tying subsidies to a

democratic candidate selection process), the answer in fact is far from clear.

If democracy implies active citizen participation and parties provide one of the venues for

that participation, then internal democracy is important. Similarly, if democratic elections are

about choices of representatives and among candidates, internal democracy may allow groups of

citizens to determine the individuals who will represent them and the policy preferences that theywill represent. On the other hand, there is a significant body of democratic theory that takes the

opposite position -- arguing, in Giovanni Sartoris words, that democracy on a large scale is not

the sum of many little democracies (1965, 124). Anthony Downs, for example, argues against

an inclusive definition of party, or internal party democracy, because whatever policies emerge

are likely to form a hodgepodge of compromises (1957, 25). In this case, even if the

representational function of elections might be enhanced, the clarity of choice offered to the

voters would be sacrificed. And indeed in the Downsian model, the aim of democracy is

furthered by competition between parties that are motivated solely by the private interest of their

leaders, who generate popular policies simply as a means of winning votes. It is the personal

disinterestin policy of the party leaders that leads them to converge toward the first preference of

the median voter - which is the policy package that has the best claim to the title will of thepeople. But since individual party members would not share in the personal rewards of office,

the presumption is that they are motivated by policy. Thus, even if internal democracy did not

produce the hodgepodge of compromise that Downs feared, it would produce proposals near to

the median preference of each partys members, and therefore not at the median of the electorate

as a whole. In other words, democracy within the parties would prevent the democratic outcome

that is supposed to be furthered by competition among the parties.

While the Downsian ideal of convergence requires a two-party system,9the requirement in

multiparty systems is that the leaders of the parties be willing and able to compromise with one

another to form coalitions. Particularly because internal party democracy is likely to empower

activists, who tend to be stronger and often more extreme in their preferences, rather than either

base party members or party supporters in general, it is likely to make compromise less ratherthan more easy and indeed in Lijpharts original work on what he called in English

consociational democracy (Lijphart, 1968) (kartel democratiein Dutch), elite autonomy from


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10In addition, there is the potential problem that assuring representation for particular

groups will contribute to, rather than ameliorate, the balkanization of politics and society.

their followers was advanced as one of the secrets to maintaining liberal democracy in a deeply

divided society. From this perspective as well, the claim that internal party democracy will

further democracy at the system level is at least suspect.

The idea that certain forms of campaign practice must be banned because they riskoffending groups or inflaming passions, or that certain ideologies or individuals (for example,

those tainted by involvement in a prior regime) must be banned as being anti-democratic similarly

seem appealing at first glance but is problematic on closer inspection. In Rousseaus democratic

theory, for example, the first question that should always be proposed, and never on any account

omitted was whether the present form of government should be continued (1947, 91) in other

words, democracy requires that the continuation of democracy always be regarded as an open

question. In more practical terms, one consequence of barring the expression of anti-democratic

views through party competition may be to force the expression of those views by less legitimate

and less desirable means. Simply, a balance must be struck between containing those who would

use the protections and privileges given to parties in order to destroy the system that allows those

protections and privileges not only to themselves but to their opponents, and recognition that theenforcement of democracy against the wishes of the people is highly suspect in democratic terms,

not to mention that it is likely to be a futile effort.

Enforcement of good taste, civility, or truthfulness in campaign activity all necessarily

involve not just the protection but also the constriction of democracy. While incitement to

genocide, for example, clearly cannot be protected, it also must be recognized that the definitions

of good taste, civility, or truth often are politically contentious, so that to impose definitions is to

bias the discussion. Again, a balance is required rather than simply an attempt to impose civility

through legislation.

Requirements of ethnic or gender diversity pose a serious dilemma for democratic theory.

Even if these were purely cosmetic, a phrase that I mean to be taken as even weaker than purely

symbolic, they would still restrict the choices of party members or voters to be in accord with thepreferences of those imposing the requirements. But when they have more substantial

justification (to embody the equality of all citizens, or even more to assure that the interests of

particular groups are represented regardless of the wishes of those choosing candidates or party

officials), the problem is more severe for precisely those reasons. In basing diversity

requirements on the asserted political relevance of certain demographic characteristics, one is

truncating the sphere in which democracy is allowed to work. The possibly perverse results of

such regulations can be seen if one imagines gender quotas having been applied in Iceland in

1995, which presumably would have required the Samtk um kvennalista to have both men and

women among its candidates and party officials notwithstanding that its purpose was to be a party

for women.10 The point here is that whatever the justification for insisting on demographic

balance or diversity of representation in the parliament as a whole, to impose an analogousrequirement on the individual parties that make it up is of a different order. Such requirements

fundamentally alter the meaning of representation by parties in ways that may not further

democratic government. Without taking sides in that debate, it should be noted, for example, that


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11One implication of this argument, were it to be applied to the system of campaign

finance regulation in the United States, would be to disallow all limits on spending by PACs

while potentially retaining limits on individual contributions whether to PACs, to parties, or

directly to candidates.

one criticism of the Lebanese requirement that party lists in each district conform to a legally

prescribed ethnic balance was that it drove the real leaders of all ethnic groups out of electoral

politics.

This conflict between the freedom of speech and other democratic values like communityalso arises with regard to regulation of party finance. First, there is a conflict between the ideals

of equality and majority rule (which might suggest, among other things, strong limits on the size

of allowable contributions from individual citizens and perhaps a total ban on political spending

by anyone/anything except individuals), on the one hand, and the ideals of freedom of speech and

the liberal pluralist notion that various groups, endowed with different mixes of resources

(numbers for some groups; wealth for others; access to or ownership of strategic communications

media for still others) should be allowed to protect and advance their interests as best they can.

Second, there is a conflict between the ideal of politics as a labor intensive activity in which large

numbers of citizens take part on a regular basis (again suggesting strict limits on party finance)

and the reality that electoral politics has become a capital and expertise intensive activity, in

which citizens often can take part more effectively by pooling their financial resources so as tohire experts.11 Third, there is a conflict between the idea that the effects of regulations concerning

party fund raising, and especially concerning the provision of public resources or privileges,

ought to be in rough proportion to current popular support, and recognition that those who want to

challenge the status quo often depend on a very few large donors or access to public resources in

order to build public support in the first place. In other words, apparent equity based on

demonstrated support can be extremely conservative in its effect. Fourth, there is the conflict

between the fear that enforcement powers will be used by those in power to repress, harass, or

hamper their opponents for partisan reasons and the recognition that regulations without a timely

and effective enforcement mechanism not only are unlikely to be effective but also are likely to

bring the entire notice of fairness through regulation into disrepute. Fifth, there is a conflict

between the idea that politics should be a public and collective activity so that citizens should bewilling not only to acknowledge but also to defend their political actions to one another

(including in the case of Barbers (1984) Strong Democracy, for example, even their votes which

might not be secret) and a desire for individual privacy not only with regard to votes but to

financial contributions as well as protection against undue influence or reprisals.

Laws setting conditions under which political parties will be recognized, and given

privileges like assured ballot access, public subsidies, or representation in parliamentary

committees all can be justified as necessary to make elections manageable. An excessive number

of choices is likely to so fragment the vote that the result will not be meaningful; similarly,

excessive fragmentation in parliament, which is discouraged by requiring that parliamentary

groups maintain a reasonable size in order to receive committee positions or by prohibiting MPs

elected under one partys banner from defecting while retaining their seats or committeepositions, is likely to make the maintenance of stable majorities impossible. If access to public


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12While I phrase this as desire to influence policy rather than hope of being elected to

allow for blackmail parties, or parties that simply want to influence the public debate. On the

other hand, the British connoisseurs wine party - in reality a wine merchant using the free

distribution of candidates election addresses to advertise his business, illustrates the possible

results of excessive liberality. In the British case, with strong party loyalties, such actions may

be regarded as quaint curiosities. In emereging democracies, where voters may have more

trouble distinguishing between political and commercial candidacies, the potential for mischief

might be more serious.

13The United States offers an instructive example, with the two major parties being

treated equally with regard to presidential campaign funding, but minor parties receiving

proportionately less and new parties not only receiving less but also receiving it only after the

election - when it is for all purposes except paying down a campaign debt too late.

resources is not limited to serious contenders, there is a risk of candidacies motivated by desire

for the resources rather than desire to influence policy.12 An official party registry facilitates

timely and definitive resolution of conflicts concerning the use of a party name and the right of

individuals to identify themselves as candidates of the party. At the same time, however, oneeffect of such regulations is almost inevitably to stack the deck in favor of the existing parties:

requiring new would-be parties to undertake extensive organizing efforts at a time when politics

is likely to be less salient; freeing existing parties from the need to expend resources to collect

petition signatures or otherwise to demonstrate support in advance of the election in order to

secure a place on the ballot; giving established parties resources and a position in parliament that

are denied to those who leave the parties for which they were elected, independents, or supporters

of parties that only win a few seats; giving them access to public resources in greater amounts and

on more favorable terms.13

Conclusion

With regard to the democratic propriety of party laws, this paper has several relatively

simple conclusions, all of which apply to electoral systems (Katz, 1997) as well as to party laws.

The first is that democracy is a complex concept. Although there is virtually universal

consensus that democracy is a good thing, there is no such consensus regarding the definition of

democracy. One reason is that democracy is valued as a means to the achievement of a number of

ends, all of which are at first glance desirable, but which on closer examination turn out to be

incompatible. This means that compromises must be struck, and as with all compromises there

can be disputes about the relative weight to be accorded to values, even if there is universal

agreement that all of the values being compromised are desirable.

The second is that the actual results of reforms often are extremely difficult to anticipate.

The history of reform efforts is replete with examples of the law of unintended consequences. Ashas been found repeatedly with attempts to limit the influence of political money, while it may be

possible legislatively to influence the channels through which money flows, those who want to

influence politics almost always can find a new method for achieving the same end. Some results


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simply may not be achievable by legal regulation.

The third is that few, if any, institutional reforms are politically neutral. Some interests or

parties are advantaged and others disadvantaged -- at least relative to other reforms that might

equally plausibly have been proposed. Since there can be no unproblematic standard by whichfairness can be assessed, this means that to propose reforms, even in the name of fairness or

neutrality, is likely to be perceived by some participants as taking sides in the substance of

political competition. Certainly there are some practices that are unacceptable by any reasonable

standard of democratic propriety, and those should be opposed. Beyond that, however, those who

advocate not just specific content for party laws, but even the principle that there should be party

laws, would be well advised to recognize that such a proposal is not above politics, but is of

politics.


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References

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Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row).

Goodwin-Gill, Guy. 1994. Free and Fair Elections: International Law and Practice (Geneva:

Inter-Parliamentary Union).

Katz, Richard S. 1997. Democracy and Elections (New York: Oxford University Press).

Lijphart, Arend. 1968. The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in theNetherlands (Berkeley: University of California Press).

Lijphart, Arend. 1984. Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Democracy in

Twenty-One Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press).

Lijphart, Arend. 1999. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six

Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press).

Macpherson, C. B. 1965. The Real World of Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Ranney, Austin. 1962. The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government (Urbana: University ofIllinois Press).

Rousseau, Jean Jacques. 1947. The Social Contract (New York: Hafner).

Sartori, Giovanni. 1965. Democratic Theory (New York: Praeger).

Schattschneider, E. E. 1942. Party Government (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston).

Schumpeter, Joseph. 1950. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper and Row).

Documents

Democracy and the Legal Regulation of Political Parties