Delta Fire - GM RDD Delta Fire - GM RDD Exercise Exercise

5/13/035/13/03Lansing, MichiganLansing, Michigan

RadiologicalRadiologicalLessons LearnedLessons Learned

Michigan Department of Environmental Quality

Radiological Protection and Medical Waste Section

"Obstacles cannot crush me;

every obstacle yields to stern resolve.“

Leonardo da Vinci

• Planning extended over 7 months.

• Delta Fire spearheaded the effort. With the Lansing Fire Department they decided upon an RDD scenario, because it was what they were least prepared for.

• Their courage has provided a shining example of leadership.

Objectives:

• Delta Fire goals included testing a large incident command facility in a mutual aid coordinated emergency response to a weapons of mass destruction (disruption) multi-jurisdictional incident.

• DEQ goals included testing our ability to support and integrate with the local 1st responder effort in a large scale radiological incident, including response time, communications, emergency worker advisory capacity, radiation safety, environmental contamination assessment, and the ability to make sound public protection recommendations to the onsite incident commander and to the State Police EMD director.

Who became involved?

This event has brought together 1st responders from General Motors, a multitude of local fire and hazmat teams, state and local emergency management groups, county public health, the Michigan National Guard 51st WMD Civil Support Team, and the DEQ Hazardous Waste and Radiological Protection Section. Efforts were supported by the Red Cross and Sparrow Hospital. Unified Command included local and state law enforcement and the FBI.

The onsite scenario:

6000 Curies of Cs-137 with 10 lbs of high explosive detonated in a factory.

Will the DEQ premise remain valid?

• Premise: For a dirty bomb event, the radiological impact will generally be low enough that first responders can enter the affected area for lifesaving purposes and exit quickly without being overly concerned about excessive exposure or dose.

• Basis: NCRP 138, Management of Terrorist Events Involving Radioactive Material.

• Notion: A dirty bomb will be a weapon of mass disruption rather than mass destruction.

The offsite scenario?

600 Curies Cs-137 (10%) from building leakage.

What were the initial events?

• Detonation occurred at 8:45 AM.

• 60 victims staged 20-100 yards from the blast (now in radiation fields 20-225 rad/h).

Syndromes: rad

Hemopoietic (blood changes) > 200 Gastrointestinal (intestinal lining destroyed) > 1000Central Nervous System > 2000 480 rad* = ~ LD 50/30 (50% die in 30 days)

28 of the earliest Chernobyl responders died from radiation induced effects.

*RTM 96

What effects can be expected in high radiation fields?

• General Motors onsite emergency response team rushed to the blast scene and advised those who could walk to exit. (estimated dose 1.5 rem each for GM responders).

• About 35 victims walked out.

•Fire trucks and hazmat teams were on site by 9:00 AM.

Where are the primary hazards?

1st Responders are aware. An explosion implies potential radiation, secondary devices, and potential perpetrators.

When was radiation first detected?

Two firemen, with respirators, entered the building at 9:15 AM with a CDV-700 meter and bullet probe. (Estimated dose 1.25 rem)

Wait a minute! My meter doesn’t go that high!

Are the victims contaminated?

Victims were contained in a group and injuries attended to. At first, no mention of contamination was evidently provided to the attendees (GM emergency workers).

Victims went through an ‘emergency decon’ being sprayed with fire hoses over a lawn area.

How can initial decontamination be done?

Although slightly cool weather, it was an effective rinse.

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Victims were directed to one of three decon tents for monitoring and further decon. (EWs with respirators)

1st Responders with respirators.

Many decontamination skills demonstrated.

Controllers identified decontamination areas where further guidance would be of benefit including positioning, meter use, and procedures.

Hey guys, what did you see when you monitored?

Could contaminated water be contained?

Is the hospital prepared?

9:30 AM 1st victim arrives at hospital.

9:30 AM – Metro response team is prepared for rescue. The FBI is now involved in decision making.

Can we go in?

Who is in charge?

• Local law enforcement and Delta Fire arrive first and form a unified command (UC).

• Michigan State Police and the FBI soon join UC.

How should the unified command (UC) work?

• The UC will facilitate both crisis and consequence mgmt.

• The FBI coordinates the crisis management team and DHS/FEMA coordinates the consequence mgmt. team (FEMA did not play in this exercise – TOPOFF same date).

• The Incident Command System consists of Command (united), Liaison Officer, Press Information Officer, Safety Officer, Operations, Planning and Intelligence, Logistics and Finance/Administration sections.

• Operational control of assets is retained by designated officials representing local, state and federal agencies.

SEOC activated. Unified command now in two vehicles.

Who can assist in a radiological incident?

When was the DEQ notified?

• 9:45 AM: A State EOC briefing announces that a 50 R/h radiological reading was made at the incident (30 minutes earlier).

• DEQ dispatches one field team and a team consisting of 2 Field Team Center Coordinators (FTCCs), a health physicist for dose assessment, and a public information official.

Wind Direction?

The response team almost arrived at the incident site before establishing radio contact or reporting readings.

Start

Pick up Equip

Incident

1 hour elapsed - what about the remaining victims?

• The DEQ considers contacting the incident commander en route. No phone number. Other options?

• 51st WMD Civil Support Team (CST) en route.

• Press begin wandering through contaminated areas.

• Victims inside and some have now received a radiation dose of 335 rem. Could they be communicated with?

• A secondary explosive device has been identified in a vehicle close to the building and made safe.

• Incident command is facing tough decisions, a chaotic command environment, and further complications.

What?!! You found radiation levels how high?

The 51st WMD Civil Support Team arrives with both offsite and onsite monitoring capability along with many specialized radiological resources.

What lies behind these doors?

51st CST sets up decontamination resources in an area to the east, slightly upwind, as directed.

Delta Fire – GM RDD Exercise 5/13/03Delta Fire – GM RDD Exercise 5/13/03How well is the site, JPIC, and SEOC coordinating?

As the CST prepares to survey inside, a perpetrator is spotted on the roof (not in scenario -> 1.5 hr delay)

Is everyone accounted for?

10:40 DEQ team logs in at incident site. They find MSP mobile command vehicle jammed full of people. The Delta Fire IC vehicle is also packed. DEQ needs power and a fax. They work limited in their van beside command vehicles.

10:45 Two hours elapsed – what are the priorities?

As the SWAT team attempts to clear the area, inside 4 GM employees now have lethal doses, 4 more display rad sickness. Is the SWAT team wearing dosimetry?

What levels of radiation are we monitoring for?

After several trips through decon, 1st responders correctly deduced internal contamination.

How badly are public residents affected nearby and what is the environmental impact?11:04 DEQ reads 850 uR/h about 1.2 miles downwind.

11:22 Cs-137 is identified, no alpha present.

What Protective Actions Orders should be given?

• 11:40 State secondary complex (upwind) is sheltered.

• The 496 Expressway has been shut down (2 mi downwind).

• The Michigan Department of Agriculture (MDA) has embargoed foods and issued advisories.

• Public relocation concerns are recognized within a mile downwind but are non-immediate.

• 11:45 8 GM employees inside the building now have a lethal dose, 11 more are sick from radiation exposure.

How many patients can the hospital receive?

• 11:30 AM Decontaminated patients begin arriving. They comment that they have already been decontaminated about 4 times. They are still internally contaminated.

• Patients were registered, tested for chemical contamination and grouped in the cancer center.

Will the GM employees see daylight soon?

Rescue has been held up by law enforcement due to observed perpetrator on the roof who is eventually shot.

What are we up against inside the building?

12:05 CST enters SW corner entrance with two team members, level A PPE, and small mobile response vehicle.

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12:30 CST attempts a southern entrance.

12:40 almost 4 hours elapsed – who’s ready for rescue?

About 15 firemen enter with standard gear, respirators and rescue sleds. They ignore CST lead, run to victims.

Did firemen receive extreme doses from radiation?

Victims could be removed in as little as two min. Fire Fighter total doses ranged from 1-30 rem/trip (ave 4.3)Victims total doses ranged from 230-1341 rem. (9 lethal)

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1st responders transfer highly contaminated GM employees from defined hot zone to decontamination area.

Was multi-agency coordination achieved?

Estimated dose for two CST members – about 19 rem

What are the Emergency Worker dose limits in Michigan?

Michigan Emergency Worker Administrative Limits: 1 rem/day TEDE 3 rems/incident

Michigan Emergency Worker Maximum Dose Limits:

5 rem/yr TEDE 25 rem/yr lifesaving activities

TEDE - Total effective dose equivalent (whole body)

So what have we learned?

How could more lives have been saved?

• Direct contact from IC to DEQ HWRPS or other radiological authority.

• DEQ communication with IC en route and on site to characterize, assess and prioritize radiological perspective.

• Concept for lifesaving: 2 minute surveillance mission. Measure radiation levels, review limits, calculate stay times.

• ADP 2000 meter can read up to 100 R/h. Most victims were in a radiation field much less than this (103 R/h for 3).

• Pursue avenues for quick and efficient rescue with dosimetry. (Firemen entering did have dosimetry and were ready early. Could they have responded more efficiently without the multi-agency assistance?)

Can communications be improved?

• As the number of agencies increases, it becomes more difficult to interface with each one sufficiently.

• Priorities and initiatives need to be identified, verified and communicated amongst major and minor players.

• Players with needs should vocalize them to expedite the response with other agency resources or personnel. Examples of needs that could have been expressed and met included workspace, AC power, extra meters, dosimetry, a fax machine, health physics support and possibly more field teams, portal monitors and SEOC support personnel.

How unified was the response?

• Three levels of varying radiological expertise were available at both the incident site and at the SEOC – local, state, and federal agencies.

• The locals addressed decontamination of the public (they could have used more guidance and support).

• The locals and the 51st CST addressed rescue (not their business). DEQ could have assisted with onsite assessment.

• DEQ was assisted in offsite monitoring by the CST (but, they needed a controller to be more involved).

• Did coordination between local, state and federal radiological entities occur at the SEOC to prioritize needs?

Would additional exercises be of benefit?

Most important lesson learned:

Response agencies need to practice working together to maximize efficiencies.

Result: A successful exercise. Agencies involved are now much better prepared to work as an integrated team.

Other than a real emergency, there is no substitute for an exercise to genuinely test response capability, especially a multi-agency response.

Credit goes to the exercise initiators and players

A challenging scenario can maximize lessons learned and can be designed for success with careful planning.

The willingness to fully test response capability in the interest of founding a stronger and more united base, to build more confidence and competence in responders and to reassure the public, is to be commended.

Hazardous Waste and Radiological Protection Section Department of Environmental Quality

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51st District National GuardCharlotte Fire DepartmentConsumer and Industry ServicesDelhi Township Fire DepartmentDelta Charter TownshipDelta Township Fire Department DEQDeWitt Township Fire DepartmentEast Lansing Fire DepartmentEaton County Public Health Eaton County Sheriffs Department East Lansing Fire Department FBIGrand Ledge Police Department GMGrand Ledge Emrg. Srvs. Authority Hayes Green Beach

Congratulations is due to all participants.

Delhi Township Fire Department Ingham Regional Medical CenterLansing Fire Department Lansing Township Fire Department Lansing Community College Life EMS Lansing Township Police Department Meridian Township Fire Department Michigan State Police Photography GroupR.A.C.E.S.Sparrow HospitalSt. Lawrence HospitalState of Michigan EOCTri-County Emergency Med. Ctrl. AuthorityUAWWindsor Township Fire Department

Radiological Protection and Medical Waste Section Department of Environmental Quality

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For further information contact:

Richard Meister, Deputy Chief, Delta Fire Department(517) 321-6622 ext 405 rmeister@township.delta.mi.us

Trent Atkins, Captain, Lansing Fire Department(517) 483-7642 tatkins@ci.lansing.mi.us

Lou Brandon, CHP, Chief, Nuclear Facilities Unit(517) 241-1277 brandonl@state.mi.us