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8/4/2019 Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma0
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For Ph ilosophical Issues (Sup p. N ous) Vol 11, 2001
Deliberative Democracy and the D iscursive Dilemm a
Philip Pettit
Taken as a m odel for how group s should make collective jud gments and
decisions, the ideal of deliberative democracy is inherently ambiguou s. Consider the
idealised case where it is agreed on all sides that a certain conclusion shou ld be
endorsed if and on ly if certain premises are admitted. Does deliberative dem ocracy
recomm end that members of the group d ebate the premises and then individually
vote, in the light of that debate, on wh ether or not to supp ort the conclusion? Or does
it recomm end that m embers individually vote on the p remises, and then let their
comm itment to the conclusion be settled by w hether or not the group endorses therequired p remises? Is deliberative dem ocracy to enforce the discipline of reason at
the individual level, as in the first possibility, or at the collective level, as in the
second?
Deliberative-democratic theory has not addressed th is issue, perhap s because
of an implicit assumpt ion that it does not matter whether th e discipline of reason is
imp osed at the individua l or at the collective level. But that assumption is false and
there is no excuse for neglecting the issue raised. The d iscursive dilemma of my title
a generalisation of the d octrinal parad ox that has recently received attention in
analytical jurispru dence shows that the p rocedures distnguished can come apart.
Thus deliberative democrats must m ake up th eir minds on w here they stand in
relation to the issue; they cannot sit on th e fence.
This paper is an attempt to add ress the issue and look at the grounds on
which it may be resolved. In the first section, I give a brief account of the ideal of
deliberative dem ocracy, as I un derstand it. In the second , I introd uce the d iscursive
dilemma w ith the help of some stylised examples and then in the third section I show
why the issue that it raises is of relevance, theoretically and practically, to the
deliberative-democratic ideal. How should deliberative dem ocrats resolve that issue?
I argue in the fourth section that the role in wh ich republican theory casts
deliberative dem ocracy argues for preferring th e imposition of reason, where
possible, at the collective level. And then in the final section I argue for the
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consistency of that position with th e main sorts of argum ent put forward by others in
defence of the ideal.
1. The id eal of delib erative dem ocracy
There are three issues on which deliberative democrats divide among
them selves. First, the question of how many contexts electoral, parliamentary,
industr ial, edu cational, and so on ough t to be dem ocratised. Second , the question
of how m any issues in any dem ocratised context ought to be und er democratic
control: just the choice of office-hold ers, or also the choice of policy-programs, or
perh aps the choice of some d etailed p olicies. And third , the question of how far a
democratic character serves to justify or legitimate a regime and pat tern of decision-
making, or at least to give them a p resump tive authority: to place the onus of
argum ent on the shoulders of those who wou ld not comp ly.
But there, or thereabouts, disagreement ru ns out. For no matter wh at their
d ifferences on such matters, deliberative democrats do show a remarkable degree of
consensus on how d emocracy shou ld be organised. Wherever dem ocracy is
instituted , however deeply democratic control runs, and w hatever standing it is
taken to give to decision-making, they agree that it ough t to be inclusive, jud gmental
and d ialogical (see the represeentative read ings in Bohm an and Rehg 1997; Elster
1998). These constraints spell out w hat I shall describe here as th e deliberative-
democratic ideal.
The inclusive constraint: all mem bers are equally entitled to vote on how toresolve relevant collective issues, or bu nd les of issues, with something less than a
unanimous vote being sufficient to determine the outcome.
The jud gmental constraint : before voting, members should deliberate on the basisof presumptively comm on concerns about w hich resolut ion is to be preferred.
The dialogical constraint: they shou ld conduct this deliberation in open andunforced dialogue with one another, whether in a centralised forum or in various
decentralised contexts.
The inclusive constraint means that deliberative democracy is to be contrasted
with elitist or authoritar ian schemes, even ones in which deliberation and dialogue
have an imp ortan t place. It will be satisfied in any context by having a representative
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democracy, if dem ocratic control only run s to th e choice of office-holders, but the
general assum pt ion is that wh ere direct par ticipation by all mem bers is feasible
and is consistent w ith the general case for deliberative democracy it w ill be
preferred to indirect representation. The constraint includes the stipu lation that
un animity is not required for the determina tion of an ou tcome by voting, since a
combination of inclusiveness and u nanimity wou ld lead to a group s being unable to
reach a common view on most significant issues; un animity is probably achievable,
at best, only on very abstract constitutional m atters (Buchanan and Tullock 1962).
The jud gmental constraint has got two sides to it. First, it requ ires voters to
deliberate or reason about how they shou ld vote, not just vote in an u nreflective or
spontaneous or reflex manner. And second , it requires voters to deliberate about how
they shou ld vote on the basis of considerat ions as to what is best for the society as a
whole: what is likely to advan ce those common interests that p eople are capable of
recognising as common interests. This constraint need not itself specify any
par ticular conception of such comm on, perceived interests: that m ay itself be matter
for the sort of deliberation recommended. What it coun sels against is any pattern of
voting in which each ind ividual voter takes account only of what is good for his or
her particular coterie or corner or circle. The model of voting recomm ended und er
this constraint can be described as jud gment-voting rather than p reference-voting(Cohen 1986; Coleman and Ferejohn 1986; Brennan an d Pettit 1990). The idea is that
each voter should m ake up his or her own m ind as to wh at is for the good of the
group in question and should vote on th e basis of that jud gment, not on the basis of
bru te preference (Sunstein 1993) or bargained com prom ise (Elster 1998, 5-8; cf Pettit
1993, Ch.5).
The third , dialogical constraint in the ideal of deliberative democracy marks a
further, important level of differentiation. It ru les out the sort of plebiscitarian
dispensation in wh ich each participant privately forms his or her jud gment about
comm on p erceived interests, rather than doing so in d ialogue w ith others, and then
votes on the basis of that judgment. It is sometimes thought, on the basis of his
remarks about the danger of faction, that Rousseau embraced this plebiscitarian
ideal. According to Rousseau, so it is said, each voter is polled about his
independ ently reached choice, without any group deliberation (Grofman and Feld
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1988, 570). But th is interp reta tion is almost certainly mistaken , if only becau se it
makes no sense of Rousseaus requiring th at the p eople come together in an
assembly. What he was anxious to guard against was not d ialogue and debate, with
the formation of ind ividu al jud gment that this fosters, but rather the th reat of some
individuals being so intimidated or imp ressed by others so deferential toward s
them that they vote according to the jud gments of those others, not according to
their own (Estlund and Waldron 1989).
The third constraint r equires that the d ialogue envisaged be open and
un forced, wh ile allowing that it may be centralised or decentralised. It mu st be open
in the sense that each can get a h earing and it mu st be un forced in the sense that no
one need fear to speak their mind ; it must ap proximate the conditions for ideal
speech that Juergen Habermas (1984, 1989) emphasises. Some will insist that
d ialogue mu st be centralised in a single forum, if talk of deliberative democracy is to
be justified (Goodin 1999). But I think th at it is better to leave that qu estion open and
to take the centralised or collective picture of deliberative dem ocracy as a m ore
specific version of a broad er ideal.
2. The discursive dilem ma
So much for the different elements in the ideal of deliberative democracy. In
this and the next section I want to show that the ideal is seriously un derspecified
and , in p articular, that there are tw o quite d ifferent w ays in which it m ay be
understood in any context.
My argu ment in this section derives from the recent discussion in
jur ispru den tial circles of what its analysts have sometimes called the d octrinal
paradox (Kornhauser and Sager 1986; Kornhauser 1992; Kornhauser 1992;
Kornh auser and Sager 1993. See too Chap man 1998a; Chapman 1998b; Brennan
1999). This is a parad ox that arises when a mu lti-mem ber court has to make a
decision on the basis of received d octrine as to the considerat ions that ought to be
taken into accoun t: on the basis of a conceptu al sequencing of the issues to be
decided (Chapm an 1998a) . I describe the problem, in its general form, as a
d iscursive dilemma. I prefer the w ord d iscursive, because the problem in question
is not tied to the acceptance of comm on doctrine, only to the enterp rise of making
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group judgments on the basis of reasons. I prefer the w ord d ilemm a, because while
the p roblem generates a choice in which each op tion has its d ifficulties, it does not
constitute a paradox in any strict sense. My analysis of the d iscursive dilemma
derives directly from that jurisprud ential literature, though many of the points I
wan t to make do not appear there; wh ere they do appear, I explicitly acknowledge
them.
The discursive d ilemm a: the conjunction case
In order to introdu ce the d iscursive d ilemma, consider an issue that m ight
arise in a w orkp lace, among the employees of a company: for simp licity, as we m ay
assum e, a compan y owned by the employees. The issue is whether to forego a pay-
rise in order to spend the money thereby saved on introducing a set of workp lace
safety measures: say, measures to guard against electrocution. Let us supp ose for
convenience that th e employees are to make the decision perhaps because of prior
resolution on the basis of considering two separable issues: first, whether the
danger is serious: say, whether the risk of electrocution is above some tolerable
threshold; and second, whether the pay-sacrifice would make it possible to buy a
safety measu re that w ould be effective in reducing the risk below that threshold , in
the event of its having been above it. If an emp loyee thinks that the d anger is
sufficiently serious, and the safety m easure sufficiently effective, he or she w ill vote
for the p ay-sacrifice; otherwise they will vote against. And so each w ill have to
consider the seriousness issue and the effectiveness issue and then look to w hat
should be conclud ed abou t the pay-sacrifice.
Imagine now that after approp riate dialogue and deliberation the employees
are disposed to vote on the relevant prem ises and conclusion in the p attern
illustrated by the following m atrix for a group of three workers. The letters A, B, and
C represent the three employees and the Yes or No on any row represents thed isposition of the relevant em ployee to adm it or reject the correspond ing premise or
conclusion.
Serious danger? Effective measure? Pay-sacrifice?
A. Yes No No
B. No Yes No
C. Yes Yes Yes
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Matrix 1
If this is the pa ttern in w hich the employees are inclined to vote, then what
decision or jud gment w ill be mad e by the grou p und er deliberatively d emocratic
procedures? It tu rns out that a d ifferent d ecision will be made, depending onwh ether the group jud gment is driven by how m embers jud ge on the premises or by
how they jud ge on the conclusion. Looking at the matrix, we can see that thou gh a
majority rejects the pay-sacrifice, a majority supp orts each of the premises. If we
think that the views of the employees on th e conclusion should determine the group-
decision, then w e will say that the grou p-conclusion shou ld be to reject the pay-
sacrifice: there are more Nos than Yess in the final colum n. But if we think that
the views of the employees on the p remises should determine the group-decision,
then w e will say that the grou p-conclusion shou ld be to accept the pay-sacrifice:
there are more Yess than Nos in each of the premise colum ns. The fact that
socially aggregating the conclusion-jud gments gives us a d ifferent result from
socially aggregating the prem ise-jud gmen ts illustrates the d iscursive dilemm a.
It should be clear that the discursive dilemm a will generalise from the three-
person case to a group of any size. All that is required for the paradox to arise is that
a majority in the grou p supp orts the first of the premises, a different majority
supp orts the second B and C rather than A and C and the intersection or
overlap of those majorities C in our example represents only a minority in th e
group as a w hole. The fact that th e intersection represents only a minor ity explains
why there is a majority against the conclusion. But n ot only will the parad ox
generalise to group s of any size. It should equally be clear that it will generalise in
other w ays too: for example, to a case where there are any nu mber of premises, not
just tw o; and to cases that arise in quite d ifferent dom ains.
The structure requ ired for the sort of parad ox illustrated to be capable ofgeneralising can be sum med up in these points:
a. there is a conclusion to be decided am ong a grou p of peop le by reference to a
conjunction of independent or separable prem ises the conclusion w ill be
end orsed if relevant p remises are endorsed, and otherw ise it will be rejected;
b. each m ember of the group forms a jud gment on each of the prem ises and a
correspond ing jud gment on the conclusion;
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c. each of the p remises is sup por ted by a majority of members but those majorities
do not coincide w ith one another;
d . the intersection of those majorities will sup por t the conclusion, and the others
reject it, in view of a; and
e. the intersection of the majorities is only a minor ity in the grou p as a w hole.
The discursive dilemm a, as illustrated in ou r workplace examp le, stems from
the fact that the group can m ake its jud gments in the conclusion-driven w ay or in the
prem ise-driven w ay and that in many cases those procedures yield different results.
It constitutes a d ilemma, so far as each op tion has its problems. As the examp le
shows, going the conclusion-driven w ay means adop ting a course that is inconsistent
with the premises endorsed by the group and going the premise-dr iven w ay means
adopting a course that a majority ind ividually reject. Going the first way means
sacrificing collective rationality for the sake of respon siveness to ind ividuals, going
the second means sacrificing responsiveness to ind ividuals for the sake of collective
rationality.
There are familiar p ractices of group d eliberation and decision-making
correspond ing to those different app roaches. Thus the group wou ld go the
conclusion-driven w ay if members entered into d eliberation and dialogue and then
each cast their personal vote on whether to endorse the pay-sacrifice or not; in that
case the decision w ould be against the pay-sacrifice. The grou p w ould go the
prem ise-driven w ay, on the other hand , if there was a chairperson w ho took a vote
on each of the prem ises say, a show of hand s and then let logic decide the
outcome; in th is case the d ecision w ould be in favour of the p ay-sacrifice.
The discursive d ilemm a: the d isjun ction case
But the sort of discursive dilemma illustrated is not the only sort there is.
Another version of the dilemm a arises wh en the issue facing a group has to be
decided , not by reference to a conjunction of premises, but rath er by reference to a
d isjun ction. In this case the conclusion w ill be endorsed if any one of the premises is
endorsed any, not a ll and otherw ise it w ill be rejected. (It might also be
required, of course, that any two of three or more premises wou ld have to be
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endorsed or any three of four or more premises, and so on but I shall ignore
that possibility here.)
The second var iety of the d iscursive d ilemma can be illustrated with another
sort of decision that ou r w orkplace group might face. Sup pose that the group has todecide on whether to introdu ce a clocking-in and clocking-out system an d th at by
their shared lights the decision should be m ade on the ground s, and only on the
ground s, either that such a time-check w ould increase produ ctivity or that it wou ld
serve to reassure everybody that others are pu lling their weight in the joint
enterp rise. Let someone d ecide the p roductivity question in the affirmative, or let
them decide the reassurance question in the affirmat ive, and their conclusion will be
that the time-check shou ld be introduced; otherwise they will conclud e that it ough t
not to be introduced. The conclusion will be jud ged by reference to a disjun ction of
those independ ent premises: endorsing either premise on its own will be enough to
sup por t the end orsement of the conclusion; rejecting both of the p remises will be
enough to supp ort the rejection of the conclusion.
Imagine now , as in the conjun ction case, that after appropr iate dialogue and
deliberation the emp loyees are disposed to vote on the relevant premises and
conclusion in the pattern illustrated by th e following matrix for a group of three
workers. The letters A, B, and C represent the th ree emp loyees, as before, and the
Yes or No on an y row represents the d isposition of each to ad mit or reject the
corresponding premise or conclusion.
Prod uctivity issue? Reassurance issue? Time-check?
A. Yes No Yes
B. No Yes Yes
C. No No No
Matrix 2
Where votes follow th is pat tern, then the premise-driven app roach will yield
one group-jud gment, as in the previous sort of case, the conclusion-driven approach
another. Each of the p remises is rejected by a m ajority, as we can see by considering
the p remise columns, so that if we go by the p remises, then w e will take the group-
decision to be aga inst the time-check prop osal. But the conclusion, on the other hand ,
is endorsed by a majority so that if we go by the conclusions the employees
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ind ividually reach, then we will take the group-decision to be in favour of the time-
check.
This sort of dilemm a allows of generalisation in just the sam e way as the first.
The salient points to preserve in this case mirror the points mentioned with the other:a. there is a conclusion to be decided am ong a grou p of peop le by reference to a
d isjun ction of independent or separable premises the conclusion will be
end orsed if any of the prem ises is end orsed, and otherw ise it will be rejected;
b. each m ember of the group forms a jud gment on each of the prem ises and a
correspond ing jud gment on the conclusion;
c. each of the premises is sup por ted by a m inority of members bu t those minor ities
do not coincide w ith one another;
d . the union of those minorities will sup por t the conclusion, and the others reject it,
in view of a; and
e. the union of the minorities is a majority in the grou p as a w hole.
In this case, as in the last, there are familiar decision-making practices that
differ in implementing either a conclusion-driven mode of group-judgment or a
premise-driven m ode. The workp lace ballot in which each casts his or her vote
privately would implement th e conclusion-driven m ode, whereas the workplace
meeting in wh ich the chair takes a vote on each of the relevant considerations and
then annou nces the significance for the conclusion wou ld imp lement the premise-
driven mode.
3. The relevance of the dilem ma for deliberative d emocracy
The relevance in p rinciple
Und er the regime of deliberative democracy, it is required th at with any
logically connected p ropositions in the d omain of discussion the prem ises and
conclusion of our examples people make up their mind s about the prop ositions in
such a way that reason is satisfied. They do not end orse inconsistent or otherw ise
incoherent sets of propositions; they do n ot fail to derive conclusions that are
supp orted, even saliently sup ported, by wh at they already end orse; and they do not
follow a procedu re say, one of unanimitarian voting that gives them nothing to
say on m ost issues (List and Pettit 2000).
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The question raised by the d iscursive dilemm a is wh ether this d iscipline of
reason is meant to apply to each ind ividual, taken singly, or to the group taken as a
whole. Und er the conclusion-driven, majoritarian way of voting the discipline is
app lied to each ind ividual, un der the prem ise-driven, majoritarian way of voting it is
app lied to the group taken as a wh ole. The question is a pressing one, where it arises,
because it represents a hard choice or d ilemm a. Let a group ind ividualise reason, and
it will ensure responsiveness to ind ividuals in its collective view on each issue bu t it
will run the risk that th e views w ill be irrational. Let a grou p collectivise reason, and
it will ensure the ra tionality of the collective views main tained but run the risk of
adop ting a view on one or another issue that is unresponsive to the views of
individuals on that issue.
The choice with w hich groups a re faced is not necessarily a choice between
following a conclusion-driven, majoritarian p rocedure and following a p remise-
driven, majoritarian one. Individualising reason and ensuring responsiveness to
individual views w ill always involve having m embers vote, whether on a
majoritarian or som e other basis, about each of the issues involved , and th en letting
that vote d etermine the collective view; this, in effect, is a generalisation of the
conclusion-driven procedu re. But collectivising reason an d ensur ing collective
rationality will not always involve privileging certain issues in the manner ofpremises and letting the collective views on those issues logically determ ine the
collective view on the conclusion. Consistently with behav ing in a deliberative
democratic manner, the group might let the presum ptive set of collective views be
determined by having m embers vote on each issue and only consider mod erating
those views amend ing one or other of them in the event of the collective views
proving to be irrational in some way. The amendmen t chosen might involve letting
the views w ith the p resump tive status of premises if that can be agreed
determine the view on the conclusion. But it might also involve hold ing onto that
conclusion and revising the collectively endorsed view on one of the premises. In
short, it might involve practising mod us ponens letting the premises dictate the
conclusion or modus tollens keeping the conclusion and revising one or more
of the prem ises.
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To sum up , then, the d iscursive dilemm a is relevant in pr inciple to
deliberative dem ocracy so far as it raises the qu estion as to whether deliberative
dem ocrats require people to be d isciplined by reason at the ind ividu al or, where this
is feasible, at the collective level. There is a dilemm a involved , because each of the
options ava ilable has its problems. Let peop le be d isciplined by reason at the
ind ividual level and they may collectively endorse an irrational set of propositions.
Let them be d isciplined by reason at the collective level and they m ay collectively
endorse a conclusion that a m ajority of them ind ividually reject.
The relevance of the dilemm a in p ractice
But is the d iscursive dilemma relevant in p ractice to the way the ideal of
deliberative dem ocracy is specified? Some m ight say that it is not, on the grou nd s
that it is rarely going to be a feasible option for people to d iscipline themselves by
reason at the collective level and that all deliberative democracy can require is that
ind ividuals do this in the formation of their opinions at the individu al level. The
problem raised will be that if people are to discipline themselves collectively by
reason, then they must agree on what are the relevant considerations by reference to
which various issues are to be d ecided . But that agreemen t, so it w ill be said, is rarely
going to be available. Thus sceptics will maintain that th e assump tion that the parties
in my w orkp lace examples agree on the prem ises by reference to which the pay-
sacrifice and time-check issues are to be decided is an id ealisation rarely satisfied in
practice.
This point is well taken for large scale collectivities such as an electorate and it
may well be the case that all deliberative democrats can seek in such contexts is a
d iscipline of reason imp osed at the ind ividual level.1 But the point does not hold
more generally. There are two sorts of groups that rou tinely confront the possibility
of collective self-discipline, and that mu st therefore d ecide on whether to followreason at the individual or at th e collective level. And there is a further , more general
consideration w hy any grou ps that seek to advance a comm on pu rpose, and not just
the tw o sorts ment ioned, are going to confront that p ossibility in the course of their
development.
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The first sort of case is that of a grou p th at is charged by an external authority
with making certain d ecisions on the basis of designated considerations, and on that
basis only. Examples of such grou ps are appointment and prom otions committees;
committees charged w ith deciding w ho is to win a certain p rize or contract; tru sts
that have to m ake jud gments on the basis of a trustees instructions; associations or
the executives of associations that have to justify their actions by reference to th e
groups charter; corporations that have to comp ly with policies endorsed by their
shareholders; pu blic bodies, be they bureau cratic committees or app ointed board s,
that have to discharge specific briefs; and governm ents that are more or less boun d to
par ty program s and p rinciples. In all of these cases deliberative dem ocrats will want
their ideal to apply and in each case there will clearly be an issue as to whether the
d iscipline of reason shou ld be imp osed at the individual or at th e collective level.
In the second sort of case, it will be a mat ter of internal aspirat ion in a grou p
that m embers find comm on groun ds by w hich to justify whatever line they
collectively take. Think of the political movem ent that has to w ork ou t a policy
program ; or the association that h as to decide on the terms of its constitut ion; or the
church that has to give an accoun t of itself in the public forum; or the learned
academy that seeks a voice in the larger world of politics and journalism. In such
cases members of the group m ay not have access to an anteceden tly agreed set ofconsiderations on th e basis of which to justify par ticular jud gments. But their
identification w ith one another w ill supp ort a w ish to reach agreement on such a set
of reasons. To the extent th at tha t w ish gets to be satisfied, the d iscursive dilemma
will generate the issue as to whether the group shou ld make its decisions in a
premise-driven or conclusion-driven way.
These two cases are special in a certain w ay. They contrast with the case of a
group that has to advance a pu rpose, as those group s have to do, but that may be
quite happ y to have its members reach a jud gment on an y issue without their
agreeing on th e reasons that supp ort that judgm ent; a majority may vote for the
jud gment bu t, theorising it on ly incompletely (Sun stein 1999), different people
within that m ajority may supp ort it for d ifferent reasons. Will a group of this laid-
back kind ever confront the possibility of imposing reason at a collective level and
ever have to face the discursive dilemma? I believe that it will (Pettit 2000).
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Like the other grou ps envisaged , this sort of group is bound to genera te a
history of jud gments that it is on record as making, when it seeks to pursue its
pu rposes. But those past jud gments w ill invariably constrain th e future jud gments
that it can rationally maintain at the collective level: this, in the way that a p olitical
par tys past comm itments on red ucing taxes but increasing expenditure in certain
areas will constrain the other decisions it has to make about expenditure. And so
there will be a serious question for the group as to w hether or not it should impose
reason at the collective level, letting later jud gments be d ictated in a p remise-driven
way by earlier ones or d isowning some of the earlier jud gmen ts; after all, the lesson
of the discursive dilemm a is that thou gh every ind ividu al holds a rational set of
views on the issues involved, voting independ ently on each issue could lead to a
collectively irrational result. That question will arise to the extent that effective, joint
action requ ires collectively rational jud gments. And it will assume a par ticularly
sharp form so far as members or outsiders are ready to charge the group, perhaps
even m ock it, for any failu re of collective reason .
The upshot, then, is this. Take those groups w here the ideal of deliberative
democracy apparently app lies and w here the collectivisation of reason is not made
infeasible by num bers or d isorganisation. Are such grou ps likely to face the hard
choice betw een ind ividualising an d collectivising deliberation? Yes, they are. Theywill certainly face that choice if they are comm issioned to m ake their d ecisions on the
basis of certain criteria or if they succeed in establishing criteria by w hich to m ake
those decisions. But even if they d o not have such criteria imposed on th em, or
cannot agree on any criteria by w hich to opera te, they will still face the hard choice
represented by the discursive d ilemm a; they will not be able to rest content w ith
their mem bers each voting accord ing to their own particular reasons on the different
issues that come before the group . The reason is that any such group will build up a
history of jud gments over time and those jud gments are bound to provide reason,
now here, now th ere, for taking a certain line on some new issue. Thu s the group will
have to choose either to let their line on this new issue be governed by m ajority vote,
at a r isk of proving inconsistent over time, or to en force collective reason in the event
of such inconsistency, whether by letting the previous jud gments d ictate that line or
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by allowing the new vote to stand and by revising one or more of those jud gments.
The discursive dilemm a is, qu ite simp ly, un avoidable.
4. The resolution in repub lican th eory
The republican argum ent for deliberative democracy
Repu blican theory, as I have argu ed elsewhere, pu ts a premiu m on p eoples
enjoying freedom as non -domination: that is, on peoples having a status such that
ideally no one else is able to interfere arbitrarily in th eir lives. If any other person or
agency is able to interfere in their lives, then they m ust be forced to track p eoples
perceived interests in the interference they practise; they must not have a pow er of
arbitrary interference.
That ideal raises the question of how th e state can be blocked from enjoying a
pow er of arbitra ry interference in th e lives of citizens. The state is a necessary
institution and it necessarily has a power of interfering with p eople: it cannot operate
without being able to tax, legislate and penalise the governed . So how is its pow er of
interference to be mad e non-arbitrary? Repu blican constitutional theory is built
around that question and has consistently sought to describe various devices
whereby non-arbitrariness may be fur thered . These includ e familiar mechanisms
such as d emocratic election, rule of law, separation of pow ers, limitation of tenu re,
rotation of office, and so on.
In this republican tradition of constitut ional discussion, one important stran d
has been the idea that if the states pow er of interference is to be rendered n on-
arbitrary th en whatever other devices are in place, peop le must be able to contest the
decisions made by various arms of governm ent. They must have access to the
reasons sup porting those decisions and they must be able to contest the sound ness of
those reasons or the degree of sup por t they offer to the decisions mad e. Moreover
they m ust be in a position, ideally, to expect that such contestations will be heard ,
will be impartially adjudicated and, if necessary, will be imp lemented against those
in government. The general m essage is that so far as a governm ent is effectively
contestable, to that extent it is less likely to enjoy arbitra ry p ower .
The effective promotion of contestability in th e political sphere requ ires a
variety of institutions, especially if it is to guard against unw ieldy levels of
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complaint, and I have tried elsewh ere to review som e of them (Pettit 2000). From our
point of view, how ever, only two observations are relevant. The first is that p ut ting
in p lace a regime of participatory or representative d emocracy is essential in
guard ing against certain possibilities of non-constestability and domina tion: the
colonial, the au thor itarian, and so on . And th e second is that any such regime still
leaves striking p ossibilities of non-contestability and domina tion in p lace:
possibilities associated w ith the ty rann y of the democratic majority, in p articular, and
the tyran ny of what we m ight describe as the democratic elite: those in the corridors
of power for examp le, in the bu reaucracy, the cabinet, the courts, the p risons, or
the police force who can impose their own w ill in how they interp ret and
implement democratic policy.
How are people to be emp owered in relation to d emocratic majorities and
democratic elites? How are they to be given a power of contestation against them?
Whatever else is necessary, it seems clear that they m ust be able to ask after the
reasons that supp ort the decisions, they must be able to question the relevance of the
reasons and they m ust be in a p osition to expect a fair hearing. And all of that is
going to be possible, of course, only so far as th e democratic bodies in question
opera te in a deliberative mod e. There must be a dispensation of deliberation in p lace
in the commun ity as a whole, and in the microcosm of par liament, which establishesa currency of considerations that are ad mitted on all sides to be relevant to the
doings of government. There mu st be a commitment in the d ifferent arm s of
governm ent to justifying wh atever decisions are taken by reference to the
considerations that are relevant, by comm on consent, in their case. And it mu st be
possible for private individuals, or perh aps for designated representatives, to
challenge such decisions on the ground s that the reasons quoted are not soun d or do
not offer the requ isite suppor t for the decisions taken. It is only in the event of
democracy having this deliberative cast that contestability, and ultimately non-
arbitrariness, can be fur thered .
This republican argumen t for deliberative democracy applies also, of course,
to forums beyond those of government. Take the workplace comm unity or the
commun ity organisation or ind eed the family. Even if decisions are taken
democratically in such a bod y, there will be little protection against arb itrariness
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short of exit unless the democracy in question op erates in deliberative mode,
giving ind ividuals a chance to contest the decisions made. If decisions are made on
the basis of interest-group p olitics, or bargaining from d ifferent levels of power, then
there w ill be no grou nd s on which any contestation can be mad e. Bru te force or
naked preference will ru le.
Cass Sunstein (1993) probably h as th is repu blican case for d eliberative-
dem ocratic procedure in m ind wh en he describes deliberative democracy as a
republic of reasons. Just as people are in a position to kn ow where they stand in
relation to a cour t jud gment, only so far as the jud ges have to provid e statements of
their reasons, so more generally people can know where they stand in relation to
pu blic decisions only if they know w hat the groun ds ad du ced in sup port of those
decisions are. They w ill not be able to take a stand in relation to p ublic decisions, if
those decisions are the outcome of interest-group bargaining or of voting on th e basis
of naked, unargued p reference. Such non-deliberatively generated d ecisions would
have the profile of dictats or fiats from on high , where the prod ucts of deliberative-
dem ocratic procedure wou ld p resent th emselves as reasoned well-reasoned or
bad ly-reasoned jud gments that p eople are in a position to examine, assess and if
necessary, challenge.
App lying the republican argument
The contestability argu men t for deliberative dem ocracy ough t to have
persu asive force, qu ite apart from its connection with republican theory (see Pettit
2000). It is of particular interest here because un usu ally among such argum ents, as
we shall see in the next section it provid es a firm ground for wanting, where that
is feasible, to impose the d iscipline of reason at the collective, not at the ind ividual,
level.
If I am to be able to judge the actions of another ind ividual or agency in
relation to alleged reasons and , ultimately, if I am to be able to contest those
actions in the relevant sense then th e individual or agency mu st prove answerable
to those reasons. The ind ividual or agency must be d isposed to act as the reasons
require or, at the least, to adjust in response to the criticism that the reasons ad duced
in supp ort of something they did are not app ropriate or that what they did was not
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supp orted by those reasons. In a word , the ind ividu al or agency must p rove to be
conversable: that is, mu st prove to be an interlocutor w hose words can be taken at
face value and, where ap propr iate, invoked in effective criticism of the things they
later d o.
A grou p th at records its assent to certain considerations on the basis of
majority vote and wh ich then p roceeds to make its jud gments and decisions
accord ing to the p remise-driven stra tegy will prove conversable in this sense. Its
jud gments, decisions and actions will track those reasons in the ord inary case. And
wh ere they do not, or where the reasons add uced are shown to be in some way
inappropr iate, then it can be called effectively to book. The group will acknowledge a
role for the consideration of reasons or p remises in relation to any case; it will decide
the group comm itments in regard to those reasons or premises on the basis of
majority vote, or some such measu re of social aggregation; and it w ill then accept
that how it jud ges or decides on the case in hand should be answ erable to those
comm itments. You can deal with such a group as you might d eal with an individual
person ; indeed the grou p w ill deserve to be regard as a legal or at least cultu ral
person : a un ified, corporate entity.
A group that m akes its jud gments and decisions on the basis of
ind ividualising reason, however, will have a very different p rofile. What the
d iscursive dilemm a reveals is that such a group m ay reach theoretical and p ractical
conclusions that a re completely ou t of kilter w ith the m ajority d isposition of its
members in relation to related p ropositions. There will be little or no poin t in
interrogating th e group for its view, und er majority rule, of the different p remises
that m ight be thought to be relevant, for example, and might be acknowledged as
relevant by members of the group . For it will be a perm anent p ossibility that the
conclusion it reaches is not th e conclusion that those majority views w ould
deliberatively support.
Consider the workforce in our earlier example. We might discover that the
majority view among its members is that electrocution is a serious danger, and that a
pay-sacrifice would solve the problem and that those premises imply that a pay-
sacrifice would be desirable; and yet it shou ld be no surpr ise to find that the group
comes dow n against a p ay-sacrifice. There is no talking to a group th at operates like
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this. It is inherently unconversable. Where the grou p that runs by prem ise-dr iven
jud gment and decision is a un ified, corporate entity, the group envisaged h ere wou ld
be a d isparate, aggregate sort of thing. It would not be one, but m any.
Consider an analogy. Imagine that I am composed of man y differentpersonalities, as in some sense I undou btedly am . There is the ecologically mind ed
self, the econom ically mind ed self, and the socially mind ed self that likes to keep u p
with the neighbours. And now supp ose that I face a decision about w hether to buy a
Volvo. That d ecision, let us say, will be determined by the views I take on tw o issues:
one, whether to get a car; and tw o, whether th e best car for someone like me to buy,
asssuming they d o buy a car, is a Volvo. It is quite possible, that faced w ith a d ecision
like this, my d ifferent selves will go qu ite different ways. My economic self, A, may
say that a car is desirable, but not a Volvo: its too expensive. My ecological self may
say that a car is und esirable but agree that a Volvo is the best sort of car to bu y: it is
environm entally the friend liest kind available. And m y social self may hold that it
wou ld be good both to buy a car, in order to keep up with the neighbours, and that
from th is point of view a Volvo is the best sort there is. This, then, is the pattern of
voting among my selves.
Car desirable? Volvo a desirable car? Get a Volvo?
Self A. Yes No NoSelf B. No Yes No
Self C. Yes Yes Yes
Matrix 3
Constituted though I am in such a m ultiplex mode, I would pass as a un ified,
conversable agent were I to make my jud gments and d ecisions in this and similar
cases on a premise-driven basis. I would decide to buy a Volvo in the case on hand ,
reporting as I presum ably would d o that I think a car desirable and that I view a
Volvo as the m ost desirable car there is; after all, those are the views d efend ed by a
majority of my selves. But imagine that I mad e my jud gments and took my d ecisions
in a way that individua lised reason in my d ifferent selves, rather than collectivising
it in my p erson as a whole. I wou ld d ecide in a case like this not to bu y a Volvo. And
yet, interrogated about the relevant reasons reasons that I myself might d eclare to
be relevant I wou ld be found to defend considerations supp orting the pu rchase of
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a Volvo. It shou ld be clear that d id I operate in th is way, then I could not p rove to be
a conversable subject. I would be taken at best as a mu ltitude of disorganised voices,
at w orst as someone without anything recognisable as a mind.
Might the dem and s of contestability be satisfied to the extent that theind ividuals in a group , thou gh not the group itself, are conversable and contestable
agents? Might they be satisfied in the w ay in which they are satisfied by the mu lti-
jud ge cour t? In th is case, the grou p is relatively small and the d iffering ind ividuals or
subgroup s give their differing reasons for taking their d ifferent lines, or ind eed their
d iffering reasons for taking the sam e line. It is not clear how satisfactory a model the
jud icial bench offers, given evidence that mem bers switch votes in ord er to avoid
problems and given recent critiques of the system (Kornh auser an d Sager 1993;
Stearns 1999). But those issues aside, I think that there are good reasons w hy
contestability should be secured at the level of the group , not at the level of the
different individuals who comprise it.
The group is the entity that continu es over time despite changes in its
membership, and that fact alone makes it the salient agency that w e should w ant to
be contestable and conversable. And not only does the group continue in time across
changes in mem bership. It will often have so many members that no one could hope
to secure contestability at the ind ividual level. It w ill often be, not just the salient
agency to m ake contestable, but the on ly feasible one available for that role.
These considerations of salience and feasibility are suppor ted by a thought
that w ould ap ply, even in their absence. It is only und er a regime of group-level
contestability that th e relevant judgm ents will be made in a w ay that answers to
reasons alone and that can be challenged on the basis of reasons alone. Where a
group makes its jud gments in the conclusion-driven way, there are two d istinct
factors that d etermine w hat judgment it makes in a given case: one, the reasons thatreceive majority supp ort among mem bers of the group ; and two, the degree of
overlap betw een the supp orting m ajorities. But the second factor is not relevant from
the point of view of contestability and so it is better for the group to give authority to
the first factor only, as it d oes und er the p remise-driven procedure an d, more
generally, un der any p rocedure that collectivises deliberation.
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There are m any d ifferent argu ments in supp ort of deliberative democracy to
be foun d in the recent literature. The question that we m ust consider, then, is
whether th e position taken in favour of the prem ise-driven version of the ideal
and , more genera lly, in favour of the version that collectivises deliberation runs
seriously coun ter to any of those other argum ents. I devote the final section to that
issue.
Argum ents for making democracy deliberative
Most of the argu men ts in the literatu re focus on the virtue of making
democracy deliberative: that is, on th e benefit to a dem ocratic process or society of
having d eliberation of an inclusive, dialogical kind (see Cohen 1989; Dryzek 1990;
Sunstein 1993; Benhabib 1994; Gutmann and Thompson 1996; Bohman and Rehg
1997; Elster 1998). Some assert that making democracy deliberative should help to
ensure that peoples preferences are reflective and informed , not just the brute
produ ct of their ad apta tion to circum stance (Sun stein 1993); or that it should enable
peop le to do better in reaching beyond the chasms of difference that separa te the
members of certain grou ps, even if it does not bring them into consensus (Youn g
1990); or that it shou ld stretch peoples imagination and emp athy as they are forced
to take a general point of view (Goodin 1999). Withou t alleging any su ch
psychological transformation, other argu ments maintain that m aking democracy
deliberative shou ld a t least have th e effect of screening ou t self-regard ing concerns in
favour of more public-spirited considerations, thereby approximating or advancing
an ideal of pu blic reasoning am ong free and equal participan ts (Habermas 1984,
1989; Elster 1986; Cohen 1989; Elster 1998). And yet a further range of arguments
urge that making dem ocracy deliberative would p romote such effects as legitimising
whatever d ecisions are reached, making th em m ore likely to take accoun t of the
relatively pow erless, increasing transparency among members of the group, or
promoting just outcomes (see Elster 1998, 11, for a summary).
There is no likelihood that any arguments of this kind could be invoked
against the view that deliberative democracy ough t to impose reason at the collective
rather than th e individual level. We do not eliminate d eliberation by m aking
deliberative democracy prem ise-driven, for example, and thereby imposing reason at
the collective level, and benefits of the kind invoked in these argu ments all look to be
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consistent w ith such a p rocedure. Consider the case of the workforce deliberating on
whether to introd uce a safety measu re or to establish a time-check. Even if they agree
to reach a decision in a p remise-driven w ay, they will first be required un der th e
deliberative-democratic ideal to d iscuss the matter in pu blic. And th e benefits that
come of making dem ocracy deliberative, accord ing to the argum ents under
consideration, would all seem to be available under the prem ise-driven w ay of doing
things; in p articular, they wou ld seem to be available as read ily and as richly as
under the alternative. The premise-driven procedure m akes ample room for
achieving the psychological and other transformative effects mentioned in the
argum ents in qu estion. And so of course wou ld any other p rocedure that
collectivised reason in a d emocratic way: say, as mentioned earlier, a procedure that
allowed mod us tollens as well as mod us p onenes.
Not only that. Among such benefits there are some that look mu ch more likely
to be realised u nd er a reason-collectivising p rocedure. With many democratic bodies,
it is importan t by our general lights tha t mem bers not be prejud iced in the conclusion
they d raw , for example, and not be lazy about the consideration they give to relevant
premises. But if they are allowed to vote their ind ividual jud gments on the
conclusion to be decided, then there is more room for prejud ice and laziness than
would be available under a collectivising procedure. Not having to give theirjud gment on the relevant premises, mem bers of the body m ay find it easier to hide
the influence of prejud ice on their views. And not having to give their jud gment on
each p remise, members may be temp ted, once they have made a p remise-jud gment
that d etermines their conclusion-vote, not to bother giving consideration to the other
premises relevant.
Argum ents for m aking deliberation dem ocratic
But there is another sort of argu men t for the ideal of deliberative dem ocracythat r aises a sharp er challenge to the republican position. This is the type of
argu men t that makes a case, not for having deliberation present in democratic
process, but rather for having d emocracy present in d eliberative process; it argues for
making d eliberation d emocratic, not for m aking d emocracy deliberative. The claim is
that if there are matters of truth involved in p olitical deliberation as in the
question, most abstractly, of whether this or that is in the comm on interest then
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the chance of reaching the tru th, or of reaching the tru th accord ing to received views
of reliability, is increased by having in p lace a regime of democratic decision-making.
The argum ent may be recast for goals other than th at of maximising the chance of
reaching the tru th or m inimising the chance of falsehood . It app lies just as read ily to
a more specific goal like that of minimising the chance of a false negative, for
example: say, minimising the chance of find ing an inn ocent d efend ant gu ilty. But I
shall restrict myself here to th e original truth-centred case.
This type of argum ent has been forcefully defended by David Estlund
(1993a;1993b; 1997) but th e most famou s version, and the one I shall consider h ere,
derives from the Marquis de Cond orcets work in d efence of his so-called jury
theorem (Black 1958; Condorcet 1976, 33-70; Estlund 1994). The theorem presup poses
that the voters are independ ent of one another : while they may certainly form their
opinions on the basis of d ialogue, none of them votes in a way that is blindly
deferential to others (Estlund and Waldron 1989; Estlund 1994). It shows that if
voters each have the same, greater than evens chance of being right on some yes-no
issue then, first, their collective resolution of the issue, un der majority ru le, will have
a yet greater chance of being r ight and, second , it w ill have a p rogressively greater
chance of being right as the size of the group increases. Ind eed the latter element is
assured , even if some voters have a less than evens chance of being r ight; it w ill holdso long as the average chance of voters being ind ividually right is greater than evens
(Owen, Grofman and Feld 1989).
Let competence in a person be identified w ith the probability that on being
forced to choose between th e answers, they w ill choose the right one. Sup pose that
the person h as to choose, then, between jud ging that p and jud ging that not p. Their
competence will be given by the p robability associated w ith its being the case: either
that p , and they jud ge that p; or that not p , and they judge that n ot p. The message of
the jury theorem is that if the the competence of individual voters is greater than 1/ 2,
then th e comp etence of the group operating under m ajority rule will be greater still
and will app roach 1.0 as the number of mem bers increases.
We cannot go through the p roof of the jury theorem here for an excellent
presentation, see Estlund (1994) but th e idea is reasonably intu itive. Sup pose that
each of us in a certain grou p has a two th irds chance of being right on some sort of
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issue. If I provide an answ er on m y own as that sort of issue comes up instance after
instance, then in th e long run I may expect to be right tw o third s of the time. But if
three of us, A, B and C, decide wh at to say instance by instance, on the basis of a
majority vote, then un der the stand ard probability calculus (Skyrm s 1966, 111-37),
our p erformance ought to be better than mine on my own.
Here, in br ief, is wh y. On any occasion the group will be right so long as at
least two of us so long as three of us or any tw o of us are right. If the chance of
any on e of us being right on a given occasion is two th irds, then the chance of at least
two of us being right is the chance that A and B but not C are right, or that A and C
but n ot B are right, or that B and C but not A are right, or that A and B and C are
right. The chance that A an d B but not C are right assum ing independ ence is
the chance of A being r ight times the chance of B being right times the chance of C
not being right: i.e. 2/ 3 x 2/ 3 x 1/ 3, or 4/ 27; and similarly for the other pairs. The
chance that A and B and C are all right is 2/ 3 x 2/ 3 x 2/ 3, i.e. 8/ 27. And so, the
chance that at least two of us are right is the sum of these four figures: 4/ 27 plus 4/ 27
plus 4/ 27 plus 8/ 27; with d isjuncts that are mu tually incompatible the probability of
the d isjun ction is the sum of the disjun ct-probabilities. Thus the chance that at least
two of us are right on any occasion is 20/ 27; and this is higher than the two th irds
chance 18/ 27 of any on e of us being right. The reasoning continues in the sameway for each increase in the size of the group , sup por ting the Cond orcetian
conclusion that group competence app roaches 1.0 as the size of the grou p increases.
The question now is whether the jury theorem p rovides any reason for
resisting a mod e of democratic jud gment-making that imposes reason at the
collective level. Is there a general argument for th inking that it is better, in
Cond orcetian term s, to collectivise reason rather than ind ividualising it? In
par ticular, to make the issue more specific, is there a general argu ment for going the
prem ise-driven rather than the conclusion-driven w ay? As the answer goes in this
case, so it shou ld go m ore generally.
I raise the question un der the assum ption that a conclusion in the conjun ctive
case will be supp orted if the premises are suppor ted and w ill be rejected otherwise.
This is the assum ption , in effect, that if the premises are p and q, then the
conclusion is just the conjun ction of those p remises. We need only consider the
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conjun ctive case, since und er our interpretation the chance of an ind ividual or group
being right abou t a d isjun ction, p or q, is just th e chance of their being righ t about the
conjun ction, not(not p and not q).
The calculation of the relevant probabilities is a complex matter that WlodekRabinowicz and I add ress in an app endix, but th e overall picture suggested by those
calculations suggested, not definitively established is relatively clear. The
prem ise-driven ap proach d oes better, accord ing to that picture, provided we focus
on the case wh ere the individual or group is right about the conclusion through
being right about the premises: provided they are right about the conclusion for the
right reasons. But it is possible for an ind ividual or group to be right about w hether a
conjun ctive conclusion obtains, wh ile being wrong about some or a ll of the conjun ct-
premises: it is possible to be right abou t the conclusion for the w rong reasons.
Sup pose that it is not the case that p and q. I may be right in thinking that it is not the
case that p and q th rough th inking that not p and q, or not p and not q, when it is
rather the case that p and not q; or I may be right through th inking that p and not q,
or not p and not q, when it is rather that case that not p and q; or, finally, I may be
right through thinking that p and not q, or not p and q, when it is rather the case that
not p and not q. It turns out, surp risingly, that if it does not matter what the reasons
are for which an ind ividual or group is right abou t a conclusion, then the conclusion-driven approach does better in Cond orcetian term s: it offers a better chance of the
groups making the correct jud gment on th e conjunctive conclusion.
How should w e respond to this finding? It is not the most w elcome result
possible from the point of view of the argum ent in the last section; the most welcome
result wou ld have been that the p remise-dr iven ap proach is better either way. But it
is much m ore welcome than wou ld have been th e result that the conclusion-driven
app roach is better either w ay. And it is a result that, on reflection, proves to be quite
congenial.
When a person or comm unity makes a correct jud gment that p for the wrong
deliberative reasons, then w e deny th at they un derstand wh y it is the case that p, or
that th ey know that p . But the ideal of deliberative democracy, as that has been
articulated on all sides, is closely bound to the alleged p rospect of an increase of
understand ing and perhaps knowledge on the part of individuals in the comm unity,
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and the grou p as a whole; there is no suggestion that it merely increases the
likelihood of serendip itous error. The ideal supp oses that in relying on deliberation
to guide them toward s a collective jud gment, people will be guided by right reasons:
that is, by reasons that are sound as well as supportive.
This line of thou ght suggests that w hen w e try to determine how satisfactory
the p remise-driven app roach is in Cond orcetian term s, the question w e should ask is
wh ether it does better than the conclusion-dr iven ap proach in p romoting the chance
of the groups getting the right result, assuming th at the result is to be reached on the
basis of right reasons. And the answ er to that qu estion, hap pily, does go the way of
the p remise-driven app roach. Not only does the app roach make contestability
possible and so answ er to repu blican concerns. Under the assum ption that
jud gments are to be reached via right r easons, which is common to all theorists of
deliberative dem ocracy, it also holds out the best prospect of enabling the group to
get at the truth .
I said that the p icture d efended in the app endix, on w hich w e have been
relying, is not definitively established there. What is worth not ing, however, is that
the less secure element in tha t picture is the suggestion that the conclusion-driven
app roach w ill do better when it does not matter whether the moving considerations
are the right reasons or not. The claim tha t the prem ise-driven procedure will do
better than the conclusion-driven w hen only right reasons are in play that is, the
claim on w hich the validity of the comments just m ade depends looks to be much
more firmly supp orted.
I conclude, to return to the general line, that the various argu men ts in the
literatu re for deliberative dem ocracy are consistent with th e republican w ay of
resolving the question that the discursive dilemma raises. The republican concern
with contestability gives pow erful reason for wanting democratic procedure to bedeliberative, where possible, in way that imposes the discipline of reason at the
collective level. And the other considera tions that are more generally invoked to
support deliberative democracy do not represent countervailing forces.3
Research School of Social Sciences,Australian National University,
Canberra, ACT 0200
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Philip.Pettit@anu .edu.au .References
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Brennan, G. (1999). Collective Irrat ionality and Belief. Canber ra, Research School of
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Buchanan, J. and G. Tullock (1962). The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor, University
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Estlund , D. (1993). Who's Afra id of Deliberative Dem ocracy? Texas Law Review
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Estlund , D. (1994). Opinion Leaders, Ind epend ence, and Cond orcet's Jury
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Grofman, B. N. and S. Feld (1988). Rousseau 's General Will: A Condorcetian
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Gutm ann , A. and D. Thom pson (1996). Democracy and Disagreement. Cambridge,
Mass, Harvard University Press.
Haberm as, J. (1984, 1989). A Theory of Communicative Action, Vols1 and 2.
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Kornh auser, L. A. (1992). Modelling Collegial Courts. I. Path-Depend ence.
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Kornh auser, L. A. (1992). Mod elling Collegial Courts. II. Legal Doctrine. Journal of
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Kornh auser, L. A. and L. G. Sager (1986). Unpacking the Cour t. Yale Law Journal
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Pettit, P. (1997). Repu blicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Governm ent. Oxford,
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App end ix . The jury theorem and th e discursive dilemm a
Philip Pettit and Wlodek RabinowiczBackground
Let u s assume that in a society, S, everyone has a greater than evens
chance, k, of being right in respect of each of two u nrelated propositions, an d
. This, to take the case of in illustration, means that for any mem ber, x, the
probability that x jud ges that , and , or that x jud ges that not , and not , is
greater than 1/ 2. If we use R for is right in respect of, i.e., as short for theunderlined p roposition in the p receding sentence, then w e can express the
assum ption by saying that for every x and y in S, P(Rx) = P(Ry) = k > 1/ 2; and
similarly for .
Let us assume, in addition, that th e chance of any individua ls being right
about one of the propositions is ind epend ent of the chance of any other
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ind ividuals being right abou t it. Thu s for all x and y in S, P(Rx & Ry) =
P(Rx).P(Ry), and similarly for .
Und er these assum ptions, the Condorcet jury theorem gives rise to an
interesting qu estion. We know from the theorem that given the tw o assump tions,
the p robability of a majoritys being right abou t either proposition is greater than
k and that it ap proaches 1 as the size of the grou p increases. But w hat is the
probability of a m ajoritys being right about the conjunction & ? That
question divides into tw o, in the light of the d iscursive dilemma. First, what is
the p robability of a majoritys being right, if the group follows the p remise-
driven procedure? And second , what is the p robability of a majoritys being
right, if the grou p follows a conclusion-dr iven procedure?
We explore the answers to these questions in this append ix, entering
specific values for the size of the group and for the chance of an individuals
being right about a proposition. In pu rsuing this exploration w e add some
further assump tions, in order to make the questions tractable. We take it, not
only that and are un related p ropositions in respect of content, but also that
the competence of each ind ividual in respect of those prop ositions is un related.
Thus, the probability that the ind ividual correctly jud ges one proposition to be
true or false is independent both of the truth value of the other p roposition andof his jud gment of that p roposition (Independence). We assum e that each
individual is opinionated w ith respect to both and , i.e., the probability that
he judges () to be true or to be false the probability that h e jud ges that it
holds or jud ges that it does not hold equals 1 (Opinionation). We assum e also
that, for each of these propositions, its being tru e is equiprobable w ith its being
false (Equiprobability of Propositions). And we assume that the comp etence of each
individual is evenhanded as far as each p roposition and its negation are
concerned : that he jud ges it to be true and it is tru e is just as p robable as that he
judges it to be false and it is false (Evenhandedness).
A complexity: being right for the w rong reasons
These questions involve a comp lexity that is not at first obvious. If we ask
about someones or ind eed some group s chance of being right abou t a
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conjunction like & then w e have to consider the chance of their being right in
each of four (as we assume, equiprobable) scenarios:
1. & 2. not & not . 3. & not 4. not & .
In each of those scenarios we have to d etermine th e chance of the p ersons being
right for the right reasons, i.e. through being right about each of the conjuncts; or
being right for the wrong reasons, i.e. throu gh being wrong abou t one or even
both of the conjun cts. A person can be right in scenario 1 only through being
right about both conjuncts; in 2 through being right abou t both or wrong about
one and right about the other; in 3 through being right about both, through being
wrong about both, or through being wrong about the first and right about the
second; and in 4 through being right about both, through being w rong about
both, or throu gh being right about the first and wrong about the second .
First question, re premise-driven procedure
Let us now consider the first qu estion. Specifically let u s consider it und er
the assump tion that we h ave a group , S, of just three members and that the
chance, k, of an ind ividuals being right is 2/ 3. Und er the premise-driven
procedure w e first have to d etermine the chance of the groups being right abou t
each of the p ropositions, and . The Cond orcet jury theorem, applied as
illustrated in th e text, tells us tha t this chance is 20/ 27. So wh at, then, is the
chance of the group s being right abou t the conjun ction & ?
The elements required for making th is calculation are presented in this
table, where J ind icates that th e proposition following is jud ged to be tru e by
the relevant subject: in this case, the majority and so the grou p.
Scenarios Ways of being right Chance of being right
1. an d J and J 20/ 27 x 20/ 27
Total: 400/ 729
2. not and not Jnot and Jnot 20/ 27 x 20/ 27
Jnot and J 20/ 27 x 7/ 27
J and Jnot 7/ 27 x 20/ 27
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Total: 680/ 729
3. and not J and Jnot 20/ 27 x 20/ 27
Jnot and Jnot 7/ 27 x 20/ 27
Jnot and J 7/ 27 x 7/ 27
Total: 589/ 729
4. not an d Jnot and J 20/ 27 x 20/ 27
Jnot and Jnot 20/ 27 x 7/ 27
J and Jnot 7/ 27 x 7/ 27
Total: 589/ 729
The table displays the fact that it is hard er for the group to be righ t in
scenario 1 about th e conjun ction than in other cases; in those cases the group can
be right about the conjun ction while being wrong about one or both of the
conjun cts. The overall probability of the group s being right abou t the
conjun ction w ill equal the sum of the four totals, divided by 4, since the scenarios
are equiprobable. And that figure comes out as 1129/ 1458. This is the chance of
the groups being right about the conclusion, for right or wrong reasons, un der
the premise-driven procedu re.
But what is the chance of the grou ps being right for the right reasons? The
answ er is given by the sum of the first row totals for the four scenarios, d ivided
by 4. And the figure in th is case is 400/ 729: i.e. 800/ 1458 as against 1129/ 1458.
Second question, re conclusion-driven p rocedure
Now for the second question, which bears on the grou ps chance of being
right in the event of following a conclusion-driven procedure. Here the firstcalculation involves the random ind ividuals chance of being right about the
conjunction, given an ind ependent 2/ 3rds chance of being right about an y
conjun ct. The elements requ ired in this calculation a re given in the following
table:
Scenarios Ways of being right Chance of being right
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1. an d J and J 2/ 3 x 2/ 3
Total: 4/ 9
2. not and not Jnot and Jnot 2/ 3 x 2/ 3
Jnot and J 2/ 3 x 1/ 3
J and Jnot 1/ 3 x 2/ 3
Total: 8/ 9
3. and not J and Jnot 2/ 3 x 2/ 3
Jnot and Jnot 1/ 3 x 2/ 3
Jnot and J 1/ 3 x 1/ 3
Total: 7/ 9
4. not an d Jnot and J 2/ 3 x 2/ 3
Jnot and Jnot 2/ 3 x 1/ 3
J and Jnot 1/ 3 x 1/ 3
Total: 7/ 9.
What is the chance of a rand om ind ividuals being right abou t the
conjun ction for any reasons, right or w rong? This is given by the sum of the four
totals, d ivided by 4, which is 13/ 18. And w hat in that case, using Condorcets
theorem , will be the chance of a majority being correct? This will be the su m of
the chances attaching to the p ossibilities that all three members are correct, that
the first two are correct and the third wrong, that the first and third are correct
and the second wrong, and that the second and third are correct and the first
wrong. And that w orks out at 1183/ 1458. This is somewhat greater than the
chance of the groups being right, no matter for what reasons, un der the prem ise-
driven ap proach: 1183/ 1458 as against 1129/ 1458.
What is the chance of the group s being right w hen the ind ividuals are right
for the right reasons? In order to get an ind ividuals chance of being righ t for the
right reasons about the conjunction, we need to go back to the calculation for the
rand om ind ividu al, add up the first row totals for each scenario, and divide by 4.
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This gives us a figure of 4/ 9. Using the now familiar Condorcetian calculation,
we then find that the chance of a majority being right abou t the conclusion is
648/ 1458. This is considerably smaller than the chance of the grou ps being right
for the right reasons und er the prem ise-driven app roach: 648/ 1458 as against
800/ 1458.
Does this last result dep end crucially on the fact that the rand om
individuals chance of being right abou t the conjun ction for the r ight reasons is
less than a half, i.e. 4/ 9? We do not think so. If we do the corresponding
calculations where the ind ividuals chance of being righ t about either proposition
is taken to be, say, 8/ 9 and so with his or her chance of being right about the
conjun ction for the right reasons being 64/ 81 and greater than evens we still
find that the group s chance of being right for the right reasons is higher under
the premise-driven approach. It is 495,616/ 531,441 as against 471,040/ 531,441.
Conclusion
These calculations give u s solid if not absolutely certain grou nd s for the
claims made in the text. These are, first, that th e prem ise-driven p rocedure looks
likely to do considerably better than the conclusion-driven in securing the chance
of a majority being right for the righ t reasons about a conjunction; and second,
that the conclusion-driven procedure ap pears to do better than the prem ise-
driven one, though not by the same sort of margin, in securing the chance of a
majority being right for no matter w hat reasons, right or wrong, about a
conjun ction. This conclusion applies to d isjun ctions as well. Any disjunction p or
q can be expressed as a negated conjun ction: not(not p and n otq); and being
right abou t a conjunction is equivalent, un der ou r assumpt ions, to being right
about its negation.
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1 This means that there wou ld be nothing to be gained by having electoral dem ocracy
imp ose the d iscipline of reason at the collective level. But it does not mean that w e
should abandon the ambition, comm on to m ost deliberative democrats, to make
electoral democracy and p olitics as deliberative as possible. There may be reasons of
a non-republican kind for seeking a deliberative dispensation, as we shall see in the
fourth section. But in any event the republican rationale introdu ced in the third
section itself suggests an argu ment in sup por t of electoral d iscussion and
deliberation. This is that such debate is likely to be imp ortant for a political
democracy in helping it to establish a currency of considerations that can be invoked
to sup por t or challenge decisions of government. It can serve as a filter such that
those considerations that go u nchallenged in the electoral forum have a good claim
to express comm on perceived concerns.
2 Kornhau ser and Sager (1993) suggest that w hile the straightforw ard premise-
driven procedure is generally more satisfactory more satisfactory from the
point of view, roughly, of contestability the court should resort to a higher-
level procedu re in any case, like the one illustrated , where there is any d oubt
about th is. It shou ld take a majority meta-vote on wh ich procedure to employ at
the lower level, und ertak ing to justify its d ecision (31; cf 33-36): tha t is,
undertaking to find agreed premises such that the m eta-vote can be rep resented
as itself dr iven by majority endorsement of those considerat ions in a prem ise-
driven w ay. Thu s the higher-level considerations might be, first, that going along
with the lower-level premise-driven decision in this instance would generate a
certain resu lt and , second , that the cour t ough t to avoid such a result. Such
considerations, if endorsed by a majority, might provide a higher-level, premise-
driven case for going along with a different resu lt from th at wh ich was
supp orted by a lower-level, premise-dr iven procedure.
3I am ind ebted to Geoff Brennan, who first m ade m e aware of the dilemm a. I was
helped by comments received w hen versions were presented at Lund University,
Nov 99; at a conference on Deliberating about Deliberative Democracy, University
of Texas, Austin , Feb 00; at the ann ual Analytic Legal Philosop hers Conferece in
New York, April 00; and at seminar presentations in Johns Hop kins University, New
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York University and Princeton University. I owe a part icular d ebt to Wlodek
Rabinow itz for his helpful commen ts and I was also greatly aided by discussions
with a num ber of other p eople: David Estlund , Christian List, Victoria McGeer and
Fred Schick. Bruce Chapman and Lewis Kornh auser sent m e useful written
comm ents on the paper.