Defining the Undefinable by Theodore Plautz

8/3/2019 Defining the Undefinable by Theodore Plautz

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DEFINING THE UNDEFINABLE :

THE CANADIAN MILITIIA IN THE 1920's

Theodore Plautz



The decade following the Great War can be described, at

best, as frustrating for the members of the Canadian

Military Establishment. In the flush of ultimate victor, the

slaughters of Passchendale and Vimy Ridge could be heralded

as proud victories of Canadian arms,1 but such enthusiasm,

was confined to looking backwards„ the tension released by

the conclusion of the Armistice precipitated charges of

favouritism in the demobilization order2, led to demands

that the Siberian Expeditionary Force be recalled3, while

the use of the army to support the Civil Authorities care

under increasingly hostile attack4. Such idealistic catch

phrases as "the war to end war" caught the public fancy as

Canadians immersed themselves in an orgy of self-indulged

moralism 5. War weariness easily gave way to blatant faith

in international agreements to end wear "as an instrument

of policy while a growing sense of North American

isolationism coupled with the infant stirrings of Canadian

independence vis-à-vis the Empire appeared to eliminate the

need for an effective army, Economy became the order of the

day as politicians vied among them selves to reduce defense

spending as far as they possibly could. (See Appendix 1 )

In this milieu of economic retrenchment the military

authorities were forced to surrender to political.

Realities and accept their curtailed role in Canadian

society. Lack of funds dictated lower salaries and a

reduction of personnel;6 popular opinion, by deprecating



the military virtues, deprived those who desired to serve

of any self-concept of martyrdom. As a result, the

members of the Permanent Active Forces were compelled to

justify their very existence. The initial step in this

process was to illustrate to the public the folly of

faith in total disarmament and reliance upon reasoned

agreements to eliminate the threat of war in general,

resulting in such eminent figures as Sir Arthur Currie and

CGS Major-General MacBrien "taking to the campaign trail" in

order to dispel the false sense of security that had

been fostered by the League of Nations and German

disarmament Speaking to Montreal convention of bankers, Sir

Arthur Currie sounded the call of realism in an idealistic

world:

We must not lose ourselves in a maze of idealistic

or utopian theories, however beautiful and rainbowtinted these theories may be. As a part of a greatEmpire and a greater Humanity we must look at prac-tical realities. Now, I would be the last to askyou to worship the roll of martial drums or the waving of tattered flags. But I do say that thisEmpire of ours is unified in a large measure by thesilken cords of sentiment, and that to thestrengthening of this sentiment the CanadianMilitia in the past has made a splendidcontribution. Its purpose has been not one ofaggression; its attitude has not been one oftruculent or provoking challenge. For, paradoxical

as it may seem, the Canadian Militia is one of theagencies in our land that can hasten rather thanpostpone that long-dreamed of age,When the war drums throb no longer and the

battle flags are furled.In the Parliament of Man, the Federation ofthe World.(7)



Although such pronouncements were well received at the

Empire Club or lauded at meetings of the Navy League, the mass

of the population simply ignored them; it seemed as if the

defeat of the "Hun" would issue in the millennium where reason

ruled supreme, In this case, such a euphoric sense of security

was probably more damaging than overt hostility; popular apathy

to all things military produced a climate of opinion in which

the politicians could polarize the issue - either Canada would

secede from this new "Age of Enlightenment" by maintaining a large

expensive armed force, or such financial demands could be re-

channeled into more worthy projects, With few articulate

spokesmen,8 the military was bound to suffer at the hands of the

Parliamentarians, who made defense problems a simple matter of

balancing the budget,

Unable to obtain the necessary monies, the question of

Militia reorganization became academic; despite the warnings of

the Judge Advocate General in 1918 that, "we need no regular army

and we ought not to employ a small proportion of the population

continuously on military duty," 9 this lack of funds created a

cadre organization, which, because of lack of public interest,

was able to work within itself without any large-scale

intervention from the politicians,

As their actual strength averaged only approximately 3500 for

the decade, this Permanent Active Militia could hardly be imagined

to constitute either an effective offensive threat or a potential

military deterrent. The net result of this realization of military

impotency was to infuse in the career men a feeling that they



would form the professional nucleus around which a large volunteer

force could be grouped, and through which this amateur army could

receive at least the basic rudiments of military training.

General. McNaughton summed this up in 1927 when he wrote:

It seems obvious that what Canada needs is nota force of any kind immediately ready but alarge force in embryo... the only professionalelements required are a cadre of Instructors,sufficient troops for the maintenance andtraining of this cadre and for administrativeduties in peace. (10)

The secret General Staff opinion was, however, even more

restricted. The Chanak crisis of September 1922 sparked a

momentary interest in the problems of sending an

Expeditionary Force. Upon instructions from the Cabinet,

the General Staff was required to formulate such a scheme

for the dispatch of troops overseas. CGS MacBrien cautioned

that "the Permanent Force must not be forgotten if they are

left out they will not get the experience an instructional

corps must have and then they will lose caste and the finger

of scorn is always ready to point."11 General McNaoughton was

not, however, so concerned with a public image. In a secret

memo to MacBrien he rationalized that:

On mobilization the P.F. units to come up to strengthautomatically under arrangements of their respectiveCommanding Officers, drawing, as far as possible, ontheir old officers returned Imperial officersresident in Canada, R.M.C. Cadets of the two seniorclasses, ex-P.F. Warrant officers, non-commissionedofficers and privates.Persons to be withdrawn from Permanent Force unitsto fill the following appointments in order ofpriority:-



1. Staff Officer Schools2. Depots and Reserve units of the P.F.3. Selected officers for staffs, Heads ofServices and specialized appointments offormations of contingents.

4. Adjutants, Quartermasters, Sergeant-Majors andQuartermaster-Sergeants of units requiring thisassistance

Each P,F, unit to prepare a corresponding activeunit so that it will be ready for overseasservice as soon as let Contingent has embarked.(12)

If the function of this force was indeed limited to

instructional and administrative chores, then it was the

duty of these men to attempt to perfect their knowledge of

both the theoretical and technical aspects of modern war.

To create competent facilities for this within Canada would

have demanded a capital outlay which the Government was

quite unwilling to grant. The Canadian soldiers therefore

looked to Britain; in 1925 the decision of the Minister of

National Defense to reinstitute the program of inter Imperial

interchanges whereby qualified Canadians could attend

specialized military schools in the United Kingdom ,13

elicited

a hearty approval from the editorial staff of the Canadian

Defence Quarterly.14 Such tours of duty were designed to

benefit more than just those few who were privileged to be

chosen, rather "...on their return to Canada the personnel

have been employed in our own military schools so that we

may obtain the widest possible benefit." 1 5 Moreover. the

security files of the Department of National Defense are

filled with printed reports of such instruction; these were in

turn relayed to the Military District Commanders and other

interested officers.16



A functional analysis of the Permanent Forces, no matter

how complete, is dangerously guilty of failing to pose the

correct questions. Perhaps Mackenzie King, in one of his more

penetrating moments, stated the problem an succinctly as it

could be:

The Minister seems to think that at thepresent time we ought t o vote an amount atleast equal to amounts that were beingvoted prior to the War This is where I takedirect issue with him. Conditions are wholly different today; there is no world menace. Where does the Minister expect

invasion from? The Minister says theexpenditure is needed for the defense ofCanada - defense against whom? There is noanswer; there is no answer to be made.17

Mr. Guthrie, the Minister of Militia and Defense,

must have squirmed rather nervously in his seat on

the Front Benches. Although his reply was logical it

skirted King' s central point entirely:

It is well known that every year we abandontraining we lost so much efficiency in our force.If you abandon Military training for 2,3, or 4years consecutively I would not be surprised if ittook 10 to 15 years to raise a new Militia force. .Our program is modest, and our expenditure is modest. It is a duty we have to perform, and it isone of those duties that we ought to face with asmile. (18)

The criticism of Guthrie that he failed to provide an answer is

unfair and misleading; while no competent military strategist

would favour revealing a controversial contingency plan within

the well read pages of Hansard, no enterprising politician would



hasten to accept responsibility for fostering alarmist views.

The assumption that the Ten Year Rule applied to Canada as

well as to Britain became a maxim upon which Canadian high

policy was predicated.

The military men, by the very fact that their isolation from the

political arena divorced them from such a limiting factor as an

appeal to public opinion, were not directly swayed by such

pacifistic sentiments . Contentious arguments could be freely

discussed and either accepted or rejected on their merits rather

than just ignored for fear of political repercussions.

If Mr. Guthrie felt ill at ease at the prospect of declaring any

country a specific enemy, no such inhibitions affected J.

Southerland Brown, the Director of Military Operations and

Intelligence (DMO & 1), who, single-handedly formed the

analytical strategic branch of the Militia. Between December

1920 and April 1921, this enigmatic public servant busied

himself with an assessment of the Dominion's strategic position.

On 12 April 1921, he delivered "Defense Scheme No. 1." a

remarkable document which purported to define the frame of

reference for the DIRECT defense of Canada.20

The purpose of this analysis was to adjudge the

capabilities of Canada in the realm of "immediate defense of our

country against invasion by hostile forces."21 As such, "Buster"

Brown took it upon himself to ignore diplomatic ramifications or

political consequences in order to envision the problem in



purely military terms, although his later correspondence

concerning this plan reflects a distinctly anti-American bias

and a concomitant willingness to discuss the question within a

political frame of reference.

This study did not pretend to pinpoint one and only one

possible enemy, but rather to rationally balance the available

data in order to determine military priorities to prevent a

direct attack through invasion, Nor was it an attempt to

eliminate Imperial concerns from the Canadian military scene; on

the contrary the bond of Empire provided the most relevant

assumption central to the defense of the Dominion. The

initial determination of areas of military confrontation is

broad and far-reaching.

For a struggle for the existence of theEmpire, it would appear that four cases mayoccur:

1. A European Combination2. The United

States3. Japan4. A combination of the above.

Only (2) and (4) of the above and possibly in alesser extent (3) would put Canada in immediatedanger of invasion and call-for the Levee on Masse.It is necessary, therefore, to draw up threedifferent Defense Schemes

1. For the Defense of Canada against the UnitedStates,

2. For the Defense of Canada against Japan.

3. For the Organization and the Dispatch of anExpeditionary Force to help the Empire incase of a European Combination or a MinorCrisis...(23)



Although not specifically included in Eayrs' selections

from "Defense Scheme No. 1," there remains the presumption that

direct Asian or European aggression against Canada would be

prefaced by such large scale military and naval preparations

that the element of surprise could not be achieved, Not so

however with the United States; from a military standpoint the

unarmed frontier and geographical extent of both countries

allowed for the element of surprise to an alarmable extent*

Fully cognizant of the overwhelming military superiority of

Canada’s southern neighbour, Colonel Brown saw that the only

possible hope of resistance lay with a combination of limited

local offensives24 in the West and the Maritimes and a strategic

delaying action in the presumed primary zone of invasion - the

Toronto-Ottawa-Montreal25 triangle, The chief consideration in

the feasibility of this resistance depended upon advantageous

use of time and full utilization of the air arm:

To carry out an Offensive Action against theUnited States, means, first of all QuickerMobilization; secondly, the immediate dispatch ofFlying Columns on the declaration of War; thirdly,the dispatch of our Formations at Peace Strength tobe followed rapidly by drafts filling them to WarEstablishment; fourth, a speedy mobilization of ourReserve Units by General Recruitment and by

putting in force the Levee en Masse., as soon asProclamation is made; fifth the completion of theorganization of our Formations by the inclusion ofReserve Units; sixth, the dispatch of Reserve Unitsto certain garrisons or certain strategical points;seventh, the early formation of Depots

This emphasizes the fact that our Flying Columns must be organized for immediate action; that ourDivisions must get underway with units at Peace



Strength with the least possible delay, that is, withinthree or four days of the declaration of war.(26)

This optimistic tone seems to have been based on the

assumption that the Dominion was not expected to face the

threat alone and unaided:

To keep up this offensive and to continue the successful

defense of Canada, will require the timely arrival of

reinforcements from the Empire and particularly from the

United Kingdom and the full use of manpower and resources

of the Empire in other theatres of operation, namely, the

Atlantic Seaboard of the United States; the Southern

Seaboard i.e. the Gulf of Mexico, Florida and Mexico;

the Pacific Coast.(27)

Within this Imperial context, the Royal Navy became the vital

link upon which the ultimate survival of Canada would

depend:

Sea Power is another of the most importantfactors in the Defense of Canada. To keep open forperiods at least, the seas for the transport ofBritannic and Imperial troops to the variousTheatres and for the protection of our Atlanticand Pacific Coasts, to prevent our Ports ofDisembarkation for help from the Empire beingoccupied or destroyed. (28)

The defense of Canada was dependent therefore upon

secrecy and planning; without a predetermined order of

progression, the sheer numerical superiority of the United

States would predominate. But while the planning emanated from

the strategic nerve centre of Ottawa, the implementations of

its directives fell to the Military District Commanders,

"Defense Scheme No. 1" was therefore relayed to then for

comments and suggestions but this supposed feedback system



appears to have suffered from acute nervous disorders. While

many of the District Commanders remained silent, tactical

considerations formed the basis of any criticisms tendered.

Only Colonel C. J. Armstrong, (C.O. of M.D . No. 4 -

Montreal) braved the wrath of the D.M.O. & I through an

assertion that the whole thing was conceived in fantasy. "I

consider that the most difficult point in the Scheme," ran the

observation., "is the fact that it is drawn up for forces

which are to a certain extent non-existent." The actual

definition of the enemy, however, remained unchallenged.

While most of the Military District Commanders failed to

exercise their prerogative of criticism„ the other branches of

the Service appeared to remain equally disinterested. In a

communiqué dated 10 January 1922, CGS MacBrien related the

situation to Commodore Walter Hose, Director of Naval Service

(DNS):

I have already outlined to you the general planin case of war between Great Britain and theUnited States. The naval control of the GreatLakes enters largely into our plans of defense.It will be helpful to us if you can let me knowyour ideas or synopsis of any plans you may havefor the purpose of getting control of theLakes.(32)

By 29 March no such synopsis had been received from the

naval authorities, in fact, "their reply indicated that it is a

subject that they hadn't given much thought to," Nor,

apparently, did the Royal Canadian Air Force, In spite of the



strategic reliance upon Air Columns outlined in the scheme, no

effective communication appears to have circulated between the

D.M.O. & I. and the R.C.A.F.

"Defense Scheme No, 1" began as, and indeed remained, the

exclusive preserve of the Militia. It is a mistake, however,

to assume that it slowly gathered dust of Colonel. Brown's

office shelves. Although the correspondence

pertaining to military operations under this plan is somewhat

sparse, the file is replete with tactical suggestions and

requests from Military District Commanders seeking

compensation for expenses incurred while traveling within

the "enemy's" borders. But these were denied; there just wasn't

enough money available for any practical intelligence work,

The ever present strain of financial problems posed a

constant threat to any hopes of military action. In spite of

this, J, Southerland Brown sought every opportunity to expand

and defend "Defense Scheme No. 1." He reacted violently to the

proposal to set up an arsenal at Petawawa:

IT APPEARS TO ME THAT THE MOBILIZATION STORES AS

THEY ARE OBTAINED SHOULD BE DISTRIBUTED, NOT ONLY TO

FACILITATE MOBILIZATION, BUT TO BE IN A POSITION SO

THAT WE SHALL NOT HAVE ALL OUR EGGS IN ONE BASKET.

(his caps and underling)(36)

This assertion easily led into an analysis of "the many very

grave questions under consideration between Canada and the

United States ."36a As the D.M.O. & I. saw the difficulties, they

could almost seem insurmountable* Not only were there the questions



of deep sea fishing ports,, the Backus interests near the Lake of

the Woods, innumerable minor boundary disputes and the problem of

railroad connections through ?Mine, but also the demands of the

United States for extradition of witnesses and general search and

seizure of ships on the Great Lakes This last demand was simply

intolerable; Canada's reaction should be swift and decisive. "When

a great nation makes such demands from another nation, we not only

want to fear God and honour the King, but keep our powder dry!" 37

Such a flair for dramatic invectives fit in nicely with

Colonel Brown's personality. If the controversy over "Defense

Scheme No, I" ended on this note it might well be regarded as the

product of the overly imaginative mind of one Hyperactive civil

servant afflicted38 with "strategist's cramp",38 and only humoured

along by those with more realistic minds, But, in. fact, it is not

the end, On 24 October 1927, the Joint Staff Committee held its

first meeting. 39 While admitting that "our forces are more likely

to be required abroad for Empire Wars than Home Defense, "the

report concluded that "the scheme for the Direct Defense of

Canada.. . is the most important problem."40 On this note the

Committee continued:

The two things apparent in the Defense of Canadaare(1) that we lack depth

(2) that all our East and West Communicationscome close to the American frontier in some places



and most of them parallel it throughout the wholedistance.It is therefore clear that both by geographyand by enemy action Canada will have to be dividedinto self-sufficient military areas, (41)

With such strategic considerations as the basis of discussion,

the conclusions reached have a familiar ring:

Time is the essence of all our action duringMobilization and early operations. It is our dutyto act definitely in order to gain time forthe forces of the Empire to be mobilized tocome to our help. We will therefore carry outlimited offensives in all commands except theGreat Lakes Command, the latter being assumeda place for the defensive.

In order to carry out an offense againstthe United States it will be necessary to

quickly send our formations forward at peace strength with reserves following. We must makea great throw at first and put our maximum,strength at the earliest moment.

This limited offensive should increase ourdepth; increase our resources by occupation ofhostile country; increase the moral (sic) ofour population with a corresponding decreaseof moral of the enemy; cover the mobilizationand organization of our manpower and preventthe destruction of our resources and lateralcommunications. These will all help togain the necessary time. (42)

Considering that the reports of the Joint Staff

Committee were designed for the Minister of National

Defense, it is difficult to imagine how the responsible

political officials could fail to learn just what the

Canadian Militia was proposing. Although it may be argued that

"it is almost certain that no Canadian Prime Minister 43

ever read 'Defense Scheme No. 1 it is difficult to assume

with equal flippancy that any Minister of National Defense,

no matter how incompetent, could have failed to at least

mention such plans which ran so directly counter to

official policy. Perhaps the popular apathy towards the



Militia had permeated even the Ministry of National

Defense; perhaps it had even reached the stage where the

Government no longer cared what their military did. The only

problem with this assertion is that if the plan had leaked

out it could easily have so seriously impaired Canadian.-

American relations so as to bring down the Government.

Whatever else may be said about Mr. King, it could not be

argued that he would be willing to relinquish power to

appease the sensibilities of the Joint Staff Committee. Some

sort of approval, no matter how tacit, must have eminated

from the politicians.44

Although no action was forthcoming from the nation's

political leaders to force the cancellation of "Defense Scheme

No. 1," the Government also refused to accept any thesis of

immediate danger. This equilibrium of absurdity lasted for four

years; from 1927 to 1931 the concept of an American invader

remained in limbo* J. Southerland Brown's advice "that we

should pursue the very sound course of organization of the

Canadian Militia for the primary duty of Home Defense and I

therefore recommend that as soon as you can get the Honourable

the Minister's concurrence, Defense Scheme No. 1 should be

rewritten and brought up to date,"45 was completely ignored

by the new CGS, Major-General Thacker, and Colonel H. H.

Matthews, his new D.M. O. & I. But strangely enough there was no

formal cancellation of "Defense Scheme No. 1" until 1931

when CGS Major-General McNaughton deleted it from Canada's



files of contingency plans. Upon closer examination it was

decided that the scheme was too potentially dangerous just to

cancel; on 24 October 1933, MacNaughton ordered all "chapters,

Instructions,, amendments, appendices, etc."46 put to the

torch. It is not that the initial assumptions of "Defense

Scheme No. 1" were fallacious, but rather that its author had

inaccurately gauged the priorities, The document's preface had

outlined three potential enemies - the United States, a

European combination and Japan47 and suggested that similar

schemes be drawn up for the remaining two. Such plans, however,

lacked the energetic championship of "Buster" Brown; his

dynamic strategic talents appear to have been expended on

challenging an American. Invasion.

As has been previously stated, the Turkish situation and

the last minute telegram from London in September 1922 had

temporarily panicked the Cabinet; the Minister of Militia and

Defense instructed the CGS to "prepare in concrete form a

memo showing what troops are available for dispatch in the

eventuality same be necassary."48 In General MacBrien's

absence this request passed directly into the hands of the

D. M. C. & Is whose reply was, received by the Minister the

very next day.

The more mundane task o f preparing an expeditionary

force must not have held much interest for Colonel Brown.

The temporary plan devised sounded stale and out of date;



while making a distinction between "a struggle for the

existence of the Empire" and "a Minor crisis," there was

none of the specificity or ringing appeal of "Defense Scheme

NO. 1," The forces needed should be drawn from the existing

Militia and "should be identical as far as possible with the

old Divisions of the Canadian Expeditionary Force of the

"War of 1914-18 ."51 The distinct lack of strategic

considerations, political conclusions and detailed planning

no doubt stems from the fact that such an Expeditionary

Force, while under the direct command of a Canadian officer,

would none the leas still be under overall strategic

direction from the War Office. The lack of precise

definition even as to the probable theatre of war implied

that the Canadian end to the planning would necessarilly be

restricted to the everyday, humdrum busywork of modes of

mobilization,, composition of forces and amounts of men and

materials available. Colonel Brown, and indeed the other

officers on the General Staff, must have found it difficult

to become fervently impassioned with what must have appeared

to them to be a re-run. of the Great War. An analysis of

operations from 1914 to 1918 was merely halfway updated; the

proposals presented are noticeable only in their lack of any

imagination or proposed reliance upon anything but massed

infantry. It was blandly assumed that the Canadian contribution

would amount to some six Infantry and one Cavalry divisions; by

1923 the ante was 52 raised to eleven Infantry and two Cavalry

divisions.52



The controversy over the role of the Permanent Active

Militia in an Expeditionary Force has already been outlined

but was really a question of internal organization rather

than one of major strategical significance. The questions

of raising, equipping and training such a large force was,

however, central to any proposed usefulness of Canadian

arms.

Strangely enough, all official correspondence pertaining to

an Expeditionary Force meticulously avoided the distasteful

question of conscription. The somewhat unrealistic assumption

that the men of the 1920's would flock to the colours in defense

of the Empire was not seriously challenged,. It was blindly

asserted that somehow the needed men would materialize. The

critical situation concerning equipment was much more

difficult to explain away in general patriotic terms.

The more modest aspirations of the Quartermaster General's

staff represented the disparity between theory and reality.

In a memorandum dated 21 September 1923, Major–General.

Ashton, after surveying the Dominion's current supplies and

defense requirements, concluded that:

It is my opinion (subject to revisionafter the reports of the forthcoming

Imperial Conference have been received)that the strategical requirments will be met if mobilization equipment iscompleted during the next five years for:(a) 1 Division ofInfantry (b) 1Cavalry Brigade(c) 1 Medium Artillery Brigade

(d) Coast Defense at Halifax and Esquimalt. (53)



But even the Quartermaster General. was unable to refrain

from a little fanciful thinking:

The War Establishment of a force thissize the proposed 11 Infantry and 2

Cavalry divisions would be apx. 340,000 allranks and if the Peace Establishment weretaken at 50 % the number would be 170,000. Ofthese it may be supposed that only some 2/3

would be trained in any one year. (54)

But General. Ashton soon came back to earth and his

tabulation of equipment available reflected the true position of

the Militia as opposed to the false picture conjured up by the

strategist; the claims of thirteen divisions may have impressed

the Imperial authorities in London but were hardly justified in

view of actual strength:

The present Permanent Force is 117 546, actualstrength is 52,860, trained last year 35,000.I would suggest that the following action betaken:(i) General Staff to prepare a list of units

with apx. dates on which they are to beequipped.(ii) Q.M.G. to prepare from this a list of thestores for the Peace Establishment of theseveral units (iii) General Staff inconsultation with Q.M.G. to revise these listsand eliminate all stores which are not neededfor training. (55)

This divergence of opinion about Canada's military

capabilities lasted throughout the decade. Any and all grandiose

strategic ambitions bore no relation to the amount of

military equipment available or easily procurred within the

near future. "To my mind the serious feature is not the

amount of shortages (which measured by the requirements of



modern war would not represent the fire of a Canadian

Artillery

Corps for one day) but the fact that there is no

organization in Canada capable of undertaking replacement of

all the essential componants." ran one of many complaints from

the General Staff to the Minister. The replacement quotas

were totally ignored; deficiencies on equipment grew even

more severe as outdated materiel from the First War became

progressively more obsolete and unservicable. Even to

maintain a peace strength, the available stores were

completely inadequate. In late 1927, the Quartermaster

General. postulated that ninety-two 18 pounders and

nineteen 4.5 howitzers were necessary simply to fully equip

the Permanent Force. A study made in the summer of 1930 was

almost comic in its conclusions. While approximately 65 % of

the needed rifles were available for war establishment

requirements, only 45 % of the B.S.A.-Lewis machine guns, 28

% of the revolvers, and 18 % of the Hotchkiss guns were on

hand to equip an Expeditionary Force of 200,000.

CGS MacBrien’s observation that there was no Canadian

organization capable of producing the needed stores is really

irrelevant in view of the parsimonious Militia votes of the

decade; the reorganization of

the military system which was effected on 1 January 1923 (see

Appendix 2) placed power for procuring equipment in the hands of



the Quarter master General, Neither Major-General Ashton nor his

successors were miracle men; with no funds to work with, all

they could do was submit endless numbers of reports to the

Minister decrying the pitiful state of things. It would have

taken a Quartermaster General capable of the Sermon on the

Mount to equip and mechanize the Canadian Militia properly.

Unable to influence the politicians to increase the Militia

estimates substantially, a realistic appraisal of the role of

the Permanent Forces dictated two alternatives – neutrality in

war59

and peace time duties of aiding the Civil Power. Internal

subversion dictated from the Soviet Union was seen as a direct

threat to Canada; labour agitation in the Dominion loomed as an

extention of Bolshevism. The universality of the feeling that

Canada was threatened is reflected in the debates in the House

of Commons; while other contingency plans remained secret,

the "Red menace" was bantered back and forth on the floor of the

House, In June 1919, General Mewburn, the Minister of Militia

and Defense, attempted to justify his proposal to double the

size of the Permanent Militia:

I take the stand that any municipality

where there is trouble and where the

militia have to be called out in aid of

the civil power for the preservation of

law and order, every citizen of Canada

has the duty to perform to the State and

be should link up with the militia and do

his duty.(60)



The chaos of events in the early 1920's permitted the use

of the Militia as "strike breakers,"61 but as the return of

prosperity gradually reduced the potency of the internal

subversion argument, the Militia leaders grew cautious and

concerned with their public Image.63 By 1926, all reference to the

Bolshevik menace had been deleted from Canadian defense plans.

What then was the position of the Militia in the 1920's? The

politicians who controlled the purse strings constantly extolled

the virtues of efficiency, but what they really wanted was a

cheap army; the ever powerful dollar reigned supreme. The

debates in the House rang with pacifistic sentiments and

continued objections to Militia votes,64 but the mass of the

people remained totally unconcerned. The officers of the

Permanent Active Militia espoused many of the radical theories

on the nature of the next war, but due to lack of equipment, all

their experience was gained from military periodicals of

polemics emanating from the United Kingdom or the United

States; there was no Canadian Liddel Hart or Fuller. Grand

strategical plans were drawn up and circulated, but the state of

the forces contradicted their implimentation.

The pessimism of the above remarks is, perhaps, a little

harsh; if the proposals of the Militia leaders had been advanced

in a vacuum they would not have appeared so unrealistic. The

concept of an American invader, although proved so

historically incorrect, must be viewed within its own frame

of reference to be fairly judged. As an extention of the

first principle of Imperial Defense, that "each Dominion is



responsible as far as possible for its local defense by sea,

land and air," Defense Scheme No, 1, as a contingency plan,

is one of the logical possibilities, To point out

that it was too ambitious is certainly valid, but this is

tantamount to asserting that no "small" nation should

indulge in the fancy of hope, To claim that it

is the product of one man is to ignore all further

correspondence. To insist that the Government.. most

certainly, would have cancelled the scheme had they learned

of it is to dismiss the report of the Joint Staff Committee

of 1927, To simply chuckle, as does Eayrs, is to deny the

right to dream and no one could say that "Buster" Brown was

incapable of dreaming



APPENDIX 1

The "Secret Report of t h e Chief of Staff on theDefense Forces of Canada" (PAC; RG24A ,406 5121) contains asummary of the military, naval and air force expendituresfor the years 1913 to 1926, It cautions however that “…in

examining these figures the and undermentioned factsshould be kept in mind:

(a) The present purchasing power of $1.00 is about 65cents as Compared to 1914…

(b) The Third Service - the RCAF - has beenauthorized, and its expenditures have been devoted mostlyto Forestry Protection and Aerial Survey, and not topurely Military Training,

(c) The Non-Permanent Militia has been increased by 50%

and several new arms…have been added,(d ) Rates of pay in all Services have been increased to

meet higher cost of living,"

Permanent Force 1913-14 1924-25 1925-26 1926--27Established 3520 3537 3500 3512Strength 2900 3330 3489 3499Expenditures $2,198,452 $4,769,339 $4,775,600 $4,800,000(est.)

Total Naval, Militia and Air Force Expenditures

1920-21 $10,198,036

1923-24 $13,461,912

1925-25 $12,413, 619

Country % expended on

defense

Per capita (Canadian

dollars)

France 15 $5.70

Italy 19 $4.90

Belgium 8.25 $2.61

Japan 27.75 $3.93

Germany 9.50 $2.28

USA 16 $5.11UK 14.5 $13.17

Australia 10.1 $6.46

New Ze a 4,2 $4.00

South Africa 3.3 $2.86 (whites only)

CANADA 3.7 $1.45

*these figures are NO T adjusted t o account for the inflation mentioned in

(a) above .

Every year on 31 March, the Minister of National Defense

delivered his annual. report and his budget request.

These were usually debated

during the middle of April and, to get th e flavour of



Parliamentary opposition to defense spending one should read

Hansard for these debates .

Append ix II

On 1 January 1923 the new Defense Act came into force.The positions of Minister of Militia and Defense andMinister of Marine and Fisheries were abolished and full military control, centered in a Minister of NationalDefense. This man was to be advised by a Defense Councilconsisting of the Deputy Minister (usually responsible fornaval affairs), the Comptroller, the CGS, the DNS andseveral associate members - the Quartermaster General, the Adjutant General and the Director of the R.C. A.F.

This reorganization provided the military with a seriesof excuses in raising their estimates. While it wasdesigned to promote efficiency, the new organizationpresented growing problems throughout the decade Initialproblems of reorganization relative power positions of the

three Services and allocation of responsilbility.For the text of the bill, see The Canadian AnnualReview 1922 (Toronto, 1923).

For an account of the power -struggles within theDepartment of National- Defense see James Eayrs InDefense of Canada, (Toronto 1964) Volume I, Chapter 6,Chains of Command



FOOTNOTES

1. for a brief description of these two major battles seeG,W,L, Nicholson, Official History of the Canadian Army :CEF 1914-1919(Ottawa 1962). Chapters 8 and 10.

2. The original scheme of demobilizing in order of service

was discarded at the request of General Sir ArthurCurrie. He realized that the occupation forces couldill afford to function without the administrativepersonnel whose relatively sheltered position gave them tenure; moreover he was anxious that the CEF should re-turn to Canada in their fighting formations. Althoughthe initial plan called for direct embarkation from France to Canada, the desire of many of the men tovisit friends and relatives in the United Kingdom saw this modification adopted, In spite of the fact that the Admiralty- announced that it was able to handle up to 50,000 men per month, the Canadian railway, system was hardycapable of transporting this inflated number. Encampment inEngland while waiting for transportation was scarcely- conducive to good relations. on 25 March 1919 trouble atKimmel Park over rumours that Military Service Act draftees were getting preference in returning to Canada resulted in5 dead and 21 wounded; on 17 June at Epsom some 400Canadian troops attacked a local police station torelease some soldiers resulting in the death of apoliceman and five 12 month sentences for manslaughter;on 19 June the Whitley camp disturbances further aggravatedconditions. for details see J.C. Hopkins, The Canadian Annual Review. 1919, (Toronto 1920) 175-76; F.A. Carmen,"Demobilization” in Canada in the Great War, (Toronto 1921)

Volume VI; G.W.L. Nicholson, Official History of theCanadian Army CEF 1914-19, (Ottawa 1962 Chapter 172.

3. The ambiguity of the purpose of the SEF presentedproblems to the Canadian Government. A series of telegramsfrom White (as acting Prime Minister) to Borden (atVersailles) in November 1918 reflected the uncertainty ofthe Cabinet itself, An increasing barrage of criticism attacked the Governments decision to continue operations;this comedy of errors was capped by instructions from theCabinet to General Elmsley (Canadian commander atVladivostok) to undertake no action which might place histroops in jeopardy, The politicians nervously surveyed

public opinion and concluded that while they would notbreak faith with Great Britain, they would do all theycould to prevent any Canadian casualties, See James EayrsIn Defense of Canada, (Toronto 1964) Chapter 1; Allen Don-nel. "The Campaign in or Northern Russia", in Canada andthe Great War (Toronto 1921); Gordon Grey, "Canada and theSiberian Expedition, Nation, Volume 108 (1 February 1919)and G.W.L, Nicholson, Official History of the Canadian Army; CEF 1914-1919. (Ottawa 1962) Chapter 16



4. Use 'of the military to put down strikes and "maintain thepublic order" may have been popular to the editors ofthe Canadian AnnualReview, but they came under fire from both farm and labourleaders. Intervention in Winnipeg, Vancouver, Hamilton andToronto hardlyendeared the soldiers to the working class.

see Eayrs, In Defense of Canada (Toronto 1964) Volume I,Chapter 3; D.C, Masters , Winnipeg General Strike,(Toronto 1954) Chapter 1,

5 James Eayres, In Defense of Canada, Volume I. 8-11, pointsout that emerging nations have a tendency to assume that while war is the natural order of things in the oldernations, they will be able to escape it a thereby purifythe world; The Official Report of the Debates of the Houseof Commons: Dominion of Canada, 17 May 1920, quotesMacKenzie King’s wish to escape – from “The vortex thatcreated the whole situation in Europe..." through theelimination of secret diplomacy; the Toronto Globe for 1

December 1922 reports Sam Guthrie as favouring theabolition of cadet training because "The last war wasfought to bring universal. Peace. and I object to ourchildren being brought up in our public schools as Hun-eaters ," a clipping in "Military Intelligence Concerningattitudes of Individuals r.e. Military, Navy, Air Forceand R.C.M.P. ' s" (PAC; RG24A 395 3502) from thePresbyterian Witness for 23 July 1923 was more specific indetecting evil Militarists, of whom there are many in ourcountry… are among the greatest enemies of peace„ It is thelittle colonels majors and captains who like to strutaround in their gold and brass buttons who foster the warspirit and prattle about the need to prepare for the next

war."; Canada's unique posit ion to set the pace indisarmament became the battle cry o f many of theProgressives. In opposing the annual drill appropriationfor 1921, McMaster hoped that "...surely some thing hasbeen learned in the last five years, surely we inCanada can lead the way in the reduction of armaments."'J.C. Hopkins, The Canadian Annual Review, 1921 (Toronto1922) 338 .

6. one cannot help but be struck by the flavour of theRegimental Histories which span the interwar period.Reduced rates of pay and the lack of equipment oftenresulted in officers providing for such obvious militarynecessities as ammunition out of their own pockets. forexample see G.R, Stevens, Princess Patricia’s CanadianLight Infantry 1919-1957 (n,d .) Chapter 1.

7 Sir Arthur Currie., "The Case for a Canadian Militia"CDQ, volume III (July 1926) 440-441.

8a Although General Griesbach was a member of Parliament andColonel, Ralston became Minister of National Defence anyspokesman for the point of view of the Militia was boundto be drowned in a sea of pacifistic sentiment. Such views



as outlined in footnote 5 clearly held the floor and actedas an impenetrable wall against which those who favouredhigher defense spending could batter their heads to noavail.

9 . Memo of 3 December 1918 contained In DND-GHQ file entitled"Scheme for Iniversal Training" (PAC ; RG24A 371 2682 Volume

I) ; The Toronto Globe of 11 May 1922 editorialized that “Toleave the defense ofCanada a entirely to a small body of professionals would be a bad thing for the soldiers and a worse thingfor the Dominion.”

10. Brigadier General A.L, McNaughton, "Some Aspects of theWork of theDepartment of National Defense" , CDQ, Volume IV(January 1927 ) 144.

11. Memo of 8 February 1922 from CGS Macbrien to DMO & I J.S .Brown found in DND-GHQ file entitled "Defense o f Canada:Defense Scheme No. 3 a major War (PAC; RG24A 393 3498Volume 1)

12, Memo from Brigadier General McNaughton to CGS MacBrien

dated 2 December 1922; to be found in the DN D.GHQ fileheaded "Defense o f Canada.* Defense Scheme No o 3: A Major War (PAC; RG24A 393 3498 Volume I )

13. This policy, which was introduced under Frederick Borden in1907, was never again brought up to its pre-War volume. In1914 there were 37 British officers serving in the Dominionand a similar number of Canadians on duty with theImperial forces. In 1925, after the program had been inoperation for almost a full year, there were only 2 Britishofficers on loan to Canada while 18 Canadians were servingin either the United Kingdom or India. Lt-Colonel H.D.G.Crerar, "The Development of Closer Relations Between theM i l i t a r y Forces of the Empire" , JRUSI Volume 71(August 1926) 445-46.The CDQ reported the officers serving

overseas in the back cover of each third issue of thevolume. In April. 1927, Canadians were dispersed amongthe following institutions:

Imperial Defense College Brigadier General. MaNaughton

Camberly Major K Stuart

Captain K.C.Burns

Major P. Earnshaw

Captain P.C. Hanington

Sheerness Major D.B. Bowie

Quetta (India) Major F.R. Henshaw

Captain L.M. Hughes

Woolwich Major J .H. MacQueen

Major D.E. Dewar

Captain W.C. Thackery

Captain G.A. McCarter



War Office Major F.L. Armstrong

Lt-Colonel.H.D.G. Crerar

Aldershot Captain D.A. Grant

Captain J.C.H. Tidswell

Shorncliffe Major J.P. Archambault

Ordnance Captain G.E. Bell.

RAF Medical Major RX. Luton

Tidworth Captain. N,.A. Gianelli

14. The Editorial of January 1925 found the resumption ofthis practice “gratifying" In view of the fact that… itis desirable that our officers should have Opportunity

of enlarging their military knowledge by occasionallyseeing things outside their own limited sphere, VolumeII (January 1925) 102

15. Brigadier General A.L. McNaughton "Some Aspects of the Workof the Department of National Defense". , Volume IV(January 1927) 145,

16. While many of these files are highly technical. there are afear which are suffielentI7 general to make interestingreading for the layman. See especially DND-GHQ filers,Letters Senior Officers Course- Woking" (PAC; RG24A 3953509) and "Mechanioalization of Fighting Forces" (PAC;

RG24A 446 5115). It is also necessary to note that much ofthe material of the CDQ, especially in the earliernumbers, was reprinted from the JRUSI and other UnitedKingdom Service publication.

17, The Official Report of the Debates of the House ofCommons: Dominion of Canada 16 June 1920, 3646. Thisspeech is also quoted in James Eayrs, In Defense ofCanada, Vol I(Toronto 1964) 3; J.C. Hopkins, The -Canadian Annual Review, 1920 (Toronto 1921) 463;G.F.C. Stanley, Canada’s Soldiers 1604-1954: TheMilitary History of an Unmilitary People, (Toronto1954) 327

18. Official Report of the Debates of the House of Commons:

Dominion of Canada, 17 June 1920; J.C. Hopkins, The

Canadian Annual Review, 1920, (Toronto 1021) 464

19. This was the assumption that Great Britain would not beinvolved in a major war for at least 10 years after theconclusion of the Great Wars; this maxim became a



sliding conclusion as the date for a possible war alwaysremained 10 years away.

20. James Eayrs, In Defense o f Canada, Volume I (Toronto1964) Appendix I, 323-328.

21. Ibid 324

22 Ibid. 323; "Section I. Problems to be met by the Empire"

makes it clear that any U.S.-Canadian confrontation

would probably be precipitated by a declaration of war

from the United Kingdom. There is little hint that

Canada could become embroiled in such a struggle

independent of the Empire.

23, Ibid. 324

24, ibid. 328; "All training and organization in Peace andall arrangements during the Precautionary Period willlead up to a general Limited Offensive against theUnited StatesPacific Command. The field troops of the Pacific Commandto advance into and occupy the strategic pointsincluding Spokane, Seattle, and Portland, Oregon,bounded by the Columbia River...Maritime Command... will make an offensive into theState of Maine."

25, Ibid, 327; "Main objectives. The main objective of theUnited States force would un do u bt ed l y b e M o n tr ea l

and on to Ottawa. The next important objective of theUnited States would be the occupation of the OntarioPeninsula, including the cities of Hamilton andToronto."

26. Ibid 324

27. Ibid 325

28. Ibid 325

29. The secrecy of this document is one of the mostinteresting aspects of its history. When at firstcommunicated to the Military District Commanders, it

was reserved for their eyes alone. After complaintsthat this restriction made its implementationimpossible„ the De140O. & I. reluctantly agreed to letstaff officers see the scheme, Although it might beimagined that the Washington Naval Conference would leadto the scrapping of "Defense Scheme No. l", ColonelBrown's reaction was just the opposite. "The gist ofthe matter is that the decisions of the WashingtonConference have materially improved the relationsbetween Great Britain and the United States, therefore,



more than ever matters relating to Defense Scheme No. 1 must be treated with the greatest security." Letter of 10June 1922 from J, Southerland Brown to Lt. Colonel H.E. BoakD.SO. and found in "Defense o f Canada: Defense Scheme No, 1:Direct Defense" (PAC; RG24A 393 3496)

30, Colonel D.M. Ormand (C.0, of M.D. No. 12 - Regina)

communicated his impressions to National DefenseHeadquarters on 27 December 1923; "If the above describedarea (the Snake Creek-Missouri River junction) were underCanadian control it is considered that without detrimentto our interest sufficient steel could be obtained tocomplete the Hudson Bay Railroad which is most urgentlyneeded for the defense of Canada" Ibid.

31, Ibid , Colonel C.J. Armstrong to National DefenseHeadquarters, 28 e ember .923,

32, Ibid, memo from CGS to DND dated 10 January 1922.

33, Ibid. Letter from J. Southerland Brown to General V.A.S.Wil.Liams L . of T,T.D. toe 2 - Toronto) and dated 29

March 1922.

34. Ibid.- On 14 May 1921, Brigadier General Macdonnell (C , O,of M.D. No. 7 - St. John) requested a car "to proceed intothe U.S. Incog. (sic) twice during the early summer with myGenl. Staff Officer to make a personal reconnaissance of fourroads to Portland."; on May 1921, Brigadier General D.M.Ormnd (C.0. of W.D. No: 12 - Regina) queried the CGS whethera special arrangement could "be made whereby I would beallowed travelling expenses for the Judge who will be our

chauffeur?”

35. Ibid CGS MacBrien was quick to reply to these requests; In aletter to " Brigadier General Ormand of 25 May 1921., hestressed that, "It is a matter of policy the Minister (myunderlining) thinks that such trips should be postponed forthe time being for fear of something going wrong at scritical time."

36. Memo of 29 December 1923 from the D.M.0. & I. to the CGSfound in DND-GHQ file entitled "Mobilisation EquipmentGenerally" (PAC; RG24A 406 4530 Volume I)

37. Ibid

38, James Eayrs, In Defense of Canada, (Toronto 1964) Volume I,

73039. Ibid; "The Joint Staff Committee had been authorized on 9

June 1927. It consisted of the DNS s the CGS, and the DAF(members); the Commissioner of the RCMP (associate member); the DIAO & I (secretary),



The Chairman was the Minister of National Defense or, in theMinister's absence, the Senior Officer of the threeServices." Therefore it seems that the logical conclusion would be that this document was prepared for, and perhapseven by, the Minister of National Defense.

40. "Meetings and Proceedings of the Joint Staff Committee" (PAC;RG24A 406A 5199 Volume 1) 24 October 1027,

41, ibid

42. ibid.

43. James Eayrs, In Defense of Canada, (Toronto 1964) Volume I,

72.44, This assumption is predicated on the fact that the Minister

of National Defense was chairman of the CSC and, thereforebound to be informed, at least, of the decision reached bythe board,It seems almost incomprehensible that anypolitician Would risk so much if be did not approve.

45. Memo from J. Southerland Drown to CGS dated 11 November1927 and found in DND-GHQ file "Defense of Canada: DefenseScheme No. 1 Direct Defense" (PAC; RG24A 393 3406).

48, ibid CGS MoNaughton to all interested personnel and dated 24October 1933

47* "Defense Scheme No. 1" see above; footnote 23.

48. "Defense of Canada: Defense Scheme No. 3.- A Major War"(PAC H42" 393 3498 Volume I); Memo from Minister ofNational Defense (? from personal secretary H. F.Shewit) to CGS Macbrien dated 18 September 1922.

48. Ibid The skeleton scheme drawn up by the D.M.o. & I. waslater approved by CGS NaoBrien* Penned by hand at thebottom of the draft "stained by GHQ is the followingexplanation*

NB: The original given and explained to the Honourable George

Graham Minister of Militia and Defense and subsequently

shewn (sic) to Major General, MacBrien CGS who concurred

on my action during his absence. J.S. Brown, Colonel,

D.M.O. & I November 1922

49. ibid. Memo from D.M.0.& I. to Minister of Militia andDefense dated September 1922®

50. Ibid

52. Memo from the Quartermaster Genera. to the Deputy Chief ofthe General Staff (DCGS) dated 21 September 1923 concludes with the hope that "we might even be able to realize the -training of our full:- Peace Establishment of 1.1 DivisionsInfantry,, 4 Divisions Cavalry, together with a proportionof Corps and Army Troops after, say, an interval of 10



years” DND-GHQ file entitled "Mobilization EquipmentGenerally" (PAC; RG24A 405 4530)

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid. No doubt the figure of 117,546 should be for the

Peace Establishment.

56. Ibid. Memo from CGS MacBrien to the Minister Militia and

Defense dated 24 April 1924

57. Memo from the Quartermaster General to the CGS dated 24

August 1921 and found in the DND-GHQ file "Review of Armament

Other than Fortresses and Anti-Aircraft" (PAC; RG24A 4036

5182)

58. Ibid. Report from Quartermaster General to CGS and dated 28

August contains the following Compilations

available needed for Peace Estab, Needed for War

Rifles 113,944 132,000 180,000BSA-Lewis 2,140 41600 4,900Vickers 476 1,250 2,800

Revolvers 5,647 13,200 20,000

59. In 1931 a new DND-GHQ file was begun and entitled"Defense of Canada Defense Scheme No. 2 : TheMaintenance of Canadian Neutrality" (PAC; RG24A 3933497)

60, James Eayrs, In Defense of Canada, (Toronto 1964)

Volume I, 140.

61. The Militia was used to break up labour disputesseveral times in the first few years of the decade;Quebec City in June 1921, twice in Sydney Nova Scotia in1922 and in Cape Breton again in 1923. In 1924, theMi1itia Act was amended to only allow the use ofMilitia troops at the invitation of the Attorney General ofthe Province.

62. There are several references dotting the files which

refer to the bad image of the Militia as compared to thefavourable one projected by the R.C.A.F.

63. The "Secret Report by the Chief of Staff on the DefenseForces of Canada" (PAC; RG24A 406 5121) contains noreference whatsoever as to the use of the Militia as apolicing body.

64. Most noticable of these sentiments is the constantopposition of Agnes Macphail to the Cadet votes; eachyear she proposed that they be out to $1.00.



65. "Secret Report by the Chief of staff on the DefenseForces of Canada" (PAC ; RG24A 406 5121)



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Documents

Defining the Undefinable by Theodore Plautz