DEFENCE Force JOURNAL - Webs · 4 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 155 JULY / AUGUST 2002 exploding nuclear warheads which made the system unreliable, and even threatened the

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DEFENCEForce

Australian Defence Force Journal

Board of ManagementAir Commodore Peter McDermott, AM, CSC (Chairman)Lieutenant Colonel Ian CampbellGroup Captain Ian MacFarlingColonel David McKaskillCaptain Richard Menhinick, RAN

Contributions of any length will be considered but, as a guide, between 2000-5000 words is the ideal length.Articles should be typed double spaced, on one side of thepaper, or preferably submitted on disk in a word processingformat. Hardcopy should be supplied in duplicate.

All contributions and correspondence should be addressed to:The EditorAustralian Defence Force JournalR8-LG-001Russell OfficesCANBERRA ACT 2600(02) 6265 1193Fax (02) 6265 6972

CopyrightThe material contained in the Australian Defence Force Journalis the copyright of the Department of Defence. No part ofthe publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrievalsystem, or transmitted in any form or by any means,electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwisewithout the consent of the Editor.

Email: [email protected]/pacc/dfj/

© Commonwealth of Australia 2002ISSN 1320-2545Published by the Department of DefenceCanberra 2002

NO. 155

JULY/AUGUST

2002

Editor

Irene M. Coombes

Contributors are urged to ensure the

accuracy of the information contained in

their articles; the Board of Management

accepts no responsibility for errors of fact.

Permission to reprint articles in the Journal

will generally be readily given by the

Editor after consultation with the

author. Any reproduced articles should bear

an acknowledgement of source.

The views expressed in the articles are the

author’s own and should not be construed as

official opinion or policy.

Front Cover

Chief of Defence Force Change of Command Ceremony,

3 July 2002

Photograph by Corporal Mark Eaton

Printed in Australia

by National Capital Printing,

Fyshwick, ACT, 2609

CONTENTS

3. Contemporary Perspectives onNational Missile DefenceLieutenant Reuben R.E. Bowd,RAAOC

19. Dissecting Command andControl with Occams’s Razor orAsk not what “Command” and“Control” means to you butwhat you mean by “Commandand Control”Dr Noel Sproles, University of SouthAustralia

27. Australian Leadership – LeadingEdge or Luddite?Captain Christopher Ruff, Aus Int

34. Does Risk ManagementCultivate a Culture of RiskAvoidance?Captain I.D. Langford, RAInf

39. Current and Future CommandChallenges for New ZealandDefence Force PersonnelDr Joel Hayward, Centre for DefenceStudies, Massey University, NewZealand

46. Reviews

DEFENCEForce

JOURNAL

A U S T R A L I A N

Australian Army Blackhawks from the 5th Aviation Regiment during Operation Tanager.Photograph by WO2 Gary Ramage

3

Historical PerspectiveHistorically, NMD is no new concept. Its

origins can be directly traced as a legacy of theCold War. As early as 4 July 1945, despiteconclusions by US industry that availabletechnology precluded building an effectivemissile defence, the Army made its firstrecommendation to begin a research anddevelopment effort to counter ballistic missiles(BM).5 NMD, to date, boasts a lineage offailure. During the 1960s, Presidents Johnstonand Nixon launched a program whichculminated in deployment, in 1975, of the

Safeguard anti-missile system, designedinitially to protect US missile silos, with an“expansion option” to allow the system toprotect population centres against the “NorthCountry Threat”.6 However, this system wasabandoned on completion because it simplydid not work. In fact by the time this earlyform of NMD came online it was realised thatthe new Soviet multiple independent re-entryvehicle (MIRV) program would easilyoverwhelm it. It was also vulnerable to directattack and technical problems (such as radarblinding by electromagnetic pulse) from

Contemporary Perspectives on NationalMissile Defence

By Lieutenant Reuben R.E. Bowd, RAAOC

The concept of the development of a National Missile Defence (NMD) has been a contentiousissue since the 1960s.1 However, technological constraints have, to date, rendered any attempt todeploy such a system both impractical and premature. Furthermore, a variety of agreements, suchas the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty ratified by both Russia and the US, specificallyprohibit the deployment of defensive measures such as those presently being proposed by the USunder the umbrella of the NMD project.2 The proposal, and more recently the decision, by the USto deploy NMD today forms a focal issue of debate both within the US and across the internationalcommunity due to a myriad of uncertainties and global security concerns which such a deploymentmay present. Fears for the future of bilateral and unilateral agreements, aimed at the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially in a time of post-Cold Wargoodwill and disarmament, are paramount. Some experts even go as far as anticipating a renewedglobal arms race which would, instead of creating a more secure environment for the US (the veryobject of NMD), present new and increased dangers not only for that nation but across the globe.3

These fears are by no means unfounded and a global increase in such weapons, within nuclearstates currently not technologically capable of NMD, as a counter to the strategic advantageafforded the US by such a system should not come as a surprise. However, a moderate, rather thanextreme response, is anticipated by adversaries of the US. The reason for this is that the US hasproposed the deployment of “limited” NMD whilst simultaneously expressing its inclination tounilaterally reduce, rather than aggressively increase, US nuclear forces.4

This article seeks to discuss the potential outcome of an NMD deployment as proposed by theBush Administration in defence of US territory. It will briefly cover NMD in an historical contextas a legacy of the Cold War and will outline the NMD deployment system, as advocated byPresident Bush. Additionally, technological merits of NMD in its present context will be exploredas will the arguments for and against deployment, its vulnerabilities, and the likely military andpolitical reactions by adversaries of the US to any deployment.

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 155 JULY / AUGUST 20024

exploding nuclear warheads which made thesystem unreliable, and even threatened thesurvivability of American missiles it wasassigned to protect.7

During the 1980s the prospect of an NMDwas resurrected by Ronald Reagan with his“astrodome defence” dubbed “star wars”,aimed at creating a layered defence system forthe US and making ballistic weapons“impotent and obsolete”.8 This was a programlargely driven by an attempt to counter thethreat presented by Soviet MIRVs. LikeSafeguard, the proposed NMD system wasbeset with technological impediments and waspremature in concept. Instead of ending theglobal nuclear arms build-up it caused theopposite to occur.9 “Star Wars” was perceivedby the Soviet Union as affording the US astrategic advantage during a period of “nuclearfreeze”.10 Both proposals did not fail in conceptbut rather proved to be technologicallypremature for their time. However, recentdevelopments suggest that the requisitetechnology required for effective NMD maynot elude the scientific community for muchlonger. What these two attempteddeployments do demonstrate clearly is thelikely reaction which nuclear opponents of theUS will have to any NMD system coming on-line.

Russia is currently the only country withan operational BMD system which protects itscapital Moscow. This system is compliant withthe ABM Treaty and even to this day continuesto be upgraded.11 It began development in thelate 1950s with the most recent upgradecoming on-line in 1989. However, theMoscow BMD is the technological equivalentto Safeguard, sharing that system’s limitationsand vulnerabilities.12

President Clinton on July 22 1999 declaredit to be US policy to “deploy as soon astechnologically possible an effective NMDsystem”.13 This was an extension of hisAdministration’s “3+3” NMD plan which wasannounced in April 1996.14 The stated purpose

of any NMD system was to protect all USterritory against limited ballistic missile attackslaunched deliberately by “rogue states” and toprovide defensive measures to counter anaccidental or unauthorised launch from anysource. Clinton’s statement, rather thanindicating a change in the traditional Democratstance on opposing NMD, was primarily madein an attempt to silence Republican opponentswho were criticising Clinton for, in theiropinion, neglecting US defence issues. Clintonplaced provisos on his plan to deploy whichproved, in reality, unachievable during histerm in office. He stated that his final decisionon deployment would be based onconsiderations of technical performance, threatassessments, all the costs and arms controlimplications.15 On 1 September 2000, thedebate was temporarily put on hold whenClinton decided not to authorise thedeployment of NMD due to technologyconstraints, the refusal by Russia to agree tomodify the ABM to permit deployment, andthe reluctance of America’s allies to endorseNMD unless strategic stability could be assuredthrough a modified ABM Treaty. Clinton’sassessment was supported by the Union ofConcerned Scientists, which in a newsconference during June 2000 described theNMD programme as scientifically unsound anda “fatal rush…with a system that can’t work”.16

However, on assuming office in 2001,President George W. Bush announced that itwas his Administration’s intention to deploy aCapability 1 system comprising 100interceptors as early as 2005 with a Capability3 system being deployed by 2011 with 125interceptors located at two sites in Alaska andNorth Dakota.17

The ABM TreatyBy seeking to shake off restrictions imposed

by treaties such as the ABM, the current NMDproposal breaks with previous US policy whichaimed at “limited” NMD within the frameworkof the treaty. For example, on 5 December

5

1994, President George Bush signed the MissileDefence Act mandating to:

Develop for deployment by the earliest dateallowed by the availability of appropriatetechnology or by Fiscal Year 1996 a costeffective, operationally effective, and ABMTreaty-compliant18 anti-ballistic missilesystem. . . designed to protect the UnitedStates against limited ballistic missilethreats, including accidental orunauthorised launches or Third Worldattacks.19

The Act also specifically directed thatBrilliant Pebbles (space-based interceptorswhich were under development) was not to bepart of any initial deployment as it threatenedcurrent agreements on the militarisation ofspace.

Presently, under the restraints of the ABMTreaty signed on 26 May 1972, the deploymentof NMD is prohibited. However, anamendment on 3 July 1974 does permit eachside one deployment site limited to 100interceptors.20 In August 1997, in response tothe disintegration of the Soviet Union, thenewly formed nuclear states also signed theABM which the US now wishes to part with orat the very least amend. On 20 June 1999, USPresident Bill Clinton and Russian PresidentBoris Yeltsin issued a joint statement affirmingtheir commitment to the ABM Treaty whichwas described as “a cornerstone of strategicstability”, pledging “to [continue] efforts tostrengthen the treaty, to enhance its viabilityand effectiveness in the future”.21

However, all this changed when on 1 May2001 President George W. Bush delivered aspeech in which he said that a new frameworkwas needed, “beyond the constraints of the 30-year old ABM Treaty” that allows the US to“build missile defences to counter the differentthreats of today’s world”.22 In June 2001, USSecretary of State Colin Powell stated that theUS would break with the 1972 ABM Treaty assoon as it became a hindrance to theGovernment’s plans for a NMD system and

that US internal policy would not be dictatedby Russia.23 However, if the US was willing tothrow away the ABM Treaty then what wouldprevent Russia from doing the same, and bydoing so set back hard won agreements of thepost-Cold War era? It is true that manyelements of the ABM are in fact a product ofspecific political and technologicalcircumstances of the Cold War; however,should the US choose to repudiate it Russiamay choose in turn to absolve itself of otherinternational obligations, debts andresponsibilities made by the Soviet Union.24

These concerns were realised when, in responseto the proposed NMD deployment, PresidentPutin of Russia addressed the Duma saying:

If… the US proceeds to destroy the 1972ABM Treaty - and I want to make this clear -… if that happens, we can and will withdrawnot only from the START II Treaty, but fromthe whole system of treaty relations having todo with the limitation and control of strategicand conventional arms.25

Russia, in the words of Putin, is “againsthaving a cure that is worse than the disease”.26

It also has condemned US NMD tests and haswarned the US that the breaking of ground fora firing range at a missile defence site inAlaska will be considered a breach of the ABMTreaty.27 Like many other countries, Russiatakes the view that the US’s unilateralwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty would leadto the destruction of strategic stability, a newarms race, particularly in space, and thedevelopment of means for overcoming theNMD system. Vladimir Rushailo, the head ofMr Putin’s security council, said that “Theinternational community should consolidate itsefforts to prevent such developments”.28

The events of 11 September 2001 gave anew perspective to the NMD debate. PresidentBush used the disaster to emphasise theurgency for NMD deployment whilstopponents pointed out a need to concentrateon conventional means of preventingterrorism. On 23 October an agreement was

CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENCE


struck between the US and Russia that allowedfor progress toward NMD deployment in returnfor sharp decreases in US missile holdings.This was cemented on 15 November whenPresident Bush announced a 2/3rd reduction inthe US nuclear arsenal.29 The certainty of thefuture direction of the program was made clearwhen President Bush announced on 13December 2001 that the US had given “formalnotice to Russia” of its intention to withdrawfrom the ABM Treaty. This commenced a sixmonth timeline toward withdrawal.30 Bushemphasised that the two nations had come to anew relationship no longer based on mutuallyassured destruction but instead on mutualcooperation. Despite Russian insistence thatthe decision was not seen as posing anyserious security threat President Putin diddescribe the decision as a mistake andemphasised the urgent need for a newinternational framework to be put in place ofthe ABM. Likewise, China expressed concernas to the impact of the US decision. Australia,on the other hand, wholeheartedly supportedthe US position sharing US concerns towardthe increasing global missile threat.31

The NMD System as Proposed by BushDeployment of NMD as envisaged under

the present Bush Administration will notcomply with the ABM Treaty largely becausethe system under development (although“limited”) is to be programmed to have amaximum of 250 interceptors at twolocations.32 The project will cost Americantaxpayers at most conservative estimates $60billion dollars.33 This expenditure adds tocurrent estimates that since 1983 the Pentagonhas spent $95 billion on BMD and roughly $44billion on NMD alone.34 The system is expectedto use ground based interceptors and forward-deployed radars, sea-based interceptorsdeployed near states of concern, and spacebased early warning, tracking and queuingradars, as well as conventionally armed space-based interceptors.35 This system is dissimilar

to that envisaged under the Strategic DefenceInitiative (“Star Wars”) in the 1980s in that itseffectiveness will be measured by its ability tosuccessfully intercept some tens or lowhundreds of incoming missiles, not thousands.

The National Missile Defence (NMD)program has been described by the Pentagonas a “system of systems”.36 It involves a vastand global network of tracking and monitoringsites linked by high speed datacommunications and involving the mostadvanced technologies. In order tosuccessfully work all parts of the network mustperform their part perfectly. Currently, thereare seven parts to the Bush NMD deploymentsystem, as follows:

1. The initial launch detection and trackingsystem that consists of the satellites of theDefence Support Program (DSP). In 2006 or2007 these will be replaced by the SpacedBased InfraRed System-High (SBIRS-High)constellation of five (plus one in reserve)geosynchronous satellites.

2. Five ground-based early warning radars(including one each in the UK andGreenland) that receive the initial trackingdata from DSP or SBIRS-High through thesystem’s command and control network.

3. Four but possibly as many as nine(including one each in the UK, Greenland,and South Korea) X-band (high frequency,short wavelength) radars whose function isto discriminate between incoming realwarheads and decoys. The first is to be builton Shemya Island in Alaska.

4. An interceptor booster, which carries anexoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) to closeproximity of the planned intercept point.While in flight the EKV receives updatedinformation on the changing location ofthe incoming missile and passes thisinformation to the booster until separation.

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5. EKV, whose on-board computer processesupdates on the location of the hostilemissile after the EKV has separated fromthe booster. The EKV has a combinedoptical and infrared (multiple waveband)sensor on board through which it acquires,tracks, and discriminates its target.

6. The Battle Management, Command,Control, and Communications (BMC3)network, the heart of NMD. It links theseparate elements, receiving and processingdata of every kind. A critical sub-elementis the In-Flight Interceptor CommunicationsSystem (IFICS) through which informationis sent to the interceptor as it flies towardthe target.

7. A constellation of 24 low orbit SBIRS-Lowsatellites that will improve launch detectionand warhead-decoy discrimination, is to beadded later but is currently at the“experimental” level.37

As outlined, the seven complexcomponents of the NMD system must performperfectly, first as separate parts, and then meshtogether if the system is to successfullyintercept a hostile missile. Technology isproving to be the brake on deployment.

Technological ConcernsTo many, expectations of NMD are

unrealistic taking the form of a “field ofdreams” attitude based on the premise whichstates that “if we build it, it will work”, placinga blind faith in technology.38 To date thegreatest technological developments in BallisticMissile Defence (BMD) have been in the fieldof Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) rather thanNMD. This is primarily due to a decision inMay 1993 by then-Secretary of Defense LesAspin to reorientate the Ballistic MissileDefence Organisation (BMDO) toward the

development of TMD’s.39 It is worth while atthis stage briefly describing both types of BMD.

In simplistic terms, TMD is designed tointercept short-range missiles whilst NMDconcentrates on a long-range missile threat.Both use similar technologies which includesatellite-based infared sensors that detect andtrack launches, radar to follow a threat andinterceptors to destroy a target. Eventually,both systems may also include space-basedlasers although today this aspect remainspurely academic. The US already deploys aversion of TMD (the Patriot) which, althoughfar from perfected, goes some way towardsdemonstrating the potential of pendingtechnological enhancements which may easilybe converted for NMD application.40

Arguably, the greatest difference betweenthe two forms of MD is not technological butrather political. While TMD enjoys widesupport in the US policy debate, NMD remainshighly contentious.41 The popularity of TMD iseasily explained. Put simply, TMD addresses anon-contentious, real and visible military needin today’s world having been proven necessarythrough its application in recent militaryconfrontations involving the US.42 TMDgained essential popularity from its role duringthe 1991 Gulf War where the early Patriotsystem was deployed against Iraqi Scudmissiles being launched at Israel. Although thesystem demonstrated its technologicallimitations and did not intercept many Scudsat all, its deployment did avert Israel fromlaunching retaliatory strikes against Iraq whichcould have seriously fractured the US-ledcoalition.43 By filling this role TMDdevelopment and deployment was legitimised,not merely as a necessary element in modernwarfare, but indeed an essential one. Theideological debate over NMD is much morefractured.

With few exceptions NMD tests to date,conducted under ideal conditions, have beendismal failures.44 Exceptions occurred on 14July and 4 December 2001. The 14 July test



was only a “qualified” success whilst the 4December test is yet to be fully scrutinised,although the Pentagon has proclaimed all testsas successful based on the ability to learn somuch even from a failure.45 Discrimination(the ability to distinguish real warheads fromdecoys) is by far the most complex andcontroversial technological hurdle to beovercome.46 However, at present all elements ofthe proposed system are yet to be proven astechnologically feasible with even reliabletracking and monitoring of a target ofteneluding currently available technologies. Itwas exposed by Defence Week that thewarhead hit by a Pentagon missile during the14 July test was carrying a global positioningsatellite beacon that made it easy to track.Critics say that the missiles would have hadlittle chance of pinpointing the warhead’s pathwithout the help of the beacons.47 DefenceWeek also reported that the beacon helped thedefence missile compensate for deficiencies inUS radar tracking technology on the ground.To this end, opponents liken the enormoustechnical challenges of NMD to “attempting tohit a bullet with a bullet”.48 As evidence of thetechnical difficulties confronting the projectmany point to a decision on 15 December2001 to cancel the multi-billion missile defencesystem for Navy ships occurring due to poorperformance and excessive cost.49 Opponentsof NMD cite this as an example that goes someway to proving that getting such a complicatedsystem to work even in the most simplecircumstances is at present doubtful.

The future test program is fluid and is toincorporate at least 15 more tests, and thesystem could become operational, howeverunlikely,50 as early as 2005. Many consider itnonsensical to deploy an inadequately testeddefensive system before any clear offensivethreat is realised virtually guaranteeing thatany threat which subsequently appears will beable to penetrate the system. Missile interceptsystems will be incapable of keeping pace withimprovements in offensive capabilities.51

Regardless, the NMD projects future wasguaranteed when on 14 December 2001Congress allocated $343 billion dollars to fullyfund NMD.52

Reasons For and Against NMD deploymentThe reasons for controversy over the

proposed deployment of an NMD can best beshown by considering the US politicalarguments advocated by the two major schoolsof thought. Indeed these arguments are largelyrepresentative of those being voiced by bothopponent and supporter around the world.Supporters of NMD, largely Republicans,justify their argument on a real nationalsecurity need, that being, to protect the USfrom direct ballistic missile attack. They citethe existence of politically unstable “roguestates” which as “nuclear equipped adversarieswill not always [act] rationally or at leastoperate with the same logic” as the US does.53

Arms controllers, namely Democrats,54

consider that the solution to any security threatfacing the US lies not in a costly NMD system,but instead through securing reductions inglobal nuclear arsenals through thestrengthening of bilateral agreements, such asSTART and the ABM, and consider it of vitalimportance to improve US-Russian relations.55

Anti-NMD advocates argue that these goalswould be seriously threatened if NMD wasapproved and that the outcome of such adecision may be a renewed global arms race ofCold War magnitude.

French President Jacques Chirac, a vocalopponent of NMD deployment, expressedexactly this concern saying:

How do you convince (nations) to stoppiling up new arms when more powerfulcountries say it’s necessary to developtechnologies that put hard-won strategicbalances into question? 56

He added to the debate when, during aninterview with the New York Times on 17December 1999, he observed:

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If you look at world history, ever since menbegan waging war, you will see that there’sa permanent race between sword andshield. The sword always wins. The moreimprovements that are made to the shield,the more improvements that are made tothe sword. We think that with these[NMD] systems, we are just going to spurswordmakers to intensify their efforts.57

Supporters counter this argument byemphasising that defences would reduce theutility of enemy missiles, deterring theiracquisition.58 Each argument has merit andwill be addressed in greater detail.

Supporters of NMD draw largely on thetruism that the global missile threat to the USis growing. The nuclear club of nations now,largely as a result of the collapse of the SovietUnion, includes some two dozen states, manyof which are at present highly politicallyunstable and unpredictable.59 This concern isdoubled with the fact that the range of ballisticmissiles is currently increasing, suggesting thatshortly many of these volatile states maydevelop deployment systems capable ofreaching the US, which, when combined with apolitical will to strike, poses a real concern.Nations such as North Korea, Iran and Iraqhave been identified by advocates of NMD forthese reasons as possible “rogue” states. It iscurrently anticipated that North Korea willbecome capable of posing such a threat to theUS by 2005, Iran by 2010 and Iraq by 2015.60

In 1998 a Congressionally mandatedcommission led by former US Secretary ofDefence Donald H. Rumsfeld produced a reportwhich overwhelmingly confirmed the concernsof the pro-NMD lobby.61 Rumsfeld was highlycritical of the US intelligence communitywhich anticipated that it would have at least adecade’s prior notice before any such missilethreat materialised.62 Rumsfeld’s report warnedthat missiles could appear much sooner. Thiscriticism of the intelligence community is nothistorically unfounded and precedent for suchconcern exists dating from the earliest periods

in nuclear history. For example, theintelligence community seriouslyunderestimated the USSR following the firstatomic detonation in 1945. At this timemilitary planners anticipated that the Sovietswould take a decade to produce a similarweapon. Instead, by 1949 the Sovietsdetonated their own bomb and thus nullifiedany strategic advantage enjoyed by the US.This action-reaction dynamic typified theentire Cold War period and goes some way todemonstrating the potential dangers ofunderestimating any potential foe.63

This argument can also be used byopponents of NMD. To date, throughout thenuclear era, Washington has gained nodiscernible diplomatic or strategic advantagethrough its technological innovations,primarily because the Eastern Bloc has veryquickly matched, copied or developedcountermeasures. The same, it is argued, willquickly occur to counter the effectiveness ofany deployed NMD system, therefore nullifyingits existence and success. Perhaps the mostobvious means of countering NMD is throughrearmament, by developing greater numbers ofballistic weapons, new delivery systems anddecoys so as to overwhelm any shieldestablished by the US. This would mean theshaking off of related arms-limitations treatiesin a world that can ill-afford such action. Thisis predominantly what the anti-NMD campfears with justification.

The implication of NMD for outer space hasbeen afforded little attention, yet will pose oneof the greatest avenues for instability.64

Currently, outer space is a weapons freeenvironment “supported by a limited regime(the Outer Space Treaty)65 and a number oftacit agreements against weaponisation”.66 USdeployment of an NMD is heavily reliant onspace-based components. However, presentlythere exists no treaty banning anti-satellite(ASAT) weapons and therefore a keyvulnerability in the NMD network is presentedwhen possible responses by US opponents are


AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCFE JOURNAL NO. 155 JULY / AUGUST 200210

considered. The militarisation of space, it isargued, could inhibit future manned, scientificand commercial activities in space, as well asUS arms control monitoring capabilities.67

The vulnerabilities inherent in NMDdeployment add to the arguments againstNMD. Compared to offences, sophisticateddefences are much more vulnerable to attackbecause of their reliance on forward-basedtracking installations and space-basedcomponents. The task of the defender is farmore difficult than that of the attacker. Ateach step in an NMD process the defender isvulnerable to possible mistakes and to attackson system components.68 Furthermore, thetimeframe during which Bush will deploy NMDwill allow considerable time for adversaries to“size-up” the system and develop means ofsubverting it. Many argue that should Bushcontinue to insist on flouting the ABM Treatyand “this coincides with an increase in US-Russian or US-Chinese tensions…It might alsoinclude multinational approaches, as statesfeeling threatened by the system may begin tocoordinate their military responses in theclassic form of a preventative alliance”.69 Insuch a scenario, Russia could provide Chinawith the technology to develop manoeuvrablewarheads to enhance their capabilities.70 Thisfear is already becoming a reality as seenthrough the signing of a “Good NeighbourlyTreaty of Friendship and Co-operation” on 16July 2001 between China’s President JiangZemin and Russian President Vladimir Putin.This treaty superseded an outdated 1950version and committed both Russia and Chinato a further 20-year pact. Also, North Koreanleader Kim Jong-il has recently visited Russiafor bilateral talks with President Putin.71

Likely Military Responses to NMD DeploymentIncluding Russia and China

Potential adversaries will react to US NMDdeployment differently depending on their owncircumstances. For Russia, the most logicalresponse would be to stop de-MIRVing its

ICBMs as it is currently doing under thepresent disarmament framework.72 This movewas confirmed when, following summit talksin Slovenia during July 2001 with PresidentBush, President Putin expressed “that despite itbeing in violation of the START II agreement,Russia would strengthen its nuclear forces inresponse to US NMD and could eventuallycounter an American defence system byimplementing multiple warheads on itsICBMs”.73 This response, in reality, willculminate in a breakdown in the disarmamentprocess but little increase in numbers ofmissiles. This is because Russia already hasenough warheads to overwhelm the proposedsystem.74

China is staunchly opposed to thedeployment of NMD or TMD both in Americaand East Asia. Many analysts within the USand abroad argue that the NMD initiative isprompted, not by a threat from “rogue states”but instead by a perceived “China threat”.75

China only has a small stockpile of missiles, 76

and it is this fact that poses greatest concernfor China when it comes to the US NMDdeployment. On 2 September 2001 it wasalleged by the New York Times that the WhiteHouse had told the Chinese that it would notobject to China’s plan to expand its limitedarsenal of nuclear missiles if support for itsNMD proposal was forthcoming. Howeveradministration officials have since rejected thereport reaffirming their commitment toreducing the global arms stockpile.77

Condoleezza Rice, President Bush’s nationalsecurity adviser, said the US “is not about topropose to the Chinese that in exchange forChinese acceptance of MD, we will accept anuclear buildup” adding that whileWashington does not believe the Chinese havereason to expand their nuclear forces, “theirmodernisation has been under way for sometime”. One senior official added: “We knowthe Chinese will enhance their nuclearcapability anyway, and we are going to say tothem, `We’re not going to tell you not to do

11

it’”.78 Also, The Bush administration plans tooffer China an early look at plans for testingthe proposed NMD system in an effort to easeBeijing’s opposition to the US shield.79 Clearly,China would be prompted to more activelypursue options such as mobile missiles andMIRVs and many believe that shoulddeployment occur a “head on collision withChina will be difficult to avoid”.80

Hence, in response to NMD deployment, itcan be surmised that large and technologicallycapable states will seek “step level” increases insophistication and modest increases in thenumber of launchers. Middle powers, such asNorth Korea, may seek numerical increases inballistic missiles, especially where these canalso be used to counter local adversaries, whilstsmaller states will build a few weapons but willbe unable to afford a sustained build-up. Allof these adversaries, it is anticipated, will turnto penetration aids to ensure the success of themissiles they have. Less technological statesposing a threat to the US may find it mostbeneficial to turn to asymmetric responses.81

This course of action has already beenalluded to by senior Chinese diplomats andmilitary specialists who emphasise that Chinamay pursue an “Andropov solution” (buildingcountermeasures) in response to any US NMDdeployment.82 The Andropov solution wouldbe more economical with some Chinesearguing that they could developcountermeasures to the US NMD system “at acost of two per cent of their defence budget. Atthe same time, they had heard that the USsystem would cost two per cent of the USdefence budget. Given the huge disparitybetween the two budgets, they asked, werethey not getting the better end of thebargain?”83. As long as countermeasuresproved effective no strategic build-up would benecessary to overwhelm the US system.84

The primary reason why penetration aidswill prove attractive to US adversaries is thatthey are inexpensive and do not requireadvanced technology. They also do not violate

any international treaties or agreements and asthey are not categorised as “weapons” arepolitically favourable.85 Further, penetrationaids will prove highly effective against NMD.Recent US NMD tests have proven that dealingwith large numbers of decoys will severelyinhibit the system.86 Hence, even if a globalproliferation of ballistic missiles does notoccur, a build-up of penetration aids, whichmay render the NMD system ineffective, will.The problems faced by the current NMDsystem when discriminating warheads fromdecoys has already been mentioned.

The NMD system and its elements couldalso be exposed to potential attack from theground, sea and in space by adversaries. Manyof its elements are susceptible to attackespecially the forward based radar in Alaskaand those facilities to be located on foreign soilsuch as in the UK and Greenland.87 Forexample, air strikes or special forcesoperations,88 or terrorist attack, could inflict asubstantial blow against the NMD system. Alow yield nuclear attack on any of the remoteelements would be impossible to defendagainst.89 This vulnerability could increase thedemand for tactical nuclear missiles amongNMD opponent states some of whom,especially those with fewer resources, mayfocus on sea launch and cruise missilecapabilities which would not be able to bedefeated by the NMD umbrella. Also, the sea-based elements of the system which are to becarried by the Aegis-class destroyers mayresult in an increased procurement anddevelopment of quiet submarines, of the typenow widely available from Russia.90

Space-based components, critical to anyNMD system, are particularly vulnerable toattack with opponents only having to becapable of launching medium-range ballisticmissiles with some accuracy to attack theseassets. Low Earth Orbiting (LEO) satellites aremost vulnerable and due to their tracking andqueuing taskings would be a high prioritytarget.91 Hence, direct ascent ASAT weapons



would become a likely focus for some states asa counter to NMD and would be capable ofblinding the system and rendering itinoperative. Co-orbital and permanent spacebased ASATs may also see deploymentespecially as these weapons (unless nucleararmed) do not represent any direct violation toany standing agreements on weapons inspace.92 Should the US deploy NMD and shrugoff the ABM, it would have no grounds forobjecting to space-based weapons beingdeployed in large quantities. Furthermore, inan effort to undermine the US NMD systemRussia could sell ASATs with impunity toChina, India, Iraq, or other states of itschoosing. Such weapons could also be nucleararmed offering considerably greater range andimpact, although this would violate the OuterSpace Treaty. Once deployed ASATs couldrender near earth space unusable for civilian orpassive military use. Some ardent pro-NMDsupporters in the US continue to press forspace-based interceptors (Brilliant Pebbles)which would only encourage states to developand deploy countermeasures and wouldcounter any agreements aimed at thedemilitarisation of space.93

Regardless, the most likely focus of “rogue”states to NMD will be in the form ofasymmetric military responses. Theasymmetric response is appealing due to thefact that weapons are inexpensive and unlikeballistic missiles, which are highly transparentand easily detected, are best suited for stealthyattack. A state would merely need a means ofdelivery, (not necessarily a missile) such as asuitcase bomb smuggled in vehicles or by foot,small aircraft, small boats or other means, toattack the US. Even terrorists lacking any statebacking have been capable of launchinginternal attacks on the US through this means,as in the case of the World Trade Centreattacks in New York and on the Pentagon.94

This is not to say that missiles can notfeature in any asymmetric response. Cruisemissiles, easily available off the shelf,95 would

be highly effective and not easily detectedespecially if deployed on a commercial vesselin international waters off the coast of the US.Short-range ballistic missiles could also belaunched in a similar fashion with little chanceof detection by any planned NMD system.96

Other options may include delivery of aweapon on a rubber raft, or another vesselwhich is hard to detect, as occurred in the USSCole incident in Yemen.97 One senior memberof the Bush administration readily admittedduring a conference in 1999 that “he expectsNMD to cause “the bad guys’ to redouble theirefforts to acquire asymmetrical means ofattacking the US homeland or US allies andtheir assets.98 Hence, it is very likely that NMDwill fuel development of WMD and lesstraceable means of delivery. Advocates ofNMD argue that such developments are“inevitable” and that the US would be betteroff with at least some means of self-defenceagainst missile attack. Asymmetric means ofattack will mean that many states will respondto NMD deployment by “spending on areaswhere they believe the US to be vulnerable”.99

This will prove taxing on the US military andenforcement agencies and may see opponentsexacerbating the situation by testing US basesand defences.100 Moreover, it is likely that“rogue” states and terrorist groups will belikely to receive “more assistance in theirefforts if US NMD policy is conducted in a waythat alienates either Russia or China, or both”.These countries are in a “good position toassist third countries in their efforts to acquirealternative delivery systems and weapons” inan effort to undermine the US NMD.101

ConclusionIt appears likely that the response of other

states to NMD deployment would be limitedmainly to reactive missile deployments and abuild-up of penetration aids. However, anyNMD deployment by the US will be met bysome certainties, these being that NMD isunlikely to revolutionise the strategic

13

environment or render offensive weaponsobsolete, and that it will be met by activemilitary countermeasures from a variety ofstates, dependant on each state’s uniquecircumstances. It may also trigger action-reaction dynamics and lead other states intounilateral arms build-ups; and, NMD is likelyto increase rather than reduce the worldwidearmaments stockpile.102 It will also complicatethe future international environment for armscontrol and increase world tensions. Themilitarisation of space would also make thepeaceful use of space, especially for armscontrol monitoring, very difficult.

It can clearly be seen that NMDdeployment will open a Pandora’s box ofuncertainty for which the global community isunprepared and which it is largely unwilling toaccept. Although the system faces manytechnological challenges it appears likely thatsome “limited” NMD system will be deployedby Bush in his first term of office. It is felt thatthis system, like the earlier “Safeguard” NMD,will be a “rush to failure”. Not only will thesystem, at present, fail technologically, but alsohard-won non-proliferation agreements will bereneged on and any groundwork which hasbeen made in arms control lost.

NMD is not without its alternatives. A USattempt at promoting international cooperationand non-proliferation regimes as an attempt atmissile proliferation, instead of the isolationistpath currently being taken through NMD,would be a much more permanent and positivemethod of addressing the US security concerns.Also, the long standing US policy, commonlyreferred to as “deterrence”, has served the USwell for years and no evidence suggests that itwould not continue to work against “roguestates” or terrorists.103 Treaty compliant missiledefences aimed at TMD, offensive armsreductions within the framework of existingtreaties such as SALT, strengthening of theMissile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),104

and the negotiation of an ASAT-ban for thedemilitarisation of space would be much more

positive steps than the deployment of acontentious NMD.105 Such measures, in thelonger term, may also result in a globalarmaments reduction thereby nullifying anyneed for an NMD.

This article has not sought to address thestandpoint of US allies, particularly in Europeand Asia. However, it can be said that all holdreservations toward NMD and oppose anydeployment that violates the ABM Treaty.106

This was also the stance of the United NationsGeneral Assembly when on 5 November 1999it voted overwhelmingly in favour of aresolution to preserve the ABM Treaty.107 Thereis little popular support for a system which,whilst possibly offering the US increasedsecurity within a unilateral framework, willexpose her allies and alliances especially NATOto a new, dangerous and uncertain world.108

These sentiments were echoed by formerAustralian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser whowarned that participation in NMD would makecountries like Australia “hostage to US actions”and “a first-rate target in the event ofhostilities between America and anothercountry”.109 NMD deployment by the UScould lead to regional and even global armsraces, polarising the world anew and makingenemies of countries that are now at worstonly competitors”.110

NOTES1. John Isaacs, “A Political Decision”, in Bulletin

of Atomic Scientists, March/April 2000, p. 23.2. Michael O’Hanlon, “Star Wars Strikes Back”, in

Foreign Affairs, November/December 1999, p. 71.

3. http://www.stopstarwars.org. (Green PeaceWebsite).

4. James Clay Moltz, “Forecasting the Strategic-Military Implications of NMD Deployment”, inInternational Perspectives on MissileProliferation and Defenses, Occasional PaperNo. 5 (Monterey: Montery Institute ofInternational Studies, March 2000), p. 35.

5. http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.6. Ronald E. Powaski, Return to Armageddon:

The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race,



1981-1999, New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 2000, pp. 32-33.

7. http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.8. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March/April 2000,

p. 23. On 23 March 1983, President Reagandelivered a national television address in whichhe called for research into defences that wouldmake “nuclear weapons impotent andobsolete”. On 24 March 1983, opponents inCongress labelled President Reagan’s vision of adefensive umbrella “Star Wars”. See also,http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.

9. In particular there was a substantial Sovietbuild-up of penetration aids such as chaff,balloons and dummy missiles in response to“Star Wars”.

10. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March/April 2000,p. 23.

11. There have been three system developmentssince the late 1950s. These being the ABM-1/A-135, ABM-2/S-225 and the most recent,commenced in 1978 and operational in 1989,the ABM-3/A-135. www.fag.org/starwars/program/soviet.

12. http://news6.thdo.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1177000/1177889.stm, andhttp://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreignp/usstrat-e.asp

13. John Steinbruner, “National Missile Defence:Collision in Progress”, in Arms Control Today,November 1999, p. 3.

14. Powaski, Return to Armageddon, pp. 32-33.Theplan allowed three years for development ofNMD and, if warranted, three more years todeploy a system. pp. 190-91.

15. John Steinbruner, “National Missile Defence:Collision in Progress”, p. 3.

16. http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate. Seealso note 46.

17. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March/April 2000,p. 24. The Capability 3 system will alsocomprise 3 command centres, 5communications relay stations, 15 radars (6early warning and 9 high resolution UHF or X-band), and 29 satellites (Space Based InfraredHigh and Low). See also Colonel Daniel Smith,USA (Ret.), “Technological Challenges inNational Missile Defense” [? 2001] athttp://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.

18. ibid. Own emphasis added. 19. ibid.20. Michael E. O’Hanlon, Defence Policy Choices for

the Bush Administration 2001-05, WashingtonD.C: Brookings University Press, 2001, p. 145.

21. http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.22. ibid.

23. ibid.24. O’Hanlon, “Star Wars Strikes Back”, Foreign

Affairs, November/December 1999, p. 71.25. http://www.stopstarwars.org.26. ibid.27. Guardian Newspapers Limited 2001 at

http://www.commondreams.org/headlines01/0713-01.htm.

28. ibid.29. http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.30. ibid.31. ibid.32. Michael E. O’Hanlon, Defence Policy Choices for

the Bush Administration 2001-05, p. 154.33. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March/April 2000,

p. 24.34. Powaski, Return to Armageddon, p. 189. See

also, http://www.stopstarwars.org.35. International Perspectives on Missile

Proliferation and Defenses, Occasional PaperNo. 5, p. 34.

36. Daniel Smith, “Technological Challenges inNational Missile Defence” [2001 ?] athttp://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.

37. ibid.38. O’Hanlon, “Star Wars Strikes Back”, Foreign

Affairs, November/December 1999, p. 82. 39. ibid., pp. 68-69.40. ibid., pp. 68-69.41. ibid., pp. 68-69.42. Michael E. O’Hanlon, Defence Policy Choices for

the Bush Administration 2001-05, pp. 143-44.43. ibid., pp. 143-44.44. Daniel Smith, “Technological Challenges in

National Missile Defence” [2001 ?] athttp://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.

45. ibid.46. ibid.47. http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.

Exposure of US authorities rigging tests forideal conditions should come as no realsurprise. On 10 June 1984, under the ReaganAdministration, an interceptor package guidedby infrared sensors and a computer destroyedits target in a similar fashion. In this instancethe General Accounting Office in 1994 noted inits report that the target had been artificiallyheated to increase its infrared signature.

48. ibid., This analogy has been asserted since 1955when, after 50,000 simulated ballistic missileintercepts on an analog computer, BellLaboratory scientists concluded that “hitting abullet with another bullet” was possible.Although not valid today this test gives someperspective of how long the NMD testing anddebate has been underway in the US.

15

49. http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.50. In February 1998 the first Welch review

criticised shortcomings and overambitious timelines that amounted in its findings to a “rush tofailure” in various missile programs includingNMD. See Foreign Affairs, November/December1999, p. 73.

51. John Steinbruner, “National Missile Defence:Collision in Progress”, in Arms Control Today,November 1999, p. 3.

52. http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.53. Stated in May 1992 by the House Armed

Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin.http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.

54. See also page 3 for an explanation of whyClinton, a Democrat, launched NMD projects.

55. Foreign Affairs, November/December 1999, pp.69.

56. http://www.stopstarwars.org.57. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March/April 2000,

p. 25.58. International Perspectives on Missile


59. Foreign Affairs, November/December 1999, p.70.

60. ibid., pp. 70-71.61. Rumsfeld has reassumed the appointment of

Secretary of Defence under the current BushAdministration.

62. ibid., pp. 70-71. In November 1995, a NationalIntelligence Estimate (NIE 95-19) judged that“No country, other than the major declarednuclear powers, will develop or otherwiseacquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 yearsthat could threaten the contiguous 48 states orCanada”.

63. International Perspective’s on MissileProliferation and Defenses, Occasional PaperNo. 5, p. 33.

64. ibid., pp. 33-34.65. The treaty opened for signature at Moscow,

London and Washington on 27 January 1967to “contribute to broad international co-operation in the scientific as well as the legalaspects of the exploration and use of outerspace for peaceful purposes”. See,http://www.iasl.mcgill.ca/space_law/conventions/outerspace.html.

66. International Perspective’s on MissileProliferation and Defenses, Occasional PaperNo. 5, p. 33-34.

67. ibid., pp. 33-34.68. ibid., p. 34.69. ibid., pp. 34-35.70. ibid., pp. 34-35.

71. Dr. Bruce Blair, “Impact of NMD on Russia,Nuclear Security” [2001?], http://www.-abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.

72. International Perspectives on MissileProliferation and Defenses, Occasional PaperNo. 5, p. 35-36.

73. Dr. Nicholas Berry, “U.S. National MissileDefense: Views from Asia” [2001?], athttp://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.

74. Peter Van Ness, Ballistic Missile Defenses: AResponse, (Canberra: ANU, 1999), p. 2.

75. ibid., p. 2.76. ibid., p. 2. The International Institute for

Strategic Studies notes that “China’s strategiccapability is comprised of less than 200 nuclearwarheads, of which perhaps 20-30 would beoperational at any given time”.

77. Robert Burns, “US Says China Nuke BuildupUnnecessary”, Associated Press, 5 September2001, on internet at National Missile DefenceOrganisation http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/html/ nmd.html.

78. No author, “China to See U.S. Missile Plan”,Washington Post, 2 September 2001 athttp://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/ap/20010902/pl/us_china_4.html.

79. ibid.80. Peter Van Ness, Ballistic Missile Defenses: A

Response, (Canberra: unpublished, 1999), p. 2.81. These include the use of weapons, other than

ballistic missiles, such as conventionalexplosives, or biological and chemical weapons,against the US. International Perspective’s onMissile Proliferation and Defenses, OccasionalPaper No. 5, p. 36.

82. Rose Gottemoeller, “If China Builds MoreWarheads”, Washington Post, 6 September2001, p. A23 at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A48967-2001Sep5.html.“In the 1980s, faced with the necessity ofresponding to the Reagan administration’s ‘StarWars’ initiative with an economy that wasalready in crisis, the Communist Party generalsecretary, Yuri Andropov, decreed an approachthat was an innovation in Soviet policy at thetime: Instead of trying to match U.S. strategicdefenses or engage in a strategic offensivebuildup, as had been past practice, the SovietUnion would concentrate on developingcountermeasures to the system — chaff,balloons and other technologies that woulddefeat the system without destroying it. In thatway, Andropov argued, he could maintainSoviet security on the cheap, without having tomatch or mirror U.S. programs”.



83. Rose Gottemoeller, “If China Builds MoreWarheads”, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A48967-2001Sep5.html.

84. ibid.85. International Perspective’s on Missile


86. ibid., p.37.87. ibid.88. North Korean commandos have infiltrated

South Korea with ease for years despite the bestefforts of the US and South Korea to preventthem. And terrorists have struck deep withinthe heart of US territory. See also notes 91 and94.

89. International Perspectives on MissileProliferation and Defenses, pp. 37-38.

90. Such as the Kilo-class 636 model.91. International Perspectives on Missile

Proliferation and Defenses, pp. 38-39.92. The USSR conducted tests in the 1960s and

1970s on a space-based ASAT weapon leadingthe US to declare it “operational”.

93. International Perspectives on MissileProliferation and Defenses, p. 39.

94. The first attack occurred on 26 February 1993when a vehicle loaded with explosives wasdetonated beneath the complex killing sixpeople, injuring thousands and causingextensive damage. On 11 September 2001 thecomplex was completely destroyed whenterrorists hijacked two commercial aircraftcrashing them into the towers killing a yet tobe disclosed number of people. The Pentagonwas also attacked in the same fashion.

95. Examples of conventional missiles (cruise andother) which are widely held and capable ofsuch tasking are the Soviet SA-2,3,6,10 and 12,the SS-18, SS-24, and SS-25 and the Scud. InAmerica the D-5, Tomahawk and Harpoon. Toname but a few amongst hundreds.


97. The USS Cole suffered severe damage on 12October 2000 in a terrorist bombing attackwhen the ship was in the port of Aden, Yemen,for a routine fuel stop. A rubber raft loadedwith explosives was ploughed into the shipkilling 17 sailors and injuring 39 in the blastwhich blew a hole in the port side of thedestroyer. http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/news/news_stories/cole.html.


99. ibid., p. 41.

100. The recent attacks on the World Trade Centrein New York and the Pentagon in WashingtonD.C have stretched US military andenforcement agencies (i.e. FBI, Fire Brigade andPolice Forces) to the limit, and were notanticipated by the US intelligence agencies.Therefore what hope would the US have ofpreventing strikes against NMD elements onforeign soil let alone on their own? NMD willbe incapable of addressing these real threats.See also footnotes 82, 88 and 91.


102. ibid., p. 41.103. Peter Van Ness, Ballistic Missile Defenses, p. 3.104. The MTCR is an informal political arrangement

formed in 1987 to control the “proliferation ofrocket and unmanned air vehicle systemscapable of delivering weapons of massdestruction and their associated equipment andtechnology. The Regime’s controls areapplicable to such rocket and unmanned airvehicle systems as ballistic missiles, spacelaunch vehicles, sounding rockets, unmannedair vehicles, cruise missiles, drones, andremotely piloted vehicles”. MTCR also has considerable range limitations.http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/np/mtcr/mtcr.html.

105. Rear Admiral Eugene J. Carroll, Jr., USN (Ret.)“Why Should You/We Care?” athttp://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.

106. Peter Van Ness, Ballistic Missile Defenses, pp.4-5. See also, http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.

107. Peter Van Ness, Ballistic Missile Defenses, p. 4.108. Jeremy Stoker, “Briefing Missile Defence”, in

Janes Defence Weekly, 22 August 2001, pp. 23-25.

109. Christopher Hellman “The Costs of BallisticMissile Defense” [2001?] at http://www.abc.net.au/4 corners/roguestate.

110. Peter Van Ness, Ballistic Missile Defenses, p. 5.

BIBLIOGRAPHYBooks:Centre for Nonproliferation Studies, Occasional

Paper No. 5: International Perspectives onMissile Proliferation and Defences, (Monterey:Monterey Institute of International Studies,2001).

Marshall, A.W., Martin, J.J., and Rowen, H.S. (eds),On Not Confusing Ourselves: Essays onNational Security Strategy in Honour of Albertand Roberta Wohlstetter, (Boulder: WestviewPress, 1991).

17CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENCE

O’Hanlon, M., Defence Planning for the Late 1990s:Beyond the Desert Storm Framework,(Washington D.C: Brookings Institution, 1995).

O’Hanlon, M., Technological Change and the Futureof Warfare, (Washington D.C: BrookingsInstitution Press, 2000).

O’Hanlon, M.E., Defence Policy Choices for the BushAdministration, 2001-05, (Washington D.C:Brookings Institution Press, 2001).

Osgood, R.E., The Nuclear Dilemma in AmericanStrategic Thought, (Boulder: Westview Press,1988).

Patton, T., Strategic Arms Limitations: An Analysisof Factors that Impact Arms Control Progressand Weapon System Selection, (Michigan:Dissertation Information Service, 1981).

Paulsen, R.A., The Role of US Nuclear Weapons inthe Post-Cold War Era, (Alabama: AirUniversity Press, 1994).

Payne, K.B., Deterrence in the Nuclear Age,(Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky,1996).

Powaski, R.E., Return to Armageddon: The UnitedStates and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1981-1999,(New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

Journal Articles:Isaacs, J., “A Political Decision”, in Bulletin of

Atomic Scientists, March/April 2000.Isaacs, J., “Go Slow”: The People Speak on Missile

Defence, in Arms Control Today,January/February 2000.

O’Hanlon, M., “Star Wars Strikes Back”, in ForeignAffairs, Vol. 78, No. 6., November/December1999.

Steinbruner, J., “National Missile Defence: Collisionin Progress”, in Arms Control Today, November1999.

Stoker, J., “Briefing Missile Defence”, in JanesDefence Weekly, 22 August 2001.

Van Ness, P., Ballistic Missile Defences: AResponse, Canberra, ANU, 1999.

Internet Sources:Christopher Hellman “The Costs of Ballistic Missile

Defense” [2001?] at http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.

Daniel Smith, “Technological Challenges inNational Missile Defense” [2001 ?] athttp://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.

Dr. Bruce Blair, “Impact of NMD on Russia, NuclearSecurity” [2001?], http://www.abc.net.au/-4corners/roguestate.

Dr. Nicholas Berry, “U.S. National MissileDefense: Views from Asia” [2001?], athttp://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.

Guardian Newspapers Limited 2001 athttp://www.commondreams.org/headlines01/0713-01.htm

no author, “China to See U.S. Missile Plan”,Washington Post, 2 September 2001 athttp://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/ap/20010902/pl/us_china_4.html.

Rear Admiral Eugene J. Carroll, Jr., USN (Ret.)“Why Should You/We Care?” athttp://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.

Robert Burns, “US Says China Nuke BuildupUnnecessary”, Associated Press, 5 September2001, on internet at National Missile DefenceOrganisation http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/html/nmd.html.

Rose Gottemoeller, “If China Builds MoreWarheads”, Washington Post, 6 September2001, p. A23 at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A48967-2001Sep5.html.

http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/news/news_stories/cole.html.

http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreignp/usstrat-e.asp.http://www.fag.org/starwars/program/soviet.http://www.iasl.mcgill.ca/space_law/conventions/

outerspace.html.http://www.news6.thdo.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/

europe/newsid_1177000/1177889.stm.http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/np/mtcr/

mtcr.html.

Lieutenant Reuben Bowd (RAAOC) graduated from ADFA in 1998 with an Arts degree double majoring in Historyand Politics and sub-majoring in Asia-Pacific Studies. In 1999 he attended RMC, Duntroon and was allocated toRAAC. Lieutenant Bowd has been posted as an instructor at ALTC, Bandiana and is presently serving in 3 CSSB,Townsville. In 2001 he returned to ADFA to undertake history honours. In addition to coursework that included airpower evolution and theory, he researched a thesis on a little known yet important intelligence unit, the AlliedGeographical Section. In December 2001 he was awarded first class honours and the L.C.F. Turner prize for“outstanding performance in history”. Lieutenant Bowd is keenly interested in military intelligence and maintains anambition to serve in the Australian Army Intelligence Corps.


The Australian Armyand the Vietnam War

1962-1972

The 2002 Chief of Army'sMilitary History Conference

3-4 October 2002National Convention Centre,

Canberra

Conference Enquiry Line Phone: (02) 6266 2744

19

A more fruitful approach may be torecognise that every word or expression in ourlanguage has a history commencing from thetime when someone, somewhere, firstassociated it with something. This history,which traces the development of a word orexpression from its inception through anysubsequent derivations, is called its etymology.Treating “command and control” simply as aphrase while neglecting to study its etymologyis ignoring an approach that promises to offera more edifying explanation of the term thanthose usually provided.

This article suggests a possible etymologyfor “command and control” commencing fromits roots in the efforts to achieve unifiedcommand amongst the Western Allies inWWII. It will show that terms that could wellbe the precursors of “command and control”appear throughout the literature surrounding

the command arrangements instituted by theAllies from 1941 onwards. Placing the usageof the separate words “command” and“control” in the context of those times willshow that the meanings attributed to them inthe 1940s are different from those currentlygiven them when associated with “commandand control”. Although “command andcontrol” started out as a phrase sometime inthe 1940s, it will be suggested that it hasevolved to become a compound word andshould now be treated as such. While it is notsuggested that the explanation that will beoffered can claim to be definitive, it issupported by strong historical evidence. Inproviding a simpler explanation of what thisterm means, based on its etymology, it issuggested that it also provides a more plausibleexplanation than those usually found in theliterature.

Dissecting Command and Control withOccam’s Razor

orAsk not what “Command” and “Control”

means to you but what you mean by“Command and Control”

By Dr Noel Sproles, University of South Australia

Command and Control (C2) provides coordination and smooth functioning in a militaryoperation, but as a topic it more often than not causes confusion and disagreement amongstmilitary professionals. One such cause for confusion is the view that “command and control” is aphrase and that an examination of its constituent words can contribute to an understanding ofwhat command and control really is. The result is rarely satisfactory and leads one to ponder whyit is that two such familiar words should develop such difficult-to-understand concepts whengrouped together in this way? More often than not, the explanations offered seem more forced thanlogical and are never very enlightening. They bring to mind the scene in an ancient temple wherepriests and seers pore over the entrails of an animal in an attempt to read the future or ascertainthe meaning of some natural phenomenon. The only certainty in this approach is that if aparticular meaning is sought, then that meaning can be contrived.


OriginsThere seems to be agreement that

“command and control” appeared either duringor sometime soon after WWII. WhileAshworth (1987, p. 34) suggests that it had itsorigins in WWII, Alberts and Hayes (1995, p. 6)is more emphatic in noting that the term didnot appear until after WWII. It is difficult toargue with the contention that “command andcontrol” is a post-WWII term as a search of theliterature contemporaneous to WWII has so farfailed to reveal its use before 1945. Theearliest mention found in the search forbackground material for this article was byGeneral Morgan who was responsible for muchof the early planning for the Normandyinvasion. When discussing the issue ofdirectives to the naval and air Commanders-in-Chief for Operation Overlord, he madereference to “…the solution to the air commandand control problem” (Morgan, 1950, p. 226).Murphy (1948, p. 146) refers to AdmiralsRamsay and Mountbatten in 1942 disagreeingon who “…should be in command and controlof the Naval Assault Forces during theirtraining in Combined Operations”. WhileMurphy (1948) indicates an early date for theuse of the term, it is possible that Morgan(1950) presents proof of even earlier use as theForward to Morgan (1950) was signed anddated by General Eisenhower in March 1947.Whichever one is the earlier may be open todispute but what is clear is that the term“command and control” was in use in theperiod immediately after WWII leaving it opento the possibility that it was in fact in useduring the war.

Its usage in the immediate post-war erawas not as popular as it is now. For instance,Wilmot (1952, p. 51) when discussing theGerman attacks on the British radar andcommunications installations during the Battleof Britain, refers to them as attacks on “…thenetwork of control”. It is almost certain that apresent-day writer would refer to them insteadas attacks on command and control. However,

references can still be found to “command andcontrol” in the literature of this period.McCarthy (1959, p. 15) referred to theagreement “…between Britain and Americaregarding the machinery to be set up for thestrategical command and control of theirmilitary resources”. That McCarthy did not feelit necessary to explain this term either in thetext or in footnotes indicates that he expectedit to be a term familiar to the reader. The term“command and control” was used in the 1964film Dr Strangelove by George C. Scott actingthe part of the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff thereby suggesting that by then it wasa widely accepted expression.

While there may not be evidence that theterm “command and control” per se was usedduring the war years, there is ample evidencethat expressions closely resembling it were incommon use during that period. In a letterfrom the RAAF Chief of Air Staff to GeneralMacarthur’s HQ early in 1944, reference ismade to “command and administrativecontrol” (Odgers, 1957, p. 199). The AustralianPrime Minister, Mr. John Curtin, in a 1945letter to General MacArthur twice madereference to “operational control andcommand”, once in relation to 1st AustralianCorps (Long, 1963, p.45) and secondly inrelation to the RAAF (Odgers, 1957, p. 437).Again, in 1945 the Australian DefenceCommittee referred to the need for “…unifiedoperational and administrative control of thewhole RAAF …under one command” (Odgers,1957, p. 438).

The terminology was not restricted to USand Australian usage. Stacey (1948, p. 48)associates “command” with “operationaldirection” when discussing the internalcommand arrangements for 1st CanadianCorps. “Direction” and “control” aresynonymous and the phrase “command anddirection” was used when now “command andcontrol” would be used. Field MarshalMontgomery provides evidence of this when inOctober 1945, he stated “On 1 September, the

21

Supreme Commander assumed command anddirection of the Army Groups himself…”(Montgomery, 1945, p.12). When he referredto the same event some years later, he changed“direction” to “operational control” when hewrote “…from the 1st September 1944onwards, I was not satisfied that we had asatisfactory organisation for command oroperational control” (Montgomery, 1958, p.326).

The German General, Adolf Galland,describes the amalgamation of the Luftwaffeday fighter and night fighter control systemslate in WWII. He states that “The unificationof command and organisation of the day andnight fighters …was at last achieved” (Galland,1955, p. 193). Whether the term “commandand organisation” was used by Galland or wasthe translator’s interpretation of the originalGerman is not known, but its intent and usageis that usually associated at that time with“command and control”.

Command ArrangementsIn the instances quoted, the terms

“command and control”, “command andoperational control”, “command andadministrative control”, “command anddirection”, and even “command andorganisation” are referring to commandarrangements. This supports the view ofAshworth (1987, p. 34) that “command andcontrol” originated to “…cover a set ofprocedures related to the control of joint andcombined operations”. The high degree ofunification of command and integration ofstaff functions that was achieved during WWIIby the Western Allies, particularly at theatrelevel, created an intense interest in whatAshworth (1987, p. 34) referred to as “…theexercise of command across organisationalboundaries…”. It became necessary toimplement command arrangements that werethe formal basis for establishing at the veryleast a minimum level of cooperation to beachieved in the pursuit of unity of effort

between a unified commander and subordinatecommanders of a joint or multi-national force.These command arrangements established theoperational and administrative constraints orboundaries placed on the unified commander’sauthority. When establishing the origin of themeaning of “command and control”, theeffects of this overriding need to achieveunified command arrangements acrossorganisational boundaries must be kept inmind. These arrangements encompassed notonly procedures but also political decisions onthe nationality and Service of Alliedcommanders.

Modern definitions of command andcontrol describe “command” in terms of acommander’s authority. A typical example isthat given by the US Marines who see the“command” component of the term “…asexercise of authority”(MCDP 1996). While theWWII commanders would have been aware ofthis nexus between command and authority, itis suggested that this is not the meaning thatthey were referring to when using expressionssuch as “command and operational control”.In the context in which the expression wasused, they were referring instead to the identityof the individual commander, to hisnationality, or to his Service. In that era whengreat multi-national operations were beingmounted, the nationality of a commander wasoften a politically significant issue, as indeed itstill is. Churchill (1952, p. 76) illustrates thedelicacy of such issues as nationality when herecords that as the US provided the unifiedcommander in Africa, then the British shouldprovide the commander for Operation Overlord.This was then overruled when it was realisedthat the US would have the preponderance oftroops in Europe in 1944 and so “…anAmerican commander should be appointed forthe expedition to France”. To placate Britishpublic opinion, it was agreed that all thesubordinate Commanders-in-Chief would beBritish. While General Montgomery acted asland commander for the initial period of the

DISSECTING COMMAND AND CONTROL WITH OCCAM’S RAZOR


invasion, US public opinion would not accepta British officer as land commander over theUS Army Groups for the remainder of thecampaign (Sixsmith, 1972, p. 157). GeneralEisenhower’s deputy commander and chief ofstaff for the Allied invasion of North Africahad to be Americans “…to create theimpression that the liberation of French Africawas an American, not a British venture…”(Bryant, 1957, p. 498). The degree of politicalsensitivity surrounding the nationality of thecommanders is further illustrated by Burns(1970, p. 182) who wrote about the concern ofChurchill’s staff at the appointment of GeneralWavell, a British officer, as Supreme AlliedCommander of ABDA (American, British,Dutch, Australian) Command in 1942. It wastheir concern that “…Wavell was slated to be aBritish scapegoat who would preside over arapidly disappearing command”. The boot wason the other foot when Churchill (1968, p.659), following the 1943 US defeat at thehands of Rommel at the Kasserine Pass inTunisia, said:

What a providential thing it was that Iperpetually pressed for General Eisenhowerto take the command, as the defeat of theAmerican corps, if it had been under aBritish general, would have given ourenemies in the United States a good chanceto blaspheme.In addition to his nationality, the armed

service to which a unified commanderbelonged was also an important issue.Churchill (1968, p. 118), when discussing theappointment of General Wavell to ABDAcommand in 1942, notes that “It was staffed instrict proportion to the claims of the differentPowers, and all in triplicate for the Army,Navy, and Air”. Unified command of thePacific foundered on the issue of whether itshould be a Navy or an Army appointment.The US Navy felt that as it had acknowledgedthat command of the European theatre shouldbe an Army appointment, then the Pacificshould be a Navy appointment. This

developed into an acrimonious debate with theresult that command in the Pacific waseventually split between the US Army and theUS Navy.

Those attempting to dissect “command andcontrol” and provide meaning for theindividual words offer many explanations forthe supposed meaning of “control”. The USNavy, for instance, states that “Control is themeans by which a commander guides theconduct of operations” (NDP6, 1995,p. 9).Another version is provided by the US Marineswho see control as “…feedback about theeffects of the action taken”(MCPD6, 1996).These explanations do not allow for thepossibility that the inclusion of “control” in“command and control” can be explainedsolely from its association with commandarrangements.

The manner in which the terms“operational control” and “administrativecontrol” were used by WWII politicians andmilitary commanders indicates that theyunderstood them to mean the limits to aunified joint or multi-national commander’sauthority over the forces of other Services ornations. WWII commanders had a similarunderstanding as their modern-daycounterparts on the restrictions imposed bylimited delegation of operational oradministrative control or authority. Forexample, while the Australian Governmentdelegated operational control of assignedAustralian forces to General MacArthur in hiscapacity as Supreme Allied Commander, heacknowledged the restrictions inherent in nothaving administrative control of these sameforces. In a letter to Prime Minister Curtin,General MacArthur referred to his not beingable to move a RAAF headquarters into theoperational area because “…the majorproportion of the administrative personnel inthe headquarters is composed of W.A.A.A.Fs(Women’s Auxiliary Australian Air Force)who…are forbidden to leave Australia” (Odgers,1957, p. 438). On the rare occasion when the

23

Supreme Commander’s staff overstepped thelimits of their administrative authority theywere quickly made aware of the situation. In1945 Allied Air Headquarters unilaterallydesignated Air Vice Marshal Bostock as AirOfficer Commanding-in-Chief RAAFCommand and were immediately advised bythe RAAF Chief of Air Staff that such matterswere his prerogative and that the order shouldbe withdrawn (Odgers, 1957, p. 439).

While early usage included the modifiers“operational” and “administrative”, these weresoon dropped as evidenced from the immediatepost-war usage of the term. A possibleexplanation for this is that commandarrangements should spell out not only thecommander’s operational authority but also thelevel of administrative authority delegated.This realisation would have made the separateidentification of the types of controlunnecessary in any general reference tocommand arrangements.

A Compound WordAlberts et al. (1995, p.6) states that “Prior

eras referred only to command…no one knowswhy the language changed…”. The historicalevidence presented here suggests that thechange may have commenced in the attemptsto resolve the complex political andorganisational issues surrounding commandarrangements for the unified command ofWWII joint and multi-national forces. Urbanlegend has it that “C2” gained its currentpopular acceptance after it was used as ameans to gain funds from the US Congress fora military project.

“Command and control” may now refer tomore than just command arrangements. Thereference may instead be to command itself, orto command support systems, or anycombination of these three (Sproles, 2001, pp.15-22). When “command and control” is usedin the sense of “command”, the separate words“command” and “control” are synonymousand serve no real purpose in combination.

Van Crevald (1985, p. 1), perhaps the pre-eminent authority in the field, chose to use“command” in preference to “command andcontrol” when writing “Command in War”.Ashworth (1987, p. 34) refers to “commandand control” as “…a subset of command”.

There is some evidence in the literature forthis development of separate meanings beingassociated with the term “command andcontrol”. General Brooke, the British Chief ofthe Imperial General Staff from 1941 to 1946,referred to his having selected General Hobartto “control and command” the experimental79th Division (Bryant, 1957, p. 597). Thisapplication of the term, curiously reversed inthe same manner as that used by Curtin, is inthe sense of “command”. Frequent reference toexpressions such as “control and direction”,“operational direction and control”, “direct andcontrol”, and “directing and controlling” willbe found in Montgomery (1958). In mostinstances they refer to command arrangementsbut on other occasions they refer to“command”. Another illustration is to befound in the way the term was intended in Dr Strangelove (1964). In this instance thereference is to what would now be calledcommand support systems yet only a shorttime before this, “control systems” was beingused to describe the same thing. Bryant (1957,p. 213), when referring to the German attackson British air defence control centres andradars during the Battle of Britain noted the“…growing damage to its control system andairfields”. When statements such as “Airpower was used to destroy the enemy’scommand and control”, it is command supportsystems that were being destroyed. Indeed, themost common use of “command and control”now seems to be associated with commandsupport systems. This interest is expressed inthe proliferation of terms such as C3I(Command, Control, Communications, andIntelligence), which Van Crevald (1985, p. 1)dismisses as “jargon”, to indicate an interest in



a particular element of the command supportsystem.

It is suggested that this is evidence of thegradual evolution of the term as itmetamorphosed to become what is known as acompound word, i.e. two or more words thattogether express a single idea. An opencompound word consists of two or more wordswritten separately, such as “chief of staff”,“rock and roll”, and, dare we say, “commandand control”.

“Command and control” is not the onlyexample of a military term that hasmetamorphosed over the years into an opencompound word. Kemp (1954, p. 108)provides an historical background to thecompound word “Fleet Air Arm” and itsorigins in the term “Fleet Air Arm of the RoyalAir Force”. In 1937 operational andadministrative control of the Fleet Air Arm waspassed over to the RN and it ceased to be anarm of the RAF. Since then the role and verynature of naval aviation has developed andbears little resemblance to what it was in the1930s. To dissect this compound word into itscomponent words and attempt to associatespecial significance to each in isolation doesnot add to the understanding of the single ideathat “Fleet Air Arm” conjures up today. It iseven more pointless to try to do so with theFleet Air Arm of the RAN which has never hadan organisational link with the RAF. “Fleet AirArm” is a compound word with an interestinghistory that expresses an idea that is nowdifferent from that when it was formulated as aphrase. The origin of the word lies in thecommand arrangements established betweenthe RN and the RAF but it has evolved overtime to mean something else other than this. Itshares this property with “command andcontrol”.

Which Explanation?During the past several decades, many

alternative explanations for the term“command and control” have been offered that

concentrate on the relationship between thetwo component words of the expression. Thisarticle argues against this idea of treating“command and control” as a phrase. Itsuggests that “command and control” hasevolved over time to become a compoundword with three possible meanings, none ofwhich can be ascertained without anunderstanding of the context in which theword is being used. Acceptance of “commandand control” as a compound word then makespointless any attempt to find meaning fromany of its constituent words. The question tobe asked is which of the available explanationsis to be accepted? Is “command and control” aset of words whose individual meaning ispertinent to the meaning of the whole orshould it be treated as a compound wordexpressing a single idea? Does it make senseto attempt to define the constituent words orshould they be considered to be a single entityjust as they are in other compound words suchas “chief of staff” or “rock and roll”.

The argument presented in this article isthat the meaning of “command and control”has evolved over time and that this meaning isno longer to be found in an examination of thediscrete words making up the term.Unfortunately there does not appear to beproof positive one way or the other as to whichof the various explanations on offer is thecorrect explanation. One person’s view, itwould seem, is as good as anyone else’s.However, the explanation of the meaning ofthe term “command and control” offered herehas the virtue of simplicity and, according toOccam’s razor, it should therefore qualify asthe most likely explanation under thecircumstances.

Occam’s RazorOccam’s razor is a principle stated by a

medieval monk, William of Occam, that“Plurality should not be posited withoutnecessity”. Although its application can besubtler than just as a mere application of the

25

KISS principle, it is generally understood tomean that given two explanations, then thesimpler is more likely to be correct. Whenapplied to the term “command and control”,which of the explanations offered is thesimpler? Is it amongst those that attempt tofind a variety of seemingly obtuse meaningsthat are often difficult to comprehend andseem to serve little purpose? Or is it the onethat places the origin of the term in thehistorical context from which it has developedand acknowledges its evolution over time intoa new set of meanings? The choice isultimately the reader’s.

Conclusion It is suggested that the origin of the term

“command and control” lies in its associationwith the command arrangements developed inWWII to achieve unified command amongstthe Allies. Over the intervening half century orso, the term has come to be used to refer notonly to command arrangements but also tocommand itself and to command supportsystems. The term has also metamorphosedover that period from being a phrase to being acompound word. Any relationship betweenthe separate words “command” and “control”is an historical curiosity that should beaccepted as such. Attempts to attribute specialsignificance to these words serve little purposeand add nothing to the understanding of whatthe word is trying to convey.

It is worth repeating once more at thisjuncture that the explanation offered in thisarticle for the meaning of “command andcontrol” cannot claim to be definitive, at leastnot at this stage of the enquiry. However,unlike other attempts to explain the term, thisarticle provides a plausible history andderivation of the term that fits in withdocumented history and the mindset of thepeople who initiated the term. Attempts toassociate other meanings complicate the issueand only serve to add to the confusionsurrounding the term. Occam’s razor indicates

that the explanation provided in this article, bygiving the simplest explanation of the term, ismore likely to be correct.

Therefore, to paraphrase words used byPresident Kennedy in his inaugural address inJanuary 1961, it may be best to “Ask not what‘Command’ and ‘Control’ means to you butwhat you mean by ‘Command and control’”.

REFERENCESAlberts, D.S. and Hayes, R. 1995, Command

Arrangements for Peace Operations, NationalDefense University Press Publications,Washington, D.C., USA.

Ashworth, N. F. 1987, “Command and Control”,Defence Force Journal, No. 63, March/April1987, pp. 34-36, Department of Defence,Canberra, Australia.

Burns, J.M. 1970, Roosevelt – The Soldier ofFreedom, Konecky & Konecky, New York, USA.

Bryant, A. 1957, The Turn of the Tide, Collins,London, UK.

Churchill, W.S. 1952, The Second World War.Closing the Ring, Vol. V, Cassell, London, UK.

Churchill, W.S. 1968, The Second World War. TheHinge of Fate, 4th Ed, Vol. IV, Cassell, London,UK.

Galland, A. 1955, The First and The Last, (Englished), Methuen & Co. Ltd, London, UK.

Kemp, P.K. 1954, Fleet Air Arm, Herbert Jenkins,London, UK.

Long, G. 1963, “Australia in the War of 1939 –1945”, Series One, Army, Vol. VII, The FinalCampaigns, Australian War Memorial,Canberra, Australia.

McCarthy, D 1959, “Australia in the War of 1939 –1945”, Series One, Army, Vol. V, South WestPacific Area – First Year, Kokoda to Wau, 1962reprint, Australian War Memorial, Canberra,Australia.

MCDP6 1996, “Marine Corps Doctrine Publication6, ‘Command and control’”, United StatesMarine Corps 4 October 1996 [Online, accessed13 Jun. 97], URL:http://ismo-www1.mqg.usmc.mil/docdiv/6/ch1.htm

Montgomery, B.L. 1945, 21st (British) Army Groupin the Campaign in North West Europe 1944 –45, Lecture to the Royal United ServiceInstitution London, October 1945, Printing andStationery Service, BAOR, Germany.

Montgomery, B.L. 1958, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery, Fontana Monarchs,London, UK.

Morgan, F. 1950, Overture to Overlord, Hodder &Stoughton Limited, London, UK.



Murphy, R. 1948, Last Viceroy. The Life and Timesof Rear-Admiral The Earl Mountbatten ofBurma, Jarrods, London, UK.

NDP6 1995, Naval Doctrine Publication 6, “NavalCommand and Control”, US Navy DoctrineCommand, Norfolk, Virginia.

Odgers, G. 1957, Australia in the War of 1939 – 45,Air War Against Japan 1943 - 1945, (1968reprint), Series 3(Air), Vol. II, Australian WarMemorial, Canberra, Australia

Sixsmith, E.K.G. 1972, Eisenhower as MilitaryCommander, Stein and Day, New York, USA.

Sproles, N. 2001, “The Command and Control Triador Making Muddy Waters Clear”, AustralianDefence Force Journal, No. 151,November/December 2001, pp. 15-22,Canberra, Australia.

Stacey, C.P. 1948, The Canadian Army 1939 –1945. An Official Historical Summary, King’sPrinter, Ottawa, Canada.

Van Crevald, M. 1985, Command in War, HarvardUniversity Press, Cambridge, USA.

Wilmot, C. 1952, The Struggle for Europe, TheReprint Society Ltd, London, UK.

Dr Sproles is a Senior Research Fellow with the Systems Engineering and Evaluation Centre, a research group of theUniversity of South Australia. He spent 23 years in the Australian Army, retiring in 1982 as a lieutenant colonel. In1999 he was awarded a PhD from the University of South Australia. Dr. Sproles is currently working with DSTOEdinburgh under an agreement between the University of South Australia and DSTO. His current research interestsare in measures of effectiveness and C2. He has published widely in Australia and overseas on both topics.

27

Just as the processes, skills and systems ofthe agricultural era were removed to meet

the demands of the industrial era; new waysare today being sought to take advantage ofthe opportunities offered by the informationage. This new age has brought with it a host ofchanges particularly in the way people are led.Traditional career structures no longer existand managers are required to take moreresponsibility for their own development. Theyare expected to coach and empower ratherthan to control, and temporary roles andcompetencies are replacing job descriptions.Flexible contracts are becoming the norm andtraditional systems of hierarchy are giving wayto flatter structures based on processes andteams.1 If leaders are to keep pace withworkplace changes of individualaccountability, global competitiveness andcontinuous learning, they need to adopt newleadership approaches and philosophies such asthose described above. This new approach isnecessary for the trend to globalisation isprobably the most important issue affectingAustralian leaders in the 21st century.

Just as it was 200 years ago, there aremany people today who do not feel

comfortable with these changes and the paceat which they are occurring. These people arevery likely to resist this change and attempt toretain the old processes within which they feltcomfortable (and powerful). It is these peoplewho I choose to refer to as the new Luddites,and just like their predecessors they have thepotential to cause considerable damage andinconvenience when they choose to activelyresist change within their respectiveorganisations.

Australia is not immune to thisphenomenon and it is because of thisvulnerability that this article will seek toexamine whether Australians are at the leadingedge of leadership or whether they areLuddites. The main focus of this article is tohighlight that whilst Australians take pride inthe way they conduct leadership in theirrespective environments; many people appearto refuse to adapt their particular leadershipapproaches to reflect the changing demands oftheir organisation, despite the advantages indoing so. In order to highlight this point, thefirst part of this article will be devoted tosummarising the theoretical perspectives ofwhat constitutes Australian leadership.

Australian Leadership – Leading Edge orLuddite?

By Captain Christopher Ruff, Aus Int

As Great Britain underwent the Industrial Revolution during the late 18th and early 19thcenturies, many of the old manufacturing systems gave way to new innovative processes based onmass production and mechanisation. As the physical processes themselves underwent this change,the attitudes and values of the people themselves were changing just as rapidly. Resistance to thischange was common, and a group known as the Luddites established a reputation for action in thisarea. The Luddites were predominantly handloom weavers who, fearing the loss of their lifestyles tothe new factory based machinery, resorted to acts of vandalism in order to resist the introduction ofthe new processes. Because the Luddites were financially secure under the old system, with itsremoval, they saw their way of life (and their influence) being destroyed. The authorities ultimatelyresponded to their actions, but their movement has gone down in history as being representative ofthose who do not readily embrace changes in their respective environments.


Secondly a description of the environmentthat Australia operates within will provide auseful context with which to approach thefinal stage of this article. Finally, the issue willbe highlighted that whilst Australians attemptto embrace new approaches to leadership, theyare often prevented from doing so primarily bya resistance to change. Many leaders seek toretain their positions and influence under theold approaches and just like their Ludditecompanions from 200 years before, theyattempt to damage the process and delay theadoption of new techniques.

In a presentation to the Senior ExecutiveService in Canberra on 16 April 1998, Dr KenParry from the University of SouthernQueensland presented the findings of arecently completed synthesis of leadershipresearch in Australia and New Zealand. Thisresearch examined the practice and nature ofleadership in various organisational settings.The researchers interviewed over 5000Australians from both private and public sectororganisations with the results being comparedwith similar research conducted in the UnitedStates. Because of its depth, this study providesthe background to the examination of thetheoretical aspects of Australian Leadership inthis article.

Transformational leadership is a popularand current concept in leadership and this isevidenced by its concentration in the researchthat is undertaken in Australia. Someauthorities in this field include Bruce Avolio,James Sarros, Oleh Butchatsky and JoeSantora. Avolio for example presents hisinterpretation of the ways thattransformational leadership can deal with thechallenges experienced in Australia. His workdiscusses the component aspects oftransformational leadership and outlines itsbenefits from the individual, team and TotalQuality Management (TQM) perspectives. Themain themes that arise are the criticality ofchanges to the existing mindset ofmanagement; the criticality of organisational

learning; the importance of changing andimproving the existing management workforcerather than waiting for a newly educatedworkforce to arrive. He also stressed theimportance for leadership of building teamsand building cultures.2

The works of James Sarros, OlehButchatsky and Joe Santora recommend a keyshift in the approach to leadership, anapproach that can be found in the work titled“Australian Leadership”.3 This recommendationis based on an analysis of interviews withsenior Australian executives, which resulted inthe generation of a model of “breakthroughleadership”. Breakthrough leaders rethink thestructures, processes, values and ideals of therealities of organisational life with the purposeof improving existing practices, or replacingthem with something better or more relevant.It results in the four Cs – continuous learning,confidence, competence and commitment.

Another perspective on Australianleadership is that put forward by Parry andSarros where, with the increasing globalisationof both the business and governmentenvironment, flexibility and adaptability ofleadership styles to suit different markets andclients is becoming essential.

All of the researchers described in thisarticle agreed that certain aspects of leadershipneed to be adopted regardless of career pathand gender. These include:• creating a vision and having strategic

skills;• communication and people management

skills; and• knowledge of the industry and/or expertise

in the subject matter.Other aspects include drive; innovative

thinking; political awareness; engenderingtrust and negotiation skills. The opinionsexpressed in this study were consistent withthe known values, abilities, and skills ofleadership. The traditional leadership aspects ofcommunication, strategic thinking, valuingpeople, personal qualities and values-based

29AUSTRALIAN LEADERSHIP – LEADING EDGE OR LUDDITE?

behaviour were reaffirmed as important forboth present and future leaders.

This research is just as relevant forfollowers in organisations as it is with theleaders and this is an important point whenexamining the impact of leadership inAustralia. Transformational leadership is ableto change the motivations, beliefs, andattitudes of followers more so than otherapproaches to leadership. The ability to affectthis change has a significant impact on theirbehaviour and values as their perceptions ofsatisfaction; effectiveness and output areinfluenced by the actions of their leaders. Astheir behaviours and values are influenced, sotoo is the culture of the organisation andultimately this can develop into improvedorganisational performance. Whilst thisinfluence is hoped to be seen in a positivelight, any negative perceptions in this processcan have an equally significant impact in theseareas. This will be covered later in this articlewhen the behaviours of current leaders areexamined.

In his presentation, Parry states thatAustralian leaders are currently grappling withthe implementation of technology,globalisation and change managementthroughout their organisations. Innovation,creative thinking and cultivating knowledgecapture and dissemination are considered to beessential for leaders in order to handle thesedevelopments. Also important is the ability toachieve cultural transformation and corporateagility through influencing people and values.From this statement it appears that theadoption of transformational styles ofleadership is necessary when it mirrors theskills required to handle the changes intechnology and globalisation.4 Many leadersmention transformational leadership, but as thenext part of this article will demonstrate, thereappears to be some resistance to this changeand the leading edge Australian is replaced bythe Australian Luddite.

From the materials obtained in the researchfor this article, it is evident that Australiarecognises the concepts of transformationalleadership and it attempts to encourage theiruse within the workplace. This should besuccessful given the nature of Australia’sculture and national psyche. Australians like tosee themselves as an easy-going and athleticnation, and the habit of combining businesswith sport indicates this. The deeply ingrainedcultural traits in Australian society as well asinstitutional factors such as the legislativeframework underpinning workplace behaviouradds value to the adoption of this approach toleadership. In keeping with an increased globalperspective, a more competitive businessclimate has produced a more inclusiveleadership style according to Paul Kerin,Managing Director of the managementconsultancy AT Kearney.5 Authority is beingdevolved, shared with the emphasis oncooperation. Teamwork, partnerships and theentrusting of employees further down the linewith greater responsibility are the key issuesfor the people running Australian companies.

Yet whilst these traits share a commonality,certain negative aspects of Australian cultureexist that can prohibit the development ofeffective leadership. Australians are inclined tobe sceptical of leadership. Whereas Americanleaders receive the respect of their followersuntil they demonstrate themselves to beuntrustworthy, Australian followers start witha negative aspect of their leaders until theydeserve their respect.6 Quite simply, inAustralia, leadership is a tenuous occupation,because once one is in the role, there is oftensomeone waiting in the wings to take over.Research for the Australian Industry Taskforceon Leadership and management skills foundthat Australian managers tended to possess acultural mindset that fails to recognise theneed for changes in management styles.7

Perhaps the most troubling sign is the failureamong leaders to identify the uniqueness ofAustralia. This is in part a measure of isolation:


There is no strong sense of identity becauseidentity relies on being noticed, and at timesthe rest of the world rarely notices Australia.Whilst it is important to gain the benefits fromseeing the world and absorbing differentcultures, one should come back to the localculture and embrace it. To impress others, it isfirst necessary to understand yourself and thisis perhaps highlighted by this extract fromSarros’s book Australian Leadership, a quotethat highlights the unique position thatAustralia is in the world.

Historically, Australia is the progeny of theUnited Kingdom. Ideologically, we areclosely aligned with the United States.Geographically, Australia is firmly in theAsia Pacific region. Is it any wonderAustralian Executives have some troubleleading their firms when confronted withcontradictory conditions such as these?8

The examination of Australian leadershipsoon makes it clear that it is culture specific;for what leadership means in Australia may bedifferent to the concept in the United States,Middle East or Asia. Americans generally arecommitted to leadership yet whilst the Britishshare the same language, their concept ofleadership is more restrained. The keydifferences appear to be in the areas of peopleorientation, skills in negotiation, skills inmanaging national diversity, and the capacityto manage between extremes. Evaluating thequality of Australia’s leaders requires taking alonger perspective of national progress andassessing performance not just against what isachieved but also against what might havebeen done. The implication is that leaders are along way from knowing how to place Australiain the emerging global economy.9

Many operating managers howeverconsider culture change or organisationalimprovement the “forbidden zone”. Theyrecognise the opportunity in doing this for theorganisation, but are uncomfortable oroverwhelmed addressing it. Many companiesare prepared to make dramatic changes to

organisational structure, however painful thatmay be but they often fail to change the softelements of the organisation. Cross-functionalteamwork, delegation of responsibility, andbroadly defined roles for employees are keydrivers of the potential benefits in mostredesign initiatives – yet they are frequentlyneglected. These issues become that muchmore important as the scope and level ofchange desired increases.10

As indicated, there exists within Australianleadership (especially at the higher levels) adistinct reluctance to practice effectiveleadership styles. When it comes to leadership,Australians appear to display a cultural quirkthat can make the adoption and acceptance ofnew styles of leadership difficult. Added to thisis insecurity when it comes to assertingthemselves in the wider international arena. Itis well known that Australian cricketers andrugby players are the best in the world andthat our Olympic Games were one of the best.However, when it comes to competing in theglobal marketplace, problems can occur. Theinstitution of the changes necessary to be morecompetitive are recognised by senior leaderswithin organisations, but it appears that theyare unwilling to make the hard but necessarychanges. Those leaders who encourage(whether intentionally or not) the resistance tothe adoption of change are causing significantproblems for the future. If the leader acts inthis way within an organisation, then thosefollowers who wish to do so may attach theirvalues and beliefs to this leader. This mayresult in the spreading of this resistance furtherdown the leadership chain.

The first part of this article mentioned theLuddite movement and the motives for theiractions. If a suitable example could be foundtoday within Australian leadership then thiscould be it. “Australian Luddites” by the virtueof their positions of influence within theleader/follower relationship are capable ofinflicting greater damage to an organisationthan simply smashing a handloom. This does

AUSTRALIAN LEADERSHIP – LEADING EDGE OR LUDDITE? 31

not mean that there exists a nationwideconspiracy to thwart the development ofeffective leadership. Many of these peoplesimply fear the consequences of the rapiddevelopments that are being seen today andthey feel that they may not be able to handlethem. Because of this, their actions are a meansof coping with their situation. It is almost as ifthey are slowing down the pace of change to alevel to which they are comfortable with. Thisform of resistance whilst not endemic issufficiently well entrenched to constitute aproblem that needs to be recognised and dealtwith.

As younger generations adopttransformational approaches to leadership,these issues should be reduced over time. Thosepeople who represent Generation “X” and “Y”have greater exposure to rapid change and theonset of globalisation. As a result, they arebetter equipped to embrace change. As thesepeople progress throughout their organisations,they are more likely to utilise transformationalstyles of leadership and enable the changes todevelop within the organisation that willhopefully improve organisational performance.Tough markets for products and services driveongoing major workplace change at arelentless pace. For these reasons, theleadership skills required to create a stable yetinnovative future to inspire and motivatepeople to commit to the new, are requiredmore than ever at all levels of the organisation.This is a belated recognition that we need adifferent balance of skills for the situation atthe moment, and that these skills areeverybody’s business.

Can anything be done for the “AustralianLuddite”? In the 19th century, Luddites wereimprisoned and sometimes executed for theiractions. Whilst many would like to wish thesame fate on various leaders they have metduring their lives, measures such as these arenot necessary in today’s environment. The keylies in developing critical cultural capabilitiesthat will make companies competitively fit for

today’s economy. Traditional rules ofmanagement and organisational design needto be broken and new paths to success need tobe defined. By focusing on alignment, a betterunderstanding of the differences in thinkingand behaviours required of leaders can beobtained. Creating alignment involves threebroad categories of activities: generatingcontext, co-creating challenging andcompelling commitments and realising them.Leaders must embody the organisation’scommitments. Leaders do this throughchanging their behaviours and actions so thatthey become the personification of thecommitments.11 Avolio’s view ontransformational leadership mentioned that itexamines the criticality of changing culturalmindsets as well as emphasising learningthroughout organisations. This perhaps is themost useful way to handle the new Luddite.Essentially their existence is based on fear anda lack of understanding as to what isoccurring. If these fears are removed, then theprocess can be allowed to resume and theseleaders can play their role in the change.

It has been a continual process since thenof developing programs in leadership andmanagement development that look atvalues, ethical issues and leadership as anall-encompassing aspect of a person’s life. Inthe global context, Australian managers arenot going to be successful if they do notlearn relationship skills of a very high order.It is insufficient to take Australian leadersand tell them that they have to be better atrelating to people in different cultures andunderstanding workforce and strategicalliance partners in different cultures. ManyAustralian executives do not understandthemselves well enough to be effectiveleaders. Australia is coming of age in termsof business leadership and to share in therewards, Australia needs leaders who havevision and the capacity to achieve that visionwith the commitment and conviction of achallenged, educated and energetic


workforce. Therefore, Australian leadersrequire international experience, languagecapabilities, experience of managing cross-culturally, and an understanding of culturalnuances pertaining to social, economic andpolitical relationships overseas.12 This changewill not be easy for it goes to the very core ofthe organisation, challenging the culture,values and beliefs that brought success in theprevious decades.13

In some circles of Australian leadership,there exists a fear, not necessarily of changeitself, but at the pace of change and itsperceived direction. Just as the handloomworkers feared the loss of their positions, sotoo do some of our leaders and it is due tothis negativity that a Luddite attitude may beperceived as being prevalent in Australianleadership. This should not be a long-termissue, for as the industrial evolutionprogressed and provided the impetus forchange in other areas, so to will the changespresent in 21st century life allow forsignificant improvements in the field oftechnology and globalisation. The Ludditephenomenon appears when old processesundergo dramatic and significant changes.The use of education and the continued useof new approaches and the resolving ofdeeper cultural issues within both the leadersand the followers can handle situations suchas these. The applications of transformationalleadership styles are one way of helpingresolve these issues. Australia is able tocontribute to the wider global community,but first the cultural issues covered in thisarticle need to be addressed. Once Australiansare able to understand themselves in a widerglobal context then they can attempt toresolve the negative issues affecting theirperformance. Whilst a Luddite attitude can beseen at the moment, Australian leadershipcan look forward to be being seen as leadingedge in the near future.

NOTES1 . Pam Jones, “The New Business Age: Delivering

Exceptional Performance”, Mt Eliza BusinessReview: 54-61.

2. Ken W. Parry, “Leadership Profiles Beyond2000: How Australian Leadership is Different”,National Press Club Canberra. 16 April 1998.

3. James C. Sarros, Oleh Butchatsky, “Leadership.Australia’s Top CFO’s: Finding out what makesthem the best”, Harper Business, Sydney 1997.

4. Ken W. Parry, “Leadership Profiles Beyond2000: How Australian Leadership is Different”,National Press Club Canberra. 16 April 1998.

5. James Dunn, “The Stuff of Leadership”,Management Today, May 1998, pp.14-18.

6. Amanda Sinclair, Doing Leadership Differently.Melbourne University Press, Melbourne 1998.p. 47.

7. Catherine R. Smith, Leonie V. Still, “Breakingthe Glass Barrier: Barriers to Global Careers forWomen in Australia”, International Review ofWomen and Leadership (1996), 2(2), pp. 60-72.

8. James C. Sarros, Butchatsky Oleh, “Leadership.Australia’s Top CEO’s: Finding out what makesthem the best”, Harper Business Sydney 1997.p. 263.

9. David James, “Do Australian Leaders Rate OurInterest?” Management Today, March 2001,pp.14-19.

10. Gustafson, Grant; Thrum, Andrew: “Bravingthe Forbidden Zone”. HR Monthly, April 1998,pp. 24-27.

11. Mark Youngblood, “Leading at the Edge ofChaos”, HR Monthly, May 2000, pp. 32-33.

12. Catherine R. Smith, Leonie V. Still, “Breakingthe Glass Barrier: Barriers to Global Careers forWomen in Australia”, International Review ofWomen and Leadership (1996), 2(2), 60-72.

13. Pam Jones, “The New Business Age: DeliveringExceptional Performance”, Mt Eliza BusinessReview: pp. 54-61.

BIBLIOGRAPHYArbuthnot, Scott. “Taking It Personally”.

Management Today. August 2000. p. 19.Avery, Gayle. “The Australian Way”. HR Monthly.

March 2000. pp. 38-39.Cottrell, David. “The Need For Speed in New

Millennium Leadership Styles”. EmploymentRelations Today”. Spring 2000. pp.61-71.

Davis, Ed, “Towards Improved People Management-An Analysis”. Journal of the Australian andNew Zealand Academy of Management1997.3(2). pp.28-33.

Dunn, James; “The Stuff of Leadership”.Management Today. May 1998. pp. 4-18.

AUSTRALIAN LEADERSHIP – LEADING EDGE OR LUDDITE? 33

Goleman, Daniel. “Leadership That Gets Results”.Harvard Business Review. March/April 2000.pp.78-90.

Gustafson, Grant; Thrum, Andrew; “Braving theForbidden Zone”. HR Monthly April 1998. pp.24-27.

Hartmann, Linley; “What Do Managers Like to Do?Comparing Women and Men in Australia andthe US”. Australian Journal of Management.June1997 22(l), pp. 71-91.

Hauschild, Susanne, Light, Thomas and Stein,Wolfram. “Knowledge Must be SpreadAround”. BRW Magazine. March 2 2001. pp.64-68.

Hickman, Gill. R. Leading Organisations:Perspectives for a New Era. Sage Publications.California 1998.

James, David. “BHP Management School willNurture New Management Style”. BusinessReview Weekly. 10 February 1997. pp. 44-46.

James, David. “Do Australian Leaders Rate OurInterest?”. Management Today. March 2001.1pp. 4-19.

Jones, Pam. “The New Business Age: DeliveringExceptional Performance”. Mt Eliza BusinessReview. Pp 54-61.

Kavanagh, John. “Australia’s Most Admired”.Business Review Weekly. 15 October 1999. pp.68-73.

Kelly, Paul. Future Tense, Australia beyond Election1998. Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, 1999.

Kingsley, Hugh;. “Just For A Change”. ManagementToday. April 2000. pp. 20-22.

Lamond, David. “If Management is ‘Common Sense’,why is Sense in Management So Uncommon”.Journal of the Australian and New ZealandAcademy of Management 1998..4(2). pp.1-9.

Mair, David. Managing in Australia. LandsdownePublishing, Sydney 2000.

Mant, Alistair. Intelligent Leadership. Allen andUnwin, St Leonards 1997.

Martin, John. “Leadership”. Local GovernmentManagement. February 1999. pp.16-19.

McColl, Gina. “Engendering Good Management”.Management Today. May 1999. pp.16-19.

Murrill, Maureen. “Category Leaders”. ManagementToday. June 1998. pp. 3-4.

Parry, Ken W. “Leadership profiles Beyond 2000:How Australian Leadership is Different”.National Press Club Canberra. 16 April 1998.

Pratt, Richard. “Leadership, A Fine Distinction”.Management Today. January/February 2001. p. 9.

Prescott, John. “Management Challenges forAustralia in the Asian Century”. Mt ElizaBusiness Review. pp.38-45.

Ruff, David; The Fourteen Obligations of TopManagement. 1997.

Sarros, James C., Butchatsky, Oleh. “Leadership.Australia’s Top CEO’s.- Finding out what makesthem the best”. Harper Business Sydney 1997.

Saville, James, Higgins, Mark, AustralianManagement: A First-Line Perspective.McMillan Education Australia, Melbourne1994.

Simons, Fran. “Heroes, Warriors, Leaders,Managers”. The Australian Financial ReviewMagazine.

Sinclair, Amanda. Doing Leadership Differently.Melbourne University Press, Melbourne 1998.

Smith, Catherine R. Still, Leonie. V. “Breaking theGlass Barrier: Barriers to Global Careers forWomen in Australia”. International Review ofWomen and Leadership (1996),2(2). pp.60-72.

Stanton, Dennis. “The Emergent Leader”. HRMonthly. March 2000 pp. 48-49.

Thompson, Ian, Morgan, David, E. “The WorldAccording to Karpin”. Journal of IndustrialRelations. December 1997, 39 (4) pp 457-477.

Ulrich, Dave. “A Time To Get Results”. ManagementToday. April 2001. p.12.

Way, Nicholas. “Leadership at the Barriers”.Business Review Weekly. October 6 2000: pp.56-62.

Way, Nick. “Battle of the Chromosomes”.Management Today. August 2000. pp. 16-18.

Youngblood, Mark. “Leading at the Edge of Chaos”.HR Monthly. May 2000. pp. 32-33.

Captain Christopher Ruff graduated from the Royal Military College Duntroon in December 1994 into the AustralianIntelligence Corps and is currently posted to Sydney as the Second in Command of the 3rd Intelligence Company, 1stIntelligence Battalion. Captain Ruff has a Bachelor of Arts Degree from the University of Adelaide (Politics) and aMasters of Management Studies (Human Resource Management) from the University of New South Wales.

34

Risk Management and AvoidanceRisk is defined as:the potential for injury or loss, the potentialfor a hazardous event or hostile action tooccur. It is a combination of consequence,exposure, probability/likelihood of aspecified hazardous event or hostile action.2

It is this potential which RM attempts tomitigate against through examination of theactivity and the level of risk determined to beacceptable.

Risk Management is defined as:a process whereby decisions are made andactions implemented to eliminate or reducethe effect of hazards and threats to theachievement of a mission or task.3

The RM process is broken down into sevenstages. They are:

a. Step One: Establish context;b. Step Two: Identify risks;c. Step Three: Analyse risks (the

likelihood and consequenceof each event should bedetermined);

d. Step Four: Evaluate risks;e. Step Five: Treat risks (identify

treatment options);f. Step Six: Monitor and review; andg. Step Seven: Communication and

consultation.Once this process is complete, the

commander must then be willing to accept theidentified risks. This may minimise or exclude

Does Risk Management Cultivate a Cultureof Risk Avoidance?

By Captain I. D. Langford, RAInf

An Army not prepared for combat is like an orchestra without instruments.The Fundamentals of Land Warfare1

The safe management of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) materials and personnel hasreceived significant attention over the past few years both operationally and non-operationally.Deployments such as East Timor, Bougainville, and Afghanistan, events such as the Blackhawkaccident, the HMAS Supply fire, and the ADF Everest team tragedy in 2001 have brought themanagement of risk into the spotlight.

The ADF, including the Australian Army, has introduced mechanisms of Risk Management(RM) identification and mitigation into the decision-making process. This is aimed at maximisingforce preservation whilst encouraging intuitive decision-making. This mechanism has beenincorporated into military doctrine and is applied entirely across the operational continuum (peace,conflict, and war).

The Army has both a legal and moral requirement to minimise risks whilst maintainingcapabilities largely concerned with the exercise and application of violence. This training isinherently dangerous, and it is this balance between realistic training and risk minimisation thathas led to a culture of risk avoidance being encouraged to ensure no loss of life or equipment.

The aim of this article is to assess whether RM doctrine and procedures encourage riskmitigation or total risk avoidance. Much of this analysis is derived from terms and definitionswithin the doctrinal risk management process, so therefore a review of the key terms and elementsof risk management must be included.

DOES RISK MANAGEMENT CULTIVATE A CULTURE OF RISK AVOIDANCE? 35

some components of the capabilitydevelopment which, whilst expedient for thecommander in the short term, impacts onrealism in training and creates a culture of riskavoidance over the long term.

Limitations of Risk ManagementThere are a few limitations within the

standard RM framework that could restrict itseffectiveness as a command tool. Firstly, RMassumes that the activity being analysed mustbe conducted in the general manner specified.Treatment options (i.e. Step 5 of the process),do not incorporate alternate means ofconducting the activity (e.g. fly/steam/drive),and it would not be valid to embed alternativeswithin the existing framework. This wouldtherefore mean an individual, stand-alone RManalysis for each activity option is required,despite it being a component of the sameoperation/exercise.

A further limitation of the nature of RMconcerns the management of time. RMimplicitly assumes that all selected treatmentoptions must be implemented immediately inorder to be effective, but in somecircumstances this assumption is not correct.This will arise in the context of deliberateplanning, and any other risks seen on thehorizon are deferred until that stage.

The other significant limitation to the RMprocess assumes that all risks are independentof each other. As a result, the structure of theRM is very straightforward, with a list of risksand mitigators the result. However, there is infact a very complex inter-relationship betweenrisk and circumstance, which should beconsidered when examining treatment options(e.g. a vehicle accident could be the cause of agunshot injury; this could be mitigated againstif the requirement to unload prior to boardinga vehicle was identified).

RM also fails to take into its calculationsany historical or statistical analysis whendetermining the probability of occurrence. If infact we did proper statistical analysis of those

accidents that did occur then we may find thatmany are in fact within “residual risk”probability zones.4 (For example, if we knewthat the probability of death by accidentaldischarge of a weapon is 1:1,000,000 we wouldnot bother trying to manage it since it was wellwithin acceptable and community standards).

Risk Avoidance and Risk AcceptanceRisk avoidance is defined as the informed

decision not to become involved in a risksituation.5 In relation to RM in the AustralianArmy, it is argued that as a result of the focusof risk management in doctrine, commandersare unwilling to accept the higher risksidentified at a cost of the realism of training.The commander that chooses to not acceptreasonable risk therefore becomes an inhibitorto the maintenance of individual and collectivecapability of his/her force element. This is, ofcourse, in direct doctrinal contrast to theAustralian Army’s vision, which is:

...to become a world class Army, ready tofight and win as part of the AustralianDefence Force team, to serve the nation andmake Australians proud.6

Risk acceptance is the calculated decisiontaken by commanders accepting risks oncethey have assessed that the outcome is worththe risk “exposure”. It is a command decisionbased on balancing the mission, the personnel,and the outcome. On operations the results arefairly obvious, with success gauged by theaccomplishment of the mission, casualtiestaken, etc. In training, success is determinedpredominantly by the safe conduct of theactivity, and the improvement of capability. Itis in training, however, that the commandercan limit the improvement of capabilitythrough refusal to accept reasonable risk.

The acceptance of reasonable risk is anessential quality of commanders, who as aconsequence of their actions determine bothoperational success and realism in training.Realism in training develops in individuals andteams the knowledge, skills, and attitudes

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL 155 JULY / AUGUST 200236

required to win the operation. Quality trainingensures that commanders and their soldiers arefit to carry out their tasks and responsibilities.Such involvement is central to thedevelopment of a mutual trust, and it is thecommander that must engender this in trainingto ensure it continues in battle.

The Australian Army and Risk ManagementAs stated, RM in the Australian Army is a

method undertaken to achieve forcepreservation and preserve combat power.7 Theauthoritative documents for theimplementation of the Army’s riskmanagement policy are Training InformationBulletin No. 83 (TIB 83), Risk Management8

and the Defence Occupational Health andSafety Manual (DOHSMAN).9

It is the TIB 83 which links RM to doctrine,clearly articulating the responsibility forcommanders and all key stakeholders toincorporate RM into their exercise andoperational planning (via the MilitaryAppreciation Process). The DOHSMAN detailsthe actual implementation of RM in theworkplace, the formulation of policy, and theownership of responsibility onto allcommanders and their soldiers. Of particularnote however, the DOHSMAN considersimpartially the acceptance or avoidance of riskas competing options, although it points outthat avoidance of risk is the only optionrequiring no additional effort from thecommander.10 This in a sense makes it a moreseemingly attractive option to a risk-aversecommander. Despite this however, both of theaforementioned documents offer sound policyand advice to commanders to enable them to achieve an effective balance between capability development andoperational/exercise safety.

Risk Management and DoctrineRM is firmly embedded into the Australian

Army’s parent philosophical doctrinalpublication, The Fundamentals of LandWarfare.11 Force preservation is the principle-

driving element for the rationale for RM. It isachieved through the acquiring of a knowledgeedge a process beginning with information andending with decisive action.12 The applicationof the knowledge edge in training and combatallows commanders to pursue professionalmastery, which provides the means to realisethe potential benefits of superior situationalawareness.13

Doctrinally, the Australian Armyencourages manoeuvre warfare utilisingdirective control.14 This ability to manoeuvrerelies on effective command. One of theprinciple components of command concernsitself with decision making. RM of course aidsthe commander to fulfil doctrinal obligations,but also gives the commander the freedom ofaction to focus on the key issues, rather thanbeing distracted or overwhelmed by theunimportant.15

Risk Management and the Military AppreciationProcess (MAP)

TIB 83 articulates exactly the relationshipbetween RM and the MAP:

The risk management process is not aremedy for poor planning or execution.It is not a separate planning process to theMAP. Indeed, the MAP is primarilyconcerned with the identification of risksassociated with each possible COA,determination of methods to control risk,and acceptance of risk inherent in the finalplan.16

It is the thought processes that are involvedin the formulation of RM that is appliedinformally within the Intelligence Preparationof the Battlefield (IPB). This step gives scope tothe commander to consider the risks from thethreat (i.e. enemy), and the environment(terrain, weather, etc). Accordingly, during theCourse of Action Analysis, the commanderwargames plans, auditing them informally forrisk and risk controls. This is the operationalimplementation of RM.

DOES RISK MANAGEMENT CULTIVATE A CULTURE OF RISK AVOIDANCE? 37

As stated, through the doctrinal applicationof RM throughout the process of the MAP,professional mastery at all levels of commandis enhanced. This engenders an intuitivedecision-making cycle at all levels. This lessensthe effect of the “fog of war” which is derivedfrom misinformation, contradictory evidence,and intelligence sensor confusion.

Application of Risk Management on Operationsand Training

RM on operations is somewhat easier toaccommodate than in training. For thecommander, operational risk is an ongoingconsideration in all aspects of militaryappreciation whilst deployed. Owing to thisfact, it is easier for the commander to acceptan operational risk because it is put into acontext in relation to the strategic aim (e.g.Military Operations in the LittoralEnvironment, Forced Entry from the Air andSea, etc). Casualties on operations are alsoseemingly more acceptable to Government inthe pursuit of its strategic agenda rather thanin training.

In training, RM is a much more involvedprocess, which places risk into a trainingcontext, the benefits of which are much harderto identify. This has the potential for thecommander to make the assessment the risk isnot worth the reward. The price of this, is ofcourse, a loss of realism in training and areduction in individual and collectivecapability. This “risk-averse” culture isperpetuated not necessarily by the RM process,but from a refusal from commanders to acceptthat despite our best efforts, managed risks willsometimes occur. These commanders disregarddoctrinal guidance (to provide realistictraining) in order to eliminate risk.

TIB 83 begins with the premise that bothoperations and training are hazardous and willbe rarely free from risk. It is the doctrinalresponsibility of commanders to utilise RMtools both formally and informally in order tofacilitate realistic training. Paradoxically, it is

the realism of training and the acceptance ofrisk by the commander in training that willreduce the risk to personnel and equipment onoperations. Risk avoidance is the act ofcommanders who by virtue of their risk refusalin training, increases risk on operations.

ConclusionThis article has demonstrated the

importance of RM across the operationalcontinuum in the Australian Army. Whilstsome believe that the articulation of the RMprocess encourages a process of “riskavoidance”, this article contends that thisavoidance is more to do with the refusal ofsome commanders to accept risk rather thanthe requirement to conduct the RM process asper the TIB 83, DOHSMAN, and TheFundamentals of Land Warfare.

As discussed, it is the preservation of forcethat is the fundamental aim of RM in bothpeace and war. Commanders at all levels havean obligation to provide realistic training andaccept risk in order to minimise that risk whenon operations. It is in the pursuit of the“knowledge edge” that will lessen thelikelihood of an accident in training, or atactical disaster in war.

NOTES1. Australian Army, The Fundamentals of Land

Warfare, 1998, p. 6-1(since superseded byLWD-1, The Fundamentals of Land Warfare,2002).

2. Australian Army, TIB 83, p xiv.3. ibid., p. xv.4, Email MAJ Mike Cook/Brig Peter Lambert

(AAA President) dated 2 Apr 02.5. Australian Army, The Fundamentals of Land

Warfare, 2002, p 3.6. ibid., p 3.7. John F. Antal, Manoeuvre Warfare: An

Anthology, 1993, p. 1-1.8. Australian Army, Training Information Bulletin

No.83 Risk Management, 1998.9. Australian Defence Force, Defence Occupational

Health and Safety Manual, 2001, Chapter 5.10. Australian Defence Force, Defence Occupational

Health and Safety Manual, op. cit., para. 506.11. Australian Army, The Fundamentals of Land

Warfare, 2002, p. 87.

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOFURNAL 155 JULY / AUGUST 200238

12. ibid., Ch 4.13. ibid., Ch 4.14. ibid., Ch 1-6.15. ibid., Ch 3-6.16. LWP-G 0-1-4, Ch 4, Ann D.

BIBLIOGRAPHYAntal, J.F. 1993, Manoeuvre Warfare: An Anthology,

edit. R.D. Hooker, Jr, Presidio Press. McLennan, P. 2002, The Application of Risk

Management Methods to the Employment ofCivilians in the Area of Operations, RoyalAustralian Air Force Aerospace Centre.

Command Staff & Operations Wing 2002,Operations Notebook 2002.

Department of Defence 1996, Australian ArmyManual of Occupational Health and Safety.

Department of Defence 1998, Training InformationBulletin No.83 Risk Management.

Department of Defence 2002, The Fundamentals ofLand Warfare.

Department of Defence 1998, The Fundamentals ofLand Warfare.

Department of Defence 2001, LWP-G 0-1-4 TheMilitary Appreciation Process.

Captain Ian Langford joined the Army in 1992, and after serving as a soldier with the 8/12th Medium Regiment, wasselected to attend The Royal Military College, Duntroon which he graduated from in 1995, winning the Sword ofHonour. Upon commissioning, he was posted to the 1st Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment where he served inboth Rifle Company and Support Company appointments. In 1999 he successfully completed the Combined SpecialForces Selection Course and was posted to the 4th Battalion (Commando), The Royal Australian Regiment. Whilst inthat tenure he served in Malaysia, the United States of America, and in 2001, East Timor. His most recentappointment is as the Staff Officer Grade Three-Operations at Headquarters Eight Brigade in Sydney. CaptainLangford has a degree in Management, and is currently studying a degree in Law.

39

The first example of this occurred even whilethe Soviet Union was gasping its last

breaths in 1991. In June of that year Croatiaand Slovenia decided they would not remainpart of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Thisinitiated a bloody four-year intra-state conflict(that is, a war within a state, not betweenstates) that pitted various south Slavic ethnicgroups against each other.

Without the superpower interference thatkept ethnic disturbances and state failures ata “manageable” level, such crises haveescalated in number and intensity. The dawnof the 21st century reveals a world that ishighly fractured, with the United Nations(UN) supporting an ever increasing numberof peacekeeping missions in countries wherecultural, religious and ethnic tensions haveturned violent.

The UN has not, however, proven entirelysuccessful at easing tensions and fosteringpeace in many hot spots around the globe, andits record of successful peacekeeping is poor.The UN’s apparent support of the right to self-determination for all peoples (most easilydefined by ethnicity and cultural uniqueness)may be an attractive by-product of de-colonisation. Yet this ideal has itself inspired

ethnic groups to seek self-determination orsovereignty in states and regions where theattainment of their goals without violentstruggle is highly unlikely.

Only the United States, as sole superpower,has the ability to take the lead in majorsecurity problems. Yet its foreign activities arethemselves sources of tension to many peopleswho accuse the US of heavy-handedbehaviour, favouritism towards certain states,self-serving foreign policy and culturalimperialism. Even the widespread sympathythe US gained in the wake of the 11 September2001 terrorist attacks is evaporating withsurprising speed. Any mismanagement of theAmericans’ “War on Terrorism” could begreatly destabilising, particularly in the alreadyvolatile Middle Eastern and Central Asianregions.

The fragility of world peace naturallyimpacts on New Zealand and its security andforeign policy concerns, especially as its own“neck of the woods” — the Asia Pacific region— has not remained free of coups, ethnicdisturbances and failed states. Aspirations ofself-determination or freedom from externalcontrols have emerged in several places aroundthe Pacific Rim. UN and regional coalition

Current and Future Command Challengesfor New Zealand Defence Force Personnel

Dr Joel Hayward, Centre for Defence Studies, Massey University, New Zealand

The Berlin Wall’s destruction in 1989 initiated a two year period in which the Soviet Unionstruggled to hold together and prove it still had political and economic relevance in a world that nolonger cared so much about the communism-capitalism rivalry that had dominated internationalrelations for 40 years. In 1991 the Soviet Union could limp on no longer and, in essence, gave upthe fight. The Union collapsed, eventually replaced by a weaker and smaller Commonwealth ofIndependent States.

Although the likelihood of global war has since become remote, the Soviet Union’s dissolutionbrought an end to the power balance that had created a degree of certainty in internationalrelations. Whereas the great powers had generally kept a lid on their subject or satellite nations’internal tensions and squabbles — often through the threat or use of force — their new “hands off”policies and practices have allowed those tensions to re-emerge.


peace-support missions are consequently nolonger occurring only on the other side of theglobe; they are happening in New Zealand’sbackyard. Since September 1999, for instance,New Zealand has maintained a largepeacekeeping force of 700 or so Service menand women in East Timor.

The point of all these observations, ofcourse, is that there is something paradoxicaland disturbing about the way successive NewZealand governments have handled defenceand strategic issues since the end of the ColdWar over a decade ago. Between 1991 and2002 the percentage of New Zealand’s GDPdevoted to defence almost halved, with theNational Government being responsible formost of the reduction in defence spending.

The Labour-led Coalition Governmentformed in 1999 has not reversed the trend.Despite having more New Zealand DefenceForce (NZDF) personnel deployed overseas(most in East Timor) at any time since theVietnam War, the Government seems willing

to keep defence spending at a mere one percent of GDP. Nonetheless, seeing no obviousthreats to New Zealand’s sovereignty, and witha global war now highly unlikely, theGovernment has sought a new role for itsarmed forces. Judging peace-support missionsto be the NZDF’s best means of contributing toregional security, the Government has tried tomake the NZDF a more flexible, effective anddeployable asset for the United Nations andany potential regional coalitions.

It has, therefore, significantly re-prioritisedits meagre defence spending in order toachieve different objectives to those set byprevious governments which were purportedlylocked into Cold War thinking. Its decision thatNew Zealand no longer needs an air strikecapability, announced in May 2001 andactualised through the dissolution of threeRNZAF squadrons by year’s end, representsNew Zealand’s greatest departure fromtraditional defence and foreign policy thinkingin several generations.

New Zealand troops in East Timor

CURRENT AND FUTURE COMMAND CHALLENGES FOR NZ DEFENCE FORCE PERSONNEL 41

Some people in the NZDF and the widercommunity consider the Government’s actions,policies and plans to be reckless and unwise,while other see them as courageous, timely andappropriate. Debate between these two“camps” raged throughout 2001 and into 2002,with bitter public accusations of conspiraciesand leaks of official informationovershadowing and stifling genuine debate onthe most important strategic and securityissues.

It is within these challenging global andnational contexts that the NZDF’s officers muststrive for command, leadership and managerialexcellence as they undertake the nation’s wide-ranging demands as defined and articulated bythe Government.

Perhaps right now the greatest challengefor any potential or serving commanders,especially at higher levels (Army lieutenantcolonel or equivalent), is keeping their ownand their subordinates’ morale high. Moralethroughout the NZDF has clearly taken abattering from savage media criticism andmicroscopic scrutiny, fuelled by self-servingpoliticians who are using defence issues as“ammunition” to fire at their enemies on theother side of the Debating Chamber. Seeminglyendless claims of dysfunctionality, inter-Service hostility and conspiracies haveincreased, not decreased, the tensions andinter-Service suspicions.

Junior, intermediate and senior leaders inall three Services have a heavy commandresponsibility (which almost all recognise, ofcourse) to prevent their own and theirsubordinates’ feelings about recent and currentdefence policies from becoming divisive. Theymust pull their units and Services together, notapart.

This won’t be easy for all personnel. TheGovernment’s disbanding of the air combatand jet training squadrons in 2001 seriouslywounded morale within the RNZAF. Forremaining airmen and airwomen their primarychallenge may well be overcoming their

resentment and staying in an Air Force thatwill no longer have much possibility of a directcombat function. Many RNZAF officers,including senior officers, feel that their raisond’être no longer exists, and that air logisticalsupport of the Army and Navy cannot possiblygive them command opportunities of agenuine military type. Yet, at least for the nextfew years, the RNZAF’s senior officers willhave powerful command challenges to rise to:keeping personnel aware of their constitutionalloyalty to a government they may still feelhostile to; maintaining order and discipline inspite of dissatisfaction; providing strong andinspiring leadership to raise morale;demonstrating managerial efficiency andeffectiveness as they re-organise the Air Forcefor its new roles and challenges.

The Navy, on the other hand, will benefitfrom the Labour-led Government’s decision(announced in January 2002) to purchase alarge multi-purpose warship and several off-shore patrol ships to go with its two ANZAC-class frigates. With more hulls in the water,and with the officer in charge of each shipexercising command, leadership andmanagement responsibilities (even on a limitedscale in the case of small vessels) the Navylooks set to provide more commandopportunities than it has been able to forseveral decades.

Tensions between the three armed Servicesare not new, of course. At least a little inter-Service rivalry has always existed, particularlyover capital acquisitions and upgrade/-modernisation programs. The run-down indefence spending during the last decade or sohas even occasionally turned the Servicesagainst each other in an unwanted, butseemingly inescapable, competition forresources.

Yet the Services have, by and large,committed themselves to the concept ofjointness; that is, their closely synchronisedemployment, under unified command, toachieve common objectives in a range of


situations across the broad spectrum ofconflict. Although the Labour-led CoalitionGovernment’s scrapping of the RNZAF’s airstrike capability has undoubtedly damagedinter-Service relations, in the short termanyway, the future is not bleak. In July 2001that same Government established NewZealand’s first operational Joint ForcesHeadquarters, with personnel drawn from allthree Services to form a staff that will plan andoversee future NZDF operational deployments.This is a significant step towards theattainment and maintenance of true jointness.

Yet jointness itself creates tremendouschallenges for those exercising command.Joint commanders need to know far more thansingle-Service commanders ever did. Theyneed at least a basic understanding of theterminologies, technologies, doctrines,limitations and capabilities of all threeServices, as well as how best to utilise elementsfrom each at any given moment. Because thisplaces unrealistic expectations on any oneindividual, the Joint Force Commander (amajor general or equivalent) has to rely heavilyon his or her three Service componentcommanders. They, in turn, have to workharmoniously as a united team of experts asthey offer advice, make plans and coordinateefforts. Appropriate training for these jointcommand positions will be difficult; the USleads the world in this area, but New Zealandand the US now have very limited officerexchange programs.

At the very heart of jointness is the notionthat, although a particular Service maysometimes seem to be the dominant forcebecause of its largest contribution to aparticular mission, all three Services are equalpartners and all have critically important rolesto play. Effective jointness is certainly a forcemultiplier, and should be pursued with zeal.

Commanders not only within the JointForces Headquarters, but also those within thesingle Services, must ensure that their staffsand teams respond to the other Services as

brethren-in-arms. They must tolerate no inter-Service rivalry and they must try to gain fullerunderstandings of the limitations andcapabilities of the other Services.

This naturally raises the issue oftechnology. Since around the time of thePersian Gulf War of 1991, new weapons,information technologies and tactics havepurportedly been transforming warfare toenable battles to be fought “over the horizon”with little face-to-face contact betweenbelligerents. Military professionals commonlydescribe this transformation as the “RMA”, orRevolution in Military Affairs. The more ardentand techno-centric proponents of this RMAclaim that the fundamental nature of warfare ischanging. Digitisation and remotely operatedweapons, they say, have already maderedundant the chaotic, frightening and violentclose combat that has always characterisedwarfare. The “norm” will now be less chaoticand more manageable “stand-off” battles(hitting the enemy from positions of safety)and long-range precision strike.

Other more cautious commentators,including the author of this article, accept thatthe means of prosecuting warfare havechanged dramatically, so that a joint orcombined-arms battle today would beincomprehensible to, say, one of GeneralPatton’s soldiers. Yet we also believe thatwarfare’s fundamental nature has not changedat all. Rather than being in a militaryrevolution, it seems clear that we are merely ina period of rapid change in the technologiesavailable with which to do the same old jobs:intimidating, coercing, punishing, taking,crushing; in short, threatening or inflictingbloodshed.

Having said that, New Zealandcommanders must stay abreast of those newand constantly-improving technologies if theywant to remain professionally competent andmilitary competitive. Thanks to satellites andaircraft and shipboard tracking and sensorequipment, for instance, they can have


fantastic battlespace awareness. But they willhave it only if they strive to master thetechnologies and the corresponding newpractices and procedures (and sometimes evennew doctrines) and recognise the full potentialof the new capabilities they provide. They mustalso take great care when assessing orexploiting all new capabilities that they don’tbecome, or let their subordinates become, sosmitten by the technology that they take theireyes off the time-honoured and provenprinciples of war.

Education is thus becoming moreimportant, not only in terms of the great massof technical information now available, butalso in terms of understanding thecomplexities of the constantly changing world,region and nation. With peace-supportmissions becoming more frequent andsubstantial, NZDF personnel are called onincreasingly to operate in wider and lessfamiliar roles throughout the west and southPacific regions. These roles includepeacekeeping, truce monitoring, conflictresolution, disaster relief and civil defence.

With these new demands in mind, the NewZealand Army has gained a slight lead in termsof providing tertiary education to its officersand senior NCOs, but the other Services are notfar behind. All are now providing at least abasic education in: military history; the widerinternational environment; the origins andcharacter of this region’s diverse cultures; thedistinctive foundations and nature of NewZealand society; the organisation andgovernance of its communities; and the natureof civil society, democracy and publicdiscourse.

All this, of course, must be learned inaddition to the routine, the promotion-relatedand the specialised professional training thatall military personnel undertake in order tomaster the particular tasks that their Servicesassign to them. The whole weight of learninghas thus become heavier than that carried by

New Zealand commanders (and all theirsubordinates) in former generations.

This is not the only change during recentdecades. Since around the time of the VietnamWar, most Western nations have become lesswilling to commit their armed forces toconflicts unless the cause is (or can be “sold”as) primarily humanitarian and not merelynational-political. Public expectations ofwarfare have also shifted. Whereas death andprivation were accepted as ever-presentfeatures of armed conflict as recently as theSecond World War, now the public want iron-clad guarantees of minimal casualties, nocollateral damage, and the quick return ofcombatants. The growing Western sensitivityto casualties has been manifest on manyoccasions in the quarter-century sinceVietnam. The clearest case is perhaps thedramatic drop in American public support forthe United Nations peace-enforcement missionin Somalia that followed the October 1993killing of 18 American soldiers in Mogadishu.President Clinton and Congress respondedpromptly by withdrawing the entire Americanforce.

These new attitudes place intense pressureson the commanders who must plan and leadall operations, including peace-supportmissions. These should, by their very nature, befar safer than combat missions, yet deathsinevitably occur despite the very bestcommand efforts, actions and decisions. Singledeaths, however, can be sensationalised (andeven trivialised) by news-hungry media andinsensitive politicians hell-bent on scoringpoints against their opposition. This oftenunfair and ill-informed scrutiny can bepsychologically traumatising to those incommand positions. They find seriousaccidents and deaths almost unbearable at the“best” of times. Dealing with intense andperhaps accusatory scrutiny only adds to theirdistress.

Becoming “media-savvy” is nowcritically important for commanders, whose


troops, squadrons or crews are exposed tofar more media interest than ever before.They need to find a balance between, on theone hand, providing the public with basicoperational information in a transparent andhonest fashion and, on the other hand,maintaining an appropriate level ofoperational secrecy as well as protectingtheir subordinates’ right to some privacy.Moreover, commanders need to learn how tohandle improper media intrusiveness withoutcausing offense, and how to remain withintheir constitution boundaries when quizzedon current political actions and decisions.Having sworn oaths to obey and serve theirgovernment they clearly cannot publiclychallenge or condemn decisions they don’tlike. Commanders must especially watch outfor the so-called “CNN factor,” the ability ofintrusive media to cause political and socialdisruption back home by reportinginaccurately or putting a negative spin onbenign events.

One thing that some serving militarypersonnel don’t especially care for is recentgovernments’ high commitment topeacekeeping. Some see this as a potentiallycostly distraction from their training for war.With over 700 military personnel deployedoverseas on peace-support missions onecannot doubt that the NZDF is pulling itsweight in terms of regional security. Thisheavy overseas commitment is nonetheless adouble-edged sword: it gives many moreService men and women opportunities toexercise authority while on operations thatthey would otherwise get during periods ofrelative inactivity. Yet it removes them fromtraining and exercise opportunities that focusmore directly on preparing for command incombat.

Commanding forces in combat, they know,is very different to commanding them onpeace-support missions. While no-one doubtsthat peacekeeping involves grave risks andoften places personnel in mortal peril, the

violence of “hot” combat (which might evenresult from an unexpected incident during apeace mission) will place commanders underdifferent pressures in terms of the use ofmanoeuvre and firepower and the maintenanceof force protection. Issues of life and deathbecome far more important, as do thecommanders’ own grasp and experience (orlack thereof) of tactics and operational art.These are things that must be trained for;intensively. Peacekeeping alone cannot provideall the insights and skills needed.

Training with other national armies, airforces and navies may help to prepare theServices and their commanders for combat,especially as some of New Zealand’s stated andlikely allies have experienced real and majorcombat in recent decades. It is probable, infact, that if and when New Zealand ever sendsa sizeable force overseas for combat it will bepart of a coalition led by the United States,Britain or Australia. Kiwi commanders, then,must ensure that they and their subordinatesunderstand their likely partners’ forces,doctrines, systems and procedures. Given NewZealand’s relatively low level of training withUS forces, its current and future commandersunfortunately get little exposure to, andexperience with, US military personnel andtheir awesome array of state-of-the artweaponry and systems. This situation — aresult of the “ANZUS rift” caused by NewZealand’s anti-nuclear stance — is a factor thatthe New Zealand Government needs toaddress.

Perhaps the last of the major issuesaffecting, or likely to affect, New Zealandmilitary commanders are those of gender andethnicity. Increasing numbers of women arejoining the three Services, and even enteringroles (such as flying fighters, at least before theair strike capability disappeared) traditionallyreserved for men. They are also rising throughthe ranks and assuming significantresponsibilities, including that of command.Although there has not yet been a woman of


one-star rank (brigadier or equivalent), therehave been several of colonel or equivalentrank. Likewise, the NZDF continues to attractmany Maori, with a far higher percentage ofthe uniformed strength being Maori thanfound in almost any other employment sector.There are currently Maori at almost all ranks,including Major General Jerry Mateparae,Chief of Army General Staff (CGS). He is notthe first Maori warrior to have gained thisposition.

All commanders, male and female, Maoriand others, need to be aware of society’schanging values, including increasedsensitivity towards gender and ethnic issues.Women can now be committed to combat (atthe time of writing, for example, one of therifle platoons in East Timor has had a womancommander) and they must be treated fairlyand without discrimination in every instance.Harassment must not be tolerated, andcommanders need to remain mindful of allEqual Opportunities issues. They must alsodemand, and use discipline to enforce, a zero-tolerance policy on discrimination andharassment. Their best means ofaccomplishing this is to remove allobjectionable behaviour, even that usuallyassociated with mirth, from their ownconduct, and to make their expectations clearto all subordinates.

It is the same with ethnic and racial issues.Not only will commanders need to recognisethat the NZDF is as multi-cultural as widerNew Zealand society, with a strong Maoriparticipation, but they must also remainsensitive to the ethnic dynamics of regionalsituations. New Zealand has peacekeepers innations or territories marked by ethnic

divisions, and also sponsors a MutualAssistance Programme to provide academicand skills-based training to members of otherPacific-rim nations’ armed forces. The RoyalNew Zealand Air Force Command and StaffCollege at Whenuapai includes officers fromother nations and ethnic backgrounds on itsannual senior course.

Ethnic issues, therefore, cannot be ignoredby leaders and commanders if harmoniousrelations are to develop within the NZDF andbetween it and other national forces.Sensitivity, tolerance and inclusiveness mustbecome integral to every commander’sbehaviour and leadership style, and it mustbecome the norm at all levels of his or her unit,right down to the private soldier or otherService equivalent.

All in all, then, New Zealand’s currentcrop of military commanders, and thoserising through the ranks to succeed them indue course, have demanding challenges toface as they strive for excellence. Yet, if theirforebears are any example, New Zealand hasevery reason to expect that its officers willmeet their challenges with passion,determination, commitment and greatprofessionalism. They will strive to overcomethe frustrations of resource constraints,unpopular political decisions, occasionallytesting inter-Service relations and so forth tocreate motivated teams that can fulfil theirgovernment’s requirements effectively, safelyand credibly. In doing so, they will doubtlessemerge as exemplary citizens of both NewZealand and the world’s community ofnations. We can, therefore, be optimistic thatNew Zealand commanders will live up to thehigh standards of their predecessors.

Dr Joel Hayward is a Senior Lecturer within the Centre for Defence Studies at Massey University in New Zealand.With a particular interest in joint doctrine and operational art, he has published widely on military and strategicmatters and lectures at New Zealand’s RNZAF Command and Staff College and the RNZN Naval College.

GALLIPOLI 1915 by Richard Reid, ABCBooks 2002, hardcover, dust jacket, 154pages, $39.95

Reviewed by Lex McAulay

This book is timely,in that our lastveteran of Gallipoli,Alec Campbell,recently passedaway. It is sad toread this book with

the certain knowledge that no one in anyphoto is alive. Richard Reid, has created abook with a different aspect on the Gallipolicampaign. The illustrations are selected fromthose taken by the soldiers themselves, andfrom those published by the newspapers of thetime. Richard Reid’s text provides a generalbackground to the photos and drawings, whichare accompanied by good captions.

Dr. Reid has widened the horizons, as itwere, of this book, by reminding the Australianreader that as well as Australians and NewZealanders, there were British, French andIndian forces involved, and the Turks andGermans.

The book is well structured, and insequence covers The Allied Navies, TheLanding, Battle, Daily Warfare, MedicalServices, Beaches and Harbours, Daily Life,Dwellings, Evacuation, Gallipoli Portraits, TheGallipoli Drawings of Captain Leslie Hore, andRemembering Gallipoli 1915-1930.

It’s all there – the ships, the men, theterrain, the lifestyle, death and burial, and theaftermath. Hopefully, this book will be asuccess and so will be followed by others usingpersonal photos taken in France and Palestine.

The book does have one major irritation –to this reviewer, anyway. Instead of the

caption for an illustration being adjacent to it,almost invariably the captions are on anotherpage, sometimes in a block of captions,sometimes above or below a piece of text, andthis is compounded by the fact that there is nostandard presentation, so one is continuallysearching for the correct piece of informationrelating to an image.

THE ELEVEN DAYS OF CHRISTMASAMERICA’S LAST VIETNAM BATTLE byMarshall L. Michel III, Encounter Books, USA;ISBN 1-893554-24-4 hardcover, dust jacket,324pp, 20 photos, 4 appendices, notes.

Reviewed by Lex McAulay

This book will be painfulreading for those veterans ofthe USAF B-52 bombingcampaign against Hanoi inDecember 1972, for thefamilies of those killed orbadly injured in the strikes,and presumably, also, for thefamilies of the senior officers concerned, astheir incompetence, arrogance and sheer lackof understanding of leadership in war aredescribed in detail.

President Richard M. Nixon had becomefed up with the North Vietnamese attitude toserious discussions about ending the war inVietnam. Though the Vietcong had beenannihilated and the North Vietnamese forcesdefeated everywhere, the Politburo in Hanoitried to achieve maximum advantage from theanti-war attitude of the US Congress. Nixonwanted an end to the war before Congressconvened for the 1973 year. He decided to usethe B-52s of Strategic Air Command (SAC) toattack targets in and close to Hanoi to showthe Hanoi leadership just what a fearsome

Reviews

REVIEWS 47

force he could send against the city, but whichhad not been so used before.

It was a close run thing. Nixon had anarrow window of only a few weeks to forcethe Vietnamese to agree, before Congresswould bring a halt to the bombing by refusingfunds for the war, but the Vietnamese defencesachieved remarkable success against thebombers. Today, both sides claim victory – theUSA because the bombing forced the Hanoileadership back to the peace talks, so thefighting ceased and the US POWs werereturned, but the Vietnamese claim that the USleft Vietnam because the B-52s were defeated.However, Marshall Michel points out that theNorth Vietnamese did not begin their finaloffensive in 1975 until Nixon was no longer inoffice, and not able to deploy US air power tosupport South Vietnam, as had happened inthe April 1972 offensive.

Marshall Michel, himself a USAF veteran of320 combat missions in F-4s and RF-4s, hasprovided a thoroughly researched account ofthe “Christmas bombing”, with contributionsfrom participants in the White House, throughthe USAF chain of command to the squadronsand aircrews who flew the missions, and alsofrom veterans on the Vietnamese side, backedby official and personal documents.

The faults of the British high command inWWI have been well researched and reported.The hierarchy at SAC mirrored all thoseshortcomings: the British generals lived andplanned in chateaux remote from the battle,and SAC planned and issued detailed orders foroperations over North Vietnam from the HQ inthe USA; the British generals had noexperience of modern warfare, and SAC wasrun by generals with no or little bombingexperience, and that was gained in 1944-45;British generals sent overloaded men acrossmorasses into unbroken defences, and SACorders sent formations time after time at thesame height along the same single approachroute at the same time intervals to the sameunsuitable targets over the concentrated

defences; detailed plans from SAC staff were tobe followed to the finest degree, but losseswere the fault of the subordinate ranks andsuccess due to the expertise of the commanderand his staff.

SAC, in existence solely to execute nuclearretaliation in the event of such an attack by theUSSR, became almost a separate armed servicerather than a branch of the USAF. SAC createdfor itself an unassailable position – only SACknew how to maintain the force of bomberswhich alone kept the USSR at bay.Advancement in SAC was achieved by slavishobservance of every little rule and regulation,and instant unquestioning obedience toprocedures and decisions from SAC itself –even an aircraft captain with a problem wastold by direct radio link with Omaha what to doin an inflight emergency; his unit commanderwas a mere listener to the transmissions.Qualifications and experience gained outsideSAC were frowned upon – everythingnecessary for an enlisted man or officer toperform any task or assigned duty was knownand taught in SAC by SAC methods.

But by 1972, the commander of SAC andthe commander of the B-52 force deployed tothe western Pacific were fighter aces fromWWII, and in this campaign were shown to beout of their depth, perhaps another example ofthe Peter Principle – promoted that one fataltime above their level of competence.

The Vietnamese, while infuriating theirSoviet teachers, did deduce ways to make theirobsolescent SA-2 weapons system effectiveagainst the B-52s, though in this they onlyexploited the many errors in the original SACplan.

If the results of the studies by staffs atsubordinate operational headquarters had beenaccepted by SAC, it is quite probable that noB-52s would have been lost. The campaignwould have been a resounding success. As itwas, 15 B-52s were shot down, though somestruggled back to base or to an area where thecrews could be rescued.


The author is unbiased, but it is difficult tofind anything planned or ordered by SAC thatwas not wrong, and then only changed afterheavy losses. The first attacks were made atthe same times; with the same long intervalbetween waves which allowed the defences torecover and prepare; along the same approachroute, at the same altitude, to the same targets;with the same exit procedure which took theaircraft over the highest concentration ofdefences and negated the effect of their on-board EW jammers; turned the aircraft backinto the 100mph jetstream, and back overenemy territory rather than out to sea; wrongtargets were selected and wrong sub-model B-52s sent to them. The funnel-neck in the airdefence system, the missile storage andassembly depots, was ignored.

Crews were ordered not to take evasiveaction under threat of court-martial; a colonelordered a fuel state report from the entireairborne force during the approach to thetarget, and insisted, despite being told thiswould inform the enemy how many aircraftwere coming and their location. A crew wascharged with violating a “no-fly” zone nearChina, but as it was deemed aircrew did nothave “a need to know” these zones, the mapswere classified too highly to issue them tocrews. A survivor could not understand whyno one came to rescue him, and surrenderedonly when almost dead from exposure andstarvation – HQ had decided his radiotransmissions were a Vietnamese trap. SACbombed elsewhere than Hanoi rather thancomply with the political aim of the campaign.At one stage, Nixon had to tell the most seniormilitary officer that unless the bombing wasconducted as ordered, that officer’s resignationwas required.

After the campaign, commanding generals,with one exception, ordered self-adulatory“histories” compiled. Crew members still resentthe lack of awards to their colleagues whorepeatedly faced the missiles, compared toawards to senior staff who did not fly or flewone mission, but who went along with theheadquarters version of events:“unprofessional” crews brought losses onthemselves, and SAC’s actions were beyondreproach. The official version, produced onlyafter thorough vetting by senior officers hadremoved all reference to shortcomings in theUSAF, is in use at staff colleges today. Thisbook provides the “unvarnished truth”.

One crumb of comfort for Australiansreading this book is that Australiancommanders serving under operationalcommand of an Allied power retain the rightto consult their own national defence HQ andGovernment before joining any operationabout which they have doubts. The Hanoimissions planned by SAC abandoned everytenet of commonsense.

This is an absorbing account of a militarycampaign which had the potential to make afailure of the US policy of disengagement fromVietnam. The situation arose because of theglobal responsibilities of the US Defense forces,in which “side-shows” diverting attention andresources from the major aim of keeping theUSSR in check were deeply resented. Theevents of September 11, 2001, show that somethings remain constant.

(This review copy is a US edition, and inJune the publishers advised it will be availablein bookshops in Australia or direct fromWakefield Press, Kent Town, South Australia;or www.wakefieldpress.com.au. )

Documents

DEFENCE Force JOURNAL - Webs · 4 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 155 JULY / AUGUST 2002 exploding nuclear warheads which made the system unreliable, and even threatened the