DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA

DSIDEFENCE and SECURITY

of INDIAKanwal SibalCCaann IInnddiiaa--RRuussssiiaa ttiieess ssttaanndd tthhee tteesstt ooffssttrreennggtthheenniinngg IInnddoo--UUSS rreellaattiioonnss?? II 06

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VOLUME 1 ISSUE 1 Rs. 200JULY, 2008

RETHINKINGINDIA'S

TIBET CARD

RETHINKINGINDIA'S

TIBET CARD

Pakistan’s ArmyTThhee mmiilliittaarryy rreemmaaiinnss aa ffoorrmmiiddaabbllee ppoolliittiiccaall ffoorrccee,, aanndd tthheenneeww rreeggiimmee hhaass nnoott ddiisscclloosseedd aannyy ppllaann ttoo rreenneeggoottiiaattee tthheessoocciiaall ccoonnttrraacctt iinn cciivviill--mmiilliittaarryy rreellaattiioonnss II 44

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India's muted response to the most recent crisis in Tibet has drawn widespread criticism

by C. Raja Mohan

DSIJULY, 2008

1

LETTER FROM THE editor

We dissect thevarious optionsbefore NewDelhi: should itratchet up thepressure onBeijing, or shouldIndia use itsleverage with the Tibetanleadership togain China’sconfidence

EDITORDefence & Security of India

T a time of surging global interest in India, our editorial team isexcited at bringing you the first Indian publication exclusivelydevoted to national security policy. With evaluations and fore-casts from top-drawer analysts and policymakers, Defence &Security of India (DSI) will equip its often busy readers with

the perspective needed for making strategic decisions --- business, security and politi-cal --- relating to India and the broader South Asian region.

While retaining a South Asian centricity, DSI will explore the strategic and security sit-uation in the context of its surrounding geographies, including China, the Indian Oceanregion, the Gulf and South Central Asia. The magazine will also closely examine In-dian security planning and alliances, its procurement of military equipment and tech-nologies and the maturing Indian defence industry.

DSI will remain politically neutral; our contents will reflect a cross-section of politicaland policy opinion in South Asia. The articles we bring you will be carefully pitched atan analytical level to enhance the debate on regional and national security. This is not amodest ambition but we will do our utmost to equip you, our reader, for confronting thechallenges of the world’s most dynamic region.

This inaugural issue of DSI focuses primarily on India’s unsettled relations with itsmost proximate major power, China. Even as the Indian government gropes for a re-sponse to the resentment in Tibet, we dissect the various options before New Delhi:should it ratchet up the pressure on Beijing, supplementing the Tibetan aspiration for po-litical and cultural autonomy? Or should India use its leverage with the Tibetan leader-ship to gain China’s confidence and extract concessions from Beijing on critical bilateralissues, such as the resolution of the boundary dispute? These are important questions forIndian policy-making, and an eminent panel of writers looks for answers from the In-dian, the Chinese and the Tibetan perspectives.

This issue also explores India’s growing defence relationship with the United States,the increasingly complex friendship with Russia, and analyses the continuing insecurityin Pakistan and Nepal. And, sadly, in our inaugural issue, we bid farewell to a leg-endary Indian military hero, Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, who played a major rolein shaping the geography of South Asia into the form it bears today.

A

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DSI JULY, 2008

INTERVIEW 14

“WHAT ISINDIA’SCLAIM TOBE PART OF5TH GENFIGHTER”Russian ambassador to IndiaVyacheslav I. Trubnikov is acareer diplomat but he does-n’t allow his profession to getin the way of a hard-hittingconversation in which heoutlines the contours of thechanging ties between India

and Russia.

BORDER LINE 62

PHANTOMLINE INTHE SANDAs demographic changessweep along the desert districts of Rajasthan, the

question everyone is askingis, will this border too see thekind of violence that has affected other parts of the international border with Pakistan?

SPECIAL REPORT 28

CHINA,MORECREDIBLEAs military expenditureshave grown, it is increasinglyprobable that more and moreof what it truly costs to runthe PLAis being reflected inChina's budget.C

ON

TE

NT

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DSIJULY, 2008

RETHINKING INDIA'S TIBET CARDIndia’s muted response to the most

recent crisis in Tibet has drawn

widespread criticism. Liberals and

Conservatives alike would like to see

India respond more positively to

democratic upsurges in the

neighbourhood.

COVER STORY 18

INDO-US TIES 54

BEYONDNUCLEARDEALWhatever the fate of the civilnuclear deal, India and theUS are on the path to furtherstrategic affiliation and in-creasing military ties.

FROM BEIJING 24

COMMONAGENDAAs great changes sweep the

world, India and China mustleverage their complemen-tary strengths and commonobjectives to focus on domes-tic prosperity and regionalstability.

PAKISTAN 44

CAN THEELEPHANTDANCE?Pakistan has a new armychief and a new governmentin Islamabad. Will the newdispensation mark the beginning of a new era inPakistan’s politico-military

relations or will it only be areturn to the past?

NEPAL 50

OLD DOG,NEWTRICKS? As the Maoists prepare to

lead Nepal's nascent democ-racy, its neighbours wonderabout etiquette, and keep awatchful eye on their ownradical left movements.

NEIGHBOURS 36

MIDDLEPATH FORTIBET?The lack of trust betweenChinese officials and theDalai Lama’s representativeshas meant that, despite thecloseness in rhetoric, theirtalks continue to be a dia-logue of the deaf.

CONTRIBUTORS

4

C. RAJAMOHAN

C. Raja Mohan is currently a Profes-

sor at the S. Rajaratnam School of In-

ternational Studies, Nanyang Techno-

logical University, Singapore. Earlier,

Mohan was Professor of South Asian

Studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru

University in New Delhi. He also

served as the Strategic Affairs Editor

of The Indian Express in New Delhi.

Rahul Bedi is the New Delhi corre-

spondent for the Jane’s DefenceWeekly, UK, and contributes

regularly to it on a diverse range of

security and military-related matters.

He is also the India correspondent for

The Daily Telegraph, London and the

Irish Times, Dublin for which he writes

on a variety of issues.

Yubaraj Ghimire is a Kathmandu-

based journalist and among the few

Nepali news professionals who honed

their journalistic skills abroad and

eventually returned home to practice

the craft. He is the editor of the

popular Samay newsweekly and News-front, a English news tabloid. He is the

former editor of Kantipur.

RAHUL BEDI

AYESHA SIDDIQA

Ayesha Siddiqa is an independent po-

litical and defense analyst currently

teaching at the University of Pennsyl-

vania. She did her Ph.D. in War Studies

from King's College, London and is the

author of Pakistan's Arms Procure-ment and Military Buildup, 1979-99 ;In

Search of a Policy; and Military Inc, In-side Pakistan's Military Economy.

Claude Arpi, French by birth, has lived

in India for the last 34 years. He is the

author of several books on Tibet, India,

China and Indo-French relations,

including the just-released Tibet, theLost Frontier (Lancer Publishers). Af-

ter graduating as a Dental Surgeon

from Bordeaux University in 1974, he

decided to come to India.

CLAUDEARPI

Kanwal Sibal was Foreign Secretary

to the Government of India from 2002

to 2003. Most recently he was India's

Ambassador to Russia (2004-2007).

He joined the Indian Foreign Service in

1966. He began his career in France

(1968-1973), and was Deputy

Spokesman in the Ministry of External

Affairs (1973-1975).

KANWALSIBAL

YUBARAJGHIMIRE

5

JULY 2008 VOLUME 1, NUMBER 1

EDITORSonia Shukla

EDITORIAL CONSULTANTMitali Saran

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Defence and Security of India is published and printed

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Manvendra Singh is a Member of

Parliament and represents Barmer &

Jaisalmer districts in India's 14th Lok

Sabha. This is his first term as Member

of Parliament. Before that he was a

journalist with The Indian Express in

various capacities. Singh is a

member of Parliament's

Committee on Defence.

Richard A. Bitzinger is an Associate

Professor with the Asia-Pacific

Center for Security Studies, where his

work focuses on military and defence

issues relating to the Asia-Pacific re-

gion, including regional military

modernisation, weapons

proliferation, local defence

industries and arms production.

Xiaojun Heng is currently

Professor and the Vice President of

the China Foreign Affairs University.

He is also member of European Asso-

ciation for lexicography (EURALEX),

China Education Association for

International Exchange, Translators

Association of China.

Ajai Shukla works in both the visual

and the print medium. He is Consult-

ing Editor (Strategic Affairs) for New

Delhi Television (NDTV), India’s

best-reputed news broadcaster, for

which he anchors prime time news

and special programmes. In addition,

he is Consulting Editor (Strategic

Affairs) for Business Standard.

AJAI SHUKLA

MANAVENDRASINGH

RICHARD A.BITZINGER

XIAOJUN HENG

DEFENCE and SECURITYof INDIA

6

DSI JULY, 2008

RELATIONS between India and Russiahave been remarkable for their stability.No other relationship between big

countries provides a parallel. If India and Rus-sia (including its Soviet incarnation) havemaintained an unbroken friendship for al-most 50 years, it is because of shared nationaland geo-political interests.

Those interests have not changed, even if theinternational situation has. As a nonalignedcountry in a Cold War setting, India was op-posed to any exclusive relationship with the So-viet Union even when our strategic dependenceon it was high. In the post Cold War setting,when there is no pressure to choose camps, Indiacontinues to promote its interests without align-ing itself with any country. We can maintain tra-ditional ties with Russia while establishingstrong relationships with other partners.

India and Russia have a common interest inmaintaining an equitable balance in interna-tional relations. Aweak Russia is not in India's in-

terest, as the void will be filled by China. Theemergence of the US as the sole superpower in1991 drove America towards unilateralism andcostly foreign policy mistakes. For multilateral-ism to function, Russia, India, and others need tobe able to exert their weight in international rela-tions. This requires a continued good under-standing between Russia and us.

Between the southern borders of Russia andour western borders, there is the great expanseof Central Asia where for strategic reasons Indiawants to increase its presence, and Russiawants to preserve its position. Increasing Chi-nese penetration in this area, capturing energyresources and local markets, would be at theexpense of our ambitions. Projects like thoselinking some of these states to the Karakoramhighway and on to Gwadar Port, which Pak-istan is pushing in order to make strategic in-roads beyond Afghanistan, would further limitour opportunities in Central Asia.

Russia has a large Muslim population and is

INDIA-RUSSIA TIES

KANWAL SIBAL

Russia and India todaystand on the threshold of

establishing a more equalrelationship as their

respective capacities grow.But for that to happen the

economic pillar of therelationship must be

strengthened.

INDIA-RUSSIA TIES: FU

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DSIJULY, 2008

threatened by religious fundamentalism andterrorism, just as we are. We are closer to theepicentre of this twin menace in Pakistan andadjoining areas of Afghanistan, but Russia toosees Afghanistan as its frontline, as anyspillover into Central Asia would make south-ern Russia vulnerable. Drug trafficking fromAfghanistan into Central Asia, and on to Russia,is already a major problem. Both India andRussia have a long-term interest in insulatingCentral Asia from religious fundamentalismand terrorism, so that our own polities are notendangered. Both countries are deeply con-cerned about Afghanistan's stability, the rise ofTaliban forces, and Pakistan's complicity. Ourpast cooperation to counter the Taliban re-mains an option in the future.

The West is applying unrelenting strategicpressure on a weakened Russia, with NATOseeking now to expand to Ukraine and Geor-gia, the European Union extending its frontiersinto Russia's neighbourhood, and missile de-

fence systems being installed in Russia's Euro-pean periphery. Western geopolitical moves inCentral Asia and in the Caspian Sea region, toevacuate their hydrocarbon resources whilebypassing Russian territory, challenge Russiancore interests. To ease pressure from the West,Russia has strengthened its understanding andengagement with China, which, until recently,was the biggest customer of Russian militaryhardware. In the UN Security Council bothcountries cooperate well on several issueswhere both are at odds with the West. Workingtogether prevents the diplomatic isolation ofeither on sensitive issues such as Iran, Myan-mar, Kosovo, the Middle East, human rightsand disarmament issues.

The trilateral India-Russia-China dialogueinitiated by Russia was part of its effort tocounter western pressure and promote the ideaof multi-polarity. China was initially reticent,while India's approach was tentative. Now thedialogue has acquired a rhythm of its own,

Now the India-Russia-China dialogue has a

acquired a rhythm of itsown, with four stand alonemeetings already held but

the weak leg in this tripod isthe India-China relationship

“Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi(L), Russian Foreign Minister SergeiLavrov and Indian Minister forExternal Affairs Pranab Mukherjee(far left); Russian President VladimirPutin (above); Russian paratroopers

LL TILT AHEAD

8

DSI JULY, 2008

with four stand-alone meetings al-ready held. The weak leg in this tri-pod is the India-China relationship.Russia's intent in promoting this fo-rum was also to create another plat-form for India and China to interact on majorglobal issues, besides exploring trilateral eco-nomic synergies. The West was initially in-trigued by this potentially far-reaching initia-tive, but no longer sees it as threatening; thereality is that each of the three participants haspowerful interests tied up with the West.

Russia, though weakened, is a resurgentpower, while India, though still a weak power, isrising. The relationship between us today ismore balanced than in the past. India, however,still punches below its weight internationallybecause of an acute sense of its own vulnerabili-

ties. Our preoccupation with inter-nal politics has muted our voice onthe international political stage,and our anxiety to avoid annoyingthe US in the context of the nuclear

deal adds to our normal caution. As we are notpermanent members of the Security Council, wecan get out of taking positions on a gamut of in-ternational issues.

China's weight as a permanent member canbe leveraged by Russia on issues of the highestconcern to it. For Russia, the most effective fo-rum to resist US unilateralism is the UN Secu-rity Council, where it has a veto. As India is ab-sent from the Security Council, Russia does notneed to engage intensively with it on front-line is-sues. The limited visibility of India-Russia diplo-matic engagement because of these factors cre-

A commercially activeMoscow city is a living symbol of aresurgent Russia

INDIA-RUSSIA TIES

“Russia, though weakened, is a resurgent power, while

India, though still a weak power, is rising. As a result, the relationshipbetween the two today is

more balanced than in the past

DSI JULY, 2008

10

ates the misperception that either Russia nowattaches less importance to India, or that it is sig-nalling its unhappiness with India's new pro-US leanings.

But Russia attaches as much importance toIndia as serves its interests. We tend to sentimen-talise our relationship with Russia because ofpast Soviet linkages. The Russian leadership is

unsentimental. For a while, duringthe Yeltsin years, our relationship suf-fered because new Russia wanted tofree itself from close Soviet-era entan-glements. But Russia's European op-tion was rebuffed, and Russia turnedeastwards. President Putin is the realarchitect of the current India-Russiastrategic partnership, for practical,not sentimental reasons. His goal is torebuild Russia's Great Power statusand, while stabilising ties with Eu-rope, reassert its Eurasian rolethrough a 'multi-vectored' policy. Un-der his watch, the two countries have

maintained a regular dialogue at the highestlevel-eight summits in as many years.

Our strategic partnership with Russia isbased on common thinking-not necessarily ac-companied by common initiatives-on a broadrange of issues: the need for multipolarity, re-spect for the principle of sovereignty of coun-tries, rejection of the doctrines of interventionand regime change, combating internationalterrorism without double standards, etc. In thebilateral framework, it expresses itself in Russiansupport for India's permanent membership ofthe Security Council, a strong defence relation-ship with Indian access to advanced Russiandefence technologies, cooperation in sectorssuch as space, including Glonass, nuclear en-ergy, and so forth.

Russia's recognition of India's pre-eminence

in South Asia is part of our strategic under-standing. Russia does not arm our adversariesor help them develop strategic capabilities. Itdoes not insert itself into conflicts in the regionand press for solutions that fit into its regional in-terests, or concern itself with a "strategic bal-ance" in South Asia. If one were to calculate thepolitical, military and economic cost to India ofpolicies pursued in our neighbourhood bysome outside powers, the enormous value to usof benign Russian policies in the Subcontinentwould be evident.

Our strategic partnership has solid defencecontent. Russia gives us technologies that othercountries do not. In significant ways, they arehelping us build a robust defence base. Our rela-tionship is based on trust, which takes time tobuild in this sensitive area. The important thingis political reliability. Russia has offered us partic-ipation in their Glonass system, including ac-cess to military signals.

Over 50 percent of the equipment used byour services is of Russian origin. Today, India isRussia's largest market for defence exports. Indiais procuring the aircraft carrier Gorshkov andtwelve Mi29K aircraft, as well as 230 SUMKI air-craft; it will manufacture 1000 T-90 tanks locallyunder license and procure 347 more; it has ac-quired three Project 1135.6 frigates and orderedthree more; it has followed its acquisition of 2Smerch rocket launchers with a third; and hasordered eighty Mi 17 medium-lift helicopters. Itis considering upgrades of various aircraft, andacquiring equipment for indigenously built Pro-ject 17 ships, etc. Our Navy and Army haveplaced large orders for the Brahmos missile, andan air version is being developed.

As of mid-2007, over $14 billion worth ofIndo-Russian defence contracts were in varyingstages of implementation. The decision to jointlydevelop the Multi-Role Transport Aircraft andthe Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft, which willtie our respective defence planning and indus-tries even more closely, signals Russia's continu-ing position of privilege in India's defence sector.We should, for the first time, get access to designcapability.

Product support for Russian equipment sup-plied to India's armed forces has, however, be-come a major issue, provoking calls to diversifysources of supply and reduce dependence onRussia. In the context of major inroads beingmade by Israel, and the hectic efforts of US sup-pliers to get a share of India's huge market, Rus-sia needs to address Indian concerns withgreater promptitude.

Russian supplies are bedevilled with prob-lems in maintaining support facilities, supply-ing spare parts, training and technical documen-tation. Russia's tardiness in dealing withteething problems in new equipment developedto our specifications, and, at times, its reluctanceto absorb the cost of rectification, have exacer-

“Russia’s recognition of India’s pre-eminence in

South Asia is part of ourstrategic understanding.

Russia does not arm India’s adversaries or help

them develop strategiccapabilities

The Kremlin and the Red Squareform the centre of Russia fromwhere all power radiates

INDIA-RUSSIA TIES

DSIJULY, 2008

11

bated negative feelings. Violations of contrac-tual obligations and departures from deliveryschedules have become serious problems, espe-cially in the case of Gorshkov.

The biggest weakness in our strategic part-nership is the low level of bilateral trade. At $4billion, the two-way trade is unimpressive. In-dia and Russia are among the four largestemerging markets and have entered the leagueof trillion dollar economies. India is growing at 8to 9 percent, and Russia at around 7 percent.Russia has the third-largest foreign exchange re-serves; India's reserves are sizable too. Russia

attracts even more foreign investment than India.However, these strengths are not being reflectedin mutual exchanges.

State-directed trade is no longer possible.The private sector on both sides must be galva-nized. But our growth sectors, especially IT andITES, are largely tied to western markets. Rus-sia's big story is oil and gas, minerals and metals;its manufacturing is losing competitiveness. TheRussians are not yet sufficiently equipped forcompetitive bidding in our conditions. The twogovernments are targeting a figure of $10 billiontwo-way trade by 2010, which would be an im-provement, but not enough compared to ourother big partners.

India got a good break in Russia's hydrocar-bon sector in 2001, when ONGC invested $2.7billion in Sakhalin-1 in partnership with Rus-sia's Rosneft. With Russia asserting state controlover its vital energy sector, the rules for foreigninvestors have become tighter. India has madeseveral proposals for participation in otherRussian energy assets, but so far without suc-cess. At the political level the doors are said tobe open, but political will has not been easy toconcretize at the company level.

Energy-rich Russia and energy-deficient In-dia have compatible interests. Their lack of geo-graphical contiguity creates c practical difficul-ties in linking them with energy networks.India could potentially be a market throughswap deals, as is happening with India's share ofoil from the Sakhalin-1 project. If Russia aimsto retain its dominance in India's defence marketand potentially its civilian nuclear market, thenIndia can legitimately look for openings in

Soviet troops leaving Afghanistan in 1988

Sukhoi 30MKIs

DSI JULY, 2008

12

Russia's oil and gas market. Finally, our relationship with Russia is

based on mutual trust built over time, and ourbroad national and geopolitical interests arecompatible. Russia and India face commonchallenges, especially those of terrorism andreligious extremism. We do not weaken Rus-sia's position in its neighbourhood; likewise,Russia has over the years respected our interestsin the Subcontinent. Radical changes in the in-ternational situation haven't undermined thebasis of our understanding.

Today there is greater scope for establishinga more equal relationship. Rising India andresurgent Russia can forge more mutually ben-eficial ties as their capacities grow. The eco-nomic pillar of the relationship must bestrengthened; we need an expanded economicrelationship, involving the most enterprising

and productive elements of both societies. Rus-sia could use India's IT and ITES capabilitiesmore, with pharmaceuticals, biotechnologyand trade in raw diamonds as other areas ofconsiderable potential. Defence, space, nuclearenergy, scientific and technological exchangesremain core areas of cooperation. In defence,which dominates the relationship, the Russianside must take steps to resolve product supportissues, as slow action in this regard couldsteadily erode its standing in India.

Recent protocol-level incidents have givenrise to speculation here that some coldness hascrept into Indo-Russian ties because of the rapidwarming in Indo-US ties. But Russia is not seek-ing an exclusive relationship with India, andIndo-US ties follow a logic unrelated to our rela-tionship with Russia. The India-Russia relation-ship, strong in the past, has every reason to re-main strong in the future.

Kanwal Sibal was Foreign Secretary to the Gov-ernment of India from 2002 to 2003. Most re-cently he was India's Ambassador to Russia(2004-2007). He joined the Indian Foreign Ser-vice in 1966. His diplomatic career spans 41years. He began his career in France (1968-1973),was Deputy Spokesman in the Ministry of Exter-nal Affairs (1973-1975). He then spent an aca-demic year at Oxford University (1975-1976). Hethereafter served in Tanzania (1976-1979) andPortugal (1980-1982). He was Deputy Chief ofMission in Nepal (1982 -1985) and then JointSecretary in the Ministry of External Affairs(1986-1989). He was India's Ambassador toTurkey (1989-1992) and Deputy Chief of Missionin the United States (1992-1995). He servedthereafter as India's Ambassador to Egypt (1995-1998) and France (1998-2002).

INDIA-RUSSIA TIES

Russian-made T-90 tank

The MiG-29 hashydraulic controls anda SAU-451 three-axis

autopilot but, unlikethe Su-27, no fly-by-wire control systems

“Energy-rich Russia andenergy-deficient India havecompatible interests. Their

lack of geographicalcontiguity creates

clear practical difficulties in linking them with

energy networks

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DSI JULY, 2008

� There is much to be happy about in India-Russia relations, especially in Russia’s will-ingness to provide India with high technol-ogy. But there is growing friction over timeand cost overruns in defence purchases likethe Gorshkov. Are there also difficulties in ne-gotiating the respective roles of India andRussia in forthcoming joint developmentprojects like the proposed 5th GenerationFighter Aircraft (FGFA)?

I can only speak about the political approachto what we have been doing, the general princi-ples of our cooperation. The general approach isto participate in the creation of (the FGFA) fromthe very beginning. It means designing, thenconstruction and production and then market-ing. All the processes will be discussed by bothsides and together they will determine who is re-sponsible for what. And of course, contributionof either side will be in the framework of what(each side) is able to produce in best quality andof the most modern type.

If we speak about the Russian side, theSukhoi design bureau… is well known for itsfighters and the brand of Sukhoi 30 MKI is wellknown to India. It is considered by the Indians tobe one of the best of its type. Now it is being as-sembled in Nashik. Both sides signed an addi-tional contract for 40 such aircraft to be assem-bled here. So the quality is guaranteed. It is nowessential to determine what the Indian designersmight suggest (can be done) from the Indianside (in developing the FGFA).

I know perfectly well an aircraft that wascreated entirely by the Russian side: the Sukhoi30 MKI. But I don’t know what the Indian sidewill do. So one must ask the question to the In-dian designers, the Hindustan AeronauticsLimited (HAL), what is their claim to be a partof a newly built aircraft, a fighter of the fifth

generation type. Is it avionics, an engine, orwhat? I don’t know.� In defence production India is a relativenewcomer compared to Russia, which has ex-perience of more than 70 years.

This year, for the first time, India (displayed)its product in the (ILA 2008) air exhibition inBerlin: the Dhruv helicopter which is producedfor selling in the international aircraft market.It is an Indian brand. I do not know anothercompleted military machine that is created byIndia for selling in the international market. Al-though India has experience in producing onits own, its own military equipment, e.g. Tejasand, in tanks, the Arjun… these are not for sell-ing in the international market. It means that In-dia does not consider these brands mature yet,to be proud of, and to have them as a brand forinternational selling.

Now when India is engaged with Russia inthe production of a 5th generation fighter, it hasthe goal of selling it in the international market.Up to now, the best and brightest example of amilitary product produced here in India isBrahmos missile. It is a unique product of ab-solutely contemporary weaponry, of extremecapacity and effectiveness. This product de-serves to be sold in the international market.

� In going for joint development partner-ships like the FGFAand the Multi-Role Trans-port Aircraft (MRTA), how much confidencedoes Russia have in India’s ability in systemsdevelopment? Are those projects based on agenuine technological synergy, or are theymore driven by political partnership?

It is not just showing strength in politicalpartnership, the weapon systems are going tobe assessed by their quality and how they corre-spond to today’s international requirements

INTERVIEW

“What is India’s claimto be a part of a new 5th

generation fighter?”

The Russian ambassador to India Vyacheslav I.Trubnikov, is a careerdiplomat but he doesn’tallow his profession to getin the way of a frank andhard-hitting conversationwith AAjjaaii SShhuukkllaa, in whichhe outlines the contours ofthe changing partnershipbetween India and Russia.

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DSIJULY, 2008

and (they) should be judged at their face value.Year after year, India as a partner of Russia isproving itself more and more effective and hasmore and more experience. Now when we talkabout the FGFA we would like to talk as equalpartners and have the same level of responsi-bility for a product that is being produced byone side or the other. Both sides should have thesame kind of high quality and bring in the samekind of profits in case it is sold. It should becompetitive in the international market.

It is not just a token of our friendship, itshould get assessment at its face value. It shouldcorrespond to the highest standards. This mustbe the yardstick by which we measure our coop-eration in the military field. We must assess our-selves as equal partners in a joint venture. This isthe approach we should stick to.

� For decades, Russia has treated India as astrategic partner and sold it military equip-ment at “friendship prices”. Is Russia’s newcommercially driven approach to defencesales symbolic of a new political approach?

We are not changing. The approach is thesame as that of a strategic partner becauseboth countries are engaged in a strategic part-nership. Which means that we are not part-ners for one hour, or in one show. It means weshould project a very high level of responsi-bility and interdependence and effectiveness.Our partnership should produce mutually ac-ceptable and useful results.

In (the case of the FGFA, neither side canconsider the other side its younger brother orelder brother. We are equally responsible forwhat we jointly produce, the brand is Indian-Russian, (whether) it is 30 per cent Indian or 70per cent Indian. It is a joint product and we to-gether must be responsible for it. No onewould say Russians are excellent becausetheir part of the aircraft is excellent. In case theoverall product is excellent then our partner-ship in the creation of this product is excellent,independent of the percentage of our cooper-ation in terms of money, value or technicalcharacteristics. And we should be equally de-manding of each other. This is not just a showof our political friendship.

Nothing has changed in the attitude. Whathas changed is that India started producing (de-fence equipment) that it did not produce previ-ously, and India was relying on the SovietUnion for these. Now it is self-sufficient in veryimportant areas.

For example, in space research, India is pro-ducing satellites completely indigenously. Butit started not in an empty place; it used certainexperience and technology which it got fromthe Soviet Union, no doubt about it. The bulk ofISRO got education in Russia. I was veryproud when in Bangalore I was shown two as-sembly lines where two satellites were assem-bled by Indian specialists without any for-

eigner —- and completely indigenously —-but many people who supervised the assemblyline spoke Russian. Now they do not needRussians in the assembly line.

�Are you saying that this joint development isnot a slogan and it is not politically driven, butthe reason why India and Russia can now enterthese joint partnerships is because Indian in-dustry has reached a certain level of maturity?

I am saying it should be so.

� Is the issue of intellectual property rights(IPR) still a significant hurdle in these jointdevelopment projects?

No. We have a bilateral treaty that guaran-tees IPR in military technical sphere. We are sat-isfied with that. From what I know there wasnever any leakage of information that the Russ-ian or Soviet side shared with India. India wasimmaculate. Sometimes, even before signingthe IPR treaty three years back, we shared sensi-tive information with India for decades becausewe were sure of India as partners.

� As India diversifies its partnerships, willNew Delhi’s growing relationship with Wash-ington impact on the Russia-India relation-ship? Is there a sense in Moscow that India ismoving away from an old and comfortablepartnership?

I believe (India’s growing strategic rela-tionship with the US) would not influence ourpartnership, to an extent that Russia might bejealous or concerned. (The US-India partner-ship) is an inevitable process because India isnow developing into a state, definitely of re-gional dimensions, and verging on a countrywith global interests. How can a country withglobal interests be oriented only on one friendor partner country?

Look at Russia, we are maintaining good ”

Step by step India will reach a point where it

would not be jealous ofRussia’s“practical ties”with Pakistan and other

countries which might be considered “not-

very-convenient”neighbours of India

For the first timeIndia took the Dhruvhelicopter to the airshow in Berlin

16

DSI JULY, 2008

relations with the world, independent of (rela-tions with) China and the US and India. Withall these countries we would like to have equaland well-developed relations because we cansurvive in a complicated and challenging worldtoday because we are all bound by interde-pendence, mutual assistance, mutual steps. Thechallenges of today are impossible to fight onone’s own.

The period of unilateral steps, especially useof force, is over. And the results of unilateralsteps are sometimes catastrophic. I think youunderstand that really I am talking about Iraq.Unilateral steps, especially the use of force, areunacceptable now for the whole internationalcommunity, not just Russia. We do not think thatcompetition in the market economy should belooked upon suspiciously. But, in case, competi-tion is not honest then we would have concerns.

� India had asked Russia not to allow China toprovide Pakistan with the Russian RD-33 air-craft engine, which powers the joint China-Pakistan JF-17 fighter. Do you see New Delhias unduly circumscribing Russia’s genuinecommercial interests, in that case?

Step by step India would reach a pointwhere it would not be jealous of Russia’s practi-cal ties with Pakistan and other countries whichmight be considered not-very-convenientneighbours of India. I think today’s world is toocomplicated to have a straightforward outlook.

We have to distinguish not only black andwhite but also shades of colours in the relationsbetween countries of the world.

No doubt if we are strategic partners thenwe should have closer relations and a better un-derstanding of many things compared withother countries. When we are engaged in suchenterprise as mutual creation of an interceptor orfighter, in mutual production and with sharinglatest technology of very delicate character, it isa reflection of our strategic partnership. We sellto India certain technologies that we do not sellto anybody else. So we trust India as strategicpartner, all the history of our friendship istrusted history; we never let down each other.We (have) supported each other.

�And on the RD 33 engine, have you stoppedChina from providing it to Pakistan? There isstill no real clarity.

For me also there is no clarity. This enginewas sold to China with (the provision of) an enduser certificate. So it cannot go to Pakistan ac-cording to the certificate.

� The increase in price of the aircraft carrier,Admiral Gorshkov; that has created badblood with the Indian Navy. Why has thatprice raise happened?

It was an initial mistake, the general price ofthe contract was below admissible, it was un-real. It happened because developments that

INTERVIEW

”

Now when we strikecontracts with the Indian

side, they agree to put intothe text of the contract an

escalation clause. That everyyear there will be an amount

of escalation in prices, it maybe just 5 per cent

The Arjun tank is one ofIndia’s success stories indefence production (Photo: Ajai Shukla)

DSIJULY, 2008

came afterwards were unforeseen at that time.The change of price of oil, (the depreciation) ofvalue of the dollar; who could see it at the timethe contract was signed? But the amount ofwork which (the Russian shipyard, Sevmash)undertook to fulfil cannot be done now at theprice which is fixed in the contract. Either (thework) should be cut, but then India will not getthe product it wanted at the time of signing thecontract or the price should be high. We cannotsell it at a loss. This is the reality.

� But people may argue, as has India’s navychief, that a contract is a contract.

But a contract may be correct or incorrect.To an extent, that contract was incorrect. I haveexplained the circumstances: the navy build-ing industry was urgently in need of moneyand the Indian side used it not only to utmost,but practically pressurised the Russian side onprice, without foreseeing the practical conse-quences. Now when we strike contracts withthe Indian side, they agree to put into the text ofthe contract an escalation clause. That everyyear there will be an amount of escalation inprices, it may be just 5 per cent, depending onhow the international prices are changing.There was no such clause at that time. It was avery serious lesson for both sides.

� You are saying that the Indian side was to

blame for excessively taking advantage of theRussian shipyard’s compulsions, and the Rus-sians were to blame for not evaluating thecontract correctly.

Correct.

� The international press has reported, in thecase of a number of projects other than theGorshkov, about problems in the Sevmashshipyard. Is there a problem in the way Sev-mash is structured and run?

I told you we needed money; it was Sev-mash that needed money. I don’t know the exactsituation now but, as I was told, it requires a cer-tain amount of money for its modernisationand upgradation. And probably it is also notsuitable for the kind of work needed on Gor-shkov, because the ship is too large. This was amistake. Never has this shipyard undertakensuch a job. They were not prepared to deal withthis situation. There were some objective andsome subjective circumstances that influencedthe decision.

� Is there also a problem with fixing the pricefor an engine for the Intermediate Jet Trainer(IJT) that Hindustan Aeronautics Limited(HAL) is developing? NPO-Saturn, which hasfinally completed the development of the IL-55I engine for the IJT, has apparently de-manded an extra US $64 million from HAL.

Both sides are engaged in fixing the price. Ithink it will be solved. The question is about fu-ture production of these engines in India, andthe price of the licence. It is not just about price ofthe engine but also about the price of technol-ogy for production (of the IL-55I engine) in India.

AJAI SHUKLA works in boththe visual and the print medium.He is Consulting Editor (Strate-gic Affairs) for New Delhi Television (NDTV), India’sbest-reputed news broadcaster,for whom he anchors prime time

news and special discussion programmes. In addition, he is Consulting Editor (Strategic Affairs) for Business Standard, India’s thinkingbusiness daily. He has also published opinionpieces in the Wall Street Journal, Asia. Ajai spe-cialises in defence, security and international af-fairs. He has travelled extensively in the SouthAsia and Gulf regions, particularly in the insurgency-hit states of Jammu and Kashmir and India’s north-east. Ajai has also reported fromAfghanistan, Pakistan, US-occupied Iraq,Lebanon, Syria, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Beforebecoming a journalist, Ajai served in the army forover two decades. He retired as a Colonel aftercommanding the reputed tank regiment, Hodson’sHorse. Ajai did his MA in War Studies fromKing’s College, University of London.

18

DSI JULY, 2008

INDIA's muted response to the most recentcrisis in Tibet has drawn widespread criti-cism. Liberals who would like to see India re-

spond more positively to democratic upsurgesin the neighbourhood, and conservatives whosee China as the principal long-term threat to na-tional security, have both accused New Delhi ofabject surrender to China. The Tibetan tragedyunites socialists on the left with the BharatiyaJanata Party on the right and Gandhians in themiddle. The Western world, too, is dismayed byIndia's seeming reluctance to take an active po-sition in defence of the Tibetans who havedemonstrated extraordinary political courage indefying the Chinese state. The Dalai Lama himselfhas called India's response "too cautious".

The Congress coalition's dependence onthe Communist parties for its political sur-vival, its apparent willingness to put the his-toric nuclear deal with the U.S. on hold untilthe Left is placated, and its attempts to signalsome political distance from Washington on abroad range of foreign policy issues, suggests apolitical imperative of pleasing, if not appeas-ing, Beijing. The Chinese premier Wen Jiabao'spublic expression of gratitude to New Delhiseemed to confirm the worst suspicions of theCongress Government's critics.

For India, the Tibetan crisis played out at twolevels: the government's reaction to Tibetan exiles

who attacked the Chinese Embassy in NewDelhi and threatened to march across the Sino-Indian border; and the extraordinary lengths towhich the Indian state went to protect the pas-sage of the Olympic torch through New Delhi. Itwas quite clear from the outset that the Indiangovernment had inescapable obligations to pre-vent any Tibetan violation of the Sino-Indianborder, provide iron clad security to Chinesediplomatic properties and personnel, and en-sure a smooth ride for the torch. At the sametime, democratic India had an obligation to safe-guard the Tibetan right to peaceful protest. On

India's muted response to the most recent crisis in Tibet has

drawn widespreadcriticism. Liberals and

Conservatives alike wouldlike to see India respond

more positively todemocratic upsurges in

the neighbourhood.

RETHINKINGINDIA'S TIBET CARD

COVER STORY

C. RAJA MOHAN

19

DSIJULY, 2008

both fronts, however, the Congress-led government signalled confusion.

New Delhi was right to remind theTibetans that they are "guests" in In-dia and must abide by the nation'slaws. But as India was inexorably sucked intothe crisis in Tibet, the government proved ut-terly incapable of managing this complex dy-namic. Its weakness and vacillation can bepartly explained by its apparent surprise at theturn of events in Tibet, and the reaction to themwithin India. In addition, the Manmohan Singhgovernment appears to have lost what little po-

litical and administrative coherence ithad.

Be that as it may, our focus here ison the second, more substantivelevel of India's Tibet policy. The big

question is whether India could have re-sponded to the latest crisis in a more muscu-lar manner. The Tibet issue is quite obviouslylikely to remain on the front burner for a while.Although the Beijing Olympics have gener-ated an important focus point for Tibetanprotests, the reality is that they are a conse-quence of heightened Chinese repression in re-

cent years. The defiance of monks in Tibet,who a few weeks ago were daring enough toprotest in front of foreign journalists beingshepherded around by Chinese officials, un-derlines the depth of resentment. More impor-tantly, Tibetans no longer seem afraid of theconsequences.

Given that the Tibet issue will be with us forsome time, does India have any options otherthan those it has exercised? Could it ratchet uppressure to make Beijing yield to what most Indi-ans agree are the legitimate aspirations of the Ti-betan people for political and cultural auton-

Tibetanprotestors marchon the streets ofLondon

20

DSI JULY, 2008

omy? Or should India play the Tibetan card theother way, leveraging it to gain China's confi-dence and extract concessions from Beijing onother critical bilateral issues, such as the resolu-tion of the boundary dispute? These are impor-tant questions for Indian policy-making; butthere are no easy answers. The fact is that thereare many real constraints on India’s ability toplay the Tibetan card one way or another.

The year 2009 will mark the fiftieth anniver-sary of the Dalai Lama's escape to India after anunsuccessful uprising in March 1959. Lookingback over the last six decades, Tibet has alwaysbeen at the very centre of the turbulent Sino-In-dian relationship. China would not have beenIndia's neighbour but for the fact that Beijing oc-cupied Tibet. The intractable boundary disputebetween New Delhi and Beijing, and its manyassociated problems, is in reality about Tibet—about the geographic, political and cultural di-mensions of the Indo-Tibetan frontier, and thecontestation of New Delhi's cultural and politicalrelationship with Lhasa. Failure to resolve vari-ous issues relating to Tibet has resulted in deepSino-Indian suspicion and the knowledge that ei-ther country could significantly threaten theunity and territorial integrity of the other.

It is not that India has not played the Tibetcard before, or that China has not retaliated.

American Professor John Garver, author of adefinitive history of Sino-Indian relations, di-vides India's Tibet policy into four phases, fromthe middle of the last century to the turn of thenew millennium.

In the first phase, from 1947 to 1951, asChina prepared to gain control over Tibet, Indiatried to boost the international standing of theTibetan government and considered a few mil-itary options to shore up Lhasa's defencesagainst an invasion. But, weakened by Parti-tion and its consequences in Jammu and Kash-mir, it was in no position to protect Tibet fromChinese occupation. Since then, India has con-tinually had to balance its desire to secure the in-terests of the Tibetan people with its severelylimited capacity to do so.

In the second phase, during the 1950s, In-dia sought to befriend China in the hope thatBeijing would grant Tibet substantive auton-omy, limit its military presence on the plateauand accept the boundary disposition. Beijing,for its part, used the time to consolidate its mil-itary and logistical control over Tibet. WhenIndia offered political asylum to the DalaiLama after the 1959 revolt and collaboratedwith the U.S. to support resistance within Tibet,bilateral relations rapidly deteriorated and re-sulted in the 1962 war.

During the third and worst phase of bilat-eral relations, from 1962 to the late 1970s, NewDelhi provided strong political support to theTibetan movement and tried to mobilise interna-tional pressure on Beijing. China, in turn,

strongly supported Pakistan's slogans on "self-determination" for the people of Jammu andKashmir, and provided assistance to insurgentgroups in the North East.

The fourth phase, from the late 1980s to theturn of the century, saw more give and take, andimproved bilateral relations. India reaffirmedthat Tibet is an autonomous region of China, ac-commodated some of Beijing's demands to limitthe political activities of Tibetans in exile, andcondoned the Dalai Lama's political outreach tothe West. China, in turn, modulated its positionson Kashmir and withdrew support to rebels inthe North East.

We might add to Garver's summary by iden-tifying a fifth phase, in the present decade.When China reacted harshly to India's nucleartests in May 1998, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Va-jpayee signalled India's willingness to play theTibetan card by meeting with the Dalai Lama.Soon after the brief post-Pokhran chill, India re-verted to the basic moorings of the Tibetan policyin the fourth phase. After returning to power inOctober 1999, Vajpayee made a special effort to

COVER STORY

”

During the third and worstphase of bilateral relationswith China, from 1962 to the

late 1970s, New Delhiprovided strong political

support to the Tibetanmovement and tried tomobilise international

pressure against Beijing

The Dalai Lama withPandit Jawaharlal

Nehru in 1959

21

DSIJULY, 2008

resolve the boundary dispute with China. Dur-ing his visit to Beijing in June 2003, he struck adeal agreeing to the formulation that the "TibetAutonomous Region is a part of the People's Re-public of China". Beijing, in return, agreed torecognise Sikkim as part of India. The two sidesagreed to renew border trade between Tibet andSikkim, and elevate negotiations on the bound-ary dispute to a political level.

Although the Vajpayee formulation on Ti-bet was widely criticised as a major concessionto China, the fact remains that India is one ofthe few countries that does not endorse Bei-jing's formulation that Tibet is an "inalienable"part of China. India is willing to acknowledgethe current reality that the TAR is a part of thePRC, but stays close to the Dalai Lama's posi-tion on Tibet. The Dalai Lama has agreed todrop the demand for independence and is will-ing to accept that Tibet is part of China, but notBeijing's demand that he certify that Tibet wasalways part of China.

Despite the domestic and external criticismsof India's Tibet policy, it must be recorded that

Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping with Panchen Lama (centre), and the Dalai Lama at the StandingCommittee of the Politburo of CCP in Beijing in 1954; Potala Palace in Lhasa

DSI JULY, 2008

22

New Delhi has stood by certain basic principles.Besides its emphasis on the autonomy of Tibet,India allows a Tibetan government in exile tofunction in Dharamshala, notwithstandingNew Delhi's position that it does not allow Ti-betans to conduct political activities on its soil.Above all, it has assisted in the survival of Ti-betan culture outside China for the last fiftyyears. The Dalai Lama and the Tibetan leader-ship fully understand the importance of Indiansupport to their cause. During the recent crisis,India's seemingly low-key response maskedsome strong articulation of the Tibetan cause bythe Foreign Office.

A Ministry of External Affairs statement is-sued on March 15, 2008 said: "We are distressedby reports of the unsettled situation and vio-lence in Lhasa, and by the deaths of innocentpeople. We would hope that all those involvedwill work to improve the situation and removethe causes of such trouble in Tibet, which is anautonomous region of China, through dialogueand non-violent means." Acareful reading of thestatement underlines a number of Indian posi-tions. It gives a clean chit to the Tibetan rioters, re-jects Beijing's charge that the Dalai Lama was re-sponsible for the protests, and asks China toaddress the sources of the tension throughpeaceful dialogue.

In the end, what India says about Tibet is lessimportant than what it does. A number of fac-tors will continue to shape India's Tibet policy.First, recent events have revealed the profoundpopular empathy in India for the Tibetan cause.No Indian government can ignore the specialhistoric relationship with the Tibetan people.Second, the weight of China has steadily ex-panded in the world. As it becomes India'slargest trading partner and a dominant eco-nomic and political force in Asia, New Delhi willbe bound by necessity to maintain good rela-

tions with China. Third, India does not have thecapacity to forcibly liberate Tibet from China.Put another way, playing the Tibet card beyonda limit will have costs. However, within the con-strained political space defined by the above fac-tors, India can and must pursue a more imagina-tive policy towards Tibet.

Such a policy would necessarily involve thefollowing elements: One, India must join the in-ternational community in urging China to em-bark on a productive dialogue with the DalaiLama. While the initial contacts between thetwo sides are welcome, India needs to help sus-tain international encouragement of the dia-logue after the Beijing Olympics, and facilitatethe resolution of a number of outstanding issuesbetween the two sides.

Two, New Delhi can do a lot more to help Ti-betan culture flourish. It can strengthen variousTibetan centres in India, including the Tawangmonastery, by improving their national and in-ternational connectivity.

Three, India must work with Bhutan andNepal to rapidly modernise trade and transportinfrastructure all along the Indo-Tibetan fron-tier from Ladakh to Arunachal Pradesh. Untilnow, China has taken the initiative to promoteTibet's regional integration. It is now India'sturn to actively contribute to cross-frontier coop-eration with Tibet.

Four, while reaffirming India's commit-ment to China's territorial integrity, NewDelhi must suggest that an autonomous Tibetbe seen as a natural element of China's politicalmodernisation.

Finally, India must convince Beijing that bothcountries need the Dalai Lama to bless a bound-ary settlement along the Indo-Tibetan frontier.New Delhi and Beijing cannot delude them-selves that a border deal without reference to Ti-betan interests can really be effective. A Tibetthat is at peace with itself will re-emerge as thenatural bridge between the two Asian giants.

C. Raja Mohan is currently a Professor at the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies,Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Earlier, Mohan was Professor of South Asian Stud-ies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in NewDelhi. He also served as the Strategic Affairs Editorof The Indian Express, and the Diplomatic Editorand Washington Correspondent of The Hindu.Mohan has a Masters degree in Nuclear Physics anda Ph.D. in International Relations. He was a mem-ber of India's National Security Advisory Boardduring 1998-2000 and 2004-06. Mohan was a Jen-nings Randolph Peace Fellow at the U.S. Institute ofPeace, Washington DC, during 1992-93. His recentbooks include Crossing the Rubicon: The Shap-ing of India's New Foreign Policy (New York:Palgrave, 2004) and Impossible Allies: NuclearIndia, United States and the Global Order (NewDelhi: India Research Press, 2006).

COVER STORY

The world's highest railwayconnecting Tibet with

eastern Chinese provinces forthe first time by rail,

operational since July 2006

Tibetan monks leading aprotest march in Lhasa

DSI JULY, 2008

24

CHINA and India are closeneighbours and ancient civi-lizations that have greatly

contributed to human progress anddevelopment. Now, as the world’stwo largest developing countries,both rising powers in the 21st cen-tury, their bilateral relations are naturally ofgreat importance in maintaining regional, andeven global, peace, stability and development.Since today almost every aspect of our life hasbeen touched by the advent of the Informa-tion Age and the knowledge economy, it isnecessary to look at China-India bilateral re-lations from a global context first.

The world is in the throes of tremendouschange. Scientific and technological innova-tions have changed our way of life; economicglobalisation, regional economic integrationand the information superhighway havebrought us closer; countries are increasingly in-terdependent. We inhabit a global village. Amidthis tremendous historical and social transfor-mation, the world is at a crossroads. We face op-portunities and challenges, and also difficultchoices, the effects of which will considerablyinfluence future generations.

The 16th-century British dramatist Christo-pher Marlowe, a contemporary of Shakespeare,is most remembered for three plays: Tam-burlaine the Great, The Jew of Malta, and TheTragical History of Doctor Faustus. In these

plays, Marlowe depicted three typesof human being in the Renaissance(1300-1500AD), a period of tremen-dous historical, social, political andeconomic transformation in Europewhich bears an amazing resem-blance to the period of global trans-

formation we are now experiencing at the be-ginning of the third millennium. Marlowe’stypes stood for the will to power, the desire forwealth, and the thirst for knowledge.

Let us look first at the will to power. Theworld needs order; without it, we would fallinto a state of anarchy. But what kind of inter-national order or system should we establish,and how? By conquest, or through dialogueand consultation? This is a debate about multi-lateralism versus unilateralism. History hasshown that unilateralism is a dead end. The insa-tiable will to power is likely to lead to confronta-tion and conflict, especially given the range ofnon-traditional security issues we face today,such as the proliferation of weapons of mass de-struction, international terrorism, infectious dis-eases, transnational organised crime, globalwarming and climate change, the energy crisis,and so forth. No country is capable of solvingthese problems alone. It will require a joint ef-fort by the international community; our ap-proach must be multilateral.

Next, consider the desire for wealth. Eco-nomic globalisation is sweeping across the

As great changes sweepthe world, India and China,

the rising stars of the global economy, must

leverage theircomplementary strengths

and common objectives to focus on domestic

prosperity and regional stability.

XIAOJUN HENG

VIEW FROM BEIJING

A Common Agenda

Economicglobalisation issweeping across all the major citiesin China

COVER STORY

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world at ever-accelerating speeds, and its im-pact can be felt in almost every corner of theplanet. Countries today naturally try to developtheir economies so as to best improve the lives oftheir people. One of the UN Millennium Devel-opment Goals (MDGs) is to eliminate poverty.However, two by-products of globalisation areoften neglected. The first is economic margin-alisation, which has widened disparities be-tween the North and South. The second is envi-ronmental damage and deterioration. We face aserious dilemma: we cannot develop at the costof the environment, nor can we give up develop-ment for the sake of environmental protection.The best way to achieve common prosperity istherefore to find a balance between sustainabledevelopment and environmental protection.

Third, let us look at the thirst for knowl-edge. Knowledge is power, and this is the ageof rapid technological advancement. Scien-tific and technological innovations have easedour lives. However technology is a double-edged sword; it can also be used to produceweapons of mass destruction, including nu-clear weapons, biological weapons and chem-ical weapons. A small nuclear device in thehands of international terrorists could causea global catastrophe.

Faced with these opportunities and chal-lenges, what are the possible solutions? Weneed an effective international system forglobal governance, for global security, conflictmanagement and crisis resolution, for climatesecurity and environmental protection. Insteadof the traditional strategic triangular relation-ship aimed at balancing power, in which onecountry unites with another in order to dealwith a third, we can look forward to a future ofpeace, cooperation, prosperity, and a win-winresult. The alternative is containment, conflict,confrontation and war.

Against this large historical background andglobal context, let us look at the relations be-tween China and India. Both countries need astable international and domestic environmentfavourable for economic development, in orderto strengthen bilateral cooperation, achievecommon prosperity and maintain regionalpeace and stability. This is based upon the fol-lowing considerations:

1.China and India’s splendid ancient civi-lizations are important component parts

of world civilization. The cultural exchange be-tween the two countries dates back over 2,200years. Buddhism came to China from India inthe 1st century AD, and during the Tong Dy-nasty (618-907) the Buddhist monk Xuan Zang,who was also a scholar and traveller, went allthe way from China to India in order to obtainSanskrit texts. As Premier Wen Jiabao said, 99.9percent of the 2,200-year-long exchange be-tween China and India consists of friendly co-operation. Carrying this traditional China-In-

dian friendship forward is both a general trendand the responsibility entrusted to our twopeoples by history.

2.China and India have both suffered the hu-miliations of imperialist power and colo-

nial rule, and therefore both particularly valuenational independence and state sovereignty.We all remember that during the War of Resis-tance against Japanese aggression, the famousdoctor Dwarkanath Kotnis came all the wayfrom India to help the Chinese in their fight,and sacrificed his life for them. MahatmaGandhi once said that China and India arefriends who share the same sufferings.

3.Both China and India face the commontask of economic development to elimi-

nate poverty, encourage prosperity, and en-able their people to live a better life. In 1820 thecombined economic strength of China and In-dia accounted for about 48 percent of theworld, but a hundred-odd years later, Chinaand India lagged far behind. Now, with rapiddevelopment in both economies, India’s GDPhas grown at over 8 percent in the past threeyears, and China’s by over 10 percent in thepast five years.

The economic growth of China and Indiahas attracted the world’s attention and be-come a driving force for the world’s economy.China and India now play an increasingly im-portant role in global economic affairs, not be-cause of their vast populations, but because of

COVER STORY

The Beijing stadium can seat asmany as 91,000 spectatorsduring the Olympics. Thecapacity will then be reduced to80,000 after the Games. It hasreplaced the original intendedvenue at the Guangdong Olympic

Stadium. The stadium is 330 metres long by220 metres wide, and is 69.2 metres tall. Thestadium uses 258,000 square metres of spaceand has a usable area of 204,000 squaremetres. It was built with 36 km of unwrappedsteel, with a combined weight of 45,000tonnes. The stadium has some 11,000 squaremetres of underground rooms with waterproofwalls. The stadium will cost up to 3.5 billionyuan (423 million USD).

”

Instead of the traditionalstrategic triangular

relationship aimed atbalancing power, in which

one country unites withanother in order to deal with a third, we can look

forward to a future of peace and prosperity

DSIJULY, 2008

27

the competitive power of their in-dustrial products. Tata Motorshas just purchased the British lux-ury icon Jaguar, and Land Roverfrom US car-maker Ford, for overUS$2 billion.

Besides, the economies ofChina and India are complemen-tary. Both constitute a huge market. While In-dia excels in the computer software and serv-ice sectors, China’s manufacturing andcomputer hardware industry occupy an impor-tant place. Therefore, a win-win result can beachieved through mutually beneficial exchangeand cooperation.

4.China and India face common challengesin the process of economic and social devel-

opment. With the largest and second-largestpopulations in the world, both struggle to pro-vide better education, employment, medicalcare, and housing for our people; reduce the dis-parity between rich and the poor and realise so-cial equality; and balance economic develop-ment and environmental protection to achievesustainable development. On the issue of globalwarming and climate change, for example, thereis ample scope for China and India to strengthentheir cooperation, taking into account history,total emissions and per capita emissions, as wellas production and consumption.

5.Finally, China and India share manyviews in international affairs. Both stand

for a multilateral approach to re-solving international disputes andvarious non-traditional securityissues. India was the first non-so-cialist country to establish diplo-matic relations with China onApril 1, 1950. Chinese PremierZhou Enlai and Indian Prime

Minister Jawaharlal Nehru exchanged visitsin 1954, and jointly initiated the Five Princi-ples of Peaceful Coexistence, which providesthe foundation for friendly relations betweenthe two countries.

It is natural for countries to have differingviews on some issues, but these differencescan be peacefully resolved through dialogue,consultation and negotiation. In 1988, PrimeMinister Rajiv Gandhi’s historic visit to Chinalaid a solid foundation for the future develop-ment of bilateral relations. The followingtwenty years have seen frequent visits ex-changed between heads of states and heads ofgovernment. To name just a few, Premier WenJiabao visited India in 2005, and the two coun-tries established a strategic cooperative part-nership oriented towards peace and stability.Early this year, in January 2008, Prime MinisterManmohan Singh visited China and, togetherwith Premier Wen Jiabao, signed a joint docu-ment called “AShared Vision for the 21st Cen-tury”. China’s trade with India in 1991 was ap-proximately $300 million, but in 2007

amounted to more than $37 billion. Both coun-tries expect trade volumes to grow to $60 bil-lion by 2010, which is “China Year” in Indiaand “India Year” in China. All these thingsserve as a solid foundation for the future de-velopment of bilateral relations betweenChina and India.

To conclude, China and India are coopera-tive partners, not competitors. In this new pe-riod of history, replete with the opportunitiesand challenges of economic globalisation, it isvery important to strengthen mutually benefi-cial exchanges and cooperation to savour thefruits of development, promote mutual under-standing and trust, and shoulder the commonresponsibility of maintaining regional andglobal peace and prosperity.

Xiaojun Heng is currently Professor and the Vice Presi-dent of the China Foreign Affairs University. He is alsomember of European Association for lexicography (EU-RALEX), China Education Association for InternationalExchange, Translators Association of China. Heng wasdeputy editor-in-chief for the publication, Contempo-rary China and Its Foreign Policy, World AffairsPress, 2003. Between 1995 and 1999 he was EducationConsul in the Chinese Consulate General in New York;and a lecturer and associate professor at the Foreign Lan-guages Department, Anhui Normal University from1987 to 1994. Between 1986 and 1987 Heng did his Mas-ter of Philosophy (MPhil.) in Applied Linguistics fromthe University of Exeter, UK.

The Beijing CBD is thecity's new centralbusiness district, and ishome to corporateregional headquarters,shopping precincts, andhigh-end housing

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DSI JULY, 2008

If Not More Transparent, ASPECIAL REPORT

29

DSIJULY, 2008

EVERY March, as part of the release ofits annual budget for central govern-ment expenditures in the coming year,

Beijing makes public a single overall figurefor national defence spending. In 2008, thatamount was 418 billion yuan (CNY), orUS$58.8 billion--an increase of nearly 18 per-cent over last year. Yet, a flurry of incredu-lous reports in the world press fanned specu-lation that Chinese military expenditures aremuch higher than are declared in the coun-try's official defence budget, and, further-more, that China's lack of transparency in

defence spending isonly another sign of Bei-jing's aggressive intents,perhaps even a warningof a covert militarybuildup.

But before we embark on another bout ofconjecture about how much the Chinese arereally spending on their military and whatit all means, it might be advisable to stop amoment and ask ourselves: What if the offi-cial defence budget increasingly does reflect

As military expenditureshave grown, it isincreasingly probable thatmore and more of what ittruly costs to run the PLAis being reflected inChina's official budget.

The PLA has noshortage ofmanpower (Photo:Gordon Arthur)

At Least More Credible

RICHARD A.BITZINGER

30

DSI JULY, 2008

actual spending? If the declared budget is notmore transparent, is it at least more credible,and, if so, what does that mean for Chinese in-tentions and capabilities?

What we hope to learn from looking at de-fence budgets.

To being with, what insights do we gainfrom analysing defence budgets and militaryexpenditures? Ideally, such analysis shouldthrow more light on:� Intentions and resolve: As an indicator ofthe country's determination to modernise itsarmed forces over the long haul, what areChina's long-term commitments to defencespending? Is Beijing willing to increase suchspending both in real terms and over a sus-tained period? How does this compare withneighboring states and potential rivals?

The burden on the national economy: IsChina spending an inordinate amount ofmoney on defence, compared to other na-tions? What does this say about commitmentsand resolve? How sustainable are current lev-els of spending?�Modernisation priorities: Which defencetechnologies, military research and develop-ment (R&D), and arms procurement programsare receiving priority funding? What weaponssystems, and how many of a particular type,are being produced or acquired? What doesthis say about current or emerging Chinesemilitary doctrine or strategy? How much is be-ing spent on personnel versus operations andmaintenance (O&M) versus equipment, eachof which indicates different priorities for forceimprovement and has different timelines forpayoffs? Is any particular area of expenditurestarving?

� Future military capabilities: How muchfunding is going to which branch, or branches,of the military? Is more money being spent onmodernising the navy and air force, and henceon increasing power projection capabilities, ormore on ground forces and territorial defence,i.e., the People's War? Is the People's Libera-tion Army (PLA) putting more funding intotechnologies relating to the so-called revolu-tion in military affairs (RMA), particularly in-formation warfare and precision-strike, whichcould result in increased capabilities to fightan unconventional or asymmetric war?

Basically, therefore, we analyse defencebudgets to see if (and where) a country is put-ting its money where its mouth is. As such, thestrength of defence budget analysis lies in itsuse of 'hard' empirical information-i.e., fiscalauthorisations, appropriations, and outlays-that can be quantified and charted. This infor-mation, in addition, can be compared, tracked,and trend-lined over time, subjected to a vari-ety of statistical analyses, and therefore usedto reveal insights into a country's plans, prior-ities, and likely capabilities.

SPECIAL REPORT

”

Lack of data is the greatest obstacle

to constructing usefulmethodologies and

approaches for an indepth study and

interpretation of Chinese defence

spending

OFFICIAL CHINESE DEFENCE BUDGET, 1997-2007

Source: “Chapter IX: Defense Expenditure,”China's National Defense in 2006 (Beijing:Information Office of the State Council of thePeople's Republic of China, December 2006);“China’s Defense Budget to Rise 17.8% in2007,” ChinaToday.com, March 15, 2007.

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DSIJULY, 2008

Before we can use defence budg-ets and military expenditures to ad-dress such quantifiable issues, how-ever, we must first have thebudgetary figures to work with.More than almost any other field ofinquiry, defence budget analysis is a highlydata-dependent field of study-in other words,it involves a lot of number crunching. Conse-quently, it demands a lot of numbers tocrunch; the more numbers we have, the moredetailed and useful the analysis. It is thereforeironic that defence budget analysis is depend-ent on some of the least reliable data in anyarea of Chinese military studies. Lack of data istherefore the greatest obstacle to constructinguseful methodologies and approaches for anindepth study and interpretation of Chinesedefence spending.

China's exploding defense budgetSo what do we know about Chinese mili-

tary expenditures? First of all, a few firm facts:

1.China's defence budget has grown sig-nificantly for over a decade. There is

no question that the PLA has beenthe beneficiary of a long-term ex-pansion in defence spending. Be-tween 1997 and 2005, Beijing in-creased defence spending bydouble-digit doses every year-13.7

percent per annum, in real terms, i.e., after in-flation, according to the Chinese's own statis-tics. China's official 2006 defence budget ofCNY284 billion (US$36.65 billion), for exam-ple, constituted a 14.7 percent rise over the pre-vious year-while the 2005 budget was itself a12.5 percent increase over 2004.

A 2008 budget of US$58.8 billion meansthat Chinese military expenditures have morethan quintupled in real terms since 1997, thuspermitting Beijing to put considerable addi-tional resources into the hardware and soft-ware of military modernisation. China nowoutspends Japan, France, and the UnitedKingdom, and likely Russia as well, on na-tional defence.

2.China appears to be putting particularemphasis on equipment purchases.

All areas of the country's defence budget have

benefitted from these increases, such as per-sonnel, training, and operations. Nowhere,however, has Beijing's munificence beengreater than in the PLA's equipment budget-that is, expenditures for procurement and,supposedly, research and development(R&D). The PLA's annual spending on equip-ment has increased from US$3.1 billion in 1997to an estimated US$15 billion in 2007-again, afivefold increase in real spending; if this trendholds true, the equipment budget will likelyreach US$20 billion in 2008. This means thatChina probably has the second-highest levelof procurement spending in the world (afterthe United States, which, admittedly, still out-spends China by a factor of ten to one). If any-thing has supported China's recent expansionin military power, it is this explosion in de-fence spending, which has permitted the PLAto acquire, over the past decade, new surfacecombatants and submarines, modern fighterjets, air-to-air refuelling aircraft, satellites, un-manned aerial vehicles, and a host of ballistic,cruise, and tactical missile systems.

This upward trend is likely to continue for

The Chinese Navyis expanding froma coastal to bluewater navy (Photo:Gordon Arthur)

DSI JULY, 2008

32

some time. In May 2006, Beijing ap-proved a new 15-year national devel-opment plan for defence science andtechnology that would boost militaryR&D spending and focus on devel-oping high-technology weapons and 'IT solu-tions' for the PLA, support advanced manufac-turing technologies, and cultivate morecollaborative international defence R&D ef-forts, with the goal of "transforming the PLAinto a modernised, mechanised, IT-basedforce."

3.Chinese defence expenditures are amanageable burden on the national

economy. In 1996, China's official defencebudget absorbed around 9 percent of centralgovernment expenditures (CGE) and per-haps 1.5 percent of GDP. Over the pastdecade, defence expenditure as a percentageof CGE has fallen to a little over 7 percent,while it has remained at around 1.5 percentof GDP. This indicates that, even as defencebudgets have been increasing, militaryspending has actually been a modest and sta-ble burden on the Chinese economy.

Still off the books? Extrabudgetary de-fence expenditures

At the same time, it is widely accepted inthe West that the official budget released bythe Chinese every year accounts for only afraction of actual defence spending. In particu-lar, whole categories of military expenditure

are believed to be missing from offi-cial figures, including:� Research and development costs: Itis generally believed that military re-search and development (R&D) is

funded from other parts of China's statebudget, such as the country's general R&Dfund and from a special fund for "new prod-uct promotion". Areasonable estimation of an-nual Chinese defence R&D spending could beas high as US$2-3 billion.� Arms imports: Many Western analysts be-lieve that most arms imports are also extra-budgetary purchases, often covered underspecial or supplemental appropriations. Be-tween 1998 and 2005 Beijing signed new armsimport agreements worth some US$16.7 bil-lion, according to the U.S. Congressional Re-search Service; in 2005 alone, it purchasedUS$2.8 billion worth of foreign weapon sys-tems.� Expenses for the People's Armed Police andmilitia/reserve forces: Expenditures for theparamilitary People's Armed Police (PAP) arepaid for out of a separate central governmentbudget, while costs for PLAreserves and mili-tia forces are partly borne by the provincialbudget.� State support for China's military-industrialcomplex: Much of China's military-industrialcomplex has long operated at a loss. Officialdefence budgets probably do not include thecosts of direct subsidies to Chinese defence in-

SPECIAL REPORT

Shang infantry were armed with a varietyof stone or bronze weaponry, includingmáo spears, yuè pole-axes, ge pole-baseddagger-axes, the compound bow, andbronze or leather helmets (WangHongyuan 1993). Their western militaryfrontier was at the Taihang Mountains,where they fought the ma or “horse” barbarians, who might have used chariots. The Shang themselves likelyonly used chariots as mobile commandvehicles or elite symbols. Although the Shang depended upon themilitary skills of their nobility, themasses of town dwelling and rural commoners provided the Shang rulerswith conscript labour as well as military obligation when mobilized for venturesof defence or conquest.The subservientlords of noble lineage and other staterulers were obligated to furnish their locally-kept forces with all the necessaryequipment, armour, and armaments,while the Shang king maintained a forceof about a thousand troops at his capital,and personally led this force into battle.

This bronze axe was used in hand-to-handcombat, and was also a ritual objectsymbolizing power and military authority.

The PLA areexpanding theirSpecial Forces(Photo: US DoD)

DSIJULY, 2008

33

industries or (in more recent years) forcedloans by state-owned banks to arms factories,many of which end up having to be written offas nonperforming.� Earnings from PLA-run businesses: Untiltheir forced divestiture in late 1998, the PLAoperated thousands of commercial enter-prises, including farms, factories, hotels, dis-cotheques, arms exports, and other services.The profits or budgetary offsets from these ac-tivities could be counted as additional sourcesof revenues for the military. It is still unclearhow many PLA-owned business were actu-ally sold off (most PLA-run farms were ex-empted, for example), how many are still se-cretly owned by the Army (e.g., throughdummy partnerships), and how many di-vestiture orders were simply ignored.

The extent of all this extrabudgetary spend-ing is the subject of considerable debate andopinion in the West, and, as a result, a veritablecottage industry has sprung up dedicated toestimating likely 'real' Chinese defence expen-ditures. These unofficial estimates employmany different approaches and methodolo-gies, and not surprisingly, vary widely in theirresults-from anywhere between 1.5 to tentimes greater than the official figure. The U.S.Defence Department, for example, has statedthat China's actual defence budget is two tothree times its official figure, which wouldmake it the world's second-largest militaryspender.

But is it fair to continue to make such ar-guments about 'hidden' Chinese defencespending? In the first place, evidence thatcertain elements of military spending are notin the official budget-in particular, spendingon R&D and arms imports-has always beenspotty and usually uncorroborated. In addi-tion, such arguments are too often basedmore on inference than fact, such as the ques-tion: "How could an armed force of 2.3 mil-lion men have a procurement budget of only a

few billion dollars?" After all, India maintainsa force roughly half that size and of similar,on a budget of approximately US$20 billion.Why, therefore, is a PLA budget of US$45 billion or even US$58 billion so incredible?

In addition, many estimates of 'actual' Chinese defence spending use some kind ofpurchasing power parity (PPP) multiplier thatattempts to take into account the 'true value'of these expenditures in terms of spendingpower relative to Western industrialised

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countries-for instance, savings from relyingon cheap conscripts, lower wages paid at de-fence factories, and so on. Unfortunately, thereexist no reliable PPPs for China, and the oneswe have vary so widely as to be nearly useless.

In fact, it is just possible that China's de-clared defence budget is actually becoming amore accurate indicator of what the Chineseactually spend on defence. Especially as mili-tary expenditures have grown, it is increas-ingly probable that more and more of what itcosts to truly run the PLA is being reflected inthe official budget.

There is some precedent to believe that thismight be so. In the late 1990s, when the PLAwas told to get rid of its outside business opera-tions, such as factories, hotels, and real estatecompanies, at least part of the plus-up in the of-ficial budget was to compensate the Army forthese divestitures. Therefore, is it increasinglylikely that the official budget now does includespending that may have once before been cov-ered in extrabudgetary supplementals.

So What Does It All Mean?If the official Chinese budget does, more

or less, account for all actual military expendi-tures, what does this mean? First, just by look-ing at the decade-long rise in official defencespending, we can deduce that Beijing is seri-ously committed to putting sufficient re-sources into modernising the PLA and toovercoming current personnel, equipment,and operations-related impediments to field-ing an advanced military force. Salaries andallowances for military personnel have beenincreased, training has improved, and educa-tion has become more professional.

In particular, it is evident that over tenyears of double-digit increases in defencespending have begun to pay dividends interms of improving the quality of Chinesemilitary equipment. The PLA today is muchmore modern and capable than it was only afew years ago, with new fourth-generationfighter jets (such as the recently unveiled J-10fighter), surface combatants equivalent to the

SPECIAL REPORT

”

It is evident that over ten years of

double-digit increases in defence spending

have begun to pay dividends in terms

of improving the quality of Chinese military

equipment

DSIJULY, 2008

35

U.S. Aegis-class destroyer, and up-to-date submarine designs. It has es-pecially made dramatic improve-ments to its command, control,communications, computing, intelli-gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance(C4ISR) architecture, an increasingly criticalcomponent in modern armies. China has alsobeen able to make large-scale purchases ofRussian weaponry, including fighter aircraft,missiles, and naval combatants-items thatmake up some of the sharpest edges of thepointy end of the PLAspear.

We may thus infer that China is usingthese budget increases to signal to potentialadversaries-especially Taiwan and theUnited States-that it is serious about usingmilitary force, if necessary, to gain certain po-litical-military objectives, such as the "re-turn" of Taiwan.

At the same time, it is important to watchfuture increases in Chinese defence spend-ing relative to the country's inflation rate.

The PLA has reaped enormousgains from very low inflation ratesover the past decade, but this maybe set to change. China's inflationrate surged to an 11-year high of

7.1 percent in January 2008, and is expected toclimb further this year, undermining any de-fence rises.

It may be that the Chinese still signifi-cantly under-report their military spending.Even so, it might matter very little in the end,as even the official budget for PLA is largeenough, and expanding quickly enough, togive one pause. On balance, one does notneed to count all the beans to know thatChina is emerging as a military-as well aseconomic and political-power in the Asia-Pa-cific to be reckoned with.

Richard A. Bitzinger is an Associate Professorwith the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies,where his work focuses on military and defense is-sues relating to the Asia-Pacific region, including

regional military modernisation activities,weapons proliferation, local defence industriesand arms production, and the challenges of de-fence transformation in the Asia-Pacific.

Bitzinger has written several monographs, articles, and book chapters, and his publicationshave appeared in International Security, Orbis,China Quarterly, and The Korean Journal ofDefense Analysis. He is the author of Towardsa Brave New Arms Industry? (Oxford Univer-sity Press, 2003); and Gearing Up for High-Tech Warfare: Chinese and Taiwanese Defense Modernization and Implications forMilitary Confrontation Across the TaiwanStrait, 1995-2005 (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 1996).

Bitzinger was previously a research analystwith the RAND Corporation, the Defence BudgetProject, and the US government. In 1999-2000,he was a Senior Fellow with the Atlantic Councilof the United States. He did a Masters in Interna-tional Policy Studies from the Monterey Instituteof International Affairs.

The GuidedMissile DestroyerShenzhen (DDG-167)

36

DSI JULY, 2008

NEIGHBOUR WATCH

37

DSIJULY, 2008

ON JUNE 18 1988, the Dalai Lamadropped a bombshell in Strasbourg.Addressing the Members of the Euro-

pean Parliament, he declared: “I have taken theinitiative to formulate thoughts which, wehope, may serve as a basis for resolving the is-sue of Tibet.” He went on to elaborate: “Thewhole of Tibet should become a self-governingdemocratic political entity founded on law byagreement of the people for common good andthe protection of themselves and their environ-ment, in association with the People’s Republicof China. The Government of People’s Repub-lic of China could remain responsible for Ti-bet’s foreign policy. The Government of Tibetshould however, develop and maintain rela-tions, through its own Foreign Affairs Bureau, inthe fields of commerce, education, culture, reli-gion, tourism, science, sports and other non-political activities.”

From that day, he stopped claiming inde-pendence for his country, pleading only for agenuine or meaningful autonomy.

Most Tibetans, especially the younger gener-

ation, were dejected that their leader had sud-denly abandoned the objective of full inde-pendence for Tibet.

A couple of years ago, I interviewed LodiGyari, the Dalai Lama’s Chief Negotiator withChina. He recounted the course of events:

“I remember very vividly that in 1987, whenHis Holiness [the Dalai Lama] first presentedthe ‘Middle Way approach’ in a formal docu-ment, he consulted a few people outside of theTibetan leadership.

One of them was former [US] President[Jimmy] Carter. I flew directly to Minneapolis toshow President Carter an 8-page document,which later became the ‘Strasbourg Proposal’.

He really took time to read it very care-fully. Then he turned to me and asked: ‘Whatis His Holiness’ bottom line?’ I told him: ‘Thisis the bottom line.’ He was surprised: ‘If this isthe bottom line, you have to start from some-where else.’

I responded to President Carter saying thisissue was raised, but His Holiness’ position isthat he is not a politician but a simple monkwho wants to be really sincere and transparentand place on the table what he really wants.”

Thus was born the ‘Middle Path’ approach. It was not only younger people who were

upset about dropping their cherished dream ofa ‘Free Tibet’. Lodi Gyari remembers his ownexperience: “When I accompanied His Holi-ness to Strasbourg to present the Proposal, mymother was deeply upset with me. Until HisHoliness’ presentation of his proposal to the

CLAUDE ARPI

The Middle Path:AutonomousStatus for Tibet?The lack of trust between Chinese officials and the Dalai Lama’s representatives has meant that, despite the closeness in rhetoric, their talks continue to be a dialogue of the deaf.

The whole of Tibet shouldbecome a self-governing

democratic political entityfounded on law by

agreement of the people forcommon good and the

protection of themselvesand their environment, in

association with China

“

38

DSI JULY, 2008

European Parliament, I would keep this docu-ment under my pillow because it was extremelyconfidential. When I returned from Strasbourg,the first thing my mother said was: ‘If I hadknown that the document that you were so pre-ciously guarding was this Proposal, I wouldhave ripped it apart.’”

What motivatedthe Dalai Lama towalk this MiddlePath so unpopularwith his people?

As a Buddhistmonk, he would naturally emulate his Master,who first propagated the Middle Path. But amore practical reason was that Gyalo Dhondup,the Dalai Lama’s elder brother, had had a meet-ing with Deng Xiaoping in 1979, at whichChina’s new boss told him that “the door to ne-gotiations remains wide open… except for theindependence of Tibet; all other questions canbe negotiated”. This encounter between Dengand the Dalai Lama’s emissary triggered thefirst rapprochement in the early 1980s. It led tothe visit of four fact-finding delegations fromDharamsala who travelled through the threemain provinces of Tibet, and later, to two roundsof talks between the Dalai Lama’s representa-tives and Chinese officials belonging to theUnited Front Department.

Another reason that the Dalai Lama chosethe Middle Path was what he himself called the“vast seas” of Chinese migrants who “threatenthe very existence of the Tibetans as a distinctpeople”. In an article in the New York Times, heexplained: “In the eastern parts of our country,the Chinese now greatly outnumber Tibetans.In Amdo province, for example, where I wasborn, there are, according to Chinese statistics,2.5 million Chinese and only 750,000 Tibetans.Even in the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region(i.e., central and western Tibet), Chinese govern-

Jawaharlal Nehru, IndiraGandhi, the Dalai Lamaand the Panchen Lamareceive Zhou Enlai in NewDelhi in 1957

Anti China protestors inthe Gansu province in

March 2008 (right); themain street in Lhasa

NEIGHBOUR WATCH

“

The fact that the StrasbourgProposal was well received

by Western governmentsprovides grist to the rumour

mill that the Dalai Lama was influenced by

certain western politicianswho promised politicalsupport in exchange for

abandoning the objective ofTibetan independence

39

DSIJULY, 2008

ment sources now confirm that Chinese out-number Tibetans.”

Asimilar process had already taken place inEastern Turkestan (Xinjiang) and in Mongolia. Inthe article, the Dalai Lama pointed out: “Today,in the whole of Tibet 7.5 million Chinese settlershave already been sent, outnumbering the Ti-betan population of six million…”

This was in 1985; during the following yearsthe situation deteriorated considerably, espe-cially after the arrival of the railway line toLhasa in 2006. This explains the deep resent-ment recently expressed by people in the threetraditional provinces of Tibet, and the riskstaken by those who took to the streets inMarch/April 2008.

The fact that the Strasbourg Proposal waswell received by Western governments tendsto provide grist to the rumour mill that theDalai Lama was influenced by certain Westernpoliticians who promised political support inexchange for abandoning the objective of inde-pendence. The Dalai Lama has always deniedthat he was ‘influenced’. It is true, however,that he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize ayear after he made his proposal and that sincethen, his popularity has tremendously in-creased in the West.

However, the Chinese leadership has neveraccepted his Middle Path approach. In 1993, ayear after the Dalai Lama had written a long let-ter to Deng Xiaoping on “everything except in-dependence”, Sonam Tobgyal, Chairman of theTibetan Government-in-Exile renewed contactwith Beijing.

He was invited to China for a week to meetofficials of the United Front Department. The Ti-betan Minister remembers: “One thing wasclear: these officials, with whom we were talking,did not have the authority to decide anythingon their own.” Further they only wanted to talkabout the status of the Dalai Lama in case the lat-ter decided to return to China.

In 2003, when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabaovisited the US, he was interviewed by TheWashington Post. When asked: “The DalaiLama has declared that he is not seeking inde-pendence for Tibet. Do you foresee face-to-face

Panchen Lama (L) and Dalai Lama withChairman Mao (C) in Beijing in 1954

DSI JULY, 2008

40

meetings with the Dalai Lama and representa-tives of China?” The Premier replied: “Regret-tably, the Dalai Lama has not genuinely givenup his position of Tibet independence and hasnot given up the separatist activities aimed atsplitting the motherland.” For unclear reasons,he added the issue of Taiwan to the already com-plicated Tibetan question: “[The Dalai Lama]also has not recognised that Taiwan is an inalien-able part of Chinese territory.”

Wen added: “We have taken note of the re-cent remarks by the Dalai Lama but we still needto watch very carefully what he really does…”

These words were obviously for the Ameri-can public’s consumption. Unfortunately, duringthe last two decades the litany from Beijing hascontinued unabated. More recently, in April2008, when Chinese President Hu Jintao met thevisiting Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd,he told him: “Our conflict with the Dalai clique is

not an ethnic problem, not a religious problem,nor a human rights problem… It is a problemeither to safeguard national unification or tosplit the motherland.”

Like Wen in 2003, he reiterated that Beijingwas “ready to meet the Dalai Lama, but only if hemet certain pre-conditions, such as desistingfrom trying to split the motherland”.

From these declarations of the top Chineseleadership, we can understand why the sixrounds of talks held between Gyari’s team andChinese officials between 2002 and 2007 havebeen a dialogue of the deaf. While the DalaiLama’s envoys speak of ‘meaningful’ autonomyfor the three traditional provinces of Tibet, theChinese are ready to discuss the TAR only,which is less than half of all Tibet. This seems aninsurmountable difference; so too is the intro-duction of democracy in an autonomous Tibet, asmentioned in the Strasbourg Proposal.

NEIGHBOUR WATCH

Marshal Zhu De andPremier Zhou Enlaireceive the Dalai Lamaand the Panchen Lama atBeijing railway station(top); Zhou Enlai,Panchen Lama and DalaiLama with Chaiman Maoin 1954

DSIJULY, 2008

41

As he continues a tour ofEuropean cities to rally sup-port for Tibet’s autonomy, theDalai Lama has expressedhope that China will, in a fewweeks, begin serious negotiations with his rep-resentatives.

However, the 72-year-old Nobel laureatehas warned that he is losing the support ofmany followers inside Tibet because of the Chi-nese government’s refusal to strike a deal withhim. In an interview with the Financial Timesin the UK, he indicated that radical Tibetans,who urge violent confrontation with China, areincreasingly losing faith in his strategy of au-tonomy through peaceful dialogue. He warnedthat in recent times, many Tibetans have shown“clear signs of frustration” with his lack ofprogress in talks with the Chinese. “There aremany Tibetans who have the view that our non-

violent approach is not havingan effect,” he said.

Asked whether he was los-ing control over his followers,the Tibetan spiritual leader,

said: “Yes, naturally. My efforts have failed tobring concrete results, so this criticism is becom-ing stronger and stronger.”

He repeatedly rejected calls to pursue the Ti-betan cause through violence. “We must carryforward that just cause through non-violentprinciples,” he said. “If the violence grows out ofcontrol, then my only choice is to resign.” TheJune meeting between the Dalai Lama’s repre-sentatives and the Chinese authorities will becritical in determining whether Beijing can con-tain the Tibet issue ahead of the Olympics.

What is India’s position on the question ofautonomy? To answer this question, one mustrecap a little history.

When Tibet adopted Buddhism in the 7thcentury AD, the powerful empire suddenlyturned pacifist, and as a result lost the ability todefend itself effectively, instead relying for mili-tary support on the Mongol Khans and later theManchu Emperors, in return for religious guid-ance from Tibetan Lamas to their royal patrons.This worked relatively well till the end of the19th century.

In July 1904, a young British Colonel namedFrancis Younghusband entered Lhasa with asmall army and forced upon the Tibetans theirfirst Agreement with the mighty British Empire,by which London ‘acknowledged’ Tibet as aseparate nation.

In 1912, the Thirteen Dalai Lama formallydeclared Tibet’s independence, and Tibet re-mained a de facto independent nation till Octo-ber 7, 1950 when the People’s Liberation Armymarched into Eastern Tibet.

At the time of Indian independence in 1947,the Government of India considered Tibet to bean independent nation under a ‘vague andhazy’ Chinese suzerainty. But the situationchanged after the Chinese invasion of Tibet in

China has launched a charmoffensive on Tibet by settlingits populations and creatingstate-of-the-art infrastructure

DSI JULY, 2008

42

October 1950. Prime Minister JawaharlalNehru was rather embarrassed. In a Note try-ing to define India’s Tibet policy, he wrote thatafter the entry of the PLA on the Roof of theWorld, for Tibetans the “autonomy can obvi-ously not be anything like the autonomy, verg-ing on independence, which Tibet has enjoyedduring the last forty years or so.”

Amonth later, the Prime Minister stated inParliament that he had made it clear to theChinese Government that India was anxiousthat “Tibet should maintain the autonomy ithas had for at least the last forty years”, andadded: “It is a right and proper thing to sayand I see no difficulty in saying to the ChineseGovernment that whether they havesuzerainty over Tibet or sovereignty over Ti-bet, surely, according to any principles theyproclaim and the principles I uphold, the lastvoice in regard to Tibet should be the voice ofthe people of Tibet and of nobody else.”

But he had already stated, in his Note: “Wecannot save Tibet.”

Over the years the Government of India’sposition has evolved, and today Delhi doesnot even insist on an autonomous status forthe TAR or greater Tibet.

It is worth mentioning that the Chineseleadership has not always been as rigid on thequestion of autonomy as it is today. PhuntsoWangyal, known as Phunwang, a veteran Ti-betan Party leader, was the first Tibetan Com-munist in the 1940s; he led Chinese troops intoLhasa in September 1951. In his memoirs herecounts: “One day [in 1955 in Beijing], Maounexpectedly came to visit the Dalai Lama athis residence [where he stayed]… During theirconversation, Mao suddenly said, ‘I heard thatyou have a national flag, do you? They do not

want you to carry it, isn’t that right’?” Phunwang continues: “The Dalai Lama just

replied, ‘We have an army flag’. Mao per-ceived that the Dalai Lama was concerned byhis question and immediately told him, ‘That isno problem. You may keep your national flag.’Mao definitely said ‘national’ flag [tib. rgyaldar]. ‘In the future,’ he said, ‘we can also letXinjiang have their own flag, and Inner Mon-golia, too. Would it be okay to carry the na-tional flag of the People’s Republic of China inaddition to that flag? I was amazed to hear’.”

This remark had a deep impact on Phun-wang, who was arrested in April 1958 on avague charge of ‘local nationalism’; he neededto ‘cleanse his thinking’. During the following18 years he was tortured and jailed in the mostatrocious conditions. When he was rehabili-tated at the end of the seventies, he continuedto ponder the ‘nationalities’ issue and its placewithin the People’s Republic of China. He be-lieved that nationalities in a multiethnic stateshould have a relationship of complete equalityand autonomy, and that the State must guar-antee this equality (by, for example, not impos-ing the Chinese language over a ‘nationalitylanguage’ such as Tibetan).

In the 1980s, Phunwang managed to senda 25,000-character memo to senior Party lead-ers such as Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang andZhao Ziyang. He stressed that the outcome of adebate on the question of nationality wouldhugely impact future work in ‘minority na-tionality areas’ such Tibet.While certain Partymembers wanted to show him the door, HuYaobang and Deng Xiaoping instructed offi-cials not to remove him as a member of theStanding Committee of the National People’sCongress. His stand was vindicated; in De-cember 1982, he was proud that the new Chi-nese Constitution stated: “Socialist relationsof equality, unity, and mutual assistance havebeen established among the nationalities”.

Will Hu Jintao and his colleagues take noteof Phunwang’s point on the issue of nationali-ties, or will Han chauvinism prevail onceagain? Perhaps the fate of Tibet depends onwhich way the wind blows in Beijing. In themeantime, it is not advisable to go aroundLhasa with a national Tibetan flag; Mao’sThoughts have not percolated that far in con-temporary China.

Claude Arpi, French by birth, has lived in Indiafor the last 34 years. He is the author of severalbooks on Tibet, India, China and Indo-French relations, including the just-released Tibet, theLost Frontier (Lancer Publishers). After gradu-ating as a Dental Surgeon from Bordeaux Univer-sity in 1974, he decided to come to India. In December 1974, he joined Auroville, the Interna-tional community founded by the Mother, Sri Aurobindo’s spiritual collaborator.

“Over the years theGovernment of India’s

position on the issue of Tibet has undergone

change, and today New Delhi does not even

insist on an autonomousstatus for the TibetanAutonomous Region

NEIGHBOUR WATCH

In 1959, Tenzin Gyatso, the 14thDalai Lama came to India after theChinese conquest of Tibet, and wasoffered refuge in McLeod Ganj.

44

DSI JULY, 2008

MANY see Pakistan's 2008 electionsas a milestone in the country's his-tory, a chance for the new civilian

government to renegotiate the social contractwith the military-dominated establishment.Pakistanis place their hopes in the promisemade by Asif Ali Zardari, Chairman of thePakistan People's Party, to reduce the power ofthe military. According to one school ofthought, this will be the prime determinant ofthe country's political future.

Transforming the nature of Pakistan's civil-military relations will not, however, be easy; ittakes two to tango. The military must also bewilling to take a step back and rethink its rolein politics, economy and society. Observers inWestern capitals judge that the new armychief, General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani, de-scribed in the Western press as liberal andhighly professional, is capable of effecting thatchange. Soon after taking charge as army chiefin November 2007, General Kiyani expressedhis desire to distance the armed forces from

NEIGHBOUR WATCH

Pakistan has a new army chief and a new

government in Islamabad.Will the new dispensation

mark the beginning of a new era in Pakistan’s

politico-military relations or will it only be a return

to the past?

AYESHA SIDDIQA

Can the elephant b

45

DSIJULY, 2008

politics and professionalise them. Whether hewill succeed is the million-dollar question.The professionalisation of the military willhave a direct bearing on its future militarystrategic role and on Pakistan's role in re-gional and global geo-politics. But it hingeson numerous issues, including the ethos andobjectives of the institution, and the capacity ofthe new political leadership to renegotiate therule of power politics with the armed forces.

The West suffers from a Cinderella syn-drome when it comes to Pakistani politics.Washington and other capitals repeatedlylook to a prominent individual-especially amilitary commander-every time there is talkof change in Pakistan. True to tradition, somein the US policymaking circles have begun totalk about General Kiyani as their knight inshinning armour who will professionalisePakistan’s armed forces (there are others whostill believe that Musharraf is the only optionfor America). Opinion pieces in the US andBritish media laud him for being an avidgolfer, a professional officer with a 'can-do'image. He is someone that the West can com-fortably work with.

But notwithstanding the General's desire, ittakes more than one individual to achievethese objectives. Like all militaries, Pakistan'sis conservative and resistant to change; institu-tionalising transformation will require a con-certed effort. Past experiments to de-politicisethe army have failed. The end of General Zia-ul-Haq's government kindled many hopes forpermanent change in Pakistan when a series ofofficers, including Generals Aslam Beg, AsifNawaz Janjua, Waheed Kakar and JahangirKaramat, took a back seat in politics. How-ever, General Musharraf's challenge to NawazSharif's government on October 12th 1999proved that no institutional change had takenplace. Any general could still come to power

Some in US policymakingcircles talk of General Kiyani as their knight

in shining armour who willtame the Pakistani army, there are others who still

believe General Musharraf is their only option

be taught to dance

”

Generals Musharraf(left) and Kiyani

46

DSI JULY, 2008

with a military coup. It might not be possiblefor General Kiyani to revolutionise the mili-tary within his brief three-year term as armychief. Getting the military to shift its focusaway from political ambition and back to do-ing its job is not as simple as redeploying abattalion from one front to another. Four fac-tors make the shift a Herculean task.

First, Pakistan's armed forces are currentlyoverstretched in terms of power and stake-holder interest. They continue to enjoy ex-traordinary visibility in society. AlthoughGeneral Kiyani was quick to recall serving of-

NEIGHBOUR WATCH

”

It might not be possible forGeneral Kiyani to

revolutionise the militarywithin his three-year term asarmy chief and shift its focusaway from political ambition

47

DSIJULY, 2008

ficers from civilian departments to createspace for the new government, there has beenno corresponding shift from military to civilianpower in the case of senior retired officerswho continue to hold important governmentposts. For instance, Lt. General (retd) JavedHassan and a team of other retired officerscontinue to head the key training facilities forcivilian bureaucrats.

Similarly, military foundations and retiredmilitary officers continue to use their influ-ence or armed forces connections to obtainbusiness contracts. Large public sector corpo-

rations such as the national airline, PIA, con-tinue to award lucrative contracts to compa-nies owned by senior retired military officers.Keep in mind that the overall share of the mil-itary economy is over seven percent of theGDP and one-third of total heavy manufac-turing in the country. Currently, all major pub-lic sector construction projects are also given tomilitary companies such as the FrontierWorks Organization (FWO) and the NationalLogistic Cell (NLC).

Second, because of its involvement in in-ternal security matters, there is no evidence

that the military will redefine its domestic po-litical role. Despite the new government'sclaim that it will hold talks with terrorists andnot use the military option, the fact is that in-ternal security remains undefined. It will beyears before the Para-military forces are suf-ficiently trained to replace the army. Eitherway, the military will continue to play a rolein critical areas that have always been withinthe purview of the security establishment.

Third, the new government does not havethe capacity to reduce the military's role in theshort to medium term. A powerful Ministryof Defense (MoD), as it was conceived by the1973 paper on 'Higher Defense Re-organiza-tion', suffered a setback in its infancy; the secu-rity management structure created in 1976could not deliver because General Zia-ul-Haqimposed martial law in 1977. The MoD, con-ceptualized as a powerful civilian institution,gradually became militarized, and in the ensu-ing years its civilian bureaucracy lost its teeth.The situation worsened under Musharrafwhen a retired general was appointed minis-ter. It would take five to ten years of consis-tent training and effort to re-energize theMoD's civilian bureaucracy, and since the newregime does not have a clear plan for it, thisseems an unlikely event. The appointment ofpeople like Maj. General (retd) Mehmood AliDurrani as National Security Advisor to thePrime Minister, on the pattern of the IndianPMO, will only strengthen the military ratherthan the civilian government.

Fourth, transforming civil-military rela-tions is directly dependent upon many otherchanges, starting with a stronger politicalregime. Given the perils of coalition politicsand the vulnerability of the political leader-ship, it appears unlikely that the power of themilitary can be substantially curbed. Cur-rently, the important political parties and theiradvisors are more concerned with keeping thearmy happy than with taking critical deci-sions for the country's long-term future.

Finally, there is as yet no evidence that thearmed forces' intelligence agencies have beentold to reduce their interference in politics. As aresult, one possible scenario is that the militarywill bide its time until its improved image, anda corresponding slide in the image and influ-ence of the political leadership, allows it tostop pulling its punches. We are yet to see thenew government present a political and eco-nomic agenda that can allow ordinary Pakista-nis to hope for an enduring transformation.

Under the circumstances, General Kiyaniseems to be pursuing three parallel options.The first is to improve the military's batteredimage. The army has a history of withdraw-ing in the face of a domestic crisis: it surren-dered political power in 1971 after a civil warin East Pakistan and defeat in war with India;

Women lead theGuard of Honour atthe Quaid Tomb;Pakistani soldiers(below)

DSI JULY, 2008

48

and again in 1988 when its top leadership, in-cluding the then army chief, was killed in amysterious air crash. Some sources suggestthat it will take up to two years for the armedforces' image to recover. It would be politi-cally expedient to take a back seat until thenew regime collapses under the dead weightof compromised politicians, by which timethe army will have regrouped and can reclaima place in the forefront of power politics.

Second, General Kiyani is working to re-duce organisational cleavages created by Gen-

eral (retd) Musharraf's policy of-blatantly,some would say-following American advice.Segments of junior and middle-ranking offi-cers are uncomfortable with the policy of al-lowing the US to carry out military operationsin tribal areas, and there is very little consensusin Pakistan on the efficacy of fighting the waron terror, which is seen as America's war im-posed on Islamabad. The new Pakistaniregime's insistence on distancing itself fromthe earlier policy on tribal areas, and on talkingto the jihadis, will help to bridge these cleav-

NEIGHBOUR WATCH

”

Sections of junior andmiddle-ranking officers are

uncomfortable aboutallowing the US forces to

carry out operations inPakistani tribal areas and

the new regime in the army istrying to distance itself from

this decision

Pakistani army soldierspatrol the streets against aterrorist threat

Ghauri Missile test launch

DSIJULY, 2008

49

ages. The alleged policy change recreates pre-2003 conditions, when the Pakistani GHQ im-pressed upon the United States the impor-tance of allowing Islamabad to deal with theTaliban while America targeted Al-Qaeda.

In a related issue, the services also plan togarner greater support from disgruntled com-munities by improving the ethnic balance inthe organization. In the past five years about80,000 ethnic Sindhis have been inducted intothe army. In an information brief publishedby the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR)

in September 2007, the military plans to re-duce the proportion of Punjabis to 57 percentby 2011, while increasing Sindhis to 17 percentand Baluch to 3.2 percent. The number ofPashtuns in the military will be reduced from9.11 percent to 9 percent, in light of current op-erations in Waziristan and tribal areas.

Third, Kiyani will concentrate on mod-ernising the armed forces with weapons pro-curement and related issues. The services arealready trying to acquire American F-16s andChinese JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft. In

March, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) inductedseven Saab 2000 reconnaissance aircraft fittedwith Eireye radar. One assessment is that thePAF hopes to replace its aging Mirage and F-7fleet with approximately 250 JF-17 Thunderand 110 F-16s. There is discussion aboutprocuring the Chinese J-10 fighter aircraft, andthe PAF has begun to induct an indigenouslymade UAV. These measures will bolster theoverall capability of the armed forces. TheNavy is in talks to add Chinese F-22P frigatesand German submarines to the existing inven-tory of French midget and Agosta 90-B sub-marines. Some German sources are curiousabout whether the navy is interested in adapt-ing the submarines to launch nuclear weapons.The service is also working to increase its fleet ofP-3C Orion aircraft to enhance anti-submarinewarfare and naval reconnaissance capability.

The Pakistani military is a permanent actorin the country's power politics. The presentarmy chief and the army might get sucked intopolitics again if the existing political instabilitymight increase in the coming days due to thetension between the pro-Musharraf and andanti-Musharraf or pro-democracy forces in thecountry. Already there are cleavages in thearmy between forces supporting Musharrafand officers that support the new army chief.General Kiyani might get sucked deeper intopolitics due to political instability. This willprobably mean that the future of Pakistan'smilitary in the coming years does not look anydifferent from its past. It continues to be a for-midable political force, and the new regimehas not so far disclosed any systematic plan torenegotiate the social contract in civilian-mili-tary relations. Consequently, any global or re-gional power strategising future relations withPakistan would be well advised to base policyon the present power equation.

Ayesha Siddiqa is an independent political anddefense analyst currently teaching at the Univer-sity of Pennsylvania. She did her Ph.D. in WarStudies from King's College, London and is the au-thor of Pakistan's Arms Procurement and Mili-tary Buildup, 1979-99 In Search of a Policy; andMilitary Inc, Inside Pakistan's Military Econ-omy. She was the inaugural Pakistan Fellow at theWoodrow Wilson International Center for Scholarsand a Ford Fellow at the Bonn International Centerfor Conversion. Siddiqa is a columnist for Pakistaninewspaper Daily Times and has contributed arti-cles in international academic journals. She taughtat the Department of International Relations,Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad and LahoreUniversity of Management Sciences. Prior to heracademic career she served in Pakistan's civil serv-ice including a two years stint as the Director ofNaval Research with the Pakistan Navy. She hasalso worked for a year as correspondent for Jane'sDefense Weekly.

DSI JULY, 2008

50

INDIA was perhaps the onlycountry more surprised thanNepal's own government

agencies, by the triumph of theMaoists in the April 10 polls to theConstituent Assembly (CA). The CommunistParty of Nepal - Maoists (CPN-M) secured 120out of 240 directly-elected seats contested underthe 'first past the post' system.

The fact that the party garnered only around31 percent of votes among the 335 seats allo-cated under the proportional representation sys-tem applied a powerful brake on the CPN-M'sroll to majority. In the final tally, the Maoistsended up with 220 members in the 601-memberCA. They are short of at least 80 members forsimple majority, and at least 180 short of the two-thirds majority it would require to settle major is-sues in the House in its favour.

The tally does, however, en-sure that the Maoists will be thesingle largest party. The non-Maoist parties, whose combinedstrength of 360 outnumbers them

by about 120 seats, watched helplessly as theMaoists declared that they will not compromiseon their radical agenda even after the CAis for-mally constituted, and the government formed.

The influence and implications of a partythat waged armed war against the state for morethan a decade are serious, and will spill beyondnational boundaries. They will almost certainlyimpact Nepal's neighborhood, South Asia as aregion, and to some extent, wider internationalpolicy (the Maoists remain on the UnitedStates's terrorist list).

Of course, worries at home are most acute.The fear is that the Maoists will abolish the

NEIGHBOUR WATCH

Old dog, new tricks? M

As the Maoists prepare to lead Nepal's nascent

democracy, its neighbourswonder about etiquette,

and keep a watchful eye ontheir own radical left movements.

YUBARAJGHIMIRE

Nepali Congressdemonstrators wave flagsnear the Thamel shoppingarea of Kathmandu

Maoist leaderPrachanda giving aspeech as Nepalbecomes a democracy

DSIJULY, 2008

51

monarchy, bring the Nepal Army under the po-litical control of the People's Liberation Army,and then target media and the judiciary to stallany resistance to their march towards one-partyrule. How will 'no compromise' on a radicalagenda impact economic and political pro-grammes? Will it erode basic democratic valueslike freedom of the press and an independentjudiciary? Or will a Maoist-led government beflexible enough to accommodate establisheddemocratic norms and practices such as ac-countability to Parliament (here the CA), trans-parency, and tolerance for dissent?

Nepal's concerns are reverberating throughthe regional neighborhood, especially in India.Nepal shares almost 1,750 kilometres of openborder with India. The Naxalite movement inIndia, which is ideologically close to the NepaliMaoists and shares common objectives and

sometimes joint action, has grown rapidly and isnow active in over 180 of 630 districts. TheCOMPOSA-an India-based federation of SouthAsian Maoist parties-still exists, and the CPN-M remains affiliated to it even after entering thedemocratic system in Nepal. A joint pledge is-sued in September 2005 by Prachanda, Chair-man of the CPN-M, and Ganapathy, GeneralSecretary of the Communist Party of India-Maoists for armed struggle in Nepal and Indiaand the world over in solidarity with other revo-lutionaries, is still alive.

All these facts pose serious challenges. TheGovernment of India will now need to monitorthe equation between the two Maoist groups, asit has serious security implications. India's ini-tial approach has been tactful; Foreign AffairsMinister Pranab Mukherjee called Prachanda tocongratulate him, signalling the bureaucracyunder him to engage the Nepali revolutionariesand encourage them to honour the age-oldfriendship and bilateral interest between thetwo countries.

In a recent post-election interaction with sup-porters, Prachanda said that his governmentwill adopt a policy of equidistance between Indiaand China, but both sides are waiting to see howthat plays out. The Chinese embassy in Kath-mandu has lodged its concern with both PrimeMinister Girija Prasad Koirala and CPN-M chiefPrachanda about growing anti-Chinese activi-ties, mainly related to Free Tibet, and been as-sured by both that the government will deal seri-ously with its concerns. But the US and mostEuropean and Scandinavian countries take theapproach that the Nepali government shouldnot suppress the right of Tibetans to raise theirdemand peacefully. China's immediate goalseems to be to prevent Free Tibet activities fromoperating in Nepal, but in the changed politicalsituation it will also want to cultivate theMaoists, and the government under them.

Nepal's increased proximity to China will bea matter of great concern for India, which jeal-ously wants Nepal to be a part of its securityumbrella. K V Rajan, India's former ambassadorto Nepal, explicitly expressed this concern, say-ing that India is dealing with a 'protectorate'now when it should be dealing with an inde-pendent nation.

In November 2005 the government of Indiasuccessfully brought the CPN-M back to the ne-gotiating table when it was still a terrorist outfitboth in India and Nepal. The international com-munity, beginning with India, Britain and theUnited States, had stopped supplying arms tothe Nepal Army in its battle with the Maoists,months before India had convinced other inter-national players that it could bring the rebelsinto the democratic fold. New Delhi's initiativebestowed political legitimacy on the CPN-M,both in Nepal and India and in the rest of theworld. That initiative culminated, on April 10,

aoists in transition

”

Worries at home are most acute that the

Maoists will abolish themonarchy, bring the

Nepali Army under theircontrol and then target

the freedom of the media and judiciary

DSI JULY, 2008

52

in a democratic election process. India now fears losing its influence, and its

suspicions are growing. There are many reasonsfor this. The Maoist insurgency that began inFebruary 1996 took an anti-imperialist (Amer-ica) and anti-expansionist (India) stance which ithas not yet given up. The Maoist manifestostates that it will scrap all inequitable interna-tional treaties, first and foremost the 1950 treatyof peace and friendship with India, whichbrings Nepal into India's security umbrella. Itadvocates rationalising Nepal's potential42,000MW production of hydro-electric power,in which India has a vital interest. The Maoistsalso want to scrap Gorkha recruitment in the In-dian and British armies.

So far India has not exhibited panic, and ismoving cautiously. It began by assuringPrachanda of its respect for the people's man-date, and that it will be business as usual as faras India is concerned. Union Home MinisterShivraj Patil said in Parliament that the CPN-M

and Indian Naxalites were different, andformed no nexus. But this belies the bordervigil based on suspicions of just such a nexus,and does nothing to reassure the Indian secu-rity forces. At least one top CPN-M ideologue,Mohan Baidya, was arrested and detained inSiliguri for over two years on suspicion that hewas working with Naxalites in West Bengal.Another prominent Maoist leader was ar-rested on the charge of being a conduit forarms purchases by Kashmiri Jehadis forNepal. Both were, however, later released.

The Bharatiya Janata Party, which tookpower in New Delhi in 1999 for one full term,still argues that a 'compact revolutionary zone'(CRZ) extends from Nepal right to AndhraPradesh. Despite India's diplomatic engage-ment with the Maoists, the security vigil againsta possible cross-border nexus will only inten-sify. There is also the possibility that CPN-M pu-ritans who reject the democratic process willfind easy refuge in India, since the Maoists in

NEIGHBOUR WATCH

”

The People’s LiberationArmy of Nepal’s success is

an inspiration to IndianNaxalites, as seen in the

jailbreak in Jehanabad andin more successful attacks

on police posts inJharkhand, Chhattisgarh

and eastern UP

Main office of the AllNepal National FreeStudents Union,Kathmandu

DSIJULY, 2008

53

their underground days are reliably known tohave been trained by the PWG in Assam, andsome by the LTTE.

There are still very sketchy reports on howwell-armed the CPN-M cadres are. TheUnited Nations Mission to Nepal (UNMIN),which oversees the arms and armies of theMaoists as part of the peace process, has regis-tered only around 3,200 weapons, against a31,000 force of combatants whom the Maoistscall the People's Liberation Army (PLA). TopMaoist leaders have claimed that their armswere "swept away" by rivers, whilePrachanda has said they were destroyed in afire. Senior leader Baburam Bhattarai fuelledsuspicion of a vast number of undisclosedarms when he said, on the eve of the polls,that if the election was rigged, the Maoistscould capture Kathmandu in ten minutes, TheCPN-M will be the first party to own privatearms and armies besides having total controlover the state's machinery--an uncomfortablefact that neither the international community,nor the major political parties in Nepal havebeen able to raise.

The PLA's success is an inspiration to IndianNaxalites, as evidenced by the Jail break in Je-hanabad and more successful attacks on policeposts in Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and easternUttar Pradesh. The CPI(M)'s Sitaram Yechury,considered close to the Nepali Maoists, hopesthat the CPN-M's electoral victory will encour-age Indian Maoists to follow suit. But that seemsfar-fetched for now, because though both sides ofthe border share similar agendas, and both findfertile ground for ideological cultivation inwidespread poverty and illiteracy, the author-ity of the Indian state has never collapsed in themanner it did in Nepal.

Nevertheless, the CPN-M allegedly has asubstantial base and an organised network ofmembers and sympathisers in the hilly areas ofWest Bengal. Prachanda himself has publiclystated that he favours the ' right to self-determi-nation' for the people of Kashmir and India'snorth-east. Pragmatism demands that he putthis on the back burner when he assumes leader-ship of the government, but fears persist that thebonds between revolutionary comrades on bothsides are inseparable.

Yubaraj Ghimire is a Kathmandu-based journalistand among the few Nepali news professionals whohoned their journalistic skills abroad and eventuallyreturned home to practice the craft. He is the editor ofthe popular Samay newsweekly and Newsfront, anEnglish news tabloid. He is the former editor of Kan-tipur, Nepal's largest-selling newspaper. He hit theheadlines after the 2001 massacre of King Birendraand the royal family and was arrested on charges oftreason for running an article by Baburam Bhattaraicalling on the Nepalese army to revolt against thenew king, Gyanendra. He was later released.

United Nationssoldiers on the streetsin Nepal before it wentto polls

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DSI JULY, 2008

THE India-US civil nuclear agreementmight be imperilled by domestic con-straints imposed on New Delhi by com-

plex coalition politics, but the bilateral securityand defence partnership between the two coun-tries is steadily proliferating, particularly in mil-itary sales.

While President George W. Bush’s adminis-tration considers the nuclear deal a major foreigninitiative, former US defence secretary William SCohen said: “If the India-US civilian nuclear dealcollapses, it will not impact on the growing mili-tary ties between the two countries.”

Cohen was speaking at Delhi’s Defexpo inFebruary 2008, where he led the largest-ever UScontingent of defence majors to India—Boeing,Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman,Raytheon, General Dynamics and Sikorsky.

US defence secretary Robert Gates’ visit toNew Delhi at the same time was more to assessthe impact of the fading nuclear deal on the 10-year India-US Defence Framework Agreementof April 2005, than to salvage the atomic agree-ment itself. By all accounts, he was not disap-pointed.

Gates’ principal focus was on arms sales, asIndia strives to modernise its military againstthe backdrop of a turbulent neighbourhood andChina’s burgeoning defence growth. Most ana-lysts agree that, with ongoing collaborations be-tween American and local firms, greater US-In-dia defence cooperation is a reality. India’smilitary hardware purchases are expected todouble to over US$30 billion by 2012, and toUS$80 billion a decade after that as its predomi-nantly Soviet and Russian arsenal reaches collec-tive obsolescence.

This is the vast lacuna that US defence com-panies are vying to fill; and progress, which has

been incremental since sanctions against India’smultiple nuclear tests were lifted in October2001, is steadily gathering momentum.

As a sweetener, the IAF earlier this yearinked a deal for six Lockheed Martin-built Her-cules C-130J-30 military transport aircraft inSpecial Forces (SF) configuration for US$962million, through the Foreign Military Sales(FMS) programme. An add-on order for an

INDO-USRELATIONS

Beyond the NuclearDeal

RAHUL BEDI

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DSIJULY, 2008

equal, if not larger number of similar aircraft ispossible, to augment the IAF’s ageing transportfleet of largely Soviet and Russian Antonov andIlyushin variants.

The IAF will operate the C-130Js, capableof short takeoffs and landings from unpre-pared runways, for the army’s seven SF battal-ions. They expect to buy four more by 2010. Be-sides AN/AAR-47 Missile Approach Warning

Systems and counter-measure dispensing sys-tems for protection against heat seeking mis-siles, the C-130Js are equipped with radarwarning receivers and special avionics gearedfor SF deployment, like electric flare paths fornight flying operations and low level extrac-tion, or dropping paratroopers or suppliesfrom low altitudes.

The deal includes establishing ground infra-

Whatever the fate of theIndo-US civil nuclear deal,India and the United Statesare on the path to furtherstrategic affiliation.

A US officerduring theMalabar exercise

56

DSI JULY, 2008

structure facilities from scratch at Hindon, onDelhi’s outskirts, and training 18 officers and100 technicians in the US ahead of aircraft de-liveries in 2011.

The C-130J’s will serve as an interim meas-ure until around 2015, when the 18.5 tonMulti-role Transport Aircraft (MTA)—a cargoand troop transporter with low altitude para-chute extraction system capability—being de-veloped jointly by the State-owned Hindus-tan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) in Bangaloreand Russia’s newly formed United AircraftCorporation (UAC), becomes operational.

India acquired 12 Thales-Raytheon Sys-tems AN/TPQ-37(V) 3 Firefinder artillerylocating radar for US$142.4 million in 2002; arefurbished 16,900-ton Austin Class landingplatform dock (LPD), the USS Trenton—re-named INS Jalashwa—for US$50 million;and six surplus Sikorsky Uh-3H Sea Kinghelicopters to operate off it for an additionalUS$39 million. The LPD joined service withthe Indian Navy’s (IN) Eastern Fleet in Sep-tember 2007.

Like the C-130Js, both acquisitions, weremade via the FMS programme, which is in-

creasingly Washington’s preferred way of sell-ing defence equipment to India. It strengthensbilateral relations, supports coalition building,and enhances interoperability, thus furtheringAmerican national security and foreign pol-icy objectives. It also improves the US balanceof trade position, since India or any client paysa service charge to the US military for sourc-ing equipment from vendors on terms similarto what it would negotiate for itself.

India could negotiate directly with thevendors, and perhaps even secure a pricelower than the FMS cost; but then the US De-partment of Defence would not be the con-tract guarantor, ensuring product support andafter sales service. In short, the FMS pro-gramme, invariably used to transfer sensitivetechnologies, gives the US subtle leverageover its clients.

India also imported 41 General ElectricF404-GE-IN20 after burner engines to powerprototypes of the locally designed ‘Tejas’light combat aircraft (LCA), as well as for fit-ment on the first tranche of twenty fightersordered by the IAF, which are expected tojoin service by 2012-13.

”

The government that willassume office after the

April 2009 general elections in India

is expected to conclude the contract for the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft

(MMRCA)

INDO-US RELATIONS

57

DSIJULY, 2008

Side by side, the Indian Navy is in the finalstages of negotiations with Boeing to acquire eightP8I maritime reconnaissance aircraft (MRA)based on the Boeing 737 platform, for an esti-mated US$2.2 billion, to replace an equal numberof obsolete Russian Tupolev Tu142s.

During DefExpo 2008 in New Delhi, Boeingofficials said that the MRAagreement would ar-rive at a competitive price. The contract wouldbe a mix of direct commercial sale and FMS: theBoeing 737 derived P8I platform being a com-mercial sale, and the Indian Navy’s require-ments of weapons being provided under FMS.The final purchase agreement is likely to be con-cluded in Delhi in the current financial yearending March 2009.

Washington is also aggressively backing theUS$11 billion contract for 126 medium multi-role combat fighters (MMRCA), for which Boe-ing’s F/A-18 E/F, and Lockheed Martin’s F16IN export model are competing alongsideRussian and European manufacturers. Officialshint that this number will eventually increaseto 200 units, if not more.

In the MMRCAcontract, both US companiesare offering technology transfers of hitherto pro-

scribed features, like theNorthrop Grumman-de-signed active electronicscanned array (AESA) radar,which provides the pilots with en-hanced situational awareness and theability to engage multiple ground andair targets simultaneously. Boeing too iswilling to transfer technology for theAPG 79 AESA radar on its F/A-18 E/F‘Super Hornet’ fighter. With the IN in-terested in acquiring the naval versionof the F/A-18E/F for its depleting airarm, the ‘commonality’ factor couldswing the deal in Boeing’s favour.

US defence companies are increas-ingly willing to transfer military know-how in or-der to exploit India’s advanced information tech-nology (IT) industry and low labour costs, andmake it a hub for exports. India’s booming econ-omy, and its hunger for civilian and military air-craft-which is expected to grow exponentiallyover the next two decades-also strengthens thecase for transferring US aviation technology to In-dia. Beginning with direct offsets, the two sideswould eventually move towards joint production,followed by co-production as technology perme-ates into Indian industry.

US officials obliquely hint that an evolving in-dustrial partnership between the two countries’military-industrial complexes could act as ahedge against sanctions at a later stage, should In-dia opt to strengthen its strategic deterrence withanother nuclear test. This argument, howeverdisingenuous, is gaining credence in Indian mili-tary circles.

In July 2007 Lockheed Martin threw in asweetener by tentatively offering the IAF its fifthgeneration F35 ‘Lightening II’ joint strike fighter(JSF), in order to boost the ‘lethality’ of the airforce beyond the 126 MRCA it plans to procure.This offer could not have been made without first

clearing it with Washington. BringingIndia on board the F-35 programme —- which the US has allowed only itsclosest allies so far —- would not just

be a symbolic statement, but would also greatlyboost Lockheed Martin’s chances of winning theMMRCAcontract, since the F-16 is a logical step-ping stone to the F-35.

The government that assumes office af-ter India’s April 2009 general election is ex-pected to conclude the MRCA contract. Se-nior military sources said that the MMRCAchoice would ultimately depend on threefactors: price, life cycle cost, and the Indianadministration’s political affiliations withthe government of the eventual winner.

Lockheed Martin is also offering India its ad-vanced Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3)anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system. “We will beinterested in seeing how to share technologyand find ways to get a comprehensive missiledefence system for India,” said former Lt. Gen.Dennis D Cavin, Vice President of LockheedMartin’s International Air and Missile DefenceStrategic Initiatives.

The US, he said, had spent billions of dollarsdeveloping the Patriot, and India need not investso heavily in designing its own ABM system, saysLockheed Martin. The offer followed soon afterIndia’s Defence Research and Development Or-ganisation (DRDO) successfully tried out itsfledgling ABM programme. This was followed byRobert Gates’ declaration in February that Wash-ington was ‘examining’ the possibility of a jointmissile defence system with India, as part ofevolving bilateral strategic ties. However, hestressed that talks on such collaboration were atan incipient stage.

“We’re not looking for quick results or bigleaps forward,” Gates stated, “but rather asteady expansion of this relationship in a waythat leaves everybody comfortable and one that

IAEA headquarterssince 1979, Vienna,Austria

DSI JULY, 2008

58

works in terms of Indian domestic politicsand also for us.”

Missile collaboration with the US wouldconfirm India as an ally, rather than a strate-gic partner. It would also dilute, if not neu-tralise, efforts to locally develop an indige-nous ABM capability, and wouldcircumscribe India’s strategic missile pro-gramme (in which the US can never, underany circumstances, be involved), thus crip-pling India’s deterrence capability.

Lockheed Martin is also competing with Eu-ropean companies and India’s Tata Group toupgrade 30 IAF airfields and their air traffic con-trol systems, in a contract estimated at US$1.5billion. The effort is part of the Indian military’sdecision to augment mobility and network cen-tricity for future conflicts, which India’s defenceplanners anticipate will be short and intense.

To further leverage their position, and meetthe offset obligation of 50 percent of the MRCAcontract value—up from the mandatory 30 per-cent—both American rivals signed extensivepartnerships with India’s state-owned and pri-vate defence companies to jointly manufactureaerospace equipment.

Like Lockheed Martin, Boeing recognisesan opportunity to integrate its commercialand military enterprise in India. Both compa-nies are considering the prospect of initiallyproducing components, and later, completedsystems for sale to third countries. In Decem-ber 2007 Boeing signed a ten-year memoran-dum of understanding with HAL to bringUS$1 billion of aerospace manufacturingwork to India. It also indicated that it waslikely to source sub-systems from this jointventure (JV) for F/A-18’s, CH-47F heavy-liftChinook helicopters and P-8I MRA.

Three months later, Boeing entered into ajoint venture with Tata Industries that is ex-pected to generate over US$500 million of aero-space component work in India for export to theUS conglomerate and its international cus-tomers, irrespective of the outcome of the MM-RCAcontract.

Meanwhile, US defence contractors likeRaytheon, General Dynamics and Sikorskyhave entered into similar outsourcingarrangements with Indian defence compa-nies. They plan to bid for a joint Services de-mand for 384 light observation helicopters,seven frigates, and assorted SF and force mul-tiplication material like radar and electronicwarfare equipment.

Bolstering this aggressive sales pitch by theUS defence corporations are bilateral multi-service exercises, of which India and the UShave conducted over 50 since 2001 to enhance“functional interoperability” between theirarmed forces. India’s military is enthusiasticabout this new opening. Despite oppositionfrom the Congress Party-led coalition’s Com-munist allies, who also oppose the nuclear deal,the IAF has bid to participate in the prestigious‘Red Flag’ exercises in 2008 at Nellis Air ForceBase in Nevada. “It’s the most sought-after exer-cise in the world,” said IAF chief ACM FaliHomi Major. “The facilities at Nellis can simulateall kinds of air warfare and we want our pilotsand technicians to be exposed to it.” India’s mil-itary realises the utility of joint exercises, and isunwilling to politicise operational issues.

Both sides agree that military co-operationand an exchange of military personnel couldeventually lead to jointly-conducted multina-tional operations in varied terrain, sub-conven-tional warfare, and peace-keeping operationsin ethnic conflict zones like Afghanistan, whereUS and NATO troops face a stubborn and seem-ingly unending insurgency.

The most significant manoeuvres, however,are the Malabar exercises, upon which the USlays great stress as it views the Indian Navy as astabilising force in the strategically vital IndianOcean Region (IOR). One common cause forIndo-US concern is China’s strategic submarinebase near Sanya on Hainan Island, off its south-ern coast. The Jin-Class nuclear-powered sub-marines (SSNs) housed here could significantlyalter the balance of power in the IOR.

After the 9/11 attacks the IN patrolled theMalacca Straits with the USN for twelvemonths. Last September, the US Navy con-ducted multilateral exercises in the Bay of Bengalwith India, Singapore, Japan and Australia aspart of its pro-active strategy in the IOR, trig-gering concerns in Beijing about an incipientanti-China military grouping.

Over the years these exercises have shiftedfocus from conventional to anti-terror manoeu-vres that include ‘intercepting’ weapons ofmass destruction (WMD), related materials andtechnologies, as well as their delivery systems,and even ‘liberating’ states from terrorists. In-dia’s participation implicitly endorses the 11-nation, US-led Proliferation Security Initiative(PSI) that empowers itself to interdict vessels,and ultimately aircraft, suspected of ferrying

”

Missile collaboration with theUS would confirm India as an

ally, rather than a strategicpartner. It would also dilute, if

not neutralise, efforts tolocally develop an indigenous

ABM capability, and wouldcircumscribe India’s

strategic missile programme

INDO-US RELATIONS

A US naval helicopterlanding on INS Mysoreduring an Indo-USnaval exercise

DSI JULY, 2008

60

WMD and associated equipment.Given the Indian Navy’s presence

across the IOR, the US has persistentlypressed India to sign up for the PSI.But although the IN has often pri-vately expressed its willingness to doso, on the grounds that regional WMDpowers grievously undermine India’ssecurity interests, the country’s politicalleadership remains unwilling.

The IN is also not averse to joiningthe US-inspired Regional Marine Se-curity Initiative, a partnership of will-ing regional nations with varying ca-pabilities to identify, monitor, andintercept trans-national maritimethreats under existing internationaland domestic laws.

Meanwhile, besides obvious com-mercial interests, the US also seeks acredible ally in a region where its hold isslipping in inverse proportion toChina’s growing strategic relevance.Both the US and India view China as afast emerging threat, and share an in-terest in understanding and counteringChinese strategic intent, though theydo not discuss this publicly. Americabelieves that with Washington’s helpand military investment, India can emerge as acounterweight to China. While the US State De-partment’s policy of ‘constructive engagement’continues to shape Washington’s overall ap-proach to Beijing, the Pentagon is anxious tospend peacetime forging closer ties with India.

It was, after all the Pentagon that took thelead in cementing strategic relations with In-dia after the Soviet Union’s break-up in theearly 1990’s, leading to the Kickleighter pro-posals for greater military co-operation be-tween Washington and Delhi. Named afterGeneral Claude Kickleighter, then head of thePacific Command, the proposals aimed to

gradually strengthen military ties by the endof the decade.

This eventually led to the 2005 Defence Pactand other agreements, like the High Technol-ogy Cooperation Group-the first formulationthat Washington set up with any country to dealwith the long-standing bottleneck in high tech-nology transfers.

“If China emerges as a major power, the USneeds to have friends—preferably friends whoshare the same values (like democracy). In fu-ture India will have more clout and weight (inthe region),” declared an analysis for the USDoD, adding that in 2020 Washington wanted a

friend capable of militarilyassisting the US in dealingwith a Chinese threat.

But several proceduralissues remain unresolvedbefore this alliance can be

cemented. India’s hesitancy in inking the US-backed

LSA—also known as the Access and Cross- Ser-vicing Agreement—stems from strong opposi-tion from Communist MPs, whose support iscrucial to the survival of Prime Minister Man-mohan Singh’s Congress Party-led federalcoalition. The Leftists view the LSA, like the nu-clear deal, as a ‘hegemonic ploy’ by the US to‘strategically enslave’ India.

Another unresolved issue is the End-useVerification Agreement, which allows spotchecks by US defence officials at Indian mili-tary installations where American equipmentis employed. The Agreement, as per US lawwith regard to military equipment sold viathe FMS programme, also restricts its opera-tional deployment to Washington’s diktats.Although the US Navy Secretary Donald C.Winter declared in March that this is not thecase, Indian officials believe it is a ‘codicil’, li-able to be invoked if bilateral security rela-tions sour at a later stage.

India also questions the bilateral Commu-nication, Inter-operability and Security Memo-randum Agreement (CISMOA) that requiresUS defence equipment purchasers to ensure itscompatibility with other American systems.

However, officials in Delhi say that the twonations are working on a compromise sug-gested by India, under which the US could beprovided access to Indian military records withregard to the deployment of its equipment.

Whatever wrinkles remain to be ironed out,therefore, and whatever the fate of the civil nu-clear deal, India and the US are on the path tofurther strategic affiliation and increasingweapons sales. Decades of reliance on Sovietand Russian equipment has left its imprint onIndian military planning and it will take a whilebefore senior officials overcome an institutionaltendency to “think Russian”. US arms compa-nies are confident that the superiority of theirproduct and after sales support will eventuallyprevail and they are pulling out the stops tobuild a comprehensive defence relationshipwith a country that they do not yet know well,but are confident that has all the attributesneeded for an ally in the 21st century.

Rahul Bedi is the New Delhi correspondent for theJane’s Defence Weekly, UK, and contributes regularly to it on a diverse range of security andmilitary-related matters. He is also the India corre-spondent for The Daily Telegraph, London andthe Irish Times, Dublin for which he writes on avariety of political, social and diplomatic issues.

Indo US jointexercise: IAF'stwo MiG 27with USAF'sF-15

INDO-US RELATIONS

Organiser: GSA Exhibitions Pte Ltd

62

THE fencing of the border is the bestthing that's happened to us,” said FatehKhan of Sehlau village, in Ramsar tehsil

of Barmer district. I wondered at his comment,as I had always thought that communities arti-ficially separated by the Radcliffe Line wouldbenefit from a porous border. After all, mar-riages could take place without having to getvisas from a thousand kilometres away, andthe lucrative cross-border trade in groceriesand contraband sustains many lives. But hislogic was simple. “At least now,” he said, “theMuslim living on the border will not automat-ically be suspected of being a smuggler or aspy”.

The importance of Fateh Khan's observa-tion came back to me when data from the 2001Census became public. Initially it was a meretrickle of information, but even those bits andpieces were enough to ring bells beyond thelong desert boundary between India and Pak-istan. The four districts of Ganganagar,Bikaner, Jaisalmer and Barmer form thelongest stretch of the Indo-Pak border in anystate; taken together with Kutch, this is thelongest socially-contiguous border that Indiahas with any country. Curiously, as the Rad-cliffe Line cuts its way along the desert, cross-border societal connections increase. WhileGanganagar residents have only a few rela-

MANVENDRASINGH

DSI JULY, 2008

63

tives across the border, those insouthernmost Barmer and Kutchare predominantly related acrossthe Radcliffe Line, or have migratedfrom the other side.

But what arrested people's atten-tion was the Census data on popula-tion growth rates for the desert districts. Be-tween the 1991 and 2001 Censuses,Ganganagar and Kutch showed a fairly largegrowth in population of 27.53 percent and20.70 percent respectively. But it was thegrowth rates in the three districts betweenthem that raised eyebrows: Bikaner saw a dra-matic increase of 38.18 percent, Barmer 36.83

percent, and Jaisalmer an astonish-ing 47.45 percent increase in popu-lation. The fact that these three dis-tricts were so far above the nationaland state averages triggered alarmbells about the long-term implica-tions of national security planning

and strategy in these areas. The question askedboth nationally and locally was: Will this in-ternational border be affected as the othershave been?

The partition of India in 1947 saw untoldviolence along the eastern and western bor-ders as Punjab, Bengal, Jammu, and Kashmirwere torn apart socially. The desert border

As demographic changessweep along the desert

districts of Rajasthan, thequestion everyone is

asking is, will this bordertoo see the kind of violence

that has affected otherparts of the international

border with Pakistan?

Jaisalmer,Bikaner,Gangan-agar and Barmerdistricts form thelongest Indo-Pakborder stretch

THE PHANTOMLINE IN THE SANDS

BORDER ISSUES

DSIJULY, 2008

64

alone witnessed no violence or migration,even though the Radcliffe Line also dividedfamilies and communities; it was as if linesdrawn in the sand meant little to daily life.Calm prevailed on both sides until 1965, whenthe second Indo-Pak war shattered the peaceand ended the isolation of the desert communi-ties. A frontier appeared literally overnight.The Munabao-Khokhrapar rail link and theGadra road link ceased to be crossing points,and the route to Karachi and back became along one.

Wartime fears spurred Hindu familiesfrom Sindh to move into India, and IndianMuslims to travel in the other direction.This was the first time that there was humanmigration across this border. Some familiesmoved back to their original home in Indiaonce conditions improved following theceasefire, though none are known to havereturned to Pakistan. The same cycle was re-peated less than six years later when Indiaand Pakistan fought their third round in De-cember 1971. A prolonged Indian armypresence in adjoining areas of Sindh pro-voked similar movements to and fro, and areturn back to India for some Muslim fami-lies from Jaisalmer district. But the numbersof Hindu families moving into India wasthe largest ever.

The first real demographic impact of mi-

gration along this border was felt in the yearsfollowing the 1971 war. New villages came up,and certain towns reserved areas for 'refugeecolonies'-a term alien to the desert, now down-loaded from government terminology. Verysoon, however, the migrants-all of whom wereanyway related to the Indian community-were absorbed into daily life. Cross-bordersmuggling and marriages resumed, as thoughthe line in the sands weren't real.

By the end of the 1970s things began tochange in Sindh. An anti-democracy crack-down and the Islamisation campaign of the latePakistani president General Zia Ul-Haq, cou-pled with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,directly impacted the border districts as a trickleof movement began across the border in thedesert. This phenomenon continued throughthe 1980s, and gained strength after 1992, when”

Calm prevailed on both sides of the border

until 1965, when the secondIndo-Pak war shattered

the peace and ended the isolation of the

desert communities. A frontier appeared

literally overnight

The Blue City ofBrahmpuri from the

ramparts ofMehrangarh Fort

DSI JULY, 2008

BORDER ISSUES

65

Hindu fundamentalists destroyed the BabriMasjid in Ayodhya.

By the middle of the 1990s, however, theentire border in Rajasthan had been fenced ex-cept for one technically impossible portion inJaisalmer, making human migration into In-dia impossible. As sectarian excesses becamemore frequent in Pakistan, more families mi-grated legally on their passports, though theysettled in urban centres like Jodhpur, andtherefore did not affect migration patterns inthe border districts.

Despite these instances of migration, how-ever, this India-Pakistan border remainsuniquely trouble-free. Right through theheight of the terrorism problem in Indian Pun-jab and Kashmir, it was the only border wherethere was no crisis, though a number of Pun-jab terrorists are said to have crossed into In-

dia through it (the perpetrators ofthe infamous bomb blast at the In-ter-State Bus Terminus at Delhi in1985 are believed to have come via theJaisalmer border, crossing over near Khuri andthen hitching a ride to the town to hire a vehicleto Delhi). Despite the porosity of the RadcliffeLine, and despite a potentially large recruitablepopulation, peace and sanity has prevailedalong its length.

This claim to fame is not lost on the localpopulation. So when the 2001 census figureswere released amid widespread concern, thelocal reaction was only a muted murmuring.There are justifiable socio-psychological rea-sons for this confidence, and an analysis ofthe 2001 data reveals why that is so; localgrowth has to be understood in the context oflocal factors.

Migrations from the 1970s onwards did addto local numbers, well beyond what could betermed natural growth. As the numbers in-creased, so did the potential for further multipli-cation, particularly in the decade of the 1990s-somuch so that growth rates in the 2001 censusmirrored that of some Assam districts. WhileBangladeshi migrations can be held responsiblefor the numbers in Assam, Pakistani migra-tions are one reason for the growth in these In-dian border districts.

The other reasons are, once again, local.They can be best explained simply by betterhealth services. Of a total population of1,964,835 in Barmer district, almost 847,335were under the age of 14 years, and 978,039were in the 15-59 age bracket. Of a total popula-tion of 508,247 in Jaisalmer, 216,264 were agedunder 14 years, and 260,643 were in the 15-59bracket. In percentage terms, almost 55 per-cent of the under-14 bracket in both districts isaged 4 and below. This begs the questions:what of future demographic trends?

The spectre of threat was prompted by afear that the dramatic increase in populationwas caused by growth amongst Muslims,which might have a spiraling effect in thedistrict, and for the country's security sce-nario. However, further analysis of popula-tion growth shows that the rates are highestamongst the Scheduled Castes. While thelargest migration from Pakistan has been in

this section, they could well alsobe the biggest beneficiaries of im-proved rural health services. In

Jaisalmer the growth among ScheduledCastes is almost 50 percent, which is higherthan the overall district figures of 47.45 per-cent. For Barmer, the figures are only a littlelower. It is true that Muslims constitute al-most 30 percent of the population ofJaisalmer, amongst the highest percentagesin the country. But that is not a securitythreat, for a simple sociological reason.

The Muslims along this part of the borderare emotionally, socially, psychologically andhistorically connected to Sindh. They havenothing in common with mainstream Pak-istan, ideologically or psychologically. Thesame connections apply to a large section ofthe non-Muslim population across socialstrata. Strong bonds with Sindh make for acommon sociological mindset, which ulti-mately makes this region unique among theborder states. That common sociology, andcommon concerns, make for harmonious com-munal relationships.

The only time they are stressed is duringpolitical battles, but then the Indian phenome-non of success through alliances kicks in. Allelections here are fought through multiple al-liances and arrangements, thus nullifying therisk of social schisms. Ultimately, when there islittle chance of social schism, there is littlechance of malicious meddling, demographicdata notwithstanding.

Manvendra Singh is a Member of Parliamentand represents Barmer & Jaisalmer districts inIndia's 14th Lok Sabha. This is his first termhaving failed to get elected for the 13th LokSabha in 1999. Prior to that attempt he was ajournalist with The Indian Express in variouscapacities. Singh is a member of Parliament'sCommittee on Defence since 2004. He was edu-cated at the School of Oriental & African Stud-ies in London, Hampshire College at Amherst,USA and at the Mayo College in Ajmer, India.Singh has an enduring interest in security is-sues, as well as an interest in Arab Politics. Heis an avid football follower, he enjoys books andmusic for company. Married to Chitra, theyparent over a boy and a girl.

Jaisalmer fort loomsover this desert city

DSIJULY, 2008

66

DSI JULY, 2008

France offersIndian Army itsbest artillery

FRANCE, which has supplied advanced Mirage-2000 fighters and Scorpene submarinesto India, has offered to become its full weaponsdevelopment partner to produce front-line landcombat systems for the Indian Army.

“We are ready to transfer front-line technol-ogy and work to co-produce and jointly de-velop advanced systems like higher firepower,longer range artillery guns, and high mobilityland mine secure vehicles for Indian securityforces,” said officials of the top French landarmament company, Nexter, in Paris.

The French offer comes at a time when theIndian Army is on the threshold of floating itsbiggest-ever global tenders for 2,000 to 3,000wheeled, towed and tracked 155 mm guns of.52 calibre, and 1,000 to 2,000 high speed mine-protected troop-carrying 4x4 and 8x8 spe-cialised troop combat vehicles for forces oper-ating against terrorists and Maoists.

The tenders, according to experts here,could run up to 5-7 billion Euros with deliveriesexpected in three to five years. The French of-fer was echoed by the country’s Defence Min-ister Herve Morim, as he threw open theworld’s biggest land system exhibition, Eu-rosatory 2008, near Paris.

Spelling out that terrorism had become an international scourge, Morim said France wasready to co-produce and jointly develop high-tech weapons with its strategic partners.

His comments came as leading companiesfrom the US, Europe, Africa and others haveput on display technology-driven newweapons systems to combat terrorism, keep-ing in mind their first hand experience gath-

ered during operations in Afghanistan.The Indian Army is planning to float new ten-

ders to purchase up to 3,000 155 mm .52 calibreartillery guns, of which 814 would be wheeledguns and another 1,500 towed guns, to bring itsartillery firepower up to NATO standards.

The state-owned French land combat systems company, which has recently down-sized to become Europe’s leading artillery andtank building company, has expressed its willingness to co-produce and jointly developland combat systems with India.

However, Indian defence planners are in aquandary over the purchase of higher fire-power artillery guns, with an apparent hesita-tion over the controversial Bofors guns.

While the Indian army has made tremen-dous progress in modernising infantry and ar-moured units, its artillery upgrade programmeis running 10 years behind schedule.

Nexter is offering its just-produced truck-mounted Caesar wheeled .52 calibre gunwhich, its top official Laurent Nicolas says, “isunequalled in strategic mobility and air trans-portability in a C-130 J transport aircraft.”

The French guns have already been in-ducted into the French Army and have seenaction in Afghanistan. For the Indian Army’sforthcoming order, the French firm would bein competition with Israel’s Atmos SoltamSystem, Serbian Nora, South African Condorand matching guns from Slovakia.

Nexter officials said they are ready to offerthe guns on a government-to-governmentsale basis if India so wants. The Caesar guncan fire six rounds to a distance of 40 km, witha rate of fire of six rounds per minute, and agun crew of just five.

The Caesar guns support an on-board navigator and ballistics computer with muz-zle velocity measurement radar, and can beused with any fire control system.

Published in www.rediff.com

An update onmilitary policy

NEXTERVersatility,mobility, easyoperability,combat readinessand survivabilityare the keyfeatures of thisnew 155mm/52-calibre weaponsystem which isfully interoperable with the NATO 39cal. equipmentand 52 cal

de

fen

ce

talk

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DSI JULY, 2008

THEArmy will raise two “offensive” mountaindivisions in three years, according to sources inthe Army. They will be equipped with air portableguns and an integral air component to quicklytransport troops into battle positions.

In simple terms, each division, with about10,000 to 13,000 troops, will take the battle intothe enemy camp in the Himalayas. A substantialpart of India’s border with Pakistan and China isan unresolved mountainous stretch known asthe Line of Control (Pakistan), the Actual

Ground Position Line (Siachen/Pakistan) andthe Line of Actual Control (China).

The Army already has 10 mountain divisionsand a complete infantry division for operationsat high altitudes. India is negotiating with the USto import six large troop transport carriers, and isplanning to manufacture over 300 medium-lifttransport helicopters. It has also called tendersfor light artillery guns that can be air dropped.

HAL has been asked to manufacture 67 helicop-ter gunships. The other option is to import addi-

tional helicopters. Sensing the opportunity, theworld’s helicopter majors are lining up to offer theirwares. The Army is also mulling over a proposal tobetter equip its soldiers to fight at heights.

The Cabinet Committee on Security clearedthe Army’s proposal a couple of months ago.Sources claim the outlines of the two divisions,including headquarters should be in place in an-other two years. It will take another year to makethe divisions fully functional.

Published in The Hindu

INDIA’s Arjun tank is fighting its first battle even before itenters service with the army. The Defence R&D Organisation(DRDO) and key Ministry of Defence (MoD) officials, confidentthat the Arjun is superior to the army’s Russian T-72 and T-90tanks, are demanding “comparative trials”, where the Arjun,the T-72 and the T-90 are put through endurance and firing trials inidentical conditions.

But the army—particularly the nodal Directorate General ofMechanised Forces (DGMF)—is shying away. Earlier, the DGMFdeclared that the T-72 and T-90 were proven tanks that needed nofurther trials. Now, with the MoD adding its voice to the demandfor comparative trials, the DGMF has told Business Standardthat they must be put off until the army gets a full squadron ofArjun tanks (14 tanks) and absorbs the expertise to use them.

DRDO sources say the army is stonewalling the Arjun by demanding levels of performance that neither of its Russiantanks can deliver. Meanwhile, more T-90s are being importedfrom Russia on the plea that the army is short of tanks.

The DRDO’s fears are grounded in experience. On July 28, 2005Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee informed Parliament, “TheArjun tank is superior to (the) T-90 tank due to its high power toweight ratio, superior fire on the move capability during day andnight and excellent ride comfort. MBT Arjun has gone through

all the tests and it is meeting the (requirements) of the Army.”But a year later, in December 2007, India bought 347 more

T-90s for Rs 4,900 crores. That despite the MoD’s admission inParliament that the 310 T-90s purchased earlier had problemswith their Invar missile systems, and the thermal imagers thatare crucial for night fighting. A comparative trial, says theDRDO, will conclusively establish that the Arjun is a better tankthan the T-90. That will at least put a stop to the import of moreT-90s. But the DGMF is putting off such a trial. The DG of Mech-anised Forces, Lt Gen D Bhardwaj, told Business Standard,“The Arjun is based on a very stringent GSQR, and is in a classby itself. User trials are conducted based on this GSQR. Never-theless, comparative trials will be conducted once a squadronworth of tanks (i.e. 14 Arjun tanks) is inducted into the army.”

This new insistence on 14 tanks will delay the trials until atleast December 8. In 2005, the army agreed to comparative trials,with five Arjun tanks pitted against five T-72s and an equal number of T-90s.

The DGMF had even written the trial directive, spelling outhow trials would be conducted. Those trials were postponed asthe Arjun was not ready to operate in high summer tempera-tures. Now, the Arjun is ready but the army is not.

Published in Business Standard

Arjun versus T-90: Army avoiding trials

defencetalk

T-90 is a Russianmain battle tank,currently the mostmodern in theRussian GroundForces and IndianArmy arsenal. Thesuccessor to the T-72BM, it uses thegun and 1G46gunner sightsfrom T-80U, anew engine, andthermal sights

ARJUNDRDO and CVRDE were taskedwith developing the hull,armour, turret, running gearand gun, with the powerpackbought from abroad. TheArjun’s project requirementswere upgraded to 58.5 tonswith a 120mm gun

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Russia to drive hard bargain foraircraft carrier

RUSSIA will drive a hard bargain in renegotiating theprice of an aircraft carrier which the Indian Navy has purchased and for which Moscow is seeking $1.2 bil-lion over and above the $1.5 billion that had been agreedon, says the Russian ambassador.

Ambassador Vyacheslav I. Trubnikov hedged his betson transferring technology for the T-90 main battle tankand for the cryogenic engine of the BrahMos cruisemissile that India and Russia have jointly developed.Trubnikov was addressing a press conference after in-augurating a Russian Information Centre in New Delhi.

“It’s a complicated issue. There are objective andsubjective factors,” the ambassador said while refer-ring to the negotiations underway on the Russian de-mand for more money for the aircraft carrier AdmiralGorshkov that has been renamed INS Vikramaditya.

“Our economy was in a very different condition (whennegotiations for the ship first began). Our shipyards wereout of work. We agreed to the hard deal struck by the Indi-ans,” the ambassador maintained. “The reality is very dif-ferent today. When we look at the figures, they are unreal-istic as the scope of the work (involved in refurbishing theship) was grossly underestimated,” Trubnikov added.

Under the original deal, India was to buy the carrier for

$1.5 billion. Of this, $970 million was meant to refurbishthe vessel that has been mothballed since a devastatingfire in the mid-1990s. The remaining $530 million wasmeant for the MiG-29K fighter jets, Kamov surveillanceand anti-submarine warfare helicopters that will be de-ployed on the vessel.

The increased cost, the Russians now say, has been necessitated by the new engines and boilers that theship requires, ‘hundreds of miles’ of cabling, thestrengthening of the flight deck, refurbishing the arresterwires and other safety equipment, as also the extensivesea trials the ship will have to undergo after the refit.

Indian officials admit they will have to fork out morefor the vessel but are not too sure of the figure. The ves-sel’s 18-month sea trials are to begin in 2010, with de-livery scheduled for 2012.

Published in www.indiaprwire.com

AFTER homing in to a Long Range MaritimeReconnaissance (LRMR) aircraft, the Navy is allset to fill another crucial gap in its surveillancecapabilities by acquiring six new medium-rangerecon aircraft to replace its ageing Islander fleet.

A global Request For Proposals (RFP) will befloated shortly by the Defence Ministry to ac-quire the aircraft that will also play an anti-sub-marine and anti-ship role. Several leading manu-facturers will be approached for the contract andplatforms being looked at, including the Falcon900 (France), the An-74 (Russia/Ukraine), ATR-42(European Consortium) and Embraer (Brazil).

While the initial order will be for six Medium-

Range Maritime Reconnaissance (MRMR) air-craft with maritime patrol radars, jamming podsand limited air-to-air capabilities, the contractwill have a provision for acquiring an equal num-ber of aircraft as a follow up on the order. The air-craft will have a speed of over 200 knots and arange of over 400 nautical miles. They will havean endurance of at least 4-5 hours.

There is a sense of urgency to acquire mar-itime reconnaissance assets, given the growingshipping traffic in the country and the expectedexpansion of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)that extends beyond the shoreline of the country.India currently has 2.2 million sq km of EEZ that it

is set to increase to 2.5 million sq km after thedelineation of the continental shelf by the UN.

India will soon float a global tender for themid-life refurbishment of its fleet of Sea Kingand Kamov-28 helicopters. The deal is valued at$150 million.

The refurbishment will involve replacing theengine, the avionics, the mission computer, theradar system and missiles. The navy operates 14Sea King and 12 Kamov anti-submarine helicop-ters. In addition, the Sea Kings are also used forreconnaissance, search and rescue operations,and for ferrying personnel and supplies.

Published in The Indian Express

Navy to upgrade ageing fleet with six Recce aircraft

defencetalk

MiG-29K is based on the 'basic'MiG-29K airframe, but is lighterin answer to the Indian Navy'srequirements for the smallestpossible dimensions to maximisespace on the aircraft carrierVikramaditya. The MiG-29K'sfuel tanks are situated in thedorsal spine fairing and wingleading-edge root extensions. Thisreportedly gives the aircraft a50per cent fuel increase over theland-based MiG-29. Flight rangecan also be increased by in-flightrefuelling capability

The ATR 42 seats up to 60passengers, while the ATR72 seats 74 passengers.Both aircraft are operatedby a two-person crew

An-72 has a flight crew oftwo pilots and a flight

engineer, and can seat 68.The An-74 provides for a

radio operator an d apayload of 10 tonnes

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defencetalk

India, France to make surface-to-air missiles

INDIA and France plan to co-produce surface-to-airmissiles (SAM) on the lines of the Indo-Russian ‘Brah-mos’ missile. Termed Maitri (Friendship), the Indo-French short-range missile will be offered to the Army toreplace the near-obsolete Russian SAMs, said AntoineBouvier, chief executive officer of MBDA, one of theworld’s largest missile manufacturers.

“We have been assured of support at the highest polit-ical level by French President Nicolas Sarkozy after he discussed the project with Prime Minister ManmohanSingh during the former’s visit to New Delhi in Januarythis year,” he told journalists.

“We initiated discussions with Bharat DynamicsLimited (BDL) and the Defence Research & Develop-ment Organisation (DRDO) in November 2005 on acompletely new missile version. The next step is jointdevelopment with the DRDO and production by theBDL some of which can also be earmarked for export,”said Mr. Bouvier.

The proposal is in line with the views expressed by De-fence Minister A. K. Antony and DRDO chief M. Natara-jan. They have expressed a preference for taking on boardan experienced foreign company instead of Indian de-fence research and production companies trying to strikeout on a lonely and time-consuming path of their own.

Termed the Brahmos model in Indian defence circles,the government had attempted a partnership with an Is-

raeli company for a different class of missiles. But theproject was put on hold as the Central Bureau of Investi-gation is probing the company for alleged malfeasance.

The missile will be on its first test when the MBDA andthe BDL respond to a multi-billion dollar Army tender for1,000 quick-reaction SAMs. These mobile missile unitsare generally placed near army units and their tacticalheadquarters for protection against aerial threats. Themissile can strike at hostile aircraft nine kilometres awayand can also be used to protect sensitive government andeconomic complexes. Therefore, company officials see asales potential beyond the Army tender and are confidentof its use by the other two armed forces as well.

The MBDA has a two-decade-old relationship with theIndian defence sector. The company will also be involvedin upgrading the French origin Mirage-2000 fighter fleetby supplying new missiles. Its missiles are also likely to bethe preferred option for the French Rafael, the SwedishGrippen and the European Aeronautics Defence Space(EADS) company, all of which are bidding for the lucrative$10 billion Indian tender for 126 fighter aircraft.

Published in The Hindu

BRAHMOS is a supersonic cruisemissile that can be launched fromsubmarines, ships, aircraft orland. Propulsion is based on theRussian Yakhont missile, andguidance has been developed byBrahMos Corp. At speeds of Mach2.5 to 2.8, it is the world's fastestcruise missile, about three and ahalf times faster than theAmerican subsonic Harpoon cruise missile

Indo-US militaryties surge ahead

IN AN indication of the furious pace at which India-US military ties are expanding, all threeservices are girding up to hold the next roundsof joint combat exercises with US forces at vari-ous times between August and October.

India is also finalising several big-ticket de-fence purchases from the US, with the nearly$2billion deal for eight Boeing P-8i long-rangemaritime reconnaissance aircraft being just oneexample. India has already signed a $962 milliondeal to buy six C-130J Super Hercules aircraft.

The procurements, of course, hinge on the fi-nalisation of two key India-US military pacts—the End-Use Verification Agreement (EUVA)and the Communication Interoperability and Se-curity Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA)—which too is underway on the quiet.

The flurry of joint exercises, of course, is simplybreathtaking. India and the US have held as manyas around 50 such wargames in the last sevenyears to build “interoperability”. By contrast, the

combined figure for India’s military exercises withRussia, France and UK is not even one-third of that.

And the exercises certainly don’t come cheap.India is shelling out a whopping Rs 100 crore or soto participate in the celebrated “Red Flag” exer-cise at Nellis US Air Force base in Nevada, thetraining ground for Nato air combat forces.

Eight Sukhoi-30MKIs, one IL-78 mid-air refu-eller and an IL-76 heavy-lift aircraft, along withover 150 IAF personnel, will shortly leave for theUS to take part in the exercise scheduled fromAugust 9 to 24.

Around the same time, between August 1 andAugust 24, a US Special Forces contingent willbe at the Army’s unique Counter-Insurgency andJungle Warfare School at Vairengte (Mizoram)to match their anti-terror skills with Indianforces in the “Vajra Prahar” exercise.

The Navy is also finalising plans for the 14thedition of the Malabar wargames, which will beheld on the western seaboard in September-Oc-tober this year.

Incidentally, the 13th Malabar wargames, heldin the Bay of Bengal in September last year, were expanded to include Japan, Australia and Singa-pore, apart, of course, from India and US. Thishad riled China no end. Beijing lodged strongprotests against the so-called “axis of democ-racy” emerging in the Asia-Pacific region. Not tobe left behind, the Left parties in India, too, or-ganised protests along India’s east coast, holdingthat the US was using India to build up a securitycooperation arrangement to “contain” China.

Published in The Times of India

BOEING P-8I is a long-range anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare,intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissanceaircraft. It possesses an advanced missionsystem for maximum interoperability inbattle space. Capable of broad-area,maritime, and littoral operations

DSI JULY, 2008

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First Indian-builtHawk takes to the skies

The Indian Air Force (IAF) has been flying theBritish-made Hawk advanced jet trainer (AJT)since November last year, but now a significantnew landmark has been kept secret: the first In-dian-built Hawk has taken to the skies.

On the 7th of May—just eight days after aBritish-made Hawk trainer crashed near Bidar, inKarnataka—a group of more than 100 techniciansof the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL)gathered at the company runway in Bangalore. TheHawk had been restricted from flying after the ac-cident on 29th April; but HAL was going aheadwith an unannounced first flight of the first Hawktrainer manufactured in its plant in Bangalore.

As Chief Test Pilot, Squadron Leader BaldevSingh, lifted the Indian Hawk Advanced JetTrainer (AJT) off the ground, the tension evapo-rated into applause. A normal test flight takesabout an hour, but Baldev took an extra fifteenminutes on his test routine, finally ending withan audacious barrel roll manoeuvre right abovethe cheering group of watchers.

No announcement has yet been made; HALwants to shake off all the demons of the earliercrash before inviting a VIP for its formal unveil-ing. But at the company, the celebrations havealready unfolded.

“We were all pumped up,” Baldev admitted toBusiness Standard, “there’s always a certainthrill when you’re putting a new aircraft into theskies. And in the case of the Hawk, which wehave waited for twenty years to build ourselves, itwas a special feeling.”

At the high-tech painting plant in HAL, thefirst Indian Hawk is being painted in the mattegrey finish that all Indian Air Force (IAF) planeswear. By this weekend, the aircraft will be ready,but HAL says it will conduct several more testsbefore handing it over to the IAF.

The first Hawk was to have been handed overin April, but it was delayed by two months by the complexity of the assembly, which involves put-ting together 11,000 components shipped in in-dividual plastic packets from the Hawk plantnear Brough, in Yorkshire, UK.

HAL says it will make up for this delay whilebuilding the 42 Hawks that the initial contract stip-ulated (24 were to be built in Brough and tran-shipped to India). That order, say senior HAL offi-cers, will be executed on schedule by mid-2011.

“We’ve been working in three shifts, practi-cally round the clock”, explains Ashok Nayak, theDirector of HAL’s Bangalore Complex. “The ini-tial learning curve is slow while building a newaircraft, but by the time the 5th or 6th aircraft iscompleted, everyone knows exactly what to do.”

Now HAL has received orders for another 57Hawks: 40 for the IAF and 17 for the Indian Navy.At the targeted production rate of 20 Hawks ayear, this order will keep the production line goingtill early 2014.

Published in Business Standard

defencetalk

HAWK-132 is a variant of the highlysuccessful BAE Systems HawkAJTs. It incorporates an openarchitecture mission computer, glasscockpit and a state of the art avionicssuite including a new generationInertial Navigation System withGPS (INGPS). It is also equippedwith several Indian components suchas the communication sets,identification Friend or Foe (IFF)system and the radio altimeter

In addition to being an AJT, theHawk-132 is fully combat capableand can carry air-to-air missile andair-to-ground strikes. It can also beused as a lightweight fighter

76

DSI JULY, 2008

Sam Manekshaw was the first of only two Indianmilitary officers to achieve the highest rank in the Indian Army. Hisdistinguished career began with his commission into the Army in 1934,and spanned four decades and five wars. He fought in the SecondWorld War, was sent to check the Chinese intrusion in the NEFAin 1962,and served as Eastern Army Commander during the 1965 Indo-Pakwar. Appointed Chief of Army Staff in 1969, he steered India to victoryin the 1971 Indo-Pak war and was awarded the rank of Field Marshal in1973. Sam Maneckshaw’s outstanding service is fondly rememberedby a grateful nation.

Any one who says he knows nofear, is either lying, or Gurkha!

SAM MANEKSHAW

Field Marshal Sam Hormusji Framji

Jamshedji Manekshaw MC

APRIL 3, 1914 - JUNE 27, 2008

IN MEMORIUM

DCP No.F.2(D-23)Press/2008

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