Text of Deepwater Horizon Response – ICP Galveston - … · Deepwater Horizon Response – ICP Galveston....
Deepwater Horizon Response –
Captain Marcus Captain Marcus WoodringWoodringSector HoustonSector Houston--GalvestonGalveston
April 20th, 2010 – The Transocean Rig, Deepwater Horizon, suffered a major marine casualty and fire. The rig sank a few days later, severing the riser connection, releasing crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico. There were 11 casualties as a result of the fire/explosion.
BP took on the role of the “responsible party” for the oil spill response efforts. The USCG and MMS are co-chairing an ongoing investigation into the major marine casualty.
• The first Incident Command Post (ICP) was established in Houma, as the initial event occurred within the Morgan City COTP Zone. This ICP eventually became responsible for the entire State of Louisiana.
• Shortly afterwards, an ICP was stood-up in Mobile, to cover the States of Mississippi, Alabama, and the panhandle of Florida.
• ICP Florida was established for the State (other than the panhandle).
• Because of the need to “broker” the resources available between multiple ICPs, i.e. boom and skimmers, a Unified Area Command (UAC) was established in Robert, and eventually relocated to NOLA.
• After the declaration of this event as a “Spill of National Significance” (SONS), a National Incident Command (NIC) was also established.
• At BP Headquarters in Westlake, the efforts to control the source was named ICP Houston.
National Incident Command (NIC)
Unified Area Command (UAC)
ICP Houma ICP Mobile
Key Role Players
• NIC• Admiral Thad Allen
• UAC (FOSC)• Admiral Mary Landry• Admiral Jim Watson• Admiral Paul Zukunft
The NIC serves as the strategic liaison between the White House and incident. The UAC unified the effort of the ICPs and served as the FOSC for the response. Each Federal ICP Commander was in turn designated as an FOSCR.
• ICP Houma (FOSCR)• Captain Ed Stanton• Captain Roger Leferriere• Captain Scott Paradis
• ICP Mobile (FOSCR)• Captain Steve Poulin
• ICP Florida (FOSCR)• Captain Drew Pearson
• ICP Galveston (FOSCR)• Captain Marcus Woodring
• ICP Houston (source control)• Various USCG Officers
Key Role Players
• With the ongoing spill in the Gulf of Mexico, the USCG and TGLO conducted outreach with many partners and stakeholders. Plans were reviewed, preparations made, and partnership alignments double checked.
• The week following Fourth of July weekend, several tar balls and oiled vegetation washed ashore on Galveston Island, Bolivar Peninsula, and at McFaddin Beach. As in all cases of tar balls, samples were sent for analysis, and came back as a positive match to the DWH event.
• Once the positive matches were confirmed, a command post was stood up, and a press conference was held. The newspaper headlines read “All Five Gulf States Impacted”.
20April – Fire and explosion on Deepwater Horizon rig05July – First impact to Texas beaches10July – ICP Galveston stood up in Galveston15July – Well capped15July – Last impact to Texas beaches27July – ICP Galveston relocated to MSU TXC03August – Static kill completed05August – Well cemented from top14September – ICP Galveston stood down18September – Well cemented from bottom
• With positive matches in Texas, ICP Galveston was officially stood up as part of the UAC on July 10th, 2010. The ICP had the Texas General Land Office (TGLO), BP, and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). The ICP role was to keep the beaches clean and open, outreach, and represent the State of Texas to the UAC and NIC.
• Over the course of the next several weeks, we responded to many reports of tar balls and oiled vegetation washing ashore. Each was sampled to determine the source.
Galveston Island assessment teams
Galveston Island assessment teams
• Outreach and media interaction:• County Judges• Mayor of Galveston• Governor’s Office• Homeowners Associations• Chamber of Commerce• Interest Groups (i.e. Galveston Bay Council)• Emergency Managers• Congressional Delegations• The general public• Media at all levels• Fishermen• Economic Alliances
By the numbers:• ICP Galv – 121 people at peak
• UAC – Over 47,000 people at peak• ICP Galv – 118 cubic yards recovered
• UAC – 12.6 million feet of boom deployed • ICP Galv – No boom, one skimmer
• UAC – Est 3 to 5.2 million bbls spilled• ICP Galv – Cost was $1.2 million (26Aug)
• UAC - $519 million in FPN costs (26Aug)
As of July 30th:• 341,000 calls received at call center• 38,600 e-mails received, 57% of those were
offering advice• $346 million obligated by OSLTF• 39,611 Facebook followers• Over 135 million website hits• ~10K print stories and 450 broadcasts a day• Over 5,000 vessels involved• Over 3,700 “ideas” evaluated, 145 forwarded
for consideration, at peak over 800 a week were received, down to approx 100 a week now
= 10K BBLS
Where did the oil go??
Lessons Learned in Texas
1) Strength - Outreach before impact was critical to success once impacts occurred
2) Opportunity - Huge national command structure restricted “the strength of NIMS” i.e. the ability of a local IC/FOSC to make all decisions without permission
3) Strength - TGLO’s partnership and abilities in Texas
4) Opportunity – Lots of “overhead” required to be an ICP, more ICP effort expended internally than in response operations