Public Relations Review 28 (2002) 339–345

Deep and surface threats: conceptual and practicalimplications for “crisis” vs. “problem”

W. Timothy Coombs∗

Communication Resources Northwest, 9935 Lancaster Drive, Belleville, MI 48111, USA

Received 1 December 2001; accepted 8 May 2002

Abstract

This essay considers the importance of considering the reputational and operational threats posed byan event when trying to assess the event. It is argued that a true crisis must have an operational component.The paper also explores the issue of when certain response strategies will worsen an operational threatand how that acts as a constraint for selecting crisis response strategies.© 2002 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.

We use the term “crisis” rather loosely in our daily lives and even when we talk about crisismanagement/communication. The term crisis should have greater specificity when used in theorganizational context. Whether an event is a crisis or problem does matter in terms of theamount of energy and resources devoted to the response. An important part of a response is thecrisis response strategies, what crisis managers say and do after a crisis. We need to be preciseabout the term crisis when we discussion crisis response strategies; it does matter if the eventis a problem or crisis when we are selecting crisis response strategies. It behooves us to unpackwhat really constitutes a crisis, how to evaluate threats from a crisis, and how the evaluation ofa crisis affects the selection of crisis response strategies. This essay addresses these three keypoints for crisis managers.

1. Definitions: getting to the root

To begin the quest of unpacking a crisis, we must look at how crises are defined. A survey ofthe crisis management literature reveals two essential threads. First, a crisis has the potential to

∗ Tel.: +1-734-325-2067; fax:+1-313-577-6300.E-mail address: wtcoombs@hotmail.com (W.T. Coombs).

0363-8111/02/$ – see front matter © 2002 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.PII: S0363-8111(02)00167-4

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disrupt operations—the organization cannot function properly.1 Potential indicates that quickactions might prevent the crisis from having its full impact. Second, a crisis can threatenthe organization’s reputation—how stakeholders perceive the organization.2 If mishandled orignored, a crisis will tarnish an organization’s reputation. Both threads tie crises to the financialbottom line of an organization. Loss of operations, not making a product or delivering a service,will cost money and a negative reputation will lead to lost revenues as well.3 The financiallink reveals a corporate bias in the crisis management literature. However, non-profits facesimilar issues with loss of clientele and donations. Donations are directly financial while lossof clientele can result in reductions in funding or the deletion of a program. There are financialbottom line issues for both profits and non-profits.

The two definitional threads can be woven to form the basis for the Threat Grid. The ThreatGrid is not just a system for classifying crisis types, for lists of crisis types refer to Benoit’Accounts, Excuses, and Apologies: A Theory of Image Restoration or Coombs’Ongoing CrisisCommunication: Planning, Managing, and Responding.4 Instead, the Threat Grid assesses thetype and amount of threat an event presents. The Threat Grid begins by identifying two typesof threat, operational and reputational. The two types of threats can intersect, that is why a gridformat was utilized.

A Grid allows for each type of threat to be evaluated simultaneously. Each type of threat isarrayed along an axis of impact severity. Impact severity is concerned with how badly an eventmight hurt an organization. Impact severity is anchored by ability to thrive and ability to survive.The crisis managers must determine if the event reduces an organization’s ability to thrive or isa danger to the very survival of the organization. Ability to thrive would be reflected in reducedprofits or minor losses. The ability to survive would be reflected in the organization continuingto operate. The impact severity embodies the idea of deep and surface effects. The ability tothrive is a surface impact while ability to survive is a deep threat.Fig. 1presents the Thread Grid.

Threat assessment is nothing new to crisis managers. An initial step in crisis preparation is toassess the threat various crisis risks hold for an organization. The typical threat assessment is acombination of impact and likelihood. Likelihood deals with the possibility of a risk becominga crisis.5 The Threat Grid is concerned with events that have happened, hence, likelihood isno longer a consideration; the risk has come to fruition. However, we still must contend withthe impact, how badly the crisis can hurt the organization. We must determine if the eventis a minor (a problem) or serious enough to warrant the tag of “crisis” and the execution ofthe crisis management plan. The Thread Grid is designed to help crisis managers distinguishbetween problems and crises.

The thrive and survive axis are on a 10-point scale. A 10-point scale is commonly used inrisk assessment so it is used here to maintain consistency. The lower part of the scale addressesthe ability to thrive while the higher end addresses the ability to survive. A “1” indicates verylittle threat to the ability to thrive while a “5” indicates the strongest threat to the ability tothrive. A “6” indicates a minor threat to the ability to survive while a “10” indicates a seriousthreat to the ability to survive. The assessment system is designed so that the higher the score,the great the threat to the organization. The crisis managers assess both the reputational andoperational threats and plot them on the Threat Grid.

Reputations are fairly stable and difficult to change.6 The thrive reputational threats simplytarnish a reputation, something stakeholders will forget fairly quickly. In the 1980s, Chrysler

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Fig. 1. Threat Grid.

was found to have sold cars that had their odometers disconnected during test drives. The eventwas a minor spot on Chrysler’s reputation. Similarly, the application of image restoration theoryto Hugh Grant’s solicitation of a prostitute and Queen Elizabeth’s reaction to Diana’s death areexamples of thrive reputational events.7 Hugh Grant’s solicitation might have cost him a fewchoice movie parts but would no end his career. Similarly Queen Elizabeth might loss a few pop-ularity points for seeming to be cold but it would not end the monarchy in the United Kingdom.

The survive reputational threats strike at the heart of a reputation and shatter it. The eventis seen as extremely offensive and/or the event contradicts a key factor the organization hasused to build its reputation. For instance, say an organization has built its reputation around aconcern for the environment. A revelation of illegal dumping of toxic chemicals would shatterthat reputation because the stakeholders will see the organization as hypocritical. Texaco’sracism event was at the survival level because of the seriousness attributed to racism problemsin corporate America. The effect of a reputational threat can be delayed because it takes timeto feel the financial impact of a destroyed reputation. However, if the reputation is not restored,the organization is unlikely to thrive and potentially could fold in a worst case scenario.

The thrive operational threat is a tolerable loss of revenue; the loss will reduce profits orcause minor losses but will not be detrimental. When Burger King recalled the “dangerous”Pokeballs, the action was costly but nothing that threatened Burger King’s financial solvency.The survival operation threat is a loss that is intolerable; the size of the loss could result in

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the extinction of the organization. After theEscherichia coli poisonings in the Western states,Jack-in-the-Box was fighting for its very survival. The loss of revenues from the shutdownsand decreased business nearly ended the organization’s life.

The Threat Grid quadrants reflect varying intensities of threat. Quadrant 1 is a minimalthreat (thrive reputational and operational). Quadrant 2 is a moderate threat (survive reputationand thrive operational). Quadrant 3 is serious threat (survive operational and thrive reputation).Quadrant 4 is an urgent threat (survive operational and survive reputational). If we distinguishbetween problems and crises, Quadrant 1 would be a problem and Quadrants 3 and 4 crises(operational disruption) and Quadrant 2 a crisis (sever reputational threat).

The interplay between the reputational and operational threats is undeniable. Operationaldisruptions can harm an organization’s reputation. It “looks bad” when an organization cannotfulfill contracts or delivers an inferior product. Moreover, reputation damage can cascade andresult in operational problems. Key stakeholders, such as investors and distributors, mightwithdraw stakes if their perception of the organization (its reputation) becomes too tarnished.Activist stakeholders may become so angry at an organization with a negative reputationthat they seek to disrupt its operations. Or government agencies may become alerted andtry to intervene or increase regulation on an entire industry. Arthur Andersen’s role in theEnron scandal, for instance, has cast a shadow on the entire accounting industry. Hence, it isappropriate to consider the reputational and operational threads in tandem.

2. Crisis response strategy selection and the threat grid

The threat posed by an event affects the selection of crisis response strategies in two ways.First, the crisis response strategy needs to fit the situation. Second, a crisis response strategyshould not intensify the financial threat when it is at the survival level. The implications ofthe Threat Grid for crisis response strategies are considered after a quick review of the crisisresponse literature.

2.1. Background: research streams

A growing body of crisis communication research addresses the selection of crisis responsestrategies, what an organization says and does after a crisis. There are three distinct researchstreams. The oldest stream is corporate apologia, the use of rhetoric to defend an organization’scharacter. Though developed for individual speakers, apologia has been modified and success-fully applied to the analysis of organizational rhetoric.8 Apologia does have its limits. It wasintended for individuals, not corporate entities, and as such does not identify strategies andconstraints one might find in the corporate realm but that are irrelevant in the realm of indi-vidual rhetors. Individual rhetors deal almost exclusively with the reputational thread (e.g.,character) and have little concern for the operational thread.

The second stream is Benoit’s image restoration theory. Image restoration theory movesbeyond corporate apologia by grafting in crisis response strategies from the account analysisliterature associated with interpersonal communication. Benoit and his colleagues have appliedimage restoration theory to both corporate and individual crises such as AT&T, Hugh Grant, and

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Queen Elizabeth.9 Image restoration theory expands the crisis response strategy repertoire butstill ignores the constraints of the corporate milieu.10 In other words, the operational thread islargely ignored when crisis response recommendations are formulated from image restorationtheory.

The third stream is situational crisis communication theory (SCCT). SCCT is rooted inattribution theory, hence it shares earlier efforts to adapt ideas intended for individuals to acorporate setting.11 SCCT differs slightly in that it integrates work from corporate apologia,image restoration theory, and corporate approaches to crisis management. For instance, the listof crisis response strategies includes an examination of strategies used in management-basedstudies of crisis management.12 Moreover, SCCT includes a number of constraints related tooperational factors that are derived from management-based crisis management works whenexamining the crisis situation.13 The inclusion of operational concerns is significant as it canalter the equation for selecting crisis response strategies.

2.2. Threat grid and crisis response strategy selection

Corporate apologia and image restoration theory favor the use of accommodative crisisresponse strategies, those designed to help the crisis victims.14 Benoit’s work shows a clearbias for strategies that repair reputational damage and provide apologies for misconduct.15 It isimportant to try to repair reputational damage but dependence on apologies is dangerous froman operational perspective.

As Tyler noted, focusing on victims becomes a problem when operational factors areignored.16 This is not to say that operational concerns should become an imperative during acrisis but they must be given their proper respect. If an effort to fix an organization’s reputationresults in catastrophic financial loss, what is the point? Organizations have fiduciary respon-sibilities to investors and employees. These responsibilities simply cannot be abandoned. Acrisis response cannot exacerbate the operational threat when that threat is at the survival level.Accommodative strategies are often expensive. It costs money to engage in corrective actionssuch as replacing products, compensating victims, repairing a facility and/or taking respon-sibility, a key element of an apologia, will result in financial costs from lawsuits that will belost.

Do some corporations deserve to cease operations because of their crisis? Some probablydo, but most deserve to continue operating. Selecting accommodative strategies may hinder acorporation’s ability to survive operationally. Consider Johns Manville’s efforts to settle theasbestos lawsuit claims. Had Johns Manville tried corrective action immediately and acceptedfull responsibility, it would have ceased to exist. Instead, Johns Manville took the unpopularmove of filling for Chapter 11, paying out the settlements over an extended period of time, andnot taking responsibility.

2.3. Operational concern

Ideally, the crisis response will reduce both the reputational and operational threats. However,crisis management is practiced in the imperfect realm of reality. There are times when toughand often unpopular choices must be made. Financial constraints are a reality that must be

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factored into the crisis response selection equation. An organization facing an operationalsurvival threat may not be able to afford to be overly accommodative. This may mean thereputational dimension is not addressed fully but a viable response is offered. Some specificrecommendations can be assembled:

1. Problems can rely on the recommendations of image restoration theory and seek to beoverly accommodative; focus on victim concerns and the reputational threat.

2. As long as the operational threat is at the thrive level, the recommendations from imagerestoration are viable—strongly accommodative crisis responses can be employed.

3. Less accommodative crisis response strategies must be used if the risk of intensifyingsurvival level threats exists. Crisis managers can “satisfice,” use a workable but not idealsolution, by using what have been termed “legal” responses. Legal strategies still helpvictims and seek to repair damage but do not accept responsibility and favor the limiteddisclosure of information.17

3. Ethical concerns

So, can crisis managers use the above recommendations as way to circumvent responsibilityand slight stakeholders? The answer would be yes, the managers can lie about the financialrisks as a justification for being less accommodative. Is that a wise action? The answer is no.In the transparent corporate world “secrets and lies” have a way of coming out. Revelations ofdeception will trigger a new reputational crisis and inflict further damage on an organization.Consider the reputational damage from the revelations that the Catholic Church hid sexualabuse by priests as an example. The Threat Grid is not an unethical tool but it can be employedunethically if managers choose to do so. The risk of abuse is inherent in any principles devel-oped for crisis management. Ultimately, the ethicality lies in the individuals using the crisismanagement principles, not in the principles themselves.

4. Conclusion

An event appears on the crisis sensing mechanism of your organization. Is it a problem orcrisis? How should you respond? These are important questions. Calling something a crisiselevates it to status that demands additional resources and attention. The Threat Grid is offeredas a tool to aid in the evaluation of an event. The Threat Grid plots both the potential reputationaland operational threat posed by the event. Based upon the assessment, the crisis team will knowif they face a problem or a crisis and the magnitude of the crisis.

The crisis response is informed by the Threat Grid. Some events are problems and canbe handled very easily. The overly accommodative recommendations from image restorationtheory would work well. Moreover, low operational risk crises can be handled routinely if theorganization is well versed in crisis preparation and management.18 Basically, simple crises(Quadrant 1) are fairly routine. For instance, recalls and product tampering crises have patternedresponses. The delicate decision is whether or not the threat is at the survival level and thedanger of an overly accommodative response pushing the organization closer to extinction. If

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survival is at risk, an organization must consider less accommodative but still effective crisisresponse strategies. Understanding both the reputational and operational risks of an eventmakes for a more effective crisis response.

References

[1] K. Fearn-Banks,Crisis Communications: A Casebook Approach, Lawrence-Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ, 1996; O.Lerbinger,The Crisis Manager: Facing Risk and Responsibility, Lawrence-Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ, 1997.

[2] M.W. Allen, R.H. Caillouet, Legitimation endeavors: impression management strategies used by anorganization in crisis,Communication Monographs 61 (1994), pp. 44–62; L. Barton,Crisis in OrganizationsII, 2nd Edition, College Divisions South-Western, Cincinnati, OH, 2001; W.L. Benoit,Accounts, Excuses,and Apologies: A Theory of Image Restoration, State University of New York Press, Albany, NY, 1995.

[3] C.J. Fombrun,Reputation: Realizing Value from the Corporate Image, Harvard Business School Press, Boston,1996.

[4] W.L. Benoit, op. cit.; W.T. Coombs,Ongoing Crisis Communication: Planning, Managing, and Responding,Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, 1999.

[5] L. Barton, op. cit.; W.T. Coombs, op. cit.[6] K.E. Boulding,The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI,

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[11] W.T. Coombs, op cit.; W.T. Coombs, An analytic framework for crisis situations: better responses from abetter understanding of the situation,Journal of Public Relations Research 10 (1998), pp. 177–191.

[12] A.A. Marcus, R.S. Goodman, Victims and shareholders: the dilemmas of presenting corporate policy duringa crisis,Academy of Management Journal 34 (1991), pp. 281–305; G. Siomkos, P. Shrivastava, Respondingto product liability crises,Long Range Planning 26 (1993), pp. 72–79.

[13] J.B. Kaufmann, I.F. Kesner, T.L. Hazen, The myth of full disclosure: a look at organizational communicationsduring crises,Business Horizons 37 (1994), pp. 29–39.

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180; W.L. Benoit, S.L. Brinson, AT&T: apologies are not enough,Communication Quarterly 42 (1994),pp. 75–88.

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