A Different View on the SelfSo, we are not a ghost inhabiting the brain. This leaves the question: what are we - what is this self- if not our conscious thinking? It is beyond the scope of this paper to give a full description of what a self might be, but for the purpose of rejecting Wegners conclusion regarding responsibility, I think it is enough to illustrate that we identify ourselves with more than our conscious thinking all the time. I will provide some examples of everyday- , but also extraordinary things, where unconscious processes play a major role in our actions, but where we would still think it is obvious they are our actions nonetheless.As I am typing this, I do not consciously have to think about the location of every letter on the keyboard to find them. That would take way too long. Instead, it seems to go automatically, my fingers just go there. But it is still me who is typing this. Another example is the Eureka! (or Aha!) effect. This is the feeling of suddenly understanding a previously incomprehensible problem or concept. There are several examples of scientific discoveries being made due to a sudden flash of insight, Albert Einstein gives one of them. He came to his theory of relativity while talking to his friend Michele Besso: Comment by Robert de Vries: Everyday life?Comment by Robert de Vries: Far (formal)I started the conversation with him in the following way: Recently I have been working on a difficult problem, today I come here to do battle against that problem with you. We discussed every aspect of this problem. Then suddenly I understood where the key to this problem lay. Next day I came back to him again and said to him without even saying hello, Thank you. I've completely solved the problem. (Einstein, 1982, p. 46)Would it not be weird to say Einstein is not responsible for coming up with his theory, because his problem-solving seemed to have happened unconsciously? I argue that this indeed is a weird statement to make. His unconscious thoughts are also part of his self, and therefore, he is also the one responsible for this theory. An interesting view on the self which fits in this line of thinking is the idea of the self as a narrative.Comment by Robert de Vries: Strange (formal)Comment by Robert de Vries: thatComment by Robert de Vries: strange (formal)The Narrative SelfThis idea views the self not so much as a thing which causes action, but more like a narrative construct. Dennett (1992) illustrates this idea nicely with a thought experiment. Imagine a computer that is able to write a novel. Suppose it starts writing a biography of a guy named Gilbert. In this situation, Gilbert is a created self but its creator is not (it is merely a computer). Now imagine that this computer is put in a robot which can move freely in the world, and that it also capable of adapting information from the world to incorporate this into his writing. So when it went to a theater, the story will read something like I went to the theater today. But who then is this I? The first thing that comes to mind is to say that the I is Gilbert. But who then is Gilbert? Is it the robot? No, it is a self created by the computer within this robot. Dennett compares the novel-writing machine to the human brain. Our brain generates a narrative which tells us our own story, in which the self is the character. This thought experiment makes it helpful to think of the self as something that is not nested somewhere in the brain, but more as a narrative construct. The body and brain can be compared with the robot containing the novel-writing machine, the self can be compared with Gilbert, the narrative of the robot. If you are now wondering what the connection with responsibility is, consider the following. As I stated in the beginning, for most people being responsible for an action requires that you acted yourself, not someone or something else (recall the second condition for free will: Ultimate responsibility). What Wegner seemed to show is that we do not act ourselves. But this is only true if you identify yourself with you conscious thinking and as I argued, that is a mistake. As Dennett puts it: Dont make yourself your self- small; thats the Cartesian error; recognize that there is a nonmysterious, and valuable, concept of a self that can be large enough to take responsibility and act morally. (2008, p. 255)So in the case of Einstein for example, what makes the thought his, is not a conscious cause, but the fact that he has been thinking about the problem for a long time. Solving that problem is one of his own chosen projects, one of his most important components of his personal narrative. The unconscious problem-solving fits logically in this project, and that is why it is really his solution, because the project is part of his identity.Comment by Robert de Vries: selfComment by Robert de Vries: isComment by Robert de Vries: then whoComment by Robert de Vries: toComment by Robert de Vries: act / have actedComment by Robert de Vries: seemsComment by Robert de Vries: ourselvesComment by Robert de Vries: wegComment by Robert de Vries: yourComment by Robert de Vries: recogniseComment by Robert de Vries: non-mysteriousConclusionThe goal of this thesis was to critically assess the results of Wegners study on consciousness, and its implications to our notion of responsibility. First, I have established the relationship between free will and responsibility by explaining the two conditions for free will according to Kane (2005). Namely; that (1) free will requires the power to do otherwise and (2) the choice should be made by yourself. The second condition played a central role, since this one is about being responsible. Next, I discussed Wegners (2002) theory that we do not consciously initiate our actions. This seems to contradict the idea that we can be responsible for our actions. He comes to this conclusion after having conducted several experiments which show that we can fool ourselves in to thinking we have caused a certain action with our consciousness when in fact, we did not. We merely experience it like that. When the principles of priority, consistency and exclusivity are met, we are very likely to ascribe a causal relationship between intention and action. Wegner concludes conscious will is an illusion. He thereby also refutes responsibility. If we do not consciously initiate our own actions, how can we be held responsible for these actions?I have explained that his findings do not necessarily mean the end of responsibility (or free will). By stating that we are not responsible for our actions because we cannot consciously initiate an action, he reduces the self to merely our conscious thinking. At first sight identifying yourself with your conscious thinking does not seem that strange. Maybe many people do, in theory, identify themselves with their conscious thinking. But I am convinced, that in real life, we do not. The idea of a self as equal to consciousness draws back to a theory which is no longer accepted, but the remainders are still visible. Taking a closer look at Wegners reasoning teaches us that he too implicitly - uses a concept of the self that is in need of revision. I think that the actions that are initiated in an unconscious process (like Einstein coming up with his theory) are also a part of the 'self', and that this corresponds better to common sense. If someone asked Einstein who came up with his theory, what would he have said? He himself of course. He identifies himself with it, and that is important. It fits into his 'story', his own narrative. This indicates that it is still possible to be responsible, even if there is no direct causal link between conscious thought and actions. Now, if we go back to the question I asked in the introduction: Can the results of Wegners study on conscious will undermine our notion of responsibility? It should be clear that my answer is no, I do not think that it can.However, the findings of Wegner are very interesting and should not be neglected. Despite the fact that I argue that his conclusions about free will and responsibility are incorrect, his study does show us that our consciousness works different than many think it does. Wegner compares it to a magician. On the face of it, it looks like real magic stuff is going on; a woman in a box sawed in half for example. But in reality, a complex process which we did not witness took place; there are mirrors, maybe an extra box within the box, or even an extra woman, which made it look like the woman was sawed in half. It is similar for consciousness. We cannot think of doing something, and magically make it happen just by thinking of it. In reality, a complex unconscious process took place. This gives us an important and interesting insight in the way consciousness works, but this alone is not enough to prove we cannot be responsible. There is more to us than just our consciousness.Dennett (2008) provides an analogy which is fitting here. Imagine a world where people believe that Cupid with his arrows is responsible for people falling in love. He shoots you in the heart and a moment later, you are in love. Then one day, a scientist discovers that Cupid does not exists. There are no magic arrows, just some chemical reactions in your body. Does this mean that love is not real? Some might say yes, the scientist showed nobody really ever falls in love. Others would say no, love is just as real as before, and so is falling in love. It just does not work like we thought it did. The issue of free will and responsibility is like this, and Wegner interprets his own findings in the same way as the first reaction to the question if love is real. But instead of refuting free will and responsibility altogether, I think he should have rejected the outdated concept of the self in the first place. Indeed, our consciousness is different from what many people think it is or works like. But interesting as that is, it does not undermine our notion of a responsible and free will on its own.Consciousness alone does not make us do things, we - as a whole - do things. By claiming that Wegners findings cannot undermine our notion of responsibility, because we are more than our conscious thinking, new questions arise. If we still can be responsible for our actions, you might wonder if we always necessarily are. And if not, whenwould we not be? What about mentally disordered persons for example, are they responsible when they commit a crime? After the examples that I have given (me typing this, Einsteins Eureka! moment), it might seem like I think this means we are responsible for all our actions no matter what. I would like to emphasize I do not think we are, or better: I do not know if we are. There are of course examples thinkable where it is not that obvious that we are responsible for things initiated in an unconscious process. If someone hurts someone else while sleepwalking, is he responsible? If you think of the self as a narrative construct, you might conclude he is not, because hurting someone does not fit into his story. In the end, the issue of free will and responsibility is too complex to provide answers to this kind of questions within this thesis. In order to say something meaningful about free will and responsibility, I believe scientific research should go hand in hand with philosophical insights. As I have shown, taking a closer look at concepts (this would be the philosophical insight) like self can make all the difference for a conclusion based on scientific research.Comment by Robert de Vries: plays?Comment by Robert de Vries: haveComment by Robert de Vries: reachesComment by Robert de Vries: this is possible. (iets netter misschien)Comment by Robert de Vries: as ifComment by Robert de Vries: magicalComment by Robert de Vries: has shownComment by Robert de Vries: that no oneComment by Robert de Vries: similarComment by Robert de Vries: thoughtsComment by Robert de Vries: this is necessarily always the case.Comment by Robert de Vries: youComment by Robert de Vries: emphasise thatComment by Robert de Vries: ?Comment by Robert de Vries: Construction?Comment by Robert de Vries: theseComment by Robert de Vries: kinds