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Deconstruction and development: fromprogress to pause

USE BIRD

Education Department Victoria, University of Wellington

A number of issues arising from deconstructionist critiques within the socialsciences are examined for their relevance to developmental theorising. Criticismsfrom other cultural perspectives are described as often incompatible with viewsof Western writers. As an example of the sort of rethinking called for by thesecritiques, differing perspectives on the idea of an individual "self" are discussed.These views have varied across historical times, genders and cultures, as can beseen in writings on Maori culture in New Zealand/Aotearoa. This paper considersthe possibility of using a politically sensitive analysis informed by feministcritique as a way of dealing with the problems of relativism exposed bydeconstruction.

The purpose of this paper is to consider some implications of deconstructionistthought for work in the field of human development. Recent critical work couldhave wide-ranging effects for most areas of developmental research and theoris-ing for decades to come. The first section below outlines several criticalproblems, some of which have particular implications for developmentalresearch in New Zealand/Aotearoa. A second section looks more closely at onearea within developmental theorising, concerned with aspects of research intothe developing understanding of the self across age. In line with what isbecoming the usual deconstructionist style, this paper does not attempt toconclude with any solutions to the problems posed by deconstructionist critique,but rather points to some of the complexities which have not been addressed inmuch developmental writing to date.

Deconstructionist Critique and its Impact on Human Development

The past few decades have seen ripples of critique which have affected everydiscipline of knowledge from the visual arts, architecture, drama, literature, to thesocial sciences; this flood of ideas, which tears down structural assumptions of pastbeliefs about the nature of knowledge and theory, has come to be called, appropria-tely enough, "deconstruction". Deconstructionist thought is sometimes seen as part ofa "postmodern" philosophical era (see Lather, 1989). The postmodern era, in whichcertainties about values and beliefs are seen as relative in a pluralistic society, isusually contrasted with a previous modern era in which there was greater certainty.Though much has been written about modernism (e.g., Reiss, 1982), in this paper Iuse the word "modern" to refer to Western values emphasising technological progressand a belief that the world is constantly improving. Central to deconstructionist or

An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Human Development Seminar, Massey University,December, 1988.

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postmodern thinking have been the philosophical critiques of Wittgenstein,Feyerabend, and Rorty, Derrida's deconstruction of the text, Foucault's challengingof traditional beliefs about the nature of empirical evidence in social science, andKuhn's tilt at the historically-bound epistemological foundations of science. Thefoundations of Western thought since the Enlightenment have been put to suchdevastating critique of late that the future of theorising in any field seems difficult toimagine.

The discipline of psychology has probably been affected less than any other bythese momentous changes. Because of its strong alignment with developmentalpsychology, the field of human development has experienced only the early signs ofdeconstructionist upheaval, even though human development has always been aninterdisciplinary field with an awareness of its own history and links to social policies(e.g., Kessen, 1979). In recent years, a number of writers have introduced decon-structionist ideas into psychology (notably Gergen, 1985; Sampson, 1983) andsometimes into developmental work as well (Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn andWalkerdine, 1984). Deconstructionist critiques tend to disrupt theoretical certaintiesof definition. For the field of development this means that there will be continuedquestioning of fixed theoretical concepts regarding developmental change.

Gergen (1987) has argued that deconstructionist work mocks the credibility ofprevious research without positing an alternative, an action which can be criticisedfor intellectual remoteness and negativism. He (1985, 1987) has written eloquently infavour of moving social constructionist ideas into, thereby essentially altering, thediscipline of psychology. The social constructionist approach comes from a longtradition in sociology, the sociology of knowledge, particularly from Berger andLuckman's (1966) work on the social construction of reality, which gives a criticalperspective on our consensually held views of the world. Similarly, Garfinkel (1967)followed earlier work of the phenomenologist Alfred Schutz in looking at the waypeople within a society construct meaning in their lives. Garfinkel saw the scientist'sfascination with "rationality" as a particular kind of social practice. In the field ofhuman development, social constructionist research would focus on the way socialpractices help to create our perceptions of individuals as developing beings,perceptions which seem to represent an unquestionable reality.

In the field of development, British work has been influenced by social construc-tionist thought for some time (see Richard & Light, 1986), while in the U.S., a similarapproach can be seen in Bruner's work (e.g., Bruner & Haste, 1987), and in much re-cent work which has re-examined some of Vygotsky's concepts. Social constructionisttheorising in development would also benefit from a closer examination ofanthropological work which has attempted to define developmental stages of aparticular culture in terms of social practices which differ for children at different ages(see Super & Harkness, 1986). An approach which adds a political, feministperspective to the notion of socially constructed reality is that of Walkerdine (1984),who discussed the possible self-fulfilling effects of developmental training andmeasurement, for example by child care workers, on the behaviours expected inchildren of different ages. There is also relevant work by sociologists of childhood,who define development as culturally created epochs rather than as developmental

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DECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT 9

stages influenced by maturational factors. Thome's (1987) work on games of middlechildhood shows the influence of social practices which encourage romantic views ofheterosexual pairing well before adolescence, when such pairings become a normativeexpectation in both social life and many developmental theories.

Perhaps the most important aspect of recent critiques for the field of development isthe critique of the assumption that there is an "individual" at the basis of our socialconstructions of reality. Shotter's (1984, p. 177) comments that explanations ofdevelopmental processes reflect current fashions in thinking, which are "bothindividualistic and scientistic", and that "we have concentrated far too muchattention upon the isolated individual studied from the point of view of an uninvolvedobserver" do not seem radical at first glance. After all, Bronfenbrenner's (1979; seealso Bronfenbrenner, Kessel, Kessen, & White, 1986) call for greater awareness of thesocial contexts surrounding the individual has been an influential criticism of theartificiality of many earlier research efforts. However, the deconstructionist critique ofindividualism in psychological theorising goes much deeper.

Valsiner (1986) has been an advocate for a reanalysis of the role of the individual indevelopmental theorising. Valsiner and Benigni (1986) criticised the wholesale use ofthe term "ecological" by child psychologists who have not reconceptualised theirnotions of the individual. Perhaps some developmental researchers in recent timeshave simply chosen to "add some context to the individual and stir". Valsiner andBenigni suggest that Vygotsky looked at this question many decades ago, byconsidering developmental phenomena within a context of social meanings andhistorical relevance, issues central today for a social constructionist perspective. Aninteresting concept put forward by Valsiner (1988) is the idea of "personal culture" asa way to describe the individual. In this view, people's selves are constructed by"internalized, idiosyncratically transformed versions of 'collective culture' " (Val-siner, 1988, p. 8). This idea has similarities with the concept of individual personalityseen in critical theory, which brings together ideas from psychoanalytic theory as wellas marxist thought. Some critical theorists speculate about the means by whichparticular historical and social circumstances might influence each person insomewhat different ways (e.g., Leonard, 1984; Poster, 1978). However, unlike thecritical theorists mentioned, Valsiner does not add a political dimension to hisconceptualisation of the developing individual.

The real bogey that deconstruction poses for research methodology and disciplinesof knowledge is that of relativism: there are no longer any firm rules for deciding onthe evidence which constitutes truth or for allowing the expert's voice a tone ofauthority. This is an obvious threat to the power of universities and to research as aninstitution. However, there are complex problems involved in defining relativism (seeMargolis, 1986), which will keep many academics employed for some time. It seemsunlikely to me, though, that a social constructionist approach will be able to proceedwithout self-destructing as an inevitable result of its inability to find a place fromwhich to identify something with certainty as a social construction. I will mention thisagain below.

It is interesting that relativism has had a long and respectable tradition withinanthropology, in this discipline's acceptance of many different, potentially valid

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viewpoints. Radical anthropologists Marcus and Fisher (1987) have argued thatthere are no longer cultures uninfected by Western values, since there has been such apervasive (hegemonic?) influence of Western ideas throughout the world. Theysuggest that research counterpoint "modern", Western views with those of cultureswhose indigenous values have been colonised by the West, rather than position theWestern view as the standard by which another is judged. This would allow twovoices to be heard at once, rather than solely the drone of the superior andauthoritative voice of the Western commentator. Dealing with the complexities ofmultiple, hidden and shifting perspectives is an essential part of writing which isreflective about its own potential deconstruction. This approach is particularlyrelevant for a culturally confused society such as New Zealand/Aotearoa, with itscolonial, individualist British values having overlaid earlier, more collectivist Maoriones.

Another way to cope with deconstructionist uncertainty in research would be totreat social constructions as literature, which would erode the distinctions betweentheoretical writing and fiction. This seems to be the possibility expressed inanthropology by Geertz (1988). Similarly, Shotter and Gergen's (1989) collection,which looks at the use of narrative structure in the social construction of personalidentity, has moved beyond empirical studies of the human lifespan to morepermeable boundaries with fictional narrative accounts in literature.

However, there is another approach which takes a different tack on the problem ofrelativism in theorising. Bringing together feminist critique and other criticalperspectives, Lather (1989) has written with some disquiet about the politicalimplications of postmodernism (which she summarises admirably). Lather wonderswhether the catatonia that can be induced by so much self-reflective deconstruction isyet another Foucauldian double-flip, a way of privileging intellectual argument and ofavoiding effective action that might change the structures of power in society. As aneducationist, she argues for research which is openly political and aimed attransformative change towards a more equal sharing of power in society. And,consistent with her argument, Lather (1986) urges deconstruction of the roles ofresearcher and researched, with their inherent assumptions of authority and power.Her work clearly calls for greater reflectiveness on the part of the researcher involvedin the research process, especially for reflection with awareness of political impli-cations of all interactions between researchers and "others".

Lather's analysis and political focus is strongly informed by feminist criticism. Inher book on the implications of postmodern critique for feminism, Weedon (1987,p.l) defines feminist practice as, "a politics directed at changing existing powerrelations between women and men in society". In the past few decades feministtheorising has become another strong critical tradition throughout the academicdisciplines, though, once again, it has had less impact on psychological fields than inother areas of social science (see, e.g., DeBois, Kelly, Kennedy, Korsmeyer, &Robinson, 1985). The deconstruction of gender is crucial to the process of theoreticalre-examination within human development, and will entail further conceptualanalysis of women as people colonised by the dominant Western male perspectives.An example of work influenced by Foucauldian critique and political analyses,

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including feminist analysis, and which has touched on developmental issues, is theHenriques et al. (1984) collection mentioned above.

Dealing with all the implications of the deconstructionist critiques, and thedifficulties involved in finding ways to proceed with research in this postmodernclimate, will be a difficult process. Much deconstructionist writing discusses theepistemological problems involved from a lofty plane of intellectual debate, anddodges the seemingly impossible problem of how to transform the conduct of practicalresearch. However, for a start there will be particular critical issues that need to beaddressed within each area of developmental research. Because my interest is in thearea which can be referred to as achievement motivation and children's self conceptsabout their abilities, in the next section I will bring in a few jagged puzzle-pieces ofrecent theorising about the self which bring to light particular problems for the area ifit is to be sensitive to deconstructionist arguments. In what may be becoming theofficial style of deconstructionist writing, I will not try to bring these pieces togetherinto a seamless whole, but will leave these fragments ajar for the time being.

Deconstruction of the Self and the Critique of Individualism

There are many different theoretical currents which are relevant to any developmen-tal study of the human self, but I will mention only a few issues which create somedisruptions for any attempt at coherent theorising. The focus will be on theunderlying assumption in most developmental theories that there is an individualthere at the centre, one who is developing. But is this individual an historically-specific belief in Western societies?

Glimpses of alternative views of the universe must be particularly difficult foranyone raised with the ubiquitous Western idea that each human is a separateindividual. However, there appear to have been historical changes even in Westernperceptions of the self. Johnson's (1985) historical analysis of the Western view of"self ties the modern belief in individualism to religious beliefs arising during themiddle ages in Europe, when there was widespread belief in monotheism and in thewholeness and unity of disparate parts. Further, he argues that the concept thathumans were born with "original sin" implied that at birth the human was separateand alienated from God, but that during life the person attempted to overcome thissevered connection with goodness. Johnson (1985, p. 118) also links these beliefs to"an extraordinary emphasis on the individual's responsibility to (one) God in termsof personal, human actions" in the middle ages.

In discussing historical changes in the concept of "identity", Baumeister (1986)argues that the view of "self has changed since the middle ages from beingsynonymous with external behaviour, particularly behaviour that might indicatewhether the person was leading a morally good life, to the modern belief in an innerself which can be differentiated from its external appearance or behaviour. Gelis(1986) further points out that there has been a change in views of time in reference tothe self, from the circular view, prevalent in the middle ages, that people arecontinuous with their ancestors, to the linear view of modern times that each life istemporally finite. There have been further suggestions that the post-modern self is

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more relativistic and multi-dimensional rather than the unified and coherent self ofthe modern era (Gergen, 1987; Verhave and van Hoorn, 1984).

Western views of the self may have changed greatly over history. There also appearto be very different perceptions of the human "self depending on cultural perspec-tive. Views of the self found in non-Western cultures (see Marsella, DeVos and Hsu,1985) present quite different assumptions about human subjectivity.

Some writers criticising Western individualism have looked to Maori perspectivesas an alternative to the view that people are isolable individuals with separatephysical selves (see Harre, 1984; Heelas and Locke, 1981). As an example, anemotion such as feeling "upset" might be perceived as existing in a social interactionrather than as simply as a physiological reaction with a material existence inside aperson's body (see also Harre, 1987). Joan Metge (1986), a Pakeha anthropologistwho has lived and worked in Maori communities for many decades, has discussed ofthe concept of "whakamaa", a feeling which does not translate directly into English,but which encompasses a range of feelings such as embarrassment, shyness,depression, feeling incompetent, and many other feelings, along with physicalsymptoms that may include withdrawal from others for some time. However, theemotion is never seen as something experienced by a person in isolation; it isdescribed by people Metge interviewed as occurring within particular social contexts,and as being related to issues of social prestige or "mana".

In contrast, Western psychological views of emotions as physiological events withina single human body would seem to fit in with our views of humans as existingseparately within individual bodies which act as "containers" of our individuality,bounded by skin. Linguists Lakoff and Johnson (1980) propose that use of metaphorin a language gives very important information about the underlying meanings withina culture. As an example of metaphor, they mention the tendency in common speechto refer to the human body as though it were a "container"; examples might be "getinto shape" or "keep your feelings inside". Similarly, philosopher Liz Grosz (1986)has discussed the body as a significant "container" in defining the human self, whichcan be seen as an underlying assumption in expressions which use terms referring tovolume (e.g., in comments people make about weight reduction) and covering (e.g. inreferring to clothing). Certainly Piaget's (1965) observation of his daughter Lucienne,at the point at which she appeared to realise that the hand floating across her visionwas connected to her body, demonstrated his interest in how the child learns toperceive an individual and separate body.

There have been a number of quite different viewpoints expressed at different timesin history and in different cultures regarding a concept as fundamental to develop-mental theorising as the "self. Thus, there is no longer any firm ground in whichbeliefs about the self at the centre of development can be planted. Another critiquerelevant to these differing views of self is the critique of individualism which is seen asan outgrowth of beliefs about modernism in Western society.

Feminist writers (Ferguson, 1980; Pateman, 1984) argue that it is the politicalbelief in liberal individualism that underlies Western fascination with the construct ofthe individual, which is central in developmental theorising. Such an approach holdsthat people are by nature individuals with separate needs and hence separate rights to

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material possessions and well-being. Such beliefs also posit that all people are equal,and that each person can act in a self-chosen way that ensures a balance betweenconflicting selfish needs. The belief in individual responsibility for achieving a betterplace in society is an extension of modernist Western views (Berger & Luckmann,1966). In criticising liberal individualism, Ferguson puts forward the view that afocus on the individual ignores the structural power relations that exist in societies.Power relations do not have to be based on direct force, but can exist in situations inwhich a particular person or group is able to limit the alternatives which can bechosen by another.

Views of modernism, that society is characterised by continual advancement, alinear progression of successively superior achievements, are part of the foundation ofdevelopmental theorising which also needs further deconstructive thinking. Goodnow(1984) has referred to modernist beliefs in the child's continual improvement asinfluential in Western childrearing practices. Their beliefs are also important indevelopmental theorising. Gould (1977) has traced the presence of Darwinianevolutionary ideas in numerous writings of this century. The idea that childrenimprove towards their evolutionary potential as they grow older, and that thisrecapitulates ideas about historical changes from primitive to more evolved processes,has not completely disappeared since Stanley Hall's time. Evolutionary ideas such asthese have probably left traces which can be found in any theory which positsdevelopmental improvement using hierarchical notions of change. The belief indevelopment as hierarchical forms the basis of Stone's (1987) critique of a researchstudy of women's developing understanding of their own lives using extensiveinterviews with a range of American women (Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger &Tarule, 1986). Stone argues that such a model of development is sexist because of itsreliance on a hierarchical model which privileges some forms of articulation aboutself-understanding above others. All these theoretical views which incorporate theidea of progressive change may owe some debt to the values of modernism.

Another radical critique with important implications for development is adeconstruction of the beliefs held by developmental theorists about heredity in thelight of Oyama's (e.g., 1985) work on beliefs about genetics and ontogeny as socialconstructions. Oyama argues that what appears to be invariant change, even inphysiological detail, may reflect the stability of environmental features as much asinnate programming. Those Western beliefs about selves as physically separateindividuals have presumably been influential in our most basic notions of heredityand change. Oyama's critique makes it more difficult to posit any innate biologicalprocesses as an underpinning for mechanisms of developmental change.

Further work within psychology from a feminist viewpoint which is critical ofindividualism is the work on the development of a gendered self. A number of feministwriters have looked to the developmental theory of object relations to attempt toexplain how the belief in individualism is a function of male socialisation in modernsociety. Expansions of original work by Chodorow (1978) can be found in recentwriters such as Keller (1985), Eichenbaum and Orbach (1983) and Ferguson (1980),to name but a few (see also Gilligan, 1983). Both Keller and Ferguson argue for adevelopmental view of self that is a dialectic between an autonomous, separate self

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and one connected with others, in contrast with theories which focus on individuality,such as Maslow's self-actualisation, Erikson's integrity, or Kohlberg's views of moralreasoning. One problem with the latter two theories, which are developmental stagetheories, is that the notion of a linear sequence of changes is in essence a hierarchicalview of individuals, the problem mentioned earlier.

Some interesting work which presents a conceptual analysis sensitive to issuesraised by deconstructionist thought is research on the social construction ofindividual selves in the collection by Yardley and Honess (1987); of particularinterest here are the analyses by Harre and Gergen. Harre argues for the importanceof socio-linguistic practices in the creation of selves, which leads to complex analysisof daily social practices, while Gergen focusses on the collective aspects of construc-tion of selves amongst people in relationships. Both authors avoid mentioning issuesof power inherent in social relationships and the political implications of structuralorganisations in society which maintain social codes of domination and submission.Instead, there is an implied value-neutrality in the researcher's quest for moreinteresting knowledge about the intricacies of daily human interactions betweenvarious selves in society. Such a perspective on the part of the researcher may not bereflective enough about the power relationships involved in being a researcherobserving another person; the danger is that the researcher might be seen as having amore objective and knowledgeable view from a position outside the relationshipbetween researcher and researched. The issue of relativism which emerges inevitablyfrom deconstructionist critique has not been fully addressed in much of this researchso far.

This section has looked at a number of issues relevant for any developmentaltheorising about self-understanding. The idea that there are "selves" which areseparable was seen to be related to beliefs held by particular cultures in certain eras ofhistory, with its apex reached, perhaps, in the achievement of the separate, maleindividual during the "modern era" in Western societies. There were further issuesraised about uncertainties in our social constructions of heredity and gender, andabout the tendency for much theorising to hide with some embarrassment from thepolitical issues involved in conducting research.

Conclusion

This paper has not gone very far in dealing with the implications of deconstructionistcritique in the field of human development. The examination of cultural andhistorical differences in views of the individual self shows that any assumption madeabout the developing person must be situated in a particular context, at a certain timein history, subject to specific social issues concerning the shifting bases of power andauthority within Western society. Like the controversial "egocentric" child ofdevelopmental debate, the developmental researcher must try to reflect on her/hisown place in the conduct of research and in its implications for social practice and theinterplays of power in the relationship between researcher and researched while beingimmersed within particular social institutions and practices. When the researched arepeople with less social power to act in their lives due to their age, gender, race,

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economic status or health, the research process and the interactions between expertand "subject" need very careful reflection. There certainly needs to be fundamentalquestioning before choosing a seemingly appropriate research methodology. Therevisioning of theory in the broad field of human development has barely begun.

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